Matan Chorev - Iraqi Kurdistan: The Internal Dynamics and Statecraft of a Semistate

8/12/2019 Matan Chorev - Iraqi Kurdistan: The Internal Dynamics and Statecraft of a Semistate

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The Fletcher School Al Nakhlah Tufts University160 Packard Avenue Medford, MA 02155-7082 USA Tel: +1.617.627.3700

The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Fall 2007

Iraqi Kurdistan: The Internal Dynamics and Statecraft of a Semistate1Matan Chorev

The semistate possesses many of the featurescommonly associated with the modern nation-state but remains unrecognized as a sovereignentity. Semistates (such as Abkhazia, Nagorno-

Karabakh, South Ossetia, Transnistria, and IraqiKurdistan) inhabit the central conflict fault-linesof Southwest Asias strategic landscape at thedawn of the twenty-first century. In order toconcoct effective conflict management approaches,policymakers must develop a framework forcomprehending internal dynamics and statecraftof these entities. How do they function in theabsence of international recognition? What impactdid the dynamics of conflict and politicaldevelopment under such conditions have on thenature of the semistate? What is the entitysresultant worldview and statecraft?

Knowledge of the factors that contributed tothe ambiguous status of Iraqi Kurdistan in theaftermath of the first Gulf Waris imperative to analyzing thebehavior of the KurdistanRegional Government (KRG) inthe post-Saddam era. After acursory introduction to theconcept of the semistate, thispaper will explain whatsustained Iraqi Kurdistansambiguous status throughout

the 1990s and the impact it hadon Kurdish politics.

Matan Chorev (MALD 07) is a Researcher at theBelfer Center for Science and International Affairs,Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

The third section will emphasize how thisexperience impacts and shapes the worldviewand strategic calculus of the Kurdish leadership.The third section will emphasize how this

experience impacts and shapes the worldviewand strategic calculus of the Kurdish leadership.

The Logic of SemistatesSince the attacks of September 11, 2001 directedattention to the failed state of Afghanistan, thedangers that weak and failing states present tointernational security have been welldocumented. However, the preoccupation,among policymakers and academics alike, withthe stark bipolarity of strong and weak stateshas obscured the fact that the modern nation-state

comes in innumerable forms. Article I of the 1933Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Dutiesof States outlines the four basic elements of

statehood: 1) a permanentpopulation; 2) a defined territory;3) a government; and 4) acapacity to enter into relationswith other states. Yet already in1981, before it becamefashionable to proclaim the fadingof the state as the central actor ininternational relations, politicaltheorist David Easton,

highlighted the multipleconceptions of the term byidentifying over 140 definitions.2

The relevance and future of the state tointernational politics came under increasedscrutiny as the pace of globalization hastenedat the end of the twentieth century.3 Theoctogenarian protagonist in this narrative, JamesRosenau, argued that the dynamics of

The relevance and futureof the state to

international politicscame under increasedscrutiny as the pace of

globalization hastenedat the end of the

twentieth century.


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globalization, taken together, contend that thenew, post-Cold War arrangements have lessenedthe role of the state, that a central feature of thearrangements is a continuing disaggregation ofauthority in all parts of the world and all walks oflife.4 The defining tension, he suggests, is

between worldwide forces pressing forintegration and those fostering fragmentation, aphenomenon he coined as fragmegration.5

Rather than decrying the passing of thenation-state, however, it is instructive to recallJ.P. Nettls view of the state as a conceptualvariable, as opposed to a generic unit of analysis.This view allows for analysis that is morediscriminating and sees the state as being moreor less state-like along a continuum ofstateness.6 To demonstrate, it is certainly thecase that some states fall short of virtually allperformance-based criteria of internal legitimacy,

yet retain their international recognition, orjuridical statehood as equal sovereigns. Thesequasi-states, or what today one calls failedstates, hold on to their legal protections fromintervention and interference but lack thecapacity or will to provide the services andresources their citizens demand of them.7Contrast this with the semistate (or the moreaccepted, but problematic, de facto state) thatfulfills the four features of the Montevideo treatybut lacks the international personality of quasi-states. Scott Pegg explains: The quasi-state islegitimate no matter how ineffective it is.Conversely, the de facto state is illegitimate nomatter how effective it is.8

Absent legitimacy, the semistate stilldisplays impressive longevity.9 Although theparticularities of each individual entity areinfluenced by the state from which it is seceding,scholars have identified commonalities of internaland external dynamics that contribute toprotraction of ambiguity. Charles King contendsthat a key factor is the benefits that both theparent and the separatist states accrue fromstalemate:

It is a dark version of Pareto efficiency:the general welfare cannot be improved by reaching a genuine peace accordallowing for real reintegration without

at the same time making key interestgroups in both camps worse off. Even ifa settlement is reached, it is unlikely todo more than recognize the basic logicand its attendant benefits.10

Pl Kolst argues that five factors contributeto the viability of unrecognized states in theabsence of strong state structures.11 First is thesuccessful nation-building that these semistateshave undertaken, which is premised on thecommon experience of conflict with the state fromwhich they are trying to secede, the existence of acommon enemy, and the relative homogenouspopulation that exists within the separatist entity.Second, semistates are militarized societies. Thearmed forces play a crucial role in deterring theparent state and, as a result, military leadershave become political and economic figures as

well, often with a keen interest in maintainingtheir positions of privilege. Third, the parentstate be it Iraq, Somalia, or Georgia istypically a weak state unable to retake theseparatist state or to attract the breakawaypopulation to return to its domain. Fourth,external patrons provide a vital lifeline for thesemistate. Finally, the international communityplays a crucial role, for as long as it facilitates anongoing and frequently stalled negotiationprocess between the breakaway region and theparent state, it is complicit in the prolongedexistence of the semistate.

The semistates economic pathologies arean important product and driver of the benefits ofstalemate equation.12 Most semistates fail todevelop self-sufficient economies due to severalfactors: the destruction wrought by the protractedinsurgency and conflict with the metropolitanstate, the inability to construct a favorableinvestment climate due to an uncertain legalclimate (what Pegg refers to as the economic costof non-recognition), and the presence of asubstantial illicit economy and its linkages withthe ruling elite, all of which are exacerbated by

the absence of international monitoring andaccountability. 13 Before analyzing the case ofIraqi Kurdistan, it is instructive to place it in itsappropriate historical context.


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Mustafa Barzani and his Kurdish DemocraticParty (KDP)against the new, urban-ledintelligentsia of Jalal Talabani and IbrahimAhmad. The division was essentially a contestbetween the religious and the secular, theprimordial and the nationalist, tradition versus

atheistic Marxism.18

The actions of Abd al Salam Arif, who

overthrew Iraqi leader Abd al Karim Qasim inFebruary 1963, exemplified these dynamics. Inan effort to consolidate his power and unwillingto repeat the failures of his predecessors incountering the fighting prowess of the Kurdishpeshmerga forces (literally, those who facedeath), Arif sought to infiltrate the Kurdishmovement. He invited Mullah Mustafa to sign apeace agreement with him in Mustafas personalcapacity rather than as the leader of the KDP. .Mustafa accepted, and like Shaikh Mahmud

before him, prioritized personal hegemony inKurdistan above Kurdish autonomy fromBaghdad. As a result, theTalabani-Ahmed group brokewith the KDP and proceededto accept arms and assistancefrom Baghdad to fight theKDPs forces. Thus the revoltagainst Baghdad came to astandstill.

In the eyes of many Kurds, the tragicinternal Kurdish war of 1994-1998 undoubtedlyserves as the blackest moment in Kurdishhistory.19The preconditions for the war betweenthe KDP and Talabanis Patriotic Union ofKurdistan (PUK)animosity between two majorfactions, competition for resources, destructiveinternational aid efforts, and interference fromneighboring stateshad much in common withearlier periods of strife in the region, and theconsequencesthe failure to secure the goals ofthe insurgencywere the same. The Kurdishuprising in March 1991, just weeks after USPresident George H. W. Bush called on Iraqis torise up against Saddam Hussein, was brutally

suppressed. Hussein, however, was unable toreach an agreement with a divided Kurdishleadership. Admitting that the peshmerga indeedcontrolled the urban centers, he withdrew hisforces and entire administrative capacity fromIraqi Kurdistan. The Kurds suddenly foundthemselves obliged to govern and administer theentire northern region of Iraq.

In an effort to achieve internal legitimacy,the Kurdish leadership organized immediate

elections; a dead-heat and an ensuing power-sharing agreement between the PUK and KDPresulted. Incredibly, the parties did not differover the political future or identity of anemerging state. As Gareth Stansfield argues,After 1991, attempting to describe how the

parties differed in their social bases and politicalprogram was a futile exercise; only their mutualantipathy remained.20 Beyond historicalanimosity, however, the two parties asymmetricaccess to revenue heightened competition. TheKDP controlled the western portion of thecountry, including the strategic Ibrahim Khalil(Khabur Bridge) border crossing with Turkey.The customs fees on licit and illicit trade withTurkey provided the regional authorities withtheir seemingly sole source of income, estimatedat approximately $750 million annually. ThePUK held the eastern portion of the country,

where its trade with Iran paled in comparison.The international aid program exacerbated

the tension over revenue inseveral ways. First, the absence ofa long-term development plancombined with the injection ofhumanitarian aid contributed tothe emergence of anunderground economy controlled

by networks of traditional families andentrepreneurs, both deeply connected to thepolitical parties. Second, in this new economiclandscape accelerating disparity came aboutbetween those who organized to profit from thenew sources of income and the majority who stilllived in abject poverty. Third, the aid communityfurther fragmented the territory of IraqiKurdistan by creating price differentials betweendifferent regions, which in turn set off internalrivalries and power struggles amongentrepreneurial elements of the KDP and PUK.As Natali concludes, Rather than trying tostrengthen intra-Kurdish unity, donor agenciesand foreign governments encouragedfragmentation by treating the two main leaders,

[Massoud] Barzani and Jalal Talabai as individualparty leaders.21The degree to which each party had become

dependant on external rival sponsors furtherexacerbated the economic drivers of conflict.Turkey paid the KRG $13.5 million in August1993 after the KDP gave it the green light toconduct cross-border operation against theKurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a guerilla groupwaging a bloody battle with Turkish security

An oft-repeated Kurdishproverb says that the

Kurds have no friends butthe mountains.


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forces. At the same time, however, Turkeycooperated with Husseins economic tacticsagainst the Kurds by taking the Old Iraqi Dinar(no longer in circulation in the rest of Iraq) out ofthe economy, limiting cross-border trade, andcreating incentives for commercial traffic to go

through Mosul, which was under SaddamHusseins control.22 Similarly, Iran guaranteedsupport to the PUK in return for the partysassistance against the Kurdistan Democratic Partyof Iran (KDPI), at the same time that it gavefinancial support to the Islamic Movement ofKurdistan (IMK) to fight the PUK. Complicatingthe picture further, the KDP secretly negotiatedwith Hussein to remove the PUK from Erbil. Inwhat became known as The Invasion of Erbil,the KDP fought alongside Iraqi governmentforces and repelled the PUK from the regionalcapital. The PUK recovered, however with

Iranian supportand a ceasefire line between theparties held and served as the de facto partition ofIraqi Kurdistan. Thus, the endlessopportunities that followed the 1991 electionswere squandered.23

The repercussions of the conflict that beganin 1994 and ceased only in 1998 after significantinternational intervention were multifold. First, itenabled opponents of Kurdish autonomy to framethe independence movement as pre-modern,divided, tribal, and hence incapable ofrepresenting Iraqi Kurdistan in anyinstitutionally enshrined autonomy or politicalself-determination. 24Second, internally, Kurdishsociety took on elements of a post-civil warsociety, in which the heritage of domestic conflicthas strengthened and even institutionalized thepatronage relations, primarily through themaintenance of different forms of scarcity.25

Todays KRG is a product of the evolutionand trajectory of the Kurdish struggle for self-rule. An oft-repeated Kurdish proverb says thatthe Kurds have no friends but the mountains.The above brief review of Kurdish history oughtto reveal that they might indeed have no worse

enemies than themselves. The internecineconflicts in Kurdistan consistently prevented thematuration of the Kurdish insurgent statetowards either fully autonomy or independence,causing important repercussions for the presentinternal politics and the worldview of theKurdish leadership.

The Logic of Semistatehood in IraqiKurdistan

Several internal and external drivers servedto sustain the ambiguous status of Iraqi Kurdistanfor over a decade. As will be demonstrated, thesedrivers simultaneously reinforce and chafe one

another and have created importantrepercussions for the region today.

External DriversThe end of the Cold War (and the increased

pace of globalization typically associated with it)brought about a marked expansion in the Kurdsaccess to transnational space, defined as theexternally based opportunity structures such asdiasporic networks, international governmentalorganizations, host-country democratic systemsand advanced telecommunication systems that

provide new forms of support or constraint toKurdish nationalist ambitions.26 The externaldrivers that allowed Iraqi Kurdistan to survive onthe margins of the state system are in largemeasure a by-product of this space. These driversserved to simultaneously advance, reconfigure,and place limitations on Kurdayetand the natureof Kurdish autonomy and self-rule.

Kolst argues that, for most quasi-states,the support from an external patron is cruciallyimportant, and their survival chances would bedrastically reduced should it be withdrawn.27International protection sustained Kurdistans

ambiguous status by safeguarding it from theIraqi parent state and perturbed neighbors on theone hand while at the same time placinglimitations on Kurdish self-rule on the other,through the unintended consequences ofinternational aid. The aid effort, which fearedabrogating Iraqs territorial integrity, provedunwilling to transition from emergencyhumanitarian support to a more sustainableprogram, and thus failed to encourage socialrestructuring at the local levels.28 This onlyincreased the resonance of party, tribal, andgeographic identities that have consistently

challenged Kurdish nationalism. Thus, byneglecting to work to establish the preconditionsfor a self-sufficient economy, a productiveindustry, a functioning agricultural sector, afunctioning system of higher education andhuman capital, political development, andstructural reform, external patronage allowedIraqi Kurdistan to survive, but not to thrive.


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Lowered barriers to participation in theglobal economy, combined with the simultaneoustechnological and information revolutions, alsocontributed to the KRGs ability to survive in anotherwise most unpropitious disposition. Thetechnology and information revolutions gave the

KRG access to the Kurdishdiaspora, and helped it fill theknowledge, advocacy, andresource gaps created by theunwillingness of theinternational community toinvest in long-termdevelopment and institutionbuilding in Iraqi Kurdistan.Lowered barriers toparticipation in the globaleconomy were partiallyresponsible for the emergence of illicit

economies, which played a pivotal role in IraqiKurdistans functioning. However, like otherfacets of the changing transnational space, theeffects of these on Kurdish self-rule were mixed;they advanced it by bringing in much neededrevenue and other resources, but theyundermined the development of strong state-institutions and served as a principle factor in thefactional fighting of the mid-1990s.

The notion that the regional environment ishostile to an emerging independent Kurdish stateor even hardened Kurdish autonomy is anunderstatement. Iraqi Kurdistans neighbors usedit as a leverage point on Saddam but wereequally comfortable colluding with him againstany developments in the north inimical to theirinterests. After the 2003 war in Iraq, this dynamichas been heightened, by fulfilling neighborsfear that it would embolden Kurdish nationalmovements in their respective countries.However, some policymakers are beginning tobelieve that a stable and autonomous IraqiKurdistan might advance key interests. Forexample, one view in Turkeys diplomatic andmilitary circles argues that bringing Iraqi

Kurdistan under Turkeys sphere of influencecould create an important buffer against anIranian-dominated Shii Iraq.29 It remains to beseen whether the post-Iraq war strategic calculusof neighboring states will alleviate or exacerbatehistoric tensions with Iraqi Kurdistan.

Internal DriversThrough the course of the Kurdish struggle,

each of the politys centers of power built,sustained, and maintained political and economicsupport networks heavily intertwined with tribaland geographic identities. The accidental

arrival of self-rule, and the ensuingformation of the KRG, did noteliminate these patronagenetworks. Instead, they wereinstitutionalized in a form of neo-tribal confederations wrappedaround the flag of democracy. Likemafia families delineating theirspheres of authority, the twoKurdish parties divided up IraqiKurdistan into separate governancezones after the civil war. This

arrangement of elite accommodation30 brought

a notable degree of stability to Iraqi Kurdistanfrom which the parties and their affiliatedsupport networks profited. The internationalcommunitys comfort level with, and interest in,the status quo, reinforced the division.

Despite positive gains in terms of increasedstability, these divisions severely underminedthe project of state building. To do this moreeffectively, the Kurdish leadership adeptlymanipulated the politics of fear, by remindingtheir constituents of the external threat from theirneighbors and the looming specter of Husseinsreturn. The result was that internal oppositionwas suppressed as any additional internalchallenge would invite external intervention, asit did in past episodes. The expectations of theKRG were thus low as nearly any alternative toHussein was seen as an improvement. Lowpublic expectations for state-building efforts, inturn, led to inadequate attention to the rule oflaw, healthy civil-military relations, andinvestment in other elements of the public sector.Moreover, fears of redistribution of controlinhibited existing leadership from attempting toclarify the status of Iraqi Kurdistan. This lack of

incentive for clarifying the areas status existedon Husseins side as well; he feared a responseby the international community if he forciblyretook the north, and, under the sanctionsregime, benefited from having five million lesspeople to feed.

The dependency on external sources ofrevenue, monetary constraints, unemploymentand economic recession, illicit economy,

Like mafia familiesdelineating their

spheres of authority, thetwo Kurdish parties

divided up IraqiKurdistan into separategovernance zones after

the civil war.


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corruption, and rent-seeking behaviors, allserved to allow little maneuver room for theKurdish leadership. They simply lacked themeans to pursue the kind of state-building projectthat could sustain a truly autonomous entity.

At the same time, a multitude of other

economic problems also undermined statebuilding in Iraqi Kurdistan. Primary amongthese, the KRG was not able to resurrect the

commercialagricultural sector.Most Kurdsdeserted the sectorand pursuedeconomic activitiesthat could providethem with short-term capitalaccumulation. This

included theselling of capitalassets, smuggling,

chopping down trees, and collecting scrapmetal.31 Unemployment during this period wasestimated at around 80 percent. Those employedtypically earned wages far below the 1,500-2,000Swiss Dinar UNICEF estimated as needed tosupport a family of five. By the year 2000, only15,000 people were able to pay any sort of taxesto the KRG,32 and 20 percent of Kurds still livedin the mujammaat, or Husseins settlementtowns.33 The vast majority of Iraqi Kurds lackedconsistent access to electricity, water, and otherbasic services. Those with the means to leave theregion, typically the skilled laborers and highlyeducated cadres, did so, resulting in a ruinousbrain-drain.

By all accounts the black market becamethe most important component of the economy.This had important socio-political repercussions. Itincreased income disparities and created anuneasy dichotomy in Iraqi Kurdistan between themajority who are destitute and a minority ofmerchants who are extremely wealthy.34

Coupled with the existence and dominance of theneo-tribal networks, this offered incentives for thecontinuance of the status quo.

Finally, although the political imperatives ofsecuring self-rule and autonomy are indeed high,the Kurds have shown, particularly after 2003, aninclination toward flexibility in their demands forsovereigntyfor the sake of economic stabilityand growth. As Natali argues, Contrary topopular claims, most Kurds today would prefer

continued stability and growth rather thaneconomic decline or conflict for the cause ofindependent statehood.35 This is largely due tothe fact that the clientalist networks that sustainthe current leadership rely on this far more thanthey do on securing independence or hardened

autonomy.

The Statecraft of the KRG in the New IraqIn the lead-up to and aftermath of

Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Iraqi Kurdishleadership, cognizant of the persistingendogenous and exogenous constraints on itsbehavior, adopted a shrewd and realistic strategywhose principal interest is to preserve the de factoindependence of Kurdistan. To secure this statedvital interest, Iraqi Kurds made a strategicdecision to participate fully in the Iraqi nationalproject, support the U.S. occupation, and work toaccelerate the political and economicdevelopment of the Kurdistan Region.

The Kurdistan Region was recognized as alegal region of a federal Iraqi state by thepermanent constitution, adopted in the October2005 referendum. The provisions of theconstitution served to legitimize, on aninternational level, Kurdistans de facto autonomyand self-rule. In fact, the arenas in which wherefederal law supersedes regional law in the Iraqiconstitution are limited and severelycircumscribed. These are: control over foreign

affairs (although federal regions are grantedoffices within Iraqi embassies), defense policy(even though the KRG retains control over itsown military, or Guards of the Region), theprinting of money (importantly, Baghdad cannotlevy taxes against the will of a regionalgovernment), and regulation of weights andmeasures.

Nonetheless, important elements ofdependency endure. The KRG minister offinance suggested that Iraqi Kurdistans economicpicture deteriorated after the Iraq war. While theeconomy of the KRG was smaller before the war,

the KRG could exercise more control over it.Since the fall of Saddam, billions of dollars wereinjected into the Kurdish economy from statecoffers and international investment, but theKRG lost significant levels of control to the centralgovernment. Since 2003, 95 percent of therevenue of the KRG has derived from the centralgovernments oil revenues, a share that amountsto 17 percent of the total Iraqi national budget.

Since the fall of Saddam,billions of dollars were

injected into the Kurdisheconomy from state

coffers and internationalinvestment, but the KRGlost significant levels of

control to the centralgovernment.


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Under this arrangement, the central governmentcan exercise significant leverage over the KRG.

The persistence of patronage and clientalistnetworks exacerbate poor development indicatorsin the region. Rather than using the new sourcesof capital to improve the desperate condition of

the agriculture and infrastructure sectors or todevelop other sustainableindustries, the Kurdish leadershipallocated 64 percent of its budget togovernment salariesin essencepaying people not to work andfurthering patronage behavior.Although the KRG passed a law inJanuary 2006 unifying the PUK andKDP administrations, someministries, including Finance,Peshmerga Affairs, Justice, andInterior, remain bifurcated. The

government in Erbil remainslargely symbolic; Prime MinisterNerchivan Barzani still has noexecutive authority in PUK-territory. Moreover,the benefits to be gained from the division of thespoils of Iraqi Kurdistan remain. For instance, asof October 2007, the KDP (Korek) and PUK(Asiacell) maintain separate cell phone companiesin their respective territories, and the services donot communicate with one another.

However, to improve its image and preventa return to economic isolation, the KRG launcheda massive public relations campaign called TheOther Iraq. The campaign was the product of apartnership between the Kurdistan DevelopmentCorporation (KDC) and the KRG to promote andimplement inward investment opportunities inthe stable and prospering Kurdistan Region inIraq.36The KRGs approach was to paint itself asa second Dubaia global hub of business andtelecommunications. Othman I. Shawni, theKRGs Minister of Planning, asserted, Theregion will attract more than $2 billion in the firstyear [of the plan] in four major sectors and highreturn on investment is guaranteed due to the

big demand for these facilities.

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As part of theseefforts, a massive mall is being constructed inErbil, directly across from the historic citadel andthe ancient souk, which will be home to 6,000stores and offices as well as a massiveunderground garage. The citadel itself, the oldestcontinuously inhabited place in the world, wasrecently emptied of its inhabitants and iscurrently being renovated as a tourist attraction.The Dream City a shopping and amusement

complex is being built outside Erbil. The KorekTower promises to be the tallest building in all ofIraq and the American Village, a housingcomplex eerily reminiscent of the suburbs ofArizona or New Mexico, is nearly complete.

The Kurdish leadership is trying to advance

its interests in a methodical and prudent fashion.Whether or not it succeedsremains to be seen. Althoughit has thus far managed tostave off destabilizingbehavior from its neighbors,the prospect of interventionremains realistic. A cross-border skirmish with the PKKin the fall of 2007 suggests thatTurkeys patience with thePKK safe-haven in northernIraq is coming to an end.

Should the Iran crisis escalate,opposition Kurdish elements,based in Iraqi Kurdistan,

might be encouraged to intensify their anti-Ahmadinejad operations, prompting Iranianspecial forces to take action as well. However, theevent that looms most closely on the horizon isthe referendum on Kirkuk, originally scheduledto take place before the end of 2007, butpresently delayed to a future, yet unannounced,date. As the different parties organize to proclaimthe oil-rich city, northern Iraq is sure toexperience new levels of violence and foreigninterference heretofore unseen in that part of thecountry.

Internally, there is also reason for concern,as evidence suggests that the KRG is losing therace for good governance.38The post-2003 boomin the economy has improved the lives of only asmall minority of the Iraqi Kurdish population.Ongoing resentment over the lack ofimprovement in the provision of basic serviceshas strengthened the only political actors able tochallenge the PUK-KDP-dominated publicsphere: the Islamic parties. In Halabja, the town

decimated by Husseins chemical weapons attack,citizens demonstrated their displeasure with theKRG by setting fire to the monument for thevictims on March 16, 2006. During the samemonth, students from the University ofSulaimaniyah took to the streets in a Ukrainian-style orange protest against KRG corruption.Mohammed Ihsan, Minister of Extra-RegionalAffairs, argues that the the hurdles to mobilizethe population behind the Kurdish National

Should the Iran crisisescalate, oppositionKurdish elements,

based in Iraqi Kurdistan,might be encouraged to

intensify their anti-Ahmadinejad

operations, prompting

Iranian special forces totake action as well.


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project are now much higher now than they werein 1992: People are no longer willing to live inabject poverty for the sake of the nationalistcause. The democratic experience has broughthigh expectations.39Denise Natali elaborates:

The commitment to Kurdish nationalism that

once defined political life in pre-2003 IraqiKurdistan has vanished. What has emergedinstead is an undertaking to protect Kurdishinterests at politically expedient moments, but nostrategy to ensure the ideologicaland political engagement of themasses in the long term. Absence ofsocial capital - networks, norms,and social trust that facilitatecoordination and cooperation formutual societal benefit - has furtherweakened societal engagement toKurdish nationalism. Changing

norms in the liberalizing Iraqi statehave encouraged short-term interestmaximization, namely revenuegeneration, and not a shared senseof struggle and suffering for the Kurdish nation.40

It remains to be seen how this shiftingsocial contract will impact the behavior of theKurdish leadership. While one official admittedthat without a leadership purge things will notchange, others were more confident that changewill come through a gradual, long-termtransition.

ConclusionThe dynamics inherent in of Iraqi

Kurdistans protracted state of ambiguity havegreatly undermined its chance for long-termsustainability as an independent entity. In hisresearch, Kolst found that there are strongreasons to believe that, if any of theunrecognized [semistates] of todays world shouldsucceed in achieving international recognition,most of them will end up not as normal or fullyfledged states but instead transmute intorecognized [failed-states].41 Moreover, the

imperative of stability in northern Iraq over thecoming years suggests that the status quo willpersist. This implies that the economic andpolitical dilemmas that undermine sustainabledevelopment in Iraqi Kurdistan are only likely tocontinueand in turn cause the type of authoritycrisis often associated with the deficient internallegitimacy of weak and failing states.

The future of Iraq, Somalia, the Balkans, andother conflicted regions will require policymakersand academics alike to confront the realities ofsemistates. The dilemmas they are likely to facewill go far beyond the issue of recognition andthe redrawing of state borders. Such solutions

might provide short-term stability but will likelysow the preconditions for future conflicts. As thiscase study exemplifies, the drivers that sustainthe ambiguous status of semistates require a

much more sophisticatedapproach than thecartographic entrepreneurshipthat brought about theirexistence in the first place.

The views and opinions expressed in articles arestrictly the authors own, and do not necessarilyrepresent those of Al Nakhlah, its Advisory andEditorial Boards, or the Program for Southwest Asiaand Islamic Civilization (SWAIC) at The FletcherSchool.

The dynamics inherentin Iraqi Kurdistansprotracted state of

ambiguity have greatlyundermined its chance

for long-term

sustainability as anindependent entity.


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The Fletcher School Al Nakhlah Tufts University160 Packard Avenue Medford, MA 02155-7082 USA Tel: +1.617.627.3700

Works Cited

1I am indebted to the Fletcher School and Tufts University for their generous financial support of

essential field research in Iraqi Kurdistan during the winter of 2006/2007.2David Easton, "The Political System Besieged by the State," Political Theory9, (3) (1981): 307.

3As numerous and diverse as the definitions of state are, the seemingly infinite conceptions of

globalization have rendered the term meaningless. According to the U.S. Library of

Congress catalogue, in the 1990s, about 500 books were published on globalization. Between2000 and 2004, there were more than 4,000. Between the mid-1990s and 2003, the rate ofincrease in globalization-related titles more than doubled every 18 months. Panjaj Ghemawat,Why the World Isnt Flat, Foreign Policy, March/April 2007: 55..

4James N. Rosenau, The Study of World Politics: Globalization and Governance, 2 vols., vol. 2 (London:

Routledge, 2006), 2.5Ibid.

6See J.P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," World Politics20 (4) (1968).

7See Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International

Jurisprudence and the Third World, International Organization41 (Autumn 1987)8Scott Pegg, International Society and the De Facto State(Brookfield: Ashgate, 1998), 5.

9Barry Bartmann, Henry Srebrnik, and Tozun Bahceli, eds., De Facto States: The Quest for Sovereignty

(London: Routledge, 2004), 246.10Charles King, "The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia's Unrecognized States," World

Politics 53 (2) (2001): 526.11

Pl Kolst, "The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States,"Journal of Peace Research43(6) (2006): 729.

12Dov Lynch, Engaging Eurasia's Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto States (Washington,

DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004), 64 .13

Kolst, 729.14

Ted Robert Gurr,Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethno-Political Conflict (Washington, DC: UnitedStates Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 125.

15Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and History Denied(New York: Columbia

University Press, 2003), 10.16

Denise Natali, The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran(Syracuse:Syracuse University Press, 2005), 58.

17Edgar O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt: 1961-1970(London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1973), 169.

18David McDowall,A Modern History of the Kurds(London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 316.

19Interview, Hassen Aziz, Head of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Military Services, Sulaimaniyah ,

Iraq,December 2006.20

Gareth R.V. Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development and Emergent Democracy(London:RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 96.

21Denise Natali, "The Spoils of Peace in Iraqi Kurdistan," (Middle East Studies Association Conference

2005), 8.22

Interview, Sarkis Aghajn, Minister of Finance, Erbil, Iraq, January 2007.23

Interview, Dr. Hania Mufti, former director of the Middle East branch of Human Rights Watch,

Amman, Jordan, December 2006.24

David Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2006), 211.

25Michiel Leezenberg, "Iraqi Kurdistan: Contours of a Post-Civil War Society," Third World Quarterly26

(4-5) (2005): 640.26

Natali, The Kurds and the State, 160-161.27

Kolst, 733-734.28

Natali, The Kurds and the State, 168.


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Matan Chorev - Iraqi Kurdistan: The Internal Dynamics and Statecraft of a Semistate

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