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Luhmann's General SociologyAuthor(s): Dag sterberg
Source: Acta Sociologica, Vol. 43, No. 1 (2000), pp. 15-25Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4201179Accessed: 24-08-2014 21:10 UTC
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8/11/2019 Luhmann General Sociology
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ACTA OCIOLOGICA000
Luhmann's
General
Sociology
Dag
0sterberg
Department
of
Music
and
Theatre,
University
of
Oslo,
Norway
ABSTRACT
The
article
deals with
Niklas Luhmann's
treatise
Die
Gesellschaft
der
Gesellschaft,
exposing
it
to
a
critique
in
terms of
Luhmann's own
criterion:
plausibility.
It
is
argued
that both Parsons'
general
sociology
and
Marxism
render
more
plausible
accounts
of
modern
society
than
does
Luhmann's
theory
of
autopoietic
systems.
It
is
asserted
that
the fundamental mistake in Luhmann's theory is his conflation of the concepts of
differentiated social
systems
and autonomous social
systems,
a
conflation that
confers
a
ring
of
the
imaginary
to
Luhmann's
treatise.
Dag
0sterberg,
University
of
Oslo,
Department
of
Music
and
Theatre,
P.O. Box
1017,
Blindem,
N-0315
Oslo,
Norway
? Scandinavian
Sociological
Association
2000
1. Introduction
Ten years ago, in a book on general sociology, I
devoted
a
chapter
to Luhmann's
book Soziale
Systeme
(1984).
I
concluded with a
provisional
epokj?,
saying
that it
was
too
early
for
me to
make
up my
mind as
to
the
validity
of
this
avant-
garde
approach.
Since
then,
Luhmann
has
carried
out
his entire
programme.
After
publish-
ing
a
series
of
monographs
on
particular
social
institutions,
he crowned
his
life
work in
1997
with
a
huge
treatise
on
society
as
a
whole,
world
society
-
Die
Gesellschaft
der
Gesellschaft (1997).
As an
opportunity
to
concentrate on
Luh-
mann's
work
and
take
a
stance
towards
it,
the
present
occasion
is
favourable.
Mainly,
I
shall
comment
upon
Die
Gesellschaft
der
Gesellschaft
(GdG).
This
voluminous book
contains
much of
philosophical
and
meta-sociological
concern
-
considerations
on
non-Aristotelian
logic,
on the
'old
European'
ontology
and
how
to transcend
it,
on the
constructivity
of
science,
etc. I
shall,
however,
limit
myself
here
to
questions
of
a
more
straightforward
sociological
character.
But
in
the
first two
sections,
I
comment on
some
aspects
of
Luhmann's
writings,
which
somehow
disturb the
sociological
reading,
before
turning
to the real
subject
matter,
'die
Sache
selbst'.
2. The
aggressively
anti-left-wing
tone
of
Luhmann's writings
uhmann's
writings
Already
in Soziale
Systeme
(1984),
an
anti-left-
wing
attitude
was
discernible,
in
spite
of the
extremely
abstract
or
general
tone
of
the
discussions
in
the
book.
The
reason
for
this
was
that
left-wing political
positions
or
activities
were
relatively
often
used as
negative examples.
In
GdG
this
anti-left-wing
attitude
is
sharper,
as
in
others of
his
later
writings.
All over
the
thousand
pages
are
sprinkled
sarcastic or
condescending
or
polemical
anti-left-wing
remarks,
which
go
beyond
the mere refutation
of a
different,
adverse
doctrine.
It
is hard
to
say
whether
this is
incon-
sequential
to
Luhmann,
considering
that he
purports
to transcend
all
sorts of
politics
and
moralizing.
He
poses
as
one who
has
pierced
the
illusions
of his
contemporaries,
who
are
stuck
in
an
outdated
'semantics'
which does not
suit
what
he calls 'modern
society'.
More than
any
other
great
sociologist
of the
past,
Pareto
is the
one
who
comes
to
mind
when
reading
GdG.
He,
too,
liked or could
not
resist
venting
his
political
antipathies
in
the
midst of
a
huge,
learned
and
serious
treatise
on
general
sociology.
As one
example,
Luhmann writes
(p.
613
in.)
about 'Marx's
trick' of
describing
society
as
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16 ACTA
SOCIOLOGICA000
VOLUME
3
constituted
by
two
social
classes.
Now,
as
most
sociologists
will
know,
Marx
himself
stated
(in
Das
Capital,
III. ch.
52)
that
capitalist
society
in
his
time
was
constituted
by
three
classes,
the
capitalists,
the
wage-earners
and
the land-
owners. This error raises the suspicion that
Luhmann's vast
readings
do
not
include
Marx's
Das
Capital.
But
this is
a
minor
point
here.
The
issue is rather
why
Luhmann
uses
the
word
'trick',
thereby
suggesting
that
Marx
intended to
deceive his
readers.
Another
example
is
Luhmann's
section
(pp.
847
?T.)
on
'protest
movements'
-
the
atmosphere
is
chilly,
sarcastic,
if
not
downright
hateful.
By
ingenious theological
reasoning
-
Luhmann
knows a
lot
about
theology
-
he
manages
to
present
the
position
of
the
protest
movement as that of the Devil: just as the Devil
pretends
to observe
God
from an
independent
position
(which
is
'impossible'),
the
participant
of
a
protest
movement,
Luhmann
asserts,
pretends
to 'know better' than
society,
which
is also
impossible
and
at
best
ridiculous.
Now,
in
my
own
experience, protest
movements
do not
pretend
to
'know better'
than
'society',
but
'better'
than
the
political
authorities,
which
is
quite
another
thing.
Luhmann's
diabolic inter-
pretation
of
protest
movements
is therefore
unfounded.
But he also
goes
on
to
assert that
'nothing' warrants the assumption that a
protest
movement knows
better than the
authorities
and their
experts.
Now,
at
least
in
Norway,
exactly
this
has
happened
several
times.
A third
example
is found in
Die Kunst der
Gesellschaft,
wherein Luhmann refers in
passing
(p.
228)
to Adorno's and
Horkheimer's 'arro-
gant
rejection'
of
mass
culture.
(It
almost
goes
without
saying
that there are
many
other
attacks
on
the Frankfurter
School
in his
writings.)
Adorno
was
-
in
addition to
a
professional
philosopher
-
an
outstanding
musicologist
and
an
expert
on
literature. He
also wrote
on
film music
together
with
Hans
Eisler.
Obviously
he
was
entitled
to have
his
own
opinion
on
'mass
culture',
which
he
disliked.
Why
does
this dislike
qualify
as
'arrogance'?
Why
should
we instead
trust
Luhmann's
judg-
ment
on mass
culture,
and
his
judgment
on
Adorno?
Luhmann
entangles
himself
in
self-
contradictions.
He states and
repeats
that
one
should
not
pose
as
a
Besserwisser,
as
the
Frankfurter
School
did and does
-
so
why
should
he
himself
pretend
to
know better
than
Adorno and Horkheimer?
Aggressive
remarks
like these
may
be
subconscious
slips
of
the
pen;
they
reveal
Luhmann's
political
stances,
but,
strictly
speak-
ing,
should
not
occur
within
a
sociological
treatise
on
this
level
of
abstraction and
general-
ity.
3. Platitudes
and
cynicisms
Platitudes
of
'gesunde Vernunft'
In
Luhmann's
writings,
extreme
radicalism
goes
together
with
a
strong
conformity
and
establish-
ment
attitude.
His books
abound with
extremely
common-sense
remarks in
favour of the
Estab-
lishment.
Here follow
a
few
examples
to
indicate
what
I
have
in
mind.
In
GdG,
Luhmann
writes
(p.
492):
'Who-
ever wants to abolish nuclear plants (Atom-
kraftwerke)
therefore
will
find
himself
con-
fronted
by
the
question:
How,
then,
do
we
otherwise
produce
electricity?'.
One
response
is
that the
consumption
of
electricity
seems
boundless
today.
Norway,
with all
its
waterfalls,
imports
electricity
from
Denmark.
Examples
of
sheer waste can
easily
be
given.
Now,
those
who
oppose
nuclear-driven
plants very
often
oppose
this
boundless
consumption
of
electricity,
mak-
ing
a
plea
for
a
diminished
consumption
of
electricity
if
necessary.
This
is
not
just
a
whim;
surveys in Norway strongly indicate that the
majority
would
prefer
a
simpler
material life.
Besides,
surely
there
are other
possible
energy
sources:
wind,
sea
waves,
the sun.
(In
Norway,
research on
sea waves
had
a
promising
start
around
1970,
but was
neglected
by
the
authorities
when
the North
Sea
oil
was dis-
covered.)
Luhmann's
remark trivializes the
deep
concern about
the
danger
of nuclear
energy;
he
takes
for
granted
that
nobody
will
renounce
warm
showers
and
drawing
rooms
(where
the
temperature
has
risen
from
18?
to
24
?C
on
average
in recent
decades.)
On
p.
531
we read: 'In
the
meantime,
society
has
got
habituated
to
technics',
and on
the next
page
we
read that
turning
away
from
technology
'is
practically
out
of
question'.
This
is
true,
but
a
platitude,
a
very boring
remark.
This
boredom
may
be
intentional;
Luhmann
-
a
sociologist
of unlimited
imagination
-
pretends
to be
confined
within
extremely
narrow
bound-
aries.
Technology
must
be
accepted
-
why?
Because
it
has
become
a
habit. But
habits,
surely,
can be
changed?
No,
that
is
practically
out
of the
question.
But
what does
'practically'
mean in this context? Could it mean just that
Luhmann
feels
comfortable
with
the
present
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Luhmann's
General
Sociology
17
^?mst?***^?;
level of
technology
in
his
everyday
life?
A few
pages
earlier
(p.
523),
he states
peremptorily:
'Since it is
only
too clear that life and
survival
depends
on
technics,
it
becomes
implausible
'to
make the true
human
the
contrary
of
technics .
This, also,
is
a
platitude,
almost
a
tautology:
our
present-day
Western
way
of
life
depends
on
'technics'
for
its survival.
But
that
cannot mean
that
humanity
as a whole
cannot survive
without
technology;
at
any
rate,
this
is
not at
all
'obvious'
(?berdeutlich).
On
the
other
hand,
what
does seem obvious is that the
population
as a whole cannot
adopt
the Western
level of
technology
without the
ecological
system
breaking
down. For
instance,
not
everybody
can have a car. A
reasonable
conclusion
to be
drawn is that
the West
must
considerably
reduce its use of energy-consuming
technology
and
chemical
products,
even if
this
change
makes life
materially
less
comfortable.
Surely,
Luhmann
is
acquainted
with this
simple
reason-
ing; by ignoring
it in his
text,
he
tries
to
induce
in the reader
conformity
to the
Established
order,
which
is still
oriented towards
technolo-
gical
growth
(pace
the
Brundtland
Report).
In
Goffmannian
terms,
Luhmann's
framing
of his
texts,
his
context of
plausibility,
is
very
often that of the
Establishment,
of the
liberal-
conservative
politics
and
ideology
prevailing
within the ruling and dominating circles. His
platitudes
have this
purpose:
to
make the
reader
take for
granted
the code of
Establishment.
Cynicism
and
blas?
attitude
To
exemplify
Luhmann's
cynicism,
I
shall
comment
upon
a
passage
from
?kologische
Kommunikation
(pp. 212ff.).
The
topic
is the
role of values in
contemporary
political
discus-
sions,
how decisions
are
increasingly
under-
pinned by referring
to
'values',
which
leads to
an
inflation of 'values'.
Now,
Luhmann has
got
an
inkling ('man
kann
ahnen)
that
the
discus-
sions of
ecology
will
contribute to
this infla-
tionary process.
In
the first
place,
he
surmises,
pure
air
and
water,
trees and animals
will
attain
the
dignity
of
entering
the 'list of
values'
(in
the
idiom of laconic
German:
they
will
become
Wertkatalogfdfhig).
He then
goes
on:
'And
since it
is
just
a
question
of a
list,
one could extend it
ad
libitum:
pandas,
Tamils,
women
. . . '.
The
reader
is
prone
to
smile
approvingly
at this
remark,
but
also feels
that
this kind of
humour
is an invitation to
cynicism
for
several
reasons.
In
the first
place,
one is
supposed
to
endorse
('mitmachen)
Luhmann's
placement
of
animals
and
human
beings
on
an
equal
footing.
Certainly, pandas
are
darlings,
cherished ani-
mals for
campaigns
of
the World
Wildlife Fund
and
similar
organizations.
But
are
we to think
of
Tamils as
pandas?
For one
thing,
Tamil
Nadu is
a state in
India,
with
approximately
30 million
inhabitants. To
suggest
that
they
should
be
included in
a
list of
threatened
species
is to
suggest
the
possibility
of
exterminating
them.
Perhaps
Luhmann had
in mind
merely
the
Tamil
refugees
in
Germany,
but
why suppose
that
they
are
more or
less valuable
than other
human
beings,
candidates for a
'catalogue
of
values'?
And
then
'women':
the
suggestion
seems to be that the
various
feminist move-
ments,
while
claiming equality
with
men,
will
go
on and claim that
women
are
more valuable
than
men,
or that
they
feel
threatened with
extermination like
pandas,
which
portrays
the
feminist movement as
hysterical
or
extremely
unrealistic. It also
suggests
that a
woman is a
darling
just
like a
panda, easily
arousing
our
immediate
compassion,
which
sort of
sugges-
tion
should be
resisted
by
sensible
sociologists.
Turn and twist it as
you
like,
this kind of
wit
is
morally
reproachable.
Luhmann,
presumably,
is
fed
up
with
playing
the
sociologist
in the
expected
role as
a
goodie-goodie, backing every
conceivable
Good
Cause,
speaking
for
the
wretched of the
earth, for the underprivileged, for the oppressed,
for
aboriginal populations,
for
those who
are
Different as such.
Instead,
he
opts
for a
certain
cynicism, emphasizing
the
modest role
of
sociology
in social life
today.
On
this
last
point
he
may
be
right,
but
the
situation
does not call
for
cynicism.
The
lawyer
is
committed
to
Justice,
the medical doctor is
committed to
Health,
the
teacher is
committed
to
the
Youth,
etc.
These
are ethical
professions
that
impose
moral
obligations
on those who have
chosen them.
The
sociologist,
too,
may
be
under moral
obligations. But
a
commitment to make society
better is not
sufficient.
What
matters is the
professional
achievement.
The
sociologists
who
make
themselves
spokesmen
for
groups
who
justly
feel that their social
rights
are
being
violated
may appear
to be
goodie-goodies,
but
only
if
they perform
badly.
If
what
they
have
to
say
in
public
comes out as
mere trivial
outbursts
of
indignation, sociologists
are
useless.
Their
specific,
professional
contribution
is
to
underpin
the moral
standpoint
with
better
arguments
and research data than
most
non-sociologists
could
do,
or to
reformulate
the moral
protest
within a more
appropriate
social
context. In
other
words,
the
sociologist
role
is a moral or
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18 ACTASOCIOLOGICA000
VOLUME
3
moralist
one,
just
like that
of the
lawyer
or
medical
doctor. This
may
sometimes be
tiresome
or
cause
uneasy feelings
of
hypocrisy.
But
that is
no reason for the
sociologist
to
opt
for
cynicism.
Let us leave all
consideration
of
attitude
and tone aside, since it disturbs the really
important
subject
matter
of
Luhmann's
work,
i.e. his construction of an alternative
to
all
sociology up
till
now,
to which I now turn.
4. Two basic tenets
Luhmann's two basic tenets are as
follows:
1. 'Modern
society'
is above all
characterized
by ever-increasing
'differentiation' and 'com-
plexity';
2. 'Modern
systems theory'
is best suited to
describe modern
society
in a
scientific
way.
By
'differentiation'
Luhmann
means a
prolifera-
tion of 'autonomous' or
'autopoietic'
social
systems,
each
of them
defined or constituted
by
its own
specific
code or
'leading
difference'.
Any
social
system
deals
with
its
surroundings
-
its Umwelt
-
solely
in
terms of its
specific
code.
Therefore,
it would be
misleading
to
say
that
each
social
system
is a Leibnizian
'monad',
a
'world of its
own',
a solus
ipse.
On
the
contrary,
any
social
system
communicates with its
surroundings
precisely
by
virtue of its
closed-
ness.
Only,
it communicates
through
its own
code.
Social
systems
are
-
according
to Luh-
mann
-
a subclass
of
communication
systems.
Therefore,
sociology
should
be transformed into
a
branch
of communication
theory,
or
-
what
comes
to the same
thing
-
a
branch of modern
systems
theory.
Modern
systems theory
-
according
to
Luhmann
-
has
made
considerable
progress
away
from the
systems thinking
that influenced
Parsons'
and
his school of functional
sociology.
While Parsons described 'social
systems'
in
terms of
'adaptation',
'integration', 'equili-
brium'
and 'maintenance
mechanisms',
thus
presenting
social
life as
by
and
large preoccu-
pied
with
stability
and
self-preservation,
the
recent
systems
theory
of
Maturana and others
emphasizes
wholly
different
characteristics.
5. Stratified
and
functionally
differentiated
societies
'The great transformation' according to Luh-
mann
is the shift
from a
society
constituted
by
social stratification to one
constituted
by
func-
tional
differentiation.
With
him,
the
term
'stratification'
seems to denote a
system
of
estates
or St?nde. Modern
society
is not
without
social
stratification,
but
this is no
longer
an
essential trait. One's social origin (Herkunft)
'hardly plays
any
longer
a role within
the
functional
systems' (p.
734). (This
recalls the
Linton-Parsonian
distinction
'ascribed
status-
achieved
status',
and is
probably
meant
as an
improvement
on
that.)
Within
functionally
differentiated
society,
each 'function'
corre-
sponds
to or defines an
autopoietic
system,
each with a
specific
leitdifferenz,
communicating
with the environment
according
to its code.
From
Parsonian functionalism
Luhmann
makes a most
important
break
-
to
him,
'the
functional' is dissociated from all concerns with
social
'integration' (though,
as
I
shall
argue
later,
he is
inconsequential
on this
point).
With
Parsons,
the
functionally
differentiated institu-
tions
contribute,
each in its
specific way,
to the
maintenance
of
society
as a whole.
Luhmann
expressly
denies this.
In
any
case,
one
must
give up
the
idea
dominating
the research on modernization after
WWII,
that
is.
the idea
that modernization
trends within the
particular
functional
systems
-
political
democ-
racy,
rule of
law.
research
unhampered
by dogmas,
non-censured mass media, schooling of the whole
population
according
to their individual
capacities
etc.
-
will
trigger
off
an
impulse
of
development,
where
the achievement of each
particular
function
system
would
reciprocally support
and affirm the
other,
(p.
568)
Precisely
this was the
presupposition
of Parsons.
Luhmann,
by
contrast,
adds:
'Rather,
the
opposite
is
probable'
(ibid.)
That is to
say.
the
evolution
of modern
societies
points
towards
dissolution
and
disintegration,
if it
has
any
direction
at all.
Luhmann
states that modern
society
is not
predictable,
nor does he think that
sociology
can
tell the truth
about social life.
By
what
criteria
then
are we to
judge
Luhmann's
general
sociology?
His own
criterion is
plausibility:
'The
semantics
in
question
must be
plausible
and
appropriate (passen)
to the structures of the
social
system' (p.
156).
And:
'Every self-descrip-
tion demands
historical
plausibility
in the
situation
in
which
the
self-description
is
regarded
as such'
(p.
1137).
In order
to evaluate the
plausibility
of
Luhmann's sociology I begin by sketching two
pre-existing
plausible
accounts of modern
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Luhmann'sGeneral
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19
society,
i.e. Parsonian and
Marxist
interpreta-
tions.
6.
The
plausibility
of
Parsons' 'semantics'
In
many ways,
Luhmann's construction endea-
vours to
improve upon
and
supersede
that of his
former
teacher,
Parsons. One
may
therefore
with
good
reason reflect
on the
plausibility
of
Parsons'
interpretation
of the
contemporary
world,
especially
as
presented
in his The
System
of
Modern Societies from
1971.
(This
book,
together
with its
preceding companion
volume,
is an overview
published
when
Parsons was 68
years
old,
and thus is a
pendant
to
Luhmann's
GdG,
published
when
he
was
70
years
old.)
Parsons describes modern society in terms of his
action
theory
and its
specification
of
various
types
of
action,
chosen from a
number of
structural
variables-universalism-particular-
ism,
specificity-diffuseness,
etc. The modern
world is
characterized
by
the
paramount
importance
of the
universalism-performance-
affect
neutrality pattern-foreshadowed
by
the
Calvinist
type
of the
Reformation
age.
This
pattern
is internalized
as
a
prevalent personality
type
and
institutionalized
as
a
cultural
pattern.
But this value
pattern,
while
dominant,
is not
the only one. On the contrary, it stands in a
complementary
relation to other
patterns,
such
as
the
pattern
dominating
within
the
family
institution,
and within
institutions
like
science
and art.
Generally,
modern
society
is charac-
terized
by
advanced functional
differentiation:
each differentiated
subsystem
has its function
within
the
system
as a
whole,
which makes
the
system
as such
highly
flexible and
adaptive.
This is
so,
provided
there
is sufficient
integration
of the
system;
i.e. the
subsystems
and their institutions
-
while
having
their own
'logic'
or
specific
value
pattern
-
must at the
same
time
be
functional
to
the
system
as a
whole. The
subsystems
must be
subordinated to
the
system,
through
value
integration.
This is
what
by
and
large
has
gone
on over
the
centuries.
Thus,
one
can
follow
the double
evolutionary process
of differentiation
and
integration
since the
age
of
the
renaissance
and reformation in
Europe.
The
first
stage
was
the differentiation of
political
and
religious
institutions;
the next
was the
differentiation of
economy
and
household
institutions;
the
third
was the differentiation of
professional
life and
educational culture. The
leading
societies of this
evolution
were
England
and
Holland,
but
around the turn of
the last
century,
the
USA
became the lead
society.
It had
become
as
democratic as France and as
industrially
advanced as
England, combining
these two
features on a new level of
integration
and
differentiation.
What makes
the USA so
markedly
modern
is first its absence
of
nobility
and aristocratic
culture. American
culture is
egalitarian,
based
upon
the value of work
and
individual achieve-
ment.
Next,
it is the
absence
of
religious
persecution.
Religious
life in
the USA is
plural-
ist; indeed,
the
emigration
to
America
began
as
an
escape
from the
horrors
of
religious
intoler-
ance
in
Europe.
In the
USA,
religion
is not
part
of the
political
constitution,
but differentiated as
part
of civil
society.
Third,
the
differentiation
between daily community life and the legal
institution is
marked;
the
legal
system
is
important
for
integrating society
as a
whole,
regulating
conflicts
according
to universalist
principles.
Fourth,
the
political
institution
is
sharply
differentiated from
the
economy,
mak-
ing charges
of
'corruption'
very
serious.
Early
America was
characterized
by
a
multitude of different ethnic and
religious
groups.
Their
integration,
socially
and cul-
turally,
has
been
going
on
by
and
large
un-
interrupted.
The
evolutionary
trend has been
towards ever more widespread commitment to
the dominant value
system.
Ethnic and other
differences have been
overcome
through
'adap-
tive
upgrading'
of the cultural
and social
systems, through
a
parallel process
of
general-
ization and
differentiation. The
functionality
of
this most modern of
societies
is shown
by
its
capacity
to
adapt
to new
challenges
from the
environment.
The conflicts within this
modern
society
may
be
considerable,
but
they
do not
challenge
the
dominant
cultural
pattern
as such. Left-
wing opponents
comment
harshly upon
the
glaring inequalities
and
injustices
of the
system,
but in
doing
so,
they presuppose
that
very
value
system.
No alternative cultural and
social model
has been
important
in the USA.
True,
the
Soviet
Union has been a
'counterpart'
model
since the
Cold
War,
at least. But closer
scrutiny
reveals
that
on
many
points,
the Soviet
Union
repeats
the modernization
process
of
Western
countries,
and thus does not
proffer
an
essentially
different
type
of
society.
Its lack of
differentiation
between
the
economy
and the
polity
is a
pre-modern
trait,
making
the
system
less
flexible and
adaptive
than that of the USA. The
prospect
is
that the Soviet Union
will
get
more
and more
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ACTASOCIOLOGICA
000
VOLUME3
similar to the
USA in the
future.
The
same
goes
for
other
non-Western
societies
-
Japan,
China,
etc.
Thus,
a
synthesis
of
Durkheimian
and
Weberian
sociology
is attained.
With
Durkheim,
Parsons approaches modern
society
from the
perspective
of social
and
cultural
integration.
Drawing
on
recent
psychology
and
psychother-
apy,
he
gives
a
better
understanding
of how
the
individual
internalizes and
adapts
to his or
her
society,
and how
personality
conflicts
have to do
with
conflicts and
disintegrative
features of the
social
groups
to
which the
individual
belongs.
On
the
basis
of
recent,
neo-evolutionary biology,
he
develops
Durkheim's
sociology
of
differentia-
tion and
integration,
taking
the
'cultural
symbol'
as the
sociological equivalent
of the
biological 'gene', and stressing 'adaptive up-
grading',
thus
meeting
the
objection
that his
sociological theory
is static.
With
Weber,
Parsons
stresses
the
impor-
tance of Western
Rationality.
He
shows how the
professional
in modern
organizational
life
-
within
business,
politics,
science,
etc.
-
has
internalized
the
value
pattern
that
originated
within
English
and
Dutch
Reformed Christian-
ity, stressing
self-control,
individuality,
'inner-
worldly
asceticism'.
Parsons
combines
neo-
Freudian
psychology
with
(neo)-Weberianism:
the paramount role of the universalism-
achievement-affect
neutrality
pattern
entails
considerable
strain on
the
personality,
threaten-
ing
neurosis
and
mental
disturbance. The
function
of modern
family
life is to
counteract
these
tendencies;
the
value
pattern
of
the
modern
family
differs
strongly
from,
say,
that
of the Wilhelmine era. In
the
modern American
family,
affectionate
relations are
all-important,
and the
significance
of marital
sexual
relations
paramount.
The much-derided
'money/sex'
preoccupation
is therefore a case
of
adaptive
upgrading,
of
counteracting
disintegration by
differentiation. Similar
considerations
pertain
to
the
differentiation of the
scientific
subsystem
in
relation to
religion,
or
the
subsystem
of art in
relation
to
science,
etc.
By
an
elaborate
system
of
'pattern
vari-
ables',
combined
with a
refined
theory
of
differentiation,
integration,
functionality
and
conflict,
Parsons succeeds in
giving
a
highly
plausible
account of modern societies.
In
fact,
his
interpretation appears
more
plausible today
than
at the
time
it was
published.
For at
that
time,
the
Student and Counterculture
movements had
started,
protesting against
the achievement
orientation
of the dominant
middle-class cui-
ture. This was the
heyday
of
Marcues's
Eros
philosophy (opposed
to
the
'sex-and-work'
pattern).
Further,
the
USA's
engagement
in
Vietnam
was
becoming
more and
more
alarm-
ing,
demonstrating
violent and
amodern
aggression
as an
aspect
of American
modernity,
an
aspect
Parsons
played
down in
his
account.
In
addition,
Third World
countries
had
important
liberation
movements,
fighting
against capitalist imperialism,
making
a
deep
impression upon public
opinion
in
the
West.
Also,
the
cultural
revolution
in China
had
many
famous
proponents.
From
this
perspective,
Parsons
appeared
as a
model of the
Apologist
of
his
own
society. Today,
Parsons'
anticipations
have been confirmed to a
large
extent.
Norwe-
gian
society,
for
instance,
has
become
more
similar to the USA in recent decades. The
modernization of Asia also
goes
on in an
'American
way'.
Even the
core of
the former
'counterpart',
the Soviet
Union,
has
developed
a
'market
economy'
-
and so
on. The
system
of
modern
societies
appears
to be as
well
inte-
grated
as
ever,
under
the
leadership
of the
USA
-
at least from the
viewpoint
of a
sociology
of
social
integration
and
differentiation.
7.
The
plausibility
of
'Marxism'
There has been
a
widespread
flight
away
from
Marxist
doctrines
in
the last two
decades,
especially
after
the
dissolution of the
Union of
Socialist Soviet
Republics,
and the
reunion
(Wiedervereinigung)
of East
and West
Germany.
These two
momentous
political
events
are
often
presented
as
the reasons for a
turning away
from
Marxist
stances. This
may
hold true in
some
arenas,
but from the
standpoint
of
general
sociology,
Marxist
interpretations
of
the world
have
not
weakened
during
the
1980s and
1990s.
The
mode
of
production
characterizing
Western
societies
is
capitalist
in the
strict
sense: it
is
defined
by
private
ownership
of the
means of
production
and
distribution,
and
this
property
is
administered
as
capital,
i.e.
as value
to be
augmented
in the form of
'profit'.
The
complement
to
capital
is
wage
labour and the
wage
labour-market. The market as an
institu-
tion
makes
for
competition
and
non-co-opera-
tion,
thus
making prices appear
as
the outcome
of
supply
and demand. For this
reason,
the
capitalist
mode
of
production
and
distribution
is
also called the 'market
economy'.
The
main
cultural code
defending
and
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legitimating
this
mode of
production
is Liberal-
ism.
It
may
be
advocated
in
more or
less
good
faith,
more
or
less
hypocritically.
Liberalism
celebrates
the
capitalist
mode of
production
as
the
bulwark
of
Freedom for
all,
and
also
as
conducive
to economic
or material
Progress
for
all.
Liberalism
defends the
unalienable
right
of
each individual
to
property
and
freedom,
in
the
tradition
of Locke.
Its
blindness
has
been
pointed
out
by
both
Conservative and
Socialist
thinkers,
countless
times.
Sociologically,
it
must
be considered
as
a
refuted doctrine.
Notwith-
standing
this
refutation,
Liberal
thought
con-
tinues
to dominate the cultural
world
of
Capital,
with
its cult of individualism.
On
the
philoso-
phical
or
ideological
level the
prestige
of
neo-
liberal economic
theory
and
its
ramifications
(game theory,
economic
theory
of
marriage,
etc.)
underpin
the
capitalist
mode of
production.
Through
its 'materialist
conception
of
History'
Marxist
thought
points
out
how
the
artefacts
of human
activities
become
a
kind of
'actor'
in
social
life,
in
addition to
its
human
participants.
By
generalizing
the role
of
Capital
as an
acting
historical
force,
one
obtains
the
notion
of
a
'practico-inert
field'
(Sartre
1960)
or
a
'socio-material
field',
which
makes
possible
a
non-intellectualist
doctrine
of
social
action,
thus
contradicting the Liberal doctrine.
Capitalist
production
and
distribution
tend
to
expand unceasingly,
transforming
more
and
more
products
and activities into
'commodities'
and
'services',
thus
making
money
the
general
medium
and mediator of
relationships
between
human
beings. Working
activities are
trans-
formed
into
wage
labour and
profit-seeking,
leisure
time transformed into
consumption
of
capitalized
entertainment such
as
'tourist
packages'
or
the
products
of
'pop
industry'.
As
Marx and
Engels
stated
in
the
Manifesto,
nothing is 'holy' for Capital.
The
capitalist
mode
of
production
and
distribution
entails
the
division of
society
into
two
major
classes
-
the
capitalist
class and
the
wage
labour
class,
or
'proletariat'.
Owing
to the
'permanent
revolution' of the
means
of
produc-
tion
('technology'),
there
exists
at
any
time
a
'reserve
army'
of
wage
labourers.
This
reserve
army
tends
to
exert
pressure
on
the
wage
level,
making
it descend towards
a
subsistence
level.
Hence,
it
is
impossible
for most
wage
labourers
to accumulate
capital
and leave
the
wage
labour
class.
On
the
contrary,
the
historical
tendency
is
to
transform
small
peasants, shopkeepers,
etc.
into
wage
labourers.
The
'relative
pauperiza-
tion'
(Verarmung)
of
the
wage
labour
class
is a
historical trend:
the
wealth
of
the
great capital
owners
being
vertiginous,
the condition
of
the
ordinary
wage
labourer becomes
relatively
worsened.
Social
life revolves around the
capitalist
mode of
production
and
distribution
and
its
inherent
conflicts.
The State
charges
itself
with
the
task
of
ensuring 'peace
in
working
life',
pacifying
and
neutralizing
discontented
groups,
implementing
schemes
for
welfare and social
security
and
protecting
the
regime
of
private
property
through
the
police
apparatus
and
the
prison
system.
On
the
cultural
level,
legitima-
tion
of
the
capitalist
economy
goes
on
unceas-
ingly
in
the mass
media,
as
testified
by
soap
operas
and
the
TV
series of
crime and
action.
This
kind
of entertainment is
only intelligible
provided
the
capitalist
or
market
economy
is
taken for
granted.
The
so-called
'globalization'
process
implies
the
speeding
up
of
capitalist expansion
all
over
the world.
The
semi-corporate
tendencies
of
the
postwar period
have
been
counteracted since
the
1980s
for countries
like
Egypt,
Indonesia
and India as
well
for
Western
Europe.
In
addition,
the
market
economy
is
sought
in
Eastern
Europe,
even
in the
People's
Republic
of
China. This
globalization
entails
unfettered
world markets - a process that considerably
weakens
the collective
bargaining
strength
of
trade
unions
and
other
wage
labour interest
organizations.
A world
proletariat
arises
of
hitherto unseen
magnitude
-
millions and
millions of
wage
earners
working
on
or
below
subsistence
level.
They
are
badly
organized,
even
disorganized
-
a
condition
upheld
in
many
cases
by
the State's
armed
forces.
Precisely
because
Eastern
Europe
failed
to
construct
an alternative
economy,
Marx
and
Engels' interpretation
accords
better
with
plain
facts than it has done for many decades. In order
to defend
Marxist doctrines
in the
period
1950-
80,
one
had to
be
subtler,
one
had
to
point
out
latent structures
of
oppression
and
domination,
showing
that,
contrary
to
appearances,
capital-
ist class
society
was
still
with
us.
Today,
the
basic traits of
a
society
based
upon
a
capitalist
mode
of
production
are
quite
manifest,
even
openly
declared
and hailed as
historical
pro-
gress.
This,
I
presume,
is one
of
the
reasons
why
a
Marxist
interpretation
has lost
its
spell
for
many
sociologists.
Since
it
accords
('stimmt)
so
well with
facts,
it
does
not
pose
the
same
intellectual
challenge
as
before;
it
cannot
satisfy
the
need
to be
sophisticated
and
brilliant;
a
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22 ACTASOCIOLOGICA
000
VOLUME3
Marxist
description
has become
plainly
in
accordance
with
facts,
and hence
banal.
True,
on one essential
point,
the Marxist
doctrine
is not
plausible,
on
the
topic
of the class
struggle.
The
class
struggle
does not evolve
according to Marxist interpretations. The
labour movements
in the
West are weak at
present,
and
the
huge
masses of
wage
labourers
in countries
like South
Korea,
Thailand,
the
Small
Tigers,
etc. seem at least to live
under
the
sway
of
capitalist
domination. If there is class
struggle,
it
seems
that the
rising
class
is
rather
the
capitalists,
not the
proletariat.
Despite
this,
taken as a
whole,
the Marxist
doctrine
is
quite
plausible
as an
interpretation
of
world
society
today.
This is so because
it
does
-
just
like Parsons'
-
base itself
upon
what Weber
termed 'central cultural values'. Marxist doc-
trine bases
itself
upon
the fundamental notions
of
Modernity
-
Reason,
individual
liberty
and
historical
Progress.
The
shortcomings
of
Liber-
alism
cannot
simply
be
regarded
with forbear-
ance,
since
Liberal
thought,
too,
is committed to
Modernity.
Marxism,
as the internal
critique
of
Liberal
thought,
is
plausible
and
important
as
long
as and
in
so
far as Liberalism
prevails
in
our culture.
8.
The
implausibility
of Luhmann's
semantics
The world
is not
acentric;
it has one
or
more centres
'Functional
society',
Luhmann
states,
Operates
without
a
top
and
a
center'
(p.
803).
This
is,
he
thinks,
one
of the
main
reasons
the
protest
movements
are ill-conceived
and
doomed
to
failure.
But
the statement is
implausible;
it even
goes
against
widespread experience.
Luhmann
speaks
of
'premature (vorzeitige)
fixation
of
ideas'
(p.
540),
which
in fact
applies
in the
present
case.
According
to the
theory
of
autopoietic
systems,
'society'
should be
an
acentric
system.
But world
society
certainly
has a
centre,
or
at
least,
it
is
polycentric.
The
centre
of the
world is
the
leading
strata of
the
USA
-
it
dominates the
world
economically,
politically,
culturally
and
militarily.
Several of
the
mega-cities
of the world
-
New
York,
London,
Paris,
Tokyo
-
exert
a
strong
influence
upon
the rest
of the
world,
an influence which is
not
reciprocated
by
the lesser
agglomerations.
There is not even a
tendency
in an acentric
direction;
on
the
contrary,
the concentration
of
economie,
political,
etc.
power
has
apparently
become
stronger recently.
The
notion
of an acentric world
can be
found in anarchist
thinking,
such
as in
Deleu-
ze's
philosophy
of
Difference.
But this
philoso-
phical notion cannot support the statement that
today
world
society
is acentric. That statement
is
simply wrong.
Whoever
goes
outside
the
Western
hemisphere
will
have
the
experience
that
people
are,
whether
they
want
to be
or
not,
'other-directed',
oriented towards the
Western
world and under
its domination. It is
almost
embarrassing
to
point
out this fact.
World
society
does not
become
ever more
functionally
differentiated
One
may
venture
the assertion that there exist
few, if any, autopoietic systems in social life. Again,
modern
systems
theory, imported
from
biology
into
sociology,
leads
astray.
To
demonstrate
this
may
be
embarrassingly
trivial,
all the
more
so
as
Luhmann
himself
addresses a list of
weighty
objections
to
his own thesis.
Nevertheless,
I
make an
attempt
to
point
out the
obvious,
beginning by
commenting upon
a
couple
of
quotations.
Luhmann
states: 'We have
already empha-
sized
that
those
who
possess
do not
deserve
more
esteem
(Achtung)
than those who do not'
(p. 406). This does not demonstrate Luhmann's
personal
attitude,
but that of modern
society.
But
as such
it is
plainly
wrong. High
income
and
wealth do
in
fact serve
or
function
as status
symbols.
This
was
pointed
out
long ago
by
functionalists
(Sorokin
1927;
Parsons
1940;
Davis
&
Moore
1945).
Thus,
one of the main
justifications
for income differentiation
within
organizations
is
that those who fill the most
important
positions
should earn more than the
rest
as
a kind of
'reward' and
sign
of
esteem.
Luhmann
states: 'Not even the
very
rich
have for that
reason
political power
or
better
artistic
understanding
or better chances
to be
loved'
(p.
767).
Once
more,
the
incorrectness
of
this as
a
statement
of
fact
is
palpable.
As
for
'the
chances
to be
loved',
it is documented
that
very
few
rich
men
are not
married,
even
if the
proverb
says
that love
may
befall
upon
dirt
as
well as
upon
a
lily.
That
being
rich
does
not
influence
social standards
of art
may perhaps
be
defended,
though investigations
such as
those
by
Bourdieu
clearly
indicate
that
the
opposite
is
true. As for
the
political
power
of rich
people
as
such,
this is
almost
true
by
definition. To
be
very
rich cannot but have political consequences.
Therefore
the
political
and economic
systems
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Luhmann's
General
Sociology
2 3
must
be
taken
as
one
politico-economic
system.
To
conceive the
economy
as an
autopoietic
system,
the code of
which
is
'pays/pays
not',
Luhmann makes
the distinction
between
the
'achievement'
(Leistung)
of the
economy
and
its
function,
to
'secure
future
subsistence
(k?nftige
Versorgung)'
(p.
758).
Even
so,
the
construction
is awkward.
Luhmann
praises
the
'money
economy'
as the most
spiritual
achievement of
modern
society
(ibid.).
However,
the
world
economy
is not
about
money,
but
about
production
and
distribution of
'use
values',
about the 'metabolism
with
nature'
(Marx),
whereby humanity
transforms
the
environment
and
thereby
itself.
Even
within a
capitalist
economy,
where financial
capital
plays
an
important
role,
as is
the case
today,
where
speculators all over the world can threaten
national economies
-
even
today
business
people
are
preoccupied
with
'real
capital'
as
distinct from
'money
assets'.
Institutional
eco-
nomics has shown
over and over
again
that
the
economy
is not
autonomous
-
what,
then,
is
gained by
characterizing
economy
as
autopoie-
tic? Mutatis
mutandis,
one could
show
that
the
other institutions of
society,
too,
do not
qualify
as
'autopoietic' systems.
As for
the
institution
of
Art,
the
autopoietic
thesis
may,
at
the
very
least,
hold
for a
segment
of
the
modern
art
institution,
but not for the institution of art as a whole.
The class
distinction
is not
replaced
by
an
inclusion/exclusion
distinction
Luhmann
himself
emphasizes
that
'social stra-
tification is
by
no means
abolished' in
present-
day society (p.
772).
But he
thinks that
stratification
-
and a
fortiori
social
class
-
is
less
important
than
the
distinction
between
those
who are
included
in
society
and
those
who
are
excluded.
The
inclusion/exclusion
distinc-
tion recalls
that
of the
'2/3
society' image. Most
of the
population
is
integrated,
they
have
jobs,
satisfactory
family
or
other
primary
relations,
they
take
an
interest
in
public
matters,
etc.
A
minority
is
marginalized
and
excluded
-
the
homeless,
the
junkies,
the
criminals,
the
hope-
lessly
poor,
etc.
This
conceptualization
induces
one to
think
and feel
that
wage
earners have
more
in
common with
the
great
capitalists
than
with
the
'excluded'
-
'after
all,
I
have a
home,
a
job,
I
am
included'.
This
is a
comforting thought
for
'the little
man'. Der
kleine
Mann
should
not
ask for too
much,
but
must be
content
with
little. In fact, the conflicts in modern
society
are
still
not
constituted
mainly
by
the
exclusion/
inclusion distinction
-
but
by
class
conflicts
and
similar
interest
group
conflicts.
The
notion
of
progress9
is
not
obsolete
Luhmann
discards the
notion
of
'progress'
many
times in GdG. For
instance,
he
asserts
that 'since
the end of
the
19th
century
one
dares
no
longer
(traut
man
sich
nicht)
presuppose
progress' (p.
567).
Luhmann
may
be
thinking
of
Nietzsche
or
Georges
Sorel,
Max
Weber,
Spen-
gler,
etc.,
even the
Dada
movement
-
all
of
whom
rejected
the
notion
of
Progress.
But
even
so,
there can be
no doubt
that
the notion of
progress
is
still
important
within
modern
society.
Thus,
the
semantics of
scientific
pro-
gress,
or
economic
progress
(Allianza
para
el
progreso,
etc.)
has
permeated
public
discourse
since 1945 until this
very day.
Those who
follow,
or
have even heard of
names like
Koyr?,
Kuhn, Foucault,
or
who know
anything
about
'paradigm
shifts'
constitute
a
dwindling
minor-
ity.
9. The
imaginary
character
of
Luhmann's
sociology
Parsons'
Empiricist
and
Positivist-minded
adver-
saries used to
dismiss his
general
sociology
as
empty verbiage, as words and utterances with
no
'empirical
reference',
as mere
thoughts.
Parts
of
Luhmann's
doctrine
may provoke
similar
responses.
But
-
except
in the
specific
sense of
Heidegger
and
Sartre -1 for
my
part
do
not
accept
that it is
possible
to
think
about
nothing.
All
thinking
is about
something
in
the
world.
Therefore,
even if
there
may
not be
many
autopoietic
systems
in
the
world,
and
world
society may
not
be
structured
by
functional
differentiation,
Luhmann's
general
sociology
cannot for
that
reason
be
rejected
tout court. It
remains to account for the delight of his texts,
what
makes
them so
fascinating
and
brilliant.
The answer
proffered
here,
is
twofold.
First,
Luhmann's erudition
makes his books
highly
valuable.
In
themselves
all
the
bibliographical
references
make his
books treasures for
anybody
occupied
with the
history
of ideas and
cultural
history.
Also,
his
style
of
writing
is
fluent,
light
and
elegant.
Secondly,
and
more
importantly,
the
fascination of
a
work like Die
Gesellschaft
der
Gesellschaft
is one
of
the
imaginary.
Luhmann's
sociology
is about
society
in
an
imaginary
mode
of
being,
as contrasted with
society
in
the
modus of
the
real.
Here,
as
on
many
occasions
before,
I take
the
distinction
between the
real
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ACTA
SOCIOLOGICA
000
VOLUME
3
and
the
imaginary
in the sense
of
Sartre,
in
his
phenomenological
study
from
1940,
L'imagi-
naire
(Sartre
1940,
published
in
English
as
The
Psychology
of
Imagination).
While
the
real is
characterized
by
a
general causality,
the
ima-
ginary is not. Therefore, dreams are so hard to
retell;
they
seem
to
dissolve when we tell others
about
them,
since
they
do
not
obey
the
general
law
of cause
and effect. The
imaginary
is
unreal,
a
specific
attitude
of
consciousness
towards the
world.
Luhmann's
writings
often
take
on
this
imaginary
character. One sometimes
gets
the
impression
that
he
is
'playing'
at
being
a
scientist,
for
instance,
when
he
writes
about
choosing
between
different
'theoretical
strate-
gies'
or sets forth
'hypotheses'
that
are
not
subsequently put to any test. The imaginary
character
of the
treatise
also stems
from his
slippery
use of
biological
metaphors.
While
Luhmann
asserts
that
one
should
not
think
of
society
in
terms
of
biology,
he time and
again
writes
in
a
biological
vein.
Thus,
he tells
us
(p.
504)
that
Lamarck
introduced
the word
'irritabilit?'
into
biology.
But
he
himself writes
about modern
society
letting
itself
be 'irritated'
by
the environment,
and
this
time,
he does
not
mean
'irritation'
in
the
sense
that a
person
gets
irritated
with another.
He
suggests
'irritability'
in the sense of Lamarck, that is, the capacity of
responding
to a
stimulus.
By
this
perpetual
quidproquo
and
Vexierbild
our
image
of
modern
society
becomes
flimmery
and
dreamlike,
i.e.
imaginary.
10. A
fundamental
objection:
conflation
of
differentiation
and
autonomization
The
most
serious
error,
it
seems
to
me,
is
Luhmann's
abuse
of,
or an
imaginary,
equivocal
use
of the
term
functional
differentiation.
This
term
has
a clear
meaning
within
the Durkheim/
Sorokin/Parsons
perspective,
where
it
gener-
alizes
the
notion of
'division of
labour'. The
socially
functional
is connected
to
what
is
differentiated,
and social
differentiation
is con-
ceptually
connected
to
social
integration,
just
as
the
differential
and the
integral belong together
in
Mathematics.
Sometimes
Luhmann
writes
about
the
functional
in
the
above-mentioned,
traditional
sense
as
something
that serves
(dient) general
society,
that
is,
contributes
in
a
specific
way
to
its
preservation.
He
also
some-
times
partakes
of the Durkheimian concern
with
social
preservation,
as when
he
uses
his
favourite
phrase,
'so
geht
es
nicht
weiter,
it
cannot
go
on
like this
any
longer.
Then
he
describes
society
as
perpetually
striving
to
obtain
integration
in a
world
of
ever-increasing
complexity.
But
elsewhere,
Luhmann confers
another meaning upon the term 'functional' -
every
social
system
is
functional
by
virtue
of
its
performance
according
to
its
specific
code.
Now,
he
describes
society
as a
multitude
of
systems,
each
acting according
to its own
code.
What
he
aims
at is
to
generalize
Weber's
notion
of
mutually
irreconcilable
value
spheres
(the
political,
the
moral,
the
erotic,
the
religious,
etc.).
Weber
(1922)
tends
to
present
modern
society
as
constituted
by
autonomous
interest
spheres
-
where
art
challenges morality
(instead
of
sup-
porting
it,
as
in
Kant's
Critique
of
Judgment
and
other idealist aesthetic doctrines); where the
erotic
challenges
the
political,
and
so
on,
in
the
famous
'demonic
struggle'
between value com-
mitments.
Weber's value
spheres,
owing
to their
supposed
autonomy,
may
serve as
examples
of
'autopoietic
systems'.
Moreover,
Weber
himself
very
seldom
writes
about
'differentiation' of
these
spheres,
since
'differentiation' refers to
the
twin
concept
of
'integration'.
It
seems
to
me that
Habermas
was
the
first
to blur
the
opposition
between
Durkheim/
Parsons
and
Weber,
imputing
to
Weber a notion
of modern
differentiation
which
is
foreign
to
his
thought
(Habermas
1981).
Luhmann
appears
to make
the same
mistake. This
mistake is
at
the
same
time obvious
and
grave
-
differentiation
and
autonomization
are
opposite processes.
They
point
in
opposite
directions: differentiation
towards
integration,
autonomization
towards
disintegration
and
conflict.
Luhmann
conflates
the
perspectives
of
Durkheim
and
Weber.
But he
leans
more
towards
Weber
than Durkheim.
His
autopoietic
conception
of
modern
society
emphasizes
its
fragmented
character,
consisting
of a multitude
of autonomous
contexts
and
groups
trying
to
maintain
their
autonomy.
Within
such
a
picture,
there
is
no
place
for
the
term 'functional
differentiation'.
Society,
as
described
by
Luh-
mann,
is
not
differentiating
itself;
therefore
it
is
misleading
to
designate
the social
systems
as
'functional'.
The
fascination
of Luhmann's
general
writings
partly
stems
from this
con-
ceptual
conflation;
his
synthesis
is
not
real,
but
imaginary.
A
possible
rejoinder
may
be that,
after
all,
the
proliferation
of
autopoietic
systems
may
'serve' modern
society by augmenting
the
mass of alternatives to select from. To cope with
complexity,
modern
society
then
has at
its
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Luhmann'sGeneral
Sociology
25
disposal
an
increasing complexity
of
alterna-
tives
-
and to
Luhmann,
the functional
con-
notes
alternatives.
Possibly,
this
may
be
granted,
but
since the evolution of modern
society
-
according
to
Luhmann,
by
contrast with
Parsons
-
has no
direction,
this functional
interpretation
of
autopoietic systems
adds little
to our
understanding
of world
society
-
it
reminds
me of
the mild
optimism
of classical
Deism.
11. Final
remark
By
no means does this 'critical
critique'
intend
to
reject everything
in Luhmann's
sociology.
His
book on
intimacy
is an
important
contribution,
as is much of his
sociology
of the art institution.
However,
these
and other fine
contributions
do
not
depend
for their
validity
on the
general
theory
of
autopoietic systems,
the
specific
doctrine
of
evolution,
etc.
What
I
oppose,
in
this
comment,
is Luhmann's most
general
tenets,
as
presented
in
Soziale
Systeme
and Die
Gesellschaft
der
Gesellschaft.
First version received
May
1999
Final version
accepted August
1999
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