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Marshall’s Dilemmas

N D E R different conditions September would have been a sat- isfying month for General Marshall. Instead, as arguments over

his appointment mounted, it became troubled and unsettled. Rather than looking confidently toward his future command, the Chief of Staff faced painful dilemmas.

The month had started well. At its opening Montgomery’s troops had moved across the Strait of Messina into the toe of Italy, less than a week before General Clark’s Anglo-American force landed at Salerno. On the day before the second landing, September 8, General Eisenhower aii- nounced the Italian armistice, arranged by members of his staff with the Badoglio government.

Recent weeks had also gone well for the Soviet Union. At the beginning of February 1943 the final remnant of German resistance around Stalin- grad had ended to complete what Sir Basil Liddell Hart called “the most long-drawn-out battle of the Second World War.” Then in July, after the greatest armored battle of the war, near Kursk, the Red Army beat back the powerful panzer forces of the enemy. On July 12 the Soviet forces opened their offensive against the Ore1 salient, retaking the city three weeks later and ending the possibility of any later attack on Moscow. Before the month ended, the Russians had clearly seized the initiative from the enemy and opened the drive that although slowed at times, would not be complete1)l halted. By the end of August, Soviet forces had regained Kharkov, crossed the Donets, and were driving hard for the Dnieper.1

At home Marshall in his biennial report, issued on the day of the Ital- ian surrender, had just reviewed his work since 1941 in preparing the Army and the Army Air Forces for war. Intended, as the Chief of Staff stated, to eliminate “various rumors and beliefs regarding the progress of the war and . . . to prepare the people for the heavy fighting and heavy

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280 Organizer of Victory

casualties which must be endured prior to [the] victory,” the report made clear the tremendous advances of the past two years.2

Since mid-1941, Marshall revealed, the enlisted strength of the Army had been “increased by 5,000,000 men” and “the officer corps had grown from 93,000 to 521,000.” The gains included 182,000 officers and nearly 2,000,000 enlisted men in the Air Forces Unprecedented growth included a 3500 percent increase in the Air Forces proper, 4000 percent in the Corps of Engineers, and 12,000 percent in the service personnel of the Air Forces.

Global war [reported Marshall] has introduced lines of communication encir- cling the earth (a rough check indicates that present protected supply lines extend over 56,000 miles). It has made necessary harbor improvements with depots and railroad management, as in the Persian Gulf for the transportation of supplies to Russia, and in the region of the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. I t has required construction of bases in Australia and throughout the Pacific and air bases at Karachi and Calcutta on the west and east coasts of India, pipe lines and pumping plants to facilitate movement of gasoline, and a multiplicity of requirements to support our fighting forces and permit them to devote their undivided attention to the enemy.

Marshall called special attention to the assistance given Soviet Russia since the German invasion. “Over 3,000 airplanes, 2,400 tanks, iog,ooo submachine guns, 16,000 Jeeps, 80,ooo trucks, 7,000 motorcycles, 130,000 field telephones, and 75,000 tons of explosives” had actually arrived in Russia in addition to many other items of munitions, foodstuffs, and raw materials.

He ended by painting a rosy picture for the future:

July i , 1943, finds the United States Army and Navy united against the Axis powers in purpose and in operations, a unity shared when the occasion de- mands by the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Chinese, Dutch, French, and other fighting elements among our friends and supporters. Across the At- lantic the enemy had been driven from North Africa, and Europe has been encircled by a constantly growing military power. T h e Russian Army, engaging two-thirds of the German ground forces and one-third of the German air fleet in deadly and exhausting combat, has dispelled the legend of the invincibility of the German Panzer divisions.3

The reactions of the former, Chief of Imperial General Staff, Field Mar- shal Sir John Dill, were given wide publicity. He commented:

T h e tale of the orderly though nonetheless rapid development of the mighty strength of the United States Army is of itself a most impressive one, and one can gather how immense must have been the effort involved to ensure a proper balance and co-ordination . . .

Every American citizen who reads this report will, I am confident, be filled with pride and thankfulness. Pride in the wisdom of the Commander in Chief, pride in what has been achieved, and thankfulness to the Chief of Staff and those working under his direction who made this vast achievement possible. Victory is not yet, but in this report we see how much the seeds of sure victory have been ~0wn.4

Marshall’s Dilemmas 281 And indeed almost without exception the chief newspapers of the nation applauded Marshall’s achievements.

Paradoxically the tremendous growth of the Army under Marshall’s leadership constituted one important reason why he found it difficult to take the overseas command. It was one of the manifold reasons that his continued presence in Washington seemed so important to his fellow Chiefs of Staff, leading members of Congress, and old friends, such as Pershing, and why he now faced a dilemma that he found increasingly difficult to resolve. Although he knew and characterized as “ridiculous” charges that he was being eased out of Washington, he could see daily evidence that a strong hand such as his, strengthened by a prestige slowly gained in Allied councils, would be needed to deal with pressing prob- lems in theaters around the world and at home.6

First of all, old suspicions in the Pacific resurfaced. There had been a warning in the sharp reactions from the Southwest Pacific to the an- nouncement that Lord Louis Mountbatten would head a new Southeast Asia Command. The significance of Mountbatten’s appointment was widely misinterpreted and nowhere more than in MacArthur’s theater. On the evening of September 21, in a statement described by one news- man at Southwest Pacific Theater headquarters as “mysterious and unex- pected,” the American General implied that his plans for winning the war in the Pacific had been scrapped at Quebec and that he had been relegated to a third-rate role in favor of the campaigns of Lord Louis Mountbatten and the island-hopping strategy of the Navy 6

In his criticism of the Navy strategy MacArthur explained that his own concept was only to use massive strokes against major strategic objectives, taking advantage of surprise and air-ground striking power, supported and aided by the fleet. “Island-hopping, with extravagant losses and slow progress,” he continued, “is not my idea of how to end the war as soon and as cheaply as possible.’’ “It is typical of MacArthur’s humility,” wrote one newsman from New Guinea, “that the man Roosevelt drafted out of retirement added: ‘I have no personal military ambition whatever, and am perfectly content with such a role as may be prescribed for me.’ ”

If MacArthur had no ambitions for a larger role, his friends did not share that view. One or more members of a five-man senatorial team just back from the Pacific had other ends in mind. Senator Albert B. (“Happy”) Chandler of Kentucky announced on his return that he would urge in the Senate that MacArthur be given Supreme Command of Allied Forces in the war against Japan. In reporting Chandler’s statement the Army and Navy Journal agreed that the Southwest Pacific com- mander should be “destined for direction of a far larger sphere in the Pacific than he now commands.” The Washington Ttmes-Herald polled several members of Congress and came up with “typical comments” by six members, three Democrats and three Republicans, praising MacArthur. Although Senator Rufus Holman of Oregon thought that MacArthur’s

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plans had been discouraged possibly because the President feared him as a political rival, and Representative James W. Mott of the same state saw Mountbatten’s appointment as the first step in easing MacArthur out, none of the men interviewed mentioned the plan suggested by Chandler.8

One of MacArthur’s stanchest newspaper supporters, the Ttmes-Herdd, hailed his challenge to the plans made at Quebec. I t continued:

President Roosevelt, according to New Dealers, regards MacArthur as his McClellan. General George Briton [szc] McClellan, commander and organizer of the Army of the Potomac, ran against President Lincoln in the Civil War.

MacArthur’s blast was regarded in some quarters as a bid for the presidential nomination. Friends of the General dismissed this suggestion as absurd, declar- ing that he was making a bid for recognition of the proper conduct of the war. They insist that MacArthur’s soldier’s heart cherishes no presidential aspira- tions.0

There had been earlier straws in the wind that summer. Colonel Mc- Cormick said in an interview in New York: “Roosevelt’s in a hell of a position. If MacArthur wins a great victory, he will be President. If he doesn’t win one, it will be because Roosevelt has not given him sufficient support.’’ In late August, Representative Hamilton Fish, a well-known Republican isolationist from Roosevelt’s congressional district, spoke of the opposition being built by Republicans and anti-New Deal Democrats against “the power-hungry bureaucrats and left-wing New Dealers in Washington.’’ He proposed drafting General MacArthur on “a win-the- war platform and on a one-term plank, as opposed to a fourth term and military dictatorship.” A short time later Senator Arthur Capper, Repub- lican of Kansas, expanded the slate by saying that he believed MacArthur or Eisenhower would be the Republican presidential candidate in 1944. To those who doubted the effectiveness of the MacArthur boom, a Gallup poll in mid-September gave some interesting data. In answer to the ques- tion of how they would vote if an election were being held at that time between Roosevelt on the Democratic ticket and MacArthur on the Re- publican, 58 per cent of those expressing an opinion favored the President and 42 per cent the General. But among Middle Western farmers the vote was Roosevelt, 44 per cent; MacArthur, 56 per cent.10

No matter how much MacArthur’s friends then or later denied his po- litical aspirations, the private record of one of his chief supporters for the presidency, Senator Vandenberg of Michigan, revealed irrefutably after his death what had been suspected earlier, that the Southwest Pacific commander was willing to be a presidential stalking horse. Although Mac- Arthur carefully remained aloof from any overt political move, he was cognizant through one or more of his personal staff that efforts were being made to get the nomination for him. Possibly he wanted only to ensure that he got what he wanted in the Southwest Pacific, but it is difficult to doubt that he knew that an attempt was being made to take advantage of public resentment against the administration’s policies. Throughout the

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Marsh all’s Dilemmas 283 summer of 1943 Vandenberg continued the efforts that he had begun ear- lier in the year to win support for a MacArthur candidacy by conferring with such potential backers as General Wood of Sears, Roebuck, former president of the America First movement, and newspaper publishers such as Frank Gannett and Roy Howard. Lest he precipitate a premature boom, Vandenberg warned his intermediary with the Southwest Pacific commander, Major General Charles A. Willoughby (MacArthur’s chief of intelligence), to tell “my friend to just ‘get on with the war’ and to forget this whole political business back here in the States.” In mid- September the senator wrote General Wood. “I have heard from General Willoughby that the ‘situation is satisfactory’ (which is all I care to put on paper) and that the guidance of friends like you and Edgar Queeny and Frank Gannett and Roy Howard and myself will be satisfactory. Roy Howard seems to be in doubt about the whole matter (although not through any lack of total loyalty to the General).” l1

By the end of September public reaction against recent strategic deci- sions emphasizing the war against Europe and leaving MacArthur short of supplies encouraged Vandenberg to hope that an effort to cash in on American public opinion could succeed. “These people,” he wrote, “can easily martyrtze him into a completely irresistible figure So it seems to me more important than ever that we should give our own ‘commander-in- chief’ [Roosevelt] no possible excuse upon which to hang his own politi- cal reprisals. It is obvious on every hand that the movement [for MacAr- thurl is making solid headway in all directions. . . .” l2

Not all MacArthur’s supporters were as discreet as Vandenberg. John O’Donnell, whose column faithfully reflected the Patterson-McCormick opposition to the administration, implied that campaign politics was in- volved in recent presidential decisions. He declared. The tart comment of General MacArthur from his Australian headquarters had only one meaning: “The American hero issued the statement and cleared through his censorship the blunt interpretations of correspondents so that the people back home shall know that higher-ups in Washington have Been starving him for men and supplies to fight the Japs and that now he has been told to play second fiddle to Lord Louis Mountbatten, who will launch the spectacular main attack on Japan while the Hero of Bataan fights a third rate holding war in the islands north of Australia.” He predicted that the real story would break within a few days as Senator Chandler led the fight for a larger role for MacArthur with support from Senators Lodge and Brewster.l3 O’Donnell had once goaded Roosevelt to the extreme of presenting him with a German Iron Cross for service to the enemy, and it is not unlikely that Roosevelt felt tempted at this point to send him another.

O’Donnell’s speculation met strong rebuke from Republican and Democratic papers alike. The pro-Republican New York World- Telegram reacted heatedly:

284 OsgmiZeH Of ViCeOnpl

When General MacArthur publicly challenges the strategic decisions of Ais superiors, that is news. But it is dangerous news, revealing a split so serious that the General feels justified, in the most unusual military course of carrying a highly technical strategy dispute to the public.

When this coincides with semiofficially inspired stories about a shift of Gen- eral Marshall [to overseas] command, the whole thing becomes too explosive for safe-ty.

We have too much admiration for MacArthur as a man and a great soldier and too much sympathy with his desire to press the war against Japan, to condemn him for this risky action without knowing all the facts. Nevertheless, the burden of proof certainly is on him to justify a course which, if followed by commanders on other fronts, might destroy public confidence and service con- fidence in the global conduct of the war.

Of course MacArthur has nothing to do with attempts to make political capital out of military disputes-those misguided efforts of some of his support- ers in this country are hurting him more than are his critics.14

Roosevelt and his military advisers could not believe that the Pacific commander was opposed to what was being done in his name. Even if the presidency was not involved, it appeared that a challenge to the President and the high command might be thrown into Congress-where an ex- panded command or a different strategy for MacArthur would be de- manded. Perhaps Roosevelt took the matter too seriously. But the fact that a few weeks later he told General Morgan of COSSAG that he might not be able to spare Marshall for political reasons may have meant that he feared a serious challenge in Congress in 1944. Further the question was whether, as Chief of Staff, Eisenhower, who had once served as a major and lieutenant colonel on MacArthur’s staff in Washington and Manila, would be as capable of coping with the prestigious Southwest Pacific com- mander as would Marshall, who stood well with Congress ,and had the venerable Pershing as champion.

Equally important to the President and the War Department was the careful handling of Stilwell and the rancorous situation in the Far East. The relative calm that had prevailed in that area during the Quebec conference ended in early September. On the fifth Ghennault took advan- tage of his authorized channel to the President to send a message of dis- couragement: he was not getting promised supplies. While he did not name Stilwell as the guilty party, he left Roosevelt free to draw only one conclusion.15

General Marshall discussed the Stilwell problem with Stimson on §ea- tember 6, blaming the Generalissimo and Madame Ghiang Rai-shek for much of the difficulty. Apprehensively both men awaited new complaints that would certainly be forthcoming.

They did not have long to wait. In midBeptember, Dr. T. V. Soon& Chinese Foreign Minister, made a number of proposals designed PO inn- prove Chiang Kai-shek’s position and to curb General Stilwell’s pwer.

Marsh all’s Dilemmas 285 His first requests were totally unrealistic. He proposed Chinese represen- tation on the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Munitions Assignment Board, recommendations that the British would not accept and that the United States-despite its greater respect for Chiang’s role-was not even prepared to transmit. He also asked for a Chinese Supreme Commander and a Chinese Chief of Staff for the China Theater with American depu- ties and urged that all military units of whatever nationality be under the Supreme Cornrnander.16

Soong next attacked the multiplicity of jobs held by Stilwell, aiming at any job held by the CBI commander instead of at his absurd conglomera- tion of hats. Stilwell was the Generalissimo’s Joint (Allied) Chief of Staff, China Theater, and commander of the U.S. Forces (including Air) in the CBI. A particular sore point to the Chinese was the fact that under him came Major General R A. Wheeler’s Services of Supply in India and China. In addition to these assignments Stilwell had command of Chinese divisions in India and exercised an undefined authority over Chinese forces in Yunnan Province. Worst of all, from Chungking’s standpoint, he could influence the flow of Lend-Lease supplies.

Exasperated by the continual bickering and countercharges, Roosevel t asked Marshall to talk with Soong. The Chief of Staff conferred politely with the Chinese representative but firmly declined to make requested changes in the command structure. When near the end of the month Soong complained to the President that Chennault was not getting planes that had been promised, Roosevelt spoke more pointedly to Marshall, ask- ing that he “get behind this again and vigorously push our agreed plans.” 17

As the Chinese situation continued to deteriorate, the Secretary of War attempted to take a hand. In talking with Roosevelt on October 18, he found him seemingly determined to recall Stilwell. Stimson hastened to inform Marshall of his conversation and to reiterate that he still believed Stilwell to be the best man for the job, even though he could not get along with the Generalissimo.18 \

“Marshall [was troubled] over it, being tired and worried himself, and I could see that it was a blow to him,” Stimson wrote. The Chief of Staff told Stimson that he was now sorry that he had not brought Stilwell back earlier when the shift would not have appeared to be a dismissal. On the following day Marshall actually had a draft cable prepared ordering Stil- well’s relief. Apparently he thought briefly of Somervell, then on a trip to the Far East, as a replacement. For a moment it seemed that Stilwell had

But he was to hold on for another year. In an intriguing episode Stil- well was saved in part because of the intervention of the Soong sisters, Madame Chiang and Madame Kung, and partly through the efforts of General Somervell.

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286 rganizer of Victory Shortly before this development Mountbatten and Somervell had set

out from Quebec to explain the QUADRANT conference decisions to Chiang Kai-shek. Enroute, at New Delhi, they met Dr. Soong, who informed Som- ervell that Roosevelt had agreed to withdraw Stilwell. Somervell had heard nothing of this before he had left Washington, a few days earlier. Marshall apparently got his first word on the nineteenth, when Stimson did. Soong then either had prior information from Roosevelt, which was not passed on to Marshall, or drew unwarranted conclusions from conver- sations with the President.

The Chinese diplomat also warned Mountbatten that any attempt to name Stilwell as his Deputy would be disastrous.20 Mountbatten was star- tled by the idea, fearing not only the effect of command changes on his operations but also an unfavorable American reaction. “He felt,” Somer- vell reported to Marshall, “that the same group that claimed’that he was attempting to supplant MacArthur would claim that no sooner had he arrived than he had successfully ousted the one possible contestant for fame and glory in South East Asia.” 21

While Mountbatten remained briefly in New Delhi, Somervell flew on to Chungking. There the Generalissimo, using Soong as interpreter, indi- cated that he wanted Stilwell recalled. Knowing that Marshall’s backing still held, Somervell urged Chiang Kai-shek to reconsider.

At this crucial moment Madame Chiang Kai-shek and her sister came to Stilwell’s aid. In an atmosphere of “medieval court intrigue,” as Somer- vell described it, the ladies upset the plans of the Generalissimo and of their brother. An “unholy family row” developed over Stilwell, and “the Madame was overheard telling Soong that thenceforth he would be sick, to go home, and not to reappear at the conference.” Calling Stilwell away from a party that he was giving for Mountbatten, Madame Chiang urged him to seek an interview with her husband. She reminded him of the deference due Chiang’s position, suggesting he explain that if he had made mistakes he had done so from misunderstanding and not intent and that he was ready to cooperate fully. The truculent commander’s first reaction was to tell everybody to “go to hell,” but he finally yielded to reason. He submitted resignedly to a lecture by the Generalissimo on the duties of a Chief of Staff and an admonition to avoid “a superiority complex.” The talk, he noted, seemed to clear the air.22

Actually the rifts in Stilwell’s relationships with the Generalissimo had only been papered over. A truce had been proclaimed, but Stilwell there- after gave less and less attention to his activities as an adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. He stressed increasingly his duties as acting Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of the Southeast Asia Command and Commander of U.S. Forces, CBI.23 So far as Chinese forces in India were concerned, he was a necessary link between the 6eneralissimo and SEAG. The British refused to place their troops under Chiang Mai-shek, and the Generalis-

Marsh all’s Dilemmas 287 simo insisted that his forces fight under Stilwell rather than under British command. This solution was further complicated because Stilwell did not wish to be under General Sir George Giffard, Commander-in-Chief, 1 1 th Army Group, slated for command of Allied Ground Forces, SEAC. He proposed instead that he serve as a corps commander under Lieutenant General William J. Slim, commander of the British Fourteenth Army. With that Mountbatten had to be content. But the strange arrangement worked. Despite some snide remarks in his diary, where neither friend nor foe was completely safe from entries that apparently eased Stilwell’s mind, “Vinegar Joe’’ held Slim in high esteem.24

Initially Stilwell seemed pleased at the appointment of Mountbatten, recording that Lord Louis was “a good egg.’’ Within three weeks he was convinced that the Admiral was “after my scalp.” According to Stilwell, Major General Patrick Hurley, in China to arrange for Chinese participa- tion in the approaching Allied conference at Cairo, had tipped him off. “Louis is working up the ‘controversy’ between me and Chennault and spoke of it to Hurley,” he wrote. “Apparently the idea is to judge me, take the part of my subordinate, and kick me out. Hurley asked him right out if he were by any chance following the old British game of ‘divide and rule.’ ” 25

If trouble was brewing between Stilwell and Mountbatten, the Chiang Kai-shek-Stilwell relationship seemed momentarily on the mend On No- vember 6, designated by the U.S. commander as “Love Feast Day,” the Generalissimo “was affable as hell” He asked Stilwell to make China’s report at Cairo. Marshall was informed of the improved state of affairs but not that it was more apparent than real. Stilwell’s current addition to his diary read: “Ella [Madame Kung] had told me he [Chiang] was in a jubilant state of mind and ready to be very friendly. Well if I hadn’t heard him rattle his tail I might have been taken in. Mistake! Last time he didn’t rattle at all-just struck.”26 Had Marshall been looking over the General’s shoulder, he would have been more certain than ever that the best time for Stilwell’s recall had passed.

Neither the old arguments nor the new command tangles in the Far East had been settled when Marshall’s attention was diverted to the task of helping to attain closer coordination of American and Soviet military efforts in Europe. This aim had been spelled out after Russian acceptance during the Quebec conference of an Allied proposal for a foreign minis- ters’ meeting in Moscow in October, hopefully in preparation for a con- ference of the leaders of the three great powers and their staffs later in the year.

Before this coordination with the Russians could be achieved, Marshall found that the United States had to send to Moscow a team of military and diplomatic representatives who would concentrate on working with the Soviet leaders rather than quarreling among themselves. He knew

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288 Organizer of V ~ C ~ O V that the American diplomatic-mili tary set-up in Russia had been marked by dissension for many months.

Part of the trouble dated from the fall of 1941 when Lend-Lease ar- rangements with the Soviet Union were concluded by the Beaverbrook- Harriman Mission. To expedite the President’s “hurry, hurry, hurry” di- rective to rush assistance to the Soviets, Hopkins had arranged that an American member of the mission, Colonel Philip R. Faymonville, be left behind as his Lend-Lease representative. A highly competent West Pointer, Faymonville had held the post of military attache in Russia from I 934 to 1939. Despite Faymonville’s obvious acceptability to the Russians and fluency in their language, General Marshall was disturbed by reports that he had been overfriendly to the Russians during his tour as military attache. When Hopkins asked that Faymonville be assigned to the new position and promoted, the Chief of Staff passed on word that onetime associates of the colonel, including former Ambassador to the Soviet Union William C. Bullitt and Loy Henderson, assistant chief of the Divi- sion of European Affairs of the State Department, questioned the Lend- Lease officer’s judgment and impartiality where the Russians were con- cerned. When Hopkins insisted that the Lend-Lease Administration must have the confidence of the Russians, Marshall did not argue further. Knowing that the President was depending on Hopkins to get supplies to the heavily pressed Soviet forces, Marshall agreed to a star for the

To balance the harsh judgments on Faymonville, there is the private report to Marshall by Major General John R. Deane after he had worked with Faymonville at the Moscow conference in the fall of 1943: “Now as to the set-up here. We found the place seething with cliques, gossip, etc. . . . Perhaps it was unfortunate that Faymonville was returned here for a few days but H do not think so. . . . Despite everything that has been said, he impressed me more favorably than any of the old regime. He did his job well and was the only one who didn’t think everyone else in Rus- sia both Russian and American was an S.O.B. I think his trouble lay in a too literal interpretation of his instructions and a stubborn persistence in refusing to depart from his interpretation.” 28

Faymonville’s cause was aided at the White House because of his pre- dictions as early as the summer of 1941 that Russia would hold out-at a time when U.S. intelligence officers in the Soviet Union and in the War Department expected her defeat within a few weeks. But the accuracy that won him the title of “General Who Called the Turn” did not make him popular with the U.S. military’attachb who was sending back con- trary prophecies. Further the military attachd, Colonel Joseph A. Mi- chela, found that Faymonville, with the use of Lend-Lease leverage, was getting information h m the Soviets that was not available to the em- bassy staff. Michela complained to his superior in the

~010ne1.27

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Marshall’s Dilemmas 289 Major General George V. Strong, who passed the messages on to General Marshall. Faymonville was even less popular with the diplomatic repre- sentatives because he had asked for and received from the White Mouse an understanding that he would not be answerable to the U.S. ambassa- dor or the embassy staff.

General Marshall was embarrassed by the complaints and charges against the newly made general but because of Faymonville’s special rela- tionship with the White House, he did nothing. Later, in discussing Fay- monville, he mused over the fact that representatives of a country who remain abroad for an extended period tend to see issues through the eyes of the people to whom they are accredited. Even Ambassador Joseph Ken- nedy, he recalled, although no wholehearted admirer of British policy, ended by supporting British Mediterranean strategy.29

An attempt was made to change the situation in 1942 with the arrival of the new U.S. ambassador, Admiral William H. Standley, former Chief of Naval Operations and a friend of Roosevelt’s. Like Marshall and most other Army and Navy officers, the Admiral liked clear-cut lines of author- ity. It was repugnant to him to find that as the President’s chief represent- ative in the Soviet Union, he did not have control over an Army officer he far outranked. Standley became especially incensed when he found that Faymonville had far greater access to Russian officials than did the ambas- sador and his staff and that, as Michela had reported, he received infor- mation from the Russians and from the White House that he would not share with the embassy.

In addition Standley was infuriated by actions of some of the Presi- dent’s special representatives who also bypassed the ambassador, on their own arranged conferences with Russian officials to which he was not in- vited and of whose nature he was not informed, and without his advice made statements that sometimes caused considerable embarrassment. In the fall of 1942 he was particularly outraged by the visit of Wendell Will- kie, Roosevelt’s Republican opponent in the 1940 presidential election. T o quote Standley, “his daily and hourly actions had served to by-pass me and undermine the prestige and respect due the American Ambassador.”

Finally Standley, deciding that he must make clear to the Russians and the President that he could not remain unless his position was respected, asked to be brought back to Washington for consultation. After a frank talk with Roosevelt in which he felt that he had gained a promise that the situation would improve, he agreed to go back to Moscow. Among Stand- ley’s specific requests to which Roosevelt assented were that his naval and military attach& be made rear admiral and brigadier general respectively and that Faymonville be instructed to report to him for duty and be under his administrative control. The Lend-Lease Administrator, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., issued the necessary orders concerning Faymonville. King agreed at once to promote the naval attach& Marshall, when asked

290 Organizer of Victory

about the military attach& replied, “Brigadier General is not the usual rank of an officer who has duty as Military Attach& but if that is the way you want it, Bill, Michella [ S K I will be promoted.’’

Within a short time after his return to the Soviet Union, Standley found that the promotions were almost all that he had gained. Faymon- ville continued to go his independent way, and as the weeks passed, other special representatives arrived who paid as little heed to Standley as had the earlier ones. Seven months after he returned, he became completely fed up. On May 3, 1943, the announcement that former Ambassador Jo- seph E Davies was being sent by the President with a secret message for Stalin proved to be “too much.” The Admiral asked to be relieved of his duties and brought back home not later than October IO.

Standley’s request was still awaiting action in August when the Presi- dent at Quebec decided to send Secretary Hull with a staff to meet in Moscow with Foreign Ministers Eden and Molotov and their respective delegations. Since this appeared to be a good time to reshuffle the staff in Moscow, he asked Standley to come to the United States in September in time to brief Hull before his departure. I t was clear that the ambassador was not to return to Moscow.30

In one of his happier choices,of the war Roosevelt named as Standley’s successor Averell Harriman, an old friend and trusted representative, then serving in London as the President’s Lend-Lease chief and member of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board’ and of the Combined Pro- duction and Resources Board. Son of the great railroad builder E. H. Harriman, manager of part of the empire built by his father, Harriman had entered the first Roosevelt administration with a post in the National Recovery Administration and then had served as director of the raw- materials division in the Office of Production Management before being sent to London on his Lend-Lease assignment. He headed the American delegation in the Joint Mission to Russia on Lend-Lease in the fall of 1941 and was back again in Moscow the following August for the confer- ences between Churchill and Stalin. No admirer of the Soviet system, he had proved his interest in helping the Russians defeat the common enemy. The services he had already rendered the Soviets in their fight deserved and won from them a sympathetic reception.

From his visits to Russia, Harriman was aware-even without being warned by others-that a successful tour of duty in the Soviet Union re- quired a changed administrative arrangement. For assistance he turned at once to General Marshall.

The Chief of Staff had been attending conferences with the new ambas- sador since the meeting at Argentia and was aware of his contributions as a trouble shooter for the President. But it was more than admiration for a gifted public servant that led him to agree heartily with the new ambassa- dor’s proposals. Detesting confused command channels, he accepted fully Ambassador Harriman’s views that the Military Mission, which included

M ar‘sh all’s Dilemmas 291

the Supply Division, should work directly under him. The change was made easier because one of Marshall’s bright young officers was selected as head of the Military Mission-Brigadier General John R. Deane, for whom the Chief of Staff at once recommended an additional star. Deane had served as Secretary General Staff and then had succeeded Bedell Smith in 1942 as Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Later he was U S. Secretary of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In a comprehensive discussion on September 22 Marshall and Harri- man agreed on measures to end the era of divided responsibility and con- trol. The small Military Mission was to be sent to Moscow under the am- bassador’s direction Brigadier General Sidney P. Spalding, head of the Supply Division of the Mission, was made responsible for the handling of Lend-Lease matters in conformity with policies established by the Lend- Lease Administration but under the coordination and supervision of the ambassador and the chief of the Military Mission. The warring briga- diers, Michela and Faymonville, were to be recalled, and no military at- tache was to be named until Harriman decided that such action was de- sirable.”l

Marshall’s directive, incorporating Harriman’s thinking, defined Deane’s objective as the promotion of “the closest possible coordination of the military efforts of the United States and the U.S S R.” To achieve this goal Deane was authorized to discuss with Soviet authorities all informa- tion concerning United States military strategy, plans, and operations that, in his judgment, was appropriate. But he was “to make no commit- ments which cause an increased deployment of U.S. Army supplies or troops without War Department approval.” 32

Not included in the directive itself was a statement on primary objec- tives for the ambassador and the head of the Military Mission that had been agreed on by the President, General Marshall, and Admiral King. According to Harriman, he and his staff were “to break down Soviet sus- picion and win their confidence that we might eventually obtain better knowledge of Soviet plans and establish a basis for closer cooperation in carrying out operational plans. We should also look toward the Pacific war not only to obtain Russian participation but to have them give us the right kind of help and enough time to prepare to make their help effec- tive.” 33

As Deane observed after the war in his book, The Strange AZZzance, the Russians were extremely suspicious of all foreigners. Recognizing that military and naval attach& by definition, were engaged in getting infor- mation on the country to which they were assigned, the Soviet officials avoided seeing them. “It was partly to overcome this attitude,” Deane noted, “that the United States withdrew its AttackiQ and substituted the Military Mission.” In view of this situation Marshall instructed Deane shortly before his departure “to avoid seeking information about the Rus- sians.” This suggestion, reported by General Deane in his book, was cited

292 Organizer of Victory

in June 1951 by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin as evidence that Marshall was pro-Russian. He overlooked the points italicized below from Deane’s paragraph, which read in full:

General Marshall took the view that even though the Soviet authorities turned over to us the blueprints of all their weapons, their tables of organiza- tion, and their complete tactical doctrine, the information would not change by one iota American production lines, organization, or tactics. He was con- vinced that a quest for such information was not only unnecessary but would irritate the Russians and make operational collaboration impossible. His at t i - tude made my task in Russia much easier and accounted in large measure for whatever success the Mission enjoyed . Consequently we studiously refrained from seeking information about Soviet equipment, weapons, and tactical meth- ods unless we could present a strong case to show that such information was of value in our fight against Germany . We did ask for and received some informa- tion about Russian cold-weather equipment, tactical methods in river crossings, and their organization to discover German agents operating in the rear of Soviet lines.34

In writing of his problems Deane contrasted Soviet secrecy with Ameri- can openness in regard to tactics, production, and weapons. From a key statement in the book McCarthy chose to quote: “Our policy was to make any of our new inventions in electronics and other fields available to Rus- sia” and then replaced with asterisks the following qualifying words, which apparently few of his admirers have bothered to read: “once we had used such equipment ourselves, had exploited the element of sur- prise, and were satisfied that the enemy had probably gained knowledge of the equipment as the result of its having fallen into his hands.” Thus a number of important items were not passed on to the Soviets. The senator did quote Deane’s later statement, “We never lost an opportunity to give the Russians equipment, weapons, or information which we thought might help our combined war effort,” but the omission of the earlier pas- sages-deliberate or not-gave a sinister overtone to Marshall’s instruc- tions.35

Deane was appointed by the American Chiefs of Staff to sit in on the forthcoming Foreign Ministers’ conference in Moscow, October 19-30, as a military observer. The instructions the Chiefs gave him were guarded. He was authorized to reveal to the Russian representatives details on Al- lied operations in Europe not already given them, if developments in the conference warranted; if the target date for the cross-Channel operation was divulged, he was to explain the importance of coordinating Russian action with that attack; and in giving the general outlines of the offensive against Japan, he was to stress the advantages to the Soviet Union in joining with the Allies.36

At the meeting Deane and General Ismay were required at the start to

Marshall’s Dilemmas 293 assure the Russians that the Allies were at last firmly set on the cross- Channel operation for the spring of 1944 The Soviet representatives seemed pleased. As Deane reported to General Marshall:

T h e Russians had only one subject to put on the Agenda-“Ways of hastening the conclusion of the War ” This was divided into three parts. (a) Intensive measures in 1943 to ensure invasion of Northern France, (b) Get Turkey into the war now, (c) Get use of Swedish air bases now. Of course the British and we looked on this as a political conference but they had to agree to discussions which our politicos turned over to “Pug” Ismay and me . T h e minutes

. I think, will indicate that we were quite frank both as to our intentions and as to what conditions would have to exist for OVERLORD. We gave a brief indication of the preparations now underway and tried to impress on them the part that the bomber offensive is playing. T h e Soviet delegates appeared to be completely satisfied but reserved the right for further questioning. This was a great relief 37

In the course of the briefing both Eden and Ismay objected to the full presentation that the Americans wanted to give. Apparently on the strength of the British complaint to London and, in turn, to Washington, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff instructed Deane to go along with the British and limit the information that he gave the Russians. Ambassador Harriman forcefully complained to General Marshall that this restraint was not in accord with arrangements made with him before he left Washington. The new instructions, he said, “make it impossible to fulfill the commitments to the Soviets taken by Secretary Hull at the conference, on the advice of Deane and myself that the Soviet Military Authorities would be com- pletely informed of the progress of our OVERLORD preparations.” 38

Although Harriman agreed on the importance of working as a team with the British, he did not expect that the Americans “would be com- pelled to go into double harness with them.” Citing Deane’s knowledge of security matters, gained from his experience as Secretary of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Harriman asked that the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s latest in- structions be modified to allow Deane to use his judgment as to what should be told the Soviet authori ties.39

Despite his initial elation at the Russian reaction to the report on OVERLORD, Deane soon had ominous news for Marshall. A gloomy report by Alexander on progress in Italy contained, in Deane’s opinion, the in- ference “that OVERLORD will be delayed or possibly abandoned because of the Italian situation.” 40 Foreseeing that “we may lose the OVERLORD fight in Moscow even before it is discussed at the coming conference” (Cairo- Tehran), Marshall recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff inform Deane that they felt that Alexander had failed to give sufficient weight to Allied naval superiority and complete dominance of the air in the Mediterranean. In his proposed statement, which was approved and dis-

294 Organizer of victory patched, Marshall and his colleagues declared that they did not believe “the situation in Italy is such that it would cause a delay, much less an abandonment of OVERLORD.” 4 1

ish conniving. The Prime Minister, he feared, despite his lip service to the cross-Channel operation, was prepared “to stick a knife in the back of OVERLORD and I feel more bitterly about it than 1 have ever done before.” This was not completely fair to the Prime Minister, because Stimson as- sumed incorrectly that Eisenhower disagreed wholly with Alexander and that Churchill had withheld this fact from the Russians. Actually the Allied Commander-in-Chief, in forwarding Alexander’s statement, had described it as a clear and accurate picture of the battle situation in Italy. What he had added, and what General Marshall quickly sent to Moscow, was the statement: “the estimates of our buildup and availability of land- ing craft as given by General Alexander are not quite in line with my own understanding, as the allocation of craft were firmly made at the Quebec Conference and the only changes have been in our favor. Our buildup so far has at least equalled our estimates.” 42

Both the Prime Minister and the Secretary of War had spoken too quickly. Churchill had overreacted to the opportunity to lay the ground for further action in the Mediterranean; Stimson had lashed out in haste. In the future the British leader would press harder for delays in shifting landing craft and divisions to the United Kingdom from Italy, and Stim- son would insist all the harder on the need of a firm hand in charge of operations against the Germans More than ever, he was convinced that Marshall must be Supreme Commander.43 Viewed in a different light, a light that perhaps both Roosevelt and Marshall were beginning imper- fectly to perceive, the episode was one more excellent reason that fall why the Chief of Staff should remain at his vantage point at the seat of power.

General Marshall watched warily the Prime Minister’s attempts to pro- mote landings in the eastern Mediterranean. After the early September meetings in Washington, Churchill deluged the Middle East commander, General Wilson, with wires from Washington and, a few days later, from shipboard. The Prime Minister could argue that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had approved an attempt by Wilson to seize Rhodes and other is- lands of the Mediterranean. But they had stipulated that the effort should be made with the resources available to the Middle East com- mander. In the end Churchill’s doggedness created what he himself de- scribed as “the most acute difference 1 ever had with General Eisen- hower.” Throughout the controversy Marshall steadfastly supported the Allied Commander.

Churchill’s frenzied attempts to get additional shipping and men foundered as the battle slowed in Italy. The Salerno operation had started well on September g with word coming, as the forces neared the beaches the night before, that the Italians had signed an armistice.

I “Dirty baseball” Secretary Stimson termed what he believed to be Brit-

Marsh all’s Dilemmas 295 Strongly backed by the Allied naval forces, General Clark’s Fifth Army, with British and American corps, landed against fairly heavy fire put down by the Germans, who had taken over the defenses from the Italians. Salerno was taken, and the Allies were managing to push inland when the Germans rushed in reinforcements from the north and east. Meanwhile the enemy units that liad been slowing Montgomery’s Eighth Army as it inched up from the toe of Italy shifted northward. British warships moved forward off Salerno to give close support, and Allied air forces bombed columns of troops and attempted to break up troop concentrations. In a series of counterattacks during a three-day period the Germans threat- ened to drive the Allies back into the sea and at one point seemed likely to cut in behind American forces on the beaches. Fortunately the line held until armored and airborne units could be brought in By the fif- teenth the main battle was won, and by the eighteenth the Fifth and Eighth armies joined up to secure the area.44

The crisis had passed, but General Marshall was afraid that the enemy would dig in while the Allies were moving slowly against Naples. On the twenty-third, as the Allied commander was enjoying Churchill’s message of praise for taking risks, he received a query from Marshall ask- ing if he could hold a,line before Naples and make an end run for Rome. Grieved to think “that General Marshall does not give him credit for cracking the whip,” Eisenhower skipped breakfast and lunch although Smith and Butcher tried to cheer him by facetious wisecracks about com- plaints while they helped draft a reply, citing lack of landing craft. In passing Butcher noted, “We have the paradox of the Prime Minister ap- plauding Ike’s willingness to take risks while General Marshall and Sir John Dill, from their global viewpoint in Washington, criticize him for failure to be bold ” 45 He failed to recall the main point-the American Chief of Staff liad agreed to the operation in southern Italy and a push toward Rome only as a means of getting a firm position at which to hold while men and landing craft were shifted from the Mediterranean to cross- Channel preparations.

The situation improved near the end of September, and on October 1

the Allies entered Naples. It was soon evident that the next phases of the advance would be more difficult. As Clark met enemy resistance along the Volturno, Montgomery-engaged in moving his supply base from the toe to the heel of the boot-was slowed, and additional demands were laid on Allied shipping. There was little to spare in the way of men and ships at a time when the Prime Minister revived his scheme for securing the islands of the eastern Mediterranean.

Hoping to induce Italian garrisons in some of the islands to resist the Germans, the Middle East Command in September had set small forces ashore on Rhodes, Leros, Samos, and Cos. The Germans on Rhodes re- acted quickly, seizing control shortly after the surrender of the Italian government. In October, German parachutists captured Cos, goading the

296 Organizer of Victory

Prime Minister to enjoin fresh miracles on his Chiefs of Staff and on Ei- senhower. His demands startled both his own Army Chief and the Allied commander. General Brooke was convinced that “with the commitments we have in Italy we should not undertake serious operations in the Aegean.” Unmoved by his adviser, Churchill soon “worked himself into a frenzy of excitement about the Rhodes attack . . and has set his heart on capturing this one island even at the expense of endangering his rela- tions with the President and Americans and the future of the Italian cam- paign.” 46

Unwilling to concede that he could not push a campaign for Rome and grasp for the Dodecanese islands at the same time, Churchill thought that he merely had to persuade the Americans to see reason. When his appeal of October 7 to President Roosevelt for landing craft and assault craft was turned down, he tried another tack Recalling that “far-reaching favour- able results” had followed his journey from Washington to Algiers with General Marshall in June, he asked Roosevelt to send the General or some other representative to Eisenhower’s headquarters for another meet- ing. But the situation had changed. Replies for the President’s signature, prepared in the War Department, reflected Marshall’s firm intention not to make further concessions. The reply of October 9, ruling out a meeting, supported only such action in the Dodecanese as required no heavy com- mitments The Americans were unwilling to divert forces from Italy that would “jeopardize the security of the Allied armies” there. More impor- tant, they were opposed to entering on another campaign that might bring greater involvement in the area east of Italy. “The problem then is,” the President declared, “are we now to enter into a Balkan campaign starting with the southern tip or is there more to be gained, and with security, by pushing rapidly to the agreed upon position north of Rome . . . ? Strategically, if we get the Aegean Islands, I ask myself, where do we go irom there and vice-versa where would the Germans go if for some time they retained possession of the islands?” 47

At Churchill’s insistence the President agreed not to bar Eisenhower’s staff from further examination of the British case. Before they could reach a final decision, however, they had evidence that the Germans were pre- paring for a major battle south of Rome, which ended any prospect of diverting further strength to the battle for the islands. I t spelled the end of the Prime Minister’s hope. Although some assistance was given the gar- rison at Leros, it fell on November 16 to an assault by the Germans.48

Marshall’s strong opposition to Churchill’s pressure for operations in the eastern Mediterranean was the type of action he could take as a senior member of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but one that would be scarcely possible for him as commander of the invasion force. This thought may have been in his mind as well as in Roosevelt’s when the time came nearer for the final decision on the Supreme Commander.