LTD Reading Assignent for Midterms or Finals

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G.R. No. 108998 August 24, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES ARIO B. LAPI!A AND FLOR DE "EGA, respondents.

Byron V. Belarmino and Juan B. Belarmino for private respondents.

BIDIN, J.:

Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still acitizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under the PublicLand Act (CA !"#

$he %epublic would have us rule on the negative and as&s this Court to nullify the decision of the appellate court

which affirmed the 'udgment of the courta quo in granting the application of respondent spouses for registration overthe lots in question.

n )une *, +*, respondent spouses bought Lots -!* and -!, Cad. s-/, as their residence with a total area of+.** sq. m. situated in 0an Pablo City, from one Cristeta /azo 1elen (%ollo, p. !". At the time of the purchase,respondent spouses where then naturalborn 2ilipino citizens.

n 2ebruary 3, +*, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (4" parcels of land before the%egional $rial Court of 0an Pablo City, 1ranch 5556. $his time, however, they were no longer 2ilipino citizens andhave opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization.

An opposition was filed by the %epublic and after the parties have presented their respective evidence, the court a

quo rendered a decision confirming private respondents7 title to the lots in question, the dispositive portion of whichreads as follows8

9:;%;2%;, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby approves the said application andconfirms the title and possession of herein applicants over Lots -!* and -!, Apa and 2lor de ?ega, all of legal age, 2ilipino citizens by birth butnow Canadian citizens by naturalization and residing at ! A. =abini 0treet, 0an Pablo City and@or4


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owners of the sub'ect realty considering also that they had paid for it quite a large sum of money.$heir purpose in initiating the instant action is merely to confirm their title over the land, for, as hasbeen passed upon, they had been the owners of the same since +*. 6t ought to be pointed outthat registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. $he $orrens 0ystem was not established asa means for the acquisition of title to private land. 6t is intended merely to confirm and register thetitle which one may already have (=unicipality of ?ictorias vs. Court of Appeals, .%. Do. L-+,

=arch -, +*". 9ith particular reference to the main issue at bar, the :igh Court has ruled thattitle and ownership over lands within the meaning and for the purposes of the constitutionalprohibition dates bac& to the time of their purchase, not later. $he fact that the applicantsappelleesare not 2ilipino citizens now cannot be ta&en against them for they were not disqualified fromacquiring the land in question (1ollozos vs. Eu $ieng 0u, .%. Do. L4+!!4, Dovember , +*".(%ollo, pp. 4*4"

;Fpectedly, respondent court7s disposition did not merit petitioner7s approval, hence this present recourse, which wasbelatedly filed.

rdinarily, this petition would have been denied outright for having been filed out of time had it not been for theconstitutional issue presented therein.

At the outset, petitioner submits that private respondents have not acquired proprietary rights over the sub'ectproperties before they acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to 'ustify the registration thereof in theirfavor. 6t maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are presumed to be public lands under the principlethat lands of whatever classification belong to the 0tate under the %egalian doctrine. $hus, before the issuance of thecertificate of title, the occupant is not in the 'urisdical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the0tate. Petitioner further argued that it is only when the court ad'udicates the land to the applicant for confirmation oftitle would the land become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land,depending on the evidence.

As found by the trial court8

$he evidence thus presented established that applicants, by themselves and their predecessorsininterest, had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, eFclusive and notorious possession andoccupation of the two ad'acent parcels of land applied for registration of title under a bonafideclaim of ownership long before )une 4, +!3. 0uch being the case, it is conclusively presumedthat all the conditions essential to the confirmation of their title over the two ad'acent parcels of landare sought to be registered have been complied with thereby entitling them to the issuance of thecorresponding certificate of title pursuant to the provisions of Presidential /ecree Do. 34+,otherwise &nown as the Property %egistration /ecree. (%ollo, p. 4B"

%espondent court echoed the court a quo7s observation, thus8

$he land sought to be registered has been declared to be within the alienable and disposable zoneestablished by the 1ureau of 2orest /evelopment (;Fhibit GPG". $he investigation conducted by the1ureau of Lands, Datural %esources /istrict (6?4" reveals that the disputed realty had beenoccupied by the applicants Gwhose house of strong materials stands thereonGH that it had beendeclared for taFation purposes in the name of applicantsspouses since +*+H that they acquiredthe same by means of a public instrument entitled Gasulatan ng 1ilihang $uluyanG duly eFecutedby the vendor, Cristeta /azo 1elen, on )une *, +* (;Fhibits G6G and G)G"H and that applicants andtheir predecessors in interest had been in possession of the land for more than -< years prior tothe filing of the application for registration. 1ut what is of great significance in the instant case is the


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circumstance that at the time the applicants purchased the sub'ect lot in +*, both of them were2ilipino citizens such that when they filed their application for registration in +*, ownership overthe land in dispute had already passed to them. (%ollo, p., 4*"

$he %epublic disagrees with the appellate court7s concept of possession and argues8

*. $he Court of Appeals found that the land was declared for taFation purposes in the name ofrespondent spouses only since 1979. :owever, taF declarations or reality taF payments of propertyare not conclusive evidence of ownership. (citing cases"

. $hen again, the appellate court found that Gapplicants (respondents" and their predecessorsininterest had been in possession of the land for more than -< years prior to the filing of theapplication for registration.G $his is not, however, the same as saying that respondents have beenin possession Gsince )une 4, +!3.G (P/ Do.


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6t must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable lands of the publicdomain, the law employs the terms Gby themselvesG, Gthe applicant himself or through his predecessorininterestG.$hus, it matters not whether the vendee@applicant has been in possession of the sub'ect property for only a day solong as the period and@or legal requirements for confirmation of title has been complied with by his predecessorininterest, the said period is tac&ed to his possession. 6n the case at bar, respondents7 predecessorsininterest havebeen in open, continuous, eFclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land not only since )une 4, +!3, but

even as early as +-*. Petitioner does not deny this eFcept that respondent spouses, in its perception, were inpossession of the land sought to be registered only in +* and therefore short of the required length of time. Asaforesaid, the disputed parcels of land were acquired by private respondents through their predecessorsininterest,

who, in turn, have been in open and continued possession thereof since +-*. Private respondents stepped into theshoes of their predecessorsininterest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to confirm whatcould otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title.

At this 'uncture, petitioner7s reliance in %epublic v. ?illanueva (! 0C%A *3 I+4J" deserves scant consideration.$here, it was held that before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the 'uridical sense the trueowner of the land since it still pertains to the 0tate.

0uffice it to state that the ruling in %epublic v. ?illanueva (supra", has already been abandoned in the +B case of

/irector of Lands v. 6ntermediate Appellate Court (!B 0C%A 3


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eFpress grant from the 0tate than the dictum of the statute itself (0ection ! IbJ" that thepossessor(s" G. . . shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential toa overnment grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title ...G 'o proof being admissible toovercome a conclusive presumption! confirmation proceedings would! in truth be little more than aformality! at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claims is of the requiredcharacter and length of time( and registration thereunder would not confer title! but simply

recogni)e a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from publicto private land! but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law from themoment the required period of possession became complete. *s was so well put in +ari,o! -. . .There are indications that registration was e"pected from all! but none sufficient to show that! forwant of it! ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof! wherever made! wasnot to confer title! but simply to establish it! as already conferred by the decree! if not by earlier law.(;mphasis supplied"

0ubsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement such that open, continuous and eFclusive possessionfor at least -< years of alienable public land ipso $ureconverts the same to private property (/irector of Lands v. 6AC,4! 0C%A B

$he Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a" the land is alienable public land and (b" hispossession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in thePublic Land Act (/irector of Lands v. 1uyco, 4B 0C%A * I++4J". 9hen the conditions set by law are complied with,the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessityof a certificate of title being issued (Dational Power Corporation v. CA, supra". As such, the land ceases to be a partof the public domain and goes beyond the authority of the /irector of Lands to dispose of.

6n other words, the $orrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land(=unicipality of ?ictorias v. CA, !+ 0C%A -4 I+*J". 6t merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. As could begleaned from the evidence adduced, private respondents were able to establish the nature of possession of their

predecessorsininterest. ;vidence was offered to prove that their predecessorsininterest had paid taFes on thesub'ect land and introduced improvements thereon (;Fhibits G2G to G2+G". A certified true copy of the affidavit eFecutedby Cristeta /azo and her sister 0implicia was also formally offered to prove that the sub'ect parcels of land wereinherited by vendor Cristeta /azo from her father Pedro /azo with the conformity of her only sister 0implicia (;FhibitGG". Li&ewise, a report from the 1ureau of Lands was presented in evidence together with a letter from the 1ureau of2orest /evelopment, to prove that the questioned lots were part of the alienable and disposable zone of thegovernment and that no forestry interest was affected (CA % Do. 4+3-, %ecords, p. --".

6n the main, petitioner see&s to defeat respondents7 application for registration of title on the ground of foreignnationality. Accordingly, the ruling in /irector of Lands v. 1uyco (supra" supports petitioner7s thesis.

9e disagree.

6n Buyco, the applicants therein were li&ewise foreign nationals but were naturalborn 2ilipino citizens at the time oftheir supposed acquisition of the property. 1ut this is where the similarity ends. $he applicants in Buycosought toregister a large tract of land under the provisions of the Land %egistration Act, and in the alternative, under theprovisions of the Public Land Act. $he land registration court decided in favor of the applicants and was affirmed bythe appellate court on appeal. $he /irector of Lands brought the matter before us on review and we reversed.

$his Court, spea&ing through )ustice /avide, )r., stated8


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As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the private respondents do not rely on fee simpleownership based on a 0panish grant or possessory information title under 0ection + of the Land%egistration ActH the private respondents did not present any proof that they or their predecessorsininterest derived title from an old 0panish grant such as (a" the Gtitulo realG or royal grant (b" theGconcession especialG or especial grantH (c" the Gcomposicion con el estadoG title or ad'ustment titleH(d" the Gtitulo de compraG or title by purchaseH and (e" the Ginformacion posesoriaG or possessory

information title, which could become a Gtitulo gratuitoG or a gratuitous title (/irector of 2orestry v.=u>oz, 4- 0C%A - I+BJ". $he primary basis of their claim is possession, by themselves andtheir predecessorsininterest, since time immemorial.

6f indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in possession since timeimmemorial, the rulings of both courts could be upheld for, as this Court stated in h Cho v./irector of Lands (*3 Phil. +< I+!BJ"8

. . . All lands that were not acquired from the overnment, either by purchase orby grant, belong to the public domain. An eFception to the rule would be any landthat should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessorsin interest since time immemorial, for such possession would 'ustify the

presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that if hadbeen a private property even before the 0panish conquest (Cari>o v. 6nsularovernment, ! Phil +-3 I+


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. . ., there does not even eFist a reasonable basis for the finding that the private respondents andtheir predecessorsininterest possessed the land for more than eighty (o and 0usi doctrines. $hus,(when the predecessorininterest" died on - =ay +-*, he transmitted no right whatsoever, withrespect to the said property, to his heirs. $his being the case, his possession cannot be tac&ed tothat of the private respondents for the latter7s benefit pursuant to 0ection !(b" of the Public LandAct, the alternative ground relied upon in their application . . .

FFF FFF FFF

Considering that the private respondents became American citizens before such filing, it goeswithout saying that they had acquired no vested right! consisting of an imperfect title! over theproperty before they lost their /hilippine citi)enship. (;mphasis supplied"

Clearly, the application in Buycowere denied registration of title not merely because they were American citizens atthe time of their application therefor. %espondents therein failed to prove possession of their predecessorininterestsince time immemorial or possession in such a manner that the property has been segregated from public domainHsuch that at the time of their application, as American citizens, they have acquired no vested rights over the parcel ofland.

6n the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly naturalborn 2ilipino citizens at the time of the acquisition ofthe properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tac&ing in the process, the possession in theconcept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their predecessorsininterest under the Public Land Act.

6n addition, private respondents have constructed a house of strong materials on the contested property, nowoccupied by respondent Lapi>as mother.

1ut what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows privaterespondents to register the contested parcels of land in their favor. 0ections * and of Article 566 of the Constitutioncontain the following pertinent provisions, to wit8

0ec. *. 0ave in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyedeFcept to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the publicdomain.

0ec. . Dotwithstanding the provisions of 0ection * of this Article, a naturalborn citi)en of the

/hilippines who has lost his /hilippine citi)enship may be a transferee of private lands! sub$ect tolimitations provided by law. (;mphasis supplied"

0ection , Article 566 of the +* Constitution above quoted is similar to 0ection 3, Article 56? of the then +*-Constitution which reads8

0ec. 3. Dotwithstanding the provisions of 0ection ! of this Article, a naturalborn citizen of thePhilippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private land, for use by him as hisresidence, as the 1atasang Pambansa may provide.


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Pursuant thereto, 1atas Pambansa 1lg. 3 was passed into law, the relevant provision of which provides8

0ec. 4. Any naturalborn citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and whohas the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of aprivate land up to a maFimum area of one thousand square meters, in the case of urban land, orone hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. 6n the case of married

couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein grantedH Provided, $hat if both shall avail ofthe same, the total area acquired shall not eFceed the maFimum herein fiFed.

6n case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall still beentitled to be a transferee of an additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes which, whenadded to those already owned by him, shall not eFceed the maFimum areas herein authorized.

2rom the adoption of the +* Constitution up to the present, no other law has been passed by the legislature on thesame sub'ect. $hus, what governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a naturalborn 2ilipino citizen who haslost his Philippine citizenship remains to be 1P 3.

;ven if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration of the propertiesin question, said properties as discussed above were already private landsH consequently, there could be no legalimpediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. $he parcels of landsought to be registered no longer form part of the public domain. $hey are already private in character since privaterespondents7 predecessorsininterest have been in open, continuous and eFclusive possession and occupationthereof under claim of ownership prior to )une 4, +!3 or since +-*. $he law provides that a naturalborn citizen ofthe Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a maFimum area of,


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land registration court prior to the approval of an application for registration of title. An application for registration oftitle before a land registration court should not be confused with the issuance of a certificate of title by the register ofdeeds. 6t is only when the 'udgment of the land registration court approving the application for registration hasbecome final that a decree of registration is issued. And that is the time when the requirements of 0ec. B, 1P 3,before the register of deeds should be complied with by the applicants. $his decree of registration is the one that issubmitted to the office of the register of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the applicant. Prior to

the issuance of the decree of registration, the register of deeds has no participation in the approval of the applicationfor registration of title as the decree of registration is yet to be issued.

9:;%;2%;, the petition is /60=600;/ and the decision appealed from is hereby A226%=;/.

0 %/;%;/.

'arvasa! +.J.! +ru)! 0eliciano! /adilla! egalado! 2avide! Jr.! omero! Bellosillo! 3elo! 4uiason! /uno!Vitug! 5apunan! and 3endo)a! JJ.!concur.

S#$%&%t# O$'('o(s

CRU), *., +'ss#(t'(g

9ith all due respect, 6 have to dissent.

$heponencia begins by posing the issue thus8

Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired bypurchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with therequirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA !"#

$here is no question that the property is private land and thus sub'ect to registration by qualified persons. 6t wasreally needless to elaborate on 1uyco, which is clearly inapplicable here. 9e can agree that the ruling case is/irector of Lands v. 6ntermediate Appellate Court, which is not challenged in this petition.

1ut 6 thin& theponencia misses the point. $he finding that the respondent spouses were naturalborn 2ilpinos at thetime they acquired the land does not settle the question posed.

$he important point is that the respondent spouses are no longer citizens of the Philippines but naturalizedCanadians. 6t does not follow that because they were citizens of the Philippines when they acquired the land, theycan register it in their names now even if they are no longer 2ilipinos.

0ection * of Article 566 of the Constitution is irrelevant because it is not disputed that the respondent spouses werequalified to acquire the land in question when it was transferred to them.


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0ection of the same article is not applicable either because it spea&s of a transfer of private land to a formernaturalborn citizen of the Philippines after he became a foreigner.

$hus it states8

0ec. . Dotwithstanding the provisions of 0ection * of this Article, a naturalborn citizen of thePhilippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, sub'ect tolimitations provided by law.

;ven if it be assumed that the provision is applicable, it does not appear that the private respondents have observedGthe limitations provided by law.G

$heponencia finds that all the requisites for the registration of the land in the private respondents7 name have beencomplied with. 6 do not believe so for there is no showing that 1.P. 3 has also been enforced.

$he view has been eFpressed that we should confine ourselves to the requirements for registration under the PublicLand Act. 6 respectfully submit that the requirements in 1.P. 3 have been read into the Act and should also be

applied.

0trict compliance is necessary because of the special privilege granted to former 2ilipinos who have becomeforeigners by their own choice. 6f we can be so strict with our own citizens, 6 see no reason why we should be less so

with those who have renounced our country.

F#-''%(o, *. o(u&&'(g

6 agree with the great bul& of the ma'ority opinion written by =r. )ustice 1idin and the result reached therein.

$his separate statement is concerned only with the last two (4" paragraphs, 'ust before the dispositive portion, of thema'ority opinion. 6n my view, it should be stressed that 1.P. 1lg. 3 which too& effect on B =arch +4,

doesnot purport to cover the set of facts before the Court in this case8 i.e., the respondent spouses becametransferees on 17 June 1976 of the land here involved while they were naturalborn /hilippine citi)ens whohappened sometime later to have been naturalized as citizens of another country. 1.P. 1lg. 3, as far as 6 candetermine, addresses itself only to a situation ofpersons who were already foreign nationals at the time they becametransferees of private land in the Philippines, but who werepreviously naturalborn Philippine citizens. 6t is difficult,therefore, to see how 1.P. 1lg. 3 can become applicable to the present situation even at the subsequent time whenthe respondent spouses would come before the %egister of /eeds. 1.P. 1lg. 3, especially 0ection B thereof,imposes certain requirements, including a specific limitation on the quantity of land (not more than ,


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9ith all due respect, 6 have to dissent.

$heponencia begins by posing the issue thus8

Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired bypurchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with therequirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA !"#

$here is no question that the property is private land and thus sub'ect to registration by qualified persons. 6t wasreally needless to elaborate on 1uyco, which is clearly inapplicable here. 9e can agree that the ruling case is/irector of Lands v. 6ntermediate Appellate Court, which is not challenged in this petition.

1ut 6 thin& theponencia misses the point. $he finding that the respondent spouses were naturalborn 2ilpinos at thetime they acquired the land does not settle the question posed.

$he important point is that the respondent spouses are no longer citizens of the Philippines but naturalizedCanadians. 6t does not follow that because they were citizens of the Philippines when they acquired the land, they

can register it in their names now even if they are no longer 2ilipinos.

0ection * of Article 566 of the Constitution is irrelevant because it is not disputed that the respondent spouses werequalified to acquire the land in question when it was transferred to them.

0ection of the same article is not applicable either because it spea&s of a transfer of private land to a formernaturalborn citizen of the Philippines after he became a foreigner.

$hus it states8

0ec. . Dotwithstanding the provisions of 0ection * of this Article, a naturalborn citizen of thePhilippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, sub'ect to

limitations provided by law.

;ven if it be assumed that the provision is applicable, it does not appear that the private respondents have observedGthe limitations provided by law.G

$heponencia finds that all the requisites for the registration of the land in the private respondents7 name have beencomplied with. 6 do not believe so for there is no showing that 1.P. 3 has also been enforced.

$he view has been eFpressed that we should confine ourselves to the requirements for registration under the PublicLand Act. 6 respectfully submit that the requirements in 1.P. 3 have been read into the Act and should also beapplied.

0trict compliance is necessary because of the special privilege granted to former 2ilipinos who have becomeforeigners by their own choice. 6f we can be so strict with our own citizens, 6 see no reason why we should be less so

with those who have renounced our country.

F#-''%(o, *. o(u&&'(g

6 agree with the great bul& of the ma'ority opinion written by =r. )ustice 1idin and the result reached therein.


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$his separate statement is concerned only with the last two (4" paragraphs, 'ust before the dispositive portion, of thema'ority opinion. 6n my view, it should be stressed that 1.P. 1lg. 3 which too& effect on B =arch +4,doesnot purport to cover the set of facts before the Court in this case8 i.e., the respondent spouses becametransferees on 17 June 1976 of the land here involved while they were naturalborn /hilippine citi)ens whohappened sometime later to have been naturalized as citizens of another country. 1.P. 1lg. 3, as far as 6 candetermine, addresses itself only to a situation ofpersons who were already foreign nationals at the time they became

transferees of private land in the Philippines, but who werepreviously naturalborn Philippine citizens. 6t is difficult,therefore, to see how 1.P. 1lg. 3 can become applicable to the present situation even at the subsequent time whenthe respondent spouses would come before the %egister of /eeds. 1.P. 1lg. 3, especially 0ection B thereof,imposes certain requirements, including a specific limitation on the quantity of land (not more than ,


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d" A sarisari store (formerly a ba&ery" also located on the above described lot.-

According to petitioners, the said lot and properties were titled and taF declared under trust in the name ofrespondent ?icente $eng ui for the benefit of the deceased 2eliF $ing :o who, being a Chinese citizen, was thendisqualified to own public lands in the PhilippinesH and that upon the death of 2eliF $ing :o, the respondent too&possession of the same for his own eFclusive use and benefit to their eFclusion and pre'udice.!

6n his answer, the respondent countered that on ctober , +3, 2eliF $ing :o sold the commercial and residentialbuildings to his sisterinlaw, ?ictoria Cabasal, and the ba&ery to his brotherinlaw, regorio 2ontela.3:e alleged thathe acquired said properties from the respective buyers on ctober 4, +B and has since then been in possessionof sub'ect properties in the concept of an ownerH and that on )anuary 4!, +*, riginal Certificate of $itle Do. P


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+3 and the subsequent sale of the same to the defendant ?icente $eng ui in ctober of +B the plaintiffs andthe defendant continued to live and were under the custody of their parents until their father 2eliF $ing :o died in+*< and their mother Leonila Cabasal died in +*.*(;mphasis supplied"

6n light of these factual findings, the %$C found that 2eliF $ing :o, being a Chinese citizen and the father of thepetitioners and respondent, resorted to a series of simulated transactions in order to preserve the right to the lot and

the properties thereon in the hands of the family. As stated by the trial court8

After a serious consideration of the testimonies given by both one of the plaintiffs and the defendant as well as thedocumentary eFhibits presented in the case, the Court is inclined to believe that 2eliF $ing :o, the father of theplaintiffs and the defendant, and the husband of Leonila Cabasal thought of preserving the properties in question bytransferring the said properties to his eldest son as he thought that he cannot acquire the properties as he was aChinese citizen. $o transfer the improvements on the land to his eldest son the defendant ?icente $eng ui, he firsteFecuted simulated /eeds of 0ales in favor of the sister and brotherinlaw of his wife in +3 and after three (-"years it was made to appear that these vendees had sold the improvements to the defendant ?icente $eng ui who

was then years old. $he Court finds that these transaction (sic" were simulated and that no consideration wasever paid by the vendees.

F F F F F F F F F

9ith regards (sic" to the transfer and relinquishment of 2eliF $ing :oNs right to the land in question in favor of thedefendant, the Court believes, that although from the face of the document it is stated in absolute terms that withoutany consideration 2eliF $ing :o was transferring and renouncing his right in favor of his son, the defendant ?icente$eng ui, still the Court believes that the transaction was one of implied trust eFecuted by 2eliF $ing :o for thebenefit of his familyO

Dotwithstanding such findings, the %$C considered the Affidavit of $ransfer, %elinquishment and %enouncement of%ights and 6nterests over the land as a donation which was accepted by the donee, the herein respondent. 9ithrespect to the properties in the lot, the trial court held that although the sales were simulated, pursuant to Article !*of the Dew Civil Code+it can be assumed that the intention of 2eliF $ing :o in such transaction was to give anddonate such properties to the respondent. As a result, it awarded the entire con'ugal share of 2eliF $ing :o in thesub'ect lot and properties to the respondent and divided only the con'ugal share of his wife among the siblings. $hedispositive portion of the %$C decision decreed8

9:;%;2%;, 'udgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant as the Court ordersthe partition and the ad'udication of the sub'ect properties, Lot !, $s-


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laws from owning public lands, and that respondent ?icente $eng ui was the rightful owner over said lot by virtue of=iscellaneous 0ales Patent Do. *!3* issued in his favor, viz8

$he deceased 2eliF $ing :o, plaintiffsN and defendantNs late father, was never the owner of the sub'ect lot, nowidentified as Lot Do. !, $s-

F F F F F F F F F

/efendant ?icente $eng ui acquired the sub'ect land by sales patent or purchase from the government and not fromhis father, the late 2eliF $ing :o. 6t cannot be said that he acquired or bought the land in trust for his father becauseon /ecember 3, +** when the sub'ect land was sold to him by the government and on )anuary -, +* when=iscellaneous 0ales Patent Do. *!3* was issued, the late 2eliF $ing :o was already dead, having died on )une B,+*< ($0D, )anuary


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3. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the ffice of the 0olicitor eneralH and

B. $here is no pronouncement as to costs.

0 %/;%;/.4

1oth petitioners and respondent filed their respective motions for reconsideration from this ruling, which weresummarily denied by the CA in its %esolution-dated August 3, ++*. :ence, this petition.

According to the petitioners, the CA erred in declaring that Lot Do. !, $s-


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of the miscellaneous sales patent by the 0ecretary of Datural %esources, and the corresponding issuance of theoriginal certificate of title in his name, show that the respondent possesses all the qualifications and none of thedisqualifications to acquire alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. $hese issuances bear thepresumption of regularity in their performance in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

%egistration of grants and patents involving public lands is governed by 0ection 44 of Act Do. !+B, which was

subsequently amended by 0ection


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6nvo&ing the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity, is li&ewise misplaced. 6t hasbeen held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because ofpublic policy, cannot be done directly...+

Coming now to the issue of ownership of the properties erected on the sub'ect lot, the Court agrees with the findingof the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, that the series of transactions resorted to by the deceased were

simulated in order to preserve the properties in the hands of the family. $he records show that during all the time thatthe properties were allegedly sold to the spouses ?ictoria Cabasal and regorio 2ontela in +3 and the subsequentsale of the same to respondent in +B, the petitioners and respondent, along with their parents, remained inpossession and continued to live in said properties.

:owever, the trial court concluded that8

6n fairness to the defendant, although the /eeds of 0ale eFecuted by 2eliF $ing :o regarding the improvements infavor of ?ictoria Cabasal and regorio 2ontela and the subsequent transfer of the same by regorio 2ontela and?ictoria Cabasal to the defendant are all simulated, yet, pursuant to Article !* of the Dew Civil Code it can beassumed that the intention of 2eliF $ing :o in such transaction was to give and donate the improvements to hiseldest son the defendant ?icente $eng uiO4

LTD Reading Assignent for Midterms or Finals

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Transcript of LTD Reading Assignent for Midterms or Finals