www.mca-marines.org/gazette 81Marine Corps Gazette • January 2014

A mphibious MAGTFs are uniquely positioned to make substantial, multifaceted, and increasingly important

contributions to joint power projection operations in contested environments.1 2 As the joint force reconfigures itself to become more effective in projecting power against adversaries with advanced capabilities, improvements to amphibi-ous MAGTFs will enable these powerful formations to operate from a dispersed, mobile, and survivable posture, and to provide essential striking power to the joint force commander (JFC) during any phase of a campaign. In fact, in a contested environment, MAGTFs will be uniquely suited to “take away the tar-get,” operate forward, and enable other key elements of the joint force in the face of adversary antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) strategies.3 Unfortunately, the lack of a compelling narrative describ-ing how the MAGTF will contribute

to joint force power projection in a “high-end” fight threatens the amphibi-ous Navy, important elements of the MAGTF, and maritime preposition-ing squadrons (MPSRons). This article proposes a “way” to project power at the operational level by describing how capability improvements to amphibious MAGTFs—particularly in Marine avia-tion—will make these unique combat

formations more essential than ever to joint force power projection in contested environments.

The Strategic and Operational Chal-lenge The Defense Department’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review empha-sized the growing importance of pro-jecting power into A2/AD environ-ments. The President and Secretary of Defense’s 2012 defense strategic guid-ance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leader-ship, reinforced this strategic imperative, acknowledging that

[. . .] [s]tates such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection capabilities, while the proliferation of sophisticated weapons and technology will extend to non-state actors as well. Accordingly, the U.S. military will in-vest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in anti-access and area denial environments [. . .].4

While A2/AD strategies are multidi-

Strengthening the Joint Force

MAGTF contributions to joint power projection in contested environments

by Cols William J. Bowers, Todd S. Desgrosseilliers & Christian F. Wortman, LtCol Kain C. Anderson & Noel Williams

>Col Bowers is CO, 6th Marine Corps District.

>>Col Desgrosseilliers is CO, The Basic School.

>>>Col Wortman serves in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy.

>>>>LtCol Anderson serves with Headquarters Marine Corps, Department of Avia-tion.

>>>>>Mr. Williams provides strategy and policy analysis support to Headquarters Marine Corps, Quadrennial Defense Review Integration Group.

“Despite its outstanding record as a combat force in the past war, the Marine Corps’ far greater contri-bution to victory was doctrinal; that is, the fact that the basic amphibious doctrines which carried Allied troops over every beachhead of World War II had been largely shaped—often in the fact of uninterested and doubting military orthodoxy—by U.S. Marines, and mainly between 1922 and 1935.”

—Gen Alexander Vandegrift

82 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2014

Ideas & Issues (avIatIon)

mensional and leverage a combination of geography, coercive diplomacy, and advanced weapons systems to present a range of strategic and operational chal-lenges, a central component of potential adversary A2/AD strategies is denying the United States the ability to operate close to the locus of conflict through the employment of large numbers of highly accurate, long-range strike sys-tems supported by an advanced intelli-gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance network. By seeking to drive America’s Armed Forces to operate at extended ranges that dramatically reduce sortie generation rates, adversaries employing A2/AD strategies hope to effectively neutralize the power projection capa-bilities of our forces, thereby reducing U.S. options for protecting important security interests. In an era of increasing fiscal austerity, our leadership’s emphasis on projecting power in A2/AD environments plays an important role in shaping the De-fense Department’s investment priori-ties. Air-Sea Battle (ASB) has attracted significant attention because of its po-tential to provide essential capabilities to operate successfully in A2/AD envi-ronments.5 ADM Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, and Gen Norton Schwartz, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, described ASB as a concept for greater Service interoper-ability and integration. ASB is built around a central idea for breaking ad-

versary “kill chains”—that is, a net-worked, integrated attack-in-depth to disrupt, destroy, and defeat adversary weapons systems.6 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has embraced ASB as an important enabling concept to the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC). Similar to ASB, JOAC calls for increased “cross-domain synergy,” while also establishing precepts for achieving operational access and freedom of action against adversaries employing A2/AD strategies. These precepts include the following:

• Conducting operations to gain ac-cess based on the requirements of the broader mission while also designing subsequent operations to lessen access challenges.• Preparing the operational area in advance to facilitate access.• Considering a variety of basing op-tions.• Seizing the initiative by deploying and operating on multiple, indepen-dent lines of operations.• Exploiting advantages in one or more domains to disrupt or destroy enemy A2/AD capabilities in others.• Disrupting enemy reconnaissance and surveillance efforts while protect-ing friendly efforts.• Maximizing surprise through de-ception, stealth, and ambiguity to complicate enemy targeting.7

Amphibious MAGTFs—true Navy-Marine Corps Teams—possess the

potential to make essential contribu-tions to operationalizing JOAC and to significantly strengthen the execution of ASB. These capabilities will markedly grow with the fielding of the F–35B.

Taking Away the Target and Enabling the Joint Force With its unique capabilities to oper-ate from a dispersed and mobile pos-ture that is well forward, amphibious MAGTFs have the right combination of capabilities to inject uncertainty into an adversary’s targeting calculus and to have these adversaries swinging at shadows. For example, with short take-off, vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft, as well as the capability to launch and recover conventional takeoff and land-ing aircraft with expeditionary arresting gear, amphibious MAGTFs can expo-nentially multiply and routinely shift the possible locations for tactical avia-tion (TacAir) operations. In the process, these MAGTFs can be employed by the JFC to powerfully communicate that U.S. forces will not operate from fixed locations that are easily targeted, thus turning an adversary’s antiaccess weapons systems into a 21st-century Maginot Line. In a crisis, adversaries employing A2/AD strategies will seek to neutralize and disrupt joint force power projec-tion through long-range attacks on concentrations of U.S. capabilities at established bases. To counter this, U.S.

Mobile sea bases combined with highly dispersed mobile air facili-ties ashore inject uncertainty into adversary A2/AD targeting calcu-lations and create uncertainty in the mind of the enemy commander. (Photo by author.)

The joint force will rely on amphibious ships that provide multiple ways to support MAGTF distributed strike operations. (Photo by author.)

www.mca-marines.org/gazette 83Marine Corps Gazette • January 2014

forces have three prominent options:

• To operate from extended distances, beyond the reach of most adversary long-range strike capacity, from hard-ened bases that are actively defended and supported by airfield damage repair capa-bilities;• To operate from mobile seabases that inject uncer-tainty into the adversary A2/AD targeting calculus from assets such as aircraft carri-ers and “big-deck amphibs” (LHAs/LHDs) optimized for F–35B operations.

These seabases would also be actively defended, and/or:

• To operate in a highly dispersed manner, from a large network of airfields and highways, regularly dis-placing and shifting operations to im-prove survivability. While potentially benefitting from active defenses, this network would rely primarily on pas-sive defenses and deception to improve survivability.

As America’s Armed Forces learned in World War II, in the Pacific theater espe-cially, broadly distributed seabased and landbased combat formations are best employed in a complementary manner to place an adversary on the horns of a dilemma and to preserve maximum options and flexibility. Therefore, these three options should be pursued in a manner that cultivates synergies among the multiple approaches. Amphibious MAGTFs can create efficiencies and opportunities for other elements of the joint force in the first approach, directly contribute in the second, and lead the joint force in the third. To enable joint force sorties operating from extended ranges, Marine forces could be postured to activate a shift-ing set of temporary airfields with our expeditionary aviation enablers, pro-viding ordnance and fuel at MAGTF forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) to aircraft transiting extended distances, and then getting these air-craft back into the fight before they must return to base. These Marine forces would draw ordnance and fuel

from amphibious ships, MPSRons, or prepositioned stocks; distribute it us-ing Navy and Marine Corps surface and air connectors, as well as the full range of MAGTF logistics assets; and provide main supply route and airfield security alongside host-nation forces; all while running and improving tem-porary airfields with aviation enablers that are reinforced by “like” capabilities resident in other parts of the MAGTF.8 Amphibious MAGTFs could also substantially contribute to the employ-ment of large-deck amphibious ships optimized for STOVL operations. The pathway for LHAs and LHDs opti-mized for F–35B operations is gener-ally understood and marked by current AV–8B Harrier operations. Depending on the variant, LHAs and LHDs could embark up to 20 or 21 F–35Bs, along with Navy search and rescue helicopters, and generate approximately 65 sorties per flight day at surge rates. There may also be real value in smaller F–35B de-tachments of 16 aircraft built around standard F–35B squadrons to allow em-barkation space for a small MV–22 de-tachment capable of in-flight refueling of F–35Bs or providing assault support for the rapid establishment of FARPs and associated security elements ashore. The key point here is that the JFC will have options for employing TacAir assets in multiple configurations to accom-plish a broader range of missions and keep our adversaries reacting to us. By employing amphibious ships in this manner, fleet commanders could

more broadly distribute their most sophisticated strike fight-ers beyond aircraft carriers to more platforms. Employing LHAs and LHDs in this man-ner would effectively double the number of seabased plat-forms deploying fifth-genera-tion TacAir assets, and would strengthen the resiliency of the battle fleet in the face of ad-versary strike capabilities. By doing so, fleet commanders would also create options for the synergistic employment of amphibious ships with aircraft carriers, submarines, and other warships, leveraging a relative-

ly low-cost platform capable of gener-ating a considerable volume of sorties. To be clear, numerous command and control capability gaps prevent amphibi-ous ships from serving as replacements for aircraft carriers, but when employed as part of a single naval battle by inte-grated Navy and Marine Corps staffs, they have the potential to be extremely complementary to carrier battle groups. MAGTF and fleet commanders should therefore work together to explore and develop this broader range of employ-ment options. With one foot ashore activating FARPs and airfields, and one foot af loat with STOVL aircraft f lying off of amphibious ships, amphibious MAGTFs can regularly shift TacAir operations from the seabase to ashore and back, generating expanded options while sowing operational uncertainty into the minds of adversaries. When operations afloat shift ashore, amphibi-ous ships could reduce (or eliminate) their electronic signature, reposition, resupply, and conduct maintenance or operational planning from sanctuary ranges. When MAGTF commanders transition TacAir operations ashore, they may continue to exploit the sea-base by keeping maintenance, supplies, and certain life support functions afloat in order to retain tactical agility on the ground. To support this distributed net-work of FARPs and expeditionary airfields the joint force would rely on all amphibious shipping variants. For

Emerging Marine aviation capabilities will enable dramatic recon-ceptualization of amphibious force contributions to joint power pro-jection operations. (Photo by author.)

84 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2014

Ideas & Issues (avIatIon)

example, those big-deck amphibs not configured or optimized for STOVL operations could still support MV–22 and CH–53 lift assets to rapidly move fuel and ordnance ashore, as well as se-curity, maintenance, and other aviation enabler capabilities. These same assault support assets could be used to routinely shift FARPs and airfields already es-tablished. Small-deck amphibs (LPDs and LSDs) could serve as “lily pads” for MV–22s and CH–53s operating across an expansive battlespace, and use their LCAC and LCU surface connectors to move fuel, ordnance, and other supplies beyond the lift capacity of vertical lift assets. These surface connectors could also enable the delivery of consumables and equipment off of MPSRons, ex-ploiting emerging in-stream, selective offload capabilities and improved at-sea interfaces. Previously seen by some as providing marginal utility to project-ing power in contested environments, smaller amphibious ships could become critical theater-wide logistics and ma-neuver enablers. MAGTF KC–130s would further reinforce the establish-ment and sustainment of this distribut-ed network of airfields. In this context, the forward stationing and readiness of MAGTF and amphibious shipping as-sets merits particular attention. Finally, amphibious forces may conduct raids, feints, and deception operations to sup-port power projection and operational objectives. By operating from multiple austere air facilities, to include highways, park-ing lots, and sports fields, and by regu-larly shifting operations from one set

of air facilities to others, amphibious MAGTFs could leverage their inherent operational mobility, enabling the JFC to introduce uncertainty into an adver-sary’s targeting calculus and creating an expanded range of employment options. Possibilities for operating ashore are extensive, given the ability of STOVL aircraft to get up and down on short, austere, and improvised runways. Even so, these options can be dramatically in-creased—along with the opportunities for, and the effectiveness of, deception operations—by conducting survey work and making minor improvements to existing airfields and highways during phase 0 theater security cooperation ex-ercises. These improvements could in-clude dispersed parking areas that make it difficult for adversary forces to target MAGTF assets and drive up adversary costs in pursuing effective long-range strikes. Amphibious MAGTFs sup-porting each of the three approaches described above could dramatically improve the effectiveness and striking power of the entire joint force, the sur-vivability of the joint force in the face of advanced A2/AD weapons systems, and, as a result, deterrence stability across important regions.

Operate Forward By exploiting the survivability ad-vantages described above—extensive “basing” options, frequent displace-ment, and the local dispersal of assets, all strengthened by decoys and de-ception—amphibious MAGTFs can operate closer to the fight, shoulder-to-shoulder with allies and partners.

The JFC may employ this capability to reassure allies and partners of U.S. com-mitment, leverage their contributions, or position an operationally responsive force to exploit fleeting opportunities and address emergent threats. Because of amphibious MAGTFs’ expedition-ary natures, these formations do not require substantial or long-lead overseas military construction. To achieve our Nation’s strategic ob-jectives, the United States must visibly show our allies and partners commit-ment to peaceful, rule of law resolution of disputes. As potential adversaries seek to isolate our allies by holding in-theater U.S. assets at risk, the joint force will need resilient, survivable, and opera-tionally relevant capabilities closer to our allies and partners. Amphibious MAGTFs can meet important elements of that requirement. Inevitably, during the course of a campaign, American forces will be pre-sented with fleeting opportunities and unpredictable circumstances. The JFC must have survivable forces forward, po-sitioned to meet the time-space-distance challenges associated with these threats and opportunities. By operating closer to the fight and enabling other elements of the joint force to do so as well, am-phibious MAGTFs have the ability to provide immediately responsive capa-bilities to address rapidly changing mis-sion requirements in ways that forces operating from extended ranges simply do not.

Getting There The Navy-Marine Corps Team stands on the cusp of a quantum leap in its operational capabilities. The ca-pabilities required to conduct the opera-tions described above are largely in the current program, and our operational experience from World War II to the present provides a road map for advanc-ing these concepts. Even so, the ideas described above should be supported and advanced by an iterative process of concept and capability development, experimentation, wargaming, exercises, analysis, and refinement. This process should occur simultaneously across the naval Services and with our joint part-ners.

Big-deck amphibs can dramatically improve the effectiveness, survivability, and striking power of the entire Joint force in the face of advanced A2/AD weapon systems. (Photo by author.)

www.mca-marines.org/gazette 85Marine Corps Gazette • January 2014

Working closely with the Navy, the Marine Corps should continue to explore how to strengthen joint force power projection into contested envi-ronments, identify capability gaps and shortfalls, and refine core concepts and capabilities. While every element of this operational concept warrants close scru-tiny, easily identifiable questions include the following:

• Should MPSRon embarkation plans be adjusted to support the rapid es-tablishment and sustainment of large numbers of FARPs and expeditionary airfields?• How can Marine forces best con-duct F–35 maintenance and mission planning in austere environments, and how can these requirements be offset with routine rotations of aircraft and aircrews to amphibious shipping?• What joint force capabilities pro-vide the greatest leverage to existing MAGTF capabilities and how can MAGTF capabilities be tailored to best support key elements of the joint force?• What types of expeditionary foreign object and debris sweepers will be re-quired to support the F–35 in austere environments?• How will Marine forces distrib-ute and maintain sophisticated, F–35-compliant munitions across this austere battlespace?• Are there opportunities for ex-panded interoperability with allies and partners with the F–35, especially during the early phases of a conflict?

Conclusion Large portions of the Defense De-partment and joint force remain intel-lectually shackled to a “mental model” of a Marine Corps that does many things well but makes only limited contributions to the highest end fights when projecting power in contested en-vironments. The changing strategic and operational landscape will require Ma-rines to stretch their imaginations and apply intellect by reconceptualizing how amphibious MAGTFs project power, and then better articulating that contri-bution to the joint force. Failure to do so could place our amphibious MAGTFs and larger institution at risk. The com-

ing changes in Marine aviation are truly game changing and are enabling the most dramatic reconceptualization of how amphibious MAGTFs will project power since the period between World Wars I and II. But the new capabilities of amphibious MAGTFs will not be op-timized without right-sized amphibious and MPSRon capacity employed as part of a single naval battle, and as part of a coherent joint campaign. Indeed, am-phibious MAGTFs will become more essential than ever. The Navy-Marine Corps Team has a great story to develop and tell; we now need to get down to the business of doing so.

>Authors’ Note: The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the De-partment of Defense or the U.S. Government.

Notes

1. For the purposes of this article, the term “am-phibious” includes both forces operating from amphibious shipping as well as those maritime prepositioning force MAGTFs supported from MPSRons.

2. “Projecting power” suggests a broad range of potential military operations. For this article, in keeping with the context of the President’s 2012 defense strategic guidance, “projecting power” refers to early-phase joint force opera-tions in contested and denied environments that are focused on achieving freedom of action by eroding an adversary’s A2/AD network and neutralizing an adversary’s military assets by

conducting operations within these contested and denied areas.3. “Antiaccess” refers to those actions and capa-bilities, usually long-range, designed to prevent an opposing force from entering an operational area. “Area denial” refers to those actions and capabilities, usually of shorter range, designed not to keep an opposing force out, but to limit its freedom of action within the operational area. See Dempsey, GEN Martin E., Joint Op-erational Access Concept, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC, 2012, p. i.

4. Obama, President Barack, and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Washington, DC, 2012, pp. 4–5.

5. Department of Defense, Air-Sea Battle, Wash-ington, DC, September 2012.

6. Schwartz, Gen Norton A., and ADM Jona-than W. Greenert, Air-Sea Battle: Promoting Stability in an Era of Uncertainty, Washington, DC, 20 February 2012, available at www.the-american-interest.com.

7. JOAC, pp. ii–iii.

8. For instance, ground and logistics combat element engineers will reinforce the airfield engineers resident in the Marine wing support squadrons, while ground combat element and logistics combat element bulk fuelers will dis-tribute JP–5 and JP–8 across the battlespace. The Marine Corps should pursue this effort jointly, seeking synergies with the other Services. There is additional leverage and efficiencies to be gained by working with Army bulk fuelers, engineers, and security elements in partnership with Navy and Air Force aviation enablers.

MAGTF expeditionary aviation capabilities provide the potential to conduct dispersed and mobile operations from austere airfields and provide essential survivability against A2/AD adversaries. (Photo by author.)