March 2016 Resilient Organisation or Mock Bureaucracy€¦ · The concept of organisational...
Transcript of March 2016 Resilient Organisation or Mock Bureaucracy€¦ · The concept of organisational...
Emergency Planning College
Occasional Papers New Series
Number March 2016
Resilient Organisation or Mock Bureaucracy:
Is your organisation “crisis-prepared” or “crisis-prone”?
Dr Kevin PollockEmergency Planning College
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Please Note:
This Occasional Paper is a discussion article, written and published in order to
stimulate debate and reflection on key themes of interest to the resilience community.
It is part of a series of papers published by the Emergency Planning College on the
Knowledge Centre of its website and available freely to practitioners and researchers.
The opinions and views it expresses are those of the author. This paper does not
constitute formal guidance or doctrine of any sort, statutory or otherwise, and its
contents are not to be regarded as the expression of government policy or intent.
For further information, including a submissions guide for those who wish to submit a
paper for publication, please contact:
Mark Leigh
Emergency Planning College
T: 01347 825036
© Emergency Planning College 2016 1
Contents
Foreword ............................................................................................................ 2
Executive Summary ........................................................................................... 3
Resilience .......................................................................................................... 4
Crisis Management: a Tool to Achieve Resilience ............................................. 6
Crisis-Prone & Crisis-Prepared Organisations ................................................... 8
Mock Bureaucracy - Why Crisis-Prone Organisations Fail to Learn ................ 11
Organisational Resilience ................................................................................ 13
High Reliability Organisations .......................................................................... 14
Benchmarking Organisational Resilience ........................................................ 16
Adaptive Capacity .............................................................................................. 17
Planning ............................................................................................................. 19
Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 21
Appendix A: Transforming the Crisis Prone Organisation – Evaluating Your
Organisation ..................................................................................................... 23
Appendix B: New Model of Organisational Resilience ..................................... 26
References ....................................................................................................... 27
© Emergency Planning College 2016 2
Foreword
The concept of organisational resilience was born out of organisations’ strong
sensitivity to perturbations on any scale. Recent disruptive events have made
governments aware that it had become crucial to develop a culture of resilience within
organisations (Robert et al., 2010). The UK Government states that ‘building a more
resilient society will help ensure that we are better prepared for and able to recover
from emergencies’ (Cabinet Office, 2015).
The term resilience is used in a wide variety of fields that include ecology, psychology,
supply chain, strategic management and safety engineering (Bhamra et al., 2011).
This has led to some confusion. The purpose of this Occasional Paper is to contribute
to the existing body of knowledge by collating and analysing key writings on the topic,
and making recommendations that have a practical application in crisis and
emergency management.
It also critically reviews whether organisations can truly become High Reliability
Organisations (HROs) by adopting key characteristics attributed to such
organisations. Furthermore it specifies essential tasks required to become a ‘learning
organisation’. This would prevent them from becoming a ‘mock bureaucracy’ by
ensuring that lessons from crises are reflected in the organisational strategies,
structure, culture, and individual beliefs and values. But above all, it sets out what
practices are necessary to ensure that organisations can become more resilient and
crisis prepared rather than crisis prone.
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Executive Summary
The current focus on organisational resilience represents a relatively new field of
research and practice. It is being applied to understand the adaptive capacities of
organisations faced with uncertainty in the context of complexity (Jiwani & Milley,
2009). This is essential in crisis and emergency management. In this context,
resilience helps an organisation to achieve its objectives and fulfil its core purpose.
The resilient organisation is able to anticipate, respond and adapt to acute or sudden
shocks and chronic or incremental changes, so that it survives and prospers into the
future (BSI, 2014).
Resilience can be viewed as both a dynamic process and an outcome of particular
strategies (Cascio, 2009). Current literature predominately refers to or emphasises
resilience as a means to recover from disturbances. But adaptive capacity is an
essential component of resilience because it reflects the learning aspect of the
organisation in response to crises (Carpenter et al., 2001). If an organisation does
not learn from crises it will remain crisis-prone. Between the crisis-prone and
crisis-prepared organisations is a continuum where an organisation’s crisis orientation
can be described (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992). This paper provides guidance on how
organisations can improve their crisis-preparedness and their learning capacity
(Garvin, 2000).
Resilient organisations are crisis-prepared. They avoid failure by learning from
their own crises and the experience of others. This learning shapes the precautionary
norms the organisation has in place (Smith & Elliott, 2007). It embeds lessons
identified during crises by ensuring that, at the individual and organisational levels,
beliefs, values and defence mechanisms are changed to reflect the new understanding
of the potential threats now faced and the necessary response capability. Some writers
(Weick & Roberts, 1993; Roberts, 1990; Rochlin, 1993; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, 2007)
highlight nuclear power plants and aircraft carriers as examples of High Reliability
Organisations, which demonstrate particular characteristics that make them
especially resilient; although others dispute this (Sagan, 1993; Boin & Schulman,
2008).
Despite the recent emphasis on resilience many organisations do not have the
capacity or capability to confidently withstand disruption. Nor do they have effective
systems to learn from crises. They do, however, have plans and procedures in place.
Unfortunately these do not reflect the values, culture and beliefs of the organisation
and its people. The plans and procedures remain separate and discreet, at a
superficial level of the organisation. They do not become embedded in the culture or
psyche of the organisation or those who work within it. In short these organisations
are ‘mock bureaucracies’ (Gouldner, 1954).
A ‘mock bureaucracy’ could be described as a ‘fig-leaf’. In this metaphorical sense it
covers up something embarrassing. The implication being that the cover is only a
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token gesture and the truth is obvious to all who choose to see it. According to
Gouldner (1954) mock bureaucracies exist where the lack of perceived legitimacy of
particular rules results in a pattern of overt organisational non-compliance with those
rules.
Policies, plans and procedures are present but ignored. The plans and procedures are
no more than a ‘fig-leaf’. In other words ‘a counterfeit front deceitfully designed to
impress key stakeholders with appropriate principles and well-ordered practices, while
hiding internal fragmentation and ad hoc operations’ (Jermier et al., 1991). This can
have serious consequences for an organisation and can easily precipitate crises
(Hynes & Prasad, 1997). Thus the concept of ‘mock bureaucracy’ provides one
explanation why organisations do not learn.
To avoid failure and ensure crisis-preparedness, resilient organisations must capture
learning and feed back into every layer of the organisation to ensure that, in addition
to the policy and procedures changing, there is a change in organisational culture and
personal practices.
Resilience
Measuring and benchmarking resilience would enable organisations to assess their
current resilience management strategies and improve performance by addressing
any capability gaps. However, the term resilience has been used in many different
contexts and there is general confusion about what it actually means. Resilience has
been described as a multidimensional, sociotechnical phenomenon that addresses
how people, as individuals or groups, manage uncertainty (Lee A.V et al., 2013). But
a recent comprehensive review found that ‘resilience’ is a malleable and nebulous
term which has been appropriated across a multiplicity of different application domains
and blended with a range of other related concepts (Banahene et al., 2014). Moreover,
resilience appears to be as much a set of attitudes about desirable actions by
organisational representatives, as it is about developing new capabilities (Kendra &
Wachtendorf, 2003).
Reactive Resilience
Resilience is often considered as the ability to continue or recover a steady state after
a disruption or crisis. This is reactive. For example, Somers (2009: 13) argues that
‘resilience is demonstrated after an event or crisis has occurred’. Mallak (1998: 1)
describes resilience as ‘the ability of an individual or organisation to expeditiously
design and implement positive adaptive behaviours matched to the immediate
situation’. Hollnagel (2006: 16) considers that the ‘essence of resilience is the intrinsic
ability of an organisation (system) to maintain or regain a dynamically stable state,
which allows it to continue operations after a major mishap and/or in the presence of
continuous stress’. Applied to an organisation, once the crisis occurs the reaction
would emphasise flexibility, coping with the unexpected and unplanned situation and
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responding rapidly to events, with excellent communication and mobilisation of
resources to intervene at critical points.
Proactive Resilience
Others consider resilience in proactive terms that encompass the ability to avert the
crisis from occurring in the first place, but being able to cope with it should it actually
happen. Leveson et al (2006) describe resilience as the ability of systems to prevent
or adapt to changing conditions in order to maintain control. The system or
organisation must be resilient in terms of avoiding failures and losses, as well as
responding appropriately after the disruption. Resilience has also been described as
‘the characteristic of managing the organisation’s activities to anticipate and
circumvent threats to its existence and primary goals’ (Hale & Heijer 2006: 35). In
terms of an organisation, there are mechanisms to foresee potential disruptions and
the adaptive capability to quickly change the structures and procedures within the
organisation to mitigate its effects.
Combining Both Reactive & Proactive Approaches to Resilience
In civil emergencies resilience is viewed as the qualities that enable the individual,
community or organisation to cope with, adapt to and recover from a disaster event
(Buckle et al, 2000). The two key aspects in relation to resilience and civil emergencies
are whether it is about simply reacting to a change in the environment when it actually
happens with the aim of ‘bouncing back’, or whether resilience means being pro-
actively alert to potential disturbances and preventing them from occurring by adapting
to them before they occur, and should they occur responding effectively.
The reactive-proactive distinction is reflected by Wildavsky’s (1991) contrast of
resilience and anticipation. Anticipation being a central mode of control where efforts
are made to predict and prevent potential dangers before damage is done. Whereas
resilience is the capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers after they have become
manifest, learning to bounce back. Wildavsky proposes that strategies of anticipation
work best against known problems, whereas strategies of resilience work best against
unknown ones. Each strategy is appropriate to specific conditions. Resilience
strategies are appropriate when there is greater uncertainty and anticipation
strategies apply best when the environment is in steady state and predictable mode.
However, Comfort et al. (2001) contend that they are complementary. Likewise,
Kendra and Wachtendorf (2003) argue that rather than being conceptually distinct,
anticipation is an integral dimension of resilience. Resilience is achieved by
preparing, not for a particular event, but rather for the maintenance of a range
of capabilities or functions that will be needed after any kind of event. In their
view, anticipation is about the design of the organisation needed to respond.
Boin and Lagadec (2000) also combine both strategies. They acknowledge that
resilience is the key to coping but that it is important for organisations to plan and
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prepare accordingly; so achieving resilience through an anticipatory approach.
Organisational preparation should consist of a continuous programme of training,
testing and learning from experience, hence ensuring that crisis management
becomes embedded in core organisational processes and values. In relation to
resilience, organisations require monitoring systems for detecting warning
signals together with processes and communication channels to quickly
activate appropriate response units with strategic authority to act in all crisis
situations.
Similarly, according to Hollnagel (2006), improved resilience requires monitoring
and response capabilities, learning abilities, and anticipation. Monitoring
supports preparedness and includes knowing what to look for and being able to
monitor what could positively or negatively affect the system’s performance.
Importantly, monitoring should also cover the system’s own performance, as well as
the wider environment. Such situational awareness improves the ability to respond, by
knowing what to do, or being able to react to regular and irregular changes,
disturbances, and opportunities. This might include activating prepared actions or
adjusting current modes of functioning to prevent significant adverse effects. As does
knowing what has happened, and being able to learn and adapt from experience, in
particular to learn the right lessons from experiences. This in turn enhances
anticipation, which is, knowing what to expect or being able to anticipate potential
disruptions, novel demands or constraints, new opportunities or changing operating
conditions.
This paper considers resilience in terms of anticipation and planning (Boin &
Lagadec, 2000). It takes the view that as a concept, resilience is as much about
attitudes and culture than structures and procedures. But an essential component is
the ability to learn from crises. In the next section approaches to organisational crises
will be discussed and the use of crisis management as a means to achieve resilience
introduced.
Crisis Management: a Tool to Achieve Resilience
The Crisis Management Approach
Crisis management and organisational resilience are dominated by systems thinking
and a general systems approach (Stead & Smallman, 1999). It has been argued that
in adopting a crisis management approach, ‘an organisation accepts that failure is a
basic property of systems and the failure is an outcome of the complex interaction
between system elements’ (Swartz et al., 1995: 17).
Crises are the result of multiple causes, which interact over time to produce a threat
with devastating potential but ‘the ultimate cause of the crisis lies in the inability of a
system to deal with the disturbance’ (Boin & ‘t Hart 2007: 46). Examples of the
application of systems theory to the field of resilience and crisis management include
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Coles (2003) systems based discussion of UK national vulnerability and Comfort et
al.’s (2001) discussion of risks emerging from the interaction between private and non-
profit organisations.
Complex Crises & Resilience
It is recognised that crises are becoming more complex in nature and are increasingly
transboundary and interconnected (Boin & Lagadec, 2000). A crisis occurs when a
community of people – an organisation, a town, or a nation – perceives an urgent
threat to core values or life-sustaining functions, which must be dealt with under
conditions of uncertainty (Rosenthal, Boin & Comfort, 2001). Ultimately, a crisis is
when policymakers experience ‘a serious threat to the basic structures or the
fundamental values and norms of a system, which under time pressure and highly
uncertain circumstances necessitates making vital decisions’ (Rosenthal, Charles & ‘t
Hart, 1989: 10).
There are usually visible stages to a crisis and most move through five of them. These
are:
Signal detection;
Preparation/prevention;
Containment/damage limitation;
Recovery, and;
Learning (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992).
The first two phases indicate proactive types of crisis management, which if successful
will prevent many crises from actually happening. Containment/Damage Limitation
and Recovery are reactive activities, done after the crisis has happened, in an attempt
to contain its damage and recover from its effects. The learning phase indicates an
interactive type of crisis management: either part of the planning in the absence of
crisis or as a result of experiencing a crisis.
In relation to signal detection, a crisis usually sends off a persistent trail of early
warning signals or symptoms. If not attended to a major crisis is likely. However, early
warning signals are difficult to interpret, so it is important that organisations have
mechanisms in place to track and analyse them. To avoid crises organisations need
to have tested, in-place prevention and preparation mechanisms. The purpose of
prevention is to proactively probe the organisation for signs of weakness before a crisis
incubates.
Preparation involves developing and testing plans, as well as training people, to
ensure they are familiar with their response roles. In the event of a crisis actually
happening, the containment and damage limitation mechanisms are activated to
prevent the crisis spreading across the organisation. The emphasis on tested and in-
place recovery mechanisms is crucial. Without such foresight it is unlikely that
responders will be able to deal with the crisis efficiently. The last phase of crisis
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management is the continual learning from crises and reassessment of arrangements
to improve on what has been done in the past. Interactive learning is vital (Pauchant
& Mitroff, 1992).
Crises can occur when organisations fail to effectively manage their risks. Major
accidents are usually preceded by periods where the organisation drifts towards states
of increasing risk until the events occur that lead to loss (Rasmussen, 1997). One
reason is that organisations fail to see the warning signs or do not understand their
significance (Fink, 2002). But an awareness and understanding of the situation and
potential consequences could prevent the accumulation of unnoticed events (Turner,
1976). Turner (1978) proposed the notion of an incubation period of actions and
events during which the change is effected and the potential for systems failure
initiated. He focused on failures of foresight, or crisis events where some forewarning
was potentially available but there was a failure to act to prevent the crisis. To
proactively avoid such failures, organisations must effectively manage the crisis by
using their awareness and understanding of the situation to continuously move ahead
of their current performance curve.
What Does an Organisation Need to Do to Improve Resilience?
The management of crises covers activities rooted in organisational structure, culture
and policies (Carmeli & Schaubroeck, 2008). Pearson and Clair (1998) describe crisis
management as a systematic attempt by the organisation and its external stakeholders
to prevent a crisis occurring, and if it does, effectively managing it. This reflects the
need for combining anticipation and resilience for an effective response to crises (Boin
& Lagadec, 2000; Comfort et al., 2001; Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003). Hills (2000)
discusses resilience as a quality or characteristic displayed by an organisation in
response to change or pressure. He links resilience and crisis management, and
suggests that resilience is an outcome or goal, and that crisis management is a
strategy or tool which organisations can use to achieve it. That is they need to become
crisis-prepared organisations, rather than crisis-prone. An organisation that invests in
effective crisis management will enhance its resilience capability and make it less
prone to crises.
Crisis-Prone & Crisis-Prepared Organisations
Between the crisis-prone organisation and crisis-prepared organisation is a continuum
where an organisation’s crisis orientation can be described. The crisis-prone and the
crisis-prepared organisations exhibit different characteristics (Weick & Sutcliffe,
2001).Crisis-prepared organisations invest in both crisis prevention and response
capability, whereas crisis-prone organisations focus on response, not prevention
(Mitroff & Alpaslan, 2003). Moreover, crisis-prepared organisations have integrated
crisis planning, flexible and adaptive structures and low rationalisation and denial
about the likelihood of crises impacting on the organisation.
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Crisis-prone organisations, on the other hand, have few, if any, plans, inflexible
structures and high rationalisation and denial about the impact of crises on their
organisation (Mitroff et al., 1989). Examples of rationalisations that hinder
organisational crisis management, and therefore organisational resilience, include ‘our
size will protect us’, ‘certain crises only happen to others’ and ‘crisis management and
crisis prevention is a luxury’ (Mitroff & Pearson, 1993).
All organisations develop their own cultural beliefs and create rules, regulations and
procedures based on a set of expectations, which may or may not be met. A
precondition for some organisational crises is ‘sloppy management’ (Turner, 1994).
Examples of which include, communication failures, blinkered outlook and groupthink
(Janis, 1982), complacency and neglect, together with inadequate assumptions about
the vulnerability of the organisation. Turner argued that these management
inadequacies and examples of unprofessional behaviour could be addressed by the
development of a safety culture, with commitment from the top, which would mitigate
the incubation of hazards. The successful implementation of such a culture would also
enhance organisational resilience.
Mitroff et al. (1989) argue that organisational culture is the most influential factor on
crisis management. To determine where an organisation sits on the continuum
between crisis-prepared and crisis-prone, Pauchant and Mitroff’s onion model (1992)
below identifies 4 layers of an organisation that can be peeled away.
(Source: Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992:49)
The two outer layers represent the visible elements of the organisation, while the two
inner layers represent the invisible and unconscious aspects. The outer layer consists
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of organisational strategies, programmes and procedures to deal with crises; the next
layer is the organisational structures, which may or may not inhibit the organisation
responding effectively in crisis; then there is the organisational culture layer, consisting
of the organisation’s unwritten rules, codes of conduct and beliefs; and the final layer
is the core of the organisation, namely the subjective experiences of individuals and
their anxieties and defence mechanisms in relation to crises.
The layers are not separate and distinct; rather each layer influences the others. ‘The
strategies implemented in an organisation influence, and are influenced by, the
organisation’s structure and culture and the psyche of individuals’ (Pauchant & Mitroff,
1992: 52). To ensure successful crisis management an organisation must perform well
through all layers (Mitroff et al., 1989).
The following table shows the major differences between crisis-prone and crisis-
prepared organisations:
Crisis-Prone Versus Crisis-Prepared Organisations: A Synthesis
Layers of Onion Model
Crisis-Prone Crisis-Prepared
4. Strategy
Traditional strategic management
Focus on survival and growth
Restricted purpose; fragmented stakeholders
Mostly reactive strategy in crisis management
No special crisis management strategies
Challenged assumptions
Focus on development and learning
Shared purpose; enlarged view of stakeholders
Reactive, proactive and interactive strategies
3. Structure
No special structure for crisis management
Focusing on balancing flexibility and control
No special mechanisms for crisis management
Effective Crisis Management Units
Focus on balancing life and death
Special rewards, tasks and training
Challenged concepts of time and space
2. Culture
Self-inflated cultures
Extreme use of faulty rationalisations
No awareness of cultural ties
Mostly unconscious, unchallenged
Culture moving toward positive self-regard
Low use of faulty rationalisations
Awareness of cultural ties
Challenged and accepted
1. Character
Strongly bounded emotionally and cognitively
Constant search for existence/ego satisfaction
High defence mechanisms against anxiety
Less bounded
More concerned about addressing problems
Adequate defence mechanisms embracing anxiety
(Source: adapted from Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992: 146)
The essential difference in crisis-prepared organisations is that they see crisis
management as a strategic necessity to ensure reliability and not as a cost.
Pauchant and Mitroff developed an Ideal Crisis Management Strategy that
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organisational crisis managers could use to determine their own organisation’s needs.
The strategy is based on the Onion Model, with the Strategic layer being split into
‘strategic actions’ and ‘evaluation and diagnostic actions’; the structural layer into
‘technical and structural actions’ and ‘communication actions’; and the culture and
character layers combined into ‘psychological and cultural actions’. The strategy is
reflected in the questionnaire that Pauchant and Mitroff developed to enable an
organisation to compare their preparedness with that of an ideal crisis-prepared
organisation. The questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix A.
Mock Bureaucracy - Why Crisis-Prone Organisations Fail to Learn
Failure to Learn
One of the reasons that some organisations become crisis-prone and are likely to
experience failure is that they fail to learn from their environment. Turner (1976)
studied organisational crises to find out why many organisations fail to heed what in
retrospect were signs of impending failure. He found that the conditions under which
large scale intelligence failures occur include: rigid institutional beliefs, a disregard of
outside complaints, difficulty with handling multiple sources of information, and the
tendency to minimise danger. These elements incubate until they become part of the
organisational culture, setting the stage for a serious problem triggered by an event
that in other circumstances might be easily dealt with.
Turner argues that organisations perform poorly when faced with ill-structured
problems, which they generally attempt to address by simplifying reality, falling back
on habit or ritual, or resorting to rules of thumb. Some organisations attempt to deal
with uncertainty by identifying goals and developing plans to achieve them. But in
contingent and complex situations they have difficulty knowing whether they have
done enough. Thus, organisations that fail to take steps to develop flexible,
complexity-embracing, problem-seeking capabilities, and fail to develop organisational
cultures that learn from their environments are likely to experience a crisis in one form
or another.
Failure of Hindsight
Toft & Reynolds (2005) refer to the inability to learn from past mistakes as a ‘failure of
hindsight’. But even when there is a significant international event, such as the 9/11
terrorist attacks, organisations still fail to learn. An investigation into whether
organisations increased their crisis response planning following the attacks found that
the majority of organisations, even those that were directly affected by 9/11, remained
unprepared for crisis (Hurley-Hanson, 2006).
Consequently, it has been argued that despite the national impact of the 9/11 attacks
on the psyche of the USA, it has ‘not changed our long-term attitudes toward the
importance of crisis management in the day-to-day course of business’ (Mitroff, 2005:
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376). In other words, the crisis did not result in a change in the affected organisations
precautionary norms, leading to greater prioritisation of crisis-preparedness. Instead
the attitudes to crisis management remained the same as they were before the
attacks.
Mock Bureaucracy
One explanation of this phenomenon of organisational non-compliance is Gouldner’s
concept of ‘mock bureaucracy’ (1954), which has been defined as ‘an organisation
with a counterfeit front deceitfully designed to impress key stakeholders with
appropriate principles and well-ordered practices, while hiding internal fragmentation
and ad hoc operations’ (Jermier et al., 1991: 189).
Gouldner (1954) studied a gypsum plant to determine variations in bureaucratic
patterns. He focused on ‘no-smoking’ regulations which were reinforced by
bureaucratic cues, such as signs, posters and inspections. Despite the rules and
reminders, most personnel disregarded the no-smoking regulation. The reason for
such non-compliance was the lack of legitimacy attaching to the rules. However,
organisations that fail to comply with safety regulations, especially when there are few
consequences for non-compliance, may generate conditions for crisis incubation
(Smith, 1990; Turner, 1994; Reason, 1990; Perrow, 1984). Therefore, the
development and enactment of ‘mock bureaucracies’ can have serious consequences
for organisations, and can easily precipitate crises (Hynes & Prasad, 1997). Moreover,
such organisations will fail to realise that it is their culture of non-compliance that
contributes to the crisis generation.
Learning Organisations
Gouldner’s (1954) findings highlight the importance of organisational culture in
achieving and maintaining compliance through shared values embedded at an
individual and organisational level, similar to the inner layers of Pauchant and Mitroff’s
Onion Model (1992). Such a culture is essential to achieve effective crisis
management, overcoming barriers to learning and becoming a learning organisation.
According to Garvin (2000), there are six specific tasks critical to organisational
learning:
1. Continually collect intelligence about the environment.
2. Learn from the best practices of other organisations.
3. Learn from your own experiences and past history.
4. Experiment with new approaches.
5. Encourage systematic problem solving among all members of the
organisation.
6. Transfer knowledge throughout the organisation.
However, true ‘learning organisations’ are rare even though the idea is widely
accepted (Christenson, 2007). Successful ones will have a defined learning agenda
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based upon identified knowledge gaps. They will be open to discordant information so
news does not get watered down before it is sent up the command chain. Reports will
be trusted because relationships and reporting systems will be healthy. Opposing
viewpoints will be sought out and explored for effective learning opportunities. They
will avoid repeated mistakes because a ‘learning organisation’ will regularly reflect on
experiences, distil useful lessons, share knowledge, follow through and be supportive
in the implementation of refined processes. In other words a ‘learning organisation’
overcomes Turner’s (1976; 1978) barriers to learning and in doing so becomes a much
more resilient organisation. Organisational resilience is discussed in detail in the
following section.
Organisational Resilience
Gibson and Tarrant (2010: 7) argue that ‘resilience is an outcome and not a
process, management system, strategy or predictive measurement’. They see
organisational resilience as an outcome influenced by a dynamic complex combination
of environmental factors, including the organisation’s risk culture, which may range
from being reactive to adaptive to potential threats. It is the ability to anticipate, prepare
for, respond and adapt to events – both sudden shocks and gradual change. That
means being adaptable, competitive, agile and robust (BSI BS 65000: 2014).
Organisational resilience is a capability which enables organisations to adjust to
perturbation, moderate the effects of risk and uncertainty and take advantage of
emergent opportunities (Banahene et al., 2014). For Weick et al. (1999), it comprises
coping skills, which materialise when events get outside of normal operational
boundaries, and knowledgeable people who can self-organise into ad hoc networks to
provide expert problem solving.
Measuring Resilience
One measure of resilience in an organisation is the ability to create foresight, which is
to anticipate the changing shape of risk, before failure and harm occurs (Woods,
2005). In this sense, organisational resilience represents the capacity of an
organisational system to anticipate and manage risk effectively. It does this through
appropriate adaptation of its actions, systems and processes, to ensure that its core
functions are carried out in a stable and effective relationship with the environment
(McDonald, 2006). Organisational resilience is, therefore, ‘a balancing act between
risk and resources, between vulnerabilities and escalating or unmanageable
catastrophe’ (Comfort et al., 2010: 273).
Organisations can achieve improved resilience through anticipating and preparing for
crises and their consequences by using knowledge, social collaboration and
innovation (Comfort et al. 2010). But organisational resilience is a continuously moving
target, which contributes to performance during business-as-usual and crisis
situations (Mitroff, 2005). It requires organisations to adapt and to be highly reliable
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(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007), and enables them to manage disruptive challenges
(Durodie, 2003).
In terms of organisational resilience, high reliability is a desirable trait (Vogus &
Sutcliffe, 2008). Reliability is an increasingly critical quality and competency for
organisations responding to crises. It has been defined as ‘the capacity to
continuously and effectively manage working conditions’ (Bigley & Roberts, 2001:
1281). Reason (2000) argues that High Reliability Organisations offer important
models for what constitutes a resilient system. This view will be critically analysed in
the following section.
High Reliability Organisations
High Reliability Organisations have been described as resilient organisations (Weick
& Sutcliffe, 2001). In their study of High Reliability Organisations, Weick and Sutcliffe
(2001) found HROs experience fewer problems because they have developed ways
of acting and styles of leading that enable them to manage the unexpected better than
most other kinds of organisations. Such organisations were able to maintain reliable
performance because of certain key characteristics:
Preoccupation with failure – treating any lapse as a symptom that something is
wrong with the system, encouraging reporting of errors, learning lessons from
near misses and being wary of complacency.
Reluctance to simplify interpretations – knowing that the world is complex,
unstable and unpredictable, they encourage individuals to look beyond their
own boundaries and to be sceptical towards received wisdom.
Sensitivity to operations – scrutinising normal operations in order to reveal
deficiencies in supervision, safety procedures and training, hazard identification
etc., and encouraging continuous adjustments that will prevent errors from
accumulating and enlarging, encouraging people to speak out about their
concerns.
Commitment to resilience – developing capabilities not only to detect problems
but also to be able to continue working when things go wrong.
Deference to expertise – decisions are delegated to those on the front line and
with the most expertise (not necessarily the highest rank or most service) in
that field.
(Adapted from Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001: 10-17)
High Reliability theory describes the extent and nature of the effort that people, at all
levels in an organisation, have to engage in to ensure consistently safe operations
despite its inherent complexity and risks (Dekker & Woods, 2010). It is argued that
High Reliability Organisations are able to shift seamlessly from routine operating
modes, where formal attributes such as hierarchical authority and standard operating
© Emergency Planning College 2016 15
procedures dominate organisational activities, to high tempo activities, where more
informal organisational norms dominate.
During high tempo periods, operating experts are given great latitude to control
operations, communication flows where needed (unhindered by the chain of
command), and the problem is the focus of everyone’s activities, regardless of their
formal position in the organisation (Rochlin et al., 1987). The ability to switch between
two modes of operations, one emphasising planning and routines, the other focusing
on contingency and rapid response and adaptation appears to reconcile the competing
requirements of both anticipation and resilience in highly reliable organisations
(LaPorte, 2006).
The view of High Reliability theorists is that if appropriate organisational design and
management techniques are in place safe operations are possible even when using
extremely hazardous technologies (Sagan, 1993). But Perrow (1999) argues that
serious accidents within complex technology systems are inevitable and simply a
characteristic of a ‘normal system’.
Another criticism of High Reliability Theory is that few organisations have the
extremely complex technology that is evident in these High Reliability Organisations;
therefore the lessons to be learned from them are limited and not necessarily
applicable to mainstream organisations (Luo Carlo et al., 2004; van den Eede & van
den Walle, 2005).
Boin and Schulman (2008) outline other limitations of the High Reliability Theory,
including that the research is based on a snapshot of a small number of particular
types of organisations. Our knowledge of the origins of the characteristics attributed
to High Reliability Organisations is limited. It is not always clear whether they are:
imposed by regulatory environments, the outcome of institutional evolution or the
product of leadership. But, importantly, those characteristics have not been
conclusively linked to the reliability of the organisation’s performance. Nor is it clear
how High Reliability Organisations evolve the capability to avoid catastrophic failure,
especially as the opportunities to learn through trial and error are limited. Therefore,
in their view High Reliability Theory ‘stands not as a theory of causation of high
reliability but rather as a careful description of a special set of organisations’ (Boin &
Schulman, 2008: 1053). For the practitioner, this is – perhaps – a more useful
interpretation anyway.
Sagan (1993) also acknowledged that High Reliability Theory provided useful insights
but concluded that ‘historical evidence provides much stronger support for the ideas
developed by Charles Perrow in Normal Accidents’ (Sagan, 1993: 252). Sagan
reached this conclusion as a consequence of having identified ‘a long series of close
calls with US nuclear weapons systems: serious accidents or near-accidents that
could have led to catastrophes had they occurred in somewhat different, but
nonetheless plausible, circumstances’ (Sagan, 1993: 252).
© Emergency Planning College 2016 16
If High Reliability Theory is difficult to replicate in a normal organisation, what practical
ways are there for organisations to measure and benchmark their resilience and
demonstrate that it is improving? The following section outlines a model of resilience
developed for that purpose.
Benchmarking Organisational Resilience
Following a study of 10 organisations, McManus et al. (2008) proposed that
organisational resilience was a function of:
an organisation’s overall situational awareness,
its management of keystone vulnerabilities and
its adaptive capacity.
Situational awareness is being aware of what is happening around you and
understanding what that information means to you now and in the future (Endsley et
al., 2003). Keystone vulnerabilities are those components that, if lost or impaired,
can cause exceptional effects throughout the organisational system (McManus et al.
2008). An organisation’s adaptive capacity is its ability to continuously design and
develop solutions to match or exceed the needs of its changing environment (Lee et
al., 2013).
However, after an empirical review of the findings of the McManus study, Lee et al
(2013) propose a New Model of Organisational Resilience based on two factors:
adaptive capacity and planning, with 13 indicators. Appendix B shows the New
Model and includes a definition of each indicator.
Organisations can use the model to discuss the components of resilience and to think
about where their strengths and weaknesses might be, as well as what their current
strategies actually address and what they don’t (Stephenson, 2010).The two factors
are summarised in the table below:
Adaptive Capacity: Planning:
Minimisation of silos
Internal resources
Staff engagement and involvement
Information and knowledge
Leadership
Innovation and creativity
Decision making
Situation monitoring and reporting
Planning strategies
Participation in exercises
Proactive posture
External resources
Recovery priorities
(Source: Lee et al., 2013)
© Emergency Planning College 2016 17
In the following section each factor is considered in detail. This highlights the close
relationship between the resilience factors and indicators and the crisis management
components, through cross referencing the resilience model with crisis management
literature.
Adaptive Capacity
Minimisation of Silos – The minimisation of divisive social, cultural, and behavioural
barriers, which are most often manifested as communication barriers creating
disjointed, disconnected, and detrimental ways of working.
Fenwick et al. (2009: 3) discuss the term silo mentality arguing that ‘it is used to
describe inwardly focused organisational units where external relationships are given
insufficient attention’. Those in silos will look to their own interests rather than that of
the organisation as a whole (Wisner, et al., 2004). Silo mentality is a significant barrier
to preparedness and can hinder organisations at any level (Guelke, 2005). Silos
prohibit the creation of shared views within organisations, which has been described
in cultural terms as the opposite of a communication culture (Powers, 2004). The
consequence is a lack of effective communication, which is a common cause of failure
in crises (Smith, 1990).
Internal Resources – The need here is for the management and mobilisation of the
organisation’s resources to ensure its ability to operate during business-as-usual, as
well as being able to provide the extra capacity required during a crisis.
Crises are characterised by disruption and uncertainty affecting the availability of
existing organisational resources (Boin & Lagadec, 2000; Pearson & Clair, 1998;
Mallak, 1998). Comfort (1990) suggests that conflict among organisations seeking to
respond to the sudden, extraordinary demands in crisis is a recurring and well-
recognised problem. But a common thread in resilient and reliable organisations is
active and engaged management by highly trained professionals.
Staff Engagement & Involvement – This requires the engagement and involvement
of staff who understand the link between their own work, the organisation’s resilience,
and its long-term success. Staff are empowered and use their skills to solve problems.
Effective collaboration and network management requires reciprocity, representation,
equality and the participation of those with different skills and experiences (deLeon &
Varda, 2009; Moynihan, 2005). This requires organisations to define their resilience
culture and ensure that it is spread throughout the organisation and embedded.
Elwood (2009) argues that organisations need to develop an understanding of
resilience that goes beyond just business continuity or risk management. Staff
engagement and involvement are essential. This is because ‘no amount of planning,
expenditure, use of resources or ingenious mitigation measures will ever guarantee
© Emergency Planning College 2016 18
triumph if the espoused resilience culture is only visible within the readily accessible
corporate values’ (Elwood, 2009: 247).
Information & Knowledge – Critical information needs to be stored in a number of
formats and locations and staff should have access to expert opinions when needed.
Roles are shared and staff are trained so that someone will always be able to fill key
roles.
According to Weick (1993), if everyone knows the roles and responsibilities of
everyone in the team, resilience will be enhanced because even in the event of a crisis
the role system remains intact in the individual’s mind. He referred to this as a ‘virtual
role system’. Knowledge of the system is important; especially being able to identify
and interpret what is going on within the organisation and its environment. These are
characteristics of a resilient organisation (Hale et al., 2006; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).
One way of searching for these weak signals is by creating an awareness of
vulnerability. Processes to identify and analyse vulnerabilities, such as risk
management and business impact analysis, are well established - but organisations
often neglect to actually address issues identified as critical (Birkland, 2009).
Leadership – Strong crisis leadership is required to provide good management and
decision making during times of crisis, as well as continuous evaluation of strategies
and work programs against organisational goals.
Leaders’ perceptions, or their resilience ethos, will influence the crisis management
approach taken by the organisation (Pearson & Clair, 1998). Mitroff (2004) argues that
crisis leadership is proactive. It attempts to identify crises and prepare the
organisation as a whole before a crisis occurs. In his view, crisis leaders need to be
proactive before, during and after crises. This involves ensuring organisation
readiness through vulnerability audits, the development of skills and capabilities which
can be enacted during the crisis, and after the crisis reassessing performance in order
to design and implement new procedures. Furthermore, Crichton et al. (2005) suggest
that a key leadership skill is gathering information to enable effective decision making,
whilst Grint (2005) argues that leaders need to be more collaborative, especially when
dealing with complex crises.
Innovation & Creativity – Staff should be encouraged and rewarded for using their
knowledge in novel ways to solve new and existing problems - and for utilising
innovative and creative approaches to developing solutions.
Because of the unique nature of crises, innovation and creativity are critical skills for
crisis response (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003; Hamel & Välikangas, 2003). Weick
(1993) opines that improvisation and bricolage are important elements of resilience.
He suggests that bricoleurs are able to remain creative under pressure because they
routinely act in chaotic conditions. Therefore, they are able to improvise and create
solutions with available resources. Those that are successful have a high adaptive
capability and are able to cope with change and respond to it quickly and effectively
© Emergency Planning College 2016 19
(Denevan, 1983). Such adaptive learning centres on the ability of an organisation to
make a number of changes simultaneously and keep itself aligned with its evolving
environment (Daft & Weick, 1984; Murray, 2002).
Decision Making – This suggests the need for staff to have the appropriate authority
to make decisions related to their work, with authority is clearly delegated to enable a
crisis response. Highly skilled staff are involved, or are able to make, decisions where
their specific knowledge adds significant value, or where their involvement will aid
implementation.
In the context of crisis management, much of the literature discusses decision-making
as a potential source of error (Pearson & Clair, 1998; Smits & Ally, 2003; Smith, 2006).
Smart and Vertinsky (1977) advocate varying the membership of crisis teams to
ensure that leaders are exposed to new points of view, can discuss alternatives with
others outside of the crisis decision unit, and can invite experts to comment on
decisions and processes. Eisenhardt (1989) found those with deep knowledge of their
business can maximise decisions within time constraints by considering several
alternatives simultaneously, especially when the entire team was conditioned to work
with each other in turbulent situations. An important characteristic, attributed to High
Reliability Organisations, is deference to expertise. This suggests that decisions
should be delegated – not necessarily to those in command but to those with the most
appropriate knowledge applicable in the circumstances (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).
Situation Monitoring & Reporting – This requires staff to be vigilant about the
organisation, its performance and potential problems. Staff are rewarded for sharing
good and bad news about the organisation including early warning signals and these
are quickly reported to organisational leaders.
Organisations that create an awareness of vulnerability by seeking out signals that
may indicate unexpected activity are more resilient (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). In such
resilient organisations situational monitoring and reporting is a notable characteristic
(Hale et al., 2006). Failure to heed these signals may result in the incubation of crisis
(Turner, 1976) and drift towards failure (Woods, 2005). But successful monitoring is
dependent on risk and business continuity management processes being well
established; together with an ‘attitude of wisdom’ that means that although staff may
not initially understand the situation immediately, because they have never seen it in
that particular form before, they are aware that their response to the situation may be
improvised (Weick, 1993).
Planning
Planning Strategies – This involves the development and evaluation of plans and
strategies to manage vulnerabilities in relation to the business environment and its
stakeholders.
© Emergency Planning College 2016 20
Spillan and Hough (2003) emphasise the importance of planning and argue that every
organisation should have a plan. Planning is an important component of an effective
response (Banerjee & Gillespie, 1994; Pearson & Clair, 1998). It not only reduces
organisational vulnerability, but assists crises managers to cope with the challenges
of response (Chong, 2004). But the existence of a plan is not enough to guarantee
success (Paraskevas, 2006), other components required include leadership,
competence, preparation, a healthy organisation, equipping of staff, strong
relationships and financial commitment (Grigg, 2003).
Participation in Exercises – This requires the participation of staff in simulations or
scenarios designed to practice response arrangements and validate plans.
Resilience can be enhanced through adequate resources appropriately trained in the
various roles they may be called to perform. Crisis teams should use scenario building
and exercises (Smart & Vertinsky, 1977). The most common means of training UK
emergency services is through simulation and role play exercises (Borodzicz, 2005).
Such exercises help individuals develop personal skills specific to certain types of
incidents (McDonald et al., 1992). They have also been recognised as a means to
practice together and provide the opportunity for the development of liaison
arrangements (LESLP, 1992).
Proactive Posture – This is the strategic and behavioural readiness to respond to
early warning signals of change in the organisation’s internal and external environment
before they escalate into crisis.
Mitroff (1988) suggests that crisis management should consist of the design and
implementation of key plans, procedures and mechanisms to prepare for crises. But
it should also involve being able to ability to detect and contain crises when they occur.
Furthermore; it involves being able to make a full recovery, including learning from the
experience. Learning from failure can also go beyond the immediate organisation or
the system that the crisis occurred in. Toft and Reynolds’s (2005) view is that failure
in one system or organisation will have the propensity to recur in a ‘like’ system. This
may be superficially different, but if it contains the same or similar components it will
be susceptible to common modes of failure. Being aware of the likelihood of common
modes of failure in similar systems (or organisations) enables pre-emptive remedial
action to be taken to mitigate potential failure.
External Resources – This requires an understanding of the relationships and
resources the organisation might need to access from other organisations during a
crisis, and planning and management to ensure this access.
Without such partnerships and understanding, there is potential tension because of
the emergent demands of crisis and the bureaucratic procedures of the typical
emergency response agencies (Schneider, 1992). To avoid such tensions, Mulford
(1984) suggests designated individuals act as ‘boundary spanners’. The role of the
‘boundary spanner’ is to link the various organisations within the network by
© Emergency Planning College 2016 21
encouraging and promoting participation and the recognition of mutual benefits, which
can result in effective outcomes. Granot (1999) states that effective boundary
spanners need to be systematic and involve the active participation of policy making
personnel.
Recovery Priorities - An organisation wide awareness of what the organisation’s
priorities would be following a crisis, clearly defined at the organisation level, as well
as an understanding of the organisation’s minimum operating requirements.
During the recovery phase lessons must be learned about the causes and effects of
the response (Mitroff, 1988; Mitroff & Pearson, 1993; Stern, 1997). Turner (1976,
1978) suggests the result will be a readjustment of organisational culture to reflect the
lessons learned. But there are barriers to learning (Smith & Elliott, 2007), including the
rigidity of an organisation’s core beliefs, values and assumptions, and ineffective
communication. Furthermore, the ‘politics of crisis management’ can affect the
learning process (Boin et al., 2010). Included in the recovery element is learning
lessons (Stern, 1997; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Boin et al., 2005) which help to generate
organisational resilience (Smith & Elliott, 2007). However, the challenge is feeding the
lessons back into pre-existing policy networks (Boin & ‘t Hart, 2007).
Conclusion
The intention of this research was to explore the concepts of organisational resilience
in relation to crisis and emergency management. In doing so, it recognised that
measuring and benchmarking resilience would enable organisations to assess their
current resilience management strategies and improve performance by addressing
any capability gaps.
Effective resilience requires organisations to anticipate and plan for disruptive events.
They need to understand their adaptive capacities when faced with uncertainty and
complexity, which are inherent in crises, and plan how the organisation may respond.
Such effective organisational resilience helps organisations to achieve their objectives
and fulfil their core purpose, by enabling them to anticipate, and respond and adapt
to, acute or sudden shocks, as well as incremental change.
Crisis management is essential in developing resilience. Ineffective crisis
management will result in a crisis-prone organisation, which is likely to fail. One of the
reasons for such failure is that crisis-prone organisations do not learn from their
environment. They not only suffer from the failure of foresight but also the failure of
hindsight. To avoid failure and ensure crisis-preparedness resilient organisations
must capture learning and feed back into every layer of the organisation to ensure
that, in addition to the policy and procedures changing, there is a change in
organisational culture and personal practices. Adaptive capacity is an essential
component of resilience because it reflects the learning aspect of the organisation in
© Emergency Planning College 2016 22
response to crises. To help organisations improve their crisis preparedness an ‘ideal’
crisis management strategy and questionnaire has been included.
However, despite the recent emphasis on resilience many organisations do not have
the capacity or capability to confidently withstand disruption. The concept of ‘mock
bureaucracy’ explains why organisations do not learn. The lessons identified are not
considered to be legitimate. They do not chime with the shared values of the
individuals and the organisation. Because the shared values which recognise and
embrace learning have not been embedded, at the individual and organisational
culture level, it cannot become a learning organisation.
High Reliability Organisations were examined as a means of identifying the
characteristics of a resilient system. But while there were useful lessons, it was found
that the High Reliability Theory is based on a non-representative sample of high risk
and technically complex organisations that do not reflect most organisations.
Therefore its general application is limited.
However, a new model of Organisational Resilience, which will enable organisations
to measure and benchmark themselves, was introduced. Focusing on adaptive
capacity and planning, the model described a number of components necessary to
enhance organisational resilience. The model has been empirically tested and is
supported by crisis management theory and practice.
Resilience and crisis managers will be able to make use of the resources included in
this paper to improve their organisations’ crisis management capabilities and in doing
so enable their organisations to become crisis-prepared and more resilient. But above
all else, they should aim to avoid becoming a ‘mock bureaucracy’.
© Emergency Planning College 2016 23
Appendix A: Transforming the Crisis Prone Organisation –
Evaluating Your Organisation
Transforming the Crisis-Prone Organization Rating Your Organization Against an Ideal Crisis-Prepared Profile
Instructions: Below is a list of activities that would be undertaken and carried out by an ideally crisis-prepared organization. Please evaluate the extent to which your organization is expert in each of these activities by circling the appropriate numbers.
Strategic Not at all Somewhat in the
process Well-established
1. Managing drastic changes in corporate philosophy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Integration of crisis management in corporate excellence
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Integration of crisis management in strategic process
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Inclusion of outsiders on board, crisis management unit, etc.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. Holding effective training and workshops in crisis management
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. Using crisis simulations effectively
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. Using diversification and portfolio strategies to generate intra-organisational learning
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Technical & Structural Not at all Somewhat in the
process Well-established
8. Creatiing a crisis management unit
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. Creating dedicated budgets for crisis management
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. Developing and changing emergency policies and manuals on a regular basis
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. Having computerised inventories of plants’ employees, products etc.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12. Creating strategic emergency room or facilities
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13. Reducing hazardous products, services and production
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14. Improving overall design and safety of products and production
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
15. Having technological redundancy, such as computer network backups
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
16. Using outside experts and services in crisis management
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
© Emergency Planning College 2016 24
Evaluation & Diagnosis Not at all Somewhat in the
process Well-established
17. Using legal and financial audit of threats and liabilities
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
18. Modifying of insurance coverage
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
19. Carrying out environmental impact audits and respect for the regulations
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
20. Ranking most critical activities necessary for daily operations
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
21. Using early warning signals detection, scanning, issues management
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
22. Driving dedicated research on potential hidden dangers
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
23. Showing critical follow-up of past crises
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Communication Not at all Somewhat in the
process Well-established
24. Using media training for crisis management
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
25. Making major public relations efforts
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
26. Increasing information to local communities
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
27. Improving relationships with intervening groups (police, media)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
28. Increasing collaboration with stakeholders
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
29. Using various communication technologies and channels
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Psychology & Culture Not at all Somewhat in the
process Well-established
30. Demonstrating strong top-management commitment to crisis management
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
31. Creating relationships with activists groups
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
32. Improving acceptance of whistle-blowers
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
33. Increasing knowledge of criminal behaviour
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
34. Increasing visibility of crises’ human impact to employees
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
35. Providing psychological support to employees
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
36. Showing stress management and management of anxiety policies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
37. Making use of symbolic reminders of of past crises and dangers and successes
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
© Emergency Planning College 2016 25
Directions for scoring: Total the scores for all questions. If your total score is above 183, then your organisation is in the ‘safety zone’. If it is between 77 and 183 then your organisation is in the ‘question mark zone’. If it is below 77, your organisation is in the ‘danger zone’.
Source: Transforming the Crisis-Prone Organization, by Thierry C. Pauchant and Ian I. Mitroff. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Copyright © 1992. Permission to reproduce and distribute material (with copyright notice visible) is hereby granted. If material is to be used in a compilation to be sold for profit, please contact publisher for permission.
© Emergency Planning College 2016 26
Appendix B: New Model of Organisational Resilience
Factors Indicators Definition
Adaptive Capacity
Minimization of silos
Minimisation of divisive social, cultural, and behavioural barriers, which are most often manifested as communication barriers creating disjointed, disconnected, and detrimental ways of working.
Internal resources
The management and mobilisation of the organisation’s resources to ensure its ability to operate during business-as-usual, as well as being able to provide the extra capacity required during a crisis.
Staff engagement and involvement
The engagement and involvement of staff who understand the link between their own work, the organisation’s resilience, and its long-term success. Staff are empowered and use their skills to solve problems.
Information and knowledge
Critical information is stored in a number of formats and locations and staff have access to expert opinions when needed. Roles are shared and staff are trained so that someone will always be able to fill key roles.
Leadership
Strong crisis leadership to provide good management and decision making during times of crisis, as well as continuous evaluation of strategies and work programs against organisational goals.
Innovation and creativity
Staff are encouraged and rewarded for using their knowledge in novel ways to solve new and existing problems and for utilizing innovative and creative approaches to developing solutions.
Decision making
Staff have the appropriate authority to make decisions related to their work and authority is clearly delegated to enable a crisis response. Highly skilled staff are involved, or are able to make, decisions where their specific knowledge adds significant value, or where their involvement will aid implementation.
Situation monitoring and reporting
Staff are encouraged to be vigilant about the organisation, its performance and potential problems. Staff are rewarded for sharing good and bad news about the organisation including early warning signals and these are quickly reported to organizational leaders.
Planning Planning strategies
The development and evaluation of plans and strategies to manage vulnerabilities in relation to the business environment and its stakeholders.
Participation in exercises
The participation of staff in simulations or scenarios designed to practice response arrangements and validate plans.
Proactive posture
A strategic and behavioural readiness to respond to early warning signals of change in the organisation’s internal and external environment before they escalate into crisis.
External resources
An understanding of the relationships and resources the organisation might need to access from other organisations during a crisis, and planning and management to ensure this access.
Recovery priorities
An organisation wide awareness of what the organisation’s priorities would be following a crisis, clearly defined at the organisation level, as well as an understanding of the organisation’s minimum operating requirements.
(Source: Lee et al., 2013)
© Emergency Planning College 2016 27
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