REPUBLIC V NAGUIT

FACTS:On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The parcel of land is designated as Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D, Nabas Cadastre, AP – 060414-014779, and contains an area of 31,374 square meters. The application seeks judicial confirmation of respondent’s imperfect title over the aforesaid land. On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the application. The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Jose Angeles, representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a later date, however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a formal opposition to the petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the court issued an order of general default against the whole world except as to the heirs of Rustico Angeles and the government. The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945 under Tax Declaration No. 3888 until 1991. On July 9, 1992, Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956. Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same. She constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The administrator introduced improvements, planted trees, such as mahogany, coconut and gemelina trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land. At present, there are parcels of land surrounding the subject land which have been issued titles by virtue of judicial decrees. Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the government until she filed her application for registration. After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public prosecutor manifested that the government did not intend to present any evidence while oppositor Jose Angeles, as representative of the heirs of Rustico Angeles, failed to appear during the trial despite notice. On September 27, 1997, the MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the subject parcel be brought under the operation of the Property Registration Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto registered and confirmed in the name of Naguit. The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the land applied for was declared alienable and disposable only on October 15, 1980, per the certification from Regional Executive Director Raoul T. Geollegue of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region VI.7However, the court denied the motion for reconsideration in an order dated February 18, 1998. Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of the MCTC to the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8. On February 26, 1999, the RTC rendered its decision, dismissing the appeal.

FACTS:Corazon Naguit filed a petition for registration of title which seeks judicialconfirmation of her imperfect title over a parcel of land in Nabas, Aklan. It was alleged that Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the government until she filed her application for registration. The MCTC rendered a decision confirming the title in the name of Naguit upon failure of Rustico Angeles to appear during trial after filing his formal opposition to the petition. The Solicitor General, representing the Republic of the Philippines, filed a motionfor reconsideration on the grounds that the property which is in open, continuous andexclusive possession must first be alienable. Naguit could not have maintained a bonafide claim of ownership since the subject land was declared as alienable and disposableonly on

October 15, 1980. The alienable and disposable character of the land shouldhave already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

ISSUE:Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.

RULING:Section 14 (1) merely requires that the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. There are three requirements for registration of title, (1) that the subject property is alienable and disposable; (2) that the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, and exclusive possession and occupation, and; (3) that the possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.There must be a positive act of the government through a statute or proclamation stating the intention of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property, thus, declaring the land as alienable and disposable. However, if there has been none, it is presumed that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property and the possession of the land no matter how long would not ripen into ownership through acquisitive prescription. To follow the Solicitor General’s argument in the construction of Section 14 (1) would render the paragraph 1 of the said provision inoperative for it would mean that all lands of public domain which were not declared as alienable and disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. In effect, it precludes the government from enforcing the said provision as it decides to reclassify lands as alienable anddisposable.The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with coconut trees now over fifty years old. The inherent nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the application of Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the continuous possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN V RP

FACTS:On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-

DENR), which stated that the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration. The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.

ISSUES:

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?

HELD:

The Pertition is denied.

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by

Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

SPS. PALOMO V RP

FACTS:Diego Palomo is the owner of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order No. 40. On 1916, he ordered the registration of these lands and donated the same to his heirs, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two months before his death in April 1937. Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay on May 1970. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953. Sometime in July 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park," under the control, management, protection and administration of the

defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of the public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Law nor registerable under the Land Registration Act. The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real estate taxes thereon and introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. On April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual mortgaged the parcels of land to guarantee a loan of P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine Islands.

ISSUE: Whether or not forest land may be owned by private persons.

HELD:The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain. It is in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registerable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. There is no question that the lots here forming part of the forest zone were not alienable lands of the public domain. As to the forfeiture of improvements introduced by petitioners, the fact that the government failed to oppose the registration of the lots in question is no justification for petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots.

RP V DOLDOL

Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 1997, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court and dismissing herein petitioner’s complaint, as well as its resolution of March 5, 1998, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:

Sometime in 1959, respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Barrio Pontacan, Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental. On October 23, 1963, he filed an application for saltwork purposes for the said area with the Bureau of Forest Development. The Director of Forestry, however, rejected the same on April 1, 1968. Meanwhile, the Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental passed a resolution in 1965 reserving Lot 4932, Cad-237, Opol Cadastre as a school site. This reserved lot unfortunately included the area occupied by Doldol.

In accordance with said resolution, the Opol High School transferred to the site in 1970. Seventeen years later, on November 2, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 180 reserving the area, including the portion in dispute, for the Opol High School, now renamed the Opol National Secondary Technical School (hereafter Opol National School). Needing the area occupied by Doldol for its intended projects, the school made several demands for him to vacate said portion, but he refused to move.

In view of Doldol’s refusal to vacate, Opol National School filed in 1991 a complaint for accion possessoria with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro. The trial court ruled in the school’s favor

and ordered Doldol to vacate the land. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the court a quo, ruling that Doldol was entitled to the portion he occupied, he having possessed the same for thirty-two years, from 1959 up to the time of the filing of the complaint in 1991.

Opol National School’s motion for reconsideration of said decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of March 5, 1998, Opol National School elevated its case to this Court, claiming that the Court of Appeals erred on a question of law when it held, contrary to the evidence on record, that respondent had been in open, continuous, notorious and exclusive possession of the land in dispute for thirty-two years.

The petition is meritorious.

In ruling in Doldol’s favor, the Court of Appeals grounded its decision on Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (otherwise known as the Public Land Act). Said provision, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, provides as follows:

“Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certification of title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

x x x x x x x x x

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.” (Italics ours)

In accordance with the above provision, the appellate court averred that a citizen of the Philippines may acquire alienable land of the public domain if he has possessed the same for thirty years. Finding Doldol to have occupied the disputed lot for thirty-two years, it ruled that the former had acquired ownership of the same, thereby negating Opol National School’s claim over the questioned area.

To further bolster its argument, the appellate court cited Republic vs. CA[1] where this Court, citing Director of Lands vs. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 (1991) declared that:

“The weight of authority is that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite periodipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property.”

x x x x x x x x x

…with the latter’s proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land.

x x x x x x x x x

As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.

The appellate court has resolved the question as to who between the parties had a better right to possess the lot through the erroneous application of an outdated version of Section 48 of the Public Land Act. Likewise, Solicitor Renan E. Ramos of the Office of the Solicitor General erred in assuming that the thirty-year proviso in the aforementioned section was still good law. The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942,[2] which provided for a simple thirty year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads:

“(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.” (Italics ours)

Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that the Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.

The evidence presented shows that the land in dispute is alienable and disposable, in accordance with the District Forester’s Certification dated September 20, 1978, that the subject area is within Project 8, an alienable and disposable tract of public land, as appearing in Bureau of Forest Land Classification Map No. 585. Doldol, thus, meets the first requirement.

The parties, however, stipulated during the pre-trial hearing that Doldol had been occupying the portion reserved for the school site only since 1959. The law, as presently phrased, requires that possession of lands of the public domain must be from June 12, 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the disputed lot since his occupation of the same started only in 1959, much later than June 12, 1945. Not having complied with the conditions set by law, Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a right to the land in question as to segregate the same from the public domain. Doldol cannot, therefore, assert a right superior to the school, given that then President Corazon Aquino had reserved the lot for Opol National School. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General:

“(T)he privilege of occupying public lands with a view of preemption confers no contractual or vested right in the lands occupied and the authority of the President to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the public, or to reserve them for public use, prior to the divesting by the government of title thereof stands, even though this may defeat the imperfect right of a settler. Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired.”[3]

In sum, Opol National School has the better right of possession over the land in dispute.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 1997, and Resolution dated March 27, 1998, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated August 25, 1992, is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.