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Majority-Minority Influence

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Majority-Minority Influence: Identifying

Argumentative Patterns and Predicting

Argument-Outcome Links

By Renée A. Meyers, Dale E. Brashers, and Jennifer Hanner

In this paper, the authors investigate the argument activities of majority and mi-

nority factions in small group decision-making situations. We begin by identifying patterns of argument that characterize majority and minority communication in

34 discussions and then test several subgroup-outcome and argument-outcome

links. Results indicate that winning and losing subgroups argue differently (as do

minority and majority subgroups overall) and that consistency in argument is a

strong predictor of subgroup success. Both theoretical and practical implications

for subgroup influence in group decision making accrue from these findings.

The study of majority and minority influence in small group decision making long

has held researchers’ interests. As early as 4 decades ago, Asch (1951, 1956) dis-covered that minority factions can be pressured to conform to an incorrect answerregarding physical stimuli when confronted by a majority. Since Asch’s initialinvestigation, much scholarship has focused on the role and influence of majori-ties and minorities in group situations (see Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Alderton, 1981; Alderton & Frey, 1983, 1986; Alvaro & Crano, 1996; Boster & Mayer, 1984;Brandstatter et al., 1991; Crano & Hannula-Bral, 1994; Davis, 1973; DeDrue & Vries, 1993, 1996; Gebhardt & Meyers, 1995; Kiesler & Pallak, 1975; Kruglanski &Mackie, 1990; Maass & Clark, 1983, 1984; Martin, 1988a, 1988b, 1996; Moscovici,1980; Moscovici & Faucheux, 1972; Moscovici, Lage, & Naffrechoux, 1969; Mugny,1982; Nemeth, 1974, 1982, 1986; Nemeth & Rogers, 1996; Papastamou & Mugny,1990; Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme, & Blackstone, 1994; Zaleska, 1976,1978, among others).

Much past research in this domain has utilized an input-output model, investi-gating how the distribution of majority-minority factions (inputs) affect the final

Renée A. Meyers (PhD, University of Illinois) is a professor in the Department of Communication at theUniversity of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Dale E. Brashers (PhD, University of Arizona) is an assistantprofessor in the Department of Speech Communication at the University of Illinois. Jennifer Hanner isa trainer with New Horizons Computer Learning Company, Madison, WI. This paper was presented as

a top ranked paper to the Group Communication Division, National Communication Association, New York, November, 1998.

Copyright © 2000 International Communication Association



Journal of Communication, Autumn 2000

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decision outcome (output). Other researchers have sought to explain the differen-tial influence of minority and majority factions through such variables as social

pressure, consistency, immediacy, and strength in numbers (Latane, 1996; Latane& Wolf, 1981; Levine & Russo, 1987; Moscovici, 1980; Moscovici et al., 1969; Nemeth& Wachtler, 1974, 1983; Tanford & Penrod, 1984). Most recently, researchers havebegun to postulate cognitive and social explanations for the differential impact of majority and minority factions (Alvaro & Crane, 1996; Baker & Petty, 1994; Latane& Wolf, 1981; Mackie, 1987; Peterson & Nemeth, 1996; Wood et al., 1994).

Taken together, these studies offer valuable insights into how majorities andminorities affect outcomes and provide several noninteraction-based explanationsfor differential impact. But few investigations have focused on communication asa central explanatory mechanism. As Mucchi-Faina, Maass, and Volpato (1991)

indicated, “emphasis has generally been more on how the message is communi-cated (e.g., in a consistent or inconsistent, rigid or flexible way) than on what iscommunicated” (p. 195).

This oversight is somewhat puzzling since most majority/minority influence ingroup decision-making situations occurs in interaction. Understanding more com-pletely “how” majorities and minorities communicate in group decision-makingsituations, and whether there exists a communication-outcome link, has both theo-retical and practical significance. Theoretically, analysis of the communicative ac-tivities of these two subgroups will help us better identify their differential rolesand behavioral patterns. Once this descriptive work is accomplished, the commu-

nication activities of these subgroups can be used to predict and explain groupdecision-making outcomes. In short, an input-process-output model can be for-mulated that could provide a more complete explanation of minority-majority influence than has been available previously.

On the practical level, if we better understand what minority and majority factions say in group decision-making situations, and eventually how these com-municative activities are linked to group outcomes, we can begin construction of a prescriptive model of influence as well. That is, if the goal of a majority orminority faction is to influence the final outcome, and we know the communica-tion activities that are most effective for attaining that goal, then group participants who are aware of, and employ, those strategies may have a better chance of having their proposal selected by the group. Such information may be particularly useful to minority factions who usually have more difficulty affecting the finaldecision proposal, but whose inputs are inherently important for producing qual-ity decisions.

In this paper, we investigate the communication activities of majority and mi-nority factions in small group decision-making discussions. Specifically, we focuson one type of interaction integral to all group decision making—argument—andits impact on final group outcomes. First, we overview past research (most of itnoninteraction based) related to three prominent findings regarding majority-mi-nority influence. Second, the centrality of communication (specifically, argument)

to the majority-minority influence process is acknowledged, and relevant findingsfrom the Conversational Argument research program are briefly reviewed. Follow-ing this review, the three findings are reinterpreted from a communication per-




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spective, alternative interaction-based explanations are posited, and hypothesesdesigned to test these reinterpretations are presented. Fourth, a set of 34 group

discussions is analyzed to confirm or disconfirm the hypotheses, and results of theanalyses are reported. Finally, the implications of the findings for continued re-search in this domain are explored.

Majority-Minority Influence Research

Many scholars have sought to describe and explain the impact of majority andminority factions in small group decision-making situations. Although researchfindings in this domain do not always cohere, and studies sometimes lack theo-

retical grounding, we think at least three prominent conclusions regarding major-ity-minority influence are evident. These include (a) the majority faction is moreoften successful in influencing the final group outcome than is the minority fac-tion; (b) for both subgroups, consistency in presentation is important to achieveinfluence; and (c) majority and minority factions often produce differential formsof influence. Research pertaining to each of these three conclusions is overviewedin the next section.

Majority Is More Often Successful Than Minority

Findings show that majorities generally exert greater influence (i.e., win more

often) than minorities (Nemeth, 1986; Nemeth & Wachtler, 1983; Zaleska, 1976,1978), and this is accomplished through considerable social pressure, sometimesincluding ridicule and derision (Nemeth & Wachtler, 1983). Research on mockjuries, for example, has demonstrated that the position the majority favors prior togroup discussion becomes the verdict approximately 90% of the time (Davis,1973; Nemeth, 1986). Boster and Mayer (1984) found that the arguments forwarded by a majority are actually seen as “more correct” and are rated higher inquality than those forwarded by a minority faction. Latane and Wolf (1981) sug-gested that “a group consensus that results from interaction between the majority and minority will remain on the majority side of the issue, although it should beless extreme than it would be if there were no minority position advocated”(p. 451).

Majority-Minority Consistency in Presentation

Moscovici et al. (1969) were among the earliest researchers to suggest that thecause of majority influence was not the sheer number of members or social pres-sure per se, but instead the consistency demonstrated among majority members’comments. More recent research in communication on the Distributed ValanceModel (McPhee, 1994; McPhee, Poole, & Seibold, 1982) supports these findings.McPhee et al. (1982) found that if a majority of the group members express “clearfavor for an option, it tends to be adopted” (p. 272). Likewise, in an investigation

of consistency as a communication variable, Gebhardt and Meyers (1995) foundthat consistency plays an important role in explaining how majorities influencegroup outcomes. They discovered (in a study of 16 decision-making groups) that




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when the majority communicated consistently (especially in promotion of theirposition), they had a strong impact on the final outcome.

Consistency in presentation appears to be even more important to minority members’ arguments (Allen, 1975; Moscovici, 1976; Moscovici & Lage, 1976;Moscovici et al., 1969; Nemeth, Mayseless, Sherman, & Brown, 1990; Nemeth & Wachtler, 1974). Kruglanski and Mackie (1990) stated that “The behavioral style,and particularly the behavioral consistency, with which a minority position ispresented has been accorded a central determining role in successful minority influence” (p. 238). Nemeth (1982) suggested that if a minority subgroup was tobe influential, it must “consistently maintain its position over time, and, secondly,maintain the agreement of its members” (p. 190). Early in the group deliberation,minority group members are likely to encounter resistance from the majority;

however if the minority persists in a consistent, confident manner, members of themajority may begin to show doubt in their position, or even convert to the minor-ity view. Latane and Wolf (1981) contended that consistent behavior by a minority “forces the majority to attend to the discrepancy between its position and thecurrent state of the world, creating the conditions for a profound and often rapidchange in the status quo” (pp. 451–452). Finally, in a recent meta-analytic review, Wood et al. (1994) concluded that “consistent advocacy of the minority position isimportant because it ensures that recipients do not simply derogate and dismissthe message without consideration but instead recognize it as a feasible, althoughnot personally favored, viewpoint on the broader topic” (p. 340).

Minority-Majority Differential Influence Effects

Other findings in this research domain indicate that subjects exposed to majority or minority viewpoints experience differential influence. Exposure to majority viewpoints moves listeners toward more convergent thought processes (Alvaro &Crano, 1996; Axsom, Yates, & Chaiken, 1987; Chaiken, 1986; Legrenzi, Butera,Mugny, & Perez, 1991; Maass, West, & Cialdini, 1987; Mackie, 1987; Martin, 1996;Mucchi-Faina et al., 1990; Nemeth, 1974, 1986; Nemeth & Kwan, 1985, 1987; Nemeth& Rogers, 1996; Nemeth & Wachtler, 1983; Van Dyne & Saavedra, 1996; Volpato,Maass, Mucchi-Faina, & Vitti, 1990) and therefore, more conventional solutionsthan do those subjects exposed to minority viewpoints. As Volpato et al. (1990)found, “minorities trigger divergent thought processes leading to the discovery of new alternatives whereas the majority position is accepted without further elabo-ration beyond the majority’s message” (p. 130). Nemeth and colleagues (Nemeth,1986; Nemeth, Mosier, & Chiles, 1992; Peterson & Nemeth, 1996) concurred withthis assessment, stating:

Persons exposed to minority views are stimulated to attend to more aspects of

the situation, they think in more divergent ways, and they are more likely to

detect novel solutions or come to new decisions. . . . Persons exposed to

opposing majority views, by contrast, focus on the aspects of the stimuli perti-

nent to the position of the majority, they think in convergent ways, and they

tend toward adoption of the proposed solution to the neglect of novel solu-

tions or decisions. (Nemeth, 1986, p. 25)




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Hence when minority subgroup participants are successful in influencing groupopinion, they are more likely to cause participants to think about the issue as a

whole, rather than just the message received (DeDrue & DeVries, 1993; Trost,Maass, & Kenrick, 1992). This is especially true if the receiver of the message hashigh personal involvement in the issue being advocated (Trost et al., 1992).

A second distinction made in minority and majority influence effects is relatedto public versus private opinion change (Aebisher, Hewstone, & Henderson, 1984;Brandstatter et al., 1991; Clark & Maass, 1990; DeDrue & DeVries, 1993; Doms & Van Avermaet, 1980; Maass & Clark, 1983, 1984, 1986; Martin, 1988a, 1988b;Moscovici & Personnaz, 1980; Mugny, 1982; Mugny, Kaiser, Papastamou, & Perez,1984; Mugny & Perez, 1991; Nemeth et al., 1990; Paicheler, 1988). Moscovici andLage (1976) indicated that majorities exert influence at the manifest or surface

level only and that minority subgroups who give in often secretly maintain theirown positions. Minority exposure, on the other hand, leads to more private accep-tance of ideas by individual group members (Moscovici, 1980, 1985; Nemeth,1986; but see Doms, 1984; Doms & Van Avermaet, 1985; and Wolf, 1987, fordissenting opinions). As Trost et al. (1992) explained:

Moscovici hypothesized that a majority advocacy elicits a comparison process:The target’s attention is devoted to comparing the discrepancies between themajority’s opinion and his or her own opinion. This focus on the discrepancy engages shallow processing of the message and uncritical acceptance of themajority position because the target has attended more to the self-presenta-

tional conflict with the majority than to the message arguments. Conversely, aminority elicits a validation process: Attention is focused more generally onthe issue, eliciting a more active assessment of the message arguments and,

ultimately, internalization of the minority position. (p. 235)

In sum, this set of studies on majority and minority influence has providedimportant insights into the differential impact of these two subgroups. Yet, ascommunication researchers, we are puzzled by the peripheral role interactionplays in these investigative and explanatory efforts. In the next section, we discusstwo limitations of this research and suggest reinterpretions of these three prominent

findings based on a view of communication as a central explanatory mechanism.

Limitations of Research

We find most past literature on majority-minority influence limited on at least twocounts. First, most of the research done on majority-minority influence outside thecommunication field is conducted on “aggregates” of individuals or confederatesrather than intact groups. Tindale, Davis, Vollrath, Nagao, and Hinsz (1990) sug-gested that “unfortunately, studies of social influence . . . have typically used fairly restricted social environments” (p. 439). Many investigations focus on the one- word responses of subjects faced by a majority or minority of confederate partici-

pants. These aggregates do not conform to traditional communication-based defi-nitions of “groups” that include (at the very least) three or more members who (a)think of themselves as a group, (b) are interdependent, and (c) communicate withone another (Socha, 1997). As Smith, Tindale, and Dugoni (1996) noted:




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assuming that influence is an interactive phenomenon, and that minority mem-bers will be influenced by majority members and vice versa, it is critical to use

actual members of each influence type in order to understand fully the impactof majorities and minorities. (p. 139)

Second, many of these studies use a methodology that precludes investigationof actual group interaction. Zdaniuk and Levine (1996) decried the fact that “many of the experiments . . . do not involve interaction between group members. Rather,subjects simply learn that a majority or minority of other people (in the sameroom or the wider world) disagree with their position on some topic” (p. 202).Echoing those sentiments, Levine and Russo (1995) noted that:

It is surprising that so few efforts have been made to record and analyze thecommunication that occurs between (and within) majority and minority fac-tions as they struggle for dominance. By assessing who says what to whom atdifferent points in time, researchers could obtain valuable information aboutthe kinds of persuasive messages that majority and minority members use tocreate disloyalty in their opponents and loyalty in their supporters. (pp. 311–312)

With a few exceptions then, past studies of majority and minority influencehave ignored the role that communication plays in the persuasion process (forsome exceptions, see Alderton, 1981; Alderton & Frey, 1983, 1986; Garlick, 1993;Garlick & Mongeau, 1992, 1993; Gebhardt & Meyers, 1995; Tindale et al., 1990),

and most explanations tend to be noninteraction based. We think there is perhapsa more powerful explanatory force in the communication activities and patternsthat characterize majority and minority subgroups. For example, we think thateach of the three findings just reviewed can be reinterpreted within a communica-tion-based framework. The framework we use for reinterpretation is the Conver-sational Argument program of research that has focused on understanding thestructure, form, and function of argument in decision-making groups.

Conversational Argument in Group Decision Making

Conversational Argument research has roots in structuration theory (Giddens, 1984)and has focused on both small group and interpersonal argument (Brashers, Adkins,& Meyers, 1994; Brashers & Meyers, 1989; Brossmann & Canary, 1990; Canary,Brossmann, Brossmann, & Weger, 1995; Canary, Brossmann, & Seibold, 1987;Canary, Weger, & Stafford, 1991; Meyers & Brashers, 1995, 1998; Meyers, Brashers, Winston, & Grob, 1997; Meyers & Seibold, 1990a, 1990b; Meyers, Seibold, &Brashers, 1991; Seibold, Meyers, & Sunwolf, 1996; Seibold, Poole, McPhee, Tanita,& Canary, 1981). Early research attended to the construction and validation of theConversational Argument Coding Scheme (Canary et al., 1987; Canary, Ratledge,& Seibold, 1982; Seibold, Canary, & Ratledge, 1983) that is grounded in the theo-ries of Toulmin (1958), Perelman and Obrechts-Tyteca (1969), and Jackson and Jacobs (1980). Woven together into a single scheme (see Seibold & Meyers, 1986,for additional information regarding construction of the coding scheme), these




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three perspectives allow identification of the structure and constituent elements of

formal argument (Toulmin), interactional patterns of group argument (Perelman &Obrechts-Tyteca), and the sequencing, escalation, and surface features of argu-ment convergence (Jackson & Jacobs). See Table 1.

Later research has described the character and structure of argument in groups.Canary et al. (1987) discovered four argument structures—simple, compound,eroded, and convergent—that were linked to consensus and dissensus group out-comes. Meyers et al. (1991) provided the first picture of the distribution of argu-ment acts in 45 group discussions. They found that “argument . . . was character-ized primarily—and almost exclusively—by Assertions, Elaborations, and Agree-ment” (p. 60). Current research has centered on use of a multistage coding proce-

dure (Meyers & Brashers, 1995) and development of a model of the group argu-ment process (Meyers & Brashers, 1998). When this model was linked to groupoutcomes and its predictive capacity tested, Meyers and Brashers (1998) found themodel to be a fairly accurate predictor of final group choices.

Table 1. Conversational Argument Coding Scheme

I. ArguablesA. Generative mechanisms

1. Assertions: Statements of fact or opinion2. Propositions: Statements that call for support, action, or conference on an ar

gument-related statementB. Reasoning activities

3. Elaborations: Statements that support other statements by providing evidence,reasons, or other support

4. Responses: Statements that defend arguables met with disagreement5. Amplifications: Statements that explain or expound upon other statements in

order to establish the relevance of the argument through inference6. Justifications: Statements that offer validity of previous or upcoming statements

by citing a rule of logic (provide a standard whereby arguments are weighed)II. Convergence-seeking activities

7. Agreement: Statements that express agreement with another statement8. Acknowledgment: Statements that indicate recognition and/or comprehen-

sion of another statement, but not necessarily agreement, to another’s pointIII. Disagreement-relevant intrusions

9. Objections: Statements that deny the truth or accuracy of any arguable10. Challenges: Statements that offer problems or questions that must be solved if

agreement is to be secured on an arguableIV. Delimitors

11. Frames: Statements that provide a context for and/or qualify arguables12. Forestall/Secure: Statements that attempt to forestall refutation by securing

common ground13. Forestall/Remove: Statements that attempt to forestall refutation by removing

possible objections

V. Nonarguables—statements that are not related to the group’s argument14. Process: Non-argument related statements that orient the group to its task orspecify the process the group should follow

15. Unrelated: Statements unrelated to the group’s argument or process (tangents,side issues, self-talk, etc.)

16. Incompletes: Statements that do not contain a complete, clear idea due tointerruption or a person discontinuing a statement

Adapted from Canary et al. (1987; Canary et al., 1982; Seibold et al., 1983), with permissionfrom the Southern States Communication Association.




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In the next section, we use the Conversational Argument research program asa framework to construct communication-based reinterpretations of the three promi-

nent findings regarding majority-minority influence: (a) the majority is successfulmore often than the minority, (b) consistency in presentation is important for bothmajority and minority subgroups, and (c) majority and minority subgroups pro-duce differential influence effects. These reinterpretations allow us to connect twobodies of literature—majority-minority influence and argument—which, to date,have remained separate, but when connected, provide a basis for identifyingcommunication as a central explanatory and predictive mechanism.

Reinterpretation of Findings and Hypotheses

Majority Is More Successful Than Minority

From a communication perspective, the fact that the majority more often winsmay not be due entirely to strength in numbers (as many noninteraction-basedexplanations conclude) but may correlate instead with the majority’s use of differ-ing (and perhaps more effective) communication strategies in discussion. Perhaps winning factions offer more complete arguments, are better at getting members toconverge on a single proposal, provide more challenges and objections for theopposition to overcome, or are able to more effectively frame the issues to favortheir proposal than are losing factions (see Table 1). If so, then perhaps commu-

nication (specifically, argumentative strategies), not mere number of members, isa central and powerful explanation. In line with this communication-based rein-terpretation, we pose the following hypotheses:

H1: The majority faction will win (predict the group-decision outcome) signifi-cantly more often than will the minority faction.

H2: Winning factions (majorities and minorities) will produce each argumentmessage (arguables, convergence-seeking messages, disagreement-relevantintrusions, and delimitors) significantly more than will losing factions (majori-ties and minorities).

Majority-Minority Consistency in Presentation

Similarly, consistency can be conceived as a communication-based variable uti-lized by subgroup members to persuade others (see Gebhardt & Meyers, 1995, forone conceptualization). At the simplest level, consistency is maintenance of one’sposition in interaction—more strongly advocating for one’s favored proposal than forany other proposal (Gebhardt & Meyers, 1995; Van Dyne & Saavedra, 1996). Hence,minority-majority consistency is not mere repetition of a word in an aggregate, but isa communication strategy that can be linked to final group outcomes. To test thiscommunication-based reinterpretation, we propose the following hypothesis:

H3: The subgroup (majority or minority) that is argumentatively most consis-tent in presentation of their proposal will predict best final individual andgroup outcomes.




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Differential Influence Effects

A plausible explanation for the finding that majority influence results in conver-

gent thinking and minority influence results in divergent thinking may be that thetwo subgroups overall produce different argumentative topics (content) in discus-sion. More confident in its ability to succeed, the majority may stick to one or two“proven” argument topics, while the minority, facing a greater uphill battle, may use more variety. Hence listeners, exposed to more convergent (majority) or divergent (minority) arguments, reflect that process in their thinking. To explore thisexplanation, we pose the following hypothesis:

H4: The minority faction will produce significantly more different argumenttopics than will the majority faction.

Additionally, perhaps majority influence results in public compliance ratherthan private acceptance because majority members, recognizing that their odds of winning are fairly good, do not focus on changing others’ opinions, but insteadmerely seek to win the final vote through convergence-seeking messages. Weposit that:

H5: The majority subgroup will produce significantly more convergence-seek-ing messages than will the minority.

On the other hand, minority influence may result in more private acceptancethan compliance because this subgroup, knowing it has an uphill battle, may

work harder at changing the opposition’s opinions by producing strong argu-ments to support their proposal, as well as disagreeing with, and qualifying, themajority position. The following hypothesis is posited:

H6: The minority subgroup will produce significantly more arguables, dis-agreement-relevant intrusions, and qualifiers than will the majority subgroup.

Finally, we would predict that because the majority subgroup will focus prima-rily on convergence-seeking, minority members will remain unconvinced of themerits of the majority’s proposal and will comply but show little private accep-tance. On the other hand, we would predict that minority influence (comprised

primarily of data, claims, objections, and qualifiers) will result in more privateacceptance than public compliance. We hypothesize that:

H7: Majority influence will result in significantly more public compliance thanprivate acceptance, and minority influence will result in significantly moreprivate acceptance than public compliance.

Method

Participants

Participants were 73 male and female undergraduate students (sophomores, jun-iors, and seniors) enrolled in communication courses at a large Midwestern university. The project occurred at the end of a semester in which they had been




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classmates and occasional group discussion partners, so groups were quasi-his-tory, rather than zero-history, groups. Each received extra credit for his or her

involvement.1

Procedures

Group discussion task . As part of a larger study of argument and polarization(risky and cautious decision making) in group interaction, each of 15 groups wasasked to complete three separate tasks (Kogan & Wallach, 1964; Stoner, 1968),resulting in a total of 45 group discussions. The decision-making tasks entailedproblem scenarios concerning hypothetical actors facing serious life dilemmas(tasks were identified as Mr. C., Mr. N., and Mr. R.). These problems were particu-larly relevant for this study because they were inherently argumentative in nature.

One of the scenarios (task Mr. R) follows:

Mr. R. is currently a college senior who is very eager to pursue graduate study in chemistry leading to the Doctor of Philosophy degree. He has been ac-cepted by both University X and University Y. University X has a worldwidereputation for excellence in chemistry. While a degree from University X wouldsignify outstanding training in this field, the standards are so very rigorous thatonly a fraction of the degree candidates actually receive the degree. University

Y, on the other hand, has much less of a reputation in chemistry, but almosteveryone admitted is awarded the Doctor of Philosophy degree, though thedegree has much less prestige than the corresponding degree from University X.

Imagine you are advising Mr. R. Check the lowest probability that you wouldconsider acceptable for Mr. R. to enroll in University X (more rigorous univer-sity) rather than University Y (less rigorous university).

_____1 in 10 that Mr. R. would receive the degree from University X. (Mr. R.should enroll at University X even if there is a very small chance that he willreceive a degree).

_____2 in 10 that Mr. R. would receive the degree from University X.






1 The group sample in this study was fairly homogeneous as all participants in this study were collegesophomores, juniors, and seniors. It seems possible that in groups with more diversity, there may begreater distinctions in argument patterns between subgroups. In addition, although the student partici-pants in this study seemed to be quite involved in the task discussions (many of them relating it to

their own lives), it must be remembered that the decision task was a hypothetical scenario and had nodirect implications for the participants. Hence, the findings from this study, although providing impor-tant information about this group of participants, may not be completely generalizable to groups

where involvement in a decision-making task is greater.




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____10 in 10 that Mr. R. would receive the degree from University X. (Mr. R.should NOT enroll in University X unless it is certain he will receive thedegree).

Instructions. Participants were assigned randomly to five-member groups priorto the research session. Upon arriving at the session, each participant was givenone of the three tasks and asked to read it carefully and mark their prediscussionchoice. These prediscussion choices were collected, and fresh copies of the task were given to each participant. The group was convened and members discussed

the task to consensus. These group decision choices were collected by the re-searcher, and each participant was given a final copy of the same task and askedto mark their individual postdiscussion choice. Hence, all members provided anindividual prediscussion, group, and individual postdiscussion decision choice foreach of the three tasks (Mr. C., Mr. N., Mr. R.). Because 2 students failed to show,13 groups of 5 members and 2 groups of 4 members were utilized. All groupdiscussions were videotaped. No time limits were imposed. Tasks were counter-balanced across individuals and groups to reduce potential order effects.

Unitizing discussion content. After transcriptions were made of all videotapedgroup discussions (n = 45), discussion content was unitized by two judges work-

ing independently. The unit choice was any statement that functioned as a com-plete thought or change of thought (Auld & White, 1956; Hatfield & Weider-Hatfield, 1978; Murray, 1956). In view of our focus on argument, it seemed moreappropriate to unitize transcripts into complete thoughts, rather than microana-lytic “words” or overly comprehensive “turns.” Unit by unit intercoder reliability (Scott’s pi) for the three problems yielded estimates of .90, .90, and .89 (Krippendorff,1980).

Coding Procedures

Multistage coding process. The coding scheme (see Table 1) utilized in this inves-

tigation was the Conversational Argument Coding Scheme developed by Canary,Meyers, Seibold, and colleagues (Canary et al., 1987; Canary et al., 1982; Meyers &Brashers, 1998; Meyers et al., 1991; Seibold et al., 1983; Seibold et al., 1981).Because the Conversational Argument Coding Scheme is so complex, and be-cause of past concerns with reliabilities obtained with the scheme, a multistageprocess was utilized to code this data set (see Meyers & Brashers, 1995, for a fulleraccount of this process). In brief, the coders made several iterative passes throughthe data and identified different facets of the group’s argument each time. In thefirst stage, the coders parceled the data so as to provide an organizational framework for subsequent coding tasks. Coders first went through the 45 transcripts toseparate the argument-related from nonargument-related messages. Having com-

pleted that task, they returned to the data to code the risky-cautious valence of each argument-related statement. In a third pass, the coders identified the argu-ment content of each statement (i.e., argument topics).




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Once the data had been parceled in this way, the coders applied the Conversa-tional Argument Coding Scheme. Application of this scheme also occurred in

stages. First, the coders placed messages into the first-level categories (Arguables,Convergence-Seeking Activities, Disagreement-Relevant Intrusions, Delimitors, andNonarguables). Second, they returned to the transcripts and coded statementsassigned to each first-level category into their respective second-level subcatego-ries as follows: Arguables were classified as Assertions, Propositions, Elaborations,Responses, Amplifications, or Justifications; Convergence-Seeking Activities werecategorized as Agreements or Acknowledgments; Disagreement-Relevant Intru-sions were divided into Objections or Challenges; Delimitors were coded intoFrames, Forestall-Secure statements, or Forestall-Remove statements, andNonarguables were coded into Process, Unrelated, or Incomplete statements.

Nonarguables, however, were not analyzed in this investigation because we wereconcerned primarily with argumentative messages.

Coder training sessions. Two different sets of individuals were trained for thecoding tasks. One set of four completed all the initial parceling tasks. A second setof four completed the substantive argument coding tasks. Training was intensiveand averaged more than 40 hours for each set of tasks. Coders practiced ontranscripts extraneous to this study. After coding the practice transcripts for any given coding task, they discussed and clarified differences. When reliability for allfour coders for any given task reached 80% agreement, training sessions wereterminated, and two pairs then independently coded half of the transcripts for the

relevant task. The coders utilized the transcripts for the initial coding, but checkedtheir assignments and designations against the videotape before making a final choice.Intercoder reliability. Cohen’s kappa was utilized as the index of reliability for

each task. Estimates for relevant coding tasks were as follows: .86 for the argu-ment-nonargument codes; .88 for the risky-cautious codes, .88 for content (argu-ment topics) codes; .88 for first-level argument codes; .85 for second-level subcat-egory argument codes. All of these reliability levels are satisfactory (Fleiss, 1981).

Determining majority-minority subgroups. To determine majority/minority sub-groups, prediscussion choice preferences were examined for each member of each group on each decision task. Members were placed into one of two groups(risky or cautious) depending on their prediscussion choice. In accord with earlierresearch (Meyers & Brashers, 1998; Meyers et al., 1997), risky alternatives weredefined as choices 1–5 on the decision task, and cautious items were defined aschoices 6–10 on the decision task. Transcripts were also examined to verify how members identified themselves (risky or cautious) during opening comments inthe discussion. Four-member groups in which a two-two split occurred were ex-cluded from analysis. Groups in which all members favored the same choice (allrisky or all cautious) were also excluded. The final number of usable groups was 34.2

2 Of the 15 groups in the study, 8 were included for all three tasks, 3 were included for 2 tasks, and the

remaining 4 were included for 1 task. However, in only two instances did the same subgroups formacross more than one task for a group. In group 3 and in group 14, the same minority and majority subgroups were formed in the Mr. R. and Mr. N. situations. In every other case in which groups wereused for more than one task, the subgroups were composed of different subsets of members. Because




15

Determining consistency. All argument-related statements were coded as sup-porting either a risky or cautious position. For each group member, the measure

of argument consistency was calculated as the difference between a group member’sarguments favoring that member’s original position (risky or cautious) and argu-ments favoring the alternative position (risky or cautious) divided by the total of that group member’s arguments. The range of possible scores was –1 to +1. Con-sistency scores were averaged across members of the subgroup to produce asingle score for each minority and majority subgroup. Hence, subgroups withscores closer to +1.00 were viewed as more consistent than subgroups with scorescloser to –1.00.

Outcomes. Outcomes were the final individual postdiscussion choice and thefinal group decision choice provided to the researcher following each group dis-

cussion. Outcomes could range from 1–10 on the decision task scale.

Results

Majority vs. Minority Success

Hypothesis 1 focused on the success rate of majority and minority subgroups. This was tested with a binomial test between (a) groups where the majority won and(b) groups where the minority won. An expected frequency of 50% occurrencefor each group was utilized. The observed frequency for majority wins was 79%

and the binomial test was significant at p < .0001.3

Hypothesis 2 focused on determining if different argument messages would beused by winning and losing majorities or minorities. We compared the argumentmessages of (a) winning majorities versus losing majorities, (b) winning minorities versus losing minorities, and (c) all winning coalitions versus all losing coalitions. As shown in Table 2, there were differences in argument messages for all com-parisons. To better discern those differences, we did follow-up tests comparingeach argument category to an expected value based on the overall proportion of arguments for each group.

In the top portion of Table 2, winning majorities were less likely than losingmajorities to produce arguables, and more likely than losing majorities to produce

3 This study included situation (i.e., Mr. C., Mr. N., and Mr. R.) as a random factor. Wherever possible, we included situation as a random factor in analyses (see Jackson & Brashers, 1994). Because there isno straightforward way to deal with random factors in some analyses, such as binomial tests and chi-square tests, we also conducted analyses to explore the pattern of results by situation. In general, thoseresults closely reflected the overall pattern of significance, although the size of the effects variedsomewhat from situation to situation. For example, the binomial test between (a) groups where the

majority won and (b) groups where the minority won was significant for all three situations (majority won 85%, 70%, and 82%, respectively), as well as for the overall test (majority won 79%). A few tests were nonsignificant by situation when the overall test was significant. For space consideration, we willnot report all of the separate analyses here. These results are available from the second author.

only two sets (for a total of four) of the 34 groups were indeed repeated, we chose to treat the analysesas independent rather than as repeated measures across the groups.




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disagreement-relevant intrusions and delimitors. In the middle portion of Table 2, winning minorities were less likely than losing minorities to produce disagree-ment-relevant intrusions. In the bottom portion of Table 2, winning teams ingeneral were more likely than losing teams to produce convergence markers.

Consistency in Presentation

Hypothesis 3 posited that the faction that was most consistent in presentation would best predict the final group decision choice. To test Hypothesis 3, mixedmodel ANOVAs were conducted with the proportion of arguments favoring thegroup members’ prediscussion choices (i.e., argument consistency) as the depen-dent measure (see Table 3) and situation as a random factor. The range of possiblescores for the dependent measure was –1 to +1. Comparisons were made be-tween (a) winning majority subgroups (n = 27, M = 0.62, SD = 0.4) versus losingminority subgroups (n = 27, M = 0.20, SD = 0.6l), and (b) winning minority sub-groups (n = 7, M = 0.90, SD = 0.12) versus losing majority subgroups (n = 7, M =0.00, SD = 0.7). Additional analyses were used to compare (a) winning majority subgroups versus losing majority subgroups and (b) winning minority subgroups versus losing minority subgroups.

Table 2. Comparison of Argument Acts for Winning vs. Losing Teams

Comparison of argument acts for winning vs. losing majorities

Majority (Won) Majority (Lost) N % N %

Arguables 2224 (73.3%) 621 (80.8%) X 2 = 6.45, p < .01Convergence 374 (12.3%) 93 (12.1%)Disagreement 303 (10.0%) 42 (5.5%) X 2 = 14.63, p < .001Delimitors 132 (4.4%) 13 (1.7%) X 2 = 12. 01, p < .001Total 3033 (100%) 769 (100%)Overall X 2(3) = 29.81, p < .0001

Comparison of argument acts for winning vs. losing minorities

Minority (Won) Minority (Lost)N % N %

Arguables 337 (78.0%) 1074 (73.2%)Convergence 39 (9.0%) 127 (8.7%)Disagreement 34 (7.9%) 194 (13.2%) X 2 = 8.08, p < .01Delimitors 22 (5.1%) 72 (4.9%)Total 432 (100%) 1467 (100%)Overall X 2(3) = 9.08, p < .05

Comparison of argument acts for winning vs. losing subgroups overall

Winning subgroup Losing subgroupN % N %

Arguables 2561 (73.9%) 1695 (75.8%)

Convergence 413 (11.9%) 220 (9.8%) X2

= 4.79, p < .05Disagreement 337 (9.7%) 236 (10.6%)Delimitors 154 (4.4%) 85 (3.8%)Total 3465 (100%) 2236 (100%)Overall X 2(3) = 8.22, p < .05




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In these comparisons, winning minority subgroups had a higher proportion of arguments favoring their prediscussion choice (i.e., more consistent) than didlosing majority subgroups [F (1, 2) = 39.18, p < .05]. Winning majority subgroups were not different from losing minority subgroups on argument consistency. In

Table 3. Argument Consistency for Majority and Minority Subgroups

Consistency index

Majority Minority Winning subgroupTask Mr. R.

Group 1 +0.98 (3) +0.58 (1) Majority 3 +1.00 (4) -1.00 (1) Majority 4 +0.27 (4) +0.71 (1) Majority 5 +0.48 (4) +0.58 (1) Majority 7 +0.16 (3) +0.62 (1) Minority 8 +0.47 (4) -0.20 (1) Majority 9 +0.72 (4) -0.83 (1) Majority10 +0.79 (4) -0.16 (1) Majority11 +0.61 (4) +1.00 (1) Majority12 +0.16 (3) +0.91 (2) Minority13 +0.71 (4) -0.83 (1) Majority14 +0.63 (4) -0.36 (1) Majority15 +0.74 (4) -0.54 (1) Majority

Task Mr. N.

Group 2 +0.21 (4) -0.11 (1) Majority 3 +1.00 (4) -1.00 (1) Majority 5 -0.42 (3) +1.00 (2) Minority 8 +0.50 (3) +0.58 (2) Majority

9 +0.20 (3) +0.35 (2) Majority10 +0.39 (3) +0.41 (2) Majority11 +0.88 (3) +0.13 (2) Majority12 -0.28 (4) +1.00 (1) Minority13 +0.22 (4) +0.40 (1) Majority14 +0.49 (4) +0.95 (1) Minority

Task Mr. C.

Group 2 +0.58 (4) +0.56 (1) Majority 3 -0.24 (3) +0.91 (2) Minority 4 +0.82 (4) +0.50 (1) Majority 5 +0.89 (3) +0.89 (2) Majority

6 +0.86 (3) +0.00 (2) Majority 8 +0.56 (4) -0.14 (1) Majority 9 +0.44 (3) +0.46 (2) Majority10 +0.77 (3) +0.13 (2) Majority11 +0.07 (3) +0.85 (2) Minority13 +0.76 (3) +0.27 (2) Majority14 +0.27 (3) +0.48 (2) Majority

Note: Number of subgroup members is given in parentheses. Range is from –1 (not at all consistent ) to +1 (completely consistent ).




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addition, winning majority subgroups had a higher proportion of arguments favoring their prediscussion choice than did losing majority subgroups [F (1, 2) =74.83, p < .05], and winning minority subgroups had a higher proportion of argu-ments favoring their prediscussion choice than did losing minority subgroups[F (1, 2) = 57.38, p < .05]. Across all of the mixed model ANOVAs, none of thesituation main effects or interactions with situation were significant.

In addition, we correlated argument consistency with two measures: privateacceptance and public compliance. An individual’s movement to the group out-come can be conceptualized as total change, which is the absolute value of thegroup outcome minus the individual’s prediscussion score. This total change rep-resents two components: (a) private acceptance, which is the absolute value of the individual’s postdiscussion score minus the individual’s prediscussion score;and (b) public compliance, which is the difference between total change andprivate acceptance. For example, if a group member with an original (prediscussion)choice of 2 was in a group that chose 7 as its final group decision choice, and thegroup member chose 5 as his or her final (postdiscussion) individual choice, themember’s private acceptance score would be 3 (absolute value of the differencebetween individual postdiscussion and individual prediscussion scores), and hisor her public compliance would be 2 (absolute value of the difference betweentotal change [group–prediscussion] and private acceptance [postdiscussion–

Table 4. Argument Acts Across Groups

Majority Minority N % N %

First-order categories

Arguables 2845 (74.8%) 1411 (74.3%)Convergence 467 (10.5%) 166 (8.7%) X 2 = 15.93, p < .001Disagreement 345 (9.1%) 228 (12.0%) X 2 = 9.67, p < .01Delimitors 145 (3.8%) 94 (4.9%)Total 3802 (100%) 1899 (100%)Overall X 2(3) = 29.08, p < .0001

Second-order categories

Assertions 1447 (38.1%) 707 (37.2%)Propositions 312 (8.2%) 128 (6.7%)Elaborations 933 (24.5%) 503 (26.5%)Responses 1 (0%) 1 (0.1%)Amplifications 144 (3.8%) 69 (3.6%)Justifications 8 (0.2%) 3 (0.2%)Agreements 437 (11.5%) 159 (8.4%) X 2 = 13.35, p < .001Acknowledgments 30 (0.8%) 7 (0.4%)Objections 141 (3.7%) 103 (5.4%) X 2 = 6.99, p < .01Challenges 204 (5.4%) 125 (6.6%)Frames 128 (3.4%) 86 (4.5%) X 2 = 4.30, p < .05Forestall/Secure 14 (0.4%) 7 (0.4%)Forestall/Remove 3 (0.1%) 1 (0.1%)

Total 3802 (100%) 1899 (100%)Overall X 2(12) = 38.06, p < .0001




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prediscussion]). In the case of private acceptance, the smaller the discrepancy score, the less opinion change. In the case of public compliance, the greater thediscrepancy score, the less the individual moved toward the group’s choice as his

or her own.Overall, argument consistency was correlated negatively with private accep-

tance (r = 0.45, p < .01), indicating that as consistency went up, there was lessopinion change for pre- to postindividual choice. Argument consistency was notcorrelated with public compliance however (r = 0.05, ns ). For losing subgroups,argument consistency correlated negatively with private acceptance (r = -0.45, p <.01) and correlated positively with public compliance (r = 0.34, p < .01). Thesecorrelations indicate that, in losing subgroups, as consistency went up, there wasless pre- to postdecision change, and also less public compliance. For winningsubgroups, argument consistency was not correlated with any of the measures of

opinion change (with individual opinion change, r = -0.11, n s; with private accep-tance r = -0.18, ns ; with public compliance, r = -0.02, ns ).

Differential Influence Outcomes

Hypothesis 4 focused on determining whether the minority would produce sig-nificantly more different argument topics in group interactions than the majority. A comparison was made between majority subgroups (n = 34, M = 4.50, SD =1.39) and minority subgroups (n = 34, M = 4.00, SD = 2.01). The main effect testbetween majority and minority subgroups was not significant. There was a signifi-cant main effect for situation [F (2,62) = 8.55, p < .001], indicating that the numberof argument topics used by groups varied across the three situations (Mr. R., M =3.55, SD = 1.41; Mr. C., M = 3.97, SD = 1.60; Mr. N., M = 5.34, SD = 1.73).

Hypotheses 5 through 7 focused on determining whether the majority andminority produced different argument messages in group interaction. These hy-

Table 5. Arguments Acts Across Groups Groups Where Majority Won

Majority Minority N % N %

Arguables 2224 (73.3%) 1074 (73.2%)Convergence 374 (12.0%) 127 (8.7%) X 2 = 12.98, p < .001Disagreement 303 (10.0%) 194 (13.2%) X 2 = 9.31, p < .01Delimitors 132 (4.4%) 72 (4.9%)Total 3033 (100%) 1467 (100%)Overall X 2(3) = 22.02, p < .0001

Groups where minority won

Arguables 671 (80.8%) 337 (78.0%)Convergence 93 (12.1%) 39 (9.0%)Disagreement 42 (5.5%) 34 (7.9%)Delimitors 13 (1.7%) 22 (5.1%) X 2 = 10.96, p < .001Total 769 (100%) 432 (100%)Overall X 2(4) = 16.76, p < .01




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potheses were tested by comparing argument acts for majorities and minoritiesacross groups. As shown in Table 5, majorities and minorities produced different

patterns of argument. As predicted by Hypothesis 5, majorities were more likely than minorities to use convergence markers. Hypothesis 6 was partially confirmed.There were no significant differences between majorities and minorities in theiruse of arguables, but minority subgroups did produce significantly more disagree-ment-relevant intrusions and qualifiers than did majority subgroups.

In an additional test, we compared argument acts for majorities and minoritiesin groups where the minority won and in groups where the majority won. Asshown in Table 5, majorities and minorities produced different patterns of argu-ments across these two situations. For groups in which majorities won, ma-jorities produced more convergence markers and fewer disagreement-relevant

intrusions than expected when compared to minorities. For groups in whichminorities won, minorities produced more delimitors than expected whencompared to majorities.

Finally, Hypothesis 7 posited that minority subgroup influence would moreoften result in majority members’ private acceptance and majority subgroup influ-ence would more often result in minority members’ public compliance. H7 wastested using a mixed model ANOVA with type of change (private acceptance andpublic compliance) as a between-subjects factor and situation as a random within-subjects factor. For majority subgroups, private acceptance (M = 1.42; SD = 1.05)

was significantly different from public compliance (M = 0.40, SD = 1.03; F [1,2] =

139.45, p < .01). For minority subgroups, private acceptance (M = 2.34, SD = 1.78) was not different than average public compliance (M = 0.50, SD = 1.07, F [1,2] =5.38, ns ). Moreover, for this test, the means were opposite the direction suggestedby the hypothesis. For minority subgroups, there was a significant Type of Changex Situation interaction, F (1, 32) = 4.15, p < .05.

Discussion

Overall, the results of this study suggest that (a) majorities tend to win more oftenthan minorities, (b) there are differences overall in how subgroups argue, as wellas differences in winning or losing subgroups, and (c) consistency in argumenta-tion is an important predictor of subgroup success. In addition, majority sub-groups (but not minority subgroups) showed significant differences in privateacceptance and public compliance. Each of these conclusions is elaborated in thefollowing section.

Majority Dominance

Past research has demonstrated that majorities have the advantage when confront-ing minority subgroups. As expected, majority subgroups won more often thandid minority subgroups (27 of the 34 discussions in this study). Scholars have

explained this finding using social decision schemes (i.e., majority rules, see Davis,1973) or norms of fairness and democracy (McPhee, 1994). Most common, how-




21

ever, has been an explanation of numeric superiority. Certainly, numeric superior-ity may be a explanatory factor in our findings as well. For example, in some

groups the minority subgroup consisted of one member. Research shows thatsubgroup size can be an important factor in minority influence (Arbuthnot & Wayner, 1982; Bray, Johnson, & Chilstrom, 1982; Tindale et al., 1990). Clark andMaass (1990) suggest that “the 2:4 ration between minority and majority frequently recorded in the minority influence literature may actually represent an optimalratio for minority influence to occur . . . a decrease in the minority to majority ration may clearly be detrimental” (pp. 115–116).

From a communication perspective, however, relying on numeric superiority as an explanation masks the more interesting question. How does numeric supe-riority (or lack of same) translate into communicative influence? For example,

does the numerically superior subgroup (i.e., the majority) utilize different argu-mentative strategies than the minority subgroup in interaction? Do subgroups who“win” (usually the numerically superior majority) employ different communicativestrategies from subgroups who “lose”? Does the mode of transmission of argu-ments (i.e., consistency) differ across majorities and minorities? Discovering an-swers to these questions, as we have in this paper, provides a more completeexplanation of the process of subgroup influence, and helps us better understandthe communicative activities of these two subgroups.

Argumentative Differences

There were differences in majority and minority argument messages. Overall,majorities were more likely than minorities to use convergence statements (agree-ment) and less likely to use disagreement-relevant intrusions. Past research hasshown that repetitive agreement with members of one’s own subgroup is anindicator of “tag-team” argument (Brashers & Meyers, 1989) and may produce aperception of communicative unity that is especially persuasive (Canary et al.,1987). In fact, because agreement among members is impossible for token minor-ity members, this strategy may be especially effective for the numerically superiormajority subgroup. On the other hand, minorities may use more disagreement-relevant intrusions to (sometimes successfully) counteract this unified offense. Theirstrategy is to defend their position while attacking the majority position. Inshort, it appears that minorities are often on the defensive against a unifiedmajority offense.

In addition, we found differences in argumentative strategies among winningand losing subgroups. Winning majorities, as compared to losing majorities, ap-peared to engage more actively in critical argument, using disagreement-relevantstatements such as challenges or objections and statements that provide a context(frames) or forestall refutation. The “dissembling” (Canary et al., 1987) and fram-ing of arguments appear to be important strategies for majority success. However, winning majorities were still less likely than losing minorities to use disagreement-relevant intrusions (as discussed above).

Finally, these differences in winning-losing subgroup argument (i.e., the differ-ent patterns across the three levels of Table 2) is an interesting fact in itself. A




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focus on an overall table of group argument would mask differences that becomeapparent when we look at majority versus minority teams. By examining sub-

groups, we see patterns that may result from, and be unique to, the minority ormajority status of group members.

Consistency in Presentation

This study also confirms the hypothesis that consistency in presentation (in thiscase, argumentation) is an important predictor of subgroup success in intragroupinfluence situations (Gebhardt & Meyers, 1995; Meyers & Brashers, 1998; Wood etal., 1994). It especially may be the case that minorities must remain consistent inorder to win. The more consistent the minority subgroup, the less likely were itsmembers to change their pre- to postdiscussion decision and the less they moved

toward the group’s final decision. In short, the greater the consistency in argu-ment, the more subgroup members maintained their original stance and resistedinfluence from the majority.

Across winning and losing majorities and minorities, winning minorities werethe most consistent subgroup of all (with a mean consistency index of .90) fol-lowed by winning majorities (with a mean consistency index of .62). Losing ma-jority members were the least consistent in their arguments (with a mean consis-tency index of .00). In each of the seven interactions in which a minority sub-group won (see Table 2, Mr. R., groups 7 & 12; Mr. N., groups 5, 12, & 14; Mr. C.,groups 2 & 11), the minority was more consistent than the majority in their argu-

ments. Moreover, in each of these groups, the majority had a consistency indexless than .50, and the minority had a consistency index of greater than .60. Thus,it appears that the minority must sustain a consistent line of argument, and themajority must be inconsistent for the minority to win.

As an additional test of the impact of argument consistency, we correlated theindex of consistency with measures of opinion change. Across groups, argumentconsistency was negatively related to private acceptance. That is, the more consis-tent group members were in their arguments, the less likely they were to changefrom their original position.

For losing subgroups, argument consistency was negatively related to privateacceptance and positively associated with public compliance. Again, consistentargument was related to decreased pre- to postdecision opinion change and in-creased discrepancy between the individual and the group outcome. That is, themore consistent a member of a losing subgroup remained in discussion, the morelikely that s/he would report a final outcome different than the winning subgroup’spreferred proposal. Thus, for a losing but argumentatively consistent subgroupmember, any opinion change served as a marker of compromise rather than private acceptance. Put another way, private postdiscussion opinions tended to beinfluenced more by the individual’s prediscussion opinion that was argued consis-tently throughout the discussion than by actual influence of the winning sub-group.

For winning subgroups, argument consistency was unrelated to individual opin-ion change, public compliance, or private acceptance. This was surprising, espe-cially given the substantial correlation between these variables for losing sub-




23

groups. It may be that low variability in opinions expressed by winning sub-groups suppressed an effect for argument consistency.

Differential Impact of Majorities and Minorities

Finally, we found no differences in the argument topics produced by majority andminority subgroups. We think that our measure of argument topics may have beentoo simplistic to demonstrate significant differences. Our analysis showed that allsubgroups produced similar argument topics—albeit some produced them morefrequently than others. Perhaps future research needs to look more closely at how these argument topics are developed or maintained in discussion, or both. It may be that subgroups who produce higher quality, developed argument topics willaffect the most change in subgroup members’ opinions.

Moreover, we found differences in private acceptance and public acceptancefor majority subgroups, but not for minority subgroups. Based on past research, we expected that losing majorities (minority influence) would be influenced moreto private acceptance than to public compliance. Our data supported that portionof the hypothesis. We also expected that losing minority subgroups (majority influence) would be persuaded more to public compliance than private accep-tance. The finding of no difference may have been the result of the low power of that test; however, it is also the case that the means were in the opposite directionthan was predicted by the hypothesis. This latter finding deserves further explora-tion in subsequent investigations.

Directions for Future Research

Much work still remains if we are to fully understand the communicative natureand force of minority and majority subgroup argumentation. Future research mightadopt a more receiver-oriented perspective, seeking to understand receivers’ mo-tivational characteristics (DeDrue & DeVries, 1996; Trost et al., 1992). Kruglanskiand Mackie (1990) speculated that motivational factors determine what “informa-tion is considered relevant to the judgment of the advocacy’s validity, what will beattended to and how it will be processed, and whether the individual will conformor resist, internalize or merely comply with an advocacy” (p. 257).

Or, researchers might focus more on the sender-receiver interact in the argu-mentative interaction (Clark, 1990; Tindale et al., 1990). Levine and Russo (1995)suggested that:

group members’ use of simple vs. complex argument may be influenced by the type of argument that their opponents use. Members may assume thatopponents are most susceptible to the types of arguments that they them-selves employ, which in turn might produce imitation of opponents’ argu-

ments. (p. 314)

Finally, scholars might examine more carefully the quality of argumentative

messages. Moskowitz (1996) suggested that “when messages are of high quality minorities can exert a positive persuasive impact” (p. 58). Garlick and Mongeau(1993) indicated that “the quality of the minority’s arguments may potentially determine how behavioral consistency is evaluated” (p. 303).




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Conclusion

Theoretically, this study advances our understanding of influence patterns by ex-amining actual arguments constructed by minority and majority subgroups andthe association of those arguments with final individual and group outcomes. By analyzing the actual interaction that occurs in group decision-making discussions,this investigation allows us to move beyond confederates and aggregate groups,to more fully understand the differences, similarities, and impact of majority andminority influence as it occurs in actual decision-making interaction. Findingsfrom this investigation support the idea that minority and majority subgroupsargue differently, and that consistency in argument is a strong predictor of sub-group success.

Pragmatically, results from continued research on the argumentative patterns of majority and minority subgroups could be used to teach group decision makershow to create arguments that will be persuasive (a skill that may be particularly useful for minority subgroups). Simultaneously, such information could help groupdecision makers learn how to process minority subgroup arguments, so that socialjustice, rather than dominance, prevails in the decision-making situation. Attend-ing to minority subgroups’ arguments could have many positive results, includingbetter decision outcomes, more commitment among members, greater cohesion,and increased learning. Understanding more completely both how to construct,and how to respond to, quality arguments is inherently important to all group

decision making.The findings of this study provide a foundation for continued investigation of the centrality, and importance, of communication to the majority-minority influ-ence process. Theoretically and pragmatically, such efforts are essential to a com-plete understanding of majority and minority influence in decision-making groups.

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