Macalintal vs. PET
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requirements, subject to the observance of fundamental
and essential requirements of due process in justiciable
cases presented before them. (Samalio vs. Court of Appeals,454 SCRA 462 [2005])
o0o
G.R. No. 191618.November 23, 2010.*
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner, vs.PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondent.
Remedial Law; Constitutional Law; Locus Standi; Parties; On
more than one occasion we have characterized a proper party as
one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an
injury as a result of the act complained of.On more than one
occasion we have characterized a proper party as one who has
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a
result of the act complained of. The dust has long settled on the
test laid down in Baker v. Carr: whether the party has alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult questions. Until and unless such actual
or threatened injury is established, the complainant is not clothed
with legal personality to raise the constitutional question.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Estoppel; His failure to raise a
seasonable constitutional challenge at that time, coupled with his
unconditional acceptance of the Tribunals authority over the case
he was defending, translates to the clear absence of an
indispensable requisite for the proper invocation of this Courts
power of judicial review.Although there are recognized
exceptions to this requisite, we find none in this instance.
Petitioner is unmistakably estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the PET before which tribunal he had ubiquitously
appeared and had acknowledged its jurisdiction in
_______________
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*EN BANC.
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784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal
2004. His failure to raise a seasonable constitutional challenge atthat time, coupled with his unconditional acceptance of theTribunals authority over the case he was defending, translates tothe clear absence of an indispensable requisite for the properinvocation of this Courts power of judicial review. Even on thisscore alone, the petition ought to be dismissed outright.
Same; Statutory Construction; Presidential ElectoralTribunal; The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decidepresidential and vicepresidential election protests whileconcurrently acting as an independent Electoral Tribunal.Petitioner, a prominent election lawyer who has filed severalcases before this Court involving constitutional and election lawissues, including, among others, the constitutionality of certainprovisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9189 (The OverseasAbsentee Voting Act of 2003), cannot claim ignorance of: (1) theinvocation of our jurisdiction under Section 4, Article VII of theConstitution; and (2) the unanimous holding thereon.Unquestionably, the overarching framework affirmed inTecson v. Commission on Elections, 424 SCRA 277 (2004), is thatthe Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide presidentialand vicepresidential election protests while concurrently actingas an independent Electoral Tribunal.
Same; Words and Phrases; Verba Legis; Verba legis dictatesthat wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must begiven their ordinary meaning except where technical terms areemployed, in which case the significance thus attached to themprevails.Verba legis dictates that wherever possible, the wordsused in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaningexcept where technical terms are employed, in which case thesignificance thus attached to them prevails. This Court, speakingthrough former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, in J.M. Tuason& Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 (1970),instructs: As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyersdocument, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that itshould ever be present in the peoples consciousness, its language
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as much as possible should be understood in the sense they havein common use. What it says according to the text of the provisionto be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of thecourts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and thepeople mean what they say. Thus these are cases where the needfor construction is reduced to a minimum.
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Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal
Same; Statutory Construction; Ratio Legis Et Anima; Adoubtful provision must be examined in light of the history of thetimes, and the condition and circumstances surrounding theframing of the Constitution.Where there is ambiguity or doubt,the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordancewith the intent of its framers or ratio legis et anima. A doubtfulprovision must be examined in light of the history of the times,and the condition and circumstances surrounding the framing ofthe Constitution. In following this guideline, courts should bear inmind the object sought to be accomplished in adopting a doubtfulconstitutional provision, and the evils sought to be prevented orremedied. Consequently, the intent of the framers and the peopleratifying the constitution, and not the panderings of selfindulgent men, should be given effect.
Same; Same; Ut Magis Valeat Quam Pereat.Last, ut magisvaleat quam pereatthe Constitution is to be interpreted as awhole. We intoned thus in the landmark case of Civil LibertiesUnion v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991): It is a wellestablished rule in constitutional construction that no oneprovision of the Constitution is to be separated from all theothers, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearingupon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be sointerpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered andinterpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of theConstitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeatanother, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made tostand together. In other words, the court must harmonize them, ifpracticable, and must lean in favor of a construction which willrender every word operative, rather than one which may makethe words idle and nugatory.
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Same; Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET); Powers of thePresidential Electoral Tribunal is plenary; Unmistakable from theforegoing is that the exercise of our power to judge presidential andvicepresidential election contests, as well as the rulemakingpower adjunct thereto, is plenary; it is not as restrictive aspetitioner would interpret it.Unmistakable from the foregoing isthat the exercise of our power to judge presidential and vice
presidenti al election contests, as well as the rulemaking power
adjunct thereto, is plenary; it is not as restrictive as petitioner
would interpret it. In fact, former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., who proposed the insertion of
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786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal
the phrase, intended the Supreme Court to exercise exclusive
authority to promulgate its rules of procedure for that purpose. To
this, Justice Regalado forthwith assented and then emphasized
that the sole power ought to be without intervention by the
legislative department. Evidently, even the legislature cannot
limit the judicial power to resolve presidential and vice
presidential election contests and our rulemaking power
connected thereto.
Constitutional Law; Courts; Supreme Court; The confermentof additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the dutycharacterized as an awesome task, includes the means necessaryto carry it into effect under the doctrine of necessary implication.The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court,
with the duty characterized as an awesome task, includes the
means necessary to carry it into effect under the doctrine ofnecessary implication. We cannot overemphasize that theabstraction of the PET from the explicit grant of power to the
Supreme Court, given our abundant experience, is not
unwarranted. A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph
7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court
sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by whichthe Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the
provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on
the Supreme Courts exercise thereof. The Supreme Courts
method of deciding presidential and vicepresidential electioncontests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise
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of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the
Supreme Court to promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Senate Electoral Tribunal; House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal; The different electoral tribunals, with the Supreme
Court functioning as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET),
are constitutional bodies.Particularly cogent are the discussions
of the Constitutional Commission on the parallel provisions of the
SET and the HRET. The discussions point to the inevitable
conclusion that the different electoral tribunals, with the
Supreme Court functioning as the PET, are constitutional bodies,
independent of the three departments of governmentExecutive, Legislative, and Judiciarybut not separatetherefrom.
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Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal
Same; Same; The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not a
separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has
functions peculiar only to the Tribunal.By the same token, the
PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court,
albeit it has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious
that the PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully compliesnot
unlawfully defiesthe constitutional directive. The adoption of a
separate seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the
Chief Justice and the Associate Justices into Chairman and
Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to
highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunals
functions as a special electoral court.
Same; Same; Electoral Contests.The set up embodied in theConstitution and statutes characterizes the resolution ofelectoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicialpower.
Same; Same; The power wielded by Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET) is a derivative of the plenary judicial power
allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution.
With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated
to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latters exercise of
judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding
-
presidential and vicepresidential election contests, with full
authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a
derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law,expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the
Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between
the PET and the Supreme Court.
Same; Same; The Presidential Electoral Tribunal, as intendedby the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institutionindependent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e.,the Supreme Court.We have previously declared that the PET isnot simply an agency to which Members of the Court were
designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of
the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but notseparate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.McCulloch v. State of Maryland proclaimed that [a] powerwithout the means to use it, is a nullity. The vehicle for the
exercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution and
specifically mentioned by the Constitutional Commissioners
during the discussions on the grant of power to this Court, is the
788
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal
PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like the petitioners, should not
constrict an absolute and constitutional grant of judicial power.
Same; Pleadings and Practice; Baseless Petitions.One finalnote. Although this Court has no control over contrary people and
naysayers, we reiterate a word of caution against the filing of
baseless petitions which only clog the Courts docket. The petition
in the instant case belongs to that classification.
PETITION to question the constitution of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
NACHURA,J.:Confronting us is an undesignated petition1 filed by
Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal (Atty. Macalintal), that
questions the constitution of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of
Section 4,2 Article VII of the Constitution:
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The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge ofall contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications ofthe President or VicePresident, and may promulgate its rules forthe purpose.
While petitioner concedes that the Supreme Court isauthorized to promulgate its rules for the purpose, hechafes at the creation of a purportedly separate tribunalcomplemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set ofpersonnel and confidential employees, to effect theconstitutional mandate. Petitioners averment issupposedly supported by the provisions of the 2005 Rules ofthe Presidential Electoral Tribunal (2005 PET Rules),3
specifically:
_______________
1Rollo, pp. 39.
2Paragraph 7.
3 On May 4, 2010, the 2010 Rules of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (2010 PET Rules) took effect.
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Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(1)Rule 3 which provides for membership of the PETwherein the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices aredesignated as Chairman and Members, respectively;
(2)Rule 8(e) which authorizes the Chairman of thePET to appoint employees and confidential employees ofevery member thereof;
(3)Rule 9 which provides for a separateAdministrative Staff of the Tribunal with theappointment of a Clerk and a Deputy Clerk of the Tribunalwho, at the discretion of the PET, may designate the Clerkof Court (en banc) as the Clerk of the Tribunal; and
(4)Rule 11 which provides for a seal separate anddistinct from the Supreme Court seal.
Grudgingly, petitioner throws us a bone byacknowledging that the invoked constitutional provisiondoes allow the appointment of additional personnel.
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Further, petitioner highlights our decision in Buac v.COMELEC4 which peripherally declared that contestsinvolving the President and the VicePresident fall within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the PET, x x x in the
exercise of quasijudicial power. On this point, petitioner
reiterates that the constitution of the PET, with the
designation of the Members of the Court as Chairman and
Members thereof, contravenes Section 12, Article VIII of
the Constitution, which prohibits the designation of
Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
established by law to any agency performing quasijudicial
or administrative functions.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as directed in
our Resolution dated April 6, 2010, filed a Comment5
thereon. At the outset, the OSG points out that the petition
filed by Atty. Macalintal is unspecified and without
statutory basis; the
_______________
4465 Phil. 800, 810; 421 SCRA 92, 103 (2004).5Rollo, pp. 1238.
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790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal
liberal approach in its preparation x x x is a violation of the
well known rules of practice and pleading in this
jurisdiction.
In all, the OSG crystallizes the following issues for
resolution of the Court:
I
WHETHER xxx PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO FILE
THE INSTANT PETITION.
II
WHETHER x x x THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR
BEING A VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 7, SECTION 4 OF
ARTICLE VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
III
WHETHER x x x THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS OF THE
SUPREME COURT AS MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
-
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FORBEING A VIOLATION OF SECTION 12, ARTICLE VIII OF THE1987 CONSTITUTION.6
In his Reply,7 petitioner maintains that:1.He has legal standing to file the petition given his
averment of transcendental importance of the issues raisedtherein;
2.The creation of the PET, a separate tribunal fromthe Supreme Court, violates Section 4, Article VII of theConstitution; and
3.The PET, being a separate tribunal, exercises quasijudicial functions contrary to Section 12, Article VIII of theConstitution.
_______________
6Id., at pp. 1516.7Id., at pp. 4258.
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Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal
We winnow the meanderings of petitioner into thesingular issue of whether the constitution of the PET,composed of the Members of this Court, is unconstitutional,and violates Section 4, Article VII and Section 12, ArticleVIII of the Constitution.
But first, we dispose of the procedural issue of whetherpetitioner has standing to file the present petition.
The issue of locus standi is derived from the followingrequisites of a judicial inquiry:
1.There must be an actual case or controversy;2.The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper
party;
3.The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possibleopportunity; and
4.The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary tothe determination of the case itself.8
On more than one occasion we have characterized aproper party as one who has sustained or is in immediatedanger of sustaining an injury as a result of the actcomplained of.9 The dust has long settled on the test laid
-
complained of.9 The dust has long settled on the test laid
down in Baker v. Carr:10 whether the party has allegedsuch a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult questions.11
Until and
unless such actual or threatened in
_______________
8 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1998 ed., p. 257.
9 Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752,
183893, 183951, and 183962, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402, 456.
10369 U.S. 186 (1962).
11Province of Batangas v. Hon. Romulo, 473 Phil. 806; 429 SCRA 736
(2004).
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Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal
jury is established, the complainant is not clothed with
legal personality to raise the constitutional question.
Our pronouncements in David v. MacapagalArroyo12
illuminate:
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits.Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly
illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He
may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He
could be suing as a stranger, or in the category of a citizen, or
taxpayer. In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled
to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient
interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as
a citizen or taxpayer.
x x x x
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial
interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed with,
and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in
public service, the United States Supreme Court laid down the more
stringent direct injury test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed inTileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private individual toinvoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or
-
legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a directinjury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that hehas a general interest common to all members of the public.
This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. InPeople v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a
statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the casesuch that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as aresult. The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as,Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers
Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and
AntiChinese League of the Philippines v. Felix.
_______________
12 G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489, and
171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160, 216221. (Citations omitted.)
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VOL. 635, NOVEMBER 23, 2010 793
Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal
However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of
locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion.
This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v.Dinglasan, where the transcendental importance of the casesprompted the Court to act liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity
nor accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec, this Court resolved to pass upon
the issues raised due to the farreaching implications of the petitionnotwithstanding its categorical statement that petitioner therein had no
personality to file the suit. Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this
liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of
Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.
x x x x
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases
decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and
legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following
requirements are met:
(1)cases involve constitutional issues;(2)for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;
(3)for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest inthe validity of the election law in question;
-
(4)for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that theissues raised are of transcendental importance which must
be settled early; and
(5)for legislators, there must be a claim that the officialaction complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as
legislators.
Contrary to the wellsettled actual and direct injury test,
petitioner has simply alleged a generalized interest in the
outcome of this case, and succeeds only in muddling the
issues. Paragraph 2 of the petition reads:
2.x x x Since the creation and continued operation of the PETinvolves the use of public funds and the issue raised herein is of
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794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal
transcendental importance, it is petitioners humble submissionthat, as a citizen, a taxpayer and a member of the BAR, he hasthe legal standing to file this petition.
But even if his submission is valid, petitioners standing
is still imperiled by the white elephant in the petition, i.e.,his appearance as counsel for former President Gloria
MacapagalArroyo (MacapagalArroyo) in the election
protest filed by 2004 presidential candidate Fernando Poe,
Jr. before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,13 becausejudicial inquiry, as mentioned above, requires that the
constitutional question be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity.14 Such appearance as counsel before theTribunal, to our mind, would have been the first
opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the
Tribunals constitution.
Although there are recognized exceptions to this
requisite, we find none in this instance. Petitioner is
unmistakably estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of
the PET before which tribunal he had ubiquitously
appeared and had acknowledged its jurisdiction in 2004.
His failure to raise a seasonable constitutional challenge at
that time, coupled with his unconditional acceptance of the
Tribunals authority over the case he was defending,
translates to the clear absence of an indispensable
requisite for the proper invocation of this Courts power of
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judicial review. Even on this score alone, the petition oughtto be dismissed outright.
Prior to petitioners appearance as counsel for thenprotestee MacapagalArroyo, we had occasion to affirm thegrant of original jurisdiction to this Court as a PresidentialElectoral Tribunal in the auspicious case of Tecson v.Commission on Elections.15 Thus
_______________
13Poe v. MacapagalArroyo, P.E.T. Case No. 002, March 29, 2005, 454
SCRA 142.
14Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1998 ed., p. 263.
15G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634, and 161824, March 3, 2004, 424 SCRA
277, 324325. (Emphasis supplied.)
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Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G.R. No. 161434, and Velez, in
G.R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction
of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04003 and
in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they
directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited
reads:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or VicePresident, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The
omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any
tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vicepresidential
contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,
as not (being) justiciable controversies or disputes involving
contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the
President or VicePresident. The constitutional lapse prompted
Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, An
Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal
to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the
PresidentElect and the VicePresidentElect of the Philippines and
Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same. Republic Act
1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of
-
the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Althoughthe subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form ofgovernment under the 1973 Constitution might haveimplicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory setup, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under thepresent Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his separateopinion, was even more categorical:
The Court is unanimous on the issue of jurisdiction. It has no
jurisdiction on the Tecson and Valdez petitions. Petitioners
cannot invoke Article VII, Section 4, par. 7 of the Constitution
which provides:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc shall be the solejudge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
quali
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796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal
fications of the President or Vice President and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.
The word contest in the provision means that the jurisdiction of
this Court can only be invoked after the election and proclamation
of a President or Vice President. There can be no contest before
a winner is proclaimed.16
Similarly, in her separate opinion, Justice AliciaAustriaMartinez declared:
G.R. Nos. 161434 and 161634 invoke the Courts exclusive
jurisdiction under the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution. I agree with the majority opinion that
these petitions should be dismissed outright for prematurity. The
Court has no jurisdiction at this point of time to entertain said
petitions.
The Supreme Court, as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET), the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) are electoral
tribunals, each specifically and exclusively clothed with
jurisdiction by the Constitution to act respectively as sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the President and VicePresident, Senators, and
-
Representatives. In a litany of cases, this Court has longrecognized that these electoral tribunals exercise jurisdiction overelection contests only after a candidate has already beenproclaimed winner in an election. Rules 14 and 15 of the Rules ofthe Presidential Electoral Tribunal provide that, for President orVicePresident, election protest or quo warranto may be filed afterthe proclamation of the winner.17
Petitioner, a prominent election lawyer who has filed
several cases before this Court involving constitutional and
election law issues, including, among others, the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003),18
cannot claim igno
_______________
16Id., at p. 363.17Id., at pp. 431432.18 Atty. Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, 453 Phil. 586; 405
SCRA 614 (2003).
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VOL. 635, NOVEMBER 23, 2010 797
Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal
rance of: (1) the invocation of our jurisdiction under Section
4, Article VII of the Constitution; and (2) the unanimous
holding thereon. Unquestionably, the overarchingframework affirmed in Tecson v. Commission onElections19 is that the Supreme Court has originaljurisdiction to decide presidential and vicepresidential
election protests while concurrently acting as anindependent Electoral Tribunal.
Despite the foregoing, petitioner is adamant on his
contention that the provision, as worded, does not
authorize the constitution of the PET. And although he
concedes that the Supreme Court may promulgate its rules
for this purpose, petitioner is insistent that the constitution
of the PET is unconstitutional. However, petitioner avers
that it allows the Court to appoint additional personnel for
the purpose, notwithstanding the silence of the
constitutional provision.
Petitioners pastiche arguments are all hurled at the
-
Court, hopeful that at least one might possibly stick. But
these arguments fail to elucidate on the scope of the rules
the Supreme Court is allowed to promulgate. Apparently,
petitioners concept of this adjunct of judicial power is very
restrictive. Fortunately, thanks in no part to petitioners
opinion, we are guided by wellsettled principles of
constitutional construction.
Verba legis dictates that wherever possible, the wordsused in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed, in
which case the significance thus attached to them prevails.
This Court, speaking through former Chief Justice Enrique
Fernando, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land TenureAdministration20 instructs:
As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, itbeing essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever bepresent
_______________
19Supra at note 15.20No. L21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413, 423.
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798 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal
in the peoples consciousness, its language as much as possibleshould be understood in the sense they have in common use.What it says according to the text of the provision to be construedcompels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it,based on the postulate that the framers and the people meanwhat they say. Thus these are cases where the need forconstruction is reduced to a minimum.
However, where there is ambiguity or doubt, the words
of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance
with the intent of its framers or ratio legis et anima. Adoubtful provision must be examined in light of the history
of the times, and the condition and circumstances
surrounding the framing of the Constitution.21 In followingthis guideline, courts should bear in mind the object sought
to be accomplished in adopting a doubtful constitutional
provision, and the evils sought to be prevented or
remedied.22 Consequently, the intent of the framers and
-
remedied.22 Consequently, the intent of the framers andthe people ratifying the constitution, and not thepanderings of selfindulgent men, should be given effect.
Last, ut magis valeat quam pereatthe Constitution isto be interpreted as a whole. We intoned thus in thelandmark case of Civil Liberties Union v. ExecutiveSecretary:23
It is a wellestablished rule in constitutional construction thatno one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all theothers, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearingupon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be sointerpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered andinterpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of theConstitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeatanother, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made tostand together.
_______________
21McCulloch v. State of Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (Wheat.), 1819.
22 In the Philippine context, see Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. Nos. 83896 and 83815, February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317.
23Id., at 330331.
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In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable,and must lean in favor of a construction which will render everyword operative, rather than one which may make the words idleand nugatory.
We had earlier expounded on this rule of construction inChiongbian v. De Leon, et al.,24 to wit:
[T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not havededicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit ofone person without considering that it could also affect others.When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed,that said provision should function to the full extent of itssubstance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunctionwith all other provisions of that great document.
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On its face, the contentious constitutional provision does
not specify the establishment of the PET. But neither does
it preclude, much less prohibit, otherwise. It entertains
divergent interpretations which, though unacceptable to
petitioner, do not include his restrictive viewone which
really does not offer a solution.