Madhyamaka the Two Truths

7/28/2019 Madhyamaka the Two Truths

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The Two Truths

The Conventional Truth (savtisatya) The Highest Truth (paramrthasatya).


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To move beyond the thought of early Buddhist schools(bhidharmikas) Ngrjuna confronts three main needs:

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a new style of analysis that moves beyond reductionism,2. a new account of knowing things as they are, and3. a new approach to the definition of conventional reality

(savti satya).


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1. A New Style of Analysis

Ngrjuna must critique the claim that through a strictly reductiveanalysis, one comes upon things that are ultimately real (paramrthasatya).

The bhidharmika style of reductive analysis: one analyzes an entityby attempting to break it into its component parts, and if it cannot

be broken down further, the entity (svabhva) is ultimately real.


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A chair, for example, is not ultimately real because it can be brokendown into more fundamental parts; and when the analytical processis brought to its conclusion, one eventually arrives at irreducible,partless particles (dhammas) that are the basic stuff of the chair.

For Vaibhika the essence is svabhva.

For Ngrjuna, an entity might be dependent on other entities. If the

entity is found to be dependent, then one must conclude that it lacksessence (svabhva) and is thus not ultimately real.


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For Ngrjuna, one cannot give an account of what nirva is initself without referring to its opposite, the world of dukha(unsatisfactoriness, dis-easy) that is sasra. In other words,nirva has no meaning without sasra, just as long ismeaningless without short. Ngrjuna thus concludes that

nirva is not at all different from sasra (Mlamadhyamaka-

krik 25.19).

Sasra and nirva, however, both lack essence because theidentity of each is dependent on the other. Hence, any attempt todraw any ultimate distinction between them must fail.


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2. A new account of knowing things as they areDukha can only be stopped by eliminating ignorance, and that toeliminate ignorance one must see things as they truly are.

For the Vaibhika, to see things as they truly are is to experiencewhat is ultimately real. In doing so, one can eliminate ignorance: theconfused belief that somewhere among those elements one will find

ones absolute, fixed identity or self-nature (tman).


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For Ngrjuna, however, ignorance is not just a confusion aboutones personal identity; instead, it is the deeply ingrained cognitivehabit that makes beings see all things as if they had some fixed,absolute identity or essence (svabhva).

Thus, to eliminate ignorance one must realize that no entity has anysuch essence, and this means that one must realize that no entity isultimately real.


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But if no entity is ultimately real, what does it mean to see things asthey truly are? At the end of the analysis, what is left that one couldsee?

To answer this question, Ngrjuna employs a metaphor that runsthroughout Mahyna thought. Inasmuch as no entity can have anonrelational identity, every entity lacks essence, and Ngrjunaspeaks of this lack of essence as emptiness (nyat).


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Ngrjuna points out that even emptiness lacks essence and is thusultimately unreal. This emptiness is empty of really being emptiness(nyat-nyat), thus, one avoids nihilism.

3. Conventional Truth

Ngrjuna maintains that an entity that does not exist ultimatelymay nevertheless exist conventionally.

Truth in Early Buddhism


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The theory of Two Truths is not presented in the early Pli suttas. It appears

first in Abhidharma works. This theory is specifically developed byMdhyamikas.

InAguttara Nikya, the Buddha says there are two kinds of suttas:

1. Ntattha: suttas whose meaning is drawn out. It is a direct

statement and it can not be interpreted further.

2 h h i h b d hi i


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2. Neyyattha: suttas whose meanings have to be drawn out. This isan indirect statement that can be further developed.

The Buddha says that he made use of the two kinds of statements:Ntattha and neyyattha. Ntattha is not higher or lower thanneyyattha. But nitattha must not be misunderstood as neyyattha.

In A. I, 60 (PTS) it is said: "Whoso declares a sutta with an implicitmeaning as a sutta with explicit meaning (and conversely), such aone makes a false statement with regard to the Blessed One."

I D 9 "Th l i f h


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In D. 9: "These are merely names, expressions, turns of speech,designations in common use in the world, which the Perfect One(Tathgata) uses without misapprehending them."

In the early discourses, we find only such a distinction, but in thelater development of Abhidharma, we find discussing on two truths.In early Buddhism, paramattha is always used for nibbna, neverused in any other sense.

Theravda

I Pli lit t ti d tth d t f t t


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In Pli literature, sammuti and paramattha are used to refer to twodegrees of reality.

Sammuti means common agreement. What is based on commonagreement is sammuti.

Paramattha is used as direct reference to dhammas. A thing can beexplained in two ways:

1. It can be explained on the basis of our common sense.2. It can be explained by reference to dhamma.

I P li t i b t i th th t


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In Pali commentaries or sub-commentaries, they never say that onetruth is higher than the other. The commentators say that theBuddha uses different languages to teach students, according to the

language that the students speak.

VaibhikasConcerning the conventional, the Vaibhikas are straightforward: itis just a matter of recognizing that words such as chair are

convenient fictions that allow us to speak easily of what is reallythere, namely, many irreducible particles.

Th ti ll l thi d f th i d ibl


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Thus, conventionally real things are composed of the irreducible,ultimately real stuff of the universe. But for Ngrjuna, there is nosuch stuff, nor does one find anything else that is really there in

the case of a chair or anything else. How then does one make senseof conventional reality?

To answer this question, Ngrjuna must redefine the notion ofconventionality.

For the Vaibhika, a conventional entity depends on the highestbecause it is made from ultimately real stuff,

for Ngrj na the con entional and the highest define and depend


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for Ngrjuna the conventional and the highest define and dependupon each other through their mutual exclusion, as in other dyadssuch as long and short or sasra and nirva.


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Mahyna schools use Savti, paramrtha. Savti means toconceal the true nature of reality.

The Conventional Truth in Madhyamaka

Ngrjuna said in his MMK: The Buddhas teaching rests on twotruths: conventional truth, and truth in the highest sense. One who

does not comprehend the distinction between these two truths, doesnot comprehend the profound meaning of the Buddhas teaching(MMK, 24: 8-9).


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The Sanskrit texts have two spelling for the word for conventionaltruth, savti and savtti.

Savti derives from the root v, to cover, hide, obstruct, thus

suggesting that Savti-satya is covered or hidden truth (satya).

But savtti derives from the root vt, to exist, arise, come about,

activate, thus suggesting that savtti-satya is the truth thatcomes about within the world.

Candrakrti describes savti in a threefold etymology as basic


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Candrakrti describes savti in a threefold etymology as basicmisunderstanding, mutual dependency, and symbolic discourse.The most fundamental of these is basic misunderstanding. (Nagao,

Foundational 40)

Since the Yogcra thinkers regarded language as the locus of allworldly convention, they would appear to have thought or worldlyconvention as deriving from a Sanskrit spelling ofsavtti, derivingfrom the root, vt, to arise. (Nagao, Foundational 42)

In the Dharmapla lineage of Yogcra introduced to China by Xuan


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In the Dharmapla lineage of Yogcra introduced to China by Xuan-

zang (who translated Savti as Shi-su, worldly), the orthodox

interpretation of the truth of worldly convention is that it is truthboth hidden and manifest. In combining these opposite ideas, thisinterpretation apparently makes use of both Sanskrit spellings andattempts to synthesize worldly convention in the Chinese compound

Yin-xuan ( hidden v and manifestation vt). It hides the truth

through basic misunderstanding and primal ignorance. It is a process

of verbal manifestation, a bringing of doctrine to speech, not fullperfection itself. (Nagao, Foundational 45).

Worldly convention has therefore the senses of hidden and manifest


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Worldly convention has therefore the senses of hidden and manifest,the themes of social custom and language complementing thesemeanings in the background. This doctrine is not, however, limited

to Dharmaplas lineage of Yogcra. It is also clearly presented inCandrakrtis teaching on the three meanings of error, mutualdependency, and language. That is to say, the notion of worldly

convention as both clouded occlusion and manifestation implies thesequential continuity of ascent and descent, of transcending theworld and re-engaging in the world. (Nagao, Foundational 45)

Sum up: Savti refers to being conventional worldly and is


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Sum up: Savti refers to being conventional, worldly, and iscontrasted with paramrtha, which means being super-worldly, thehighest sense. Nagao has analyzed the term Savti from both

aspects of Madhyamaka and Yogcra. He concludes, Savti meansconvention by its existence, a meaning that is common to bothschools of Madhyamaka and Yogcra; it is a hindrance covering the

truth, but it is the same time truth itself manifested. (NagaoMdhyamika 18)

Savti, derived from the Pli samuti, first began with an ordinary

meanings as common sense, conventional, and so forth. Later,its meaning became, covering and manifesting, and finally thecombined meaning of covering-manifesting. Covering-

manifesting expresses the paradoxical nature of Mahyna


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manifesting expresses the paradoxical nature of MahynaBuddhism and describes the world of bodhisattvas. (NagaoMdhyamika 13).

The Highest Truth

The Highest truth, which always transcends conventional truth, isbeyond thought and language. This is why the Buddha alwaysremained in his (noble) silence when he was questioned on

metaphysical matters.

But the Highest Truth cannot be understood without recourse to


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But the Highest Truth cannot be understood without recourse toconventional truth. It has been said: The highest truth cannot betaught without recourse to conventional language. Nirva cannot

be realized, if we do not realize the highest truth. (MMK, 24: 10)Thus, the highest truth must be expressed in words.

In the final analysis, we cannot say that the highest truth is higherthan the conventional truth, or the conventional is lower than thehighest.

The path (conventional) must precede the attainment of cessation


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The path (conventional) must precede the attainment of cessation(highest). The entire process of human practice to cessation throughthe cultivation of the truth of the path is worldly and conventional.

Se we cannot say one has priority to the other. Each of these twotruths is useful.

Paul Williams1 explains that the highest truth is that all things,including any emptiness itself, lack highest truth. ThereforeMadhyamaka uses ultimate truth in two senses:

1Paul Williams; Anthony Tribe, Buddhist Thought, 148

(1) the first is the ultimate truth as an ultimate truth, i.e. something


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(1) the first is the ultimate truth as an ultimate truth, i.e. somethingresistant to analysis, as primary existence (i.e. dharmas inAbhidharma). In this sense, Madhyamaka is saying that there is no

such thing as an ultimate truth.(2) the second is the ultimate truth as the ultimate way of things

(the dharmat), how it ultimately is, what is found to be the case

as a result of ultimate analysis, searching for primary existence.This is the lack, the absence, of that primary existence, i.e.emptiness.

Thus it is the ultimate truth in sense 2 (nyat) that there is


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Thus it is the ultimate truth in sense 2 (nyat) that there isabsolutely no ultimate truth in sense 1 (the dharma theory ofbhidharmikas).

Ngrjuna Does not Deny Conventional Truth


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Ngrjuna Does not Deny Conventional Truth

Chap 22: V11: It is empty is not to be said, nor It is non-empty, nor It isboth [empty and non-empty], nor It is neither. They are mentioned only forthe purpose of verbal designation (prajapti). (Tetralemma)

Two Truths

Chap. 24 The Four Noble TruthsV.7:We say that you do not comprehend the purpose of emptiness. As such,

you are tormented by emptiness and the meaning of emptiness.

V.8: The Dharma-teaching of the Buddha rests on two truths: Conventional


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V.8: The Dharma teaching of the Buddha rests on two truths: Conventionaltruth, and truth in the highest sense.

V.9: Who do not know the distribution of the two truths, they do notunderstand the profound reality of the Buddhas teaching.V.10: Without relying upon convention, the ultimate fruit is not taught.

Without understanding the ultimate fruit, freedom is not attained.

V.11: A wrongly perceived emptiness ruins a person of meager intelligence. It

is like a snake that is wrongly grasped or knowledge that is wronglycultivated.

Early Yogcra: Asaga and Vasubandhu


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Early Yogcra: Asaga and Vasubandhu.

The Yogcra emphasizes mind (citta) or consciousness (vijna) inits responses to the three issues, namely:style of analysis,seeing things as they truly are, andan account of the conventional.

1. Analysis,

Asagas main style of analysis is also relational, but the notion of an


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g y y ,ultimately real personal identity is rooted in ones sense ofsubjectivity.

The subjectivity is tied to the objects. The subjectivity must also beultimately unreal because it can truly be a subjectivity only if it

perceives objects.

Asaga follows Ngrjuna in extending the critique of essence

(svabhva), but Asaga suggests that this goal is best reached bycritiquing the selfs (tman) alleged objects. The false impression of

ultimately real selfhood is rooted in ones sense of subjectivity as a


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y j yperceiver of objects.

Thus, in showing that there are no ultimately real elements thatcould serve as objects.

For the Vaibhikas, the objects basically consist of the irreducibleelements that they take to be ultimately real; hence, Asagascritique must demonstrate that all those elements are not ultimately

real.

Vasubandhu chooses to employ a reductive analysis to demonstrate


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p y ythe ultimate irreality of such particles. But in contrast toreductionists such as the Vaibhika, Vasubandhu is willing to reduce

matter to the point where it no longer exists.

He demonstrates that irreducibility is incompatible with material

existence: if material particles were irreducible, then they could haveno size, but if they have no size, then how could an accumulation ofthem form gross objects such as jars or chairs?

On the other hand, if they do have size, then they clearly are notirreducible, since they then must have parts, such as front, back, left,right, top, and bottom.


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The conclusion of this analysis is a philosophical idealism that totallydenies the existence of matter.

2. Seeing things as they truly are

For Ngrjuna, when one reaches the conclusion of the analysis,

ones seeing things as they truly are is just seeing emptiness; laterIndian Madhyamakas will speak of it as the seeing that is non-seeing.

For Ngrjuna, emptiness is utter lack of essence; hence, they are all


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g j p yultimately unreal.

For Asaga and Vasubandhu, emptiness is the absence of subject-object duality in the mind of the perceiver. There remainsnevertheless the undeniable fact of consciousness itself.

Asaga and Vasubandhu explain their new notion of emptinessthrough the theory of the three natures

(trisvabhva). The usual order of enumeration is:the constructed nature (parikalpita svabhva),the dependent nature (paratantra svabhva), and

the perfect nature (parinipanna svabhva).


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p

The constructed and the perfectare actually two different modes

of the dependent nature.

That is, the dependent nature is the causal flow of consciousness

itself: it is the sequence of one moment of consciousness producedby its own previous moment and going on to produce its ownsubsequent moment. This ongoing stream of consciousness can

appear in two different modes.

For ordinary persons, it appears with a dizzying variety of sensory


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y p pp y g y yand mental objects, and each mental moment except for the deepestsleep is replete with such an object.

To put it another way, when one sees the color blue, the apparentexistence of the blue object as an external, independent object is

false. But the fact that it is appearing to consciousness is undeniable,and since the Yogcra analysis shows that it could not be externaland independent of the mind, it must be within the mind itself.

Seeing that flow of mind in that waynamely, as devoid of theapparent subject- object dualityis to see the perfect nature.


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The dependent nature is a way of referring to the causal flow of

mind that is dependent since each moment of consciousness iscontingent upon its own previous moment, which acts as its cause.

The constructed nature refers to the objects that appear in themind such that they seem distinct from the subjectivity thatapprehends them. This dualistic distinction between subject and

object is constructed by ignorance.

In this system, emptiness describes the causal flow of mind in


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terms of its ultimate mode, the perfect nature.

That is, ultimately the causal flow of consciousness (the dependentnature) is emptyor devoid of the seeming subject-object duality (theconstructed nature) that appears in the ordinary experience that is

the constructed nature. Thus, to see emptiness or the perfectnature is to see the causal flow of mind as it truly is, namely, utterlydevoid of the subject-object duality that is the constructed nature.

3. the conventional reality (exit because of karma


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3. the conventional reality (exit because of karma

of oneself and the shared),

All ordinary perceptions, as when one sees colors such as red andyellow, are driven by ignorance, in that the red and yellow colors

seem distinct from the subjectivity that perceives them. Theseperceptions are not caused by material objects, since matter doesnot in fact exist. What, then, could cause such perceptions?

The answer is foundational consciousness or layavijna. Alsotranslated as storehouse consciousness, this form of awareness is

entirely unconscious, but within it lie all the seeds (bja) of


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experience, such as the perceptions of a red apple or of yellow corn.When one sees the red apple or the yellow corn, it is not that ones

perception is caused by some material object. Instead, variouscircumstances have come together to allow the seeds of thoseperceptions to ripen. Ones world, in short, is just a projection of

mind.

Asaga and Vasubandhu are not proposing some kind of mental

monism where everything is reducible to one universal mind. Theirrejection of monism becomes evident when one asks: if the world isjust a projection of ones mind, why is it that a perceptual object

(such as an unpleasant smell) cannot become something else (the


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bouquet of a rose) merely by the intention of ones mind to make itso? Part of the answer is the conditioning of each individuals mind,

whereby ones reality is incapable of such radical and immediatealterations. But part of the answer is also the influence of an infinitenumber of other minds. In other words, the seeds that ripen into

experiences in ones own mind have been created not only by onesown previous experiences, but also by the experiences of all theminds of the beings around one. This notion of inter-subjectivity,

which in Yogcra literature is tied to the workings of karma,enables the Yogcra to surpass Ngrjuna in their account of theconventional.

Madhyamaka the Two Truths

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