Manal Batran and Arendel

217Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 10, No. 1, April 1998

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A shelter of their own:informal settlementexpansion in GreaterCairo and governmentresponses

Manal El-Batran and Christian Arandel

SUMMARY: This paper describes why there has been a rapidgrowth of informal settlements in Cairo when there was an over-supply of formal housing, and why most new informal settle-ments develop on scarce agricultural land while large stretchesof desert nearby remain mostly undeveloped. The paper also re-views the changes in the Egyptian government’s housing andland policies over the last 40 years, including attempts to up-grade informal settlement and to combine upgrading with thedevelopment of settlements for middle-income households.

I. INTRODUCTION

CAIRO, THE CAPITAL of Egypt, is situated in a place from whereit controls the apex of the Nile Delta at the junction of Upperand Lower Egypt. This helps explain why this site was also cho-sen by ancient Egyptians, the Byzantine Empire and early Arabconquerors to establish important urban centres. In its presentconfiguration, Cairo comprises the city of Fustat, established in640 AD, and the city of Al Qahira, established in 969, whichgave its name to the present day metropolis.(1)

Throughout its history, Cairo has exerted an unrivalled eco-nomic, political and demographic supremacy over the rest ofthe country.(2) Today, with approximately 12 million inhabitants,it is one of the world’s “mega-cities” and is beset by problemsthat are similar to most other large cities in the South. Cairosuffers from the burden of supporting a population growing fasterthan its ability to expand infrastructure and provide basic serv-ices. As it expands into agricultural areas to the north and west,consuming 500 hectares of prime agricultural soil every year,Greater Cairo progressively absorbs adjacent villages. It is avery dense city with problems of transportation, inadequatedrainage and sewerage, and lack of usable spaces.

Among the most visible manifestations of the challenges posedby rapid urbanization are the informal settlements on the pe-

Manal El-Batran works at theHousing and Building Re-search Centre (HBRC) in Cairo.Her main interests are in urbanland policy and gender issues,and she is developing a courseon practicing the incorporationof gender concerns in humansettlements development pro-grammes. Christian Arandelworks at the Urban Manage-ment Programme’s regionaloffice for Arab Countries inCairo.

Addresses: Manal El-Batran, 7Abbas Hamza Street, Nazlet elBatran, El-Haram 12111, Giza,Egypt, e-mail: [email protected]; Christian Arandel,3B BahgAt Ali Street, Zemalek,Cairo, Egypt, e-mail: [email protected].

218 Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 10 No. 1, April 1998

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riphery of Cairo. These have developed mostly on private agri-cultural land and, less frequently, on publicly owned desert land.They show the inability of the state and the private formal sec-tor to meet the demand for land and housing. Even the mostefficient housing policies could not have averted the phenom-enon but this paper suggests that the government of Egypt’shousing policy contributed to making the informal sector thepredominant channel for providing shelter to the urban poor.

This is best illustrated by two paradoxes. The first is the spec-tacular growth of informal settlements which took place in asituation of oversupply of formal housing units. The 1986 cen-sus revealed that there were 1.8 million vacant housing units inEgypt and 523,000 in Cairo alone. The second paradox is thatspontaneous urbanization occurs mostly on scarce and preciousagricultural land while large stretches of desert land located inthe immediate vicinity of urban centres remain mostly undevel-oped.

However, the first of these paradoxes is explained by the factthat vacant formal housing units are not affordable to most ur-ban dwellers.(3) The second is explained by the efficiency of theinformal housing sector: those owning or developing privateagricultural land have been better able to respond to marketdemand than the government authorities which controlled thedesert land. To better understand how this happened, the pa-per first reviews how and why the informal settlements devel-oped, with a special emphasis on the government’s housing andland policies. Then it assesses the efforts that have been con-ducted over the past two decades to address the problems posedby informal settlements.

II. ROOT CAUSES OF INFORMAL SETTLEMENTEXPANSION

a. Population Growth

THE GREATER CAIRO region encompasses the city of Cairo,the city of Giza, three secondary cities and a few villages in thegovernorates of Qaliobia and Giza. Current estimates suggest apopulation of around 12 million inhabitants - compared to 1million in 1930, 6 million in 1965, 8 million in 1976 and 10.66million in 1986.(4) The total built area of Greater Cairo is 220square kilometres within a total area of 330 square kilometres.(5)

This makes it one of the densest cities in the world. For in-stance, its built up area encompasses little over twice the areaof the city of Paris proper (which covers 105 square kilometres)but it has a population more than five times as large.

For the country as a whole, the population has grown ten-foldduring the last century and a half while the population of Cairohas grown more than thirty-fold. Most of Cairo’s physical ex-pansion has occurred on agricultural land located at the pe-riphery of the city. The Greater Cairo region now representsabout 22 per cent of the total population of Egypt and 43 percent of its urban population.

1. General Organization forPhysical Planning (GOPP) andIAURIF (1983), Greater CairoRegion: Long Range Urban De-velopment Scheme, MasterScheme, General Organization ofPhysical Planning, Cairo.

2. UNCHS-Habitat (1993), Met-ropolitan Planning and Manage-ment in the Developing World:Spatial Decentralization in Bom-bay and Cairo, Nairobi.

3. In 1976, Osman AhmedOsman, then Minister of Con-struction and owner of Egypt’slargest construction company(Arab Constructions) declared, ina self-serving speech, that Egyptneeded to build at least 100,000new housing units to meet thecurrent and future demand. It waslater demonstrated that this wasnot the case and that, in fact, thesupply of housing units exceededthe demand. For more detailssee Milad, Hanna (1992), LeLogement en Egypte, Essai Cri-tique, CEDEJ, Cairo.

4. GOPP & IAURIF (1991),Greater Cairo Region MasterScheme: Implementation As-sessment Updating Proposal,Cairo.

5. Saker, H. (1996), “New urbancommunities: have they improvedthe situation of central areas?Greater Cairo region case stud-ies”, paper published in the Pro-ceedings of the 20th INTA AnnualWorld Conference: New UrbanCommunities: Past Experienceand the Future of Cities, Cairo.


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Greater Cairo’s rapid population growth rate can be explainedboth by a rapid natural increase and by rural-urban migration.Between 1935 and 1965, net in-migration accounted for ap-proximately 35 per cent of this growth. Recent census data showa decline in the importance of migration as 80 per cent of Cai-ro’s population growth today arises from natural increase. As aresult, Cairo’s population now grows at approximately the samerate as the rest of the country.

b. Housing Policy

The systematic involvement of the Egypt’s government in theprovision of public housing started with the 1952 revolutionand the rise to power of Gamal Abdel Nasser. The new govern-ment’s interest in housing manifested itself in two main ways.The first was a series of laws passed at five-year intervals toreduce and control the rents of housing units constructed after1944. The second was the state’s involvement in the construc-tion of low-cost public housing built on the outskirts of Cairoand in cleared “slum” areas in the centre of the city. From 1965to 1975, there was a sharp drop in the production of publichousing due in part to the priority given to military expenses asa result of a quasi-permanent state of war. As the populationcontinued to increase and urbanization followed, the gap be-tween demand and supply, both private and public, greatly wid-ened.

After 1975, President Sadat engaged the country in a newdirection, namely the Open Door Economic Policy (Infitah),marked by a greater political and economic opening to the westand a move away from a state controlled economy towards amarket economy.(6) With regard to housing, the governmentannounced that it would only be responsible for the construc-tion of low-income housing, and the private sector would havethe primary responsibility for providing housing units to themiddle and upper-classes. In addition, the state disengaged fromthe production of rental housing and maintained the policy ofrent control with only minor modifications.

As both the private and public sectors disengaged from therental housing market, those seeking rental accommodation weredenied access to the formal sector. The impact was all the moresevere as the private sector catered almost exclusively to theneeds of the upper-class. In addition, the rents charged for thepublic housing built in Cairo during the 1960s and 1970s, andin Cairo and the new towns in the 1980s, were not affordable bythe poor. The informal housing market became the only marketthat was affordable to urban dwellers with low or middle in-comes.

Economic changes also had a major role in the growth of in-formal settlements. Egyptians who worked in the Gulf investedheavily in land and housing, pushing land prices up in the pe-ripheries and making the sub-division of agricultural land forhousing increasingly profitable. In addition, informal housingdevelopments were rendered more attractive by strict planningand building regulations which greatly increased the cost of for-

6. Waterbury, J. (1983), The Egyptof Nasser and Sadat: The Politi-cal Economy of Two Regimes,Princeton University Press,Princeton.


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mal sector housing. Under law Number 107 of 1976 and lawNumber 25 of 1992, the formal approval of land sub-division istime-consuming and costly. Abiding by official regulations suchas building standards and plot coverage reduced the profit madefrom housing investments.

A major incentive to evade the law is that it is nearly risk-free.No informal settlement located on private land has ever beenforcibly removed. In addition, residents of many informal settle-ments on private land were able to obtain government infra-structure and services, especially in the period prior to a parlia-mentary election. Both these factors contributed to an alreadyhigh level of security of tenure. This does not apply to squattersettlements located on public land where tenure is much lesssecure.

The United States Agency for International Development fi-nanced two studies in 1976 and 1977 which showed that thehousing policies at that time, such as rent control and priceceiling, inhibited the production of housing.(7) And, as El-Kholeishowed, it was often high-income government officials and pro-fessionals who benefited from rent control because they occu-pied the accommodation where it applied.(8) Malpezzi tested theimpact of rent control on housing supply and demand.(9) Hedesigned a simulation model that presented the effect of rentcontrol on housing investments and consumption. This showedthat the illegal practice of landlords demanding side payments(or key money)(10) meant that rent control no longer kept pricesdown. But rent control also discouraged investors from build-ing housing for rent, and constrained tenants’ mobility, as thoseliving in properties with controlled rents did not want to leavethem. This means that decontrol is desirable but, to avoid chaosin the housing market, Malpezzi recommended decontrolling rentfor vacant units and suggested that rents for rent controlledproperties be allowed to rise, linked to price indexes. These andother studies recommended reconsidering current housing poli-cies, including rent control.(11)

A recent attempt was made to remedy the shortcomings ofpast legislation. Law Number 106 of 1996 was issued to modifyareas of the previous laws. It aimed to make it easier and quickerto get a building license; it also reduced fees and gave appli-cants more rights such as being able to lodge an official com-plaint if their request was not processed within a two-monthperiod. However, the most significant provision of the new law isthe suppression of rent control for all new buildings. Under thelaw, rent rates and yearly increases have to be set within theframework of a five-year contract between the owner and therenter.

c. Access to Urban Land

A major constraint on housing was the continuous escalationof land prices and, with this, the continuous increase in therelative importance of land costs within the costs of house orapartment-building. The price of land for low-income housinghas increased 23-fold between 1960 and 1993.(12) In the spirit

7. Serageldin, M. (1976), Imme-diate Action Proposal for Hous-ing in Egypt; also Cairo Univer-sity and Massachusetts Instituteof Technology (1977), Low-in-come Housing in Egypt, the JointHousing and Community Team,Ministry of Housing and Con-struction and Office of Housing;United State Agency for Interna-tional Development, Cairo.

8. El-Kholei, A. (1991), “The poli-tics of development: the case ofthe Middle East” presented at theAnnual Meeting of the Consor-tium on Development Studies,Seoul. Korea.

9. See, for instance, Malpezzi, S.(1986), Rent Control and Hous-ing Market Equilibrium: Theoryand Evidence From Cairo, Egypt,PhD dissertation, George Wash-ington University, WashingtonDC.

10. These were when the land-lord asked the renter to pay forpart of the construction costs.

11. See reference 9; alsoWheaton, W. (1980), “Housingpolicies and urban markets indeveloping countries: the Egyp-tian experience”, Journal of Ur-ban Economics Vol.9, pages 242-256; also Barrada, A., W.Wheaton and P. Annez (1980),“Public policy and the econom-ics of housing” in Housing andConstruction Industry in Egypt,Interim Report Working Papers,the Joint Research Team onHousing in Egypt, Cairo Univer-sity and Massachusetts Instituteof Technology; and Hardoy, JorgeE. and David Satterthwaite(1981), Shelter Needs and Re-sponse. Housing, Land and Set-tlements Policies in SeventeenThird World Nations, John Wileyand Sons, Chichester.

12. Allam, Ahmed (1992), “Theproblems of urban land in GreaterCairo” in Housing InternationalConference: Policies and Hous-ing Systems for Low IncomeCommunities, GOHBPR, Cairo.


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of Infitah, the government passed Law 43/1974 which dealt withattracting Arab and foreign finance. Private sector companieswere the main beneficiaries of such legislation which approved(13)

various tax exemptions on construction for periods varying fromfive to eight years, tax exemptions of 10 to 15 years for con-struction and land reclamation projects, and new communitiesoutside the city limits.

Within the context of this law, several land development com-panies began to operate in the field of housing. Large privatecompanies began to appear again, specializing in constructinghousing for upper-income groups, as this was considered themost profitable. To avoid the government requirement that allnew housing developments should include units for rent, thesewere generally developed as condominiums. These companiesinvested in the construction of middle-income housing and oneinvested in low-income housing.

The Infitah has thus led to sharply rising prices for inner-cityland, shortages in skilled labour and an increase in the cost oftheir wages because many have been attracted by the oil-pro-ducing countries.

The increases in construction and land prices, and in wagesafter the 1973 War, caused a large increase in the prices of dwell-ing units. A class with a high purchasing power evolved follow-ing the return of many workers from the Gulf States and themarket responded to their demand for luxurious housing. MostEgyptians could not afford the prices of these units. Urbangrowth expanded over agricultural land around the cities as theprice of land on the periphery was affordable compared to otherland in the city. Informal settlements evolved there althoughwith a lack of services and utilities. Desert sites around thecities were illegally occupied and then developed into informalsettlements.

Land speculation has an influential role in increases in landprices both in the private markets and in state controlled mar-kets - for instance the sale of publicly owned plots of land whichhave been connected to basic infrastructure networks (site andservices schemes).

III. THE SCOPE AND CHARACTERISTICS OFINFORMAL HOUSING

a. Informal Settlements in Numbers

ESTIMATES OF THE scale and scope of informal settlementsvary greatly depending on the definitions and techniques used.A joint construction industry study between the World Bankand GOHBPR in 1981 estimated that approximately 77 per centof all housing units built within Egypt between 1966-1976 wereinformal.(14) A study on informal housing in 1982 estimatedthat informal units represented 84 per cent of all units builtbetween 1970-1981 in Cairo.(15)

A 1993 GOPP report(16) estimated that there were 23 informalsettlements in the Greater Cairo region with a total population

13. El-Batran, Manal and AhmedEl-Kholei (1996), “Gender andrehousing in Egypt”, NetherlandsEmbassy in Cairo, Gender andDevelopment Unit, Cairo.

14. World Bank and GOHBPR(1981), Construction IndustryStudy, Cairo.

15. ABT Associates, Dames &Moor and GOHBPR (1982), In-formal Housing in Egypt, Cairo.

16. GOPP (1993), Upgrading ofInformal Settlements in GreaterCairo Region, Preliminary Re-port, Cairo.


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of about 5.88 million people and an average density of around685 persons per hectare. The Ministry of Local Administrationestimated that, in Greater Cairo, 4.52 million people lived in171 areas with an average density of 780 persons per hectare(17)

(see Map 1). Whereas the development of most of these settle-ments dates back to the 1960s, most growth has occurred since1986.

b. Typology and Main Characteristics of InformalSettlements

Several criteria can be used to differentiate between the dif-ferent types of informal settlements (ashawayats in Arabic).(18)

Land tenure is the most useful and we can distinguish betweensquatter settlements on public land and informal settlementson private, legally owned (usually agricultural) land. Illegal oc-cupation of government land is now on the rise because of therising costs of agricultural land.

Most informal settlements(19) in the Greater Cairo region havea number of characteristics in common including the progres-sive and incremental construction of housing by small contrac-tors and owners; the non-compliance with building and plan-ning regulations and the absence of architects; and a lack offacilities, amenities and infrastructure. In addition, residents ofthese areas tend to belong to lower-income segments of the popu-lation and are more affected by unemployment, low levels ofprofessional skills and low levels of education. However, as notedabove, the population of informal settlements is socially andeconomically heterogeneous and living in such settlementsshould not be equated with living in poverty.

There are also significant differences between settlements builton private land and those built on public desert land. Dwellingsbuilt on desert land tend to be of lower quality and rarely riseabove two storeys compared to three to five for dwellings onprivate land. Residents of informal settlements built on agricul-tural land are from a wider socio-economic spectrum than thoseliving on desert land who tend to be among the lowest-incomegroups. The latter cannot afford to purchase sites from theirlegal owners and are “willing” to take the risk of being evictedfrom their homes. In contrast, informal housing occurring onprivate land meets the needs of a larger clientele including thelower and upper-middle class which does not have access to anapartment with rent control and cannot afford to rent or pur-chase a unit produced by private sector production.(20) In addi-tion, a trend towards the gentrification of these areas can beobserved; it is more marked in settlements that are closest tothe city centre and have been provided with infrastructure.(21)

c. The Informal Housing Delivery System

The predominance of informal settlements located on privatelyowned agricultural land in the Greater Cairo region can be ex-plained by the relatively high level of security of tenure whichthe squatter settlements do not enjoy. Three actors play a major

17. Ministry of Local Administra-tion (1994), The State Policy con-cerning Informal Settlements Is-sues, Internal Report, Cairo.

18. This literally means “random”;ashwayats are therefore randomor unplanned settlements. Thisterm refers to all types of infor-mal settlement.

19. The term “informal settlement”will be used as a generic term todefine all informal settlements.When needed, it will be qualifiedas occurring on private or publicland. It should also be noted thatthere exists a variety of situationsof tenure even in settlements de-veloped on private land wheresquatter housing can be found.

20. Kadi, G. (1987),L’Urbanisation Spontanée auCaire, URBAMA, Tours, France.

21. It must be noted that informalland sub-division also benefitsthe high-income class. In an at-tempt to escape the noise andpollution of Cairo, high-incomegroups may buy luxurious man-sions on agricultural land on theperiphery of the city.


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Map 1: Informal Settlements in Greater Cairo

Source: El-Batran, Manal and E. El-Kholei (1996), “Gender and Rehousing in Egypt”, Netherlands Embassy inCairo, Gender and Development Unit, Cairo.


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role in the process of urbanization of agricultural lands: theowner/sub-divider, the sub-divider and the companies special-izing in land division.

The owner/sub-divider is typically a small farmer, most oftena man who owns a small parcel of land, sub-divides it and sellsit while keeping a portion for himself. The sub-divider is for-merly a small landowner who sub-divides part of his land andwith the added income buys new parcels for further sub-divi-sion. Sub-dividers keep their overall costs low by selling theparcels, without site preparation, and relying on word of mouthto find their customers. The companies buy large areas of agri-cultural land located on the outskirts of the city, that are sub-sequently sub-divided into smaller plots without providing in-frastructure or services. The companies sell to middle-incomeurban dwellers - especially migrant workers - by advertising innewspapers and offering advantageous credit conditions. Eventhough the process is increasingly commercialized, the owner/sub-dividers, who offer the smallest and cheapest parcels aswell as the best credit conditions, remain the main actors inthis process.(22)

Informal developments on public desert land tend to followthe same pattern after the land has been occupied. There aretwo markedly different ways of seizing government land. Thefirst is collective invasion by tribes, the second is a more com-mercialized system in which the sub-divider plays an importantrole. This second way is now much the most common.(23)

The informal housing development process offers many ben-efits to the individuals who participate in it. From the perspec-tive of owner/builders, it provides an incentive for saving andinvestment, allows gradual expansion when the household canafford it, is adapted to family needs and resources, and pro-vides an opportunity to “invest” income into an asset whose valuegrows. The relatively small scale of the building operations alsoallows the entry of small and medium size investors and con-tractors into the housing market.(24)

From a planning perspective, it could be argued that informalsettlements constitute a rational use of limited space as high-density developments guarantee that land is used to its full po-tential. Informal housing contributes to maintaining a balancedsupply:demand equilibrium in the land and housing market.The range of plots, house and apartment sizes offered by theinformal system, as well as location and service characteristicsof the settlements, represent a much greater variety of optionsand prices than the formal sector.

Many informal settlements are the poor’s solution to theirhousing problems. However, at best, they are only an incom-plete answer as they greatly limit the poor’s access to the city,and with it their potential for social and economic integration.(25)

The lack of basic infrastructure has a negative impact both onhealth and on the development of productive activities. Fur-thermore, informal settlements constitute obstacles to the har-monious growth of cities and are major contributors to thegradual erosion of agricultural production.

22. See reference 20.

23. Deboulet, A. (1994), Vers unUrbanisme d’EmanationPopulaire, Compétences etRéalisations des Citadins,L’Exemple du Caire, Institutd’Urbanisme de Paris, Universitéde Paris XII-Creteil.


25. Durand-Lasserve, A. (1996),Regularization and Integration ofIrregular Settlements: Lessonsfrom Experience, UMP WorkingPaper No.6, Urban ManagementProgramme, UNCHS-WorldBank-UNDP.


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IV. GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO INFORMALSETTLEMENTS

a. Addressing Informal Settlement Expansion ThroughUrban and Regional Planning

THE FIRST MASTERPLAN for the Greater Cairo region wascompleted in 1965. It created industrial poles at Helwan (southof Cairo), Shubra Al-Kheima (north of Cairo) and Imbaba-Giza(west of Cairo), and these received 50 per cent of investmentallocated for industry under the first Five-Year Plan (1960-1965).However, these industrial poles further increased the attrac-tiveness of Greater Cairo and helped contribute to a demographicgrowth that surpassed estimates. To address this problem andthe growing seriousness of transport and water drainage prob-lems, a second masterplan was proposed in 1970. It was basedon two fundamental objectives: to limit the physical growth ofCairo by giving the city an optimal size and a ring road to con-tain the city; and to absorb population growth in satellite newtowns.(26)

By 1980, the formulation of a new masterplan became im-perative because demographic growth had again been underes-timated and the satellite cities were not ready to absorb theexcess population. The objectives of the new masterplan wereto redefine the urban strategy, to make essential choices re-garding investment in urban projects and to progressively es-tablish a permanent regional planning agency.

An updated version of the 1980 masterplan integrates andmodifies past policies and projects under implementation. Itintegrates national policies by recognizing Cairo and Alexandriaas the two main urban regions of Egypt, and seeks to controland organize their development while relying on them to pro-mote national economic growth.(27) To redirect the rapid urbangrowth of the Greater Cairo region, the planners set 12 objec-tives to achieve the overall goals of economic growth and im-provement of the living environment. These include:

• protecting agricultural areas;• improving transport efficiency;• maximizing the use of existing infrastructure;• encouraging the deconcentration of population out of the

Greater Cairo region;• providing alternatives to informal settlements; and• organizing the urban fabric to improve access to public serv-

ices.

One key element of the two last masterplans was the effort toredirect urban growth away from agricultural land through thecreation of new towns and new settlements in the desert. Thispolicy aimed both at creating poles of economic developmentand providing alternatives to informal settlements.(28)





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b. New Towns and New Settlements

The main difference between new towns and new settlementsis that the former aim at spatial redistribution at the regional ornational levels and the latter aim at redirecting urban growthwithin Greater Cairo. New towns can be divided into two catego-ries: independent new towns and satellite new towns. The formerare meant to be self-sufficient communities whereas the latterare located in the proximity of large urban centres (mainly Cairo).Satellite towns are only partially autonomous and must rely onthe main city for many services. Both types of new towns arepart of a strategy for economic and industrial development andmany industries have located their operations there. New set-tlements, on the other hand, serve only to provide housing forCairo residents and are fully integrated into the Greater Cairoregion.(29)

The new settlements’ objective is to learn from informal set-tlements and emulate them on desert (and therefore public) land.They rely more heavily on the concept of sites and services thanthe new towns and incorporate core housing schemes. The tar-get population is the people currently occupying spontaneoussettlements, namely low and middle-income dwellers who areexcluded from the formal housing market. New settlements arelocated in close proximity to Cairo and allow easy access to thecity (see Map 2).

The original concept of creating sites and services was ulti-mately abandoned and the Ministry of Housing, Utilities andUrban Communities reverted to a more conventional approachconsisting of contracting private construction companies to buildfour to six-storey “low income” units for sale.(30) To date, theimplementation of the new settlements policy has been very slowas it faced a number of obstacles linked to the choice of sites,the status of the land, and water supply. The government relo-cated the victims of the October 1992 earthquake in one of thesenew settlements called El-Katamia on the periphery of Cairo.(31)

New settlements and new towns address the right issues: theproblem of urbanization in Egypt is not one of scarcity of hous-ing but one of the control of housing location and land develop-ment processes. However, the bias of the new settlements andnew towns toward owner-occupied, fully built housing, meansthat they are beyond the reach of the urban poor.

c. When Planning Falls Short: Upgrading andRegularization of Informal Settlements

Several factors led to the changes in the Egyptian government’sattitude toward settlements. The main factor was pressure frominternational donors which led to the first attempts at upgrad-ing informal settlements. Another form of external pressure camefrom the implementation of structural adjustment policies whichencouraged a redirection of infrastructure investment towardsdirect support for economic growth.

The increased sensitization of government authorities to theneeds of residents of informal settlements can also be traced to

29. GOPP, Giza Planner andDanish Group (1982), Giza Mas-ter Plan Study: Urban GrowthConsiderations, Cairo.

30. Observatoire Urbain du CaireContemporain (1993), “Les ‘newsettlements’ du Caire, LettreD’Informal Vol.33, No.77, CEDEJ.

31. Jossifort, S. (1995), VillesNouvelles et “New Settlements”:l’Aménagement du DésertEgyptien en Question, Lescahiers d’URBAMA, pages 29-43.


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Source: GOPP, Giza Planner, and Danish Group (1982), Giza Master Plan Study: Urban Growth Considerations,Cairo

Map 2: Development Corridors, Satellite Towns and New Settlements in andaround Cairo

their willingness to regain control over large areas of the coun-try’s cities, especially in Cairo. In the absence of any govern-ment intervention, informal communities have organized them-selves to provide most basic services such as health care, waterand mosques. This effort has been led by organizations with astrong religious affiliation which are a fertile ground for the dis-semination of ideology and the recruitment of new converts forfundamentalist movements. In addition, the 1994 catastrophein Durunka, Upper Egypt, which resulted in 500 deaths andhundreds of displaced persons, served to dramatize the chal-lenges posed by uncontrolled urbanization. The victims of thiscatastrophe were the inhabitants of an informal settlement whichhad developed close to an oil depot, on land prone to flash flood-ing. During the night of November 2, 1994, heavy rains caused


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a series of accidents which led to an explosion at the oil depot.The burning oil was carried by floodwater and reached the set-tlement while residents were sleeping. This tragedy was a di-rect result of the government’s inability to control urbanizationeven when the most basic safety rules are at stake. The case ofDurunka helped to revive the debate on the role and responsi-bility of the government toward these areas.(32)

d. Evolution of the Legal Framework for Upgrading andRegularization

While recognition of the significance of the urban challengeposed by informal areas is recent, attempts at regulating andregularizing them date back to the 1960s. Since 1960, an im-pressive body of laws, decrees and regulations has been en-acted covering every aspect of urban development from masterplanning and land sub-division to building codes and stand-ards of infrastructure.

However, it was not until 1980 that the regularization of infor-mal land development was identified in Egypt as an official policywhich should go beyond the periodic general regularization ofpast violations. Regularizations have greatly contributed towardsincreasing the feelings of security felt by informal settlers resid-ing on private land but they did not address the more serioustenure issues faced by squatters.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, partly as a result of WorldBank and US Agency for International Development (US AID)projects, a series of laws and decrees were passed aiming atcreating a framework for the regularization and upgrading ofsquatter settlements. In 1976, a law authorized governorates tosell public land to public companies and private developers and,in 1981, a law gave them the main responsibility for the up-grading of informal settlements. Finally, in 1984, a law pro-vided a framework for allowing the settlers to regularize theirsituation by buying their plots.(33)

There were great discrepancies in the law’s implementationbetween governorates. It was successfully implemented in Al-exandria, Ismailia and Aswan but faced greater difficulties inCairo. By the end of 1987, fewer than 30,000 requests for regu-larization had been filed, representing about 5 per cent of theestimated number of eligible illegal occupants in the governorate.The law’s failure was mainly due to the high prices set for buy-ing the land from the government.

e. Attempts at Regularizing and Upgrading InformalSettlements

By the late 1970s, the government of Egypt, the World Bankand international donors supported various pilot projects in“sites and services” and settlement upgrading - for instance, inCairo, projects were initiated in Helwan (1978) and ManshietNasser (1979), and also in Ismailia (1977) and Nasseriya in As-wan (1986).

These projects represented a drastic shift in government hous-

32. Ayeb, H. (1995), “Lesinondations de Novembre 1994en Egypte: catastrophe naturelleou politique?”, Egypt-MondeArabe No.22, 2e trimestre 1995,pages 159-185.

33. Serageldin, M. (1991), Regu-larizing the Informal Land Devel-opment Process Vol.1, Office ofHousing and Urban Pro-grammes, US AID, WashingtonDC.


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ing policy away from supplying complete, high-standard hous-ing units mostly to middle-income groups.(34) They encounteredresistance from government officials who resented the reduc-tion in the government’s role as well as the length of the self-help process and the “unattractive” (i.e. unfinished) aspect ofsites and services settlements. A major concern of governmentauthorities was that upgrading informal settlements would becondoning an illegal act and would encourage the developmentof more informal areas.

These projects met with various levels of success. Where par-ticipation by the local population and government was activelysought, they greatly contributed to the integration of residentsinto the urban network by providing basic infrastructure andsocial services, and regularizing land tenure. Where a reluctantcentral government was the main project overseer (as in ManshietNasser), they achieved at best the provision of infrastructure. Indesert areas, the main source of conflict between governmentand local populations was over the question of land tenure, withthe inhabitants considering the acquisition of land title as a pre-requisite to upgrading. Overall, upgrading and sites and serv-ices projects conducted in the 1980s failed in their main objec-tive of fundamentally altering Egypt’s housing policy. The Egyp-tian government did not replicate the approach at the nationallevel and resumed its policy of building finished housing units,particularly in the new towns.

It is only in 1993 that a systematic approach to the upgradingof informal settlements was initiated. It was formally launchedby President Mubarak in May 1993 when he announced thebeginning of the intensification of a national effort to upgradeinformal settlements all over Egypt. This shift in attitude to-wards informal settlements is largely the result of a shift in theoverall approach of the government towards the provision ofhousing. As it is retreating from its role as a housing provider itlearned that it would be hazardous to ignore informal areas.(35)

f. Upgrading through the Provision of Infrastructure

The first large-scale effort to improve infrastructure in Egypt,and particularly in urban centres, started in 1981 when theInternational Decade of Drinking Water Supply and Sanitationwas declared by the United Nations. This effort at improving thecountry’s infrastructure was spearheaded by US AID which, untilnow, had set aside nearly 25 per cent of its development aid toEgypt for this particular sector. The overriding guiding princi-ple of these projects is that whoever can pay should have ac-cess to water. Projects are based on the principle of full cost-recovery and costs can vary greatly according to location anddwelling size.(36)

A direct consequence of this market based approach to infra-structure provision is that the legality of settlements and over-all planning objectives and regulations are put aside. However,squatter settlements do not always benefit from this reform.For example, in early 1981, Cairo governorate issued a decreeallowing access to water and sanitation for informal settlements

34. El Messiri, S. (1990), Pro-posed Framework for an Inte-grated Approach to Institutionali-zation of Community Upgradingand Sites and Services Projectin the Shelter and UrbanizationConference, GOHBPR, Cairo.

35. Arandal, Christian and ManalEl-Batran (1997), The InformalHousing Development Process inEgypt, DPU Working PaperNo.82, University College, Lon-don.



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but settlements located on public land were not included in theinfrastructure layout.(37)

In the field of local administration, an important developmenttook place as a result of funds from US AID going to the Egyp-tian government as part of the US agency’s decentralizationsupport programme. Sums of US$ 455.2 million and approxi-mately 125,000 Egyptian pounds(38) were allocated to local in-frastructure projects and were to be spent mainly by the localgovernments. The main aim of the US AID grants therefore wasto decentralize policies and the provision of infrastructure tothe local level.(39)

The massive programme for upgrading informal settlementsinitiated in 1993 was seen as a social response to the spread offundamentalist religious ideology in informal settlements andaccompanied the intensification in the repression of terrorism.(40)

A national plan was established for upgrading these informalsettlements which included the provision of infrastructure andurban services for all informal settlements.

During the period May-June 1993, 106 million Egyptianpounds was allocated for upgrading programmes, mainly forthe provision of infrastructure such as electricity, water supply,sewerage, paving the streets and the banks of rivers and ca-nals, tree-planting and landscaping. The most significantamounts were allocated for electricity and special considerationwas given to street-widening, lighting and paving in informalsettlements, mainly as a security measure meant to ensure easiercontrol over the concerned areas. However, policy implementa-tion left no scope for community participation in decision-mak-ing nor did it include tenure security except when required tojustify public investment.(41)

Because of political priorities, the programme was only imple-mented in the ten governorates where the government consid-ered it most urgent to regain political control. Of a total of 904informal settlements, 343 were selected for the implementationof the first stage of this national programme. The governmentbudget for the upgrading programme for the year 1993-1994was increased to 401 million Egyptian pounds and it is expectedto reach more than 600 million. Clearance was recommendedfor 25 deteriorating inner-city areas located in Greater Cairoand Alexandria. This programme is financed in its entirety bythe Egyptian government without provision for cost recovery,and implementation is carried out by local authorities.

It is clear that the Greater Cairo region is benefiting from thebulk of this effort as Cairo, Giza and Qalyubiah received 43 percent of the total investment. This is justified by the fact thatGreater Cairo contains over 63 per cent of the informal settle-ment population of the 10 governorates and Giza has the high-est proportion of informal population in the country. Accord-ingly, the first national plan for 1993-2000 recommended theupgrading of 171 areas in the Greater Cairo region. Included inthis figure are 16 squatter areas located on valuable land whichwill be cleared.(42)

Whereas most of the recent effort at upgrading informal set-tlements focuses heavily on the provision of infrastructure,


38. The exchange rate today isaround 3.4 Egyptian pounds to$US 1; during the 1980s, the ex-change rate was around E£1.82:US$ 1.

39. Gardner, J. and A. van Hyyck(1990), The Lesson Learned: TheHelwan Housing and CommunityUpgrading Project for Low In-come in Egypt, US AID, Cairo.

40. Shoura Council Report(1994), Unplanned Housing ofInformal Areas, Arab Republic ofEgypt.




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projects developed recently in El-Munira, Giza, Shuba El Kheimaand Qalyubiah offer alternatives to current practices. The pro-posals jointly developed by the General Organization of PhysicalPlanning and IAURIF represent a significant evolution in termsof how they relate to informal settlements and, more generally,in their planning approaches to the Greater Cairo region. Thisapproach combines the upgrading of informal settlements withthe planned developments in desert areas, which are “reserved”for middle-income populations.(43)

The projects propose to remedy the most undesirable conse-quences of informal development, mainly the physical segrega-tion of these areas and the lack of infrastructure, but also totake advantage of present opportunities. These projects repre-sent a difficult balancing act between accepting popular citybuildings and the reassertion of planning principles and landuse regulations. Their success will be contingent on two fac-tors: first, the ability of the government to enforce land use regu-lations and, second, its capacity to act swiftly in the alreadyentirely built-up areas.

V. CONCLUSIONS

INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS HAVE become the dominant factorin the urbanization process and in the provision of housing forthe urban poor. These settlements should not be viewed as partof the country’s housing crisis but rather as the urban poor’scontribution to its solution. It is a particularly remarkable con-tribution as, under the prevailing conditions of scarce economicresources and bureaucratic control, neither the government northe private sector could provide the urban poor with basic shel-ter.

This paper has sought to show that the magnitude of informalhousing development is in part the direct result of failed gov-ernment approaches to housing and spatial planning policies.The three main reasons for this failure are strict rent controllegislation which discouraged formal private investment fromthis sector, the inability of the public sector to fill the gap byensuring sufficient housing was available and affordable to thepoor, and, lastly, the withdrawal of the government from therental housing market. The combination of these three factorsled to the disappearance of any shelter alternatives for the ur-ban poor other than in the informal sector. Law 101/96 Number101 of 1996 which suppresses rent control and simplifies theregulatory process is a move in the right direction but it is tooearly to assess its likely impact.

The disengagement of the state from low-income housing isnowhere more evident than in the new settlements around Cairowhere developers are now proposing housing which is geared tothe upper-middle income groups.(44) It is becoming increasinglyaccepted that new towns and new settlements, which were origi-nally designed to meet the housing needs of the poor, will ad-dress the needs of segments of the population which are rela-tively well-off and can afford to buy a finished housing unit.

43. Denis, E. (1995), “Le GOPPet l'IAURIF dans grand chantierde la régularisation des quartiersinformels du Caire” in Lettred’Information de L’OUCC No.41-42, September 1995.



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The Egyptian government’s de facto withdrawal from the pro-vision of housing for the poor implies that the poor have to usetheir own resources to provide a shelter for themselves and theirfamilies. As informal settlements play a central role in pursuingnational housing objectives, government policy options becomelimited to after-the-fact actions focusing on the supply of basicservices and infrastructure.

The Egyptian policy towards informal settlements is stillmarked by a number of incoherences. Infrastructure is pro-vided on a market basis in some places and freely in others.Settlements located in areas posing a threat to their residentsare connected to water and sewers. De facto recognition of anillegal settlement is rarely followed by de jure recognition throughgranting land titles. Meanwhile, official attitudes are more com-plaisant with settlements located on agricultural land, wherethey pose a real threat to food security, than on desert landwhen urbanization of the desert is considered a national prior-ity.

Furthermore, infrastructure provision is only a small part ofthe answer to the challenges posed by informal settlements inEgypt. In the current socio-economic and policy context there isno doubt that the ashawayats will continue to proliferatethroughout the country in the foreseeable future. There is noth-ing that the government can do to stop this phenomenon butthere is much it can do to limit its magnitude and its most nega-tive consequences. An important tool at the disposal of the gov-ernment lies in the vast areas of desert land located on Cairo’speriphery. Putting this land at the disposal of the urban poorwould go a long way towards limiting the growth of informalsettlements in the Greater Cairo region.

Manal Batran and Arendel

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