fi , is ,rdvealing. Two stations provide t, n o editorials and: the ,third, .WOW,

1 only recbntly initiated a twke-daily, fiveminute commentary on Irela- tively safe subjects. A ICMT~V affi- cia1 assqred the-commissiomthat his station had differed +th the news- paper in the past, but could not re- call one instance in the last seven years. XETV officials said nothing at all.

Just how all this impressed the commissioner was impossible to tell. Though the stations had,shown little appetite for local, live pro- graming, Commissioner Henry pru- dently abstained from any comment that might be construed as intimida- tion. Congress as well as the indus- try was listening.

Not to be denied, the trade publi- cations pounced on Henrys state- ment, that. FCC standards (later amended to :policies) may not co- incide with those of the public. The statement earned added signifi- cance amid rumors that he would replace .Minow as commission

I . .

chairman.: They also reported-heav:, ily on the hostility to the inquiry, predicting, i t would be. the last: Clearly, ,the ambush at Omaha Pass had been worth it. .. . But what had it been worth to Omaha? In a series of post-mor- tems, the daily paper by turns scoff- ed at the hearings and hinted darkly that the commission, under Ken- nedy, would impose censorship %y a firm hand in a velvet glove. Yet the recent appearance of new local live programs, together with the resignation of one station manager, suggests thei stations were less pleased. with their performance than they professed publicly. Quite possibly the concept of public re- sponsibility may, yet take hold in Nebraska.

But Omaha: broadcasters - like those in so many one-newspaper communities-will never fully meet ,public needs until they recognize their unique responsibilities vis-&- vis a monopoly press. This responsi-

I

axalnple, b13e - papers - inability t o place pubhc above private interest ha.s divided the cityybetween Those who trust .it expli,citly and - those who cant tmstit at all. And when I the interests of both m e g a coincide, as they did during the hearings, the public is completely ignored.

Omahas TV newsmen have a 8ine reputation for objective report- ing. But i t is a lightweight lever against the impacted printed word. Only a willingness to interpret the news, together with bolder experi- mentation in other video-art fohns, will reopen the avenues of genuine communication and stimulate the liind of creative controversy that has so long been suppressed under the newspapers virtual monopoly of lopinion. At stake is the citys ability to encourage and retain its talented, intelligent, youth who cannot recon- d e what they have learned with , what they are told to believe. In- creasingly, they, and their profes- ~sors, =e leaving the state.

baity is a?t the same time * their , Even the Indians are, quitting the greatest opportunity. In Omaha, for reservation.

Syria: Test of )Arab Unity

Damascus The .ten-day feast to celebrate Syrias revolution of last March opened on an omlnous, note when one of the worst cloudlbursts. in recent memory descended upon this city, temporari- ly the cynosure of the Arab world. Prepakatmns ground to a soggy halt as pedestrians, ,with trousers rolled knee-high, waded through streets transformed into chocolate-colored cascades, shop owners mopped up their deluged stores, and flags drip- ped disconsolately on corners. On the following day, however,

Danlascenes were again erecting their displays, lighting the exledors of public buildnigs with strings oP bdbs and covering the city with a blankei of banners and bunting. By tlle next day, the damage had been rep*ed, the flags wexe flap-

Gary Lecompte land Leo Mahalian ping in the sunshine, and Damas- cenes, after thanlung Allah for the blessing ofmin, once more resumed their voluble discussions of the Cairo unity talks.

The uni,ty charter issued at the end of these tallis incorporates some Baathist principles and furnishes the trappings, at least, for an Iraq-Syria- Egypt merger. But the means of implementation are left vague, and the Baathists expect conflict with Naslser on such questions as party structure and regional autonomy in ,the drawing up of the necessary constitution. Further, the Baabhists fear that Egyptian socialism will work in neither Syria nor Iraq. The charter provides twenty months for writing. a constitution; an Iraqi- Syrian coalition will battle1 to Beep Nasser from running the show.

Arab Unity is the ambition of nearly a l l 01- the; pohtical factions in Syria (this is like being for motherhood am1 .against &I), but the immediate practical problem was how to unite these fractious ,liiCUUllki asld ,vive-Uliis: uoualky sLablt;

government, while at the same time establishing bonds with other Arab states which d s o seek unity. In a country caught in the cross-currents of divergent minorities, these two objectives may, in the long run, be hard to harmonize, especially for the Baath (Rebirth or Resur- rection) Party, the powerful mi- nority now controUing the regime.

For the Baa,thists, Arab unity means more %an merely address- ing other Arab states as ,sisters. As the party slogan (Unity, So- cialism and Freedom) suggests, the cause of Arab unity precedes the other two aims set down by Michel Aflaq, tl1eir spiritual leader. On Ihe other hand, they are con- vinced that, while working for Pan- Arablc unity, they mus,t devote themselves 8 at the same time to achieving political i,ndependence and a stable, indigenous form 01 soclalisllc government in thek own land; that is, their dogan operates on all t hee cylinders or no1 at all. = LllpliGiti~~l&J d 0 &UCc;C.S~ful

p

11

effort at union among th6 Arab states are too profound to examine in detail here, but the weight of 80,000,000 people, unifying and modernizing themselves, might easi- ly change the shape of international politics and economi,cs (i.e., the threat to Israel, the attitudes of an Arab common market). It is quite natural, at this point, for the cynical Westerner to ask what the chances are of mccess.

The cynic might point out that the historical experiences of the Arab peoples have varied widely ever since Tufkish rule was estab- lished five hundred years ,ago. In: fact, he might argue that m y sem- blance of unity among them was . . . - ~. * _ ^ ^ finished even before Mohammeds coffin reached the grave in 632 arid his lieutenm-bs began to quibble over who would succeed him. From these quarrels there developed the present-day Islamic sects, as nu- merous and irreconcilable as the sectarian splinters of Christianity. For some Syrians, the shadow of

, a despotic ruler &lll looms danger- ausly over any projected lalliance;

. and n o doubt the Iraqi Baathists, with their predominantly Bri,tish education, their rougher methods ,and their richer natural resources, may be cautious in forging asso- ciations with the Syrian Baa~s ts , , witli their predominantly French education, their suave manners and their largely algricultural economy.

Second, the Baathists call for a democrbtic rule by political party rather than by authoritarian hand, with the aim of expading the freedomls f&ar in: the West. Yet, despite their determination to build a populdr p&ty, the Baath is an elite ininority which took con- trol of the government by coup detat rather than by any clear-cut mandate from the people. Though the Baath Party seems to have con- siderable support from both he military and professional classes, no orie luiows when it will dare to approach the electorate of Syria, which s t i l l has strong, if presently silent, separationist elements among athe merchant class, as well as a radical element that prefers the absolute power of Nasser to fcollective lehdership (drawn chiefly frm the educated PalesW- ans whso, though not full-fledged

citizens, wield influence in Syria). This second development depends

L@&Y th& Sbil3ty ti the Badthis$s to am

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clo what no gfoup has. been able to do since the evgcuation of Syria by the French on April 17 of 1946 (a national holiday which culm+ nated the ten-day feast): to over- come within yria itself the fac- tionalism that asises out of a com- plex of causes, mostly historical, political and personal. For example, the citizens o f , Horns have waged a tbousand-year propaganda battle against ,the people of Ham-a. A Syrian of Meppo, the manufactur- ing center of tihe country, is likely to be suspicious of his country- men &om Damalscus, long the com- msercial center. Christian Arabs, a minority in a predominantly Mos- lem countrv. #still recall. whenever religious issues flare jnto fisticuffs

S E: Chronic~e Po Zlozu me I

(as during the March 8 revolution) with apprehension the massacres of the last century. ~Moslems in turn sometimes resent what khey regard as ah unwarranted superiiority cam- plex of the Christiaix. The irnpor- ta?tt Armenian minority (dmost 70,000 in Aleppo), descendants of the rehgqes of the Turkish massa- cres, remain largely unassimated etlintcally and politically (perhaps the only way these proud people can retain !their identity as Armen?anls).

In a country which has had far more coups than elec,tions, it wiIl not be easy to find a base on which to build a stable govel-nment. Izi fact, many foreign observers feel that the coup detnt has become part of the national sport of politics. No ,one, they conclude, is -terribly distressed by a coup: the ousted minister is taken off to pzson, but allowed to furnish his cell, receive his political agsbciates and rni&t,ain ibtive political Life from i hill over- looking Damascds. The c ~ e n t re- gime plotted the March 8 coup from prison, and t h k Minister of Communications, JTIiad Dahi, was dearly Wgotteii t~ntfl ,he-e&led l3s

\

sUppor,t for the new regime froni his prisbn cell. No violent treat- ment is tol3erated amd only civil isola~ion is partially enforced. It is considered politically ethical to treat opponents very hum,anely, a practice in sharp contrast to the bloody habits of the Iraqis, ljut one hardly calculated to preserve the peace. The Baathists will have to find a way to render the opponents of their regime hleffective for a prolonged period withouk touching off the violence so characteriQtic of revolutions. As of this writing, they have succeeded. At the same time, they must learn to avoid the temptation of crushing the voices of criticism and opponents who might be rallied in the intereLst of national we lke .

Politics in Syria form an integral and disturbing element in the daily life, Young Snians who are experiencing fihe impact of Western mores on their oiyn con- servative social stnicture f?hd that socfd freedom, especidlf as related to the opposite sex, is very limited, except in the most Westernized household (often anathema to or- thhbdax Moslems). In plgce ob wliat would be a bvisy social life fn t h C United States for a young man, there is intense interest i!n political affairs, High-school studenbs are al- ready profe,ssional, political discus- sants, and by the time they reach the university, they become asso- ciated with one of the many po- litical factions established Within .the stddent body. Syrian students earnestly believe that they must play an important role in deter- mining political policy, and to a certain extent they do. Whenever the students threaten to demon- strate, the university is hastily shurt down by bhe aethorities. For an American accustomed to the blask indifference to politics on unfver- sity campuses at home, this can be an exciting and exhilarating spirit, but it is also dleadly to any serious attempt to establisll stability in the government. The simple truth is that most students, though they be- have otherwise, know less about poli,tics than their elder statesmen, and that very often (this seems to be true of the Communists) they will react to governmental action in the, hope of hindering authority. Of course, s tdents everywhere are rebellious, but this spirit of re-

(Continued on page 384) The N h T k d l

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clich6, without either the constant in- side-outside punning on jazz-twelve- tone analogues within a highly com- plex structure such as one fiqds in Babbitts All Set (performed on an earlier Schuller concert), or the flex- ible movement from totally organized texture to free-for-all Jazz improvisa- tion and back through relatjrlg inter- medial degrees, such as one hears in Schu.lIers own big-band Transforma- tzon and other of his third stseam works. Of course, Schifrin wrote for a jazz Instruqentatlon, and one of the, great joys of the evening was to hear sych music performed precisely and fluently by jazz musicians,

But if Schifrins music is reason- able compositionally, despite its failure to ,fulfill any of its pretensions to either ,jazz or any pther 7 originality, Duke Ellingtons ,Rem@scid in Tempo, one: of the earljest (1935) attempts

formally-ambitious jazz, is n o more than :a, loose, medley of apparently routine. cllqruses wit11 a corny refFain (dthopgh perhaps Schyllers declared enthusiasm for it has subtlergrounds t$an I can- discern), and falls~ into the traps that -also make. Gersh*ns serious: music ,so grotesquely inferior to, his eornq~ercial~ .. stuff. .

I As f& as individual. perforq- ances were concerned, the co~lective ilriprovjsation at the. end of the con- cmt reyealed the same relationship betqreel? the- speotacularly fgr out Dolphy agd some of his .less Per- sollal but more musically disciplined colleagues XhAt pqtams betwcen the Gazzelonls and the I Schullers of the atbet world, Thus; Don Ellis impro- vised op trumpet wit17 a fluency and subtlety whose phrpsc- and pitch- relaticgl to the underlymg structure T found, extraartjin&p perceptive and mtelligeyt, and whloh lnade Dolphys solo break seem Incoherent and t o ~ 1 g ~ e - ~ a d by comparjson Altogether, the level of ipstrumentallsrp v a s so h!gh that it will be years before I can look a symphony wmd-player in the eye, The most memorable demon- strations of competence were the bass playing, of Richard Davis, whose pitch- and timbre-scnsitiwty and delicate dexterity were unshakable even in the raucous coptext of the Dolphy quartet; the trombope playmg of James ICnep- per, who has found remarkable re- sources of agility and fluidity in this slugglsh instrument, and the saxo- phone playing of Phil Woods, with its i1lexhaushble variety of perfectly con- trolled gradatiopS, of tone color, dy-

I (&o?ttiymed ,from page 376) bellion is some,times intemified in a patriarchical society ,such as Syria. How the Baathists intend to control student power in the fu- ture is unknown, but if they are successful in permitting the stu- dents to express their sentiments regularly through the ballot, much of this rebellious energy may be constructively dissipated.

The military also suffers from its historical experience and its at- tachment to a society where poli- t ~ c s is a national passion. The Syrians established a tradition, after World War 11, of ,alliances between tbe military and- political parties. Like the public seotor, the military is honeycombed with political factions, with eqch elemept preshing orward its own ideology and attempting to transfer opposing , officers to m - significant assignments. The old Turkish practice of assigqing op- ponents to positions abroad as mili- tary attach& has become a corner- stone of Syrian poli,tical-military life.

Every previous regime knew that its longevlfy depended on its poli- ticking with the ascendarit militarry faction. The encouraging note to- day i s that the Baathisls, ham- struqg by fiheir distaste for h m y interyention is politics, never suc- ceeded h buildiq up an effectivc Ihihtary wmg during their peak years of 1955-1958. In $he recent revolutmn, they were driven to rely og Socialist elements of other fac- tions in the military for support, such as Akram d-Houranis Social- ist Raty, but the attempted house arrest of al-Hourani may indicate which way the Baathist wind will blow. If Christian Michel Aflaq and Moslem Saleh al-Din Bitar, close friends since their student days at the Sqrbonne in the early thirties, candirect instead of submi.tting to military power, they way yet bring about the national rebirth (buath) by the modlfication of traditional attitudes and s o c d oyganization that they have long pledged.

In tho current conflict over the form which unity should take, con- federation or federation, the Ba- athists ability ,to handle both Nas- ser and his supporters among the Syrian working dass will be their key to survival. As one leading gov- ernment source described the situa- ,tion, present complex, future ob- scure. .

The NATIQN