Managing fire & blast hazards by an integrated and performance-based design of safety barriers

Laurent PARIS - Réferent technologique Quantification des Risques

Paris-La-Defense, 16 Décembre 2015

Conference SPE France2

Table of contents

HSE Moment

1. Introduction

2. Overview of design approaches

3. Fire and Explosion design

4. Conclusions and way forward

Conference SPE France3

HSE Moment

1. Introduction

4 Conference SPE France

What are « small » fire and blast events ?

5

Source : Gexcon®, Norway

Source : DNV-GL, UK

Fire and blast phenomenas

Release of HC Gas/liquid

No event

Flammable vapourcloud build-up

Fire

Gas explosionDelayedignition

Overpressure

Heat FluxImmediateignition

yes

yes

No

No

6

In addition release of cryogenics mixture may lead

to embrittlement

Fire and blast are a major hazards offshore

Piper Alpha (North Sea, 1988) : 165 dead

7

MUMBAI HIGH (India, July 2005) : Ship collision, Riser fire, 22 dead,

365 escaped within 15 hours

8

Fire and blast are major hazards offshore (cont.)

8

Deepwater horizon (Mexico gulf, April 2010) : 11 dead

Background

9

Fire and Explosion biggest losses (MARCH)

Date Plant type Event Location Property loss (M$)

14/11/1987 Petrochemical Explosion Texas, USA 430

24/04/1988 Upstream Fire Campos Basin, Brasil 640

04/05/1988 Petrochemical Explosion Nevada, USA 580

05/05/1988 Refinery Explosion Louisiana, USA 560

07/07/1988 Upstream Fire/Explosion North Sea, UK 1600

20/01/1989 Upstream Blowout North Sea, Norway 410

19/03/1989 Upstream Fire/Explosion Gulf of Mexico, USA 750

23/10/1989 Petrochemical Explosion Texas, USA 1300

23/08/1991 Upstream Structural failure Sleipner North Sea, Norway 720

01/11/1992 Upstream Mechanical Damage North West Shelf, Austria 470

25/12/1997 Gas Processing Fire/Explosion Sarawak, Malaysia 430

25/09/1998 Gas Processing Explosion Victoria, Australia 680

25/06/2000 Refinery Explosion Mina Al-Ahmadi, Kuwait 600

15/05/2001 Upstream Fire/Explosion Campos Basin, Brasil 710

21/09/2001 Petrochemical Explosion Toulouse, France 610

15/04/2003 Upstream Riot Escravos, Nigeria 650

19/01/2004 Gas Processing Fire/Explosion Skikda, Algeria 580

23/03/2005 Refinery Explosion Texas City, USA > 1000

27/07/2005 Upstream Fire/Explosion Mumbai High field, India 430

11/12/2005 Storage Fire/Explosion Buncefield, UK > 1000

12/09/2008 Refinery Hurricane Texas, USA 750

04/06/2009 Upstream Collision North Sea, Norway 750

22/04/2010 Upstream Fire/Explosion Gulf of Mexico, USA > 40 000 ?

Accidents are still arriving. Need to properly adress Fire &

Blast in design phase.10

Fire and Blast hazard managementLoss

Hazard

Emergency Response

Mitigation (Fire and Blast Design)

Control (ESD, BD)

Detection (Fire & Gas)

Prevention (ATEX, Limit Inventories)

Inherent safety (Process, Layout, materials)

11

Risk Reduction Measures implemented to reduce risk ALARP

2. Overview of design approaches

12 Conference SPE France

A general evolution of design practices

Prescriptive (API, NFPA) Performance-based Approach (EC,

ISO)

Deterministic (worst case) Risk based Approach (NORSOK,

ISO) Deterministic (2015) !

Avoid overdesign (high consequences but low probability events)

Relation with Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) to mesure the overall

risk of the facility

Increased demand to demonstrate robustness of design to

client, certification bodies or local authority

13

Need to strenghten the transverse approach between safety

and engineering disciplines

Example for a fire water package

Conference SPE14

Prescriptive approach

« Enclosure should withstand a blast of

0.1 bar and be fire-rated for 2 hours »

Performance-based approach

« Firewater system package shall be functional

during and after an accident event for 2 hours »

Comparison of approaches

Prescriptive Approach

(Focus on Means)

Performance-based Approach

(Focus on Objectives)

Str

en

gth

s

Very efficient for conventional cases

Well-known and well controlled

Straightforward application

Compliance is “easy” to demonstrate for the

designer, to endorse (owner) and to accept

(certification body)

More flexible to cope with project specificities

Explicit definition of objectives and associated

performance criteria (client should express his

needs)

Potential optimisation (cost reduction, reduced

MTO)

We

ak

ne

ss

es

Implicit objectives

Special cases not covered

Long process for acceptance of any deviation to the codes & regulations

Acceptance criteria difficult to define (by owner or authorities) or to grant.

More resources needed for the design process

Time consuming during engineering phase

Safety Management System required during

the entire lifecycle of the facility to account for

potential design modifications Beware of reverse engineering

15

Risk and Performance-based approaches combined for

reasonable design

What was the objective of fireproofing ?

16

Valero – McKee Refinery. Sunray, Texas 2007

Source CSB

3. Fire and explosion design

Conference SPE17

Evolution of Fire & blast design guidance

18

Interim Guidance Notes for the

Desing and « Protection of

Topside Structures against

Explosion and Fire »

UKOOA

Fire & Explosion Hazard

Management Guidance

UKOOA

Fire & Explosion

Hazard Guidance

BFETS

(1994-2001)

Phases 2, 3a & 3b

19901988

Piper

Alpha

Disaster

1992 1995 20062001 2007 2010

API RP 2FB

ISO 19000

Series

Eurocodes

2011 2014

FABIG Technical

Notes 11 and 13

Fire & blast design guidance has continuously be improved for

the last 2 decades and is still under development

Fire & Explosion Mitigation Strategy(from safety objectives)

Safe

ty a

cti

vit

ies

Dis

cip

lin

es

acti

vit

ies

Targets(SCEs)

PerformanceCriteria

Fire & Explosion Response

Fire & Blast analysis

Design Accidental Loads specification

A multi-disciplinary integrated work process

Fire and Explosion mitigation strategy should be clearly defined

with all the stakeholders

19

Perf

orm

ance

sta

nd

ard

s

Safety objectives in case of accidental event

shall be fulfilled

Main safety functions shall be maintained

Safety critical systems and associated SCEs

shall withstand the accidental event

Fire & Blast response of SCEs by disciplines

Safety

objectives

Main Safety

Functions

Safety critical

Systems

Safety critical

Elements

Depressurisation

Escalation

protection

Flare

Flare header, Drum, Structures

Purpose of the design process shall be well understood by

engineering disciplines to ensure consistency

A system oriented approach

20

Performance standards

21

Ex: PS001 Deluge systems GLOBAL

OWNER

Review #

Date

Function

No.

Functional Criteria Basis and Assurance

1 Intended purpose in functional

terms

Key Codes and Standards

Project Philosophy,

documents

2 Function 2 …

Function

No.

System /Sub System Basis and Assurance

Function

No.

Hazardous Event Basis and Assurance

1 Events for which the system, sub

system or component have to

maintain their function

…

2 Ex: Extreme Weather condition …

Define each of the dependant or interactive

systems

Dependencies or interactions for the SCE to operate satisfactorily Cross reference to related SCE's Performance

Standards

Item 2 … …

System Dependencies / Interactions Performance Standard Reference

DEPENDENCIES / INTERACTIONS

Measurable element of the survivability for the component …

… …

SURVIVABILITY

Performance criteria Verification

RELIABILITY / AVAILABILITY

Performance criteria Verification

1 System, sub system or

components which has a key

reliability or availability element

The reliability or availability rational criteria

Reliability: Probablity to work on demand

Availability: extent to which the system is functional

… …

The measurable attribute of the output function, fundamental design performance What will be done over

Project / Faciliy life cycle

to assure that the PS will

be maintained

Criteria 1, 2, … …

FUNCTIONALITY

Performance criteria Verification

SCE Boundary Physical Battery limits / Equipment involved

SCE GOAL The functional goal of the SCE Group in maintaining the hardware barrier.

BARRIER REFERENCE Barrier Group. Ex: PROTECTION SYSTEMS

SCE GROUP Discipline in charge

Setting properly the PS is fundamental for an efficient safety

barriers management .. But it is time-consuming !

Examples of SCEsResistance(Stability)

Integrity(Containment)

Operability

Primary Structures

Buildings (Refuge, CCR)

Large HC vessels

Piping

- Flare header

- Fire Water ring main

Doors, safety valves

Survivability criteria for blast

Different levels of performance criteria may be also defined to

to better address survivability requirement

22

Dedicated explosion load cases shall be defined in order to justify

each of the requirement (Local vs global loading)

Keep a global view of the performance criteria for the whole

system, not only individual SCEs.

Example for the flare system

23

Ensure a clear and unique interface between the safety team and

other engineering disciplines

Provide only the necessary relevant data for the design :

What should designed/checked ?

Which performance to achieve ?

What are the loads to consider ?

Avoid misinterpretation by disciplines regarding the design loads

Ease demonstration that the whole system is compliant with the

performance standards (e.g. survivability requirement)

Design Accidental Loads Specification

It has been successfully deployed on several EPC contracts

24

N°

Sheet Rev

1 Piping Stainless steel piping From XX to YY BP1 0

2 Piping Stainless steel piping From YY to ZZ BP2 0

3 LP KO Drum V-01 Pressure Vessels Horizontal ZZ HCYL1 0

4 HP KO Drum V-02 Pressure Vessels Horizontal ZZ HCYL2 0

5 Flare stack Structures ZZ BP3 0

6 Structures From XX to YY BP1 0

7 Structures From YY to ZZ BP2 0

8 ESDV + BDV E-01 Instrumentation XX BOX1 0E

scala

tion p

rote

ction

Em

erg

ency D

epre

ssuri

sation

Flare network

Flare header

Supporting structure

Verification SheetSafety function System Element Tag Description LocationDisciplineObjective

An integrated approach for blast design

25

N°

Sheet Rev

1 Piping Stainless steel piping From XX to YY BP1 0

2 Piping Stainless steel piping From YY to ZZ BP2 0

3 LP KO Drum V-01 Pressure Vessels Horizontal ZZ HCYL1 0

4 HP KO Drum V-02 Pressure Vessels Horizontal ZZ HCYL2 0

5 Flare stack Structures ZZ BP3 0

6 Structures From XX to YY BP1 0

7 Structures From YY to ZZ BP2 0

8 ESDV + BDV E-01 Instrumentation XX BOX1 0

Escala

tion p

rote

ction

Em

erg

ency D

epre

ssuri

sation

Flare network

Flare header

Supporting structure

Verification SheetSafety function System Element Tag Description LocationDisciplineObjective

Principle of application

Target

Identification

Explosion

Load cases

Performance

criteria

Loads

combinations

Each discipline has both a good overview of design purpose and

the associated inputs.

An efficient interface document

26

Local effects

Structure support

Global effect (resultant)

Structure support

Survivability criteria : Resistance (stability) with no damage

Design of individual components (walls, roof, doors) → Local loading

Design of foundations (global check against sliding, overturning) → Global

loading

2 sets of design explosion loads (Plocal, Pglobal) shall be defined.

Each load could be transient or equivalent static

Example 1 : Occupied building

27

Survivability criteria : Resistance (stability) and Integrity

(containment)

Design of individual component (integrity of vessel wall) → Local loading

Design of foundations (stability against sliding, overturning) → Global loading

Design of nozzles based on drag loads (Pdrag) applied on connected piping

3 sets of design explosion loads (Plocal, Pglobal, Ppiping) shall be

defined. Each load could be transient or equivalent static

Example 2 : Column

28

Various design rules but not homogeneous for accidental event

Need to develop explicit and consistent mechanical criteria for

disciplines in accordance with performance to achieve

Fire and blast response

29

Dedicated management of interfaces needed to limit iterations.

Implementation of Fire & Blast design in project

30

4. Conclusions and way forward

Conference SPE31

Conclusions

Performance-based design for fire/blast provides opportunity

to get back to the physics while focusing of safety objectives

to ease demonstrate robustness of design

to develop innovative solutions or to cope with new technologies

But requires dedicated ressources in design phase

Cross knowledge between safety and engineering disciplines

Advanced Multidisciplinary Approach (Transverse integration)

Dedicated Management of Interfaces (Consistency follow-up)

More skilled and trained people for all stakeholders

32

HSE in design taking engineering further.

Need to revise our design practices ?

33

Need to adapt/revise our practices and workprocess in order to

face more and more challenging projects

Need to get back to the roots ?

34

Performance-based approach provides opportunities

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