ORIGINAL PAPER

Mapping the Field of VET Partnerships

Alison Taylor

Received: 20 September 2008 /Accepted: 2 March 2009 /Published online: 20 March 2009# Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2009

Abstract This paper looks critically at partnerships in education and training bypresenting a case study of a community-level partnership aimed at promoting highschool apprenticeships in Ontario Canada. The analysis maps the field of socialrelations within this partnership in order to reveal institutionally-based struggles andtheir implications for youth training and employment. The assumptions within policythat employers are actively engaged as partners and that they and other stakeholdersshare a unitary vision for education and training are challenged. Rather, partnershipsreflect tensions among partners that must be addressed in order to improve thelearning affordances for youth.

Keywords Vocational education and training . Apprenticeship . Partnership

Introduction

The political vision of creating a high skills, knowledge-based economy is evident inCanada as in other OECD countries (cf. Lloyd and Payne 2002). To achieve thisvision, workforce development policies aim to create a skilled and flexibleworkforce, partly through formal education programs that emphasize the acquisitionof employability skills and school-business partnerships (Lowe 2000). Currentapproaches to vocational education and training (VET) policies in Canada thereforefavour public–private partnerships that bring stakeholders together with the aim offacilitating smoother transitions for youth to further education and work. MostCanadian provinces have introduced school-work-transition initiatives in recentyears that rely on partnerships between stakeholders that may include schools,colleges, community organizations, government units, employers, and unions

Vocations and Learning (2009) 2:127–151DOI 10.1007/s12186-009-9021-x

A. Taylor (*)Department of Educational Policy Studies, Faculty of Education, University of Alberta,7-142 Education North, Edmonton, AB T6G 2G5, Canadae-mail: ataylor@ualberta.ca

(Taylor 2007). Programs are intended to motivate youth who might otherwise leavesecondary school early while addressing labour mismatches.

However, such policy approaches to education and training have been critiquedfor their lack of attention to demand-side issues such as employer utilization of skills(Lloyd and Payne 2002; Livingstone, in press). Writers argue that employerengagement in skills training cannot be assumed since low skills, low wage routes toprofitability remain viable for many businesses. The “field of dreams” idea that if wecreate a qualified workforce, good jobs will come is therefore problematic (Lowe2000). From this perspective, it is argued that training policy needs to be part of abroader industrial strategy that recognizes potential conflicts of interest and the roleof the state in developing a democratic corporatist approach to policy setting (Lloydand Payne 2002). For example, the labour movement argues that free trade policieslike NAFTA1 run counter to a high skill, high wage economy since they result in thereplacement of “unionized, steady, well-paid jobs” with “temporary, non-unionizedand largely part-time ‘Mc-Jobs’” (LeFort 2007).

This paper explores larger questions around the role of formal education inworkforce development and the use of public–private partnerships as a policy toolthrough a case study of a youth apprenticeship partnership in Simcoe County,Ontario, Canada. This focus is based on the assumption that policy approaches toVET and the institutional context shape affordances for learning (cf., Ashton 2002;Billett 2001; Keep 2005; Lloyd and Payne 2002). Therefore, community-levelpartnerships must be analyzed with attention to the wider context of industrialrelations, labour markets, and power relations between various stakeholders. If thegoal is to provide education and training programs that provide broad skills and leadto jobs that utilize and further develop workers’ skills within expansive learningcontexts (Fuller and Unwin 2004), this context cannot be ignored.

Partnerships and the Field of Power

Concerns have been raised from different perspectives about education and trainingpolicies in Canada and other OECD countries. For example, Jackson and Jordan(2000) suggest that OECD skills training policies in recent years have shifted controlover and benefits from skills training away from individuals and unions toemployers. They argue that pressures for training to be more responsive to short-term industry needs have prompted changes to apprenticeship systems in Australiaand New Zealand that include shorter training with tighter links to secondaryschools, more choice of providers, incentives for employers, and new flexibleemployment and wage arrangements. While acknowledging the dominance ofeconomic discourse in Canadian adult learning policy, other writers raise concernsabout its lack of inclusiveness and effectiveness (e.g., Myers and deBroucker 2006;Rubenson 2007). Responsibility for problems is located both with governments thathave reportedly used few “of the available policy levers” to encourage effectiveeducation and training, and with Canadian firms that continue to adopt low cost/lowvalue-added approaches which perpetuate a low skill/low wage equilibrium (Myersand deBroucker 2006, p. 69).

1 Appendix 1 provides a list of acronyms used in this paper.

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Within this policy context, the notion of partnerships has great currency. Partnershipspromise to overcome bureaucratic rigidities and allow governments to adopt moreflexible interventions and two-way relations with private sector stakeholders (Bradford2003; Seddon and Billett 2004). But they are seen by some writers as a tool that canbe used toward different ends. For example, social democratic partnerships have thepotential to promote less hierarchical and more active decision-making and to promoteeconomic innovation. On the other hand, neoliberal partnerships may be a way ofaddressing contradictions in governance by offering solutions to state and marketfailures and allowing the state to steer at a distance through local community networks(Jessop 2002; Robertson and Dale 2002). The context in which partnerships operate istherefore important. For example, Bradford (2003), citing Hall and Soskice, discussesthe differences between the logics of Anglo-American liberal market economies(LME) and continental Europe coordinated market economies (CME). While inCMEs, public-private partnerships are more likely to proceed through deliberation,negotiation, and coordination, in LMEs, there tends to be an historic absence of therequisite networks and structures.

For example, the dual system of apprenticeship in Germany was established bythe Vocational Training Act established in 1969 after intense negotiations betweenemployers, trade unions, and the state (Tremblay and LeBot 2003). These tripartitenegotiations have continued with the aid of coordinating structures, and in the mid-1990s, the German apprenticeship system included 370 occupations. In contrast, theCanadian apprenticeship system is governed by provincial apprenticeship legislationbut lacks tripartite coordinating structures and institutionalized links betweensecondary education and employment. It includes approximately 150 apprenticeabletrades and less than one percent of the national labour force is registered asapprentices (Raykov and Livingstone 2005; Schuetze 2003).

Bradford argues that the policy environment in Ontario more generally lacks strongrepresentative organizations or associational networks at either the provincial or sectorallevels. Bosch and Charest (2008) add that although the federal government tried toimprove the capacity of unions and employers to work together through theestablishment of sector councils in the 1990s, there continues to be a lack of strongnational corporatist structures in Canada. Because of this, Bradford (2003) suggeststhat attempts to introduce social democratic partnerships face challenges in:

[E]stablishing partnership bodies; enhancing the representational and deliber-ative capacities of the social partners; and finding incentives for business toparticipate in collective processes that imply new limits to their autonomy inthe workplace. (p. 1026)

Bradford’s comparison of partnership models promoted by social democratic andconservative provincial governments in Ontario suggest that the “neoliberal” partner-ships promoted by the Conservatives were easier to implement because “theorganization of the Ontario political economy conforms to the logic of the LME”. Forexample, the Conservative government’s Ontario Jobs and Investment Boardencouraged municipal governments to partner with local business, community andeducation leaders to develop local approaches to economic development. Suchinitiatives expressed a vision of decentralized economic governance anchored in urbanpublic–private partnerships which privileged business interests (Bradford 2003).

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In addition to macro-level “regime” conflicts, Seddon et al. (2004) suggest thatpartnerships also reflect “interest” conflicts and “role” conflicts related to differencesin partners’ aims, organizational cultures, values, and gender, race and classlocations. Similarly, Fligstein (2001) proposes that “it is the combination of pre-existing rules, resources, and the social skills of actors that works to produce fields,make them stable, and produce transformation” (p. 115). Bourdieu’s work is helpfulin linking the individual level of analysis back to organizational and societal levels(Battilana 2006). Everett and Jamal (2004) provide a useful empirical example ofBourdieu’s praxeology in their case study of multi-stakeholder collaboration. Theiranalysis of the field involved a two-stage process whereby they first examined thedistribution of material resources and forms of capital in the field that could beobserved, measured or mapped, and then looked at the meanings agents attributed totheir material and symbolic surroundings. Thus, they begin with an analysis of“surface power,” for example, who has control over decision making, proceduresand routines, and then move to deep structure power as reflected in control over themanagement of meaning and symbolic power.

I also borrow from Bourdieu in conceiving of the field as a site of struggle“whose stake is the setting of the rules that govern the different social games (fields)and, in particular, the rules of reproduction of these games” (Wacquant 1993, p. 42).Research on the field then involves understanding the relationship of a particularfield to the “field of power” or politics; constructing a “‘social topology’ or map ofthe ‘objective structure’ of positions which make up the field” and the relationsbetween them in competition for capital; and analyzing the habitus of agents withinthe field and their strategies when confronted with constraints and opportunitiesdetermined by the structure of the field (Jenkins 2002, p. 86). Since apprenticeshippartnerships involve players from different fields who come together to facilitatetraining for high school youth, my analysis focuses on the institutional tensions andcontradictions that are apparent as these individuals interact and negotiate overcapitals in their attempts to maintain an existing order or construct a new local orderor field (cf. Fligstein 2001).

This mapping of the field is similar to an “embedded context” or “ecological”approach in its assumption that understanding how training opportunities for youth arestructured requires attention to the larger institutional context, for example, the contextof education and training policies, institutional norms and cultures, relations within andbetween organizations, and the subjective meanings and understandings of individuals(cf. Stevens 2007). Social practices are analyzed within a multilevel environment thatexamines structural or “distal” features and micro-level or “proximal” processes(Feinstein et al. 2004). Feinstein et al. (2004) suggest that a “capitals approach” can bemodelled within a multilevel development approach. Figure 1 below borrows fromBourdieu and embedded context or ecological models (Stevens 2007; Feinstein et al.2004) to depict the conceptual model used in this paper.

Method

While partnerships are evident at different levels (e.g., national, regional, provincial,and local), this research focuses on community-level partnerships for the following

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reasons: First, as part of its commitment to increasing high school completion ratesand better preparing young people for further education and work, the OntarioMinistry of Education (ME) mandated that all school districts must implement highschool-to-work transition programs and funds coordinator positions within schooldistricts to promote high school apprenticeship partnerships (Taylor 2005). Suchpartnerships were particularly important since the capacity of schools to providetrades-related training “in house” has declined over time. The policy assumption thatschool districts are key partnership facilitators therefore warrants further study.Second, in the absence of corporatist VET structures found in countries likeGermany and Denmark, it is important to consider who is included in community-level partnerships, how they are structured, and how they operate. Finally, sincepartnership work has largely been delegated to the community level, participants areable to provide insightful perspectives about their work in relation to provincial andschool-level participants. In this study, most data collection involved community-level players, although a few interviews with participants at provincial and schoollevels provided opportunities to triangulate data.

Political/institutional context • Provincial labour market structures and networks (and

market logics) • Labour market policies (e.g. governing industrial relations,

VET) • Training: apprenticeship curriculum and standards • Education: secondary school policies and programs

Local order: High school apprenticeship partnerships • Organizational goals and mandates • Organizational cultures • Organizational resources and valued capitals • Resources for developing and maintaining

partnerships

Proximal processes (interactions in the field) • Interactions among and between

partners (employers, unions, college staff, school staff, government representatives)

Partners’ frames of reference (habitus) with respect to apprenticeship training

• Knowledge • Attitudes • Values, norms • Reflexivity

Fig. 1 Conceptual model drawing on Bourdieu and an embedded context approach

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The case targets partnerships in the construction trades because the apprenticeshipsystem is most developed there. Simcoe County was chosen as the site because it hasexperienced moderate to high rates of growth in population, which have put pressureon the construction and other sectors of the economy (Simcoe County TrainingBoard 2007). Since concerns about labour shortage have been expressed by Simcoeemployers, one might expect high levels of engagement in school-to-work transitioninitiatives. Ministry of Education data also suggest that rural employers are moreengaged in youth apprenticeship—Simcoe County is located about an hour from alarge urban centre but consists of several municipalities (the largest is Barrie with apopulation of approximately 130,000 in 2006). Finally, since Training DeliveryAgents (TDAs) in Simcoe include both colleges and unions, this site provides a goodopportunity to consider the impact of local industrial relations.

Participants and Procedure

Semi-structured interviews and focus groups conducted with 26 participantsexplored issues related to high school apprenticeship programs and policies,including the work of partnership, visions for apprenticeship, and relationshipsbetween groups. The majority of participants were from organizations involved insome capacity with high school apprenticeship in Simcoe Country. Participants camefrom organized labour (3), high schools (4), school boards (3), employers (4),industry associations (2), government (3), college (4), a community developmentorganization (1), a local training board (1), and a sector council (1). Unless statedotherwise, all interviews were conducted in February 2008. Most were conducted inperson; all were audio-recorded and transcribed. The qualitative data analysis used aword processing program and N6 qualitative analysis software. Other data sourcesinclude reports and published materials from partner organizations. The sections ofthe paper that follow present my analysis beginning with the political/institutionalcontext and then moving to the local order and interactions in the field (see Fig. 1).

The Political/Institutional Context

In addition to the weakness (or complete absence) of the social actors andsocial bargaining structures, poor reputation, low social status and the lack ofinternal linkages [between the training system and labour markets] are furthersources of problems for the vocational training systems [in Canada and theUS]. (Bosch and Charest 2008, p. 438)

It is necessary to understand the intersecting fields of apprenticeship, secondaryeducation, and post-secondary education and training to fully understand thepartnerships and practices involved in high school apprenticeship partnerships (seeFig. 1). Apprenticeship training tends to be viewed as more than a high schooldiploma and less than a university degree in the status hierarchy of credentials inCanada. Overall youth participation in the vocational system remains low in Canadaas compared with other OECD countries (Bosch and Charest 2008). Mostconstruction trades require a minimum of grade 10 as an entry requirement although

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some (e.g., industrial electrician) have increased this to grade 12 (last year ofsecondary school). An apprenticeship then involves a combination of in-class andon-the-job training for a specified period (usually 3 to 5 years). The Canadianapprenticeship system is characterized by a weak institutional framework, partlybecause of the country’s historical reliance on immigration as a labour marketstrategy (Schuetze 2003).2 A system of industrial relations which is decentralized tothe level of the firm also helps to explain the “low level of partnership at industry ormacro levels” (Bosch and Charest 2008, p. 438).

The Ontario system includes 150 apprenticeable trades in four sectors:construction, industry, motive power, and services. Twenty-one of these trades(14%) are compulsory, that is, they require a license to practise. Thirty-threeconstruction trades (including 10 compulsory trades) are covered by the TradesQualification and Apprenticeship Act (TQAA) and others are covered by theApprenticeship Certification Act (ACA). The ACA took effect in 2000 and wasintended by the government to replace the TQAA, which was first introduced as theApprenticeship and Tradesmen’s Qualification Act in 1964. The TQAA wasapparently seen as inflexible and there was a desire to relax the occupational tasksor skills that could qualify for apprenticeship designation. The rationale was that “asindustry activities become more specialized, there is less need for the acquisition ofthe comprehensive training embodied in the programs designed for the traditionalcrafts” (Armstrong 2008, p. 20). These changes bear some resemblance toapprenticeship reforms in New Zealand and Australia noted by Jackson and Jordan(2000). Ontario labour groups (e.g., the Ontario Federation of Labour and thebuilding trades) expressed concern that the ACA deregulates the apprenticeshipsystem and results in fragmentation and de-skilling of existing certified trades.3

Other writers describe the difference between TQAA and ACA in terms of a “time-based” versus “competency based” model of apprenticeship training.4 Resistance tothe ACA from construction stakeholders resulted in two Acts in the province, whichaccording to the author of a recent report (Armstrong 2008) makes the system morecomplex and confusing.

Provincial governments are responsible for the regulation, certification, andestablishment of provincial standards. In Ontario, Provincial Advisory Committees(PACs), which include employer and employee representatives, are appointed by theMinister to advise on issues including apprenticeship curriculum, training require-ments, standards and delivery. Local Apprenticeship Committees (LACs), appointedby the Director of Apprenticeship, provide advice related to trade qualifications for

2 Although the source countries for immigrants has changed, there continues to be a reliance on importingskilled labour through immigration and using the Temporary Foreign Worker program. For example, inrecent years, construction employers in Canada have actively recruited temporary foreign workers whopossess trades certificates (e.g., oil sands developments in northern Alberta). These practices arechallenged by unions concerned about the potential for exploitation of workers and erosion of labourstandards, and the lack of commitment of local employers to training.3 This information was accessed May 2008 at the Ontario Federation of Labour website: www.ofl.ca/uploads/convention/Policy_Paper_Apprenticeship_November_2005_Final.pdf.4 This information was accessed September 14, 2008 at a website developed by the Halton IndustryEducation Council to provide information about apprenticeship. See: http://www.apprenticesearch.com/what_is_apprenticeship.asp.

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particular geographic areas. TDAs are approved by the provincial Ministry ofTraining, Colleges and Universities (MTCU) and include public colleges and privatetraining centres (including joint management-union training centres). Apprenticeshipcompletion rates have varied historically with swings in the economy and aregenerally lower than for college or university (Sharpe and Gibson 2005).

Nevertheless, apprenticeship is seen as a “pathway” that is likely to engage youthwho may otherwise drop out of school. It is also consistent with secondary schoolcourse streams introduced in the late 1990s based on workplace, college, oruniversity destinations. Two ministries, the Ministry of Education (ME) and MTCUfund school-to-work transition programs that include the Ontario Youth Apprentice-ship Program (OYAP), the School-College-Work Initiative (SCWI) and theSpecialist High Skills Major program (SHSM). OYAP allows high school studentswho are at least 16 years of age to gain on-the-job experience in a skilled trade whileearning cooperative education credits toward the completion of their high schooldiploma, and thereby attempts to integrate apprenticeship training into generaleducation.5 Students who are able to find a sponsoring employer (with help fromschool and district personnel) can register as apprentices6 and a small proportiontake an “accelerated OYAP” program in which they complete the first level of in-class apprenticeship training while in high school. The program is administeredjointly by ME and MTCU with ME. Relatively small numbers of students participatein OYAP and participation is approximately 2.5 times higher for males than forfemales (King et al. 2005).

The aim of the SCWI is to build province-wide articulation between secondaryschools and community colleges to clarify pathways for youth. The interest inpromoting seamless transitions between secondary and post-secondary education fora wider range of student is also consistent with a high skills, knowledge-basedeconomy vision for education and training. Similar to programs in the United States(Hoffman et al. 2007), a recent goal and priority for SCWI has been to expandparticipation in dual credit and/or dual program pilot projects, many of which relateto apprenticeship, to all colleges and boards. Dual credit courses involve a collegecredit course team-taught by a secondary school teacher, college teacher, or acertified journeyperson (Interview MTCU representative, January 2008).

Colleges are also common service providers for a provincial program funded byEmployment Ontario called Job Connect which provides employment services toclients that include youth. As part of their performance measures, 10 to 15% of JobConnect placements are supposed to be in an apprenticeable trade (I-4, MTCU,January 2008). Toward this goal, Job Connect provides wage subsidies of up to$4,000 (CDN) for employers to encourage them to hire apprentices (I-20, Jobconnect, June 2008). Finally, the SHSM initiative is part of a $1.3 billion multi-yearStudent Success Strategy introduced by the government to improve high school

5 Lehmann (2007) makes a good point in the Alberta context that the high school apprenticeship programtends to be largely disconnected from the formal education students receive and there seems to be littleintegration of “academic” and “vocational” knowledge in the school setting.6 School boards (particularly the larger ones) may also do “group registrations” of students and be the“employer of record” until students graduate. Joint management-union funded training centres may alsosponsor the registration of apprentices.

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graduation rates (Ministry of Education 2003).7 It allows students to orient their highschool program toward different industry sectors including Construction, Hospitalityand Tourism, Manufacturing, Arts and Culture, etc. The Student Success Strategyalso includes legislation that requires students to keep learning in a classroom,apprenticeship or workplace training program until age 18 or until they graduate(Bill 52). SHSM is expected to involve schools partnering with local communities,sector councils, unions, and employer associations.

This brief overview suggests that VET in Canada reflects historical andcontinuing negotiations among players that include schools, other education andtraining providers, government, unions, and employers. It also reflects politicalchoices since the provincial government clearly plays a critical role in establishingthe rules of the game through legislation, regulations, and program funding. Thecurrent government has prioritized education and training partnerships and aims tomore closely link the school system to further education and employment throughOYAP, SCWI and SHSM. At the same time, partnerships are likely to be sites ofstruggle due to diverse and often conflicting interests within and across groups. Theresulting institutional and organizational tensions are reflected in the followinganalysis of interviews with partners involved in high school apprenticeship.

The Local Order and Interactions Within the Field

The local training board8 has sponsored a number of reports about apprenticeshiptraining in Simcoe County which provide useful information. The local collegeapparently offers plumbing, electrical, general carpentry and millwright apprentice-ship training at different campuses. However, campuses are spread out and there areconcerns about local access to training. Attempts by this college to expand tradestraining has reportedly run into resistance from competitor colleges (Starr Group2002, p. 37). In 1999/2000, the government reported that Simcoe country accountedfor the second lowest number of in-school apprenticeship training seats of 24 localtraining boards (Starr Group 2002, p. 22).

Related to a lack of training seats are concerns that employers are not sponsoringapprentices. The training board commissioned a survey of 483 construction firms inthe country and found that most were small businesses (85% had less than 25employees). Most had been operating for over ten years but only about one-fifth had

7 The Student Success Strategy was introduced by the Liberal government in 2003 to address the“unacceptably high secondary school dropout rate,” which had apparently increased significantly afternew curriculum had been introduced by the Conservative government in 1998. The Liberal governmentadopted knowledge economy discourse in rationalizing its target of an 85% high school graduation rate ascritical for Ontario’s “economic and competitive advantage” (News release accessed February 2009 at:http://www.edu.gov.on.ca/eng/document/nr/05.12/bg1208b.pdf).8 Local training boards in Ontario are not-for-profit corporations funded by the provincial and federalgovernment to help improve conditions in their local labour markets. They are “led by Business andLabour at the local level [and] include representation from other constituencies that have an importantstake in the vitality of their local labour market, namely: Educators, Trainers, Women, Francophones,Persons with Disabilities, Visible Minorities, Youth, Aboriginals and other relevant sectors of localeconomies” according to information accessed September 2008 on their website: http://www.edu.gov.on.ca/eng/training/localbd/localbd.html.

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prepared an HR plan for the next three to five years (Starr Group 2002). Only aboutone-quarter of firms employed apprentices on a full-time basis and there werevirtually no females employed in the construction trades (p. 19). The barriers toapprenticeship training identified by the largest number of employers included thelack of convenient locations for training, followed by a lack of employer awarenessof apprenticeship and related training programs, and scheduling problems (StarrGroup 2002, p. 24). Some employers felt that in-house training better met theirneeds. Apprentices surveyed also noted the lack of convenient facilities but addedthat employers were not willing to pay for training (Starr Group 2002, p. 28). Astudy of youth in Simcoe County more generally found that barriers such astransportation, lack of experience, lack of education, and competition with adults forjobs were prevalent (Simcoe Country Training Board 2003). Coordination oftraining was also seen as problematic—in fact, a 2002 report (Starr Group, p. 53)recommended that the local training board take the lead in establishing a permanentbody that would coordinate the delivery of a local skilled trades strategy. UK LocalLearning and Skills Councils were seen as a model for such a group.9

In sum, reports suggest that apprenticeships involve a variety of partnersrepresenting different fields and positions within those fields. The following sub-sections explore some of the power dynamics that were apparent in the SimcoeCounty case with a focus on the structure of positions that make up the field, therelations between positions in competition for capital, and the strategies of agentswhen confronted with constraints and opportunities (Jenkins 2002).

Construction Employers

Construction employers were seen by most participants as central to partnerships. Asa local representative from MTCU suggested, “they are the most important client” ofapprenticeship (F-13).10 However, they were an absent partner in some respectssince, as the report commissioned by the local training board (Starr 2002) suggested,employers were not training apprentices in great numbers. A training boardrepresentative confirms this in an interview:

We did a big research project on apprenticeship in Simcoe County… and wentout and interviewed all the employers asking them about apprenticeship andthey came back screaming: “We don’t want apprentices. … we’re not takingapprentices, we want trained people, we can get trained people… I had onemanufacturer in Orillia say to me: “Why in the heck should I provideapprenticeships? I give someone 10 bucks an hour, I teach them what otherthings they need to know and then they don’t go taking off to get 20 bucks anhour at another place. Where if I provided an apprenticeship, they’d be gone.(I-9, Training Board).

9 Apparently these local Learning and Skills Councils are no longer in place in England—only regionaland national councils are still operating (Personal communication, E. Keep, September 2008).10 F-13 stands for focus group 13. This interview included two school board representatives and oneMTCU representative.

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The “buy in” of employers to a high skill, high wage economy vision is thereforequestionable, particularly for small construction employers concerned about“poaching” (I-14).

In addition, apprenticeship ratios are seen as a barrier in some trades (e.g.,plumber, electrician). Ratios stipulate the minimum number of journeypersons whomust be on site to supervise an apprentice. The TQAA set the ratio at one apprenticefor the employer or first journeyperson in the firm, and an additional apprentice foreach three journeypersons employed by the firm (Armstrong 2008). Since the ACAdoes not make legal provision for ratios, they are only a contentious issue forcompulsory trades in the construction trades. The 1973 Dymond report characterizedratios as “a method to prevent employers from using apprentices primarily as asource of cheap labour” (Armstrong 2008, p. 87). Unions also see ratios as a way ofensuring quality apprenticeship training. However, many employers see them as away for unions to try to restrict the supply of labour, since they can be an issue forcollective bargaining.11 Although ratios do not apply to OYAP students, they are stillseen as a barrier by some employers because they come into effect as soon as theOYAP apprentice leaves high school. The frequency of references during datacollection to ratios as a barrier to OYAP and apprenticeship more generally providesevidence of employer control over the management of meaning.

The idea that apprenticeship is too costly is also prevalent, despite a recent reportwhich asserts that employers earn an average return of $1.38 for each dollar of directcosts invested in apprenticeship training (Canadian Apprenticeship Forum 2008).Apprentices are generally seen as unproductive labour, as this employer suggests:

A lot of trades nowadays are paid piece work, where in other words, they dowork at their own pace and they make the dollar. So if you pay a guy, say thisis a $1,000 job, if a guy moves fast he can probably do it in a couple days, andif the guy takes his time it’s three, four days. And if you couple that withsomeone who’s inexperienced then that might stretch it out, and you just havethat lack of want to train people. You’d rather get somebody who’s builtsomething and it will move a little quicker. Cause the last thing you want is aweight around your ankle. (I-16)

An industry association representative adds that there has been “a move awayfrom a craft type trades situation” toward more specialization and modularized workin construction, which impacts the kind of training required (I-6). In such a context,productivity becomes even more important, as this construction employer suggests:

[I]f you paid a journeyman $40 an hour, you’re going to pay an apprentice thatwalks on the job $12. …and this $40 an hour guy has to teach this other guy so

11 Countering this claim, Armstrong (2008, p. 89) writes: “Those who oppose ratios higher than 1:1attribute fault to the ‘monopolistic’ regulations said to have been worked out by labour and industry PACswho wish to artificially limit the supply and opportunity for apprenticeship work. This is a curiousallegation, given that those against whom the charge is made—i.e., those in the compulsory trades—allhave ratios below the standard ratios established under Reg. 1055 [of the TQAA] and maintained bysuccessive governments over many years.”

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he’s only half as productive.12 That worker’s only 60 to 80% productiveanyway. And that’s where the term foreman comes from. Because if you haveone man controlling four other men, you should be able to pay that man’swages by increasing the productivity of the other four people. So if you takethem from 60 to 85% productive, the foreman’s free and that’s fabulous; 85%is all you can expect. But if you take him from 85 down to 60 or 50%, thenyou may as well not have that apprentice. (I-19, Employer)

The discourse of apprentices as unproductive labour rationalizes employers’ lackof engagement and the need for increased government subsidies for apprenticeshiptraining. For OYAP students, transportation, hours of work, and age restrictions werealso named as barriers to employer engagement.

However some construction employers do participate in OYAP. For example, theowner of a group of companies that includes a modular home business was receptiveto the program because he is able to provide an indoor controlled environment. Hewas motivated to partner with a local high school because of rising labour costs anddifficulty in finding workers who have the “right attitude towards work” (I-16). Asother authors have noted (e.g., Keep 2005; Moss and Tilly 2001), attitude and other“soft skills” took precedence over “hard” technical skills. While one would expectthat construction employers are interested in engaging apprentices with cognitiveand technical abilities including math, problem solving, and skill with tools,employers appear to be equally if not more concerned about taking on apprenticeswho are enthusiastic, dependable, committed, and have a willingness to learn. Theproblems with this approach, as noted by Moss and Tilly (2001) are that assessingsoft skills is inherently subjective and the demonstration of such skills is highlydependent on the context (e.g., workers’ “attitudes” are likely to depend on how theyare treated and how they are paid).

In the case of this Simcoe employer, the costs of training (transportation to theworkplace, safety certification) were subsidized by government (through SHSMfunding) and youth (through their unpaid labour of five hours per day for asemester). Students no doubt became more employable as they gained high schoolcredits and industry certifications. However, the employer did not commit toemploying any students as apprentices after the semester. Further because studentswere registered as carpentry apprentices (because it was seen as the most flexible/least regulated trade) but were actually working in different trade areas, it is unclearhow many of the hours worked (estimated at 500 per student) would be credited byMTCU toward their apprenticeship if they did subsequently find an employer willingto take them on. Although the “golden present” promised to students through thispartnership may therefore be brass, the ability of employers to negotiate sucharrangements with schools is noteworthy.

12 The gendered language in this except and throughout the interviews was very noticeable. Opportunitiesfor young women in trades were mentioned on only a few occasions, e.g., a few participants mentioned aWomen in Trades program offered by the local college, and the training board representative mentioned anevent held to encourage young women to think about trades. However, the gender divide was apparent inthat all employers were male and service providers were more likely to be women (training board, schoolboard reps).

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Bradford’s (2003) suggestion that there is an historical absence of the requisitenetworks and structures for public–private partnerships rings true in the case of SimcoeCounty employers, according to the following observations of an MTCU consultant:

If you look at the majority of employers in this community, they’re notassociated with a group or an association. …If you look at where that employercame from, they came from an individual lifestyle… You know, a personwho’s in the trade…it’s sort of a lonely career if you think about it. …The onesyou’re seeing are the ones that are able to make the pay cheques and create theenvironment for employment. They’re very successful in they own right. Andthey’re very individual. So they don’t like the group setting. (I-13, MTCU)

This observation brings to mind Keep’s (2005) suggestion that “the biggestproblems with the value of existing vocational qualifications, and with the operationand outcomes of the work-based route (apprenticeships) [in England] tend to be insectors that have a mass of small, hard to reach employers… and a long tradition ofrelatively weak representation in VET…” (p. 538).

Again, the management of meaning is evident. Employers are privileged byeducational and government stakeholders because they are viewed as economicproducers who create employment and write pay cheques. They are therefore seen asthe most legitimate participants in determining in-school training requirements anddelivery, and access to on-the-job training and employment. Individually they havethe power to provide apprenticeship training or not, and to pay for that training ornot. Although it was difficult to “get them to the table,” the mostly non-unionemployers in Simcoe country also had influence over which groups were included orexcluded in partnerships related to high school apprenticeship and training moregenerally. For example, a representative from the local training board says:

At one point I asked a question about whether we should get a representativefrom [Labourers’ Union] Local 183 [on our board of directors] because theyhave an office here in Simcoe Country and [other board members] said “no.”They didn’t want to stir it up. (I-9)

Similarly, a school board representative notes, “if you’re talking about havingunion involvement, we’ve had employers say, if you’re having [them], I’m notcoming” (I-13). This poses a problem for the district because one of its schoolsinitiated a partnership with Local 183 to provide Level 1 training for studentsinterested in the Construction Craft Worker (CCW) trade. A high school teacher whowas instrumental in this partnership comments:

Barrie is a very non-union town. As soon as you say to certain employers inand around Barrie area that we’re involved with either Local 27 [Carpenters’union] or Local 183, they just slam the door in your face and say, “No, that’s it.I’m out of here. I don’t want anything to do with you.” (I-2)

A college representative noted that the auto manufacturing sector also made itclear which partners are unacceptable:

We work very closely with Honda and Toyota and a lot of the componentsuppliers and all of those are non-unionized. … When we’re meeting with

Mapping the field of VET partnerships 139

suppliers of [these companies] they don’t want us to have representatives ofCAW [Canadian Auto Workers union] there. (I-10)

Anti-union sentiment is reflected in the fact that the local Construction Associationhas a bylaw stating that unions cannot be members. According to a representative:

A lot of our members are getting… really harassed by the unions… It’s toughbecause it costs them a lot of money, you know, to fight this [organizingdrives]. And a lot of times their workers don’t want [to unionize] becausethey’re being treated fairly, you know, but the union doesn’t always telleverybody the truth. (I-17)

A few participants also noted that non-union construction employers in SimcoeCountry have the power to recognize the training provided by unions or not. Forexample, a service provider says:

We had a meeting here with construction employers talking about differentways of training and how to get involved and so on. And we were talkingabout the pre-apprenticeship program that Focus [Community DevelopmentCorporation] has in Alliston and that’s a partnership with Focus and Local 183.And one fellow would not hire anyone from that. (I-9, Training board)

As a result, school representatives were justifiably concerned about the labourmarket value of training provided by the Labourers’ Union: “If we train, but no onewants to touch them, we’re doing them a disservice” (I-12, School board). Given thisclimate, while educators and groups like the training board (which is mandated toinclude representation from labour and business on its board of directors) try toremain neutral13 and focus on what is best for trainees, it is clearly difficult.

Trade Unions

Their lack of representation on the local training board and in key educationaldecision-making bodies suggest that the position of organized labour in the educationand training field in Simcoe is tenuous. A representative from Local 183 observed thatwhile their share of the residential housing market in Toronto (an hour’s drive south ofBarrie) was 85%, it was closer to 27% in Simcoe Country (I-7). However, differenttrades wield different levels of labour market power. For example, electrician andconstruction craft worker trades are worlds apart in many respects.

Industrial electricians must take a 4 year to 5 year apprenticeship aftersuccessfully completing a high school diploma.14 It is a Red Seal trade, meaningthat apprentices who have completed their training and certified journeypersons are

13 For example, the training board tries to remain neutral by not engaging in divisive debates andmanaging its directorship to exclude representatives who are likely to clash. For example, there were nolabour representatives from construction trades on the Simcoe County Training Board—instead,representatives were from public sector unions.14 According to a representative from IBEW, the requirements are “Grade 12 diploma with a level 4standing in Math., English and Science if you are hired by the Joint Apprenticeship Committee. TheMTCU -and non-union- requirement is only Grade 10 completion, which we think is an inadequate basefor successful completion of trade school” (Interview, January 2006).

140 A. Taylor

able to practice across Canada by successfully completing an InterprovincialStandards Examination. It is also a compulsory trade, meaning that workers mustbe certified or registered as apprentices to practice in their occupation. A high schoolteacher suggests that it is very difficult for students to secure an apprenticeship inthis trade:

The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers [IBEW] blew me away [ata meeting of the York Training Board] because they said there are 1,000applicants for 200 [apprentice] positions and 30% of the successful applicantshave a university degree, 30% have a college diploma, and then the rest areimmigrants and high school with work experience. (I-3)

Perhaps as a result of this demand, the IBEW generally has not supported OYAP,as this representative of the Power Council of Ontario suggests:

[N]on-union competitors don’t bring in apprentices with the intention of helpingthem to complete the program. Non-union apprentices come into the market andare there for essentially free (because of government funding for OYAP) and arecompeting with us.… A lot of the young people who enter into OYAP are thosewho aren’t going to be successful. “We’re in the enviable position of being ableto ask for community college grads—they’re beating down the doors.” (Unionrepresentative, Interview, January 2006) [emphasis added]

In comparison, Construction Craft Workers take a one to two year apprenticeshipafter completing grade ten. It is a voluntary trade, meaning certification is notrequired and training is for work in Ontario only. The CCW is also a new trade thatis struggling for status in the field, as this college representative suggests:

Nobody knows where that person [CCW] fits in…I think there was somethingcalled “construction helper” years ago but it was never certified. … It’s tryingto bring the labourer’s position up, and that’s fair. Because they perform amajor job, especially in commercial. And they’re trying to give them a littlemore clout and respectability in the trade. (I-11).

A representative from the Labourers’ Union confirms that “we’re trying to getrecognition for [the important work labourers do] from the government.” Local 183is also actively involved in partnerships with schools to provide training. But unlikethe approach of IBEW, this representative from Local 183 advocates for open access:

You can’t punish a kid because he’s ADD [Attention Deficit Disorder] or can’tsit in the classroom and listen to a teacher all day, but he might be a fantasticworker out in the field. And because he doesn’t have his grade 10 math, hecan’t get into an electrical program. … I just don’t like to close the doors forany kids. I mean, I think it’s unfair right? (I-7)

The hierarchy of trades reflected in the electrician/construction craft workercomparison promotes positional competition within the education field (cf. Brown2004). For example, a cooperative education teacher in Simcoe comments “one ofthe partnerships I want to get here is carpentry [with the local college] because it’sjust got a little bit more credibility in the industry [than CCW]” (I-3, November2007). Similarly, a school board representative suggests that the carpentry would be

Mapping the field of VET partnerships 141

a “higher level of apprenticeship than what’s offered by [Local] 183” (I-12). LikeCCW, carpentry is a voluntary trade in Ontario but the apprenticeship is usually fouryears in length and it is a Red Seal occupation.

However, the likelihood of employers in the county taking on a carpentry apprenticeis arguably very low since the local college offers a 1-year certificate program thatprovides job-ready employees, according to a college instructor in this program:

When [a traditional apprentice] hits the job he hasn’t been to school yet, he is totallygreen, he hasn’t any skills whatsoever. Whereas one of these [certificate] students,he’s had all of the theory. Every bit of theory that a full apprentice would have. Allthe roof cutting and all that stuff. He just doesn’t have on-the-job. But [employers]look at these as muchmore, “I can get production right away out of them.”Whereasa regular apprentice, it’s probably two years in before they get that level ofproductivity. They sort of look at them as a labourer for the first 2 years. (I-11)

Students pay tuition for this program ($4,200 to $4,500 CDN) and thereforeemployers reap the benefits of in-class training without the costs of releasingemployees or paying for it. The existence of this college program speaks to a dangeridentified by Gleeson and Keep (2004) that employers shift the cost of acquiring askilled workforce from their own budgets to the public purse. In allowing this shift,governments further enable employer withdrawal from the apprenticeship system.

At the same time, the value of such apprenticeship-related diplomas is notguaranteed:

When [college students from the carpentry program] go to the apprenticeshipcounsellor, they may say, “Well, you have your one year here and all you’ve got todo is eight weeks of Advanced, or something like that. In some jurisdictions, theyget exempted from the whole in-school… some of the counsellors won’t givethem more than Basic. It all depends on where it is. Because there’s nothingwritten in stone. It’s sort of a wishy-washy area, these 1-year programs. And anapprenticeship counsellor can credit whatever he [sic] wants. (I-11)

This discretion results in inconsistencies across the province. For example, innorth Simcoe County, the MTCU consultant would not approve seats for OYAPstudents to complete in-class apprenticeship training because he did not agree withthe accelerated OYAP model.

The preceding discussion confirms that relations of power are related to strugglesover educational credentials:

Indeed, the holders of credentials clash, in their strategies aimed at increasingthe value of their titles, with the strategies of those who control positions,bosses and managers, who are determined to protect themselves from thedemands of bearers of cultural capital. These strategies, on either side, are bothindividual and collective (from trade unions in particular), and they necessarilyinvolve efforts to control the means (especially juridical) associated with thestate by which the exchange rate (or conversion rate) between the variouscompeting forms of capital are established. Academic credentials are thus bothweapons and stakes in the symbolic struggles over the definition of socialclassifications. (Wacquant 1993, p. 27)

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Key issues in policy discussion about apprenticeship therefore relate to whocontrols training (e.g., access, content, delivery agents, and methods of delivery),who pays for training, and what value training has in the labour market (cf.,Tayloret al. 2007). Schools, colleges and other service providers as well as unions andemployers are clearly implicated in these labour market struggles.

Service Providers

The preceding discussion provides insight into the positioning of employers andunions in the field in Simcoe. As noted, other service providers (e.g., training board,college, school boards) must tread carefully given the relations within and between“economic producer” groups. But while they are attentive to these dynamics, theyhave struggles of their own. Since they are funded by the provincial government(increasingly on a contract for services basis), and because there is uncertainty aboutthe sustainability of government funding for recent programs, dynamics among andwithin service provider groups tend to be competitive.

For example, schools compete with other schools to enlist desirable employers aspartners and to develop “glamorous” programs that increase their enrolments andenhance their status within the community and with government. Colleges competewith other colleges and other training delivery agents to deliver particular programs.As the line between secondary and post-secondary systems is blurred tensionsbetween schools and colleges also emerge (cf., Conley 2007).

For example, colleges voice concern about the possibility of schools deliveringapprenticeship training:

It’s when it’s delivered at the secondary school, which is a possible scenario inthe six different approaches that you can do dual credits under. So we have whatthey call TDA, Training Delivery Agent status, and the colleges feel that they’vefought long and hard to have that status … we want the control of it andtherefore the funding and all the pieces that relate. (I-18, College representative)

Colleges are also concerned that the promotion of dual credits may lowerstandards in their programs:

Who is the dual credit learner? At risk, disengaged? Colleges don’t want tolower the bar. …And we certainly don’t want to muddy our own marketingwaters by saying, you know, if you can’t succeed in high school come on downto college, you know it’s that easy. (I-18)

However, they face a dilemma. On one hand, the local college is concerned thatsecondary schools may be gaining control over apprenticeship training (e.g., by steeringstudents toward particular programs and TDAs), and on the other hand, it is concernedabout its own capacity to respond to growing requests from schools without additionalfunding (I-18). The struggle over who delivers credentials and the economic returns forthis work is exemplified by the current tension between education unions/associations:

[ME and MTCU] haven’t quite got all the implications [of dual credit] sortedout. …I know the Ontario Secondary School Teachers Federation is quite up inarms about it.

Mapping the field of VET partnerships 143

AT: Why is that?

Who’s getting credit for the teaching time, we want to make sure that …[highschool teachers are] doing the work. But if it’s a college credit our faculty union,they want the whole thing. How we’re meeting that right now—it’s kind of silly,it’s inefficient, but welcome to the world of education—is they’re both gettingcredit. It’s costing [ME] twice as much as it should. (I-10, College administrator)

As writers in the US suggest (Hoffman et al. 2007), dual credit initiatives dependnot only on integration of secondary and post-secondary curriculum but also onseamless finance, governance, and accountability systems.

In Ontario such systems are not yet in place and like colleges, some protectionismis apparent in this exchange between two school board representatives and the localMTCU consultant:

School board 1: So for instance, we work with Job Connect [housed in thecollege]. Sometimes after a student graduates we pass themon to Job Connect. But we don’t want employers to see JobConnect and OYAP as one and the same thing. Job Connecthas a certain target audience that they work with. They workwith average students [students who are out of school and notworking full time].

School board 2: Well and they can offer different financial assistance and…School board 1: They offer incentives right.School board 2: Which we can’t.School board 1: Right. So we’ve offered some events at the college. But ap-

prenticeship isn’t a college program.School board 2: And you don’t want it to be perceived as a college program.School board 1: Do you know what I mean? So all of a sudden employers say,

“you know, we thought…”

MTCU: Colleges like it to be that way. (I-13)

School representatives are concerned about the financial sustainability of SHSMprograms, which may include costs of transporting students to training facilities orworkplaces and contracting providers to deliver industry safety certifications. One strategyfor increasing control over funding is for schools to take on more of the training delivery.

The preceding discussion suggests that their divergent histories, institutionalboundaries, and governance and policy structures make it difficult for secondaryschools and post-secondary institutions to collaborate (Venezia et al. 2007). One canalso interpret tensions as different players competing to manage meaning and increasetheir capitals within the field. At the same time, government funding is increasinglycontingent on partnerships with other providers as well as private sector organizations.For example, the training board representative notes that to access provincial fundingfor an employer awareness campaign, they had to demonstrate that they were workingwith other service providers. Similarly, a college representative states:

You’re forced to work as a team. We don’t get any funding [for the School-College-Work Initiative] unless there’s at least one college and at least twoschool boards. (I-18)

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The financial “stakes” have also increased—program funding for the college hasgone from “$13,000 in 2002 to about half a million dollars this year.”

The increased emphasis on government funding that is tied to partnership resultsin a curious blend of competition and collaboration among providers:

[A]pprenticeship is hot…. [for] about five, six years, it’s been a hot topic wheredifferent service organizations have a mandate to promote and to signapprentices and we get called to a lot of meetings from these different serviceproviders about, you know, wanting to do that partnership. (I-13, School board)

However, some participants note that the key players are often missing:

[S]ometimes you’re at a meeting …of 20 people and they’re all serviceproviders. … There are no employers there. (I-13, School board)

And because they are not seen as economic producers, the value of their socialcapital is perceived to be limited:

You know when we get the non-profit people, you have your flip charts andthey love process and you go around and around and you write everythingdown and they love it. They go from one meeting to the next and that’s theirlife. Business people aren’t like that. They want: “Ok here is the problem. Hereare the different things that we can do about it. What are we going to do?Who’s going to do what? And this is when it’s going to happen.” And that’swhat they want. (I-9, Training board)

Further, while several participants are frustrated by the lack of coordination ofservice delivery, struggles for the position of lead partner make it unlikely that thiswill be resolved locally. For example, a college representative suggests that “we arewell suited to bridge the gap so that students have a clear pathway,” adding thatcolleges “have a golden opportunity to be the go-between” (I-10). School boards, onthe other hand, would like to establish a Business-Education Council to coordinateschool-business partnerships (I-12, I-13). In their view, such organizations are moreeffective than using the training board as partnership broker. Not surprisingly, thetraining board representative disagrees:

[W]hen we first started Passport to Prosperity [an employer engagementcampaign] one of the [school board] superintendents said to me, she said, “I’ma very straight forward person and really my director does not want to dealwith a training board. She wants to deal with a business education council.”And I said, “Well I’m pretty direct too. You don’t have a business educationcouncil and we’re doing this with or without you.” Which would have beendifficult. But you know, they have that mindset that a business-educationcouncil is focused on them. They [would] have a louder voice, whereas weonly have two educators on our training board. …I feel like RodneyDangerfield. We do an awful lot of work in putting events together and soon and I don’t think it’s appreciated, particularly by the school boards, howmuch work is being done on their behalf. There’s always been a little bitternessthat the money doesn’t go directly to the school boards. I’ve heard that fromday one about well it’s our money. You’ve got our money. (I-9)

Mapping the field of VET partnerships 145

The lack of “requisite networks and structures for partnership” along with thecentrality of economic producers fits Bradford’s description of neoliberal partnerships.

Discussion

The preceding multi-level analysis of the intersecting fields of education, training,and construction work contributes important insights to our understanding of VETopportunities and outcomes for youth. In particular, attempting to map the structureof positions within the field and identifying the deep structures of power highlightissues that are often ignored by policy makers (cf. Gleeson and Keep 2004).Bourdieu’s ideas about the field as a site of struggle along with an embedded contextapproach point to tensions within this case site that reflect the broader institutionalcontext and have implications for current approaches to VET in Canada.

The Simcoe partnership reflects negotiations between employers, unions and otherTDAs, government, and schools over control of training (access and delivery), whopays for training, and the value of that training in the labour market. Non-unionemployers are arguably at the centre of partnerships in Simcoe given their control overthe labour process and training opportunities. Unions differ in their control over accessto training and the labour market value of that training. For unions with more control(e.g., IBEW representing electricians), OYAP is seen as a way of working around theadult apprenticeship system and undercutting their labour market power, while forunions with less power (e.g., Local 183 representing construction craft workers) itrepresents a way of gaining legitimacy and building union membership. Colleges,meanwhile, seek to protect their status as training providers, expand their provision,and ensure future demand by providing credentials with labour market value.

While there are areas of consensus across these stakeholders, some tensions arearguably rooted in contradictions within capitalism. For example, companiesdemand educated flexible workers, while trying to cut labour costs and retaincontrol by systematizing and replacing worker competencies (Livingstone 1999).Although trust is a fundamental requirement of partnership, “unstable, precariousand fragmented employment systems are more likely to lead to instrumental andcontractually-based relations” (Thompson 2003, p. 365). Voluntary partnershipstherefore reflect competition to control the means by which the exchange ratebetween the various competing forms of capital in the field are established(Wacquant 1993). That said, there is arguably potential for social democraticpartnerships if the objective structure of positions in the field shifts and a new socialcontract between the state, trade unions, business and education can be developed(cf., Coffield 1999).

But currently, tensions are evident with high schools and other partners enteringthe training field. For example, some educators seek to partner with high statustrades partners thereby encouraging positional competition for training spots. Othereducators promote partnerships with trades where skill requirements are commen-surate with a high school diploma or less. Both approaches potentially reflect therole of schools in social reproduction, depending on which students are channelledinto particular pathways. In this regard, approaches reflect lack of clarity (atprovincial and local levels) around what kind of student should pursue apprentice-

146 A. Taylor

ship training. But the missing link continues to be the lack of attention to the demandside of the education-jobs gap.

As Bosch and Charest (2008, p. 430) note, while in some countries vocationalcertificates “signal competency to perform complex tasks autonomously in a broadoccupational field, in others they signal that the holder is a low achiever in the schoolsystem and possesses only narrowly based skills for specific jobs.” In countries likeNorway and Denmark apprenticeship training is well integrated with general education,while in countries like Canada, it is an “add on” to a system that continues to privilegeuniversity education pathways. As evidence, a study of Canadian 15-year olds and theirparents in 2000 found that only 6% of students aspired to achieve a trades certificationand only 7% of parents wanted this for their child (Krahn and Taylor 2005). Thereforedifferences in cultural values across countries are an important part of the context.

The current approach to VET partnerships in Canada arguably exacerbates the existingcomplexity and incoherence of adult learning systems. For example, schools, colleges, thelocal training board and other TDAs (e.g., Labourers Union) seek to maintain and expandtheir control over training and secure their positions within a new local order though SWTprograms like OYAP, SCWI, and SHSM. But the general lack of engagement of Simcoeemployers in training along with their central position in the field results in a limitedpartnership model in which some players are excluded or marginalized and any employerparticipation is regarded as exemplary regardless of its benefits for youth.

The unwillingness of government to interfere with the “demand” side of VETsuggests a “neoliberal” partnership approach. However, the contradictory role of thestate is indicated by its central role in brokering VET partnerships and controllingprogram funding, objectives, and evaluation coupled with a voluntary approach toemployer engagement and devolution of responsibility to the community level. Itscentral role as partnership coordinator and diminished role as education and trainingprovider suggests that the Ontario government, like those in several OECD countries,has become adept at steering from a distance. In the Simcoe Country case we see theresulting mixture of competition, cooperation and struggle over positions in the field.

This discussion raises important questions about the role of education in theeconomy and how education and training programs might work more effectively.Contrary to the vision of a high skills, knowledge-based economy, the SimcoeCounty case suggests that construction employers are engaging in youth and adultapprenticeship training in very small numbers. It is far from an employer-led systemin that regard. Explanations for lack of employer engagement provided by interviewparticipants included the high costs of apprenticeship, unreasonable ratios set byunions, and lack of training capacity of small owner-operated firms.

The response of government has been to attempt to link apprenticeship trainingmore directly to general education, provide financial incentives to employers, reviewratios and other regulations that confine employers, and establish coordinatingbodies (e.g., local training boards and sector councils). In September 2008, theprovincial government further announced that it would introduce legislation thatwould establish a College of Trades to “put skilled trades on a similar footing withteachers, doctors and nurses, who have their own professional colleges.”15 The

15 This news release from September 16, 2008 was accessed September 19, 2008 at: www.edu.gov.on.ca/eng/document/nr/08.09/nr0916.html.

Mapping the field of VET partnerships 147

assumption is that a focus on increasing the supply of skilled labour within avoluntaristic framework will produce a high skills economy (cf. Keep 2005, Lloydand Payne 2002).

However, the Simcoe Case and reflections on similar policy approaches in othersites (Taylor et al. 2007) suggest that the missing policy piece is the workplace(Lowe 2000). Some of the barriers to apprenticeship training cited by employershave been challenged by research which suggests that the benefits of apprenticeshiptraining outweigh the costs (Prism Economics and Analysis 2005), and the looseningof the regulatory context in trades (e.g., downward trend in ratios and lack ofcompulsory trade designation in ACA) has not resulted in greater employerwillingness to train. Instead, the Simcoe case suggests that employers, understand-ably, prefer to socialize the costs of training while maintaining control over thecontent of that training and access to labour power. From this perspective, increasedemployer commitment to training on a voluntary basis is unlikely. The centrality ofemployers without strong corporatist VET structures at provincial and national levelsin Canada raises questions about the desirability of an adult learning system thatpromotes short term, firm-specific training.

The Simcoe case supports the argument of Bosch and Charest (2008) that whilecorporatism at the local level is important for VET, it is not a substitute for nationalcoordination. Devolution to the community level in a field where players are notequal suggests that the costs and benefits of training are also likely to be unequallydistributed across players and sites. This is more likely with increasing competitionamong service providers. The search for better partnership mechanisms (e.g., abusiness-education council rather than training board) is not likely to resolve theunderlying issues of inclusion and exclusion in partnerships, positional competition,concerns about the sustainability of VET funding, and lack of resources forpartnership work. Some of these stem from a lack of clear direction at provincial andnational levels and the supply side focus of policy, which has given insufficientattention to employer accountability for training and to increasing the value of tradeswork.

This analysis also has implications for SWT programming within secondaryschools. First, I agree with Gleeson and Keep’s (2004) argument that the roles, rightsand responsibilities of all partners need to be clarified. This is important given thecurrent lack of employer engagement and the competition between service providers.Second, the question of whether employer needs are coherent or “ambiguous,confused, or contradictory,” as suggested by Rikowski (2001), needs to be asked. Atminimum, there is a need to look at the representativeness of employer voices and toensure that educators do not promote narrow utilitarian approaches to VET. Third,tensions between union and non-union sectors of the construction industry arguablyrestrict access to apprenticeship training, and affect the coherence and quality oftraining, and the valuation of that training in the labour market. There may thereforebe a role for the state in legitimizing and encouraging union involvement since anumber of unions are TDAs (cf. Gleeson and Keep, 2004). Finally, questions need tobe asked about what young people should be learning about work. If employerengagement is focused on ensuring that their investment in training pays off, youtharguably need to be prepared to come to the table with negotiation skills along withknowledge of institutional relations in the industry.

148 A. Taylor

Acknowledgments This research is supported by a grant from the Canadian Council on Learning. I wouldalso like to thank Susan Braedley and Tom Johnstone for their help during the data collection phase, and graduateresearch assistant Terrie Lynn Thompson for her helpwith proofreading transcripts and preliminary data analysis.

Appendix 1: Acronyms

ACA Apprenticeship Certification ActCCW Construction craft workerCME Coordinated market economiesIBEW International Brotherhood of Electrical WorkersLME Liberal market economiesME Ministry of EducationMTCU Ministry of Training, Colleges and UniversitiesNAFTA North American Free Trade AgreementOYAP Ontario Youth Apprenticeship Program (OYAP)PAC Provincial Advisory CommitteesSCWI School-College-Work Initiative (SCWI)SHSM Specialist High Skills Major program (SHSM)TDA Training Delivery AgentTQAA Trades Qualification and Apprenticeship ActVET Vocational Education and Training

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Alison Taylor is a Professor in the Department of Educational Policy Studies at the University of Alberta.Her current research focuses on school-to-work transition and high school apprenticeship programs.

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