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ECLS2014AnnualConference

Making,EnforcingandAccessingtheLaw

FacultyofLawTheChineseUniversityofHongKong,

15‐16November2014AbstractsSession1:Law,PoliticsandLawMakingChair:KnutPissler,MaxPlanck Institute forComparative and InternationalPrivateLawandECLSTheRoleofCampaignsinLawMakingSarahBiddulph,UniversityofMelbourne Thispaperexplorestheroleofenforcementcampaignsindraftinglegislationandinterpretationoflaw.Enforcement campaigns are employed on a regular basis to deal with problems that regularenforcement strategies have failed to address. They are often a response to perceived crises whereregulatoryfailureshaveimpactednegativelyonsocialorder.Whilstcampaignsarewellknownfortheirimpactonenforcement, thispaperdocuments theways theyalso impacton theproductionof law. Ituses as an example the campaign waged between 2004 and 2007 to redress chronic failure to paywages, particularly in the construction sector. This campaign strengthened central leadership overlawmaking and enforcement in the areas of payment ofwages and resolving disputes about unpaidwages.Indoingsoitspeededuptheiterativeprocessoflawmaking,interpretationandimplementationoflawandwasinstrumentalinthedraftingandpassageofsignificantreformstolabourlegislationin2007 and 2008. It argues that studies of lawmaking need also to take account of the impact of lawinterpretation and enforcement strategies on setting the law making agendas and on the ultimatecontentoflegislation.Law‐makinginChina:SystemicNormativePluralism,ReactiveLegislationIgnazioCastellucci,UniversityofTrentoThe traditional concept of legislation within the State powers, or functions, seen as the source ofprimarylegalnormsandaccompaniedbyanumberofsecondarysourcesandlegalformantsseemstobe challenged in the Chinese context: legislation here has a doctrinal and declamatory status evenhigherthan intheWest legal tradition,duetotheoretical lackofanypowerofcourtsorothernorm‐producingentitiesandmechanismstoproducelegalrules.Ontheotherhand,thefastevolutionoftheChineselegalsystemandlegalenvironment,especially inprivate and market economy matters, features a very vibrant synergy of many norm‐producing orinteracting/formantentitiesandmechanisms,workingbothondifferenthierarchicalandinstitutionallevels,andinaterritorialsenseaccordingtothedifferentareasofthecountry,toparticipateinafastprocessofsystem‐buildingwithinaverycomplex,pluralenvironment.

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Beyond is monolith‐like theoretical description, the Chinese legislation is just one part, thus, of thenormativeenvironment, interactingwithothernormative forces in the realmofprivate andmarket‐economy‐relatedinterests(IhavealreadydiscussedinapreviousECLSpresentationinHelsinki,2012,how the Chinese law may be characterized as displaying “variable geometries” according to thedifferentkindofinterestsregulated,makingthisdiscourseonlyfullyapplicabletoprivateandmarket‐related‐interests – leaving public interest and sensitive issues more consistent with a moreconservativemodeoffunctioningofpoliticalandlegalmechanisms).In this process, legislation very often plays an instrumental, governance role, attributing spheres ofcompetence,enforcingprinciplesandpolicylines,guidingothernormativeforces,providingsanctions;andareactiverole,thatofassessingresultsachievedthroughothermechanismsandthatofendorsingtheirresultsorcorrectingthem–ratherthanplayingthetheoreticalroleof layingtherules first inamorestablefashionandinalong‐term‐perspective,forotherinstitutions,entities,circles,mechanismsandsocietyatlarge,tofollowsuitwithimplementation/enforcement/interpretation/explanation.LawMakinginChina.TheExampleofLawsaffectingCivilSocietyKarlaW.Simon,NewYorkUniversityMakinglaws,orinthecasewearespeakingabout,regulationsandlawsinChinaisacomplexprocess,justasit is inothercountries. Whatmakesthelaw‐makingprocesswithrespecttocivilsocietyevenmorecomplexthanmostisthatthemostactivityinthatregardhasbeenregulatoryandthusundertheStateCouncil. TherehasbeensomeactualNPCactivity in recentyears, including thePublicWelfareLawof1998,theTrustLawof2001(whichincludescharitabletrusts),theCorporateTaxLawof2008(whichdealswithbothtaxexemptionsandtaxdeductions),andthecurrentlypendingCharityLaw.Butthemostactivityasofnow isnowbeingcarriedoutby theStateCouncil,which isdue toamend thenationalregulations,andbytheMinistryofCivilAffairs,whichisallowingdirectregistrationofCSOsinalmostallprovincesandself‐governingmunicipalities.Thispaperexploresthoseissues.Inter‐MinistryPoliticsonLaw‐making:LegislatingPrivateEquityinChinaXiaoYuandZhaoRanran,EastChinaUniversityofPoliticalScienceAndLawBasedoninterviewswithofficials,professionalinsidersandsecondarymaterials,thispaperdocumentstheconflictsoftwoministriesandanalyzestheunderlyingreasonsinthelegislatingprocessofPrivateEquityFunds（PE）inChina.DespitethefactthatPrivateEquityFundshavedevelopedrapidlyforthelasttwodecades,thelaw‐makingprocesshasbeenstranded.Animportantreasonforsuchadelayisthat twoministries under the State Council have been fighting for the regulation power, one is thenational development and reform commission（NDRC），the other is China Securities RegulatoryCommission（CSRC）.Overtheyears,theNDRChaslaunchedthreedepartmentalrules,andtheCSRChastwicetriedtopushthePEintothejurisdictionoftheSecuritiesInvestmentFundLaw.Butalltheattemptsfailedforthestrongoppositionofeachother.ThestalematemightbebrokenuntilFeb2014,whentheStateCouncilmadeitclearthatCSRCwillplayaleadingroleinregulatingPE.ThislongdelayinthelegislationprocesshasledtomanychaoticsituationsandthusimpededthedevelopmentofPE.This study provides insights into the legislating process in transitional China, which would helpunderstanditsfuturetrajectoriesandtherelationshipbetweenpoliticsandlegislationmoregenerally.Session2:Mediation,LawandJusticeChair:MichaelPalmer,ShantouUniversityandSOAS,UniversityofLondon

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Session3:RegulatingtheBusinessSectorChair:Lutz‐ChristianWolff,ChineseUniversityofHongKongEnforcementwithChineseCharacteristics:CompetitionLawandConsumerProtectionLawinChinaThomasKristieandQianlanWu,UniversityofNottinghamThe establishment of the Chinese legal system with socialist characteristics in 2011 lays one of itsfoundationsonthepromulgationofcomprehensivesetsoflawsandregulations,asaresultofChina’sthirtyyearsreformsince1978.However,inspiteofitsrapidmakingoflaws,China’slegalsystemfacespersistentconstraintsintermsofenforcement.Inthesphereofmarketregulation,theconstraintcanbeobserved as the tension between the fragmented administrative enforcement vis‐à‐visweak judicialenforcementof the law. Thepaper focuseson theenforcementof competition lawandof consumerprotectionlaw,astwokeylegal instrumentsforChina’sconstructionofamarketeconomy.Itaimstoexaminethepublicandprivateenforcementofthetwolaws,analysethecommonchallengesfacedbythe enforcement and to analyse to what extent the enforcement with Chinese characteristics hasimpactedonthedevelopmentofthetwolegalinstrumentandmarketregulationinChina.Notices,EnforcementandtheMakingoftheHongKongCompetitionOrdinanceFelixMezzanotte,HongKongPolytechnicUniversity CreatedbytheHongKongCompetitionOrdinance2012(Ordinance), the infringementnoticeandthewarningnoticearenovel toolsof competition lawenforcement.Theiruse,however, involves serioustradeoffs.Ontheonehand,thenoticespromoteaspeedier,moreflexibleandcheaperenforcementoftheOrdinance.Ontheotherhand,theycurtailtheOrdinance’sdeterrenteffectswhileinjectinggreaterdiscretionanduncertainty into theenforcementprocess. In thisarticlewe investigate towhatextentthese tradeoffs had been identified and weighed by the designers of the notices in the lawmakingprocess.Writtenrecordsof the legislativedebatesontheOrdinancewerecollectedandtheircontentanalysedsystematically.Thefindingssuggestthatalthoughtheparticipatingactorslargelyagreeduponandfluentlyarticulatedthebenefitsofthenotices,theyeitherignoredorneglectedtheirpotentialrisks.Thedevelopmentof competitivemarkets inHongKong requires that those risksbewellunderstoodandmanaged.

CompetitionLawMakingProcessandImplementationinChinaLeaMurphy,ChinaGreatwayAdvisoryOn August 30, 2007, the National People’s Congress adopted the People’s Republic of China’s Anti‐MonopolyLaw(AML),whichcameintoforceonAugust1,2008.This lawdelineatestheobjectivesoftheChinesecompetitionpolicy.Indeed,itincludes8chapters,dividedinto57articles,whichsetuptheinstitutionsandmechanismstofightagainstanti‐competitionpractices.Fromaninstitutionalpointofview,theAMLhasestablishedamergercontrolandsetupajurisdictionalframeworktosanctionanyabuse of dominant position, monopole situations or abuse of administrative powers that restrictcompetition.Afteralmostsixyearsofexistence,howistheAMLenforced?To encourage its widest application, the AML has created an enforcement structure with an Anti‐MonopolyCommitteeandanAnti‐MonopolyEnforcementAuthorityundertheStateCouncil.Accordingtothearticle9and10oftheAML,theCommitteeisresponsiblefordevelopingthecompetitionpolicyand theAnti‐MonopolyEnforcementAuthority is in chargeof enforcing theAML. It appears that the

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European Commission of Brussels and the Directorate general for competition inspired thosecompetences.TheAnti‐MonopolyEnforcementAuthorityiscomposedbythreeagencies.ThefirstoneistheMinistryofCommerce(MOFCOM)andisinchargeofenforcingthemergercontrolregime.Thesecondone,theNationalDevelopmentandReformCommission (NDRC),enforces theAMLprice regulations.The lastone is theStateAdministration for IndustryandCommerce, (SAIC).This latter administrationhas toenforce the unfair competition related rules of the AML and regulations against the abuse ofadministrativepowers.If theenforcementpowers seemwell allocatedbetween theNDRCandSAIC, someproblems remain.Indeed,theAMLandthesecondaryrulesissuedbythoseinstitutionsdonotspecifywhichagencyhasjurisdictionwhenasinglecaseinvolvepriceandnon‐pricerelatedelements. Inaddition,thereisanimportantoverlapbetweentherulesissuedbythosetwoagencies.In addition to the AML, the enforcement agencies have adopted numerous rules implementing itsprovisions,toclarifysomekeyissuesofthelaw.Forexample,China’sMinistryofCommerce(MOFCOM)issued the Interim Regulation on the Application of Simple Case Criteria to Concentrations ofUndertakings on February 13th,2014, which came into force immediately. Simple mergers areconcentrationsthatareunlikelytoraisecompetitiveconcerns.Themaingoalofthisnewregulationisto accelerate the clearance procedure of simplemergers. The SAIC has also promulgated secondaryrulesinitsfieldofcompetenceandNDRCissuedAnti‐priceMonopolyregulationsandrulestosupportthe AMF enforcement. For instance, the rule on the Administrative Law Enforcement Procedure forAnti‐PriceMonopolyprovidesmoreinformationontheleniencysystem,forceseenintheAML.Moreover, those three agencies conduct investigations to prevent and sanction anti‐competitivebehaviours. Indeed,theSAIChasbeencarryingoutinvestigationsinabout20antitrustcases.MostoftheminvolvedIndustryassociationssothismightleadtoanincreaseoftheirawarenessregardingtheimportance and the enforcement of AML. In the last years, MOFCOM has granted unconditionalclearancesforthevastmajorityofthecases.Buthisministryhasalsoimposedremediesinmorethantwenty cases and blocked the $2.4 billions Coca‐cola’s planned acquisition of the Chinese groupHuiyuanJuiceonMarch18,2009.Forits parts,theNDCRadopteddecisionswithsanctionsinmanycasesincludingaveryimportantoneregardingthetwoChinesetelecomgiantsChinaMobileandChinaUnicomforabuseofdominantmarket,andmorespecificallyforrefusalofdealandpricediscrimination.Accordingly,thetwo‐telecomcompanieshavedonesomeimprovementsbyreducingInternetfeesandimprovingInternetspeed.Plus,in2014,theNDCRhasconductedmorethan34,400investigationsthatledtotherepaymentofRMB632millionstoconsumers,confiscationofalmostRMB1billioninillegalgainsandtheimpositionofRMB1.58billioninfines.ThosenumbersdemonstratecertaineffectivenessintheAMLenforcement.Furthermore, the AML provides a framework for civil litigation. The article 50 of the AMF is alsoregarded as an important way to enforce the AML because it gives the basis for private litigationsregarding competition cases. This article states that the business operators who engaged inmonopolisticconductandcausedamagestoothersshallbearcivilliabilities.Chinese courts had to deal with several antitrust cases with big impact such as Johnson & JohnsonMedical case where Rainbow Medical, it’s Chinese distributor brought the action before the court.However,inmostofthecases,theplaintiffslosetheirprivatelawsuitsbecausetheburdenoftheproofthatisuponthemistoohigh.Thisisoneofthereasonswhy,onMay3,2014,thePRCSupremePeople’sCourt issueda judicial interpretationwhichaim is toprovideaguideline toChinese courts for thosekind of law suits. Indeed, the burden of proof has been re‐allocated between the plaintiff and thedefendant. The Supreme Court judges regularly enact, without direct reference to any specificproceedings pending in a court, judicial interpretations that have a greater authority than the lawsinterpreted.

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ChinesecourtsandagencieshaveproventhattheyareconfidentincompetitionlawenforcementwiththeeffectofencouraginginternationalfirmsdoingbusinessinChinatocomplywiththelawandtobereadyforMOFCOMreviewprocessincaseofInternationalMergerandAcquisitiontransaction.CompanyLawImplementationinthePRCintheShadowofCultureandtheStateRomanTomasic,UniversityofSouthAustraliaCompanyLawreformhasbeenoccurringinChinaformanyyears,withthefirstsuchlawbeingpassedas early as 1904.Although therewere a number of prior experimentswith corporatization, the firstmodernPRCcompanylawwasenactedin1993,overtwodecadesago.ThisLawwasamendedseveraltimesandthenreplacedbyanewCompanyLawin2005.Effortswillnodoubtcontinuetobemadetomodernise China’s company laws, as company law reform is an on‐going process and as such iscommonplaceinotherpartsoftheworld.WhilstChinahasbecomeadeptatformulatingnewbodiesofcommercialoreconomiclawsinceDeng’sopeningupofthecountrytonewruleoflawinfluencesthatwere seen asbeneficial, it is important to lookbeyond the formulation of elegantnew laws that caneasilybecomparedwithcomparablewesternbodiesofcompanylaw.The implementationofnewcorporate lawprinciplesandpractices inChinahasbeenamoredifficultproject. Implementation of new laws is always problematic and takes time and well trainedprofessionalintermediaries;thisisespeciallysoinlargecountriessuchasChina.ButChina’slawshavealso faced other problems. Not only have new corporate law ideas had to accommodate well‐establishedChineseculturalattitudes,companylawhasalsobeenshapedbypolitical factorsthatareunique to China. The political determinants of company law reform have influenced theimplementationoftheselawsinChina.Whilstcompanylawalwaysoperatesintheshadowofthestate,thepowerfulstatehascasta largeshadowinChina. Drawinguponavailableempiricalmaterial, thispaperreviewsChinesecompanylawreformssincetheearly1990sandprovidesanarrativeofhowtheimplementationoftheselawshasbeenshapedbyculturalandpoliticalfactors.CorporateReorganisationinChina:RecentDevelopmentsandChallengesZhangZinian,SingaporeManagementUniversityThis paper investigates the corporate reorganization of the Chinese public companies listed on itsShanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, which took place between 1 June 2007 and 31 December2013. These cases arose within the corporate reorganization regime enshrined in China’s newly‐enactedEnterpriseBankruptcyLaw2006(TheEBL2006).Byexaminingforty‐threelistedcompanyreorganizations,thispaperchallengestheassertionmadeinmostof thesecorporatereorganizationplans that themajorbeneficiariesofsuchreorganizationsarethecompany’screditors,employeesandgeneralpublicshareholders.Throughananalysisofthestatisticsderivedfromthesecompanyreorganizationplans,annualreports,publicnoticesandthemediareports,thisresearchfoundthatcreditors,employeesandgeneralpublicshareholders do not actually benefit much from such corporate reorganizations on the followinggrounds.First,thedatasuggeststhatcreditors,especiallyunsecuredcreditorscouldhavereceived62.90%moreifthefundamentalvaluedistributionprinciple–theabsoluteprioritynorm,whichmakescreditorsbepaid before shareholders – was complied with; second, on average 77.29% of employees lost jobsduring and before reorganization; and third, substantial losses were incurred by general publicshareholders,astheyhadtogiveuppartoftheirsharesunderthesereorganizationplans,85.37%of

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themcouldhavebeenavoided if thegeneral‐public‐shareholder‐protectionscheme issuedbyChina’sSupremePeopleCourtwasrigorouslyapplied.This paper concludes that instead of maximizing the interests of creditors, employees and generalpublic shareholders,mostof listed company reorganizations inChina seemed tomainlybenefit localgovernment, controlling shareholders and strategic investors. This paper suggests that only bystringentlyapplyingbasicinsolvencyvaluedistributionnormsandbyimprovingtransparencywillthereorganizationprocedure involvingChina’s listedcompaniesbe strengthenedsoas toensuregreaterlegalcertaintyfortheirstakeholders.Session4:LawandEconomicGlobalizationChair:ZhangXianchu,UniversityofHongKongLaw‐making,EnforcementandAccesstoLaw:InternationalSalesofGoodsandChineseCorporationsVivienneBath,UniversityofSydneyChina acceded to the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)effective 1 January 1988. At that time, it entered reservations relating to the application of theConventionwhereonlyonepartywasacontractingstate,andrequiringthatcontracts for thesaleofgoodsbe inwriting inordertoberecognizedasvalid(areservationwhichwaswithdrawnin2013).Since the CISG came into force, there have been numerous international arbitrations and cases,primarily in China but increasingly outside China, relating to sales contracts involving China andChinese companies. Since 2000, the Supreme People’s Court has also issued a number ofinterpretations,andrecentlyapprovedseveralguidingcases,explaininganddevelopingtheapplicationof the Chinese Contract Law to contracts for the sale of goods. The close relationship between theprovisionsoftheChineseContractLawonthesaleofgoodsandtheprovisionsoftheCISGhasbeenthesubjectofcommentarysince1999,whentheContractLawcameintoeffect.TheaimofthispaperistoconsiderthewayinwhichChineselawrelatedtocontractsforthesaleofgoodsismadeandmodifiedthrough judicial interpretationsandcasesand toexamine thesedevelopments in the lightofChineseandinternationalpracticerelatedtotheCISG.‘Ship’undertheChineseMaritimeCode:IKnowItWhenISeeIt?LiuShuo,ErasmusUniversity Forcenturies,theshippingindustryhasbeenworkingunderitsownsetofrules.Andallmaritimelegalrelationstakeplaceonboardof,orinconnectionwith,theships.TheChineseMaritimeCode,althoughtacklesvariouslegalaspectsaroundshipslikethecaseofmanyothercountries,leavestheveryconceptof ‘ship’undefined,which leads the legalstatusofmanyartificialstructures tounchartedwater.Thispaperaimstoconceptualizethenotionofshipthroughcomparativeanddynamicanalysis.First,variousapproaches of different jurisdictions will be reviewed. To be specific, the merits and demerits ofidentifyinga shipbasedon (a) itsbuoyancyproperty (Dutchapproach), (b) itspatternofmovement(UKapproach),(c)itscapabilitytoserveitsfunction(USapproach)orahybridoftheabove(Belgianapproach)willbeelaborated.Secondly,consideringtheinternationalitynatureanduniformitytrendofmaritimelaw,astudyofthedefinitionofshipunderdifferentmaritimeconventions,eitherincludedbycompromiseoromitteddeliberately,willsheda lightontheevolutionof theconceptunderdomesticlaw.Thirdly,theauthorwillproceedtoaddresstheroleoftheChinesecourtinenrichingtheconceptofship, through judicial interpretation,guidingcasesaswellas theadjudicationprocess.Especially, therelationbetween thepiecemealsolutions in judicialpracticeand theoverarchingdefinition in theory

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willbefurtherdiscussed.Finally,itleadstoamultifaceteddefinitionofship,whichisproposedtofulfillthediversifiedpurposesinmaritimecontext.Problematic Domicile Principle in Proscribing “Foreign Investor” in M&A NationalSecurityReviewofMainlandChinaYueYing,PekingUniversityNationalSecurityReviewininvestmentactivitiesisacrucialsysteminregulatingforeigninvestmentinhundreds of countries. Though it varies in each country, it plays a role as a buffer between foreigninvestor’s interestanddomestic interests.MainlandChinahasopenedthepre‐establishmentnationaltreatmentwithnegative list investmentmodel to foreign investor first in ShanghaiFTZ.However, inM&A area, the country still applies 2011National Security Review regulationwhich is obsolete andobscurebothinlegalsourcesandscope.Inthisarticle,Iwillusecomparativemethodbasedonmorethan20countiesNationalSecurityReviewSystem in Investment Law. Imainly discuss the definition of “foreign investor”, which is one of theimportantpartsof its legal scope.TheReviewSystem fails todefine “foreign investor”.Neitherdoesotherrelatinglaw.Moreover,lawconflictwitheachotherwhichwillmakeinvestorconfused.DomicilePrinciplecannotmeettherequirementofthisspeciallaw.However,almosteverycountryhasdelicatedesign fornon‐nationalsorsimilarscopedefines.Oneepisodeis theconstantlytransfersofpower inregulatingthesystembetweentwodepartmentsofMainlandChina.Lackingofconformityinlawalsoiscausedbyundefineddepartmentresponsibility.Intheend,Iwillgivemyadviceondesigningthenew“foreign investor”criterionandprovidesuggestionsonperfectingMainlandChina’sNationalSecurityReviewSysteminInvestmentLawaswellasitslawmakingregime.Session5:Law,EnergyandEnvironmentChair:BryanMercurio,ChineseUniversityofHongKongAComparisonbetweenShaleGasinChinaandUnconventionalFuelDevelopmentintheUnitedStates:Health,WaterandEnvironmentalRisksPaoloFarah,WestVirginiaUniversityChinaisappraisedtohavetheworld'slargestexploitablereservesofshalegas,althoughseverallegal,regulatory,environmentalandinvestment‐relatedissueswilllikelyrestrainitsscope.China'scapacitytosuccessfullyfacethesehurdlesandproducecommercialshalegaswillhaveacrucialimpactontheregionalgasmarketandonChina’senergymix,asBeijingstrivestodecreaserelianceonimportedoiland coal,while attempting tomeet growingenergydemandandmaintaina certain level of resourceautonomy. The development of the unconventional natural gas extractive industry will also endowChinawithfurthernegotiatingpowertoobtainmoreadvantageouspricesforgas.Thispaper,adoptingacomparativeperspective,underlinesthetrendslearnedfromunconventionalfueldevelopmentintheUnitedStates,emphasizingtheirpotentialapplicationtotheChinesecontextinlightofrecentlysignedproduction‐sharing agreements between qualified foreign investors and China. The wide range ofregulatoryandenforcementproblemsinthismatterareaccruedbyanextremelylimitedliberalizationofgasprices,lackoftechnologicaldevelopment,andbarrierstomarketaccesscurbingtheopeningofresourceextractiontoprivateinvestors..Thisstudyanalyzesthelegaltoolsthatcanplayaroleinshalegasdevelopmentwhileassessingthenewlegalandfiscalpoliciesthatshouldbecreatedorreinforced.The paper also examines the institutional settings’ fragmentation and conflicts, highlighting howprocesses and outcomes are indeed path dependent. Moreover, the possibilities of cooperation andcoordination(alsothroughUS‐Chinacommoninitiatives),andtheroleoftransparencyanddisclosure

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of environmental data are assessed. These issues are exacerbated by concerns related to the risk ofwater pollution deriving from mismanaged drilling and fracturing, absence of adequate predictiveevaluation regulatory instruments and industry standards, entailing consequences on social stabilityandenvironmentaldegradationwhichareinconsistentwiththepurposesofsustainabledevelopment.TowardsanEcologicalCivilization:EnvironmentalPolicymakinginChinaFernandoDiasSimões,UniversityofMacauThe unparalleled economic ascendance of China brought along equally impressive environmentalproblems. The Chinese government is now faced with the delicate question of how to deal withenvironmental issueswithoutdisturbing the country’s economicgrowth.Publicpolicyapproaches toenvironmental issues have traditionally relied on different tools – namely regulation, economicincentives, and technological solutions. Taking into account the magnitude of the environmentalproblems faced by China, these traditional tools are clearly insufficient. A growing body of legalscholarshipcriticizesthefailureoftraditionalenvironmentalpoliciestospeakdirectlytoindividualsassourcesofenvironmentalharm.Usinglawtochangehowindividualsimpacttheenvironmentthroughtheirbehavioursrequiresareorientationofenvironmentallawandpolicy.A new policy approach argues that policymakers should design policies that reflect on how peoplereally behave instead of just seeking to change people’s behaviour through rules and regulations.RichardThalerandCassSunstein’s influentialbookNudge: Improvingdecisionsabouthealth,wealth,andhappinessdrawsonbehaviouraleconomicsandsocialpsychologytoexplainwhypeopleoftenactinways that arenot completely rational. This newparadigmargues thatpolicymakers should act as‘choice architects’, organizing the context, process and environment in which individuals makedecisions.ThalerandSunsteinadvocatetheuseof‘nudges’,smallfeaturesdesignedintheenvironmentofchoicemaking.Nudgeoffersavaluable framework forchanging thechoicearchitectureofChinesecitizensinordertoachievemodificationsintheirbehaviours.However,suchtoolsshouldbedesignedtaking due account of the specificities of the Chinese society and culture, creating ‘green’ but also‘Chinese’nudgeswhicharesuitabletoachieveeffectivebehaviourchange.Prevention of Agricultural Land Pollution: An Empirical Study on LegalMeasures inHunanProvinceWuXianshu,ChinaUniversityofPoliticalScienceandLawThe "Soil Pollution Survey Communique 2014” shows that in agricultural land, the soil pollution isexceedingby19.4%andtheslight,mild,moderateandseverelevelswere13.7%,13.7%,1.8%and1.1%respectively,includingcadmium,nickel,copper,arsenic,mercury,lead,DDTandPAH.This research used large‐scale investigation, sampling investigation, case survey and trackinginvestigation,conductedamongfarmers,administrativedepartmentsandenterprises.HUNANprovince,as “a Land of Nonferrous Metals” and the “Hometown of Rice” faced pollution both industrial andagricultural,isblamedforitscadmiumricein2013.Initially,theauthorwillanalyzethedistributionandthecauseofpollutioninagriculturallandbasedonthisempiricalstudy.Secondly, the authorwill analyze the current legal system. After examining the LandAdministrationLawofthePeople'sRepublicofChina,agriculturallaw,EnvironmentalProtectionLaw,regulationsonthe management of farmland, it points out that the defect is lack of special legislation and lack ofspecificlegalmeasures.

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Finally, theauthorwill put forward the followingmeasureswhich shouldbedivided intopreventionand governance. The preventive measures includes: a. improving the administrative managementsystemoftheagriculturallandpollution;b.improvingthedynamicmonitoringandevaluationsystemofsoilpollution;c.improvingtheenvironmentalqualitystandardsystem,takecadmiumforexample;d.improving cleaner production system, especially in pesticides and fertilizers; c, improving theprotection consciousness and public participation bymaking the information open. The governanceincludes: a. improving the system of legal responsibility including subject, object, and scope; b.promotingexperimentalareatoremedy,suchasZHUZHOUtestplotsinHUNANprovince.Theauthor contends that, theurgent task is to improve thepreventionandgovernancemeasuresofagriculturallandpollutioninlegislation.RegulatingCarbonEmissionsTradinginChina–FromLocalPilotSchemestoNationalMarketZhaoYuhong,ChineseUniversityofHongKongThepressureonChinatotakeactiontomitigateclimatechange is intensifyingasweapproach2020.Thedomesticallybindingtargetof40‐45percentcut incarbon intensityby2020ascomparedtothe2005 level has to be achieved and the potential international legal obligation to control totalgreenhousegas (GHG)emissionsbeyond2020seems inevitableandwillhave tobehonouredby theworld’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide. Apart from the administrative command‐and‐controlmeasures,subsidiesandtechnologyinnovationtopromotecleanenergyandcleanproduction,Chinaiskeentotryandtestmarketmechanismsincludingcarbonemissionstradingandcarbontax.ThispaperstudieshowanemergingcarbonmarketinChinashouldbedesignedandregulatedsoastoabate carbonemissions effectively and efficiently. Sevenpilot schemes in twoprovinces (Guangdongand Hubei) and five cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin and Chongqing) have been up andrunningoneafteranothersincemid2013underslightlydifferentregulatoryframeworksdesignedbythe local governments. Despite the short period of operation, they have already provided valuableexperienceandlessonsfromdifferentaspectsfortheregulationofanationalcarbonmarketanticipatedto be established as early as 2016. On the basis of case study of local pilot schemes, the paperwillexaminekeyissuesincluding(1)settingandadjustingthecarboncap,(2)allocationofemissionsquota,(3) monitoring, reporting and verification, (4) information disclosure, and (5) sanctions for non‐compliance.Session6:SocialistDemocracy:Theory,PracticeandInnovationsChair:ZhaoYun,UniversityofHongKongCraftingaTheoryofSocialistDemocracyforChinainthe21stCentury:ConsideringHuAngang’s Theory of Collective Presidency in the Context of the Emerging ChineseConstitutionalStateLarryCatáBacker,PennsylvaniaStateUniversityThis paper considers the emergence of a theory for a new type of law maker in China with deepimplications for Chinese constitutionalism and democracy theory. In the West democraticconstitutionalism is grounded on the premise that democracy occurs outside of the organs of state,through elections and discourse. Chinese constitutional theorists have begun to elaborate a distinctview—thatdemocraticconstitutionalismmayalsobegroundedonthepremisethatdemocracyoccurswithin the organs of state and the political apparatus of the nation, through collective and

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representational decision making. Hu Angang has most recently expressed a theory of socialistdemocracyaroundthenotionofacollectivepresidency.ThispaperconsidersHuAngang’stheoryanddefenseoftheroleoftheCCPinChina’sconstitutionalsystem,withparticularfocusontheevolutionofthe premises of collective actionmergedwith democratic theory and applied to the operations of aparty‐statesystem.ItsobjectistotheorizeinternaldemocraticstructuresoftheCCP,andthroughthem,of the government as a whole. Its focus is on the development of collective leadership. Part I firstconsiders the theoretical underpinning of the theory of collective presidency—grounded in China’shistory, context and its political ideology. The object is to better situate the history and utility of acollective presidency within the political structures and ideological premises of Chineseconstitutionalism,andthentoconsidertheconnectionbetweenthatconstructionandglobalprinciplesof constitutional democracy. Part II then considers the arguments advanced for the efficiency andrepresentation‐reinforcingelementsofthecollectivepresidency—collectivesuccession,collectivelabordivisionandcooperation,collectivelearning,collectiveresearch,andcollectivedecision‐making.PartIIIbrieflyconsiderstheworkthatremainstobedoneastheCCPcontinuesto“scientificallydevelop”thetheoryofdemocraticsocialismandattendstothehardertask,notofdrawingtheoryformfacts,butoflivingtheorythroughpractice.JournalisticExerciseofFreedomofInformation:ASocio‐legalReviewofChina’sAccesstoInformationRegimeChenYongxi,UniversityofHongKongThis article examines and explains the impacts of access to government information (ATI) regime inChina, a party‐state that introduced transparency reform in the absence of press freedom. TheRegulationsonOpenGovernment Informationbecameeffective in2008, implicitly conferring anATIrightoneverycitizens.Despitethesurprisingincreaseinthevolumeofinformationrequests,thepublicatlargeandjournalistsinparticularhavehadgreatdifficultyinaccessinginformationwhosedisclosureis likely to enable the citizenry tomonitor and check the government. From a legal perspective, theinsufficientprotectionof journalists’ATIrightowesto theambiguity inandconflictsof the laws,butalso to the unreasonable judicial law‐makings that impose a need to knowandbind the right to theimmediate interests of information requesters, as shown by an empirical survey of over 300representativelawsuits.Inaddition,thelegalregimeofstatesecrets,thequasi‐legalinstitutionofpresscensorship,andthepoliticalcontrolofjournalists,haveseverelyunderminedtheutilityofinformationaccessand the incentivesof journalists to file requests.Toagreatextent, the “old”defects inChina’sexistingaccountabilitysystemhasdeprivedtheATIregimeof itspotential functionofaccountability‐enhancing.OnthePerfectionofJudicialProtectionSystemofHumanRightsinContemporaryChinaWangXigen,WuhanUniversityJudicature is themost importantway to transferhumanrights from ideal to reality.The3rdPlenarySessionof the18thCentralCommitteeof theCPC is a symbol that theprotectionofhumanrights inChinahasbeentransformingrapidly fromlegislationto judicature,whichaimstorealize theunityofsubstantive, procedural and comprehensive rights. The so‐called substantivehuman rights consist ofthreetypesofbasicrights,includingtherighttolife,tolibertyandtoproperty.Whatmainlyindicatestheprotectionoftherighttolifeisthemeasureofdecreasinggraduallythenumberofcrimeswhichthedeathpenaltyappliedto.ItisnotonlygoodformaintainingsocialorderandprotectingrightsinChina,butalsosatisfiestheinternationalstandard.Therighttolibertyismainlyaboutpersonalfreedom.Toprotectthisright,thereformofabolishingtheregimeofreeducationthroughlaborhasbeencarriedout.Asfortheprotectionoftherighttoproperty,weshouldpayspecialattentionto“furtherstandardizingthejudicialprocedureofsealingup,distraining,freezinganddealingwiththepropertyinvolvedinthecase”,andrestrictpowerbyprocedurewhilesafeguardhumanrightsbyrestrictionofpower.

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The right to fair trial, to humanistic treatment, and to return to life compose thenamely proceduralrights.Everybodyhas thequalification tobe justly andopenly judgedbya lawfully established, self‐governed and impartial court. The principles of exclusion of illegal evidence and presumption ofinnocence ought to be legislated into regulation and standard of law as well as normalized viaspecialized judicial interpretation. Meanwhile, the right to humanistic treatment is by no means totolerate and connive with the suspect; on the contrary, it plays a key role in opposing extortingconfessions by torture, corporal punishment and maltreatment, which in turn can prevent theoccurrenceofcasesthatpeopleareunjustlycharged.Inaddition,therighttoreturntosocietyisrelatedtotheproblemabouthowtomaintaintheharmoniousrelationshipsamongthesubjectsofcommunitycorrection,right,obligation,procedureandsubjectsofcorrectioninlegaltheoriesandnorms.Regarding to comprehensive rights, the accessibility, availability and convenience of judicature arecommonlyacknowledgedasthecriterionofruleoflawInorderthateveryoneiscapableofengaginginalawsuitandequallyenjoyingtheachievementsoflegalreform,weshouldendowparticularsubjectswiththerighttoobtainmaterialandmentalassistancefromthenationorsociety,principallyincludingthreeaspects:righttojudicialassistance,tolegalaidandaccesstohelpbylawyers.Tosolvetheactualproblemsaboutjudicialprotectionofhumanrights,wemustestablishthesystemsof complaint reporting ended by judicature, disputes resolved in judicial mechanism concerningpeople'slivelihoodtogetherwithpublicinterest,anduniformstandardsofaccesstojudicialcareer.Weshouldalsopromotejustices'consciousnessandorganizationsystemofprotectinghumanrights.

Session7:China’sCourtReformChair:RogierCreemers,UniversityofOxfordandECLSSession8:LabourandImmigrationChair:JuhaKarhu,UniversityofLaplandandECLSCollectiveBargaininginChina:GuangdongRegulationaHarbingerofNationalModel?RonaldCBrown,UniversityofHawaiiatManoa Negotiating collective contracts in China can be viewed as a source of “law‐making,” regulating theemploymentrelationship;and,issuesareraisedregardingenforcementoftheprocessandtheresultantcontract,thusembracingtwoofthethreeConferencethemes.China’scollectivenegotiationshaveevolvedfromtheironricebowltocollectivecontractsnegotiatedbyprocessesrecentlyresembling“collectivebargaining.” Labordisputes frequentlyoccurduring thenegotiation process and over collective contracts. The ACFTU increasingly embraces collectivenegotiationsasitstrivestostayrelevant.Whilelaborrightsaredealtwithbylegalmeasuresprovidingmediationandarbitration;processes forresolvingdisputes involving laborinterestsarestillevolving.WhileuseoftheLaborArbitrationCommitteesiswidespreadfordisputesoflaborrights,thereisaveryunderdevelopedregulationforresolvinglaborinterestdisputes,notwithstandingsince2004therearenational legal provisions in place that could deal with the negotiation process, impasses, or laborinterest disputes. Discussed in this paper are the legal developments of collective bargaining and asummary and critique of the September 25, 2014 Guangdong Province Regulation on CollectiveContracts for Enterprises. Observations are made whether it can serve as a model for nationallegislation.

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Implementation of Justice in Employment and Service Relations in China: ExploringLegalResponsibilitieswithinContractChainsintheBuildingIndustryPilar‐PazCzoske,UniversityofCologneDivisionoflabourandlabouroutsourcingareameansofincreasingefficiencyandprofit.Coupledwiththeseadvantagesfromaneconomicapproach,questionsofjusticeariseontheemployees’side.Itisthedivisionoflabourandoutsourcingoflabourforcethateasilycreatealackofrightsimplementationforemployees. Within a production chain it is easier to shift legal responsibilities. It is a significantchallenge fora legalsystemand it isdriving formaland informalnormsetters to ‘re‐allocate’ shiftedlegalresponsibilitieswithinchainsoflabour.ThispaperaimstoexamineandtodeterminelegalresponsibilitiesandlegalliabilitiesinChineselabourrelationsbyfocusingonformalandinformaltwo‐party labourrelations, labourdispatchandthe ‘baogong tou’‐phenomena,which is a common form to realise projectswithin the building industry andreflectsthehandlingofdividedandoutsourcedlabourforceinpractice.ThepaperstartsbyclassifyingthedifferentformsofemploymentwithintheChineselegalsystemandthensearchesfordogmaticapproachesandapproachesinpracticeof legalresponsibilityandliabilityprinciples.Insodoing,questionsoflawmakingandlawimplementationarise:Asthedifferenttypesofemployment relationsand the legal responsibilityand liabilityof theemployersand theiremployeesare not conclusively and clearly defined in legal norms set by the legislative bodies, court decisions,executivenormsaswellasstandardizedcollectiveandindividuallabouragreementsandsubcontractsplayanimportantrolefordetectinghowlabourrelationsareclassifiedwithinthelegalsystem,whoissetting responsibility principles and liability norms and how these can orwhy these can’t be easilyimplemented in practice within the different types of labour relations. By exploring the latter, thispaperalsodrawsattention toapproaches thathavebeendeveloped inorder toensureaccess to lawmakingandlawenforcementontheemployee’sside.Law Enforcement through Political Campaigns: Taking the Sanfei Campaigns as anExampleintheAreaofImmigrationLawJasperHabicht,UniversityofCologneDuetoChina’srapideconomicdevelopment, thecountryturnedouttobeapreferreddestinationforpeoplefromcountriesoftheso‐called‘GlobalSouth’.Thisinflowofsurpluslow‐skilledworkerssurgingintothebiggercitiesisseenwithbigconcern,especiallysincemanyofthesemigrantsdonotpossessproperdocuments.Inmid2012,theStandingCommitteeoftheNationalPeople’sCongresspromulgatedanewExit–Entrylawthatestablishedarigorous immigrationexaminationandadministrationsystemandentered intoforceinJuly2013.InMai2012,thepolicebegantoexecuteseveralactionsagainstforeignersresidingandworkingillegallyinChina.Thiscrack‐downwasthefirstinarowofso‐calledsanfeicampaignsindifferentmajorcitiesacrossthecountry.Campaignsareoftenconsideredcriticalbecauseoftheirpoliticalnaturethatislikelytocircumventanylegalbasis.Onthecontrary,recentresearchhasshownthatinthelastdecadescampaignsincreasinglyadhere to legal proceedings andmore andmore often are used as ameans of enforcement of legalnorms.This paper aims to shed light on the main goals of the sanfei campaigns and their role in lawenforcement.Inthefieldofimmigrationlaw,differentinterestsclash:Ontheonehand,illegalactivitiesposeathreattopublicsecurityandthushavetobecurtailedbyappropriatelegalrules.Also,campaigns

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againstforeignersarecapabletosatisfypublicxenophobicresentmentsandthusmayserveasameanstosafeguardparty legitimacy.On theotherhand, foreignworkershelp tobuildup tradeconnectionswhilestricterimmigrationruleshaveachillingeffectonforeigninvestment.In this paper, on the basis of a thoroughdiscourse analysis the author tries to identify the intendedfocusofthesanfeicampaignsagainstthebackgroundofapparentlyconflictinginterests.TheBonfireofthe‘Illegalities’:WillChina’sNewImmigrationLawCombatthe‘SanFei’(IllegalEntry,IllegalResidence,IllegalWork)?MimiZou,ChineseUniversityofHongKongThis paper is perhaps the first scholarly analysis of the new regulatory regime to combat ‘illegal’immigrationunderChina’sEntryandExitAdministrationLaw2013(‘CEEAL’).Untilrecenttimes,Chinahad no special law for regulating the legal statuses accorded to migrants, with only a handful ofdisjointed national and local regulations and rules that dealtwith the entry and exit procedures. AsChinaisrapidlybecomingadestinationcountryofinternationalimmigration,theCEEALrepresentsanimportant step in building a much‐needed comprehensive immigration law framework andadministrative apparatus. This paper seeks to situate the complexities of this new legislation in thecontextofanincreasinglyhostilepoliticalandpublicdiscourseconcerningthe‘threeillegalities’(sanfei)ofillegalentry,residenceandworkinChina.IcriticallyanalysethespecificprovisionsinCEEALthatareaimedatcombatingthe‘illegalities’,includingemployersanctions,fines,detentionanddeportation.Forastateseekingtodevelopamore ‘ordered’systemof immigrationcontrol, legal interventionsforthepreventionandpunishmentofsanfeimayfailtoaddressthemanywaysthatirregularsituationscanarise.Atthesametime,astheexperienceofmanyotherdestinationcountrieshasshown,governmentsoften pursue politically‐motivated policies that disregard the basic needs and rights of irregularmigrantsaswellastheeffectsofirregularmigrationonarangeofactorsinandbeyondthereceivingstate.Session9:CriminalLawandJusticeChair:GregoryGordon,ChineseUniversityofHongKongThePoliticalBattlefieldSurroundingtheCasesofLiuXiaoboandXuZhiyongHermannAubié,UniversityofTurkuOn 25 December 2009, Liu Xiaobo, the 2010 Nobel Peace Laureate, was sentenced to eleven years'imprisonmentandtwoyears'deprivationofpoliticalrightsbytheBeijingNo.1IntermediatePeople’sCourt.Hewaschargedof"incitingsubversionofstatepower."Fiveyearslater,on26January2014,XuZhiyong,ahumanrightsactivistanduniversitylawprofessor,wassentencedtofouryearsinprisonfor"gatheringcrowdstodisruptpublicorder"bythesamecourtinChina. Both inciting subversionof statepowerandgathering crowds todisruptpublicorder arecrimesstipulatedbytheCriminalLawofthePeople’sRepublicofChina.Bothcasesrelatetofreedomofexpressionandfreedomofspeech.ThisarticleexaminesdifferentargumentsandinterpretationsoflawsinChinawithregardtothesetwocases.Itsummarizesandanalyzesthedifferentargumentsfromthecourtjudgments,lawyersdefensestatements,thedefendants’self‐statement,andanalysisfromtheChineseacademicworld.Itconcludesthat although that both Liu Xiaobo and Xu Zhiyongwere officially criminalized, different argumentssurrounding the two cases have shown how controversial the judgments are. Moreover, they havereflectedthattheinterpretationsandtheimplementationoflawsinChinahasbecomeabattlefieldfor

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politicalaims. Ontheonehand,theuseof legalrhetorictosilencedifferentvoiceshasshownthatinChinapoliticscanstilloftenprevailoverlaw;ontheotherhand,Chineseintellectualsandlawyershavealsoendeavoredtousethelegallanguagetoexpresstheiropinionsandthoughts.MentalDisabilityinanAgeofSocialHarmony:China'sMentalHealthLawinPracticeJoyChia,ChineseUniversityofHongKongChina’sfirstNationalMentalHealthLawcameintoeffectonMay1,2013,aftermorethan25yearsofdrafting. While lauded by official media for standardizing treatment and limiting “unnecessary”commitments,China’sMentalHealthLawhasinpracticegranteddiscretiontopublicsecurityorgans,hospitals and guardians to involuntarily commit those deemed “dangerous” to society, leaving thesystemopentoabuse.Understandingthisapparentconflictrequirescontextualizingthelawwithinitspoliticalandsocialcontext,wherethetwingovernmentgoalsofeconomicgrowthandsocialharmonyareparamount.Thementalhealthanddisabilityrightsarenathereforeisarichsiteforinquiryintolaw‐makingandenforcementinChinaaslegalactors(i.e.judicialactors,legalandmedicalexperts,plaintiffs,guardiansandpractitioners)areallgrapplingwithunderstandingandenforcingthenewMentalHealthLaw,oftenwithverydifferentresults.TheArticlewill first locate theMentalHealthLawwithinChina’sdomestic legalregimeandcomparethelawtointernationalstandardsondisabilityrights(includingreferencetoEuropeanlegalstandards).Itwillthendemonstratehowconflictingframeworksforaddressingmentaldisabilityhavecreatedlegalconfusiononcritical issues, including:(1)thelawsgoverninglegalcapacityandguardianship;(2)theapportioningofcivilandcriminalliabilityinmattersinvolvingpeoplewithmentaldisabilities;and(3)accesstojusticeforindividualswithinthementalhealthsystem.TheArticlewillalsoanalysetwolegalcasesbroughtafterthepromulgationoftheMentalHealthLaw,andconsiderhowlegalambiguitiesandconfusionhave stymied judicial actionandhindered individuals’ access to courts.Finally, thisArticleconcludesthatafocusonpsychosisandsocialstabilityhasunderminedthecoretenetsoftheMentalHealth Law and offers policy recommendations to ensure that legal actors are able to interpret andcomplywiththelaw.EnforcementofAmendedCriminalProcedureLawinChina:TrendsandPatternsLiLi,SunYat‐senUniversityTheenforcementof theCriminalProcedureLaw(CPL) inChina ispoliticallyembedded in thepowerrelationsbetweenvariousproceduralparticipants.The structural configurationsof thesepowers areshapedbyformallawsaswellasdynamicnegotiationsconductedindailypractice.ThenewlyrevisedCPLhasamended thecriminalproceedings inmanyareasbutnot addressed the fundamentalpowerrelationsinthe“irontriangle”,i.e.,thepolice,prosecutorsandcourts.The“irontriangle”issupposedtooperateintheoldfashionedwayoffunctionaldivision,mutualchecks,andcooperation,thusresultinginastrongproceduralauthorityandcomparativelyweaksocialengagement.Inthispaper,itisarguedthatastrongauthoritytogetherwithweaksocialinvolvementleadtotheappearanceofseveraltrendsin the enforcement of the CPL. First, although the current CPL intends to reduce the use of arrests,arrestrateshavebeenslightlyreduced.Onereasonforthesmallchangeinthearrestratesisthepoorapplicationofthesurveillanceofresidence,asociallyenforcedcompulsorymeasureandanalternativeforarrests.Anothertrendistheoccasionalexclusionofillegalevidence,whichispartlybecausedefenselawyershavedifficultiesinadducingrelevantcluesthatshowtheillegalityoftheevidencetoinitiatetheexclusionprocess.Thethirdpatternistherareprosecutorialdecisionsofconditionalnon‐prosecutions,whicharelargelyduetothelackofsocial facilitiestokeepsuspectsundersurveillance.Furthermore,althoughtheCPLencourageswitnessestotestify inopencourts, it isstillrare forwitnessestodoso.Finally, this article discusses the pros and cons of the power relations in criminal proceedings, andsomelegislativerecommendationsareoffered.

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Session10:JudgesasLegislators?Chair:SamuliSeppänen,ChineseUniversityofHongKongResponsive Justice in China during Transitional Times: Revisiting the Juggling PathbetweenAdjudicatoryandMediatoryJusticeGuWeixia,UniversityofHongKong Chinahasbeendiscussedininternationalliteraturesasatransitionalstateinsocialandeconomicsense.LiteraturesarehoweverscantinanalyzinghowChina’sjusticesystemrespondstothecountry’ssocialandeconomictransitions.ThisArticlestudiestheinternational“transitionaljustice”framework,whichexaminesjusticesystemineconomic,societal,andpoliticaltransitionsinpost‐CommunismCentralandEast European (CEE) jurisdictions. Although China is not a transition state in political sense, thetransitional justicestudies,particularly theanalysesonhowsuccessorregimes inCEEcountriesdealwith the aftermath of economic restructuring and societal reparations through justice system, is ofrelevance to Chinese ongoing judicial reform and its future development. By comparing judicialsituations in China to the CEE countries during transitional times, this Article attempts to analyzeChina’s distinctive justice response to her massive economic and societal transformation, so as toconceptualize“responsivejustice”inChinaduringtransitionaltimes.Judge‐madeLawinChineseCivilLaw:FromanEmpiricalPerspectiveMinLee,CentralSouthUniversityofForestryandTechnologyInmoststudiesofjudge‐madelaw,thedefinitionofjudge‐madelawisseldomdiscussed,whichisnotbecauseof thedefinitenessof this concept,butdue todiversityofunderstanding. InChinese judicialpractice,judge‐madelawsarefrequentlyappliedbutneveraffirmed.Theprimarygoalofthisresearchistodifferentiateproperjudge‐madelawandalienatedjudge‐madelawandtoclarifyjudge‐madelawsinjudicialpracticeaccordingtodifferentlawmakersanddifferentmodesoflaw‐making.Theresearchsuggeststhedangerof judge‐made lawisnot fromproper judge‐made law,but fromalienated judge‐made law.Alienated judge‐made lawismadeby theSupremeCourtbywayof Judicial Interpretationotherthanproperjudge‐madelawmadebythejudgesbywayoflaw‐makingcasebycase.Similartothestatute,thealienatedjudge‐madelawisofgeneralbindingeffectinjudicialpractice.Inconclusion,theresultsshowthatitisnecessarytospecifyjudge‐madelaw.Onlyontwooccasionscanthejudgemakelaws.Oneisthatitisnecessaryforfillingthegapsofstatute.Theotheristoavoidtheextremeinjusticeofapplyingtheunreasonablestipulationsofstatuelaw.Inadditiontotheseresults,inmakinglaws,thejudgesshallbesubjecttothebasicprinciplesofcivillawandthesystematicconsistencyandshallreferto doctrine and guiding cases. Besides, the judge shall be in duty bound to illustration andargumentationofthelawmadebyhim/her.JudicialLawmakinginChinaVaiIoLo,BondUniversityAccordingtotheChineseConstitution,theNationalPeople’sCongress(anditsStandingCommittee)andtheStateCouncilare toenactbasic lawsandadministrativeregulations, respectively.TheLegislationLawalsodelineatesthelegislativepowersofvariousstateorganizationsandexplainsthehierarchyoflegalnorms.AlthoughtheConstitutionandtheLegislationLawvesttheinterpretivepowerintheNPCStanding Committee, the National People’s Congress has authorized the Supreme People Court tointerpret laws and decrees relating to their specific application at trial. Occasionally, the SupremePeople’sCourtissuesjudicialinterpretationstoprovidelowercourtswithguidanceintheirapplicationofstatutorynorms.Inissuingjudicialinterpretations,theSupremePeople’sCourtmaycreatenewlegal

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normsbeyondthemereapplicationoflawinadjudicatingdisputes.Tofacilitatetheuniformapplicationoflaw,theSupremePeople’sCourthasrecentlyadoptedthesystemof“guidingcases,”towhichlowercourtsshould“refer”inadjudgingsimilarcases,eventhoughtheguidingcasesmayfallshortofbeingjudicial precedents. This paper examines judicial interpretations and the “guiding cases” system inselectedareasof lawandassesses theroleof judicial lawmaking inChina’sefforts toreformits legalsystem.TheChineseGuidingCaseSystem–SolutiontoLegalProblemsorReactiontoNon‐LegalDemands?MarcoOtten,UniversityofCologneSince thepromulgationof theprovisionsof the SupremePeople’sCourt concerningworkon guidingcasesin2010,thenewmechanismhasattractedconsiderableattentionfromscholarsbothwithinandoutsideofChina.Beingdesignatedtogiveguidancetolowercourtsandcoveringavarietyoflawfields,guiding cases seem to have far reaching implications for a considerable amount of civil, public andcriminallawconstellations.Butistheguidanceoflowercourtstheonlyintentionofguidingcases?Thisstudyaims toassesswhetherornotan impacton theapplicationof law to specific cases is theonlyeffectoftheGuidingCasesorifthemechanismhastobeseenfromadifferentangleaswell.Thepaperexaminesthe26guidingcasesthattheSupremePeople’sCourthasissuedbynow,focusingonthequestionwhethertheguidingcasesprimarilyaddressdoctrinalquestionsoflaworwhethertheyrather address political demands of the party state or general popular expectations towards thejudiciary, more specifically: Do guiding cases address real legal problems, i.e. cases where legalprovisionsareunclearorwherecontradictingscholarlyviewsorcontradictingcourtpracticeexist?Ifcasesaddresssuchproblems, is thesolvingof thedoctrinal issuesatisfactory? Is the intentionof themechanism to respond to popular demand or political requirements defined by the party state? Arethereevencasesaddressingconstellations,thatarenotproblematicatallintermsoftheinvolvedlegalproblems?After giving an overview on the guiding case mechanism, the paper aims to answer the abovementionedquestionbyexamining thecurrentChinese literature:Do legalexperts regard theguidingcasesasa contribution tosolving legalproblems?Thenext step is toput thecases intocontextwithpolitical requirements and popular demands. Lastly, it shall be decided, where the emphasis of themechanismcanbefound:Solvinglegalproblemsorreactingtonon‐legaldemands?Session11:LawinSocialTransformationofChineseSocietyChair:BillyK.L.So,HongKongUniversityofScienceandTechnologyLawintheChunqiuZuozhuanUlrichManthe,UniversityofPassauMrZuo’sCommentaryof theSpring andAutumnAnnals is the richest andmost importanthistoricaldocument of the Zhou dynasty. Zuo Qiuming seems to have written the Zuozhuan about 400 BCE.WithintheChunqiuandtheZuozhuan,therearesome,butnotmanytracesoflegalmatters.ThefeudalsystemestablishedbyKingWuofZhoustillexisted,butdeclineduntiltheendoftheSpringandAutumnperiod; the feudal lordsceasedtoobservetheceremonialrulesofbehaviouragainst theking.Theunwritten“constitution”ofKingWu’sstatewasnomoreeffective.TheenforcementofLibyConfuciusmaybeseenashisreactiontohisdisappointmentatthisdevelopment.

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DuringtheChunqiuperiod,theconceptofFaasacodeofconductforthesubordinateclasswasdevel‐oped. The first written code was enacted during the 6th century BCE; this enactment was heavilycriticizedbycontemporaries.Infamily law,wecanobservethatthesystemof(originallymatrilineal)clannameswasrestrictedtomembersoftherulinghouseswhereasthecivilservantsgraduallygotfamilynames.Marriageswereonlyrecordedwhentheytookplacebetweenmembersoftherulingclans.Therewasnofixedsystemofexchangeofprincessesbetweenthestates.IntheZuozhuan,therearetracesofadevelopingcontractlawandofcriminalprocedure.Theauthorwillspeakonsomelegalphenomenaandtrytoexplainthemintheirhistoricalcontext.

DirtofWhitewashing:Re‐conceptualizingDebtors’Obligations inChineseBusinessbyTransplantingBankruptcyLawtoEarlyBritishHongKong(1860s‐1880s)MichaelNg,UniversityofHongKongThispaper,drawingonawiderangeofarchivedmaterials,andusingoneoftheearliestsetsofEnglishbusinesslawimportedtoHongKong—theBankruptcyOrdinanceof1864—asacasestudy,arguesthatthetransplantationoftheEnglishbankruptcyregimeintoearlycolonialHongKongwascontrarytothebusiness interests of both the European and Chinese communities and wrongfully displaced thetraditional Chinese business norms and practices that had contributed to the health of the colonialeconomypriortotheregime’sintroduction.ThispaperconstitutesoneofthefirstempiricalstudiestoplaceEnglishbusinesslawanditswidelyacknowledgedcontributiontotheeconomyofearlycolonialHongKongunderscrutiny.Fromtheperspectiveof therelationshipbetweenEnglish lawand formerBritish colonies’ quest for business modernity, the findings presented herein contradict the readilyaccepted notion that English business law provided a solid legal infrastructure uponwhich colonialHong Kong’s prosperity and economic growth were built and call for more nuanced studies of thepositiveroleofChineselegaltraditionsinHongKong’squestforbusinessmodernityinitsearlycolonialperiod.Session12:ChinaandtheInternationalLegalOrderChair:BjörnAhl,UniversityofCologneUnravellingthe‘RightofAsylum’:ACaseStudyofChinaShuoLiu,UniversityCollegeDublinAlthough “asylum” was conceptualised as an individual human right in Article 14 of the UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,modernstateshavealwaysimposedstrictbordercontrols,renderingtherealisation of this right difficult for asylum seekers to assert in practice. By unravelling the draftingprocessesofkey international instrumentspertainingtoasylum, itbecomesclear thatcontraryto therhetoric infusing the “right of asylum”, States were consumed during the drafting processes withdomesticandideologicalpoliticalpreoccupationsresulting,untypically,inunanimousagreementontheformulation of the so‐called right. Against this backdrop, the paper analyses China’s participation indraftingprocessesconcerningasylum.AlthoughChinaisroutinelyviewedasarefugee‐producingstate,thishistoricalanalysisdemonstratesthatChinahasalsoplayedasignificantroleasareceivingStateforrefugees and was an active player in the debates that led to the erection of the modern system ofinternationalrefugeelawbasedonindividualizedrefugeestatusdeterminations.Despitethatactiverole,Chinahasresistedcommitmentstoestablishaclearlegalframeworkorrefugeedeterminationsystemtoensuretheproperprocessingofrefugeeclaims.Thepaperconcludeswithsomeinsights intothegaps

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thatcurrentlyexistinrefugeeprotectionregimeinChinaandthereasonswhyamorestructuredsystem,typicalinmostdevelopedcountries,hasfailedtoemerge. Effective Use of International Law in the Chinese Domestic Order: FormalImplementationorInformalInspiration?WimMuller,UniversityofManchesterandChathamHouseForalongtime,thequestionofthedomesticstatusoftreatiesandcustomaryinternationallawinChinaremained a doctrinal, theoreticalmatter.With the constitution silent, the initial theory of ‘adoption’,whichmaintained that treatieswere incorporated intodomestic lawwithout a legislative act and allprovisionsdirectlyapplicable,wasneverappliedinpracticeandabandonedinthe1990s.Drivenbythedebate on domestic applicability of the WTO Agreement and its annexes, two new theories weredeveloped: ‘transformation’, which assumes that treatiy provisions need an act of transformation toapplyinthedomesticorder,anda‘hybridform’,whichsynthesisesbothapproachesanddistinguishesbetweendirectlyapplicableorself‐executingtreatyprovisionswhichbecomebindingimmediately,andother provisions which do not. The continuing debate led to seemingly paradoxical statements byChineserepresentativesbeforeUNhumanrightstreatybodies,refectingthedifferentapproaches.Whilethisdoctrinarydebatewastakingplaceamonginternationalandconstitutional lawyers,othersdidnotwaituntil treatieswereratifedorcasesreachedthecourts.Criminalprocedure lawyershavelong been referring to international human rights law to support their proposals for legal reform.Proponentsoftheruleof lawusedtheprocessofWTOaccessiontopromotebettersafeguards.Allofthis leaves the question: how do norms of a foreign provenance enter into a society and becomeinternalised in its practice? The present paper explores this questionwith regard to China in awaywhichtakesintoaccountbothdevelopmentsindoctrineaswellasthemoreempiricaldimensionaboutthewayinwhichinternationalnormsareactuallyusedbydomesticactors.Inparticular,itattemptstoanswerthequestionwhetherinternationalnormshavebeenmorerelevantbytheiractualuseratherthantheirapplicationthroughanyformalchannel.ShouldtheCESLInfluencetheChineseConsumerProtectionLawReform?KateSurala,MaastrichtUniversityChina is not only Europe’s second largest trading partner but also a dominant player in the globaleconomyandengagedintransactionswithmanycountriesthat inturnhavestrongconnectionswithEuropeannations.MostcivilcodesinEuropehavebeenenactedbynationallegislatures,however,thecontinuing efforts of the European Union to reduce the resulting diversity of private law betweenMemberStatesisbecomingmorepressingduetoasetofnewlyadoptedlegalinstruments.Afterseveralinitiatives by the European institutions, such as the Common Frame of Reference, the Europeancontractlawcanberegardedasadevelopinginternationalphenomenon.Therefore,onecanconcludethat theEuropeanizationofprivate law isblurring the linebetweennational andCommunity law. Inaddition, the adoption of an optional instrument on aCommonEuropean Sales Law (‘CESL’)may behighly influential for subsequentdevelopment,notonly in theEU,butalso forChina.Thispaperwillexplain the potential impact that CESL may have on Chinese legislation and on bilateral relationsbetween EU and China.Most scholarly initiatives focus solely on the evaluation of harmonization ofcontract law in the EU whilst very little research has been done to assess the impact of those EUharmonizationeffortsoncountriesoutsideof theEU, suchasChina.Thispaper shall therefore focusmainlyontheareaofharmonizationofprivatelawwithaspecificemphasisonCESLanditssignificanceforChina.

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Session13:TheChangingRoleoftheJudiciaryChair:ZhaoYuhong,ChineseUniversityofHongKongLaw‐makingandEnforcementofLaw:theSPC’sTwoFacesofJanusIvanCardillo,ZhongnanUniversityofEconomicsandLawTheSupremePeople’sCourtisthehighestjudicialorganinChina,bindbytheprincipleof"judicatureforthepeople".Amongitsfunctionswefindthepromulgationofjudicialexplanations.Theyconstitutethesoulofthecasejudgmentsystem,basedonstatutorylawandnotoncaselawlikeinthecommonlaw,and theyareusedby theSPC togivedirections for theaccurateunderstandingandappropriateapplication of the provisions of laws. The final result is the creation of specific rules, classified as“secondarylaw”,thatplayanimportantroleonshapingthejudicialprocessandthenormativeassetofthe society.While fulfilling their duties, the judgesmust strictly observe the Constitution and laws,safeguard the State interests and public interests, safeguard the lawful rights, accept the legalsupervisionandthesupervisionbythemasses.InthesametimetheSPCisnotempoweredtointerpretthe Constitution, and to release judgments on its basis. Also, is not clear of the meaning and theimplicationsofthe“safeguardofpublicinterests”andthe“supervisionbythemasses”.AccordinglytheSPC’spositionintheChineselegalsystemisunclear,duetoitsdoublepoweroflaw‐makingandmakingjudgmentsthatcanserveasaboundaryforthepoliticalpowerorasitshiddenhand.TheindependenceoftheCourtisamajorissue.TheoutcomesdemonstratethattheSPChasanimportantroleonshapingtheChineselegalsystem,bycombiningtheabstractlawwiththesocialneeds,solvingconflictsoflaws,establishing more detailed rules, dealing with sensitive social issues, and promoting a generalunderstandingof the legalconceptsbasedon thepracticalexperience.TheChineseexperienceof thejudicial system is different from any western models and its deepening can provide a betterunderstandingoftheruleoflawwithChinesecharacteristics.CourtsasRegulators:UnderstandingtheNon‐JudicialRoleoftheChineseJudiciaryPanXuanming,ChineseUniversityofHongKong Regulation has been ubiquitous in different legal systems. During the past few decades, a growingliteraturehasacknowledgedtheriseofregulatorsinresponsetotheproblemofdeterrencefailurethatmay be resulted from inefficient law enforcement by courts. The allocation of law enforcement andlawmaking powers to different state agents has been a subject of enduring interests. As noted inexisting studies, allocating original lawmaking powers to the legislature alone is insufficient forachievinganoptimal levelofdeterrence,especiallywhenagiven lawcannot resolveall futurecases.Therefore,thepowertointerpretanddevelopexistinglawandtodecidehowtodealwithnewcases,namely the residual lawmakingpower, needs to be allocated to courts or regulators. The twomajorlegal systems, however, allocate residual lawmaking powers quite differently. In civil law systems,judgesarepurported to interpret, notmake, law; common law judges, comparatively, holdextensiveresiduallawmakingpowers,andareoftenvestedwiththepowertodevelopnewprinciplesoflaw.Thisarticlechallenges theconventionalwisdombygivingacasestudyofChinese localcourts.Thearticlearguesthat,evenwithin thecivil lawtraditionandother limitedchoicesof legal institutions,Chinesejudges have strived to mitigate the problem of deterrence failure by expanding their residuallawmakingpowers.Thearticlealsocontributestothecomparativeliteratureforunderstandingjudicialresponsiveness to socio‐economic changes by advancing the knowledge of the Chinese‐style judicialinnovationand, inparticular, exploring theunconventional regulatory role that canbeplayedby theChineselocalcourts.

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Judicial Independence or Government Responsibility? The LawMakers and Users ofEnvironmentalCourtsinChinaWangJuan,McGillUniversityandLiangWenting,BeihangUniversitySince1996,over100environmentalcourtsatthebasicandintermediatelevelshavebeenestablishedinaround14provincesinChina.Whywerethesespecialcourtsestablished?Existingresearcheshaveprimarily focused on two factors: local severe and complex environmental problems necessitate theestablishment of special courts; the career consideration of local state agentsmotivates them to useenvironmental courts to showcase “green” strategies. However, not all places that suffer fromenvironmental problems establish environmental courts, and some environmental courts werepromoted by higher courts (such as Yunnan) instead of local governments. In fact, a closer look atdifferent environmental courts across China reveals different lawmakers (local intermediate courts,highercourts,orlocalgovernments)anddifferentlocallawsandregulationsontheestablishmentanduseofenvironmentalcourts.In this essay, we argue that different facilitators of and designs on the establishment and use ofenvironmentalcourtsacrosslocalitiessuggestdynamicrelationshipbetweenlocaljudicialsystemsandgovernment administrations.Through interviewsanddocument collection,we compareand contrastthe roles of local judicial systems and government administrations in environmental courts in twoprovinces.Morespecifically,weexamine the identitiesof lawmakers, thesubstanceof local lawsandregulationsonenvironmentalcourts(e.g.lawsuitselectioncriteriaandplaintiffqualificationforpublicinterest litigation), court records of lawsuits, and government policies on environmental issues andactivitiesinaddressingthem.This essay makes both theoretical and empirical contributions. Theoretically, understanding theconditions under which these environmental courts were established and used contributes to thescholarlydebateonjudicial independence.Empirically,understandinglocalpracticesofgovernments’involvementinenvironmentalcourtshelpsmakesubstantivesuggestionsonthejudicialinterpretationof“governmentresponsibility”forthe2014revisionoftheEnvironmentalProtectionLaw(art.26).JudicialEmpowermentwithin/outofthePolitical‐LegalSysteminChina?YuXiaohong,TsinghuaUniversityIstherejudicialempowermentinChina?Somescholarsargueforjudicializationonthebasisofeitherthe expansion of court jurisdiction, or the increasing role of Chinese courts in policy‐making.Othersdisagreeandstressthoseadversetrendsinthelastdecade,suchastheriseofdiehardlawyers(sike死磕律师),theturningagainstlawwhichismanifestedinthegrandmedicationproject,etc.ThepapernotesthatsuchdivergenceispartiallycausedbymistakingcourtsasthejudiciaryinChina.Unliketheircounterpartsinthewesternsystemofseparationofpowers,Chinesecourtsaremerelyoneofthefourinstitutionsthatcomposethepolitical‐legalsystem(zhengfa政法),whichitselfisonlyoneoftheninepolicysystemsinthisparty‐state.Fromthisperspective, the judicialpower(courtperse.) inChinaexpands fromwithout thepolitical‐legal system yet dwindles fromwithin. The authority of courts vis‐à‐vis other state organs expandssignificantlyduringthepastfewdecades,especiallyatthelocallevel.Withinthepolitical‐legalsystem,however,theriseofthecourtsisthwartedbythatoftheprocuratorate,whichwasarguablythebiggestwinnerofthelastroundofthejudicialreform.Instrumentality of the judiciary is the logic behind this seemingly ironic observation. The judicialempowermentvis‐à‐visotherstateorgansderives fromboththestrategicandactivistsactionsof the

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courts,andthewillingretreatfromotheragencies.Itisespeciallythecasewhenacentral‐localtensionis involved. Thedejudicializationwithin thepolitical‐legal system, on the otherhand, takes root in averyessentialorganizationruleoftheparty‐state:tocentralizeonmajorissuesandtodecentralizeonminorones(daquandulanxiaoquanfensan 大权独揽小权分散).Inthelastdecade,theprocuratoratewasintentionallyempoweredtooffsettheexpansionofcourtpowersincelate1970s.Theparty‐stateisstrengthened through keeping the political‐legal system fragmentedwhereas at the same timeusingcourtstoreinindisarraylocalofficials.Session14:AccesstoJusticeChair:LinFeng,CityUniversityofHongKongPublicTrialinChineseCourtsandtheNewPublicAccessJudgmentDatabaseBjörnAhlandDanielSprick,UniversityofCologneTheSupremePeople’sCourt issuedRegulationsonthePublicationofCourtDecisionsonthe Internetand an Opinion on Establishing Three Platforms of Judicial Transparency in November 2013. Thejudicialinterpretationsincludeageneralobligationofcourtstopublishalldecisionsinapublicaccessonlinedatabaseaswellas,interalia,therequirementtovideotapeeverycourthearing.Itisstipulatedthatthevideorecordingsaretobestoredcentrallyandthataccesstotherecordingsistobegranteduponrequestbythepartiesofthelawsuit.Themove of the Supreme People’s Court to introduce “total transparency” of the courtroom and toincludealldecisionsofalllevelsofcourtinapublicdatabasewillbeanalyzedinthecontextofongoingjudicialandpoliticalreforms.Wediscussthefeasibilityoftheprovidedmeansandmechanismsthatareputinplaceinordertoimplementthenewtransparencymeasures.Thesemeasuresarejuxtaposedtocurrent practice of conducting public trials and well publicized experiences of model courtsadministering transparency of the courtroom.We argue that expanding the principle of public trialbeyondthelimitsofthecourtroominChinawillinduceeffectsthatcanbothprotectandinfringeupontherightsof theparties.The introductionofsuchacomprehensiveapproachto judicial transparencymightbeparticularlyambiguousinalegalsystemwherethenotionofjudicialindependenceisratherfrail at best. Although public scrutiny can be filtered and/or censored by the administration, thesweepinguseofreal‐timesocialmediainChinawillalmostcertainlybiasjudicialdecision‐making.Considering the institutional effects of the new measures we hold that they enable higher rankingcourtstomeasure,assessandcontroltheworkofcourtsandindividualjudgesinunprecedentedways.ThetransparencymeasuresalsofacilitateotherinstrumentsoftheSupremePeople’sCourtthatservetosteerandcontroljudiciallaw‐makingsuchastheguidingcasesmechanism,thusservingtheaimofbureaucraticcentralizationofthejudicialsystem.PracticesofCivilMediationinMainlandChina:FromTraditiontoModernityHeZhi‐hui,HubeiUniversity CivilmediationsystemisanincreasinglyinterestingtopicforbothChineseandforeignresearchers.Asto the revival of mediation in mainland China, some foreign scholars have drawn a preliminarydistinctionbetweenChina'straditionalmediationandmodernmediation,butthedeep‐rootedopinionthatChina’smediationexistsasoneofthereflectionsofConfucianismintheareaofdisputeresolutionhasinsomecasesledtothemisinterpretationinrelevantresearch.WhethertheinfluenceofConfucianethicsonmediationhasbeenoveremphasized?

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Furthermore, there were and there are so many transmutations of civil mediation that even someChinese judges, mediators and scholars blend them without differential treatment. In the latestamendment to the Chinese Civil Procedure Law, which went into effect on 1 January 2013, someprovisions of a new type so‐called “mediation beforehand” were prescribed so as to increase thepossibilitiesofvaguenessinpractice.Duetothedifferencesinthedefinitionofcivilmediationandthediversification in China's practice, we cannot simply classify them under existing typologies ofmediationatAmericanandEuropeanlevel,althoughsomeoftheircharacteristicscorrespondtoknownmodels.Therefore，"civilmediation"，theobjectofstudy in thisarticle,doesnotmerelyrefertotherangeofmethodsbywhichthirdpersonsseektoresolveadisputewithoutimposingabindingdecision,i.e.,itinevitablycontainsthetypeswhich,inastrictsense,donotbelongtoADR.This article, therefore, is not merely to explore civil mediation in mainland China from a historicalperspective,butalsostudies,bymeansofrulesanddata,eachkindoftraditionalmediationandmodernmediationseparately,particularlythecauses,actualeffectsandexistingproblems.EvolutionoftheGuidingCaseSystemtowardsJudicialCentralizationinChinaPeterWang,CityUniversityofHongKong GuidingcaseisanewconceptcurrentlyraisedinChina. It isexclusivelydecidedandpromulgatedbytheSupremePeople’sCourtandisbindingonlowercourtsfordecidinglatersimilarcases.BasedontheProvisionsoftheSupremePeople’sCourtontheWorkofGuidingCases,Chinahasformedacase lawsystemwith itsowncharacteristics. Itprovidesbothopportunitiesandchallengesas to the futureofChina’slegaldevelopment.Thisarticleattemptstoexploresocialandpoliticalconditionsthatleadtoitsbirth,towhatextentandunderwhatconditionssuchmechanismoperatesinpractice.Furthermore,itrevealsthattheGuidingCaseSysteminbasedonthemodelofcentralizationofjudicialpowerandtheroleoftheSupremePeople’sCourthasbeenchangedaccordinglywiththedevelopmentoftheGuidingCaseSystem.Session15:WhitherChineseLegalReform?Chair:AlbertChenHung‐yee,UniversityofHongKongChangesinChineseAdministrativeStructuresandtheRuleofLawJuhaKarhu,UniversityofLaplandKey to understand one central dimension and element in the changes of Chinese legal system, andindeed the framework for a possible newChinese legal culture, is to analyse the changes of the lastwave of administrative structure reforms. Even if some models from Western post‐New PublicManagement trends can be detected these changes contain and express some special Chinesecharacteristics. One of these characteristics is to analyse the dynamics and concrete institutionalreforms of similar structural changes on national, provinsional, county and city level. The specificperspective adopted in the paper is Rule of Law, and especially the specific role of administrativelitigationasanaccesstojustice.

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Fly High the Banner of Socialist Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics! What Does the 4th Plenum Decision Mean for Legal Reforms in China? Randall Peerenboom, La Trobe University and University of Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies OnOctober23,2014,the4thPlenumofthe18thCentralCommitteeoftheChineseCommunistParty(CCP) promulgated the CCP Central Committee Decision concerning Some Major Questions inComprehensivelyPromotingGoverningtheCountryAccordingtoLaw(theDecision).Thiswasthefirsttimeacentralcommitteeplenarysessionaddressedthetopicofruleoflaw.PartIprovidesanoverviewoflegalreformsduringthelastthirtyyears,andaddressesthequestionofwhyholdaplenumonruleoflawnow?PartIIanalysesthemainfeaturesoftheDecision.TheDecisionsoughttoaccomplishthreemaintasks.First,toreconfirmfordomesticandinternationalaudiencesthatChinaispursuingitsownpathofdevelopmentaimedatestablishingsocialistruleoflawwithChinesecharacteristics; second, to provide a central‐level comprehensive plan for reforms that cuts acrossjurisdictionsandrisesabovedepartmentalinterests;andthird,tomovebeyondthehardwareoflegalreformstothesoftwarebypromotingthenormsandpracticesofaruleoflawcultureforofficialsandcitizens alike. Part III assesses the general principles of the reform agenda. Part IV examinesmajorinstitutionalreformstothelegislature,administrativeagenciesandthejudiciary.PartVconcludeswithanoverall assessmentof the reformagendaandadiscussionof the implicationsofChina’sefforts toestablishasocialistruleoflawforthepromotionofruleoflawglobally.Gift‐GivinginChinaandtheRuleofLawandVirtueMarySzto,HamlineUniversityGift‐giving,ubiquitousinChinesefamilial,business,andofficialpractices,hasbeenunderfirebybothlawsoutsideandwithinChina.Forexample, theAmericanForeignCorruptPracticesAct forbidsgift‐giving to foreignofficials. China’s recent anti‐corruptioncampaignhas targeted theuseofbanquets,mooncakes,andluxurygoodsinthebribingofofficials.What are the origins of ubiquitous gift‐giving in China? Is gift‐giving a form of law? This articleexaminestheancientrootsofChinesegift‐giving.Gift‐givingoriginatedingiftstoancestorsandotherspiritualbeingstofosterblessingsfortheliving.Theyencouragedfilialpietyanddeferencetoasacredorder.Giftstothelivingengenderasimilarsocialorderbasedonrespect,affectionandmutualsupport.Parallel to ancestral clan rituals in traditional China, the imperium and merchant guilds also hadelaborate rituals of gifts and offerings. These also fostered affection‐building and familial‐likeassistance.Theywerepartofaruleofvirtue.The advent of modernization and China’s recent meteoric economic growth has not lessened thepracticesofgift‐giving,butmayhaveacceleratedthem.Itisestimatedby2015halfofallluxurygoodsintheworldwillbepurchasedbyChineseconsumers.Manygotoofficialsandotherstoeasebusinessandotherpractices. Thisarticlewillexplorewhetheraruleofvirtueofgift‐giving,canbeconsistentwithanti‐corruptionmeasuresandaruleoflawintoday’sChina.

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Session16:LawandtheMarketChair:BryanDruzin,ChineseUniversityofHongKongChina’sFiscalandTaxationLegalReform–IssuesandProposalsHuTianlongLawrence,ChinaRenminUniversityThe Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms (“The Decision”)adoptedatthecloseoftheThirdPlenarySessionofthe18thCPCCentralCommitteeheldinNovember2013 delineated a detailed strategy for reforming the China’s fiscal and tax system reform as “animportantguaranteeofStategovernance”.Moreover,detailedmeasuresonfiscalandtaxreformwerereleased thereafter in December 2013. This article provides a summary of (a) observations andassessmentofmajorobstaclesorproblemsinChinafiscalandtaxsystemtoday,and(b)tentativepolicysuggestionsandorientationsforthenearfuture.Chinahas achieved rigorousprogress inpast threedecadeson fiscal and tax reform, especially afterChina’s major tax system overhaul in 1994, and China today faces an unprecedented task andopportunity in economic and social development, by and through factoring in social welfare, socialstability,urbanization,andcitizens’well‐beings.ThisarticlearguesthatChinacanattaingoalsonfiscaland tax system reform designed in The Decision from the top‐level design perspective, but it mayrequirecommitmentfromChina’sleadersondetailedarchitecting.Inparticular,thearticlereviewsanddiscussesthefollowings.China fornowshould improve thestatebudgetmanagementand transparencyby fullyexploring thefiscal to strengthen underlying urbanization. Moreover, the tax administration and collection effortsandenforcementshouldbeenhancedtoalevelofpracticalcontrol,whichisalynchpinofamoderntaxsystem.Asaresult,theobstinatewhilesevereproblemoftransferpaymentsystemshouldbepromptedtobalancecentralizationandde‐centralizationefforts,especiallyfortheusageoftaxincentivestoexertaninnovativeroundofforeigninvestment.The paper also summarizes and concludes a few policy orientations and proposals against China’scurrent fiscal and tax reform from a four‐layer program, including the commitment for theinternationalization of RMB; promoting a comprehensive carbon tax system against worsenedenvironment protection; advocating a philanthropic culture for social security and removingwealthdisparity;andvoicingoutChina’spositionforstructuringinternationaltaxorderssuchastheBEPSandnewtransferpricingguidelines.DeterminantsforEffectivenessofChineseLaw–ACaseStudyofProductQualityLegalRegimeMaryIp,UniversityofNewSouthWalesOnefunctionoflawistoprotectpeople’sinterestsandrights.Theeffectivenessofthisfunctionwoulddependonthenexusofachainofdeterminantsthatislaw‐making,implementationandenforcement.Abreakofthechainofthesedeterminantswouldrenderthelawuseless.However,eachdeterminantisalsoinfluencedbyeconomic,socialandpoliticalfactors.Thus,thechainofdeterminantsistiedcloselytotheinfluentialfactorsofeachdeterminantandformacomplexmatrixwhichultimatelycontroltheeffectiveness of a piece of legislation. TheChineseProduct Liability Law (PLL) has provided a goodexampleforthisstudy.Consumer protection is one of the objectives of the PLL as it has explicitly stipulated in Article 1.However, by navigating through the PLL’s legislative path and its later development, it has been

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revealed that the legislative goal of protecting consumers has been overshadowed by a number ofissues.Whatarethoseissuesisthefocusexaminationofthispaper.Thestructureofthispaperisasfollows.Tosetthescene,thispapercommenceswithabriefdiscussionofthelegislativebackgroundbeforepromulgationofthePLL.Then,thispaperscrutinisestheadequacyof the PLL in its role of consumer protection. After that, this paper identifies factors which haveobstructedthePLL’sfulfilmentofitsresponsibilitytowardsconsumersandcatalystswhichhaveledtoitsoverdueamendment. Thefinalremarkofthispaperissocial,economic,politicalandlegalaretheinfluences that have strongly impacted on the PLL not only on its legislative path but also on itsobligationinsafeguardingconsumers’rightsandinterestsinChina.AStudyofChina’sRegulationonInsiderTradingofUnlockedRestrictedStocksPengLian,EastChinaUniversityofPoliticalScienceandLawWeexaminearegulationinChinathatrequiresinsiderswhoplantosella largeamountofun‐lockedrestrictedstockstodosothroughtheblocktradingsystem,focusingonitseffectofdeterringinsiders’informed trading and protecting the average investors. While the regulation is well intended andinnovative,wefindthatitissuboptimalbecauseitdoesnotimposerestrictionsonthecounter‐partiesoftheinsiders’blocktrades.Asaresult,thecounterpartieslackincentivetosafeguardtheinterestsoftheaverageinvestorsandtheinsidersareabletoevadetheregulationtoalargeextent.Evidenceshowsthat,consistentwithourhypotheses,theretailmarketreturnsafter insidersalesaremuch worse for the block trades than for the retail trades, insider block sales signal poorer futureearningsoftheirfirms,andthecounterpartiesoftheinsiderblocksalesgainfromtheirtradeswiththeinsidersandotheroutsideinvestors.Protecting Minority Shareholder Rights: Comparative Analysis of Laws in China,Germany,UkraineYelyzavetaSushko,UkraineNowadays joint stock companies becamemajor form of centralization of capital. A relation betweentheirmanagementorgansandshareholders isan issuethat influencestheefficiencyofactivityofanyjointstockcompany.Themajorshareholdercanexercisetheirpowertomaintaintheauthorityinsideajointstockcompany;however,minorityshareholdersmaystayoutsidedecision‐makingprocessduetolimitedrightsthattheirsharecanprovide.However,provisionofrightsofminorityshareholderscanbringtoasituationwhenminorityshareholdercantakethegivenrightsforgrantedaswell.Therefore,theprotectionofrightsofminorityshareholdersshouldbewellbalanced.Mechanismofprotectionofminorityshareholdersneedstobeefficient.It is importanttoavoidsituationofmisuseoftheirrightsand to provide stable work of a joint stock company. The purpose of this study is to investigatederivative suit as a mechanism of the protection of minority shareholders in China, Ukraine, andGermany.This study startswith brief analysis on doctrine background of derivative suit. This is important toknow for understanding of derivative suits’ roots and their influence onRoman law countries. Thenthere isacomparativeanalysison legalscholars’ thoughts inChina,Germany,Ukraineonthematter.Thisisdoneinthisworktoshowtheapproachesthatscholarsofthesecountrieshave.Afterwardsthisworkdealswith thecomparativeanalysisof introductionofcorresponding legalprovisionsand theircontent in China and Germany. Then there is an analysis of legal situation on derivative law suit inUkraine.Thisstudyintendstoanswerthefollowingresearchquestions:

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(1) How does the mechanism of protection of minority shareholders’ rights look like in China andGermany?(2)WhatisusefulfromtheexperienceofChinaandGermanyinthisaspect?…Figure1.ComparativeanalysisofthebasicsforfilingderivativelawsuitinGermanyandChina.…Figure 2. Comparative analysis of peculiarities of admission procedure to file a derivative action inGermanyandChina.…Figure3.MechanismofaderivativeactioninChina,Germany,Ukraine.Private‐orderingontheInternet:TheSinaWeibo’sCreditScoreSystemTaoZhongyi,UniversityofHongKongSinaWeibo(microblogging)isoneofthemostpopularsocialmediawebsitesinChinawithmorethan300millionusers.InApril2012,itproposedacreditscoresystem.Underthissystem,everyuserhasanoriginal score of 80; posting false information ormessages that violate other’s rightswill result in adeductionofcreditscores,from1to10.Userswouldbeprohibitedtoforwardmessages,unabletoaddfansandtheiraccountswouldevenbeblockedwiththedecreaseofthecreditscore.SinaWeibolearnedthejurysystemincommonlawviaestablishingcommitteesofordinarypersonsandexpertsseparatelytoevaluatethedisputes.This credit score system represents valuable creativity in private ordering on the cyberspace. Thesystem designed has a certain degree of democratic character; the dispute resolution is speedy.Meanwhile, it also brings a series of problems. Some users question the fairness of the system,especially theneutrality of committeemembers; some commentators concern thatWeibo, under thepressure of government, used the credit score system as a tool to stamp out dissent, which heavilyaffectthefreedomofspeech.Two‐yearpracticeshowsimprovementaswellaschallenges.ThispapertakesSinaWeibo’screditscoresystemasacasetoillustrateprivateorderingontheInternetinChina.Itexaminesspecificrules,outcomesandchallengesduringtheenforcementofthesysteminthepasttwoyears,andmakesacomparisonwithsimilarcreditscoresystemofotherwebsites, suchas taobao. Itargues that transparent process and neutrality of the executors is essential to the effect of privateordering.Session17:LawandEnforcementChair:HuangHui,ChineseUniversityofHongKongEvolving Concepts and Standards in PRCTrademark Law 2001‐2013:A Study on theInteractionofStatuteandCaseLawRaffaelloGirotto,UniversityofTrentoThisarticleisanabridgedversionofthegraduationpaperIwrotebetweenDecember,2013andMarch,2014. It investigates the interaction of the legislative and judicial formants in the evolution of PRCtrademark law from the statutory amendment of 2001 to that of 2013. The following topicswill beanalyzed: concept of “trademark use”; use of likelihood of confusion as a standard for judgingtrademarkconflicts;protectionagainstsquatting; issuesentailedbytheuseof trademarks inoriginalequipmentmanufacturing;trademarkcoexistence.The People’s Courts seem to be the driving force in the evolution of Chinese trademark law. Manyrelevant innovations made to this branch of law in the last decade or so spring from day‐by‐day

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enforcementwork,tobelaterendorsedinlegaltextsissuedbycourtsand,finally,fixedinthestatute.Asaresult,althoughthelegalsystemofthePRCdeniesjudicialprecedentsanybindingvalue,caselawin fact leads the evolutionof law; statute,which inprinciple is theonly binding sourceof law, oftenseemstoactuallyratifyexpostsolutionsalreadypracticed.Thistrailblazingactivityofcourtsseemstobemainlytriggeredbypolicyimpulses.Thelawisenforcedkeeping inmindpolicy aims thatdonot supersede thepurely legal solutionof each case, but rather“bend”theapplicationoflawandthereforechannelitsevolution.Mostinterestingisthefactthatthiscreative role remains hidden at the declamatory level: judges, though proud of contributing to legalprogress, do not stress their own creativity, but rather the fact that they abide by the (correctlyinterpreted)statuteandbytherelevantpolicyguidelines.Post‐contractualEvaluationofObligationsinChina:EmphasisonChangingCircumstancesMattiTjäder,UniversityofLaplandThispaperdiscussescertainfeaturesofChineselegalsystemrelatedtopost‐contractualevaluationofthe parties’ obligations should an unforeseen circumstance on the market arise. The scope ofcontractual parties has been limited to concern commercial enterprises contracting within the P.R.China.SpecialemphasisisputoninspectingthechangingcircumstancesdoctrineinthecontemporaryChinesecivil law. In this paper it is inspected to what extent there is, first of all, a doctrine of changingcircumstancesestablished(especiallyintermsoftheSupremePeople’sCourt’sGuidingCasesof2009andtherecognitionofsuchnameddoctrine)inChina,andwhatarethegeneralfeaturesandthescopeof applicability. One of the main questions is whether the general understanding of the doctrine issimilar in China and Europe, and especially what is its relation to principle of good faith (and fairdealing)andforcemajeuredoctrine.!The academic discussion in China has been inspected, the overall approach being contrasting thesimilar discussions in Europe, especially in the Nordic countries. Themain focus is put on inwhichsituations the changing circumstances doctrine becomes applicable, and further‐on, what are thespecific criteria. Especially the requirement for unpredictable circumstance criterion in relation totypicalbusinessriskisbeinginspected.SpecialemphasishasbeenputtoanalysewhatchallengesdoesthiscriterionbringtothelegalassessmentinaverydynamicandrapidlychangingmarketenvironmentofChina. In this respecta significantcontribution fromthecommercial customshas tobe taken intoaccount.Also,thispaperdiscusseswhetherthechangingcircumstancesdoctrinecanbeseendefactobringingmoreorlessflexibilityforthepost‐contractualevaluationofobligations.AnUnderstandingofTraditionalChineseMedicinefromaConcernofLegalandSemanticAspectsWangSaisai,UniversityofBrussels The formats of the TCM mentioned in many research articles and books were various; TCM hasdifferent expressions in different legislations; the different characteristics of Chinese medicine andwesternmedicinehavenotbeenrecognisedclearlyandsufficiently.Allthesecomplicatedsituationsledto the misusing or misunderstanding of TCM and other relevant wordings; counteractively, themisusingormisunderstandingoftheterminologiesbringsconfusingtothemedicallegislationpractice.Wordings are needed to be precise in the statutes. So this paper aims to clarify the terminologiesrelevant to TCM from a concern of legal research aspect. The paper reviewed the reason andimportance of unifying the wordings relevant to TCM in the introduction; it discussed relevantimportantwordingsusedinwesternmedicineworldinthefirstpartatthesametimecomparedcertain

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differentcharacteristicbetweenTCMandwesternmedicineinpartI;itanalysedthecategoriesofTCMandwordingsusedinChineselegislationinpartII;andthenshowedthedefinitionrelevanttoTCMininternationallegislationsinpartIII;finally,itsummarisedsometerminologiesrelevanttoTCMfromaconcernof legalperspective inpart IVandsuggesteddividing theTCMlegislation into twobranches,onemainlyregulatesthecrudeChinesedrugsandDecoctionpieceviasettingouttherulesforChinesepractitioners,whiletheotheronefocusesonthepharmaceuticalsupervisionofZhongChengYaointhemarket.ReasonsforNoncompliancewithCulturalHeritageLawsinChinaZhangShunxi,ChinaRenminUniversity Recognizing the value of cultural heritage, the Chinese central and local governments have set up aseriesoflawandregulationsonheritagepreservation,butinrealitytheyoftenfailtoensurepeople’scompliancewiththe law.Manyheritagesiteshavebeendamagedanddestroyedbyhumanactivities.Thispaperisaimingto investigatethenon‐complianceof lawsandregulationsinthefieldofculturalheritage preservation in China. There are several reasons contributing to this social and culturalphenomenon.The first one is the costof offence is too low.Thepreservation law is not be enforced effectivelybyrelevantauthorities,butthebenefitsfromtheoffencecanbehigh,thereforemanypeopleincludesomelocalgovernmentstakearisktoviolatethelaw.Thesecondreasonisrelatedtotheoveremphasisonexternalinterventionfromthegovernmentsandexperts,whichhasledtoadisengagementofcitizenswith cultural heritage preservation. The third is the benefit of cultural heritage ismonopolized andrarelyused to improve localpeople’s livelihoods, resulting inan increaseof the tensionbetween thedevelopmentof localcommunitiesandculturalheritagepreservation.Thispaperarguesthatheritagepreservationhighlydependsonthecomplianceandparticipationoflocalpeopleandcommunities;andthe largest incentive to the compliance is to share thebenefit gained fromculturalheritagewith thelocal.Atthesametimepeople’sunderstandingontheirsharedresponsibilityforculturalheritageandpublic participation should be promote. All these need establishing a better monitoring and co‐operation system. Council of Europe framework Convention on the value of Cultural Heritage forSociety has set up a good example for China to learn how to dealwith the challenge in the area ofculturalheritagepreservationinatransformativeage.AdministrativeComponentsinPrivateLaw‐TheSpecialRoleoftheChineseStateinPrivateLawEnforcementRebeckaZinser,HumboldtUniversityBerlinChinesecopyrightlaw,unfaircompetitionlaw,consumerprotectionlawareallareasofprivatelaw.ButinChinatheyshareonecharacteristic feature:theycanbeenforcednotonlywithprivate lawmeans,butalsobymeansofadministrativelaw.Becauseofthisadministrativecomponent,thestateplaysanactiveroleinlawenforcement,asopposedtomerepassiverelianceontherightholderstodefendtheirinterestsincourt.Therefore,thestatehasthepowertoactuponpoliciesandraisepublicattentionandawarenesswith “crackdownon” and “strikehardagainst” campaigns.This styleof lawenforcementreceivesharshcriticismandisoftensaidtobeaninheritanceoftheMao‐era.Thereasonsforoptingfortheadministrativeenforcementofprivatelawarerootedinhistoryandthecurrentstatemodellikewise.Theoriginalunderstandingoflaw,asin法,isanobjectiveandpublicone.Accordingtothisunderstanding,thestateisresponsibleforsafeguardingthelegalsystemasawhole.Itwaslaterpairedwiththesocialistmodelofgovernmentandlawmaking,whichviewsthestateastheprevailing actor in enforcement in any field of law. Even today, in the era of opening and reform, asubstantivewithdrawalofthestateisrarelydiscussed.

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Recognizing this self‐understanding of the Chinese state’s role in law enforcement is crucial tounderstandingthemeaningofXIJinping`sandLIKeqiang´scallforstrengtheningtheSocialistRuleofLaw.Thispaperdescribes,firstly,thesystemofadministrativeenforcementinChineseprivatelaw.Secondly,itcomparesthissystemwithotherlegislativemodelsofprivatelawenforcementthat,thoughprivate,try toprotectawidercircleof interests than thoseof theparties involved,suchaspunitivedamagesandclassaction.Thirdly,itassessestheimpactoftheadministrativeenforcementmodelonthejudicialsystemofthePRC.