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1. Alba vs. De La Cruz *September 16, 1910---TrentFacts:

1. Manuela, Jose, Juan, and Francisco (PETITIONERS) surnamed Grey y Alba, are the only heirs of Doa SegundaAlba Clemente and Honorato Grey, deceased. Remedios Grey y Alba, a sister of the petitioners, was married onthe 21st day of March, 1903, to Vicente Reyes and died on the 13th of July, 1905, without leaving any heirsexcept her husband. The four petitioners, as coowners, sought to have registered the following-describedproperty:

2. This parcel of agricultural land is used for the raising of rice and sugar cane and is assessed at $1,000 United

States currency. The petition was accompanied by a plan and technical description of the above-describedparcel of land.

3. After hearing the proofs presented, the court entered a decree in accordance with the provisions of paragraph6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, directing that the land described in the petitioner be registered in the names ofthe four petitioners, as coowners, subject to the usufructuary right of Vicente Reyes, widower of RemediosGrey.

4. On the 16th of June, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the Court of Land Registration asking fora revision of the case, including the decision, upon the ground that he is the absolute owner of the two parcelsof land which are described in said motion.

5. He alleged that the decreewas obtained maliciously and fraudulently by the petitioners, thereby depriving himof said two parcels of land. He further alleged that he was the absolute owner of the two parcels of land,having inherited them from his father, Baldomero R. de la Cruz,

6. The 4 petitioners inherited this land from their parents, who acquired the same, including the two small parcelsin question, by purchase, as is evidenced by a public document dated the 26th of November, 1864.

7. Baldomero R. de la Cruz, father of the appellee, obtained in march, 1895, a state grant for several parcels o

land, including the two parcels in question. This grant was duly inscribed in the old register of property inBulacan on the 6th of April of the same year.

8. The petitioners insist that the appellee was occupying these parcels as their tenant and for this reason they didnot include his name in their petition, as an occupant, while the appellee contends that he was occupying thesaid parcels as the absolute owner under the estate grant by inheritance.

Issue:Should the application be denied because the petitioners did not include the names of the lessors?Held: No, there was no fraud.Decision: Appeal partially grantedRuling:

1. The two small parcels of land in question were purchased by the parents of the petitioners in 1864, as isevidenced by the public document of purchase and sale of that year.

2. The same two parcels of land are included in the state grant issued in favor of Baldomero Ratilla de la Cruz in1895. This grant was obtained after the death of the petitioners' parents and while they were minors. So it isclear that the petitioners honestly believed that the appellee was occupying the said parcels as their lessee atthe time they presented their application for registration.

3. The Petitioners did not act in bad faith, nor with any fraudulent intent, when they omitted to include in theirapplication the name of the appellee as one of the occupants of the land. They believed that it was notnecessary nor required that they include in their application the names of their tenant.

4. General Rule: Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only to theexceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons. Such decreeshall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, norby any proceedings in any court for reversing judgments or decrees

5. Exception: The right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree oregistration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one year. . . .

6. Thus, since there was no fraud, the decree of Feb 12, 1908 should not have been opened.

Concept:

Process of Application:

The application for the registration is to be in writing, signed and sworn to by the applicant, or by some person dulyauthorized in his behalf. It is to contain an accurate description of the land. It shall contain the name in full and theaddress of the applicant, and also the names and addresses of all occupants of land and of all adjoining owners, ifknown; and, if not known, it shall state what search has been made to find them. In the form of notice given bystatute, which shall be sworn to, the applicant is required to state and set forth clearly all mortgages or encumbrancesaffecting said land, if any, the rights and interests, legal or equitable, in the possession, remainder, reversion, orexpectancy of all persons, with their names in full, together with their place of residence and post office addresses.Upon receipt of the application the clerk shall cause notice of the filling to be published twice in the Official Gazette.This published notice shall be directed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land sought to be registered

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and to the adjoining owners, and also "to all whom it may concern." In addition to the notice in the Official Gazette theLand Court shall, within seven days after said publication, cause a copy of the notice, in Spanish, to be mailed by theclerk to every person named in the application whose address is known; to cause a duly attested copy of the notice

History of Torrens System:

Before examining the validity of this part of the Act it might be well to note the history and purpose of what is knownas the "Torrens Land Registration System." This system was introduced in South Australia by Sir Robert Torrens in1857 and was there worked out in its practicable form.

The main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible. As we have said, upon the presentation inthe Court of Land Registration of an application for the registration of the title to lands, under this system, the theoryof the law is that all occupants, adjoining owners, adverse claimants, and other interested persons are notified of theproceedings, and have have a right to appear in opposition to such application. In other words, the proceeding isagainst the whole word. This system was evidently considered by the Legislature to be a public project when it passedAct No. 496. The interest of the community at large was considered to be preferred to that of private individuals.

2. Legarda vs Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590; GR No. 8936, October 2, 1915 (Land Titles and Deeds Purpose of the Torrens

System of Registration)

Facts: A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda and Saleeby. The said wall and the strip of land where

it stands is registered in the Torrens system under the name of Legarda in 1906. Six years after the decree of

registration is released in favor of Legarda, Saleeby applied for registration of his lot under the Torrens system in

1912, and the decree issued in favor of the latter included the stone wall and the strip of land where it stands.

Issue: Who should be the owner of a land and its improvement which has been registered under the name of two

persons?

Held: For the issue involved, The Land Registration Act (Act 496) affords no remedy. However, it can be construed that

where two certificates purports to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold title

and will prevail.

The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of

the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may

arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, once a title is registered the owner may rest secure,

without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the mirador de su casa,to avoid the

possibility of losing his land.The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has entered into the Torrens system.

3. Capitol Subdivision vs. Province of Negros OccidentalFebruary 22, 1968---Castro *Province pretends to expropriate land.Facts:1. The subject land in this case was originally owned by the spouses Agustin and Pilar Amenabar, who had the

Original Certificate of Title in their names.

They later sold it in 1920 to Jose Benares for P300K and a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in his favor.2. Benares then mortgaged the land to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. for a little under P28K. Later on, he mortgaged

the land again, this time to the Philippine National Bank.

3. The second mortgage was later foreclosed, and the bank was able to purchase the land at the publicauction. A TCT was issued in 1934 in favor of PNB as a result of the sale.

All this time, however, Jose Benares had been in possession of the property as it was supposedlysubject to a lease in his favor.

4. The bank then later sold the land in 1935 to Carlos Benares, the son of Jose Benares, for P440K payable in annuainstallments.

5. Sometime after, Carlos Benares transferred his rights to the sale to petitioner Capitol Subdivision. The latter thenfinished making the payments in 1949, after which a TCT was issued in its favor by the bank.

Unfortunately, the subdivision found that the land was already being used by the Provincial Hospital of NegrosOccidental.

6. Capitol requested for a clarification of the situation from the proper officials, but all it received in return wereunsatisfactory explanations.

The public officials claimed that they purchased the land through expropriation in the years 1924-25, and that Capitol purchased it in bad faith in 1935.

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7. Hence this case.Issue: Was the province able to acquire the land through expropriation proceedings with Jose Benares?Held: No, because none of the significant requirements of a valid sale were fulfilled.Decision: REMANDED.Ruling:1. The Court considered the main question in the case as whether or not the province was really able to purchase the

land from Jose Benares through expropriation.

In fact, most of the evidence shows that there was no consummated sale.2. First, there seemed to have been a misunderstanding which land was being used for the provincial hospital

second, the price supposedly paid cannot reflect the real value of the land; third, the plaintiff company did noteven know that the hospital was being constructed there.

The land is therefore the exclusive property of Capitol.3. The Court went on to explain the main purpose of a Torrens Title, which is to serve as a guarantee for

the public. A land with a Torrens Title would not unduly burden a prospective buyer with inquiringfurther.

In this case, however, the defects in Capitols title claimed by the province have no basis.4. The Court then ruled that the province should pay Capitol the value of the land, since Capitol was ready to

concede that there was an expropriation as long as it would get back what it paid to get the land.

4. Cruz vs. Secretary *IPRA Law is meant to protect the law of the indigenous peopleDecember 6, 2000---KapunanFacts:

1. Under IPRA, indigenous peoples may obtain the recognition of their right of ownership[60]over ancestral landsand ancestral domains by virtue of native title.[61]

2. The term ancestral lands under the statute refers to landsoccupied by individuals, families and clans whoare members of indigenous cultural communities, including residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, privateforests, swidden farms and tree lots.

3. These lands are required to have been occupied, possessed and utilized by them or through their ancestorssince time immemorial, continuously to the present

4. The Solgen believes that such provisions that grant this ownership are contrary to the constitution.

Solicitor Generals Arguments

9. First, the King of Spain under international law acquired exclusive dominion over the Philippines by virtue of

discovery and conquest. They contend that the Spanish King under the theory of jura regalia, whichwas introduced into Philippine law upon Spanish conquest in 1521, acquired title to all the landsin the archipelago.

10. Second, that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are owned by the State. They invoke the theory of juraregalia which imputes to the State the ownership of all lands and makes the State the originalsource of all private titles. They argue that the Philippine State, as successor to Spain and the UnitedStates, is the source of any asserted right of ownership in land.

11.Third, the Cario doctrine exists but argues that the doctrine applies only to alienable lands of the publicdomain and, thus, cannot be extended to other lands of the public domain such as forest or timber, minerallands, and national parks.

12. Fourth, even assuming that native title over ancestral lands and ancestral domains existed by virtue of theCario doctrine, such native title was extinguished upon the ratification of the 1935 Constitution.

13. Fifth, the recognition and protection under R.A. 8371 of the right of ownership over ancestral lands andancestral domains is far in excess of the legislative power and constitutional mandate of Congress.

14. Finally, on the premise that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are owned by the State, petitioners positthat R.A. 8371 violates Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution which prohibits the alienation of nonagricultural lands of the public domain and other natural resources.

Issue: Do Sections 3(a), 3(b), 5, 6, 7, 8, 57, 58 and 59 of the IPRA law violate Section 2, Article 11 of the Constitution?Held: No (this is merely an opinion)Decision: Petition should be granted.

Ruling:

1. The Regalian theory, however, does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since timeimmemorial.

2. Cario vs. Insular Government provided that the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private

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ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, andnever to have been public land.

3. The above ruling institutionalized the recognition of the existence of native title to land, or ownership of landby Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of anygrant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.

4. A proper reading of Cario would show that the doctrine enunciated therein applies only to lands which havealways been considered as private, and not to lands of the public domain, whether alienable or otherwise.

5. Although Spain was deemed to have acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, this did not meanthat it acquired title to all lands in the archipelago. By virtue of the colonial laws of Spain, the

Spanish Crown was considered to have acquired dominion only over the unoccupied andunclaimed portions of our islands.[86]

6. In sending the first expedition to the Philippines, Spain did not intend to deprive the natives of their property.7. Native title was not extinguished upon the ratification of the 1935 Constitution because the Constitutiona

provision provided that all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coalpetroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippinesbelong to the State.[99]

8. Nowhere does it state that certain lands which are absolutely necessary for social welfare andexistence, including those which are not part of the public domain, shall thereafter be owned by the State.

9. The mere fact that Section 3(a) of the IPRA law defines ancestral domains to include the natural resourcesfound therein does not ipso facto convert the character of such natural resources as private property of theindigenous peoples.

Concept:

The term jura regalia refers to royal rights,[69] or those rights which the King has by virtue of his prerogatives. [70]InSpanish law, it refers to a right which the sovereign has over anything in which a subject has a right of propertyorpropriedad

4. Separate Opinion of J. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary (~Diana)December 6, 2000 *Per Curiam * The IPRA Law DOES NOT VIOLATE the Regalian TheoryBrief Background:

1. In 1997, RA 8371(Indigenous Peoples Rights Act/IPRA) was passed.

2. Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, questioning the constitutionalityof certain provisions of IPRA:a) It allows the indigenous people/ cultural community to OWN NATURAL RESOURCESb) It defines ancestral lands and ancestral domains in such a way that it may include private

lands owned by other individuals

c) It categorizes ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to have been publicland

d) It violates due process in allowing NCIP(National Commission on Indigenous Peoples) to takejurisdiction over IP land disputes and making customary law apply to these

3. In the first deliberation of the SC, the votes were 7-7, so the case was re-deliberated upon

Issue: Did the IPRA violate the Regalian Theory?

A. IPRA: Under the IPRA law, lands which have not been registered before, if granted with a CADT/CALT, will berecognized as privately owned by the IPs from the beginning- thus, has never been part of public domain.

B. Regalian Theory: Lands which has not been recognized as privately owned belongs to the StateHeld: No Final DecisionDecision: Petition dismissed due to lack of votes; Law remained valid and constitutional (7 to grant -7 to dismiss)Justice Punos Separate Opinion:

The IPRA Law DID NOT VIOLATE the Regalian Theory

Reasons:1. These lands claimed by the IPs have long been theirs BY VIRTUE OF NATIVE TITLE; they have lived

there even before the Spanish colonization.

Native title refers to ICCs/IPs pre-conquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim ofprivate ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have beenpublic lands and are indisputable presumed to have been held that way since before theSpanish Conquest.

2. AND Native Title is an Exception to the Regalian Doctrine:

Oh Cho vs Director of Lands: This exception would be any land that should have been in thepossession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial

3. Native Titles provide a different Type of Private Ownership

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Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership. --- Indigenous concept of ownershipsustains the view that ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve asthe material bases of their cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of ownershipgenerally holds that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but communityproperty which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold,disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights.

4. It complies with Regalian Doctrine: Natural Sources within ancestral domains are not owned bythe IPs

The IPs claims are limited to lands, bodies of water traditionally and actuallyoccupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and allimprovements made by them at any time within the domains;

IPRA did not mention that the IPs also own all the other natural resources found withinthe ancestral domains

Discussion related to the topic of the Torrens System and Mode of Acquiring Ownerhsip (land):I. HISTORY ON THE MODE OF ACQUIRING LAND OWNERSHIP IN THE PHILIPPINES:

A. Laws of the IndiesThe Regalian Theory is a Western legal concept first introduced by the Spaniards into the

country through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas. By virtue of Spains "discovery" and conquest of the Philippines, its lands became the exclusivepatrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown Back then, the Spanish Government distributed the lands by issuing royal grants and

concessions to Spaniards, both military and civilianB. Valenton-vs-Murciano Case (1904, American Regime) Long-time occupation will not necessarily lead to ownership of the land "While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves apossession for a sufficient length of time, yet ithas always insisted that he must make thatproof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and untilhe did that the State remained the absolute owner."

C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System1903: 1st Public Land Act (Act No. 926)

Provides rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling, and leasing of portions ofthe public domain of the Philippine Islands

1919: 2nd Public Land Act (Act 2874)

more comprehensive but limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to FilipinosAmericans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges

1936: Present Public Land Law (Commonwealth Act No. 141) Almost the same as Act 2874, except that it gave the Filipino citizens and corporationswhich were previously only granted to Americans

**1903: Land Registration Law (Act 496)

It placed all public and private lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system

almost a verbatim copy of the Massachussetts Land Registration Act of 1898II. TORRENS SYSTEM

Origin: Patterned after the Merchant Shipping Acts in South Australia by Sir Robert Torrens

Governments Role:The government must issue an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named is theowner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or thelaw warrants or reserves

Certificate of Title:The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are quieted

upon issuance of said certificate.III. REGALIAN DOCTRINE

Despite of several legal developments on land distribution, the Regalian doctrine is still retained in ourConstitution.

Under this concept, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumeratedtherein, whether on public or private land, belong to the State.

5. Mateo Carino vs. Insular Government of the Philippine Islands (aka Government)February 23, 1909 Holmes *Igorot is the owner of the landFacts:

1. Petitioner Mateo Carino (Carino), an Igorot, applied for the registration of a certain land.

He and his ancestors had held the land as owners for more than 50 years (even before the Treaty oParis), which he inherited under Igorot customs.

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o His grandfather lived on it and maintained fences for holding of cattleo His father had cultivated parts and had used parts for pasturing cattle, and he had used it for

pasture in his turno They all had been recognized as owners by the Igorots, and he had inherited or received the land

from his father, in accordance with Igorot custom.

There was no document of title issued for the land when he applied for registration.

2. March 4, 1904- The application for land registration of a certain land was granted3. Respondent Government (also on behalf of US because it has taken possession of the property for public and

military purposes) appealed to CFI-Benguet.4. Argument of Respondent Government:

The land in question belonged to the State and there is no prescription against the Crown.

Basis: Under the Spanish Law, all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown exceptthose with permit privatetitles.

Petitioner Carino did not register the land. Thus, it became a public land that the US succeeded to the titleof Spain

Thus, Petitioner Carino has no that the Philippine government is bound to respect.5. Decision of CFI-Benguet:

Dismissed the application for the land registration.Main Issue: WON the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine?

Held: No. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title to his land.

Other issue:WON the action of respondent government to file an appeal (instead of a writ of error) was correct?Held:Yes. The respondent was correct when it adopted the mode by appeal (not by writ of error)

Decision: Decision is REVERSED.

Ruling:

Issue 1: The land in question DOES NOT belong to the Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine

1. The United States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes declared:

It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far as testimony or memory goes, the

land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed tohave been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have beenpublic land.

2. Exception to the theory ofjura regalia(legal rights which belong to the Monarch) The existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim

of ownership since time immemorial

This is independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown

3. Court held that even if the argument of respondent government is true (argument is that Petitioner Carino did notregister the land. Thus, it became a public land that the US succeeded to the title of Spain), it does not followthat the United States may assert absolute power against the inhabitants of the Philippines

4. It does not follow that the petitioner Carino had lost all rights and was a mere trespasser when thepresent government seized his land.

5. It is reasonable to suppose that the attitude thus assumed by the United States with regard to what wasunquestionably its own is also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its own:

Since the US Constitution provides that 'no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall depriveany person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any persontherein the equal protection of the laws, it is assumed that they will also assume the same attitudein deciding this case

6. Case at bar:

Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the present

The land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumedto have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have beenpublic land

Certainly in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give theapplicant the benefit of the doubt.

Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassersor even into tenants at will

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The fact was that titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain beyondthis recognition in their books.

7. The royal cedula of Oct. 15, 1754 provides that: 'Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deedsit shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription.

As prescription, even against Crown lands, was recognized by the laws of Spain, the Court does not havesufficient reason for hesitating to admit that it was recognized in the Philippines in regard to lands overwhich Spain had only paper sovereignty.

8. Rule for the Adjustment of Royal Lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine

Islands: For all legal effects, those who have been in possession for certain times shall be deemed owners

Prescription period does not apply for those who are already owners of the land for lapse of time.

Prescription period:

o For cultivated land: 20 uninterrupted years

o For uncultivated land: 30 years

The law provides that all should get a document of title or lose his land. The purpose of this is for theadjustment of the royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals.

o Case at bar:

It does not appear that this land ever was royal land or wrongfully occupied

The applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such proceedingsagainst him or his father ever was made

9. In the end, SC ruled that law and justice require that the petitioner Carino should be granted what heseeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived,was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain***

Other issues: Appeal is the proper mode used1. The proceeding for registration is likened to bills in equity to quiet title, but it is different in principle. It is a

proceeding in rem under a statute of the type of the Torrens act

2. A writ of error is the general method of bringing cases to this court, an appeal the exception, confined to equity inthe main. There is no reason for not applying the general rule to this case.

6. Republic v. Vera -January 27, l983 De castroFacts:Case 1:

1. Luisito Martinez filed with the lower court an application for registration of title under Act 496 of one (1) parceof land, situated in the Municipality of Mariveles, Bataan, containing an area of 323,093 square meters, moreor less.

2. Lower court issued an order of general default except as to the Republic of the Philippines and the Province oBataan.

3. Republic of the Philippines filed with the lower court an opposition to the application stating that the parcel oland applied for is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic, not subject to privateappropriation.

4. Lower Court due to cadastral proceedings the case was reopened.

5. Commissioner of Land Registration That the parcel of land applied for registration in the above-entitled caseis entirely inside Lot No. 626 of the Cadastral Survey of Mariveles, Province of Bataan, Cad. Case no. 19, LTCCad. Record No. 1097.

Records:Applicant:

Luisito Martinez, 62 years old, testified that he is the owner of the land applied for, having inherited the samefrom his parents, consisting of 32 hectares, more or less; that he started possessing the land in 1938; thatabout 8 hectares of the land is planted to palay, and there are about 42 mango trees; that kamoteng kahoy isalso planted thereon; that he declared the land for taxation purposes only in 1969 because all the recordswere lost during the war, and that possession was continuous, open, undisturbed and in the concept of owner.

Also presented two witnessesCase 2

1. March 21, 1972 - respondent Thelma Tanalega filed an application for registration under Act No. 496 in theCourt of First Instance of Bataan, docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-206, L.R.C. Rec. No. N-41884, oftwo (2) parcels of land located in the barrio of Camaya, municipality of Mariveles, province of Bataancontaining an area of 443,297 square meters, more or less, and 378,506 square meters, more or lessrespectively, and more particularly described and Identified as portions of Lot 626, Mariveles Cadastre

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covered by Plans (LRC) SWO-13430 and (LRC) SWO-13431, respectively.2. The provincial fiscal filed his opposition in behalf of the Directors of Lands and of Forestry, alleging that the

parcels of land applied for are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, notsubject to private appropriation.

Records:Applicant:

Thelma Tanalega, 27 years old, testified that she had possessed the land "openly, adversely, notoriously andin the concept of owner since February 2, 1970 when the said land was sold to her by Elisa Llamas whoallegedly possessed this land" in the same manner since 1935; that the applicant had paid for the taxes of the

land for the years 1970-1972. Alleged that they plant agriculture

She also presented two witnesses.

The applicant did not present as witness her predecessor-in-interest, Elisa Llamas, to testify on the allegedpossession of the land. The applicant also failed to present Guillermo Ramirez, who was hired by her asoverseer and her alleged tenants. Not a single tenant was presented as witness to prove that the applicanthad possessed the land as owners.

***In both cases, the Court of First Instance of Bataan in two separate decisions, dated October 9, 1972 and October16, 1972, confirmed the titles to subject parcels of land and adjudicated them in favor of applicants Luisito Martinezand Thelma Tanalega, now respondents herein.Issue: May the land be registered?Held: No, because they failed to submit the requirements and even though they did they are still not qualifiedbecause even though the land is used for agricultural purposes, all of it has to be for agricultural purposes not justpartially.

Disposition: Cadastral Proceedings decision affirmed.Ruling:1. In a cadastral proceedings any person claiming any interest in any part of the lands object of the petition is

required by Section 9 of Act No. 2259 to file an answer on or before the return day or within such further timeas may be allowed by the court, giving the details required by law, such as:

a. Age of the claimant;b. Cadastral number of lot or lots claimed, or the block and lot numbers, as the case may be;c. Name of the barrio and municipality, township or settlement in which the lots are situated;d. Names of the owners of adjoining lots;e. If claimant is in possession of the lots claims and can show no express grant of the land by the

Government to him or to his predecessors-in-interest, the answer need state the length of timeproperty was held in possession and the manner it was acquired, giving the length of time, as far asknown, during which his predecessors, if any, held possession;

f. If claimant is not in possession or occupation of the land, the answer shall set forth the interestclaimed by him and the time and manner of its acquisition;

g. If the lots have been assessed for taxation, their last assessed value; andh. Encumbrance, if any, affecting the lots and the names of adverse claimants as far as known. In the

absence of successful claimants, the property is declared public land.

2. IN THIS CASE, private respondents apparently either did not file their answers in the aforesaidcadastral proceedings or failed to substantiate their claims over the portions they were thenoccupying, otherwise, titles over the portions subject of their respective claims would have been issued tothem. The Cadastral Court must have declared the lands in question public lands, and its decision had alreadybecome final and conclusive.

3. Respondents are now barred by prior judgment to assert their rights over the subject land, under the doctrineofres judicata.

4. A cadastral proceeding is one in rem and binds the whole world.

5. Even granting that respondents can still petition for judicial confirmation of imperfect title over the landssubject matter of the instant cases, the same must necessarily fail.

a. It is to be noted that in the instant cases evidence for the respondents themselves tend to show thatonly portions of the entire area applied for are cultivated. A mere casual cultivation of portions ofthe land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership.

b. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant fromthe State.

Applicants, therefore, have failed to submit convincing proof actual, peaceful and adverse possession in the concept oowners of the entire area in question during the period required by law.

7. Bureau of Forestry, Bureau of Lands, and Phil Fisheries Commission v CA and Filomeno Gallo31 Aug 1987 Paras *Bureau of Forestry (not the court) determines whether landis forest land.Facts:

1. Diago filed in CFI Iloilo an application for registration of 30-hectare land.

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2. Director of Lands opposedsince Diago (or her predecessors) have no sufficient titleand they have neverbeen in open, continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30 years.

3. Director of Forestry also opposedsince certain portions are mangrove swamps and are within TimberlandBlock.

4. Gallo purchased the land from Diago and was thus substituted.

5. CFI Iloilo ordered the registration of the land. CA affirmed.6. CA based its conclusion upon the premise thatwhether or not a controverted parcel ofland is forest land, is a

question of fact which should be settled by competent proofs. It is incumbent upon the Director of Forestry

to submit convincing proofs that the land is more valuable for forest than for agricultural purposes.Issue: Can the classification of lands of the public domain by the Executive Branch of the Government intoagricultural, forest or mineral be changed or varied by the trial court?Held: No. The classification is a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government and not of the courts.Decision: CA decision set aside.Ruling:1. Classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a

prerogative of the Executive Department of the government and not of the courts.

2. The parcels of land are portions of the public domain which cannotbe the subject of registrationproceedings.

a. The area is within a timberland block as classification of the municipality and certified to by theDirector of Forestry as lands needed for forest purposes.

b. Being public land, there is no need for the Director of Forestry to submit to the court convincingproofs. There is no question of whether the land is forest land or not.

3. Gallo cannot obtain title by prescription. It is a rule of law that possession of forest lands, however longcannot ripen into private ownership.

8. Sunbeam Convenience Foods Inc v CA *Land sold to the petitioners was classified as forest lands.January 29, 1990, Sarmiento, J.:Facts:7. On April 29, 1963, the Director of Lands caused the issuance of a Sales Patent in favor of Sunbeam over parcels of

land located in Mariveles.8. The said Sales Patent was registered with the Register of Deeds of Bataan.9. On May 11, 1976, the Solicitor General, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, instituted before the Court

of First Instance of Bataan, an action for reversion.10. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and contends that the RP should have exhausted all administrative

remedies before filing the case and that the title issued to the petitioners had become indefeasible andimprescribtible.

11. Moreover, the petitioners contend that the action for reversion was defective, having been initiated by the SolicitoGeneral and not by the Director of Lands.12. The CFI dismissed the complaint while the CA reversed the said decision.Issue/Held: Did the CA commit an error in reversing the CFI's decision?No before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposableland for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the government.Decision: Affirmed

Ruling:1. An important factual issue raised in the complaint was the classification of the lands as forest lands. This materia

allegation stated in the Republic's complaint' was never denied specifically by the petitioners.2. If it is true that the lands are forest lands, then all these proceedings become moot and academic. Land remains

unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.3. The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not confer any validity on such title if the

property covered by the title or patent is part of the public forest

4. Our adherence to the Regalian doctrine subjects all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands to the dominion of theState

09. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT), vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS(THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA

BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA, BENJAMINand EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA,

ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORlA,BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA

April 15, 1988 (Chad) {Benguet and Atok Won the case}

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The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of theearth even if the land where the discovery is made be privateParties/Persons involved:

1. De la Rosa Family- applicants for registration of lots 1-92. Benguet Consolidated and Atok-Big Wedge Mining- adverse claimant of the lots

3. RP- 2nd adverse claimant against De la Rosa and Benguet & Atok.Facts:1. De La Rosa family applied for registration of a parcel of land (in Benguet Province) in 1965 (started inhabiting the

land in 1964, where they claimed that their parents had been occupying the said land -lots 1-9; and that theyacquired ownership thru prescription). They even presented tax declarations in 1965 and realty tax receipts from1956-1964

2. application was opposed by Benguet Consolidated (lots 1-5) and Atok (some portions of lots 1-5 and all of lots 6-9)They were claiming that the June Bug mineral claim (lots 1-5) was sold to Benguet in September 1909 and Benguethas been in actual , continuous and exclusive use of these lands. Atok alleged that a portion of lots 1-5 and all oflots 6-9 were covered by Emma and Fredia mineral claims which were purchased by atok in 1931. Both Atok andBenguet Consolidated made improvements and bore tunnels beneath.

3. RP, through the Bureau of Forestry Development also filed its separate opposition arguing that the land sought tobe registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 (February 1929)and by its nature, it was not subject to alienation under 1935 and 1973 Constitution.

4. TC held that De la Rosa failed to prove their claims of possession and ownership.5. CA reversed the TC and affirmed the surface rights to de la rosa, subject to the reserved sub-surface rights to

Benguet and Atok by virtue of mining claims.

Issue: Who has a better right over the disputed land?Held: Benguet and Atok. Their rights, by virtue of mining claims, had been vested long before the 1935 constitutionand hence while the property was considered forest land and included in the central cordillera forest reserve, it did notimpair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok.Ruling:1. It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under consideration was perfected prior to 1935, when the

Government of Commonwealth was inaugurated.2. Having complied with all the requirements of the mining laws, the claims were removed from the public domain

and not even the government of the Philippines (or US) can take away this right from them. (due process)3. Such vested rights were not affected by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution against the alienation o

all lands of the public domain except those agriuclural in nature for this was made subject to existing rights.4. the perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in force

removed it from the public domain. As the lands had become the provate property of the locators, they had theright to transfer the same, as they did to Benguet and Atok.

5. De la Rosas claim of ownership must fail as founded by the TC since they acquired the land only in 1964 andsought to be registered in 1965. even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la Rosas hadreally been in possession of the subject property, their possession was not in the concept of owner of the miningclaim but of the property as agricultural land, which it was not. The property was mineral land, and they wereclaiming it as agricultural land.

6. CAs justification of no conflict of interest between owners of surface rights and sub-surface rights must failDoctrine = owner of land has rights not only to its surface by also to everything underneath and the airspaceabove it up to a reasonable height.

7. What misled the CA is Commonwealth Act 137 (see sec. 3-6) which is an application of the Regalian doctrine.8. Regalian doctrine- reserves to the state all minerals that may be found in public and even private land devoted to

agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or for any purpose other than mining.9. Flaw in reasoning of CA: in supposing that the rights over the land could be used for both mining and non-mining

purposes simultaneously10. correct interpretation: once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at

the time, such use may be discontinued by the state to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of

its sovereign prerogative. The land is converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private partyincluding the registered owner, for any purpose that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken. Owner isentitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws.

11. However, Benguet and Atok have exlusive rights to the property by virtue of their respective mining claims whichthey validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domeainexcept agricultural lands. (vested rights already)

Concept/Law: See 1987 Cons. Art 12, Sec.2 / Regalian Doctrine

9. Republic vs. Ca *advantage to mineral finders who were recognized before the adoption of the 1935ConstiApril 15, 1988---CruzFacts:

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1. These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11, 1965, by Josede la Rosa. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots.

2. Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Albertorespectively.

3. The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big WedgeCorporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through theBureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.

Balbalio and Alberto:

4. In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land byvirtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation.

5. She testified she was born in the land, which was possessed by her parents under claim of ownership. 4Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto, who declared that the land wasplanted by Jaime and his predecessors-in-interest to bananas, avocado, nangka and camote, and was enclosedwith a barbed-wire fence.

Benguet:

6. Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on Septembe22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded

it on October 14, 1909.7. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in

concept of owner, as evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geologicamappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land.

Atok:

8. For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Frediamineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, inthe office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from these locators on November 21931, by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots asevidenced by its annual assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment ofannual taxes thereon.9

9. The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 which

provided that:

SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the philippine Islands both surveyed and unsurveyed arehereby declared to be free and open to exploration, occupation and purchase and the land in which they are foundto occupation and purchase by the citizens of the United States, or of said islands.

Bureau of Forestry:10. The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be

registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935and 1973. 10

Issue: Is the land public property because it is indicated as a mineral land?Held: No, because the minerals were discovered prior to the inauguration of the CommonwealthDecision: Appeal Denied

Ruling:

1. It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central Cordillera ForesReserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time.

2. The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet was one of the 16 mining claims of James E. Kelly, American andmining locator.

3. He filed his declaration of the location of the June Bug mineral and the same was recorded in the MiningRecorder's Office on October 14, 1909.

4. All of the Kelly claims has subsequently been acquired by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. Benguet's evidence isthat it had made improvements on the June Bug mineral claim consisting of mine tunnels prior to 1935

5. The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma mineral claims of Atok havingbeen perfected prior to the approval of the Constitution of the Philippines of 1935, they were

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removed from the public domain and had become private properties of Benguet and Atok.6. The reservations of public lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected locations; and, of

course, if a valid mining location is made upon public lands afterwards included in a reservation, such inclusionor reservation does not affect the validity of the former location.

7. Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land while the mininglocator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he may interfere with theoperations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the crops above. How deep can thefarmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on each other's rights? Where is the dividing linebetween the surface and the sub-surface rights?

8. The rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and halfmineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral ocompletely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally classified asforest land ceased to be so and became mineral and completely mineral once the mining claims wereperfected

10. Collado vs. CAOctober 4, 2002---CarpioFacts:

1. Collado filed with the land registration court an application for registration of a parcel of land which is situatedin Barangay San Isidro (formerly known as Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal. Attached to the application wasthe technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-

Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which stated, [t]his survey is inside IN-12Mariquina Watershed.

2. The Solicitor General, filed oppositions to petitioners application.3. Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial. Their possession has been open

public, notorious and in the concept of owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name of Sesinando Leyva, one otheir predecessors-in-interest, as early as March 22, 1902. Petitioners declared the Lot for taxation purposesand paid all the corresponding real estate taxes.

4. According to them (petitioners), there are now twenty-five co-owners in pro-indiviso shares of five hectareseach. During the hearings, petitioners submitted evidence to prove that there have been nine transfers orights among them and their predecessors-in-interest.

5. There is no dispute that Executive Order No. 33 (EO 33 for brevity) dated July 26, 1904[10] established theMarikina Watershed Reservation (MWR for brevity) situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal. The mainthrust of petitioners claim over the Lot is that all Presidential proclamations like theproclamation setting aside the Marikina Watershed Reservation are subject to private rights.

They point out that EO 33 contains a saving clause that the reservations are subject to existingprivate rights, if any there be.

Issue: Is the subject land part of the public domain?Held: Yes, under the regalia doctrine.Decision: Petition DeniedRuling:

Regalian Doctrine:

1. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership arepresumed to belong to the State

2. Spain then ceded to the government of the United States all rights, interests and claims over the nationaterritory of the Philippine Islands through the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. In 1903, the UnitedStates colonial government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land Ac

3. The Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islandsremained in the government; and that the governments title to public land sprung from theTreaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States

4. Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable anddisposable.

Watershed Reservation

5. Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except agriculturalands of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution readopted this policy. Indeed, all lands of the publicdomain as well as all natural resources enumerated in the Philippine Constitution belong to the State.

6. The term natural resource includes not only timber, gas, oil coal, minerals, lakes, and submerged lands, butalso, features which supply a human need and contribute to the health, welfare, and benefit of a community

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and are essential to the well-being thereof and proper enjoyment of property devoted to park and recreationapurposes

Proving Private Right

7. First. An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he meets therequirements of Section 48 of CA 141, as amended. He must overcome the presumption that the land he isapplying for is part of the public domain and that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration inhis name arising from an imperfect title

8. The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove the following:(a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possessionand occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the PublicLand Act

9. There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, petitioners had acquired ownership or title to theLot either by deed or by any other mode of acquisition from the State, as for instance by acquisitiveprescription. As of 1904, Sesinando Leyva had only been in possession for two years

10.Second, assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, EO33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since then, the Lot became non-disposable and inalienable public landAt the time petitioners filed their application on April 25, 1985, the Lot has been reserved as a watershedunder EO 33 for 81 years prior to the filing of petitioners application.

11. The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904 could no longer be counted because as awatershed reservation, the Lot was no longer susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienationSection 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively to alienable and disposable public agricultural land.

12.Finally, even the petitioner indicated in its very own technical description of the land which they hadsubmitted with the application, that it was inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed.

11. Separate Opinion discussing Regalian doctrine in Cruz v. Secretary

12. Francisco Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority and Amari Coustal Bay Development CorporationJuly 9, 2002 Carpio *PEA attempts to bypass the RegalianDoctrine.Facts:1. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects

nationwide.

It took over the leasing and selling functions of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources insofaras reclaimed (or about to be reclaimed) foreshore lands are concerned.2. The PEA was able to acquire, through a patent by President Aquino, parcels of land reclaimed under the Manila

Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project.

These were called the Freedom Islands.3. The PEA then later entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with Amari, a private corporation to

develop the islands. It sought to transfer to Amari the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the landsreclaimed by the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP).

It also sought to have 290.1156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to be transferred to Amari.4. The project, now known as the Coastal Road, was bitterly contested by several groups after an expose by Senato

Ernesto Maceda. After investigations by the Senate itself, a number of petitions were filed by various people.Hence this case.Issue: Does the PEA have the authority to sell the lands?Held: No, to allow vast areas of reclaimed lands will amount to a gross violation of the ban on private corporationsfrom acquiring inalienable land.Decision: GRANTED.Ruling:

1. The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, nowcovered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain.

The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the publicdomain.

2. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII ofthe 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable landof the public domain.

Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submergedareas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution whichprohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

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13.Republic (represented by DENR) -vs-Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr.3 Dec 2002; P:Panganiban *A free patent obtained through fraud is voidFacts:

1. On 28 Dec 1978, Felipe Alejaga, Sr. applied for a free patent with the District Land Office of Roxas City. [FreePatent Application No. 3358]**Take note that on 27 Dec 1978, Land Inspector Efren Recio submitted a report of his investigation andverification of the land (thats 1 day before the application)

2. On March 1979, the application was approved. A patent [Free Patent Title No. (VI-2) 3358] and an OCT

[Original Certificate of Title No. P-15] was issued to Alejaga by the Registrar of Deeds.3. On April 1970, the heirs of one Ignacio Arrobang reported to the Director of Lands-Manila that Alejagas free

patent has irregularly issued over their predecessors foreshore land.4. After an investigation, a civil proceeding for the cancellation of the Alejagas patent was recommended.5. Meanwhile, on Aug 1981, Alejaga obtained a P100,000-NACIDA loan from the PNB-Cebu City. It was secured by

a real mortgaged on the land granted to him6. On April 1990, the Sol-Gen filed an action for Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and Title and Reversion against

Alejaga,Sr., PNB-Cebu and the Register of Deeds-Roxas City7. TC ruled that Alejagas patent and OCT was obtained by means of fraud. Hence, they are null and void ab initio8. CA reversed the decision. It ruled that there was not fraud. And even if there is, the States right to have the

title reversed has already prescribed.Issue:

1. Is Alejagas title indefeasible, given that 1 year has already passed from its issuance? [Main Issue]2. Was there fraud in the issuance of Alejagas patent? (needs to be determined since the RTC and CA have

conflicting decisions on the factual matter)Held:

1. No. The State has an imprescriptible right to cause the reversion of a piece of property belonging to the publicdomain

2. Yes. Theres a preponderance of evidence showing manifest fraud in procuring the patentDecision:-Petition Granted; CAs Decision Set Aside-Ruling:

1. ALEJAGAS TITLE IS NOT INDEFEASIBLEGeneral Rule:

a. Once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title issued, the land covered bythem ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property.

b. The Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible a year after the issuance of thelatterEXCEPTION:- The indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation

Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141The State -- even after the lapse of one year -- may still bring an action for the reversion tothe public domain of land that has been fraudulently granted to private individuals.

Republic v. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 721This indefeasibility cannot be a bar to an investigation by the State as to how thetitle has been acquired, if the purpose of the investigation is to determine whether fraudhas in fact been committed in securing the title

HERE:

Alejagas CANNOT invoke the indefeasibility of a certificate of title because he obtained the title bymeans of fraud (Public policy demands that those who have done so should not be allowed to benefit fromtheir misdeed)

2. SEVERAL BADGES OF FRAUD WERE FOUND IN THIS CASE:A. The issuance of the patent did not follow the procedure under the Public Land Act(Commonwealth Act No. 141)RULES:After the filingof an application for free patent with the Bureau of Lands, An investigation should be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining whether the material factsset out in the application are true [Sec. 91] There must be sufficient notice to the municipality and the barrio where the land is located, inorder to give adverse claimants the opportunity to present their claims.HERE:Date of Application: 28 Dec

1978.Date on the Investigation & Verification Report of the LandInspector:

27 Dec1978.

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We can see thatthere is a CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT, because:

The investigation was conducted PRIOR to the application

Also, the required notice to adverse claimants was not served.B. Theres a showing that no actual investigation has been conducted

The Verification & Investigation Report itselfbears no signatureC. The badges of fraud sustain the contention that Alejagas title is VOID.

This is ground for impugning the validity of the Certificate of Title

Also, the invalidity of the patent is sufficient basis for nullifying the Certificate of Title issued inconsequence thereof.

14. Republic of the Philippines (Republic) vs. Southside Homeowners Association, Inc (SHAI) and Register ofDeeds of Pasig, Rizal

September 22, 2006- Garcia *Land part of military reservation no proof was given by respondent that the landhas been

withdrawn from the reservation and declared open for disposition. Thus, it is considered asinalienable land.Parties:GR No. 1569511. Republic of the Philippines (aka Republic)- petitioner2. Southside Homeowners Association, Inc (aka SHAI)- respondent3. Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal - respondent4. Bases Conversion Development Authority - intervenor5. Department of National Defense (represented by Angelo Reyes) and AFP (represented by Chief of Staff Narciso

Abaya) - intervenors

Facts:

1. Former President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423 which established a military reservationknown as Fort William McKinley which was later renamed as Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation (FBMR)

2. The areas mentioned in this proclamation were withdrawn from sales and settlements and reserved foMILITARY PURPOSES.

3. However, several presidential proclamations were later issued EXCLUDING certain defined areas fromthe operation of Proclamation 423.

4. A petition was filed to declare NULL the title over the parcels of land (around 39.99 hectares) referred to asJUSMAGhousing which are found in Fort Bonifacio being occupied by active and retired military officers and their

families.5. Respondent Southside Homeowners Association, Inc (SHAI), a non-stock corporation organized mostly bythe wives of AFP military officers, was able to SECURE title in its name over the bulk (if not the entire) JUSMAGarea.

6. October 30, 1991 - Rizal Registry issued TCT No. 1508 on the basis of a notarized dead of sale purportedlyexecuted by the then Land Management Bureau Director Abelardo Palad, Jr.

However, the investigation conducted by the DOJ reported land scams at the FBMR and also finding thatthe signature of Palas was forged.

7. 1993- President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 173 and ordered the OSG to institute an actiontowards the cancellation of TCT 15084 in respondent SHAI's name as well as the title acquired by the NavyOfficer's Village Association (NOVA) over a bigger parcel of land within the reservation.

8. Petitioner Republic filed with RTC-Pasig a petition to declare the nullification and cancellation of titlesuit against respondent SHAI.

Reasons:

a) FRAUD attended respondent SHAI's procurement of TCT No. 15084b) TCT No. 15084 is VOID because the conveying deed is SPURIOUS (due to Palad's forged

signature), there are NO RECORDS with the LMB of the application to purchase and the allegedpayment of purchased and the property in question is INALIENABLE.

9. Argument of Petitioner Republic + Intervenors:

The land in the JUSMAG area is inalienable and the same having not effectively separated from themilitary reservation and declared as alienable and disposable.

10. Argument of Respondent SHAI:a) Denied the allegations and said the Deed of Sale is valid documents which the petitioner Republic are

ESTOPPED to deny.b) There was FULL payment of the purchase price as evidence by the receipt.

11. Decision of RTC:

Dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity and cancellation fo the land title against respondent SHA

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12. Decision of CA:

Affirmed decision of RTC in dismissing the complaint for the declaration of nullity and cancellation of a landtitle against SHAI.

Issue: WON the land sold, during the period material, alienable or inalienable, as the case may be, and, therefore, can

or cannot be subject of a lawful private conveyance?

Held: YES. The land sold was NOT alienable because it was NOT effectively separated from the military reservation

and declared as alienable and disposable.

Decision: Petition is GRANTED. Decision of CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Deed of Sale issued in favor o

respondent SHAI is VOID.

Ruling:

1. The Court agreed with the Petitioner Republic that theJUSMAG area is INALIENABLE because the same havingnot effectively been separated from the military reservation and declared as alienable and disposable.

2. Until a given parcel of land is released from its classification as part of the military reservation zoneand reclassified by law or by presidential proclamations disposable and alienable, its status as part ofa military reservation remains, even if incidentally it is devoted for a purpose other than as a military camp orfor defense.

The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, maydesignate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for

the use of the Republic or any of its branches, or for quasi-public uses or purposes Such tract or tracts of land thus reserved shall be non-alienable and shall NOT be subject to sale or other

disposition until again declared alienable

In this case, a military reservation, like the FBMR, or a part thereof is not open to privateappropriation or disposition and, therefore, not registrable UNLESS it is in the meantimereclassified and declared as disposable and alienable public land.

3. Case at bar:

Respondent SHAI had not pointed to any proclamation or legislative act for that matter segregating theproperty from the reservation and classifying the same as alienable lands of the public domain.

The JUSMAG area formed part of the FBMR as originally established under Proclamation No. 423.And whileprivate respondent SHAI would categorically say that the petitioner Republic had not presented evidencethat "subject land is within military reservation," and even dared to state that the JUSMAG area is theprivate property of the government and therefore removed from the concept of public domain per se, itsown evidence themselves belie its posture.

The petitioner Republic need only to demonstrate that all of the 15,912,684 square meters of Parcel No. 3of Plan Psu 2031 have been reserved for military purposes

4. SC ruled that SHAI must prove that the JUSMAG area had been withdrawn from the reservation anddeclared open for disposition, failing which it has no enforceable right over the area as against theState. HOWEVER, private respondent SHAI has definitely NOT MET its burden by reason of LACK OFEVIDENCE.

Respondent SHAI had not pointed to any proclamation, or legislative act for that matter, segregating theproperty covered by TCT No. 15084 from the reservation and classifying the same as alienable anddisposable lands of the public domain

Lands of the public domain classified as a military reservation remains as such until, bypresidential fiat or congressional act, the same is released from such classification anddeclared open to disposition.

Respondent SHAI's argument that the Republic is estopped to question the transfer is unavailing. The

Republic is not usually estopped by the mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents. Since the parcels of land in question allegedly sold to the private respondent are, or at leastat the time of the supposed transaction were, still part of the FBMR, the purported sale isnecessarily VOID AB INITIO.

5. The Court can hypothetically concede, as a matter of fact, the withdrawal of the JUSMAG area fromthe ambit of Proclamation No. 423 and its reclassification as alienable and disposable lands of thepublic domain.

Still, such hypothesis would not carry the day for private respondent SHAI.

The reason therefore is basic: Article XII, Section 352 of the 1987 Constitution FORBIDS privatecorporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain, except throughlease for a limited period.

Reason:The fact remains that private corporations, like SHAI, are prohibited from purchasing or otherwise

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acquiring alienable public lands.6. The whole conveyance process was also suspicious since the whole process was accomplished only in ONE DAY.

15. Buenaventura v. Republic March 2, 2007 Chico-Nazario ***And acquired before World War IIFacts:

1. Petitioners Angelita and Preciosa are the applicants for registration of title over the subject property. They arethe heirs of spouses Amado Buenaventura and Irene Flores (spouses Buenaventura) from whom they acquiredthe subject property.

2. Property was acquired by the spouses Buenaventura from the Heirs of Lazaro de Leon, namely: Aurelio deLeon and his sister Rodencia Sta. Agueda even before World War II.

a. However, it was only on 30 January 1948 that the corresponding Deed of Sale was executedin favor of the spouses Buenaventura.

b. After the execution of the said Deed of Sale, the spouses Buenaventura transferred the tax declarationin their name.

3. In 1978, the spouses Buenaventura transferred, by way of Deed of Sale, the subject property, together withthe adjacent property, which they previously acquired from Mariano Pascual, to their children, among whomare herein petitioners.

a. As a result thereof, a new tax declaration, was issued in the name of the spouses Buenaventuraschildren.

4. Petitioners then filed an Application for Registration of Title on 5 June 20005. Petitioners alleged that they and their predecessors-in-interest acquired title to the said parcel of land thru

inheritance, transfer, and possession as owners of the same since time immemorial and/or within the period

provided for by law.6. TC Application to be sufficient in form and substance, it thereby set the case for hearing, and directed the

service and publication of the notice thereof pursuant to Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree(Presidential Decree No. 1529).

a. They presented five witnesses, in order to establish the fact that petitioners and their predecessorshave acquired vested right over the subject property by their open, continuous, and exclusivepossession under a bona fide claim of ownership for over 50 years completely unmolested by anyadverse claim and to prove the alienable and disposable character of the subject property.

b. They also presented and identified several documents offered in evidence, which tend to establishfurther the following: (1) petitioners fee simple title over the subject property; (2) the nature of thepossession and occupation of the property; (3) its classification as part of the alienable and disposablezone of the government; and (4) the improvements introduced thereon and the taxes paid on thesubject property. Said documents were duly admitted by the trial court.

7. TC Granted

8. RP opposed and filed in CA9. CA in favor of RP

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the petitioners could not register the property in their namen due toinsufficient evidence?

Held: Yes, the CA made a mistake, Buenaventura has earned ownership of the property by prescription evidenced byhis tax declarations and actual possessionDecision: Reversed, in favor of BuenaventuraRuling:

Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree speaks of who may apply for registration of land. The saidprovision of law refers to an original registration through ordinary registration proceedings. It specifically provides:

SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance

[now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or throughtheir duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands ofthe public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the

provisions of existing laws.

1. There are three requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under the first category, to wit:a. That the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain;b. That the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and

c. That such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.

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2. The second classification relates to the acquisition of private lands by prescription.

IN THIS CASERepublic Supreme Court

That the propertyin question isalienable anddisposable land ofthe public domain

Petitioners own evidencetends to show that thesubject property is notalienable and disposablebecause it was a salt bed

and a fishpond and underSection 2, Article XII of theConstitution, exceptforagricultural lands, all othernatural resources shall notbe alienated.

Under the RegalianDoctrine, all lands nototherwise appearing to beclearly within privateownership are presumedto belong to the State.

It is true that under the Regalian Doctrine all lands of the public

domain belong to the State and all lands not otherwise

appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed

to belong to the State. However, such presumption is not

conclusive. It can be rebutted by the applicants

presentation of incontrovertible evidence showing that

the land subject of the application for registration is

alienable and disposable.

After a thorough examination of the records of this case, thisCourt found out that petitioners offered in evidence acertification from the Department of Environment and NaturalResources, National Capital Region dated 29 October 2001, toprove that the subject property was alienable and disposableland of the public domain.

The court found this to be sufficient to establish the true natureor character of the subject property. The certification enjoys apresumption of regularity in the absence of contradictoryevidence.

Certification remains uncontested and even the Republic itselfdid not present any evidence to refute the contents of the saidcertification.

That the applicantsby themselves orthrough theirpredecessors-in-interest have been

in open,continuous,exclusive andnotoriouspossession andoccupation; and

no sufficient evidence was

adduced by petitioners to

show that they and their

predecessors-in-interest

have been in exclusivepossession of the subject

property since 12 June

1945 or earlier in the

concept of an owner

Although they were able toshow possession by theirparents, theirpredecessors-in-interest,since 1948, they failed toprove the fact of

possession since [12 June1945] before the filing ofthe application.

Evidence presented by petitioners was not enough to prove that

their possession of the subject property started since 12 June

1945 or earlier because the evidence established that the

questioned parcel of land was acquired by petitioners parents

only on 30 January 1948, the date of the execution of the Deedof Absolute Sale by its previous owners.

Petitioners possession of the subject property could only ripeninto ownership on 3 January 1968, when the same becamealienable and disposable. Any period of possession prior to thedate when the [s]ubject [property was] classified as alienableand disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded fromthe computation of the period of possession; such possessioncan never ripen into ownership and unless the land had beenclassified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmationof imperfect title shall not apply thereto.

That suchpossession isunder a bonafide claim of ownership since 12June 1945 orearlier

Prescription

Under the Civil Code, prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership Article 1106 of the Civil Codeprovides:

By prescription, one acquires ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner andunder the conditions laid down by law.

Article 1113 of the Civil CodeAll things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwiseprovided. Property of the State or any of its subdivision not patrimonial in character shall not be the object oprescription.

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LTD Week 1 Compile

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