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Mass Incarceration and the Theory of Punishment

Vincent Chiao

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Vincent Chiao, "Mass Incarceration and the Theory of Punishment" (2015) Criminal Law and Philosophy.

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MassIncarcerationandtheTheoryofPunishment

VincentChiao1UniversityofToronto

FacultyofLaw

NB:ThefinalpublicationisavailableatSpringervia:http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11572-015-9378-x

Abstract:Aninfluentialstrainintheliteratureonstatepunishmentanalyzesthepermissibilityofpunishmentinexclusivelydeontologicalterms,whetherintermsofanindividual'srights,thestate'sobligationtovindicatethelaw,orboth.Iarguethatweshouldrejectadeontologicaltheoryofpunishmentbecauseitcannotexplainwhatisunjustaboutmassincarceration,althoughmassincarcerationiswidelyconsidered—includingbyproponentsofdeontologicaltheories—tobeunjust.Thefailureofdeontologicaltheoriessuggestsaminimumcriterionofadequacyforatheoryofpunishment:itmusttakeaggregationseriouslysuchthatitreturnsplausibleresultswhenscaledupfromindividualcasestolargepublicinstitutions.Inthisvein,Ibrieflysketchaprioritarianmetricforevaluatingtheuseofcustodialsanctionsincreatingandallocatingsocialadvantage.

Atover700peopleinstatecustodyper100,000residents,theUnitedStatesincarceratesfarmorepeoplethananyothernation.TheUnitedStatesnowincarceratesataratethatisfivetimeshigherthanagenerationago,andaboutfiveto10timeshigherthanisthenorminotherliberalsocieties.2TheUnitedStatesincarceratesover20%oftheworld’sinmatepopulation—overtwomillionindividuals—despitehavinglessthan5%oftheworld’spopulation.3Inrecentyears,ithasbecomeconventionaltorefertotheanomalouslyhighAmericanincarcerationratesasreflectingapolicyof“massincarceration,”andlaw,publicpolicyandcriminologyjournalsarefilledwithdiscussionsoftheevilsofmassincarceration,itscausesandwhatcanbedonetoeradicateit.4Many

1EarlierversionswerepresentedataBrooklynLawSchool/NYUcriminallawcolloquium,attheUniversityofToronto,St.LouisUniversityandataNewVoicesinLegalTheoryworkshopatLoyolaLawSchool.IreceivedespeciallyhelpfulcommentsfromMitchBerman,ElizabethBrown,ChadFlanders,HamishStewart,MalcolmThorburnandKitWellman.2SteveRedburn,JeremyTravisandBruceWestern(eds.)TheGrowthofIncarcerationintheUnitedStates:ExploringCausesandConsequences(Washington:TheNationalAcademiesPress,2014),p.13;seealsoRoyWalmsley(ed.)WorldPrisonPopulationList10thedn.(London:InternationalCentreforPrisonStudies,2013),availableat:http://images.derstandard.at/2013/11/21/prison-population.pdf.3Forpopulationfigures,seeUnitedStatesandWorldPopulationClock,availableathttp://www.census.gov/popclock/;forincarcerationfigures,seeWalmsley,supranote2.4Thereisbynowanextensiveliteratureacrosssociology,criminology,economics,history,politicsandlawonmassincarceration.ForabriefoverviewoftheliteratureonthepoliticalcontextinwhichmassincarcerationdevelopedintheUnitedStates,seeRedburn,Travis,andWestern,supranote2,Chapter4.

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commentatorsbelievethatthesekindsofultra-highincarcerationratesrepresentaseriousinjustice,andthattheUnitedStatesshouldstrivetoreduceitsinmatepopulationbyasignificantdegree.

ThequestionIconsiderinthispaperconcernsthephenomenonofmassincarceration,butinasomewhatobliqueway.IdonotproposetoaskwhethertheUnitedStatesactsunjustlyinincarceratingasmanypeopleasitdoes.Iwillassumethatitdoes.Iwillalsoassumethataphilosophicaltheoryofpunishmentshould,amongotherthings,specifytheconditionsunderwhichcriminalpunishmentisjustorunjust.Hence,Iwillassumethataphilosophicaltheoryofpunishmentshould,whenappliedtotheUnitedStates,contributetoexplainingwhytheUnitedStatesunjustlyincarceratestoomanypeople.TheclaimIdefendinthispaperisthat,ifyouaccepttheseassumptions,thenyouhavereasontorejectstrictlydeontologicaltheoriesofpunishment.ThisisbecausestrictlydeontologicaltheoriesofpunishmentimplythatthereisnothingunjustaboutthenumberofpeoplethatareincarceratedintheUnitedStates,andwouldevenbeconsistentwithgreatlyincreasingthatnumber.TherearemanyreasonstobelievethattheAmericancriminaljusticeinstitutionsareunjust.However,ifyoubelieveoneofthosereasonsisthattheUnitedStatesnowincarceratestoomanypeople,thenastrictlydeontologicaltheoryofpunishmentisnotforyou.

Theinabilityofstrictlydeontologicaltheoriesofpunishmenttoprovideplausibleguidancetoactualcriminaljusticeinstitutionsonamatterofbasicimportance—howmuchpunishmentisenough—restsontheNozickianprinciplethat,whenitcomestopunishment,justinstitutionsarewhollyanalyzableintermsofjusticeinindividualtransactions.Yet,orsoIwillsuggest,howthecriminallawallocatessocialcostsandbenefitsacrossapopulationcannotcannotbeanalyzedpurelyintermsofjusticeinindividualtransactions.Foratheoryofpunishmenttoprovideaplausiblemetricfordecidinghowpunitiveasocietyshouldberequiresthatitlookbeyondindividualtransactionsandconsidertheaggregatesocialcostsofpunishment,aswellashowthosecostscouldbejustifiedtoall,includingthosewhoareforcedtobearthem.Families,neighbors,communitymembers,potentialoffendersandpotentialvictimsalikeallshareinthesecosts,andjustpenalinstitutionsmustbeabletoexplainwhypunishingthismuch,andnoless,isplausiblyconsistentwithpubliclyavowableprinciplesofjustice.Thisrequiresatheoryofpunishmenttoatleastconsiderthesocialcostofpunishment,ratherthanrestsolelyontherightsofvictims,orthepublicatlarge,topunishindividualwrongdoers.

Theargumentisstructuredasfollows.Istartbybrieflycharacterizingdeontologicaltheoriesofpunishment.Ithenturn,inSection2,toexplainingwhydeontologicaltheoriescannotexplainwhymassincarcerationisunjust.IconsiderobjectionsinSection3,andstepbacktodrawbroaderlessonsforthetheoryofpunishmentinSection4.

1.

Bya“strictlydeontologicaltheoryofpunishment,”Imeantoincludeanytheorythat(a)purportstoprovideanexplanationofwhenitispermissibletopunishthosewhocommitcrimes,andthat(b)doessointermsthatexcludetheconsiderationoftheexpectedcostsandbenefitsofpunishment.“Costs”and“benefits”shouldbeunderstoodverygenerically:whetherintermsofutility,socialresources,fundamentalindividualinterestsandsoforth.Iusetheterm“permissible”incondition(a)asfollows:ifitispermissiblefor

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AtodoX,thenAhas,ingeneral,allthejustificationheneedstodoX:itwouldnotbeunjustforAtoX.Inparticular,itwouldnotbeunjustevenifthecostsofdoingXoutweighthebenefits.Ifyouprefertounderstand“permissible”toincludethelogicalpossibilityof“permissible,butunjust,”thenyoucansimplyrephraseclause(a)ofmydefinitionaccordingly—forinstance,as:“purportstoprovideacomprehensive,allthingsconsideredexplanationofwhenpunishmentwouldbejustified.”

Whatdoesitmeantosaythatstrictlydeontologicaltheoriescategoricallyexcludeconsiderationofthesocialcostsofpunishmentfromaffectingitspermissibility?Itmeansthatyoucanhaveallthejustificationyouneedtopunishsomeonewithoutconsideringwhetheranygoodwouldcomefromdoingso.Youmaytakethesocialcostsandbenefitsofpunishmentintoaccountifyouwish,butwhetheryoudosoisstrictlyuptoyou.Hence,astrictlydeontologicaltheorydoesnotsimplyinsistthatdeontologicalconstraintsmustberespectedifpunishmentistobejust.Itgoesfurtherandclaimsthatiftheconstraintsarerespected,thenpunishmentisjust:satisfyingdeontologicalconstraintsisnecessaryandsufficienttoestablishingthepermissibilityofpunishment.5

Itisworthemphasizingthatdeontologicaltheoriesarenotnecessarilyretributivetheories,andthatretributivetheoriesarenotnecessarilydeontologicaltheories.First,retributivetheoriescantakeateleologicalform,inwhichretributionissimplyanothergoodtobepromoted.Second,strictdeontologydoesnotnecessarilyrequireretributivereasons.Forinstance,KitWellman’sstrongrightsforfeituretheoryclaimsonlythatpunishingsomeonewhohasforfeitedhisrightnottobepunishedispermissible,notthatwemusthaveanyparticularreasontodoso.Itisnon-committalastowhatpositivereasonswehavetopunishanyone.Therefore,atheorycanbestrictlydeontologicalwithoutbeingretributivist.

Ofcourse,thereareretributiveformsofstrictdeontologyaswell.Deontologicalretributivistsclaimthat,asMitchBermanputsit,“punishmentisjustifiedbecausedoingsoisright—somethingwehavereason,orought,todo—andwhereitsrightnessisnotderivativeofitsbeingvaluable.”6However,thisisafurthercommitment,notonethatflowsfromstrictdeontologyperse.

Youmaywonderwhodefendsastrictlydeontologicaltheoryofpunishment.Herearefourcontemporaryversions.First,considerWellman’srecentdefenseofarightsforfeituretheory.AccordingtoWellman,whatevergoodpunishingsomeonemayachieve,weareonlypermittedtopunishthatpersonifhehasforfeitedhisrightagainstpunishment,asnormallypeoplehaveastrongrightnottobetreatedinthewaythatpunishmentinevitablytreatsthem.Apersonforfeitshisrightnottobepunishedbycommittingacrime.Therefore,wemayonlypermissiblypunishthosewhohavecommittedcrimes.7However,rightsforfeituretheoryisnotperseastrictlydeontologicaltheory.Wellmanhelpfullydistinguishesbetween“weak”and“strong”variantsofrightsforfeiture:theweakvariant

5So-called“hybrid”theoriesofpunishmentarenotdeontologicaltheoriesinmysense,sincethesetheoriesmakesatisfactionofdeontologicalside-constraintsintomerelyanecessary,ratherthansufficient,conditionforthepermissibilityofpunishment.6MitchellN.Berman,“TwoKindsofRetributivism”inR.A.DuffandStuartP.Green(eds.),PhilosophicalFoundationsoftheCriminalLaw(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2011),p.452.7ChristopherH.Wellman,“TheRightsForfeitureTheoryofPunishment,”122Ethics371(2012).

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holdsthatrightsforfeitureisnecessarybutnotsufficienttoexplainthepermissibilityofpunishment,whereasthestrongvariantholdsthatitisbothnecessaryandsufficient.Rightsforfeituretheoryinitsweakformisnotastrictlydeontologicaltheory.Thisisbecause,onaweakrightsforfeituretheory,itmightbethatweareonlypermittedtopunishsomeonewhenshehasforfeitedherrightagainstpunishmentanddoingsoalsofurtherssomeimportantsocialaim.Hence,whileaweakformofrightsforfeituretheorydoespurporttoprovideanexplanationofthepermissibilityofpunishmentasrequiredby(a),itneednotdosointermsthatexcludeanassessmentofthesocialcostsofpunishment,asrequiredby(b).Ontheotherhand,strongrightsforfeituretheory—theversionWellmandefends—isastrictlydeontologicaltheory.Thisisbecauseitholdsthatrightsforfeitureissufficienttomakepunishmentallthingsconsideredpermissible,makingconsiderationofthesocialcostsofpunishmentstrictlyirrelevant.AsWellmanputsit,ifsomeonehasforfeitedherrightagainstpunishment,wemaypunishherwhetherornotdoingsofurtherssomeimportantsocialaim.8

Second,ArthurRipsteinhasdefendedarigorouslyKantianformofstrictdeontology.AccordingtoRipstein,“[u]nlesstherighttopunishisinherentintheideaofarightfulcondition,nogoodconsequencescouldauthorizeit.”Conversely,insofarastherighttopunishisinherentintheideaofarightfulcondition,then“itsjustificationdoesnotdependonthoseconsequences.”9RipsteinisthusclearlycommittedtotheclaimthattherighttopunishinherentintheKantian“rightfulcondition”isbothnecessaryandsufficienttojustifypunishment,andthattheconsequencesofpunishmentarestrictlyimmaterial.ForRipstein,publiclaw“constitutesasystemofequalfreedominwhichnopersonissubjecttothechoiceofanother,”andpunishmentisrequiredto“hinderhindrancestofreedom”—thatis,criminalacts—andevenif“theincentivesprovidedbylawwouldbeempiricallyunnecessary…[punishment]wouldstillberequired.”10Indeed,onRipstein’sview,inupholdingpublicright,thesovereignisobligatedtopunisheverycrimeshecomesacross.

8Ibid.,p.375n.7.OnemightspeculatethatWellman’sviewisonlymeanttoexplainwhenpunishmentispermissibleinindividualcontexts,ratherthanthepermissibilityofanoverallinstitutionofpunishment.However,Wellmanpresentshisaccountasacompetitortotraditionalutilitarian,retributivist,moraleducation,expressivist,restitutiveandsocialsafetyvalvetheoriesofpunishment,whichclearlyareattemptstojustifytheoverallinstitutionofpunishment.Ibid.,pp.371-372.Moretellingly,wererightsforfeituresimplyaside-constraintonindividualdecisionstopunishsomeone,withtheoverallsocialinstitutionofpunishmentjustifiedbyother,moreconsequentialconsiderations,Wellman’stheorycollapsesintoweakrightsforfeiture.Thisis,afterall,tantamounttoclaimingthatguiltisanecessaryconstraintonpunishment,butthatpunishmentisingeneralonlypermissiblewhenitfurtherssomevaluablesocialaim.ButWellmanexpresslydeniesthisclaiminhisdefenseofstrongrightsforfeituretheory.Ibid.,p.375.Allthatbeingsaid,thereisaninterestingquestionastowhetherstrongrightsforfeituretheoryisconsistentwiththeapproachtopunishmenthedefendedinanearlierpaper,inwhichheseemedtoinsistthatstatepunishmentmustfurtheravaluablesocialaim(interalia,deterringcrime)ifitistobejustified.SeeChristopherH.Wellman,“RightsandStatePunishment,”JournalofPhilosophy106(8)(2009):pp.419-439,especially428-430.9ArthurRipstein,ForceandFreedom:Kant’sLegalandPoliticalPhilosophy(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,2009),p.301.10Ibid.,pp.306-307.

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Failingtopunishis“strictlyspeakinginconsistentwiththerightfulcondition,”andhencewouldbe“wronginthehighestdegree,”andeven“asingleexception”wouldbearenunciationofthelaw’sownprinciple.11

Third,althoughAlanBrudnerultimatelyrejectsRipstein’sKantianapproach,Brudner’sownHegeliantheoryisitselfaformofstrictdeontologicaltheory.Brudnerexplicitlydeniesthatpunishmentcanbe“justifiedinprospectivetermsasameanstofurtheringsociallydesirableends.”12HerejectsaHartian-stylemixedtheory,accordingtowhichsociallybeneficialconsequencesofpunishmentprovidetheaffirmativereasoninfavorofpunishment;the“beneficialeffectsofpunishment”cannotberegarded,Brudnerclaims,asapublicreasoninfavorofpunishmentandhencetheyareofnojustificatorysignificance.13OnBrudner’sview,acriminalrendershimselfvulnerabletopunishmentbecausebyintentionallydenyingsomeoneelse’srightsheimplicitlydenieshisown,andasaresulthehasnobasisforcomplaintwhenthestateviolateshisrightsbypunishinghim.14Thesubstantivejustificationforstatepunishment,accordingtoBrudner,isthatitisrequiredtomakemanifestthatthecriminal’simplicitclaimtoanunlimitedlibertyofactionis“aporetic,”andthereby“tovindicatethetruth…thattheonlyvalidclaimsofpermissiontoactarethosethatcanbevalidatedbyequalends.”15OnBrudner’sview,actualconcretepunishmentisrequiredtomakethismanifestpreciselybecause,byactualizinghisclaimtounlimitedfreedominexternalconduct,thecriminalclothesthisegoisticprincipleinafalseveneeroflegalvalidity.Farfrombeingameansofpromotingthepublicgood,punishmentisjustifiedbecauseitexpressivelydeniesthewrongdoer’sowndenialofrights.Hence,Brudner’sviewisastrictlydeontologicaltheory:itholdsthatpunishmentispermissible—indeed,required—underconditionsthatmakenomentionofpunishment’scontributiontopublicwelfare,butthatinsteadturnonlyontheexpressivevindicationofrights.

Finally,andperhapssurprisingly,AntonyDuffhasrecentlydefendedaformofretributivetheorythatimpliesstrictdeontology.16AccordingtoDuff,“whatgivescriminalpunishmentitsmeaningandthecoreofitsnormativejustificationisitsrelationship,notto

11Ibid.,pp.320-321.Tobefair,RipsteinattemptstoconstrainthemaximalisttendenciesofhisKantianviewbyinsistingthatheisnottaking“anyspecificpositionaboutwhatpublicresourcesshouldbedevotedtocrimedetection,orwherethoseresourcesshouldbefocused.”However,itishardtoseewhatmotivatesthedistinctionbetweeninvestigation(entirelydiscretionary)andprosecution(entirelymandatory):ifitissuchanaffronttothelawtoallowevenasinglecrimetogounpunished,whyisitnotequallyanaffrontifcrimethatcouldeasilybedetectedandpunishedwereallowedtogoundetectedandunpunished?Perversely,thissuggeststhatthestatecoulddecidetounderfundpolicingandcrimedetectionpreciselysothatitcouldavoidacquiringtherigorousKantiandutytopunishcriminalsoncedetected.Ibid.,p.321.12SeeAlanBrudner,PunishmentandFreedom(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2008),p.38.13Ibid.,p.42.14Ibid.,pp.37-41.UnlikeWellman,Brudnerviewspunishmentasarightsviolationratherthanasarightsforfeiture.15Ibid.,p.46.16R.A.Duff,“RetrievingRetributivism,"inMarkWhite(ed.),Retributivism:EssaysonTheoryandPolicy(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2011).

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anycontingentfuturebenefitsthatitmightbring,buttothepastcrimeforwhichitisimposed.”This,accordingtoDuff,isthe“coreretributivistthought.”17Justasindividualshavestandingtocallfriends,family,colleaguestoaccountinthecaseofordinarytransgressions,thepoliticalcommunityhasstandingtocallcitizenstoaccountinthecaseofpublicwrongs.Callingthosewhocommitpublicwrongstoaccountisnotdonebecauseitfurthersothergoalsthatwemighthave;rather,itisconstitutiveoftherespectduetocitizens.Failuretopursueandprosecuteawrongdoerbetraysanattitudeofindifferencetothevictim,andperhapstotheperpetratoraswell.Criminalpunishmentisawayforthecommunityandwrongdoertoshowthattheyareappropriatelyengagedwiththevictim’sinjuryviathemeansofa“formal,forcefulexpressionofapology.”18Showingrespectfortheagencyofthevictimjustifiesusincallingthewrongdoertoaccountthroughpunishment,andthisreasonforpunishmentiscategoricallyinsensitivetotheexpectedsocialcostofpunishment.Hence,insofarascallingawrongdoertoaccountprovidesasufficientreasonforpunishingsomeone—whichitmust,sinceitisallegedlyconstitutiveofshowingrespect,somethingwepresumablyhavesufficientreasontodo—itfollowsthatDuff’sretributivismisstrictlydeontological.

IncontrasttoWellman’snon-committalformofstrictdeontology,Ripstein’s,Brudner’sandDuff’stheoriesarebothstrictlydeontologicalandretributive.Theygobeyondtheclaimthatpunishmentisonlypermissiblewhensomeonehasforfeitedhisorherrights,butinsistthatthereisapositiveretributiverequirementtopunish:toupholdtherightfulcondition,toexpressivelydenythedenialofrightsortoshowrespectforthosewhoserightswereinvadedbywrongdoing.Insofarascallingawrongdoertoaccountthroughthecriminallawisconstitutiveofshowingrespecttoourco-citizens,thenfailingtodosobetraysanindifferencetothevictim,andmayevenreflectacallousindifferencetothewrongdoerhimself.19Strictlydeontologicalretributivismwouldnotallowustotellonevictimthatwearenotgoingtodevotetheresourcestoinvestigating,prosecutingandpunishingthepersonwhoassaultedhimbecausewehaveabetteruseforthoseresources.Evenifwedohavea“better”usefortheresources,tofailtocallhisassailanttoaccountjustistofailtoshowhimsufficientrespect—thatiswhatitmeansforpunishmenttobeconstitutiveofrespectforthevictim.Surelyitisnotthecasethatwearepermittedtorespectsomevictimslessthanotherssimplybecausetherearemoreofthem.Ifwedesignourinstitutionssuchthatweknowinadvancethatagreatmanyperpetrators—indeed,withrespecttosomecrimes,thelargemajorityofthem—willneverbecalledtoaccountfortheircrimes,thenvictimsofunpunishedcrimeshaveapowerfuldeontologicalclaimthattheyarenotbeingtakensufficientlyseriously.Theirobjectionremainsevenifpeoplewhoareatriskofbecomingunemployed,sickorunabletoaccessatolerablygoodeducation

17Ibid.,p.3.Or,asNozickonceputthepoint,theconsequentialgoodsachievedbypunishingwrongdoers—reform,deterrenceorincapacitation,say—aremerelyan“especiallydesirableandvaluablebonus”andarenot“partofanecessaryconditionforjustlyimposedpunishment.”RobertNozick,PhilosophicalExplanations(Cambridge:BelknapPress,1981),p.374.18Thissentenceisaparaphraseofsupranote16,pp.16-18.19Supranote16,p.14.

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wouldalsohaveclaimsifresourcesweredivertedfromthoseprogramstofundafullyenforcedcriminaljusticeregime.20

2.

Thegistoftheargumentcanbepresentedasfollows:1. TheUnitedStatestodayunjustlyincarceratestoomanypeople.2. Accordingtoastrictlydeontologicaltheory,punishmentisjust(i.e.,permissibleallthingsconsidered)ifitdoesnotviolaterelevantdeontologicalconstraints.

3. ThecurrentAmericanincarcerationrateisnottheresultofsystematicviolationofdeontologicalconstraints.

4. Hence,adeontologicaltheoryofpunishmentcannotexplainwhytheUnitedStatesunjustlyincarceratestoomanypeople.

NotethatIamsimplyassumingthat(1)istrue.SinceIdonotattempttodefendthis

assumption,myargumentwillonlybeappealingtothosewhoarealreadyinclinedtobelievethat(1)istrue,orthatitatleastmightbetrue.However,sincemany,perhapsmost,informedcommentatorsonAmericancriminaljusticebelievethattheUnitedStatesdoesindeedunjustlyincarceratetoomanypeople,Isuspectthatassumption(1)willnotbetoocontentious.Thesecondstepoftheargumentflowsfromthelogicalstructureofadeontologicaltheoryofpunishment.Step(3)requiresmoreelaboration,andIwillfocusmostofmyattentiononit.

First,however,Ipausetoclarifythenatureofpremise(1).Tobesure,theargumentwouldbemoreambitiousifitwerestatedunconditionally,i.e.,ifitpurportedtoshowthatsomespecifiedrateofincarceration,n,isnecessarilyunjust,unjustinallpossibleworlds.However,Idoubtanysuchclaimcanbesustained,atleastforanyplausiblevalueofn.21Thisisbecauseforanyplausiblevalueofn,whetheritisjusttoincarceratethatmanypeopledependsonawiderangeofsocialfacts:whatmightbeanunjustlyhighrateofincarcerationinmodernSwedenmightnotbeunjustinpost-revolutionaryChina,oreveninthecontemporaryUnitedStates.Toputitslightlydifferently,consideratheoryofpunishmentasafunctionthattakesarangeoffactors(crimerates,proportionality,legaltraditions,etc.)asinputsandreturnsanestimateofthemaximumpermissiblerateof20DougHusakhasobjectedthatweshouldnottrytodistinguishbetweenequallyguiltyindividuals,andhencethatitisastrengthratherthanaweaknessofdeontologicaltheoriesthattheysupportequalpunishmentforalltheguilty.But,ifthatistrue,thenpunishmentmaximalismfollowsdirectly.Thisobjectionalsodependsonconstruingfairnesstorequireequalexpostpunishmentsratherthanequalexantechances,apointIhaveinvestigatedelsewhere.SeeVincentChiao,“ExAnteFairnessinCriminalLawandProcedure,”NewCriminalLawReview15(2)(2012):pp.277-332.21Whatisaplausiblevalueofn?ItisworthbearingmindthatevenintheUnitedStatestodaytheincarcerationrateislessthan1%,andthatinmostotherAnglophonecountries,therateiscloserto0.01%.Itishardtoimaginewhatasocietythatincarcerated,say,10%or20%or30%ofitspopulationwouldlooklike,anditmaywellbethecasethatundersocialconditionswhereonewouldfindsucharate—perhapsconditionsofcivilwarorinsurrection—normaltheoriesofjusticewouldsimplyfailtoapply.

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incarcerationasanoutput.CallthatestimatenMAX.NotheoryofpunishmenttreatsnMAXasaconstant,regardlessofwhatvaluesareassignedtotherelevantinputs.Thequestion,however,iswhichinputsatheorytreatsasrelevant.TheassumptionIammakingisthataplausibletheoryofpunishmentshouldreturnanestimatefornMAX,fortheUnitedStatestoday,thatislowerthan0.75%.YettheverylimitedrangeofinputsthatastrictlydeontologicaltheorytreatsasrelevantmeansthatitwillreturnanestimateofnMAXforthecontemporaryUnitedStatesthatexceeds0.75%.Asaresult,itcannotexplainwhytheUnitedStatestodayunjustlyincarceratestoomanypeople.22

TheoriesofpunishmentthatareatleastopentoconsequentialconsiderationscanappealtoarangeofaggregativeinputsinestimatingnMAX.Theycan,forinstance,considertheexpectedaggregatecostsofincarceration—theharmsimposeddirectlyonthoseincarcerated,thecollateralconsequencesonfamiliesandcommunities,andtheopportunitycoststosocietyoftimewastedlanguishinginprison—aswellasitsexpectedbenefits,suchasthereductionincriminaloffendingandthevindicationoftherightsofvictims.Ifitisthecasethatthemarginalbenefitsfromincarcerationaredeclining,thenatheorythatisopentoaggregativereasonscouldsetnMAXatapointwherefurtherrelianceonincarcerationentailsmoreharmthangood.AninterpretationofnMAXalongtheselinescouldprovideaplausibleexplanationofwhytheUnitedStatesunjustlyincarceratestoomanypeopleifthereisreasontobelievethat,inexpandingitscustodialpopulationfromapproximately120per100,000toover700per100,000,theUnitedStateshascometoincarceratesomanypeoplethatthemarginalcostofincarcerationoutweighsitsmarginalbenefits.Insofarastheevidencesupportsthisproposition,atheoryofpunishmentthatisatleastopentoaggregativereasonscouldexplainwhyitisthattheUnitedStatesunjustlyincarceratestoomanypeople.

Ofcourse,itwouldbequestion-beggingtobaldlycomplainthatastrictlydeontologicaltheorydoesnottakeintoaccounttheexpectedconsequencesofpunishment.Thatissimplythenatureofastrictlydeontologicaltheory.Thedifficulty,however,isratherdifferent.ItisthatatheorythatissensitivetothesocialcostofpunishmentcanexplainwhyitisthecasethattheUnitedStatesnowincarceratestoomanypeople,whereasonecannotconstructaparallelexplanationinstrictlydeontologicalterms.Hence,insofarasatheoryofpunishmentismeanttoprovideplausibleguidanceinevaluatinglarge,penalinstitutions,thereisprimafaciereasontorejectastrictlydeontologicaltheory.

Strictlydeontologicaltheoriesrelyexclusivelyonindividualisticreasons:reasonsgroundedinthenatureofaspecificindividual’sconduct.Onastrictlydeontologicaltheory,

22Toillustrate,considerthefollowingsimplifiedexample.Supposeyourtheoryofpunishmentsaysthatthesingleinputfactorthatisrelevanttodeterminingwhetherpunishmentispermissibleisguilt:ifsomeoneisguiltyofacrime,thenitispermissibletopunishhim.Suppose,further,thatinsocietySthereisonlyonecrime,C,andpeoplewhoareconvictedofcommittingCinvariablyserveoneyearinprison.Inthiscase,thevalueofnMAXisstraightforwardlyestimated:itissimplythenumberofpeoplewhocommitCinagivenyear.Afterall,ifthestateweretoinvestigate,prosecuteandconvicteverysinglepersonwhocommitsC,thenthenumberofinstancesinwhichCiscommittedwoulddeterminetheactualincarcerationrate,andgiventhattimeservedforCisoneyear,atanygiventimenMAXshouldcorrespondtothenumberofinstancesofCintheprevious364days.Anyhigherrateofincarceration,andSwouldinevitablybeincarceratinginnocents.BecausenMAXisaceiling,anylowerrateofincarcerationofC-offenderswouldnecessarilybepermissible.

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wehaveanequallycompellingreason—oranequallyvalidpermission—forpunishinganypersonwhoexhibitsthosefeatures,whetherheisthefirstorthenthpersontodoso,foranyarbitrarilylargevalueofn.Hence,insofarasadeontologicaltheorypurportstoshowthatitispermissibletopunishanycriminalwrongdoer,itnecessarilyshowsthatitispermissibletopunishallofthem,regardlessofthecostsofdoingso.Punishingthatmanypeoplemaybepointless,orevencounterproductive,fromthepointofviewofthepublicgood.Butdeontologicaltheoriesareunitedinrejectingthosetypesofconcernsfrombearingonthepermissibilityofpunishment:theytellusthatwearepermittedtopunishregardlessofwhetherdoingso“isnecessarytopromotesomeimportantaim.”23Hence,forastrictlydeontologicaltheorytoexplainwhytheUnitedStatestodayincarceratestoomanypeople,itmustdrawonanallegedlywidespreadviolationofarelevantdeontologicalconstraintasexplainingAmerica’smasslevelsofincarceration.Theparadigmaticdeontologicalconstraintsonpunishmentarethatpunishmentberestrictedtopeoplewhoareactuallyguiltyoftruecrimes,andbeadministeredinproportiontotheirculpability,whichtogetherimplythatnMAXwouldnotbeexceededsolongaseveryonewhoisincarceratedisguiltyofacrimethatmeritsincarceration.SoastrictlydeontologicaltheorymustseektoexplainAmericanincarcerationratesviasystematicpunishmentoftheinnocent,overcriminalizationand/ordisproportionatelyharshpunishment.

IsitthecasethattheAmericanincarcerationrateissoanomalouslyhighbecauseofasystematicviolationofoneoftheparadigmaticdeontologicalconstraintsonpunishment?Thereisreasontobeskeptical.RecentempiricalworkonthecausesofmassincarcerationintheUnitedStatessuggeststhatthestandardsetofdeontologicalconstraintsonpunishmentdonotexplainwhytheUnitedStatesincarceratesasmanypeopleasitdoes.Indeed,thereisreasontobelievethattheUnitedStatescouldactuallyincarceratemanymorepeoplethanitcurrentlydoeswhilefullyrespectingalloftheseconstraints.

(a) FactualGuilt

Istartwiththepropositionthatonlythosewhoareactuallyguiltyofacrimeshouldbe

punished.SupposetheUnitedStatesweretofullyrespectthisconstraint,oratleastaswellascanreasonablybeexpectedsincesomeerrorswillbeinevitable.Wouldthiscontributetokeepingtheincarcerationratebelowmasslevels?No.Infact,theUnitedStatescoulddramaticallyraiseincarcerationrateswhilefullyrespectingtheconstraintagainstpunishingtheinnocent.Thereasonissimple.AprofoundlyimportantfactaboutcriminaljusticeintheUnitedStatesisthat,evenwiththehighestincarcerationrateintheworld,andevenwithrespecttoso-called“core”offenseslikeassault,sexualassault,theftandburglary,thecriminallawintheUnitedStatesisnotevenremotelyclosetobeingfullyenforced.In2007,roughly61%ofmurdersandnon-negligentmanslaughtersknowntopoliceresultedinarrestsorwereotherwiseconsidered“solved.”Thoseratesgodownsubstantiallyforothercrimes:comparablefiguresforrapeare42%,forrobbery26%andforburglaryandcartheft13%.24Consideredintheaggregate,clearanceratesforviolent

23Supranote7,p.375n.7.24SourcebookofCriminalJusticeStatisticsOnline,Table4.19.2007:Offensesknowntopoliceandpercentclearedbyarrest,availableat:http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t4192007.pdf.

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crimehavehoveredaround45%forseveraldecades,andthecomparablefigureforpropertycrimesisroughly15%.25Theseare,moreover,clearancerates,notconvictionrates—thatis,theyrepresenttherateatwhichpoliceconsideracrime“solved,”nottherateatwhichsomeonehasactuallybeencalledtoaccountforthecrimethroughprosecutionandpunishment.Turningtoconvictions,instatecourtsin2004,approximately68%ofmurderandnon-negligentmanslaughterarrestsresultedinconvictions,whileonlyabout16%ofmotorvehicletheftarrestsand44%ofburglaryarrestsresultedinconvictions.26

Asarough,back-of-the-envelopecalculation,thesefigurestogethersuggestthatabout43%ofmurdersandnon-negligentmanslaughters,6%ofburglariesand2%ofmotorvehicletheftsultimatelyresultedinconvictions.Thesefiguresareconcededlyrough,sincetheydonotaccountforpeoplewhoareconvictedthroughprocesscommencingwithasummonsratherthananarrest,nordotheyaccountforcrimesthatareconsideredclearedbutthatdonotresultinanarrest.Ontheotherhand,theseratesaresensitiveonlytocrimesknowntopolice,andthereisawealthofevidencethatagreatdealofcrimegoesunreported—insomecategories,suchasassault(65%),sexualassault(86%)anddomesticviolence(90%),amajoritytoanoverwhelmingmajorityofcrimeisnotreported.27Thesefiguresarenotanomalous:theyareconsistentwithcontemporaryandhistoricaltrendsinEngland.28

Inshort:therearemanymoreinstancesofpeopleforfeitingtheirrightsagainstcriminalpunishmentbycommittingcrimesthanthereareinstancesofcriminalpunishmentactuallybeingimposed.Theveryhighrateofattritionbetweentherateatwhichcrimesarecommittedandtheratesatwhichtheyarepunishedsuggeststhatthereisquiteanextensivedegreeofheadroomincriminaljusticeinputsbeforetheconstraintoffactualguiltwouldkickinasalimitingfactor.Forinstance,ifmybackoftheenvelopecalculationsareanyguide,Americancriminaljusticeinstitutionscouldprosecute10timesasmanydomesticassaults,16timesasmanyburglariesandfully50timesasmanycartheftswhilestillpunishingonlytheguilty.

(b) Criminalization

25SourcebookofCriminalJusticeStatisticsOnline,Table4.21.2007:Percentofoffendersknowntopolicewhowereclearedbyarrest,availableat:http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t4212007.pdf.26SourcebookofCriminalJusticeStatisticsOnline,Table5.0002.2004:Felonyconvictionsandsentencesandrateper100arrests,availableat:http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t500022004.pdf.27SeeDavidKennedy,DeterrenceandCrimePrevention:ReconsideringtheProspectofSanction(London:Routledge,2009),p.45.28SeeAndrewAshworthandMikeRedmayne,TheCriminalProcess4thedn.(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2010),pp.156-157(estimatingthat“nomorethan2percent”oftheeightmostfrequentlycommittedoffensesintheUnitedKingdomresultinaconviction).Forhistoricalevidence,seePeterKing,Crime,Justice,andDiscretioninEngland1740-1820(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2005),pp.11-12,132-134(reportingestimatesfromthelate18thandearly19thcenturiesthatonly1%to10%ofpropertycrimeswereprosecuted).

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Deontologicaltheoriesofpunishmentdonotsimplyclaimthatitisright(orallthings

consideredpermissible)fortheguiltytobepunishedproportionately.Theyalsotypicallyclaimthatwhatitistobeguiltyis,withinsomerange,notpurelyamatterofpositivelaw.Peopledonotforfeittheirrightsordeservepunishmentsimplybecausethelegislaturesaystheydo.Rather,theyforfeittheirrightsordeservepunishmentwhentheactstheyperformareappropriatelyorrightlycriminalized.Thus,evenifitisconcededthattheUnitedStatesismostlypunishingguiltypeople,perhapstheUnitedStateshascriminalizedconductthatitissimplyinappropriatetocriminalizeinthefirstplace,whichinturnexplainswhytheUnitedStatesincarceratestoomanypeople.29

Byfarthemostsignificantareaofcriminallawthatmightplausiblybethoughtofinthesetermsistheso-called“warondrugs.”Indeed,itissometimesclaimedthatthewarondrugsexplainsAmerica’sexperimentwithmassincarceration.30Ifthisclaimweretrue,andifaconvincingcasecouldbemadethatcriminalizingnarcoticsviolatessomedeontologicalconstraintoncriminalization,thenperhapsdeontologicaltheoristswouldbeabletoexplainwhy,evenaccountingforthemassiveheadroomincriminaljusticeinputsimpliedbyastrictlydeontologicaltheory,theUnitedStatesshouldhaveamuchlowerincarcerationrate.Suchtheoristscouldclaimthatwhiletherewouldbenoinjusticeinprosecutingliterallyeveryinstanceofeverycrime,itturnsouttherearemanyfewersuchinstancesthanwethought,especiallyoncewetakeintoaccountthemaligninfluenceofthewarondrugs.

Unfortunately,theclaimthatthewarondrugsexplainstheultra-highAmericanincarcerationrateisunsupportedbytheevidence.Forovertwodecades,thepercentageofpeopleimprisonedforadrugoffenseintheUnitedStateshasbeenfairlystableatabout20%—significant,butnotenoughtoexplainthefive-foldincreaseinincarcerationratesoverthelastgeneration.31Themajorityofpeopleinstateprisonsaretherebecausetheycommittedviolentcrimes;infact,thereareaboutasmanypeopleinstateprisonsforhomicide(14%ofstateinmates)astherearefordrugoffenses(16%).Ifwefactorinpropertyoffenses,nearlythreequarters(72.6%)ofstateprisonersareincustodybecause

29Theunstatedempiricalhypothesisisthatincreasingcriminalizationcausesincreasingincarceration.Thereisreasontodoubtthishypothesis.Afterall,thesetofcrimesforwhichpeopleareactuallysenttoprisonhasremainedfairlystableevenasincarcerationratesexploded.Thegrowthinincarcerationhaslargelybeendrivenbyincreasednumbersofprosecutionsforarelativelysmallnumberofcrimes.ItisnotthecasethatcriminalizingXautomaticallyresultsinany,muchlessmany,prosecutionsforX.MythankstoElizabethBrownfordrawingmyattentiontothisfact.30See,e.g.,MichelleAlexander,TheNewJimCrow(NewYork:TheNewPress,2010).31In2012,drugoffendersmadeupapproximately16%ofthestateprisonpopulation.E.AnnCarson,Prisonersin2013(Washington:BureauofJusticeStatistics,2013),p.15,tbl.13,availableat:http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf[hereinafterCarson,Prisoners];seealsoJohnF.Pfaff,“TheWaronDrugsandPrisonGrowth:LimitedImportance,LimitedLegislativeOptions,”HarvardJournalonLegislation(forthcoming2015)[hereinafterPfaff,War];JamesForman,Jr.,“RacialCritiquesofMassIncarceration:BeyondtheNewJimCrow,”87N.Y.U.LawReview(2012):pp.47-48.

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oftraditionalmalainseoffenses.32Whileitistruethatstrippingoutpeopleconvictedofdrugcrimeswouldlowerincarcerationrates,itwouldnotbringratesanywherenearwhattheywereformostofthe20thcentury,oraslowastheyareinanyofAmerica’susualcomparatorcountries.Althoughtherewasindeedasharpincreaseintheproportionofpeopleincarceratedfordrugoffensesduringthe1980s,thatwasasharpincreasefromaverylowbaseline:in1980,stateprisonshousedonly19,000drugoffenders,comparedtoover170,000violentoffendersandnearly90,000propertyoffenders.By2009,thenumberofdrugoffendersinstateprisonsgrewbyroughlyanadditional220,000people,butthenumberofviolentoffendersgrewbyover500,000andthenumberofpropertyoffendersbyalmost172,000.33Infact,overhalfofthegrowthinprisonpopulationsfrom1980to2009isexplainedbygrowthinthenumberofincarceratedviolentoffenders,andifwefactorinpropertyoffenses,weaccountforfullytwothirdsofthegrowth.34AsJohnPfaffhasnoted,“[e]venifwereleasedeveryoffendercurrentlyservingtimeforadrugconviction,theUSprisonpopulationwouldremainabove1million,andtheracialcompositionofitsprisonswouldnotshiftmuch”—specifically,theprisonpopulationwouldgofrom1.4millionto1.1million,andthepercentageofblackprisonerswoulddeclinetwopercentagepoints,to36%.35

Thisisnottosaythattheso-called“warondrugs”ismorallyinsignificant,orthatithasnotwroughthugeswathsoflargelypointlessdevastationthroughthelivesofagreatmanypeople.ItwouldalsobeoverstatingthecasetosaythatthewarondrugshashadanegligibleimpactonAmericanincarcerationrates.Itis,forinstance,possiblethatdrugoffensesmaymattertoincarcerationratesmoreindirectly:itmaybethatthewarondrugshasagivenlargenumberofpeoplecriminalrecords,resultinginlongersentencesforsubsequent,non-drugoffenses.Oritispossiblethatthewarondrugshasmadedrug32Carson,Prisoners,supranote31,p.15,tbl.13.TheMarshallProject,anewsorganizationfocusedoncriminaljusticeissuesintheUnitedStates,hasputtheBureauofJusticeStatisticsonlineintheformofaninteractivesetofsliders,whichthereadercanmanipulatetoseehowmanyviolentoffenderswouldhavetobereleasedinordertocutAmerica’sincarcerationrateby50%.Notethata50%reductionwouldstillleavetheUnitedStatesasthemostpunitivedevelopedcountryontheplanet.Availableat:https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/03/04/how-to-cut-the-prison-population-by-50-percent.33Pfaff,War,supranote31,tbl.1A.34SeeJohnF.Pfaff,“EscapingfromtheStandardStory,”FederalSentencingReport26(2014):pp.265-266.35JohnF.Pfaff,“TheMicroandMacroCausesofPrisonGrowth,”GeorgiaStateUniversityLawReview28,p.1270;JohnF.Pfaff,“TheCausesofGrowthinPrisonAdmissionsandPopulations,”WorkingPaperNo.1884671(2011),availableat:http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1884674[hereinafterPfaff,CausesofGrowth],pp.22-24.EvenBlumsteinandBeckacknowledgethatdrugoffensesdonotexplainthebulkoftheexplosioninincarcerationrates.AlfredBlumsteinandAllenJ.Beck,“ReentryasaTransientStatebetweenLibertyandRecommitment”inJeremyTravisandChristyVisher(eds.),PrisonerReentryandCrimeinAmerica(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2005),pp.50,78[hereinafterBlumsteinandBeck,Transient].ButseeAlfredBlumsteinandAllenJ.Beck,“PopulationGrowthinU.S.Prisons,1980-1996,”inMichaelTonryandJoanPetersila(eds.),Prisons(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1999),pp.17,21[hereinafterBlumsteinandBeck,PopulationGrowth].

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marketsmoredangerous,andhencemorecriminogenic.Butintermsofactualdrugincarcerations,itisreasonablyclearthattheycontributeanon-negligiblebutstillrelativelysmallamounttocurrentprisonpopulations,andthattheirimpactontheincarcerationrateisfarovershadowedbytheimpactofpeopleservingtimefortraditional“core”crimes,violentcrimeinparticular.

(c) ProportionalityFinally,itmightbethoughtthatitisAmericancriminaljusticeinstitutions’proclivity

formetingoutextraordinarilyexcessivesentencesthatexplainswhyitscustodialpopulationissolarge.ThatAmericansentencesarelongerthantheyareinotherpartsoftheworldisreasonablyclear;thattheyarethereforedisproportionateislessso.36Thereare,ofcourse,manyinstancesofheadline-grabbingsentencesthatmanypeoplebelievetobedisproportionate,perhapsevenforseriouscrimes.However,thesekindsofultra-harshsentencesturnouttobelargelyimmaterialtotheaggregateincarcerationrate.WhatappearstobedoingmostoftheworkisanincreasedwillingnessonthepartofAmericanprosecutorstofilefelonychargeswhichcarrysomeprisontime,notademandforextremelylongsentencesinthetypicalcase.37

Inrecentwork,Pfaffhasanalyzeddatafrom11statesfromtheNationalCorrectionsReportingProgramfrom1982-2003,andfoundthat,whenexaminingmedianand75thpercentileprisoners,timeservedhasactuallybeenstableorinsomecasesevendeclininginthisperiod.38Mediantimeservedrangedfromaboutsixmonths(California)toabouttwoyears(NewJersey);atthe75thpercentile,timeservedrangedfromaboutoneyear(California)toaboutfour(Virginia).Inasubsequentpaper,Pfaffbolstersthisconclusionwithdatadrawnfromall50states.Actualreleaseratesfromstateprisonsoverthelastthreedecadescloselyparallelahypotheticalinvariantreleaseschedule,accordingtowhichhalfofallprisonersarereleasedwithinayear,andthreequarterswithinfiveyears,withonly1%remainingincarceratedafter11years.Formostinmates,theamountoftimeservedhasnotmateriallyincreasedduringthelastthreedecades,evenastheincarcerationratehasshotup.3936See,e.g.,JamesQ.Whitman,HarshJustice:CriminalPunishmentandtheWideningDividebetweenAmericaandEurope(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2005),especiallyChapter2.37BureauofJusticeStatisticsreportthat,forprisonersreleasedin2012,themediantimeservedforviolentcrimeswas28months,12monthsforpropertycrimesand13monthsfordrugoffenses.SeeCarson,Prisoners,supranote31,p.18tbl.17.38JohnF.Pfaff,“TheMythsandRealitiesofCorrectionalSeverity,”13AmericanLawandEconomicsReview491(2011):pp.499-504[hereinafterPfaff,Myths].ThestatesinquestionareCalifornia,Colorado,Illinois,Kentucky,Michigan,Minnesota,Nebraska,NewJersey,SouthDakota,VirginiaandWashington.39Pfaff,CausesofGrowth,supranote35,pp.30-32.AsPfaffputsit,“sanctioningseveritydoesnotappeartohavechangedmuchatallbetween1977andtheearly2000s;totheextentthattherehasbeenanychangesincethen,ithasbeeninthedirectionofleniency.”Ibid.,p.4.Forcontraryviews,seeBlumsteinandBeck,PopulationGrowth,supranote35,andBlumsteinandBeck,Transient,supranote35.Pfaff’sfindingsarebasedontwodatasets,notutilizedbyotherstudies,thatallowPfafftodisaggregateprisonadmissionsperarrestintoitscomponentparts,namelyfelonyfilings

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Itisperhapsworthnotingthat,whilemanystateshaveultra-harshrepeatoffenderlaws,withtheexceptionofCalifornia,theyappeartoberarelyused.40Prosecutorialdiscretiongenerallymeansthattherearewaysaroundmostharshsentencinglaws.Indeed,sincethewayaroundthemmayoftenbethroughaguiltypleatoalowersentence,itispossiblethatwhattheselawsdoistoenhancetheabilityofprosecutorstoefficientlysendguiltypeopletoprisonratherthanrampuptimeserved—anoutcometowhichstrictlydeontologicaltheoriescanhardlyobject.

Indeed,whiletimeservedhasbeenrelativelyflat,Pfaffpresentsevidencewhichpointstoanincreaseintherateatwhichprosecutorsfilefelonycharges,ratherthanarrestrates,convictionrates,orharshersentencing,asthemoresignificantcontributortoprisonpopulationgrowthintheUnitedStates.Sincetheincreaseinfelonychargespresumablycomesfromcasesprosecutorswouldinpreviousgenerationshavedismissedortreatedasmisdemeanors,itappearsthat,asPfaffputsit,“despitetheattentionpaidtothree-strikelaws,TIS[truthinsentencinglaws],andthelike,thepredominantlocusofincreasedpunitivenessoverthepasttentofifteenyearsstillappearstobeatthelowend,notthehigh.”41Thissuggestsinturnthatajurisdictionthatdoesnotutilizeextraordinarilyharshsentencingoutcomesasageneralmattermaystillincarcerateanextraordinarynumberofpeoplelargelyinvirtueofgrowthinitscustodialinputs—asourceofgrowththat,aswehaveseen,deontologicaltheoriesareunabletomeaningfullylimit.Itis,Pfaffwrites,“[c]hangingdecisionsinprosecutors’officesaboutwhentofilecharges”that“appeartobetheprimary—attimes,seeminglyalmostthesole—driverofprisongrowth,atleastsincethemid-tolate-1980s.”42

Earlierstudieshavefoundasimilarpatternfromthe1970sto1988,suggestingthat,evenasAmerica’sexperimentwithmassincarcerationwasrampingup,timeservedwasactuallygoingdownslightly,butwasmorethancompensatedforbyanincreaseinprisonadmissions.43Thisshouldnotbeasurprisingfinding.Theverylowrateatwhichcrimesareprosecutedimpliesthatincarcerationratesaredramaticallymoresensitivetoprosecutorialdecisionsthantheyaretocrimerates.Suppose,forinstance,thatoneoutof10criminalsisprosecuted.Evenamodest5%increaseintheprosecutionratewouldresultina50%increaseinindictments.Incontrast,sinceonlyoneoutof10casesisbeingprosecutedtobeginwith,a5%riseinthecrimeratewouldbebarelynoticeable,withonly

perarrest,convictionsperfilingandprisonadmissionsperconviction.Pfaff,CausesofGrowth,supranote35,pp.5-7.40FranklinZimring,GordonHawkins,andSamKamin,PunishmentandDemocracy:ThreeStrikesinCalifornia(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2001),pp.20-21.AsZimringhasnotedelsewhere,thefederal“threestrikes”lawwasapplied35timesinthefouryearsafteritsenactment,whereastheCaliforniastatute—enactedthesameyearasthefederalstatute—wasappliedover40,000times.Indeed,theCaliforniastatute“hasresultedinninetimesasmanyprisontermsasallofthe26otherthreestrikeslawsintheUnitedStatescombined.”FranklinZimring,“ImprisonmentandtheNewPoliticsofCriminalPunishment,”Punishment&Society3(2001):p.163.41Pfaff,Myths,supranote38,p.504.42Pfaff,CausesofGrowth,supranote35,pp.7-21.43PatrickLangan,“America’sSoaringPrisonPopulation,”Science251(1991):p.1568.

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a0.5%impactonindictments.Theinstitutionalstructureofthecriminallaw,withpersistentlylowratesofprosecutionrelativetocrime,meansthatprosecutorialchargingdecisionsinevitablywillhaveadisproportionatelylargeeffectontherateofinputsintothecriminaljusticesystem.44

Tosummarize:holdingcrimeratesconstant,theUnitedStatescoulddramaticallyraisetherateatwhichpeopleareplacedintothecriminaljusticesystemwithoutrunningafoulofthedeontologicalconstraintagainstpunishingtheinnocent.Moreover,eveniftheUnitedStatesrefusedtoincarceratepeoplefordrugcrimes,itsincarcerationratewouldstillbeanomalouslyhigh,sincethelargemajorityofpeoplewhoareincustodyaretherefortraditionalmalainsecrimes.Finally,ultra-harshsentencesdonotexplainwhytheAmericanincarcerationrateisashighasitis.Tothecontrary,thereissomereasontobelievethatthemajorcauseofgrowthintheAmericanincarcerationrateisthatmorepeoplewhocommitcrimesaregoingtojailfordoingso.Hence,Iconcludethataprimafaciecaseinfavorof(3)—thatthecurrentAmericanincarcerationrateisnottheresultofsystematicviolationofdeontologicalconstraints—ismadeout.ItfollowsthatthereisaprimafaciecasethatastrictlydeontologicaltheorycannotexplainwhytheUnitedStatesnowincarceratestoomanypeople.

IstressthatIamnotcriticizingdeontologicaltheoriesofpunishmentforbeingunabletoresolvethetypeofhighlyconcrete,fine-grained“policy”questionthatphilosophicaltheoriesingeneralshouldnotbeexpectedtoanswer.WhatIamcriticizingthemforistheirinabilitytogetagripononeofthemostbasic,andmostpressing,issuesincriminaljustice,whichishowmuchofitthereshouldbe.Atheoryofpunishmentthatcannotprovideaplausibleframeworkfordecidingwhetheritwouldbeagoodideatoquintuplethesizeoftheincarceratedpopulationinthespaceofagenerationdoesnothaveanincompleteaccountofhowmuchcriminalpunishmentisenough;itisonethathasnosuchaccount.Thatisaseriousfailinginatheorythatisostensiblymeanttohelpusevaluateactualcriminaljusticeinstitutions.

3.

Inowturntoconsiderfourobjections.First,onemightobjectthatevenarelativelyshortcustodialsentenceofafewmonths

couldbedisproportionateforthecrimesthatthepeoplewhoreceivethosesentencesareguiltyof.Thedifficultywiththislineofobjectionistwo-fold.First,whiletheconceptofproportionalitycould,ofcourse,bemodulatedsoastohitanexogenouslyspecifiedincarcerationrate,thiswoulddrainproportionalityofanyindependentcontent.Itwouldsimplybeameansforensuringthattheincarcerationratedoesn’texceedsomearbitrarilyspecifiedvaluefornMAX,ratherthanasubstantivefactorindeterminingwhatthatvalueshouldbe.Second,onceweleavebehindtherealmoftheoutrageous—boilingoilforbicyclethieves,asPhilipPettitandJohnBraithwaiteonceputit—whatisaproportionatepunishmentisveryhard,ifnotimpossible,tospecifyconcretely.Indeed,deontologicaltheoriststhemselvesconcedeasmuch.Forinstance,whileWellmaninsiststhatapersonwhocommitsacrimeonlyforfeitshisclaimagainstaproportionatepunishment,heisat

44SeeKing,supranote28,p.12.

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painstonotethatwhatspecificallyisrequiredforapunishmenttobeproportionateisveryhardtodetermine.Ashenotes,“themostsophisticatedretributivistsroutinelyshyawayfromofferingprecisepunishmentsforspecificcrimes,”andhetoodeclinestooffera“simpleformulafordeterminingwhichspecificrightsareforfeitedbyanygivencrime.”45

Idonotmeantosuggestthatproportionalityisameaninglessideal.Myclaimisratherthattheidealofproportionalityinpunishmentis,toborrowaRawlsianslogan,“political,notmetaphysical.”46Thenormofproportionalityismademeaningfulbythedecisionsofappropriatelyconstitutedinstitutions,notbyabstractmoralreflection.Wehaveconsideredjudgments—forinstance,thatlifeimprisonmentforpettytheftiswrong—andthesejudgmentsprovideareasonablysolidbasisforjudgingasentencingregimethatroutinelyproducesthosekindsofoutcomestobeinthatrespectunjust.Butwithintheseverybroadlimits,whatproportionalpunishmentconsistsinisdeterminedbytheoperationofappropriatelyconstitutedinstitutions,institutionsthatmaybeinformedbyparticularculturalbeliefs,legaltraditionsandsoforth.Ifweareunsureaboutthesentencesourinstitutionsgenerate,wehavereasontotakeahardlookatthedesignofthoseinstitutionstoensurethattheyarenotdominatedbyperverseincentives,captureandshort-termpoliticalgain.Itmaystillbethecasethatthesentencestheygeneratearepointlesslylong,inflictingmoreharmthanbenefit.Buttheywillnot,therefore,bedisproportionate.

Second,proponentsofstrictlydeontologicaltheoriesofpunishmentmaybitethebullet,

rejectpremise(1),andclaimthatmassincarcerationispermissible,atleastundersomecircumstances.Suppose,forinstance,thathalfofthepopulationstealsakidneyfromtheotherhalfofthepopulation,andthatallofthekidneythievesarepromptlycaptured,prosecutedandimprisonedforafewmonths.Whatwouldbetheinjusticeinthat?Afterall,everyoneinprisonisguilty,andisservingaproportionatepunishment.Isn’tthatexactlywhatpunishmentisfor?47

Here,itisimportanttorecallthatIamnotpurportingtoshowthatastrictlydeontologicaltheoryofpunishmentisfalse,noreventhatincarceratinglargenumbersofpeopleisnecessarilyimpermissible.IamonlypurportingtoshowthatifitistruethattheUnitedStatescurrentlyincarceratestoomanypeople,thenyoushouldrejectastrictlydeontologicaltheoryofpunishment.

Iwillnottrytoconvinceyouthatincarceratinghalfofthepopulationwouldbeunjust,eveniftheyhaveallcommittedacrime.Iwilllimitmyselftopointingoutthatifitisn’t,thenobviouslyincarcerating0.75%ofthepopulation–thecurrentAmericanrate–isalsojust,giventhatalmosteveryoneincarceratedisinfactguiltyofacrime.ThisimpliesthatyoushouldbeunmovedbythethoughtthattheAmericanincarcerationrateisfivetimeshighernowthanitwasagenerationago,andthatithasincreasedeveninthefaceof45Supranote7,pp.386-387.46SeeEmmanuelMelissaris,“TowardaPoliticalTheoryoftheCriminalLaw:ACriticalRawlsianAccount,”NewCriminalLawReview15(2012):pp.146-148.Metaphysicalconceptionsofproportionalityremaincurrentintheliterature;seee.g.,GregRoebuckandDavidWood,“ARetributiveArgumentagainstPunishment,”CriminalLawandPhilosophy5(2011):pp.73-86.47Iowethisexample(andthisobjection)toKitWellman.

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steadilydecreasingcrimerates.Moreover,ifyouthinkthatitisagoodthingthatthosewhocommitcrimesareimprisoned,thenyoushouldbemoanthefactthatinrecentyearsAmericanincarcerationratesappeartohaveleveledofforevendeclinedsomewhatfromtheirpeak,andadvocateareturntothehalcyondaysofstaggeringgrowthintherateatwhichcriminalsweresenttoprison.RatherthanworryaboutthefactthatAmerica’sincarcerationrateisdramaticallyhigherthantherateinanyothersimilarlydevelopednation,youshouldholditoutasamodelforothercountriestoemulate.Perhapstheseviewsaresound;certainly,nothingIhavearguedismeanttoshowthattheyarenot.Butifyouaredoubtful,thenyoushouldnotbitethebullet.Youshouldrejectthepremiseofthekidneyexample,andyoushouldconcludethatguiltalonedoesnotprovideasufficientreasontoincarcerateanarbitrarilylargepercentageofthepopulation.

Third,itmightbearguedthatmyaccounthaswronglyportrayeddeontologicalpunishmenttheoristsasoddlysingleminded—obsessedwithpunishingtheguiltytotheexclusionofallelse.Butnothingpreventsstrictdeontologicaltheoristsfromrecognizingvaluepluralism,suchthatanydeontologicalreasonwehavetopunishisqualifiedbythemanycompetingdemandsthatcitizenscanlegitimatelymakeoneachother.Thus,Wellmanpointsoutthatrightsforfeitureisnotalwayssufficienttorenderpunishmentpermissible,“becausetheremaybeotherfactorswhichgroundobligations.”48Forinstance,ifAhaspromisedBthatshewillnotpunishCevenifCdoesforfeithisrights,thenitwouldnotnormallybepermissibleforAtopunishCinthecasethathedoesforfeitthem.

Inconsideringthisobjection,itisworthbearinginmindthatstrictlydeontologicaltheoriesofpunishmentare,orsoIclaim,unabletoarticulateaplausibletargetforsociallevelsofpunishmentpreciselybecausetheydenyvaluepluralism:theydonotmerelyclaimthatthereisadeontologicalaspecttojustifiedpunishment,butinsistthatsatisfyingtherelevantsetofdeontologicalconstraintsisallthereistojustifiedpunishment.Forinstance,showingthatJoneshasforfeitedhisrightnottobepunishedisbothnecessaryandsufficienttoestablishthatitispermissibleforustodoso.Incontrast,alessstrictformofdeontologicaltheorythatisopentoawiderrangeoffactorsinevaluatingpunishmentcould,inprinciple,drawonpunishment’snetsocialcostsindetermininghowmuchpunishmentisenough.49

Ofcourse,itisalwayspossibletoimaginethattherearefurther,strictlydeontological,constraintsthatwouldpermitadeontologicaltheoryofpunishmenttobeappropriatelycriticalofmassincarceration.However,whileWellman’sexampleofthird-partypromisesofimmunitymaybeprobativeinindividualcontexts,itseemsunlikelytoexplainwhytheUnitedStateshasunjustlyincarceratedhundredsofthousands,ifnotmillions,ofpeopleoverthelastseveraldecades.50Soweneedsomeotherdeontologicalconstrainttoexplainwhy,giventhatmillionsofpeoplehaveforfeitedtheirrightsbycommittingcrimes,weare48Supranote7,p.375n.7.49Foracontemporaryexemplarofsuchaview,seeMitchellN.Berman,“PunishmentandJustification,”Ethics118(2008):pp.258-290.50Asithappens,thereisalegaldevicethatoperationalizesroughlythekindofpromiseWellmanenvisions,whichisaprosecutor’sofferofimmunityinexchange,forexample,forcooperationwithanongoinginvestigation.ItisunlikelythattheUnitedStatesincarceratestoomanypeoplebecausetoomanyofthesepromiseshavebeenrenegedon.

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neverthelessobligatedtopunishonlyasmallfractionofthem.Giventheinadequacyofstandarddeontologicalconstraintsonpunishmenttoexplainwhatiswrongwithmassincarceration,ithardlyseemsunfairtoshifttheburdenontodeontologicaltheoriststostatewhatthosefurtherconditionsaresupposedtobe.ThesefurtherconditionsshouldexplainwhytheUnitedStatestoday,despitepunishingonlyasmallfractionoftheguilty,neverthelesspunishestoomanypeople.Theseconditionsshouldnotsurreptitiouslyintroducingtheveryaggregativereasonsthatstrictdeontologyiscommittedtoexcludingasirrelevant.

Finally,itmightbeobjectedthateven,iftheUnitedStatesdoesnotincarceratetoomanypeople,adeontologicaltheoristcanstillexplainwhyitscriminaljusticesystemisunjustinmanyotherrespects.

Iamhappytoconcedethispoint.Afterall,IamnotsuggestingthatdeontologicaltheoristscannotexplainwhyAmericancriminaljusticeinstitutionsareunjustinanyrespect.Therearelotsofreasonswhythoseinstitutionsareunjust,andmanyofthesereasonshavelittleornothingtodowiththescaleofthoseinstitutions—forinstance,thattheinstitutionsarediscriminatory,orthattheconditionsofconfinementareunjustifiablyharsh.Perhapsthereareplausibledeontologicalaccountsoftherightsthatareviolatedbythiskindoftreatment.Myinteresthereiswiththenarrowquestionofwhethertheseinstitutionsareunjustbecausetheyincarceratetoomanypeople,settingasidetheissueofwhethertheymightalsobeunjustforotherreasons.Ishouldnote,however,thattheconcernwiththescaleofcriminaljusticedoeshaveimplicationsforatleastsomeoftheseissues.Thus,supposethatAmericancriminaljusticeinstitutionsareunjustbecausethecustodialpopulationisdisproportionatelycomprisedofracialminorities.Whetheryoubelievethatjusticerequiresthisdiscriminationtoberemediedbyincarceratingfewerguiltyminoritydefendants,orinsteadincarceratingmoreguiltywhitedefendants,issensitivetowhetheryouacceptadeontologicaltheoryofpunishment.

4.

Absentamorecompleteaccountofthedeontologicalconstraintsthatlimitthedegree

towhichasocietymaypermissiblypunishtheguilty,punishmenttheoristsfaceachoice:eithertheycanendorsetheclaimthattheUnitedStatesunjustlyincarceratestoomanypeople,ortheycanendorseastrictlydeontologicaltheoryofpunishment.Whattheycannotdoisendorseboth.

Itisworthtakingastepbacktoconsiderwhyitisthatstrictlydeontologicaltheoriesareunabletoprovideaplausibleanswertohowcommittedasocietyshouldbetopunishingtheguilty.Thebasicproblemis,asIhaveputit,thattheyprovidenoprinciplefordistinguishingbetweenthefirstandthenthcriminal:whateverreason(orpermission)wehaveforpunishingthefirstpersonappliesequallytothenthperson.Thatalonemightnotbesuchaproblem.Itbecomesaproblem,however,inthecontextofatheorythattreatsthosereasonsassufficienttomakepunishmentpermissible.Whatdrivesthethoughtthatsuchreasonsaresufficient—that,forinstance,thefactthatAstoleB’skidneyissufficienttojustifythestateinincarceratingA?Whatexplainstheintuitionthattherecouldbenothingunjustaboutincarceratingsomeonewhois,infact,guiltyistheassumptionthatcriminal

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punishmentissimplytheexemplificationofanexclusivelyindividualisticconceptionofwrongdoingandpunishment.51

Seenfromthisperspective—whatIhaveelsewherereferredtoasa“privaterightconception”ofthecriminallaw—criminaljusticeinstitutionsareimportantlydistinctfromtheinstitutionsandpoliciesthatregulatepublichealth,education,income,theenvironmentandsoon.52Afterall,formostpoliticalliberals,justpolicyinthosecontextsisnottypicallyconsideredtobefullyanalyzableintermsofpre-institutional,individualdesert.Rather,whatsomeonedeserves,e.g.,bywayofhealthcareorincome,dependsuponthelegitimateexpectationsengenderedbyjustpoliticalinstitutions.Thisisnottosaythatpre-legalandindividualisticreasonsareexcludedfromconsideration,butonlythatwhethertheygiverisetoaclaimofjusticedependsonhowtheyaretakenupbyjustpoliticalinstitutions.Forinstance,supposeJoneswouldsufferunlessheisprovidedwithanextremelyexpensivedrug.ItissurelythecasethatJones’sufferingprovidesareasoninfavorofprovidinghimwiththatdrug.Butthataloneisinsufficienttoshowthathehasalegalentitlementtosubsidizedaccesstothedrugthatanyjuststatemustnecessarilyhonor.53WhetherJoneshasalegalentitlementtothedrugdependsuponwhatarangeofeconomicandpoliticalfactors,suchasthecostofensuringthateveryoneinJones’positionreceivesthedrug,aswellasafairandinformedprocedureformakingacollectivedecisionaboutsuchmatters.54

Theexclusivefocusinstrictlydeontologicaltheoriesonindividualwrongdoingandpunishmentreversestheorderofexplanation.Itsuggeststhatcriminalpunishmentinstitutionsarejustinsofarastheygivepeoplewhattheydeserve.Thismakesindividual,pre-legaldesertexplanatoryofthejustdistributionofpunishmentinawaythatitisnotforothersociallycreatedandallocatedgoods.Forthosegoods,whatyoudeserveisexplainedbywhatjustinstitutionsdo;whenitcomestopunishment,whatjustinstitutionsdoisexplainedbywhatyoudeserve(or,atleast,whatyoudonotdeserve.)

Whatmakesindividualismseemattractiveasaviewofcriminalpunishmentisthethoughtthatcriminalpunishmentissimplyprivatepunishmentascarriedoutbythestateinlieuofprivateparties.Theeverydaymoralityofpunishment—asbetweenfriends,familymembersandcolleagues—generallydoesnotraiselargequestionsoffairdistributionandsocialcost.Instead,asbetweenprivateparties,whatisparamountisthefeltneedtomanifestourmoralconvictionsbypunishingthewicked.Thisassimilationofpunishment51This,Isuspect,iswhatgivesWellman’skidneyexampleitsforce:takenindividually,eachofthekidneythievesmorallydeservespunishment.Doesthatnecessarilymakeitpermissibletogiveittothem?Allofthem?52SeeVincentChiao,“TwoConceptionsoftheCriminalLaw,”inChadFlandersandZachHoskins(eds.),TheNewPhilosophyofCriminalLaw(forthcoming).53ThethoughtthatJonesdoeshaveanentitlementtothetreatmentthatanylegitimatestatemusthonoris,ofcourse,simplyafancywayofputtingSarahPalin’sinfamous“deathpanels”objectiontopublichealthinsurance:peoplehaverights(tohealthcare),andtherearethingsnostatecandotothem(suchasdenythemthatcare)withoutviolatingtheirrights.54Thethoughtthatpunishmentmustbedeserved,andthatdesert(atleastinthiscontext)mustbeindividualistic,hasdeeproots.Foranenlighteningdiscussion,seeSamuelScheffler,“JusticeandDesertinLiberalTheory,”CaliforniaLawReview88(2000):pp.983-987.

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ofindividualstopunishmentasasocialinstitutionrendersstrictlydeontologicaltheoriesexemplarsofwhatRobertNozickdescribedas“unpatterned”theoriesofjustice.Anypatternofoutcomesintheaggregateisjustsolongasitresultsfromaseriesoftransactionsthatareindividuallyjust.Forinstance,anypatternofoverallincarceration—anyvaluefornMAX—isjust,solongasitresultsfromproportionatepunishmentoftheguilty.And,hence,thesourceoftheproblem:thejudgmentthattheUnitedStatesnowincarceratestoomanypeopleis,likethejudgmentthatincomeinequalityistoohigh,ajudgmentaboutanaggregatepatternofoutcomes.Itisnotajudgmentaboutthequalityoftheindividualtransactionsthatleadtothatresult.

Wearenowinapositiontodrawseveralmoreconstructivelessons.Thefirstisthat,beforeendorsingatheoryofpunishment,weshouldapplyitsprinciplestoactuallyexistinginstitutionstoseeifitreturnsequallyplausibleresultsattheinstitutionallevelasitdoesincasesofindividualwrongdoing.Thistestismotivatedbythethoughtthatatheoryofpunishmentismorethansimplyatheoryofinterpersonalmoralitywritlarge;itisatheorythatismeanttoevaluatelargeandhighlycoerciveinstitutionsthataffectentirepopulationsincomplex,andsometimescontradictory,ways.

Second,ifthepatternofAmerican-stylemassincarcerationisindeedobjectionable,thenweshouldfurtherinsistthatatheoryofpunishmentevaluatenotsimplyhowaresultingpatternofpunishmentoutcomeswasarrivedat,butthevalueofthisorthatpattern.Atheoryofpunishmentshouldbeatleastpartiallypatterned,andthepatternitdefendsshouldrestonasubstantiveaccountofthepointofincarceratingthisorthatmanypeople.

Third,inspecifyingthenatureofthatvalue,anadequatetheoryofpunishmentwillalmostcertainlyhavetoacceptthattheaggregatecostsandbenefitsofaninstitutionofpunishmentarerelevanttoitsjustification.Sensitivitytothesocialcostsofpunishmentprovidesameansforatheoryofpunishmenttodistinguishbetweenthefirstandthenthwrongdoer,andhencetodecidehowcommittedtopunishingtheguiltyasocietyshouldbe.

Ofcourse,tosaythataggregativeconcernsarerelevanttopermissibilityisnottosaythattheydetermineit.So-called“hybrid”or“side-constrained”approachestopunishmentareconsistentwithendorsingprinciplesthatapplydirectlytooverallpatternsofpunishmentoutcomes,evenwhiletheyinsistthatevenjustpatternsofpunishmentonlybereachedthroughmeansthatrespectrights.Inshort,tosatisfythiscriterionofadequacyrequiresatheoryofpunishmenttonotsimplysetconstraintsontheuseofcriminalpunishment,butalsotoarticulateaplausibletargettowardswhichcriminalpunishmentisoriented,andagainstwhichtheoperationofactualinstitutionscanbeevaluatedasmoreorlessadequate.

Thiswayofputtingthemattermaymakeitseemasifonlyautilitariantheoryofpunishment—onethatholdsthatpunishmentisjustifieduptothepointwherethemarginalcostofanadditionalunitofpunishmentexceedsthemarginalgains—wouldmeettheminimalcriterion.Butthisisaplainnonsequitur.Therearemanywaysofspecifyingatarget,andthespecificapproachofclassicalutilitarianism—maximizingaggregatewelfareorpreferencesatisfaction—isbutoneofthem.5555PettitandBraithwaite’srepublicantheoryofpunishment,forinstance,isexpresslyconsequentialistbutnotatallutilitarian.SeeJohnBraithwaiteandPhilipPettit,NotJustDeserts:ARepublicanTheoryofCriminalJustice(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1987).

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Consideramoreexplicitlypoliticalinterpretationofwhatisrequiredtosatisfytheseminimalcriteria.Perhapswhatitisforanindividualtobefairlytreatedbythecriminaljusticesystemshouldnotbeexplainedinpurelyindividualisticterms,butshouldbeassessedagainstthelegitimateexpectationsengenderedbyinstitutionsthatoperateaccordingtopubliclyavowableprinciplesofjustice.Plausibly,institutionsthatmeetthisstandardwillprovideanadequatelevelofprotectiontoarangeofbasicinterestsonanon-discriminatoryandnon-hierarchicalbasis,butnotsomuchprotectionastopreventtheeffectivedeliveryofothercrucialservices,suchashealthcare,educationandsoforth,givenbothresourcescarcityaswellastheimpactofpunishmentitselfonthoseinterests.Justashowmuchofherincomeaperson“deserves”tokeep,orhowmuchhealthcareshe“deserves”toreceiveshouldshefallillaredeterminedbyreferencetothecoststoothersofadoptingthecorrespondingpolicy,whataperson“deserves”bywayofpunishmentisdeterminedbyconsideringwhetherotherscouldreasonablybeexpectedtobearthecostsofimposingituponher.Butbecausecriminalpunishmentitselfinvadesbasicinterests,thereisastrongreasonnottohavemoreofitthannecessary—thatis,morethannecessarytomaximallyprotectbasicinterestsinanon-discriminatoryandnon-hierarchicalbasis.Apoliticaltheoryofpunishmentofthisformmeetstheminimalcriterionofadequacywithoutcollapsingintoaformofutilitarianism:itprovidesageneralframeworkforevaluatingwhencriminalpunishmentisjustorunjustinawaythatissensitivetotheaggregatesocialcostsofpunishment,butunderasubstantivelydifferentsetofprinciplesfromthoseespousedbyclassicalutilitarianism.

Therangeofpossibleevaluativestandards,frommoretolessegalitarian,andmoretolessdemocratic,isobviouslymanifold,andIdonotintendheretoevenbegintoaddressthecomplexquestionsrequiredtofullydefendanyoneofthem.Onepossible—and,tomymind,attractive—wayoffleshingoutthepubliclyavowableprinciplesofjusticeisinlargelyprioritarianterms,whereaparticularlysalientquestionistheimpactofpenalinstitutionsonthefairdistributionofeffectiveaccesstobasiccapabilities.Acapabilityisbasicifitisrequiredinthatsocietytoliveasanequal—asapeeramongpeers.Becauseofhowessentialthesecapabilitiesaretoaperson’sequalstandinginsociety,thosewhoselivesaretherebyaffectedbytheoperationofcriminaljusticeinstitutions—forinstance,becausetheyareincarcerated,orbecausetheyareexposedtoariskofseriousvictimization—areowedanexplanationofwhytheyoughttoagreetohavetheirlivesaffectedinthatway.Moreover,theexplanationshouldbecouchedintermsthateveryonecanreasonablybeexpectedtoaccept.Sinceincarcerationwillcertainlyinvadeeffectiveaccesstoawideswathofbasiccapabilities,itisnotenoughtoshowthatthelegalrulewhichtheyareusedtoenforceisdesignedtoprotectbasiccapability;itmustalsobeshownthattherelianceoncustodialsanctionstothisorthatdegreeisreasonablyrequiredtomaximizeeffectiveaccesstobasiccapabilitiesforall,withprioritygivenfortheworstoff.

Nonormativetheoryofcriminaljustice,includingthisone,shouldbeexpectedtogenerateuniqueanddeterminateanswerstodetailedquestionsaboutthisorthatpolicyinitiative.However,itshouldatleastprovideaplausibleframeworkfordecidingwhetherasocietyismadebetterorworseoffwhenitquintuplesthesizeofitsincarceratedpopulationinthespaceofasinglegeneration,evenassumingthateverysinglepersonwhocyclesthroughthoseinstitutionsisclearlyguiltyofanuncontroversialcrime,andservesanunambiguouslyproportionatesentenceunderentirelyreasonableconditions.Incontrasttodeontologicaltheories,theprioritarianapproachIhavesketchedatleastsuggestsa

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principle,ifnodoubtcontestableinapplication,foraddressingthesekindsofquestions.Ifitturnsoutthatquintuplingthesizeofthecustodialpopulationdoesnotmaximizethelikelihoodthateveryone—includingthoseheldincustody—haseffectiveaccesstobasiccapabilitywhencomparedtootherreasonablyfeasibleinstitutionalarrangements,thatwouldbeareasonnottodoso,andpotentiallyareasontoundoitifhasalreadybeendone.

Anormativetheoryofcriminaljusticethattakesseriouslytheaggregatecostsandbenefitsofthoseinstitutions,aswellashowthosecostsandbenefitsaredistributedacrossapopulation,cannotaffordtobeasausterelyabstractasdeontologicaltheoriestendtobe.Deontologicaltheoriesofpunishmentcanhardlybefaultedforbeinguniquelyimmunetofacts,buttheirresistancetoempiricalconfirmationorfalsificationisconsistentwithamoralizingapproachtothecriminallawthatactivelyrejectsdetailedpolicyanalysisforsweepingexpressionsofmoralsentiment.IwillsimplynotethatCalifornia’snotorious“threestrikes”law,whichisbothharsherandbroaderthanhabitualoffenderlawsinotherstates,wasinitiallydraftedbythefatherofamurdervictim,andgainedpoliticaltractionafteraparoledrepeatviolentoffenderkidnapped,sexuallyassaultedandmurderedatwelve-year-oldgirl.Itwaspreciselynottheproductofanykindofcareful,cold-bloodedlookatthecostsofenactingathreestrikeslaw.Indeed,latereffortsmerelytofundastudyofthelaw’simpactwerevetoedbythegovernor.Whybother?Afterall,ifweareentitledtopunishwrongdoersregardlessof(asDuffputsit)the“contingentfuturebenefits”fromdoingso,andregardlessof(asWellmanputsit)whetherdoingsois“necessarytopromotesomeimportantaim,”thenevidenceaboutwhatgoodpunishmentachievesissimplybesidethepoint.

Thissuggestsafinalcriterionofadequacy.Aplausibletheoryofpunishmentmustbesensitivetotheempiricalevidenceabouttheconditionsunderwhichweshouldexpectpunishmentingeneral,andcustodialsanctionsinparticular,tobeaneffectivemeansinachievingthoseends.Theevaluationoftheseconditionsshouldthereforetakeintoaccounttherangeoffeasiblealternativesforachievingthoseends.56Theevidenceamassedbybesociologists,economistsandcriminologistsabouttheextraordinarilyhighnetsocialcostsofmassincarcerationisevidencethatatheoryofpunishment,ifitistoprovideplausible

56Forjustoneexample,atheoryofpunishmentthattakesseriouslythetaskofdeterminingwhentheuseofcustodialsanctionsisappropriate,andwhenithasbecomeexcessive,mustbesensitivetowhatweknowabouthowpeoplerespondtothepossibilityofsanction.See,forinstance,WilliamSpelman,“WhatRecentStudiesDo(andDon’t)TellUsAboutImprisonmentandCrime”,Crime&Justice27(2000):pp.419-494;Redburn,Travis,andWestern,supranote2,Chapter5.Naturally,whatweconcludefromanestimateoftheelasticityofcrimetopunishmentdependsinpartuponbroadercommitmentsinthetheoryofjustice—howweassessthesocialvalueofreducingcrimeasagainstthecostsofpunishment,aswellashowweassesstheresultingdistributionofsocialadvantageacrossthepopulation.Theneedforanoverarchingnormativetheoryisapparentwhenconsideringthatpunishmentisnottheonlywaytoreducecriminaloffending;othermeans,suchasincreasingthemalehighschoolgraduationrate,alsoappeartoreduceoffending,thoughatdifferentrates,andwithadifferentdistributionofsocialcostsandbenefits.SeeLanceLochnerandEnricoMoretti,“TheEffectofEducationonCrime:EvidencefromPrisonInmates,ArrestsandSelf-Reports”,AmericanEconomicsReview94(2004):pp.155-189.

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guidanceforreal-lifecriminaljusticeinstitutions,musttakeseriously.Itneednottreatsuchinformationasdecisive,butitcannotaffordtocompletelyignoreit,either.57

5.

ThereisafairamountofironytotheargumentIhavemounted.Consequentialist

theoriesofpunishmentareoftenthoughttobeunprincipledbecausetheyareallegedlyconsistentwithexcessivepunishmentandthetramplingofpeople’srightsinthenameofcrimereduction.Theironyisthatitisactuallystrictlydeontologicaltheoriesthatlacktheresourcestoconstrainthegrowthofthecarceralstate.Despitetheiremphasisonconstrainingpunishment,inpracticeitisstrictlydeontologicaltheoriesthatturnouttohaveaproblemwithpunishmentmaximalism.Refusingtosomuchasconsiderpunishment’s“contingentfuturebenefits”oritscontributiontoan“importantsocialaim”mayappearprincipledinthecontextoftheindividualcase,butitismuchmoreproblematicwhenusedasajustificationforignoringtheaggregateimpactofhundredsofthousands,orevenmillions,ofidenticalpunitivedecisions.Ignoringaggregationinthisbroadercontextyieldstheresultthatwherethenetsocialcostsofageneralizedpracticearesteeplyrising,thefactthattheyarenotobviouslydecisiveintheindividualcasewillmaskquiteextremecostswhengeneralizedtosocialpolicy,coststhatnoonewouldthinkitreasonabletoincurifpresentedwiththepolicyintheaggregate.Yetbecauseoftheirsystematicexclusionofsocialcost,thisispreciselywhatstrictlydeontologicaltheoriesentail.

Whentheaggregatecostsofincarcerationareworthbearing,andwhentheyarenot—aswellaswhatitistoshareinbearingthosecostsaspoliticalequals—arequestionsthatcannotansweredsimplybyobservingthatapenalsystemonlypunishestheguilty,andthenonlyproportionately.Itrequiresinsteadatheorythattakesseriouslythepoliticalcharacterofcriminaljusticeinstitutions,andespeciallytheirroleaspublicinstitutionsthatcreateandallocatecrucialformsofsocialadvantage.Whatisunjustaboutmassincarcerationisnotthatitnecessarilytramplesindividualrights.Itisthatitseriously,andalltoooftenpermanently,disfiguresmillionsoflivesforlittletonoend,andtherebyimposesextraordinarycostsonpeopleinawaythatisinconsistentwithpubliclyavowableprinciplesofjustice.Hence,ifitistobebothsatiableandrelevanttothedesignofpublicinstitutions,atheoryofpunishmentshouldstartwithaconceptionofcriminalpunishmentasthesubjectmatterofapoliticaltheoryofjustice,ratherthansimplyprivatemoralitywritlarge.

57FranklinZimring,GordonHawkins,andSamKaminarchlynotedthatpopularsupportforthelaw“couldbetheoppositeofaninstrumentaljustification,inwhichpeoplebelievethatthelegislationisappropriateonlybecauseitiseffective.Instead,itisoftenthecasethatbeliefintheeffectivenessofapenalstatuteisrootedinthecitizens’convictionthatthelawisappropriate.Sincethepenalmeasuresfeelright,theymustbeworkingwell.”Zimring,Hawkins,andKamin,supranote40,p.221.