Presented by Team 10-ACITY

Fanny DominguesPancho Daskalov Qiao Zhang

Natalie HatourIbrahim Olaitan Ashirbad Ghosh

Congressional Oversight Committee House Committee on Science and

Technology

Recommendations for NASA

Put safety of flights before meeting flight schedule

Managementstructure should be diverse

Management shouldpromote the timely flow of information across NASA flight centers

Questions

Findings

Insights Recommendations

‘QFIR’ Approach

Key Points

Ensuring:

Safety

Design reliability

Communication

“We will never forget them, nor the last time we saw them, this morning, as they prepared for the journey and waved goodbye and” ‘slipped the surly bonds of earth’ ‘to touch the face of God.’”

(President Ronald Reagan, NASA

“Remembering Challenger”)

Sources Used for Analysis

(2013, July 4). Challenger beyond the tragedy. MSNBC. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JMGQad4ik5I

Edmondson, A. (2002). Group process in the Challenger launch decision (A-D). President and Fellows of Harvard College, distributed by Harvard

Business School Publishing.

Investigation of the Challenger accident: Report of the Committee on the Science and Technology, House of Representatives, 99th Congress,

2nd Session, 600 (1986). Retrieved from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016/pdf/GPO- CRPT-99hrpt1016.pdf

(2012, August 2). NASA Challenger disaster. BBC. Retrieved fromhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=reM5fTo-6PI