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Rep v CA p2

Menguito vs Rep p9

Coronado v CA p21

Heirs of Teodoro dela cruz v CA p26

Tan v Phil bank corp p32

Rep v Divinaflor p38

Atok Big Min. Co. In. v CA p44

Municipality of Victorias v CA p 59



G.R. No. L-56948 September 30, 1987

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Forest Development and theDirector of Lands, petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and MARTINA CARANTES for and in behalf of the

Heirs of SALMING PIRASO, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming intoto the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, Branch III, at La Trinidad inLRC Case No. N-287, Record No. 37205, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

It having been proven convincingly that this land was owned and possessed by thelate Salming Piraso and later by his successors-in-interest, who are his children for a

period of more than thirty years up to this date, they have shown to have aregisterable title on the property which this Court therefore confirms and affirms inaccordance with the law. Let the land so described in the technical description of thesurvey made of the same and in accordance with the corresponding plan be soregistered. (p. 50, Rollo)

On May 9, 1968, respondent Martina S. Carantes for and in behalf of the Heirs of Saying Piraso filedwith the Court of Firing Instance of Baguio and Benguet, Land Registration No. N-287, covering thefollowing describe property:

A parcel of land (as shown on plan PSU-43639) situated in the Barrio of AnsaganMunicipality of Tuba, Mountain Province. Bounded in the, NE., along line 1-2 by

property of Sioco Carino (PSU-43643, Lot 1); on the SE., and SW., along lines 2-3-4-5 by public land, on the We, along lines 5-6-1 by property of Tunccalo. Containing anarea of TWO MILLION ONE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHTHUNDRED AND SEVENTY NINE (2,197,879) SQUARE METERS. ... (p. 13, Rollo)

On January 13, 1970, the Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, filed an opposition to theapplication for registration stating, among others:

That neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title tosaid parcel of land the same not having been acquired by them either by compositiontitle from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title under the RoyalDecree of February 13, 1894;

That neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have been in open,continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of the land in questionfor at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the present application;

That the aforementioned parcel of land is a portion of the public domain belonging tothe Republic of the Philippines. (pp. 13-14, Rollo)



On April 7, 1970, the Director of Forestry also filed an opposition to the application for registration onthe following grounds:

That the whole area applied for registration is within the Central Cordillera ForestReserve established under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929;

That the area sought to be registered is neither release for disposition nor alienation;and that the herein applicant has no registerable title over the whole parcel of landeither in fact or in law. (p. 14, Rollo)

After trial, a decision was rendered by the land registration court, as earlier stated, adjudicating theparcel of land to the applicants. The motion for reconsideration filed by Government oppositor'shaving been denied, an appeal was made to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decisionof the land registration court.

In this petition, the petitioner assigns the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:

A. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION IS NOT

CAPABLE OF REGISTRATION BEING PART OF THE PUBLIC FORESTS WITHIN THE CENTRALCORDILLERA FOREST RESERVE:

B. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED POSSESSION OFTHE LAND BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND THEIR PREDECESSORS—INTEREST WAS NOTIN CONCEPT OF OWNER UNDER SECTION 48 of the PUBLIC LAND LAW, THE LAND BEINGINALIENABLE;

C. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LAND IS AGRICULTURAL BECAUSETHE GOVERNMENT FAILED TO SUBMIT PROOF THAT THE LAND IS MORE VALUABLE FORFOREST PURPOSES;

D. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROPERTY BECAME SEGREGATEDFROM THE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND ASSUMED THE CHARACTER OF PRIVATEOWNERSHIP UPON APPROVAL OF ITS SURVEY PLAN BY THE DIRECTOR OF LAND IN 1925;

E. ASSUMING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAD POSSESSED AND CULTIVATED 10 TO 15HECTARES OF THE LAND APPLIED FOR, RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN RULING THATTHEY HAD ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP THRU CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OVER THE RESTOF THE (219.7879) HECTARES APPLIED FOR. (p. 18, Rollo)

The issues raised are:

1. Whether or not the land in question is part of the public forest within the Central

Cordillera Forest Reserve; and

2. Whether or not private respondents have established registerable title over theland in question.

It is the stand of the petitioner that the land in question covered by the Plan-Psu-43639 is part of thepublic forests within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve established under Proclamation No. 217of Governor General Henry Stimson dated February 16, 1929. On February 27, 1980, an ocular inspection of said property was made by Land Inspector Crisogono Bartolo, Jr., of the Bureau of



Lands together with representatives of the Bureau of Forestry, the Land Registration Court, and theapplicants for registration. During the ocular inspection, the land was found to be rolling and stony innature. Bartolo, Jr., submitted a report on April 17, 1970 stating among others, that the land iscovered with trees, bushes and grasses and being also stony is not suitable for agriculturalpurposes.

The representative of the Bureau of Forestry, Forester Ricardo D. Zapatero, submitted to theProvincial Fiscal a separate report dated April 6, 1970 to the effect that the whole area falls withinthe Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and that the same has not been released for agriculturalpurposes by the Director of Forestry who had administrative jurisdiction over the same.

The petitioner states that since the land in question is indubitably part of the public forest and hasnot been reclassified or released from the forest zone, the same can not be the subject of registration either under Act 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, or under Section48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. The petitioner pointsout that lands within the forest zone or within a duly established reservation do not form part of thedisposable portion of the public domain nor can the same be alienated as said lands are not capableof private appropriation or ownership and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert thatsame into private property.

It is further argued by the petitioner that the private respondents or their predecessors-in-interest,Salming Piraso, had not acquired ownership over the land prior to its classification as part of theCordillera Forest Reserve use there is no evidence on record that Salming Piraso had possessedthe property for any appreciable period prior to 1929 when the land became part of the CordilleraForest Reserve.

On the other hand, the private respondents assert that the findings of fact of the Court of Appealsshow that the land subject of application is not within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and thesame land applied for registration is disposable and alienable. The private respondents, asapplicants, claim to have sufficiently shown by preponderance of evidence that the land beingapplied for registration had been possessed by Salming Piraso as far back as 1915 when he and his

workers planted the arable portion of about 15 hectares to rice and other products and raised cowson the other portion suited for pasture. The late Salming Piraso had the land surveyed by privatesurveyor Jose Castro on April 3-9, 1924 as Plan Psu-43639 which was approved by the thenDirector of Lands, Jorge B. Vargas on March 6, 1925, while Proclamation No. 217 was promulgatedonly on February 16, 1929. They state that the approval of the said survey by the government thruthe Director of Lands Jorge B. Vargas can only mean that said land was no longer included in theoverall survey of the government as it was no longer part of the public land. As applicants, theycontend that they have possessed the land applied for in concept of owner, openly and publicly,adverse against the whole world and continuously for more than thirty (30) years before they filedthe application over the land which is agricultural and separate from the public domain.

We find the petition to be meritorious. It is already a settled rule that forest lands or forest reserves

are not capable of private appropriation and possession thereof, however long, of convert them intoprivate property (Vano vs. Government of Philippine Islands, 41 Phil. 161; Adorable v. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401; Director of Forestry vs. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183; Republic vs. De la Cruz 67SCRA 221; Director of Lands vs. Reyes & Azurin vs. Director of Lands, 68 SCRA 177; Republic vs.Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; and Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701) unlesssuch lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable by the Director of Forestry, buteven then, possession of the land by the applicants prior to the reclassification of the land asdisposable and alienable cannot be credited as part of the thirty-year requirement under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act (Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, supra ). In this case, there is no



showing of reclassification by the Director of Forestry that the land in question is disposable or alienable. This is a matter which cannot be assumed. It calls for proof.

There is an erroneous assumption implicit in the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals whichthe government oppositors also appear to have overlooked. This is the reliance on Proclamation No.217 of Governor General Henry L. Stimson as the operative act which converted the lands covered

by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve into forest lands. This is wrong. The land was not non-forest or agricultural land prior to the 1929 proclamation. It did not ease a classification from non-forest into forest land because of the proclamation. The proclamation merely declared a specialforest reserve out of already existing forest lands. The land was already forest or timber land evenbefore the proclamation. The alleged entry in 1915 of Salming Piraso and the cultivation of 15hectares out of a (219.7879) hectares claimed area has no legal significance. A person cannot enter into forest land and by the simple act of cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits towards aneventual confirmation of imperfect title. The Government must first declare the forest land to bealienable and disposable agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation, and exclusive andadverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.

The records positively establish that the land in question is part of the public forest which theExecutive formally proclaimed as the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve to further preserve itsintegrity and to give it a status which is more special for certain purposes than that of ordinary forestlands.

One reason for the respondent court's decision finding a registerable title for the private respondentsis its observation that the Government failed to show that the disputed land is more valuable for forest purposes. The court noted a failure to prove that trees are thriving in the land.

The Court of Appeals finding is based on a wrong concept of what is forest land. There is a bigdifference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a classification of lands of the public domain in the Constitution. (Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, Section10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, as amended; and Section 1, Article XIII of the 1935Constitution).

One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status a classification for legal purposes.

The "forest land" started out as a "forest" or vast tracts of wooded land with dense growths of treesand underbush. However, the cutting down of trees and the disappearance of virgin forest and notautomatically convert the lands of the public domain from forest or timber land to alienableagricultural land.

As stated by this Court in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry (126 SCRA 69, 75);

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such

classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forestcover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have tobe on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrovetrees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also beclassffied as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or statusand does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless anduntil the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect



so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, therules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muñoz (23 SCRA 1184)that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into privateownership. And in Republic v. Animas,(56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the

ground that the area covered by the patent and title was not disposable public land, itbeing a part of the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void at initio. Itbears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify landwhich is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. (at p. 75)

On February 27, 1970, an ocular inspection of the questioned property was conducted by LandInspector Crisogono Bartolo, Jr., of the Bureau of Lands, together with Forester Ricardo D. Zapateroof the Bureau of Forestry, Deputy Clerk of Court Roberto Gogoling as representative of the landregistration court, Fiscal Navarro and Andres Carantes as representative of the applicant.

Land Inspector Crisogono Bartolo, Jr., submitted his report dated April 17, 1970, which states,

among others, that the land is covered with trees, bushes and grasses and being stony is notsuitable for agricultural purposes. This negates the claim of the private respondents that the land hasbeen cultivated since 1915.

More important, however, than the appearance of the land is its status, as stated in the separatereport dated April 6, 1970 submitted to the Provincial Fiscal of Benguet Province by Forester RicardoD. Zapatero which declares that the whole area applied for by the applicant fails within the CentralCordillera Forest Reserve and that the same has not been released for agricultural purposes by theDirector of Forestry who has administrative jurisdiction over the same. This has not beensuccessfully refuted. It has not been proved erroneous.

Testifying in connection with the matters stated in his report, Forester Ricardo D. Zapatero statedthat:

Q Do you know the land in question here in this case?

A I know, sir.

Q In connection with your duty to inspect the lands that are subjectmatters of land registration cases, have you inspected this land inquestion also?.

A Yes, I inspected it, sir.

Q What is the purpose of your inspection?

A The purpose of my inspection is to determine the status of the areaif it falls within the reservation or within the alienable or disposable area.

Q What is your finding, if any ?



A My finding was that the area falls within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve.

Q Was that finding reduced into writing?

A Yes, sir.

Q I am showing to you a report found on Pages Sixty-Eight (68) of therecords which for purposes of Identification, we pray that the same bemarked as Exhibit "A" for the government oppositors, your Honor.

COURT:

As what?

FISCAL BRAWNER:

Rather as Exhibit "1"

COURT:

Have it marked.

Q What is the relation of this report with that report that you made?

A This is the original copy of the Report which I submitted to theProvincial Fiscal.

Q There appears a signature above the typewritten name "Ricardo D.Zapatero", whose signature is that?

A That is mine, sir.

Q You stated that in paragraph 3 of your report, Exhibit 1 that theland falls within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, how did youarrive at that conclusion?

A Because of what I have even of the improvements of the applicantand because of the Bureau of Forestry map.

Q Did you actually go to the land in question or the land applied for?

A Yes, air.

Q So, you actually saw this land applied for?

A Yes, sir.

Q What is the nature of this land applied for?



A It is generally stony and the topography is level to rolling and thereare certain enemies of plants inside the land, in some area.

COURT:

Q What are the species of plants?

A There are species of Binayuyu.

Q That is for lumber?

A No, that is not.

FISCAL BRAWNER:

Q You stated in paragraph 2 of your report that the topography of theland applied for is generally stony, and because of the Binayuyuspecies, the condition of the land is not suited for agricultural

purposes?

A Yes, sir.

Q What is the basis of that statement?

A Because of the topography which is of solid inclination, we believethat is not good for agricultural purposes. The land applied for is moresuited for pasture purposes. (pp. 203-206, tsn., September 6,1971;Emphasis supplied)

The reports and testimonies of Land Inspector Bartolo and Forester Zapatero support the contention

of the petitioner that the area applied for by the applicant is forest land within the Central CordilleraForest Reserve. In the case of Ramos v. Director of Lands (39 Phil. 175) we have ousted:

Great consideration, it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, Paid by thecourts to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authority on Forestrymatters.

There is no factual basis for the conclusion of the appellate court that the property in question wasno longer part of the public land when the Government through the Director of Lands approved onMarch 6, 1925, the survey plan (Plan Psu-43639) for Salming Piraso. The existence of a sketch planof real property even if approved by the Bureau of Lands is no proof in itself of ownership of the landcovered by the plan. (Gimeno v. Court of Appeals, 80 SCRA 623). The fact that a claimant or a

possessor has a sketch plan or a survey map prepared for a parcel of land which forms part of thecountry's forest reserves does not convert such land into alienable land, much less private property.

Assuming that a public officer erroneously approves the sketch plan, such approval is nun and void.There must first be a formal Government declaration that the forest land has been re-classified intoalienable and disposable agricultural land which may then be acquired by private persons inaccordance with the various modes of acquiring public agricultural lands.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming thedecision of the land registration court which granted the private respondents' application for



registration of the land in question is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for landregistration is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.



[G.R. No. 134308. December 14, 2000]

SUSANA MENGUITO, EMELITA MENGUITO-MANALILI, HELEN

MARTA MENGUITO-LUNA, RENATO MENGUITO, BERSAMINMENGUITO, FROILAN MENGUITO and GENEROSOMENGUITO, petitioners, vs . REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES, respondent .

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J .:

Unless a piece of public land is shown to have been classified as alienable anddisposable, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Even assuming that such

land has been classified as alienable, title thereto can be registered only uponpresentation of incontrovertible proof of adverse, notorious and open possession in theconcept of owner for a period of thirty years.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing theSeptember 30, 1997 Decision[1] and the June 23, 1998 Resolution [2] of the Court of

Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 39638. The decretal portion of said Decision reads as

follows:

“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE . Accordingly, the appellees’ application for registration ishereby DISMISSED .”[3]

The Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City (Branch 157), [4] whichwas reversed by the appellate court, granted petitioners’ application for registration inthis wise:[5]

“WHEREFORE, the order of general default against the whole world

heretofore entered in this case is affirmed, and judgment is hereby renderedconfirming the registerable title of the applicants to the land described in their application under plan Swo-13-000227 and its technical descriptions, situatedin the Barrio of Ususan, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, and containingan aggregate area of 2,112 square meters; and individual and separatecertificates of titles to the lots comprising the said land are hereby orderedregistered in the names of the applicants, as follows:



1. For lots 6045-A, 6045-B, 6045-C, and 6045-D in the name of SusanaMenguito, of legal age, widow, Filipino citizen, with residence and postaladdress at T. Sulit, St., Pater[o]s, Metro Manila;

2. For Lot 6045-E -- in the name of Renato Menguito, of legal age, married to

Irene Toledo, Filipino citizen, with residence and postal address at T. Sulit,St., Pateros, Metro Manila;

3. For Lot 6045-F -- in the name of Bersamin Menguito, of legal age, Filipinocitizen, single, with residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros,Metro Manila;

4. For Lot 6045-G -- in the name of Generoso Menguito, of legal age, Filipinocitizen, single, with residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros,Metro Manila;

5. For Lot 6045-H -- in the name of Helen Marta Menguito, of legal age,Filipino citizen, single, with residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St.,Pateros, Metro Manila;

6. For Lot 6046-I -- in the name of Froilan Menguito, of legal age, Filipinocitizen, married to Zenaida Carag, with residence and postal address atT.Sulit St., Pateros, Metro Manila;

7. For Lot 6045-J -- in the name of Emelita Menguito, of legal age, Filipino

citizen, married to Luciano Manalili, with residence and postal address at T.Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila; and

8. For Lot 6045-K -- in the name of Generoso Menguito, of legal age, Filipinocitizen, married to Luciano Manalili; and Froilan Menguito, of legal age,Filipino citizen, married to Zenaida Carag, all with residence and postaladdress at T. Sulit St., Pateros, Metro Manila.

Upon the finality of this Decision, let an Order be issued to the Commissioner of Land Registration Authority for the issuance of the decree of registration

and the corresponding certificates of title in favor of the applicants pursuant toSection 39 of PD No. 1529.

SO ORDERED.”

The Facts



The antecedents of the case are adequately summarized by the Court of Appealsas follows:

“On November 10, 1987, in the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila an Application for Registration of Title was filed by the following successors-in-

interest of the deceased spouses Cirilo Menguito and Juana Manalo-Menguito, namely: SUSANA MENGUITO, EMELITA MENGUITO-MANALILI,HELEN MARTA MENGUITO-LUNA, RENATO MENGUITO, BERSAMINMENGUITO, FROILAN MENGUITO and GENEROSO MENGUITO. Docketedin the said court as LRC Case No. N-10938, the application reads:

‘APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE

The above-named applicants hereby apply to have the land hereinafter described brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act as

amended by the Property Registration Decree No. 1529 and to have their titlethereto registered and confirmed,

AND DECLARE:

1. That the applicants are the owners in fee simple of eleven (11) parcels of land situated in the Barrio of Ususan, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila,and are bounded and described as shown on plan Swo-13-000227 (lot Nos.6045-A, 6045-B, 6045-C, 6045-D, 6045-E, 6045-F, 6045-G, 6045-H, 6045-I,6045-J and 6045-K) and corresponding technical descriptions, x x x;

2. That said parcels of land are assessed for taxation for the current year atP5,910.00 as per Tax Declaration No. B-11-01351 of the land record of Taguig, Metro Manila;

3. That to the best of applicants’ knowledge and belief, there is no mortgageor encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting the said land nor any other persons having any estate or interest therein, legal or equitable, inpossession, remainder, reversion or expectancy;

4. That the applicants acquired the said parcels of land by inheritance;

5. That said parcels of land are occupied by the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, peaceful, continuous, andadverse possession, in the concept of owners, of said parcels of land for morethan thirty years;



6. That the names in full and addresses as far known to the undersigned, of the owners of all adjoining properties are as follows:

(a) Pilar MenguitoPateros-Taguig Road

Ususan, TaguigMetro Manila

b) Andres FilemonPateros-Taguig RoadUsusan, TaguigMetro Manila

c) Beatriz DumagatPateros-Taguig RoadUsusan, Taguig

Metro Manila

d) Maura CabanatanPateros-Taguig RoadUsusan, TaguigMetro Manila

e) Pateros-Taguig Roadc/o The District Engineer Pasig, Metro Manila

7. That the applicants’ full name, age, citizenship, residence, and postaladdress, are as follows:

SUSAN MENGUITO, widow; EMELITA M. MANALILI, married to LucianoManalili; HELEN MARTA M. LUNA, married to Benjamin Luna, Jr.; RENATOMENGUITO, married to Irene Toledo; BERSAMIN MENGUITO, married toElvira Salvacion; FROILAN MENGUITO, married to Zenaida Carag; andGENEROSO MENGUITO, single; all of legal age, Filipinos, and withresidence and postal address at T. Sulit St., Pateros, Metro Manila.

8. That should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable in theinstant case, the applicants hereby apply for the benefit of Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended;

9. That the following documents are attached hereto and made part hereof:

(a) Tracing cloth plan of Swo-13-000227



(b) Two (2) print copies of said plan Swo-13-000227

(c) Three (3) copies each of the Technical Description of:

Lot 6045-A

Lot 6045-BLot 6045-CLot 6045-DLot 6045-ELot 6045-FLot 6045-GLot 6045-HLot 6045-ILot 6045-JLot 6045-K

(d) Three (3) copies of Engineer’s Certificate

(e) Four (4) copies of Tax Declaration No. B-011-01351

x x x x x x x x x’

(Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 1-5).

“Acting on the foregoing application, the lower court issued a ‘Notice of Initial

Hearing’ addressed to: the Solicitor General, the Director of the LandManagement Bureau, the Secretary of the Department of Public Works andHighways, the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development, and the owners of the adjacentproperties as mentioned in the application, informing them that the applicationis scheduled for initial hearing on April 25, 1989. The addressees were thenordered ‘to present such claims as you may have to said lands or any portionthereof, and to submit evidence in support of such claims and unless youappear at said court at the time and place aforesaid, your default will berecorded and the title to the lands will be adjudicated and determined in

accordance with law and the evidence before the Court, and thereafter, youwill forever be barred from contesting said application or any decree enteredthereon’ (Exhibit ‘A’).

“Said notice of initial hearing was published in the April 5, 1989 issueof Abante, a daily tabloid (Exhs. ‘C’, ‘C-1’, ‘C-1-A’).



“Earlier, or on March 30, 1989, the Republic of the Philippines, through theSolicitor General, filed its Opposition to the application for registrationcontending:

‘1. That neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of theland in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto (Sec. 48 [b], C.A. 141, asamended by P.D. 1073).

2. That the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant, if any,attached to or alleged in the application, do not constitute competent andsufficient evidence of a bona fideacquisition of the lands applied for or hisopen, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner, since June 12, 1945, or prior thereto. Saidmuniments of title do not appear to be genuine and indicate the pretended

possession of applicant to be of recent vintage.

3. That the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by the applicant who has failed to file anappropriate application for registration within the period of six (6) months fromFebruary 16, 1976 as required by Presidential Decree No. 892. From therecords, it appears that the instant application was filed on July 31, 1990.

4. That the parcel applied is part of the public domain belonging to theRepublic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.’ (Amended

Record on Appeal, pp. 5-6).

“The Solicitor General therefore prayed for the denial of the application for registration and for the declaration of the properties subject thereof as part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.

“At the scheduled initial hearing of the case on April 25, 1989, a certain JoseTangco, Jr. appeared and registered a verbal opposition to the application. Onmotion of counsel for the applicants, the court issued an Order of GeneralDefault against the whole world, except as against the oppositors Republic of

the Philippines and Jose Tangco, Jr., who was directed to file his writtenopposition but never did. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

“On June 13, 1990, the applicants filed their ‘Formal Offer of Evidence,’submitting therewith the following documentary exhibits: (1) Plan Swo-13-000227 (Exh. ‘F’); (2) technical descriptions of Lot Nos. 6045-A to 6045-J,inclusive (Exhs. ‘F’ to ‘F-10’, inclusive); (3) Engineer’s Certificate (Exh. ‘G’);



(4) Extra-judicial Settlement and Partition executed by the applicants datedDecember 12, 1985 (Exh. ‘H’); (5) description of the land and theapportionment thereof among the applicants (Exhs.’H-1’ and ‘H-2’,respectively); (6) Tax Declarations (Exhs. ‘I’, ‘J’, ‘K’, ‘L’, ‘M’, ‘N’ and ‘O’) (7)Tax Receipts (Exhs. ‘O’, ‘O-1’, ‘P’. ‘P-1’, ‘Q’ and ‘R’); (8) Kasulatan ngPagkakaloob dated May 7, 1969 executed by Cirilo Menguito in favor of Pedro Menguito (Exh. ‘S’); and (9) Deed of Partition dated November 7, 1990executed by the applicants (Exh. ‘T’).

“On September 12, 1990, the oppositor Republic filed its Manifestation andOpposition to applicants’ formal offer of evidence. The said manifestationreads:

‘It interposes no objection to the admission of Exhibits ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’, relativeto jurisdictional requirements. It has no objection to Exhibits ‘E’, ‘F’, ‘F-1’, to ‘F-

10’ relating to the plan and the technical description of the lots being appliedfor and Exhibit ‘G’ which is the Engineer’s certificate.

It objects to Exhibits ‘H’, ‘H-1’ to ‘H-2’ the extrajudicial settlement and partitiondated December 12, 1985 for being self serving. It objects to Exhibits ‘I’, ‘J’,‘K’, ‘L’, ‘M’ and ‘N’ for being incompetent and insufficient proof of possessionof the lot in question by applicants or their predecessors-in interest. In fact thesaid tax declarations do not date back to at least June 12, 1945. It objects toExhibits ‘O’, ‘P’, ‘Q’, and ‘R’, the same being incompetent and insufficient toprove possession since June 12, 1945. It objects to Exhibits ‘O’, ‘P’, ‘Q’, and‘R’, the same being incompetent and insufficient to prove possession sinceJune 12, 1945. It objects to Exhibit ‘S’ as being self-serving being a merephotocopy of the alleged Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob dated May 7, 1989executed by Cirilo Menguito the same cannot be accepted in evidence,applicants not having first laid the basis for the presentation of secondaryevidence. It objects to the first page of Exhibit ‘T’, being self-serving and amere photocopy. Furthermore, page 2 of said exhibit, where the supposedacknowledgment of the instrument appears, refers to different parcels of landother than those being applied for.

WHEREFORE, considering that the applicants have failed to prove their titleto the lands applied for, it is respectfully prayed that the application for registration be denied and that the land applied for be declared as part of thepublic domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.



Considering the above, oppositor respectfully manifests that there is no needfor it to submit evidence in support of its opposition.’ (Amended Record on

Appeal, pp. 11-13).

“On May 15, 1991, the lower court rendered its decision disposing as follows:

‘WHEREFORE, the order of general default against the whole worldheretofore entered in this case is affirmed, and judgment is hereby renderedconfirming the registerable title of the applicants x x x’

“On June 11, 1991, the oppositor Republic, through the Solicitor General,moved for a reconsideration of the afore-quoted decision, to which a writtenopposition was interposed by the applicants.

“On July 8, 1991, the lower court issued an order denying the motion for

reconsideration for lack of merit.”[6]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals agreed with respondent that the lower court had failed toconsider the legal requirements for registration of imperfect titles; namely: (1) the land isalienable and disposable; and (2) the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest haveoccupied and possessed the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely sinceJune 12, 1945. It was not convinced that the land in question had been classified as

alienable or disposable and that petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest had been inpossession of it since June 12, 1945.

Hence, this Petition.[7]

The Issue

In their Memorandum, petitioners submit a single issue for our consideration:

“Whether or not the court a quo erred in reversing the findings of facts of the

trial court.”[8]

In fine, the Court will resolve whether the CA erred in rejecting petitioners’application for the registration of their respective titles.

The Court’s Ruling



The Petition is devoid of merit.

Sole Issue: Registration of Petitioners’ Titles

Section 48 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, [9] as amended, provides for theregistration of imperfect titles to lands of the public domain in this wise:

"SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,occupying lands of public domain or claiming to own any such lands or aninterest thereon, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, mayapply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is locatedfor confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of titletherefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

x x x x x x x x x

(b) those who by themselves or through their predecessor in-interesthave been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession andoccupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claimof acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding thefiling of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. They shall be conclusively presumed to have performed allthe conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to acertificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.”

Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1073 [10] clarified paragraph “b” of the said provision byspecifically declaring that it applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the publicdomain.[11]

Hence, as observed by the appellate court, petitioners were duty-bound to provetwo legal requirements: (1) the land applied for was alienable and disposable; and (2)the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the landopenly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since June 12, 1945.

The records show that petitioners failed to establish these two requisites.

Classification of the Land

To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable landsof the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: “This surveyplan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map



No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968,” appearing on Exhibit“E” (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).

This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:“All lands of the public domain , waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils,all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and

other natural resources are owned by the State . x x x.” (Emphasis supplied.)

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) mustovercome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the publicdomain.[12]Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a privateperson by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed,“occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen intoownership and be registered as a title.”[13] To overcome such presumption,incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. [14] Absent such evidence, theland sought to be registered remains inalienable.

In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s notation in

Exhibit “E” indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Suchnotation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classificationof the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor’s assertion, petitioners havenot sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable.

Period of Possession

Even assuming arguendo that petitioners have been able to prove that the land is

alienable, their Petition for confirmation of their imperfect titles and registration thereof under the law will still be denied. The reason is that they have failed to establishpossession of the lots in question -- openly, continuously, exclusively and adversely -- inthe concept of owner for at least 30 years, since June 12, 1945.

Petitioners do not claim that they are the original possessors of the lots in question,which had allegedly belonged to Cirilo Menguito before he donated it to his sonPedro. When Pedro died in 1978, these lots allegedly passed down to petitioners.

Although petitioners can trace their possession of the land from as far back as 1968only, they would tack it to that of their predecessors, who had supposedly been inpossession thereof even before the Second World War. There is not enough

convincing proof, however, to support such claim.Petitioners presented evidence that they had been paying real estate taxes since

1974.[15] Their predecessors-in-interest, they claimed, have also been paying taxes onthe land for several years before them, and Cirilo Menguito had declared the land for taxpurposes in 1943.[16] However, they did not present any documents or any other satisfactory proof to substantiate this claim. General statements, which are mereconclusions of law and not proofs of possession, are unavailing and cannot suffice. [17]



Cirilo’s six children were not presented as witnesses by petitioners during thehearing of their application for registration of the lots in question. In fact, of the sixchildren, only Pilar Menguito was personally informed of petitioners’ application. Still,she was not presented as a witness.

There can be no question that Cirilo’s children were the best witnesses, because

they could have substantiated petitioners’ claim that indeed the lots in question hadbeen donated to Pedro Menguito. Moreover, they may even have in their possessiondocuments that can adequately support their supposed claim. Instead, petitionerspresented only Raymunda Bautista, the alleged tenant of Cirilo Menguito, who had tilledthe land before petitioners built their houses thereon. Neither Cirilo’s children nor thedocuments that they might have had in their possession were presented.

Furthermore, serious doubts are cast on petitioners’ claim that their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession andoccupation of the land. Because they are of recent vintage, the tax declarations (Exhs.“I” to “N”), tax receipts (Exhs. “O”. “O’1”, “P”, and “P-1”) and the Municipal Treasurer’s

certifications of tax payments (Exhs. “Q” and “R”) presented in evidence areincompetent and insufficient to prove petitioners’ and their predecessors-in-interest’spossession of the lots in question.

Because the factual findings of the trial and the appellate courts were contrary toeach other, we waded into the records, [18] but found no reason to modify the assailed CADecision. Much as we want to conform to the State’s policy of encouraging andpromoting the distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and remaintrue to the ideal of social justice, our hands are tied by the law’s stringent safeguardsagainst registering imperfect titles. In this case, we agree with the CA that petitionershave not presented sufficient proof of their compliance with the legal requirements for registration of imperfect titles.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailedDecision AFFIRMED . Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur .



[ G. R. N o . 7 8 7 7 8 : D e ce m b e r 3 , 1 9 9 0 . ]

19 1 SCRA 814

LEONI DA CORONADO, FELI X BUENO, MELANI A RETI ZOS, BERNARDI NO

BUENASEDA and JOVI TA MON TEFALCON , Pe t i t ioners , vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

and JUANA BUENO ALBOVI AS, Respondent s .

D E C I S I O N

PARAS, J. :

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the decision* of the respondent

appellate court dated March 3, 1987 CA-G.R. CV No. 06911 entitled "Juana (Bueno)

Albovias et al., v. Leonida Coronado, et al.," affirming the decision of the lower court, the

decretal portion of which reads:: nad

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring Leonida Coronado to have no title or interest over the property in

question, hence, has no authority to dispose of the same in favor of her co-

defendants;

2. Declaring the sales executed by Coronado and subsequent transactions involving

the same property null and void ab initio;

3. Declaring the plaintiff to be the true and legal owner of the subject parcel of land;

4. Ordering the defendants to vacate the subject premises and to surrenderpossession thereof unto the plaintiff;

5. Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay unto the plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and P10,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.

Costs against the defendants." (Rollo, p. 17)

As found by the respondent appellate court, the property subject of this case is a parcel of

land situated in Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing 277 square meters, more particularlydescribed as follows: : nad

"A parcel of land situated in the Poblacion, Municipality of Nagcarlan, province of

Laguna. Bounded on the North, by property of Epifania Irlandez (formerly BonifacioFormentera); on the East, by that of Julio Lopez; on the South, by that of Dalmacio

Monterola (formerly Domingo Bueno); and on the West, by C. Lirio Street.Containing an area of two hundred seventy seven (277) square meters, more or less.

Assessed at P3,320.00 under tax declaration No. 241." (Ibid., p. 15)

Said parcel of land is being contested by Juana Albovias, herein private respondent, on theone hand, and Leonida-Coronado, Felix Bueno, Melania Retizos, Bernardino Buenseda and

Jovita Montefalcon, herein petitioners, on the other hand.

Juana Albovias (JUANA, for brevity) claims that the property in question is a portion of abigger lot referred to as Parcel G in the last will and testament executed in 1918 by MelecioArtiaga, grandfather of JUANA. This bigger lot was inherited under that will by JUANA, her



brother Domingo Bueno, and two other grandchildren, namely Bonifacio and Herminigildo,

both surnamed Formentera. Parcel G is described as follows:

"Isang lagay na lupa na ang bahagi ay walang tanim na halaman at ang bahagi naman aymay tanim na saguing, tumatayo sa gawin Canloran ng Calle Avenida Rizal nitong

Nagcarlan, at humahangan sa Ibaba; sa ari cong Testador; sa Silangan, sa cay EnriqueJovellano; sa Ilaya, sa namatay na Perfecto Nanagas, at sa Canloran, tubig na

pinamamagatang San Cido." (Ibid., p. 16)

JUANA further claims that sometime in 1925 or 1926, C. Lirio Street was created by theMunicipality of Nagcarla traversing said Parcel G and thus dividing it into two portions, oneon the west of C. Lirio St. and the other to the east of said street. Parcel G was divided by

the heirs in the following manner; the land was divided into two portions, the northern

portion of which was adjudicated in favor of the Formenteras and the southern portion wasgiven to JUANA and Doming Bueno. The southern portion in turn was partitioned between

JUANA and Domingo Bueno, the former getting the northern part adjoining the lot of the

Formenteras, and the latter the southern part which adjoins the lot of Perfecto Nanagas (notowned by Dalmacio Monterola). The part allocated to Domingo was later sold by him toDalmacio Monterola, owner of the adjoining property (Ibid.). : nad

Moreover, JUANA claims that her property was included together with the two parcels of land owned by Dalmacio Monterola, which were sold by Monterola's successor-in-interestLeonida Coronado (now married to Felix Bueno) to Melania Retizos on April 18, 1970.

Melania Retizos in turn sold the lots, including that one being claimed by JUANA, to thespouse Bernardino Buenaseda and Jovita Montefalcon, now the present possessors thereof,sometime in 1974 (Ibid., pp. 16-17).

On the other hand, Leonida Coronado and her co-petitioners (CORONADO, for brevity) claim

that the property in question was bequeathed to Leonida Coronado under a Will executed byDr. Dalmacio Monterola, who was allegedly in possession thereof even before the outbreak

of World War II (Ibid., p. 107).

Parenthetically, said will was probated under Sp. Proc. No. SC-283, entitled "Testate Estate

of the Deceased Monterola Leonida F. Coronado, petitioner (Ibid., p. 105). JUANA, together

with her husband, opposed the said probate. Despite their opposition, however, the Will wasallowed by the then Court of First Instance of Laguna, Sta. Cruz Branch (Ibid., p. 106). On

appeal, said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 40353, entitled"Leonida F. Coronado, petitioner-appellee v. Heirs of Dr. Dalmacio Monterola, oppositors-

appellants" (Ibid.). It is not apparent, however, from the record whether or not saiddecision has already become final and executory.

As a result of the conflicting claims over the property in question, JUANA filed an action for

quieting of title, declaratory relief and damages against CORONADO in the Regional TrialCourt of the Fourth Judicial Region, Branch XXVI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, docketed as Civil Case

No. 7345 (Ibid., p. 4).

As adverted to above (first par.), the lower court rendered judgment in favor of JUANA.

Not satisfied with the decision of the lower court, CORONADO elevated the case to the Courtof Appeals, which affirmed the decision appealed from (Ibid., p. 20). Hence, this petition. :-cralaw

CORONADO raised the following assigned errors:

I

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ARRIVING AT A CONCLUSIONWHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE AND IN NOT



APPLYING THE APPLICABLE PROVISION OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE LAID DOWN BY THIS

HONORABLE COURT. (Ibid., p. 108)

II

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO SHOW THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION CLAIMED BYPRIVATE RESPONDENT IS THE SAME PROPERTY ADJUDICATED TO JUANA BUENO UNDER

THE WILL OF THE DECEASED MELECIO ARTIAGA; NEITHER IS THERE EVIDENCE TO SHOWTHAT SAID WILL HAD BEEN PROBATED. (Ibid., p. 114)

III

PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS IN ESTOPPEL FROM QUESTIONING THE OWNERSHIP OF THE

PETITIONER OVER THE LAND IN QUESTION HAVING FAILED TO RAISE THE SAME IN THE

ESTATE PROCEEDING IN THE TRIAL COURT AND EVEN ON APPEAL. (Ibid., p. 119)

IV

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPRECIATED THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED AND

FACTS ADMITTED ON RECORD. IT THEREFORE COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR.(Ibid., p. 121)

As required by this Court, CORONADO filed their memorandum on May 8, 1989 (Ibid., p.105); while that of JUANA was filed on October 13, 1989 (Ibid., p. 139).

The petition is devoid of merit.

Under the first assigned error, CORONADO assails the respondent appellate court's finding

that Dr. Dalmacio Monterola could not have acquired the subject land by acquisitive

prescription. Citing Art. 1116 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, CORONADO claims that JUANA had already foreclosed whatever right orlegal title she had over the property in question, the reason being that Monterola's

continued possession of the said property for over ten years since 1934 ripened into full and

absolute ownership (Ibid., p. 112).

The argument has no factual basis.

Time and again, it has been ruled that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in casesbrought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law

imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. It is not the function of the SupremeCourt to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited toreviewing errors of law that might have been committed. Absent, therefore, a showing that

the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record, so that they are so

glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand,for the Supreme Court is not expected or required to examine or contrast the oral anddocumentary evidence submitted by the parties (Andres v. Manufacturers Hanover & Trust

Corporation, G.R. 82670, September 15, 1989). There are no convincing reasons in theinstant case to depart from this rule.

As found by the respondent appellate court, Monterola never claimed ownership over the

property in question. As a matter of fact, one of the deeds of donation executed byMonterola in favor of Leonida Coronado acknowledged that the boundary owner on theproperty conveyed to her is JUANA. This is precisely the reason why during the lifetime of

the late Dalmacio Monterola, JUANA had always been allowed to enter and reap the benefits

or produce of the said property. It was only after the death of said Monterola in 1970 thatLeonida Coronado prohibited JUANA from entering it (Ibid., p. 18). :-n ad

Even assuming arguendo that Monterola was indeed in continued possession of the saidproperty for over ten years since 1934, said possession is insufficient to constitute the



fundamental basis of the prescription. Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the

foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under claim of title (en concepto de

dueno), or to use the common law equivalent of the term, it must be adverse. Acts of possessory character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner areclearly not en concepto de dueno, and such possessory acts, no matter how long so

continued, do not start the running of the period of prescription (Manila Electric Company v.

Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. 71393, June 28, 1989).

In this case, Monterola, as found by the respondent appellate court and the lower court,

never categorically claimed ownership over the property in question, much less hispossession thereof en concepto de dueno. Accordingly, he could not have acquired said

property by acquisitive prescription.

Anent the contention of CORONADO that Leonida Coronado could tack her possession tothat of Monterola, so that claim of legal title or ownership over the subject property, even

against the petitioners, the Buenasesas, who are purchasers for value and in good faith, is a

foregone or settled issue, the respondent appellate court aptly answered the same in thiswise:

"It follows that Leonida Coronado could not have derived ownership of the land in question

from her predecessor-in-interest Dalmacio Monterola, whether by prescription or by someother title. Neither can she claim acquisitive prescription in her own name. It was only in1970 after the death of Dalmacio Monterola that she asserted her claim of ownership

adverse to that of plaintiff-appellee. Having knowledge that she had no title over the land inquestion, she must be deemed to have claimed it in bad faith. Under Article 1137 of theCivil Code, ownership and other real rights over immovables prescribe throughuninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or good

faith. And even granting that she had no notice or defect in her title and was, therefore, ingood faith, a period of ten years of possession is necessary for her to acquire the land byordinary prescription. (Article 1134, Civil Code). But she can claim to have possessed the

land only in 1968, the year the Monterola lots were donated to her. The period, however,

was interrupted in 1975, or 7 years after, when the complaint below was filed." (Rollo, pp.18-19)

Under the second assigned error, CORONADO claims that the will under which JUANA

inherited the property in question from her grandfather, Melecio Artiaga, was neverprobated; hence, said transfer for ownership was ineffectual considering that under Rule 75,Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court (formerly Sec. 125 of Act No. 190, no will shall pass either real

or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court (Ibid., p. 115).

The contention is without merit. chanroblesvirtual law library

While it is true that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved andallowed in the proper court (Art. 838, Civil Code), the questioned will, however, may be

sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at the

time said document was executed by Melecio Artiaga in 1918. The said article read asfollows:

"Article 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act inter vivos,

or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of theforced heir." (Mang-Oy v. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 33 [1986])

In this case, nowhere was it alleged nor shown that Leonida Coronado is entitled to legitime

from Melecio Artiaga. The truth of the matter is that the record is bereft of any showing that

Leonida Coronado and the late Melecio Artiaga were related to each other.



Under the third assigned error,

the ownership of Leonida Coro

in the estate proceedings in th

The contention is likewise with

Normally, the probate of a will

a will decides no other questiothe compliance with those req

of the wills. It does not determof the provisions of the will, thits authentication. The questio

be raised even after the will h114 SCRA 473 [1982]). Coownership of the property in q

of the will executed by Monter

property.:-cralaw

Under the fourth assigned err

for want of factual and legal s

she did not only fail to identifythe boundary of the property s

The contention is unavailing.

The fact that JUANA faileddiscrepancy in the boundary of

of the findings of the lower cothe lower court found sufficie

question is the same propertythat CORONADO has no right

conclusive upon this Court (Re220 [1989]).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the dSO ORDERED.

Melenc io -Herr e ra , Pad i l la , S

Endnotes

* Penned by Justices JosL. Magsino.

CORONADO claims that JUANA is estopped f

ado over the land in question having failed t

trial court and even on appeal (Rollo, p. 119

ut merit.

does not look into its intrinsic validity. The

ns than such as touch upon the capacity of isites or solemnities which the law prescribe

ine nor even by implication prejudge the valis may be impugned as being vicious or null,relating to these points remain entirely unaf

s been authenticated (Maninang, et al., v. Csequently, JUANA is not estopped fromuestion, notwithstanding her having objecte

la under which Leonida Coronado is claiming: crl

r, it is alleged by CORONADO that JUANA's

pport; the weakness of JUANA's position lies

the subject land, but also failed to explain the is claiming to be hers (Rollo, p. 125).

to identify the property in question andsaid property, assuming they are true, is im

urt as to the identity of the property in quent evidence to support the conclusion that

adjudicated to JUANA under the will of Melehatsoever to said property (Ibid., p. 20). S

ynolds Philippine Corporation v. Court of Ap

ecision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

a rm ien to and Rega lado , JJ., c onc u r .

A.R. Melo and concurred in by Justice Esteban M

rom questioning

raise the same

).

uthentication of

he testator andfor the validity

ity or efficiencynotwithstandingfected, and may

ourt of Appeals,questioning the

to the probate

title to the said: crl

petition is weak

in the fact that

e discrepancy in

to explain theaterial, in view

stion. Moreover,the property in

cio Artiaga, anduch findings are

eals, 169 SCRA

. Lising and Celso



[G.R. No. 117384. October 21, 1998]

HEIRS OF TEODORO DELA CRUZ represented by EDRONEL DELA

CRUZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PACIFICOMARQUEZ, FILOMENO and GREGORIO, both surnamed

MADRID, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

ROMERO, J .:

Petitioners seek the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals,[1] in CA G.R. No. 25339

dated September 27, 1994 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Isabela in Civil

Case No. 19-219 dated October 9, 1989 which adjudicated lot Nos. 7036-A-10-A, 7036-A-10-Band 7036-A-10-C to herein private respondents.[2]

The following facts, concisely related in the petition[3] are not in dispute.

On November 20, 1986, petitioners filed an action for reconveyance with damages [4] against

private respondents involving a parcel of land situated in Poblacion, San Mateo, Isabela with atotal area of 3,277 square meters. In their complaint, petitioners assert that the subject land was

bought by their predecessor-in-interest from the private respondents, Madrid brothers,

for P4,000.00 in a deed of sale executed on May 18, 1959, and since then they have been inactual, physical, continuous and open possession of the property. However, sometime inOctober 1986, much to their dismay and surprise, private respondents managed to obtain a

Torrens Title over the said land.

On the other hand, the Madrids denied having executed the said deed of sale and assumingthat said document exists, the same is fictitious and falsified. Moreover, while they admit

petitioners’ possession of the land, they assert that this possession is in defiance of their repeated

demands that the former relinquish the same. Meanwhile, Pacifico Marquez contends that he is

an innocent purchaser for value of the property having bought the same from the Madrid brothersin 1976.[5]

During the trial, petitioners were unable to present the original deed of sale since it was

lost. Consequently, they were constrained to offer, as Exhibit “A,” a photo copy of thepurported original carbon copy of the deed of sale in an effort to prove the transaction.

However, in disposing of the case, the trial court ruled that Exhibit “A” was inadmissible in

evidence, thus:

“Since at the time of the execution of Teodoro dela Cruz’ affidavit or on June 14,

1966, a duplicate original carbon copy of the alleged sale was still in his possession,

the plaintiffs must have to account for it. No proof was adduced that this remaining

copy was lost or destroyed. Furthermore, no attempt was done to produce the copies

retained by the notary public although there is a possibility that the same still exist



(sic). Neither was there any proof that the copy sent to the court as required by the

notarial law is unavailable. Under these (sic) state of facts, the Court believes that the

‘xerox copy of a certified true copy’ of the original issued by the notary public cannot

be admitted in evidence to prove the conveyance of the land in question.”

Accordingly, the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint, the dispositive portion of thedecision of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby

rendered:

1. Dismissing the complaint;

2. Declaring the defendants the lawful owners of the land in question insofar as

the portion thereof falling or found in their respective titles are concerned; and

3. Ordering the plaintiffs, their agents, representatives or any person or persons

deriving their title, ownership or possession from the plaintiffs, to vacate the portions

of Lots 7036-A-10-A, 70360A-10-B and 7036-A-10-C, occupied by them and to

deliver the possession thereof to the defendants;

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.”

Evidently aggrieved by the decision, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appealscontending that the trial court erred in holding that: (1) Exhibit “A” was inadmissible in evidence

to prove the transaction; (2) there was no valid sale of the land in question; (3) that they

(petitioners) are not entitled to the improvements they had introduced in the land.

On September 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered its judgment which ruled thatExhibit “A” was admissible in evidence for failure of the private respondents to object when it

was offered during the trial, thus:

“It is therefore evident that defendants-appellees never put in issue the inadmissible

nature of Exh. “A” as a mere secondary evidence and that the trial judge did not

exclude the same when it was formally offered, only to ultimately exclude it in its

decision. It is true that the originals of Exh. “A” were never produced or accounted

for by plaintiffs. Yet, notwithstanding this omission, the defense did not object to its

not being the best evidence when it was formally offered. Had the defendants

interposed an objection to Exh. “A” on the ground of its incompetency for not

complying with the best evidence rule, it would have been properly excluded by the

trial court. Defendants’ omission to object on the proper ground operated as a waiver,

as this was a matter resting on their discretion.”



Unfortunately, petitioners’ victory was shortlived. For the Court of Appeals, while ruling

that Exhibit “A” was admissible, concluded that the same had no probative value to support theallegation of the petitioners that the disputed land was sold to them in 1959, viz.:

“The lone fact that Atty. Tabangay asserted that he recognized his signature on the

copy shown by Teodoro when the loss of the originals was just made known to him,does not render Exh. “A” trustworthy as to the actual execution of the alleged deed of

sale. Exh. “A” does not even contain a reproduction of the alleged signatures of the

Madrid brothers for comparison purposes. The surviving witness to the alleged

execution, Constantino Balmoja was not presented to corroborate Atty. Tabangay’s

testimony, hinged as the latter was on secondary evidence.”

Hence, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, the dispositive portion of

which reads:

“WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial courtdated October 9, 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the case be

remanded to the court a quo to conduct the proper proceedings to determine the value

of the useful improvements introduced by appellants for reimbursement by appellees.

SO ORDERED.”

Failing in their bid to reconsider the decision, the petitioners have filed the present petition.

Petitioners maintain that even if Exhibit “A” were a mere photo copy of the original carboncopy, they had presented other substantial evidence during the trial to prove the existence of the

sale.

[6]

First , the testimony of the notary public, Atty. Tabangay, who acknowledged the dueexecution of the deed of sale. Second , their long possession of the land in question, bolstered bythe construction of various improvements gives rise to the disputable presumption of ownership.

While we concur with the Court of Appeals’ finding that Exhibit “A” does not prove that the

sale of the land indeed occurred, still we are constrained to reverse its decision in view of the

circumstances present in this case.

To begin with, Atty. Sevillano Tabangay, the notary public who notarized the deed of sale,

testified that the document has about five (5) copies.[7] Hence, it is imperative that all the

originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence can be presented. [8] These petitionersfailed to do. Moreover, records show that none of these five copies was even presented during

the trial. Petitioners’ explanation that these copies were lost or could not be found in theNational Archives was not even supported by any certification from the said office.

It is a well-settled principle that before secondary evidence can be presented, all duplicatesand/or counterparts must be accounted for, and no excuse for the non-production of the original

document itself can be regarded as established until all its parts are unavailable.[9]

Notwithstanding this procedural lapse, when Exhibit “A” was presented private respondentsfailed, not only to object, but even to cross-examine the notary public, Atty. Tabangay, regarding



its execution.[10]Forthwith, upon private respondents’ failure to object to Exhibit “A” when it was

presented, the same becomes primary evidence.[11] To be sure, even if Exhibit “A” is admitted inevidence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that its probative value must still meet the various

tests by which its reliability is to be determined. Its tendency to convince and persuade must be

considered for admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. [12]

As earlier stated, Exhibit “A” was merely a photocopy lifted from the carbon copy of thealleged deed of sale.[13] A cursory glance will immediately reveal that it was unsigned by any of

the parties and undated as to when it was executed. Worse, when Atty. Tabangay typed Exhibit“A,” the contents were based on an alleged carbon original which petitioners’ predecessor-in-

interest presented to him, without bothering to check his own files to verify the correctness of the

contents of the document he was copying. In other words, Atty. Tabangay’s failure to determine

the accuracy of the carbon copy requested by the petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest rendersExhibit “A” unreliable.

However, despite our prescinding discussion, all is not lost for the petitioner.

The records show that the disputed property has been in the possession of the petitioners

since 1959. They have since been introducing several improvements on the land which certainlycould not have escaped the attention of the Madrids. Furthermore, during all this time, the land

was enclosed, thus signifying petitioners’ exclusive claim of ownership. The construction of

various infrastructure on the land - rice mill, storage house, garage, pavements and otherbuildings - was undoubtedly a clear exercise of ownership which the Madrids could not

ignore. Oddly, not one of them protested.

We cannot accept the Madrids’ explanation that they did not demand the petitioners tovacate the land due to the unexplained killings within the area.[14] Not a single shred of evidence

was presented to show that these killings were perpetrated by the petitioners. All told, their

remonstration and fears are nothing but pure speculation. To make matters worse, the record is

bereft of any documentary evidence that the Madrids sent a written demand to the petitionersordering them to vacate the land. Their failure to raise a restraining arm or a shout of dissent to

the petitioners’ possession of the subject land in a span of almost thirty (30) years is simply

contrary to their claim of ownership.

Next, the Madrids argue that neither prescription nor laches can operate against them

because their title to the property is registered under the Torrens system and therefore

imprescriptable.[15] The principles raised, while admittedly correct, are not withoutexception. The fact that the Madrids were able to secure TCT No. 167250, and Marquez, TCT

Nos. 167220 and 167256, did not operate to vest upon them ownership of the property. The

Torrens system does not create or vest title. It has never been recognized as a mode of acquiringownership,[16] especially considering the fact that both the Madrids and Marquezes obtained their

respective TCT’s only in October 1986, twenty-seven long (27) years after petitioners first took possession of the land. If the Madrids and Marquezes wished to assert their ownership, they

should have filed a judicial action for recovery of possession and not merely to have the landregistered under their respective names. For as earlier mentioned, Certificates of Title do not

establish ownership.[17]

Even if we were to rule that the Certificates of Title to the private respondents would ripeninto ownership of the land, and therefore, the defense of prescription would be unavailing, still,



the petitioners would have acquired title to it by virtue of the equitable principle of laches. The

Madrids’ long inaction or passivity in asserting their rights over disputed property will precludethem from recovering the same.[18]

The above ruling was stressed in the following cases:

Miguel v. Catalino[19] declared:

“Notwithstanding the errors aforementioned in the appealed decision, we are of the

opinion that the judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Florencio Catalino must be

sustained. For despite the invalidity of his sale to Catalino Agyapao, father of

defendant-appellee, the vendor Bacaquio suffered the latter to enter, possess and enjoy

the land in question without protest, from 1928 to 1943, when the seller died; and the

appellants, in turn, while succeeding the deceased, also remained inactive, without

taking any step to reinvindicate the lot from 1944 to 1962, when the present suit was

commenced in court. Even granting appellants’ proposition that no prescription lies

against their father’s recorded title, their passivity and inaction for more than 34 years(1928-1962) justifies the defendant-appellee in setting up the equitable defense of

laches in his own behalf. As a result, the action of plaintiffs-appellants must be

considered barred and the Court below correctly so held. Courts can not look with

favor at parties who, by their silence, delay and inaction, knowingly induce another to

spend time, effort and expense in cultivating the land, paying taxes and making

improvements thereon for 30 long years, only to spring from ambush and claim title

when the possessor’s efforts and the rise of land values offer an opportunity to make

easy profit at his expense. x x x.”

Pabalete v. Echarri[20] stated:

“Upon a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances, we are constrained to

find, however, that while no legal defense to the action lies, an equitable one lies in

favor of the defendant and that is, the equitable defense of laches. We hold that the

defense of prescription or adverse possession in derogation of the title of the

registered owner Domingo Mejia does not lie, but that of the equitable defense of

laches. Otherwise stated, we hold that while defendant may not be considered as

having acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessor’s long continued possession

for 37 years, the original owner’s right to recover back the possession of the propertyand the title thereto from the defendant has, by the long period of 37 years and by

patentee’s inaction and neglect been converted into a stale demand. (Quoting Mejia

de Lucas v. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277).

x x x x x x x x x



This defense is an equitable one and does not concern itself with the character of the

defendant’s title, but only with whether or not by reason of the plaintiff’s long

inaction or inexcusable neglect he should be barred from asserting this claim at all,

because to allow him to do so would be inequitable and unjust to the defendant. x x

x.”

Lastly, Marquez’ claim that he is a purchaser in good faith and for value does not inspireany merit. In his testimony, he admitted that he knew the land in question.[21] Curiously, in his

Answer[22] to the complaint filed by the petitioners, he stated that he has been aware that the

former were in possession of the land since 1959. Where a purchaser was fully aware of anotherperson’s possession of the lot he purchased, he cannot successfully pretend later to be an

innocent purchaser for value.[23] Moreover, one who buys without checking the vendor’s title

takes all the risks and losses consequent to such failure. [24]

In fact, it would have been expected that in the normal course of daily life, both the Madrids

and Marquezes talked about the status of the property. This being so, it would be difficult to

imagine that the latter were not made aware of the petitioner’s possession of the land. Armedwith such information, they should have acted with the diligence of a prudent man indetermining the circumstances surrounding the property. Otherwise, the law does not give him

the benefit afforded to an innocent purchaser for value.[25]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals datedSeptember 24, 1994 in CA - G.R. No. 25339 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Instead,

petitioners are hereby declared as the legal owners of the subject land. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Purisima, and Pardo, JJ., concur.



[G.R. No. 137739. March 26, 2001]

ROBERTO B. TAN, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE BANKING CORP., HELEN

LEONTOVICH VDA. DE AGUINALDO and REGISTRAR OFDEEDS OF MARIKINA, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

KAPUNAN, J .:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Roberto Tan (petitioner) seeking

to reverse and set aside the resolutions, dated 28 August 1998 and 23 February 1999,

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39903. In the said resolutions, the CA

directed the Register of Deeds of Marikina to reinstate the Transfer Certificates of

Title (TCT) Nos. 194096 and 194098 in the name of Philippine Banking Corporation(respondent bank) over the same parcel of land already covered by petitioner’s valid

and subsisting TCT No. 296945.

The antecedent facts of the case as culled from the decision [1]of the CA are as

follows: On 29 December 1995, petitioner bought from Helen L. Aguinaldo

(respondent Aguinaldo) a parcel of land at the Valley Golf Subdivision in Antipolo,

Rizal. The lot was then covered by TCT No. 294192 in the name of respondent

Aguinaldo. No claims, liens or encumbrances appeared on the said title. After

payment of the agreed purchase price, TCT No. 294192 was cancelled and a new one

(TCT No. 296945) in the name of petitioner was issued.

On 29 February 1996, two (2) months after he bought the property, petitioner was

served a copy of the petition for certiorari filed by respondent bank in CA-G.R. SP

No. 39903. Said petition stated that petitioner was “being sued here as a nominal party

as the new registered owner of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 296945.” It was only

then that petitioner learned that the lot he bought from respondent Aguinaldo was

subject of legal dispute between her and respondent bank.

It appears that respondent Aguinaldo and her husband Daniel R. Aguinaldo

obtained a loan in the amount of two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) from

respondent bank some time in December 1977. To secure the payment of thisobligation, the Aguinaldos executed in favor of respondent bank a real estate

mortgage over three parcels of land situated in Antipolo and Cainta, Rizal covered by

TCT Nos. 234903, 153844 and 151622. In January of 1985, Daniel Aguinaldo

obtained three more loans from respondent PBC totalling over five hundred thousand

pesos (P500,000.00). He died without having paid these loans.



Upon maturity of these loans, respondent bank sent a demand letter to respondent

Aguinaldo, as administratrix of the estate of her husband. Despite said demand, the

loans remained unpaid. Respondent bank thus initiated extra-judicial foreclosure

proceedings on the real estate mortgage. In the public auction sale, the mortgaged

properties were sold to respondent bank as the highest bidder.

On 15 February 1990, before the expiration of the redemption period of one year,

respondent Aguinaldo filed a complaint for the nullification of the aforesaid

foreclosure proceedings, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-1705-A, with Branch 71,

Regional Trial Court, Antipolo, Rizal. In said proceedings, the parties (respondent

Aguinaldo and respondent bank) entered into a Joint Partial Stipulation of Facts

stating, among others, that they “agree that the decision to be rendered by this

Honorable Court [RTC] shall be final and unappealable, subject only to the filing

within the reglementary period of the usual motion for reconsideration.”

On 20 April 1995, the trial court rendered its decision the dispositive portion of

which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1) The Notice of Sheriff’s Sale dated February 10, 1989, Certificate of Sale dated

March 10, 1989, Affidavit of Consolidation executed by the defendant bank, and the

deed of sale dated February 1, 1995 executed by the bank in favor of the Terraces

Realty & Development Corporation are hereby declared null and void and of no legal

force and effect;

(2) The Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila is hereby ordered to cancelTransfer Certificates of Title No. 194096 and 194098 in the name of the bank and

Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275504 in the name of Terraces Realty &

Development Corporation, and to issue, in lieu thereof, new titles in the name of the

plaintiff or her successor-in-interest upon proof by the latter of the payment to be

made by them to the bank or by similar proof that such amount is deposited by the

plaintiff in trust for the bank.

The plaintiff shall pay to the bank or deposit the amount in trust for the bank within

fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy of this decision the amounts as follows:

(a) on the promissory note for P176,623.24 – The amount of P176,623.24 plus the

stipulated 12% interest per annum from January 24, 1985 until March 10, 1989; and

12% interest per annum on said amount of P176,623.24 from March 11, 1989 until

fully paid.



(b) on the promissory note for P380,000.00 – The amount of P380,000.00 plus 14%

interest per annum from January 24, 1985 until March 10, 1989; and 12% interest per

annum on said amount of P380,000.00 from March 11, 1989 until fully paid; and

(c) on the promissory note of P31,000.00 – The amount of P31,000.00 14% interest

per annum from January 24, 1985 until March 10, 1989; and 12% interest per annumof said amount of P31,000.00 from March 11, 1989 until fully paid.

(3) The claim of plaintiff for damages and attorney’s fees is hereby denied.

No pronouncement as to costs.[2]

Respondent bank filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision. Pending

resolution thereof, respondent bank moved for the inhibition of the presiding judge.

The motion for inhibition was granted, thus, the case was re-raffled to Branch 72. The

presiding judge thereof subsequently denied respondent bank’s motion forreconsideration. Respondent bank then filed a notice of appeal but the same was

denied on the ground that it (respondent bank) already waived its right to appeal

pursuant to the joint stipulation. The decision was declared final and executory.

On 6 October 1995, the Clerk of Court of Branch 72 issued a certification that the

decision had become final. Upon presentation of the trial court’s decision and

certification, the Register of Deeds of Marikina canceled respondent bank’s TCT No.

194096 and 194098 and Terraces Realty & Development Corporation’s TCT No.

275504 and issued new titles in lieu thereof, all in the name of respondent Aguinaldo.

She subsequently sold the lot covered by one of these titles to petitioner who was thenissued TCT No. 296945 therefor.

Respondent bank filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial

court but the same was denied. It then brought the case to the CA by way

of certiorari. In its decision, dated 27 February 1998, the CA substantially granted the

reliefs prayed for by respondent bank and directed the trial court to, among others,

give due course to respondent bank’s appeal and elevate the records of the case to the

CA for review. The CA, however, denied respondent bank’s prayer for the

reinstatement of its TCTs stating that the averments as against petitioner are

insufficient to make up a cause of action against the latter.[3]

Respondent bank thereafter moved for a partial reconsideration of the CA

decision insofar as it denied its prayer for the reinstatement of its TCTs. For his part,

petitioner filed a motion to cancel notice of lis pendens while respondent Aguinaldo

filed a motion for reconsideration. Acting on these motions, the CA issued the

assailed resolution of 28 August 1998 the dispositive portion of which reads:



WHEREFORE, the Motion to Cancel Notice of Lis Pendens dated 23 March 1998

filed by respondent Roberto B. Tan and the motion for reconsideration filed by

respondent Helen Leontovich Vda. De Aguinaldo dated 23 March 1998 are

hereby DENIED, for lack of merit.

Petitioner’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated 20 March 1998 ishereby GRANTED and par.(d) of the dispositive portion of our decision promulgated

on 27 February 1998 is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:

Directing the Registrar of Deeds to reinstate the cancelled Transfer Certificates of

Title Nos. 194096 & 194098 in the name of petitioner and Transfer Certificate of Title

No. 275504 in the name of Terraces Realty & Development Corporation, or issue new

ones in the event this is not legally feasible in their favor, pending review of the case

on appeal.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the appellate

court in its resolution of 23 February 1999. Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition

assigning the following errors:

1. The Court of Appeals erred and committed serious irregularity in directing the

“reinstatement” of Philbank’s cancelled TCT No. 194096 (or the issuance of a new one in its

place), in the fact of an existing TCT in Roberto Tan’s name over the same parcel of land,

and absent any proper direct action and judgment for reconveyance against him whichrescinds or cancels his TCT No. 296945;

2. The Court of Appeals erred and acted without jurisdiction in deciding upon the question of whether Philbank’s cancelled TCT No. 194096 should be reinstated, or a new title issued in

its place, this being within the exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts, and outside the

scope of a certiorari proceeding.[5]

The Court required respondent bank and respondent Aguinaldo to file their

respective Comments. Thereafter, the parties were required to file their respective

memoranda.

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

The first assailed CA resolution (28 August 1998) directing the Register of Deeds

of Marikina to reinstate the TCTs of respondent bank had the effect of cancelingpetitioner’s title over the same parcel of land. The CA clearly committed reversible

error in issuing the aforesaid resolution. Petitioner was not even a party to the action

between respondent Aguinaldo and respondent bank in the court a quo. Petitioner was

impleaded only in the certiorari case filed by respondent bank in the CA. In fact, the

petition filed by respondent CA merely stated that petitioner was being “sued as a

nominal party in his capacity as the new registered owner of Transfer Certificate of



Title No. 296945.”[6] Other than this averment, there were no allegations to constitute a

cause of action against petitioner. As the CA held in its main decision:

Private respondent Roberto Tan has filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds, one of

which is “x x x the petition states no cause of action against Roberto B. Tan.” In his

submission to support this ground, Tan claims being a buyer in faith and for value(P2.5 Million), P2 Million of which came from a loan directly paid by the lender bank

to the seller, and the full consideration was fully paid.

Under the circumstances obtaining, the prayer under paragraph 3.5 cannot be

granted. The aforequoted averments as against private respondent Roberto B. Tan

are insufficient to make up a cause of action for the desired relief. [7]

The CA, in its decision, correctly denied respondent bank’s prayer to reinstate its

canceled TCTs because to do so would effectively cancel petitioner’s title on the same

lot. It must be noted that petitioner’s title was regularly issued after the lot covered bythe same was sold to him by respondent Aguinaldo. Petitioner relied on the seller’s

title, which was then free from any claims, liens or encumbrances appearing thereon.

As such, petitioner’s title can only be challenged in a direct action. It is well

settled that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be

altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with

law.[8] Having obtained a valid title over the subject lot, petitioner is entitled to

protection against indirect attacks against his title. The CA’s original ruling on the

matter, as stated in its decision, denying respondent bank’s prayer for reinstatement

of its canceled titles “without prejudice to the filing of proper action” should thusstand. It is more in keeping with the purpose of the adoption of the Torrens system in

our country:

The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the

most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their

indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person

purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller’s title thereto is valid, he

should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all.

This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted,

public confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions would have tobe attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of

ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more

numerous and complex than they are now and possibly also more abrasive, if not even

violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system,

should be the first to accept the validity of the titles issued thereunder once the

conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.[9]



WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolutions, dated 28 August 1998 and

23 February 1999, of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Its

Decision, dated 27 February 1998, is REINSTATED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.



G.R. No. 116372 January 18, 2001

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner.vs.COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO DIVINAFLOR, respondents.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks toreverse and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 8, 1994 in CA-G.R. CVNo. 29578 entitled "The Director of Lands, Petitioner-Appellant v. Romeo Divinaflor. Claimant-

Appelle"1 which affirmed the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay, Branch 12,rendered in favor of private respondent Romeo Divinaflor. 1âwphi1.nêt

This case stems from Cadastral Case No. N-11-lV initiated, pursuant to law, by the Director of Lands, as petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay (Branch 12). In due time, RomeoDivinaflor filed his answer to the petition relative to Lot No. 10739 with an area of 10,775 squaremeters situated in Oas, Albay, claiming ownership of said lot by virtue of possession for over thirty

years. The facts, as found by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are as follows.

"Lot 10739 of the cadastral survey of Oas, Albay is one of the parcels of land subject of these cadastral proceedings. When this case was called for initial hearing, nobody offeredany opposition. Whereupon, an order of general default against the whole world was issued.Claimant was allowed to present his evidence.

Lot 10739 is one of the uncontested lots. It is a parcel of Riceland situated at Maramba, Oas, Albay containing an area of 10,775; on the East by Lot 10738; on the South by Lot 10716;and on the West by Lot 10716. Originally, the land was owned by Marcial Listana who beganpossession and occupying the same in the concept of owner, openly, continuously,adversely, notoriously and exclusively since 1939. He planted palay and harvested about 60cavans of palay every harvest season. He declared the land in his name under Tax Dec. No.1987 (Exh. 1). On May 21, 1973, claimant acquired ownership of the land by means of deedof absolute sale (Exh. 2). He caused the same to be declared in his name under Tax Dec.No. 1442 (Exh. 3). There was another reassessment under Tax Dec. No. 35 (Exh. 3-a). Hecontinued planting on the land and all the products are used for the benefit of his family.

The land was surveyed in the name of the previous owner per certification of the CENRO(Exh. 4). The cadastral survey costs had been paid in the amount of P72.08 under OfficialReceipt No. 50652483 (Exh. 5) and the certification thereof (Exh. 5-a). All the realty taxeshas likewise been paid up to the current year per Official Receipt No. 6422679 (Exh. 6)together with the certification of the Municipal Treasure of Oas, Albay (Exh. 6_A).

There are no liens or encumbrances and neither are there persons claiming adverse

ownership and possession of the land. The lot does not infringe the public road, river or stream. It is not part of a military reservation, Public Park, watershed or the government'sforest zone. The lot has not been utilized as a bond in civil or criminal cases or as collateralfor a loan in any banking institution. There is no pending petition for its registration under Act496 known as the Land Registration Act or an application for the issuance of free patent withthe Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO). Claimant is not legallydisqualified from owning disposable property of the public domain."3



Finding that the claimant, together with his predecessor-in-interest, has "satisfactorily possessed andoccupied this land in the concept of owner, openly, continuously, adversely, notoriously andexclusively since 1939 very much earlier to June 12, 1945," the court ordered the registration andconfirmation of Lot 10739 in the name of the Spouses Romeo Divinaflor and Nenita Radan.

The Director of Lands appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the finding of the trial court that

claimant-appellee and his predecessor-in-interest have possessed Lot 10739 since 1939 is notsufficiently supported by the evidence. The Director contended that the earliest tax declarationpresented by claimant took effect only in 1980 and the certificate of real estate tax payment is dated1990. It was further contended that the testimony of Romeo Divinaflor was largely self-serving, hebeing the applicant.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgement appealed from. It ruled:

"To our mind, it is not necessary, in cases of this nature, to present tax declarations and taxreceipts of the land in question. All that the law mandates is proof of "open, continuos,peaceful and adverse possession" which appellee has convincingly established. Repeatedly,appellant hammers the fact of possession into the record by appellee's testimony on cross-

examination. Thus:

ASST. PROV'L. PROS. CRISOSTOMO:

Q You said that you bought this land from Marcial Listana, and you are referring us tothis deed of sale?

WITNESS:

A Yes, sir.

Q This land is located at Maramba?

A Yes, sir.

Q Since when did Marcial Listana begin possessing this land?

A Since 1939.

Q What was Marcial Listana doiong on the land?

A He was planting palay and sometimes corn.

Q In what concept was he possessing the land?

A In the concept of owner, openly, continuously, adversely, notoriously and exclusively.

Q Do you know whether there are disputes involving the boundaries of the land.

A No, sir.

Q Are there also persons claiming adverse ownership and possession of the land?



A No, sir.

Q Does the land encroach any road, river or stream?

A No, sir.

Q Is this part of a military reservation, public park, watershed or the government's forestzone?

A No, sir.

Q Have you paid all the taxes on the land?

A Yes, sir.

Q What about the cadastral costs?

A I also paid the same

Q What do you do with the land now?

A I planted palay during rainy season.

Q How many cavans of palay for you harvest every agricultural season?

A I get 40 cavans of palay every harvest season but sometimes more and sometimesless, during summer month I plant corn and harvest about 8 cavans of unhooked corn.

Q If and when this land will be titled, in whose name would you like the title to be?

A In our names, my wife and myself.

PROSECUTOR CRISOSTOMO;

That is all."4

"While it is true that tax declarations and tax receipts, may be considered as evidence of aclaim of ownership, and when taken in connection with possession, it may be valuable insupport of one's title by prescription. Nevertheless, the mere payment of taxes does notconfer nor prove it. (Viernes, et al. Vs. Agpaoa, 41 Phil. 286. See also Director of Lands vs.Court of Appeals, 133

The omission to declare the land in question for taxation purposes at the inception of the taxsystem in 1901 of this country does not destroy the continuous and adverse possessionunder claim of ownership of applicant's predecessors in interest. Fontanilla vs. Director of Lands, et al., CA-G.R. No. 8371-R Aug. 4, 1952.

Finally, appellant asseverates that the testimony of appellee is insufficient to provepossession for being self-serving, he being one of the applicants. We remind appellant onthis score that self-serving evidence comes into play only when such is made by the party



out of court and excludes testimony which a party gives as a witness at the trial. (See N.D.C.vs. Workmen's Compensation, et al., 19 SCRA 861; 31 C.J.S. 952)." 5

Motion for reconsideration of the above-mentioned decision having been denied, the Director of Lands has brought the instant petition raising the sole issue of-

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT HAS AQUIRED REGISTRABLE TITLE OVERTHE SUBJECT PROPERTY.

Petitioner Director of Lands assails the decision of the Court of Appeals on the ground that the law,as presently phrased, requires that possession of lands of the public domain must be from June 12,1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Petitioner argues that Divinaflor failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove possession of the land in questionsince June 12, 1945 for the following reasons; (1) Divinaflor failed to present sufficient proof that hispredecessor-in-interest Marcial Listana has possessed the lot since 1939; and (2) Divinaflor inincompetent to testify on his predecessor's possession since 1939 considering he was born only in1941, and in 1945, he was only 4 years old.

We find no reversible error in the assailed judgement. Denial of the instant petition I proper in light of the well-entrenched doctrine upholding the factual findings of the trial court when affirmed by theCourt of Appeals.6 It is likewise very basic that only errors of law and not of facts are revisable by thisCourt in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is the very rule relied upon bypetitioner.7

While the sole issue as so worded appears to raise an error of law, the arguments that follow insupport thereof pertain to factual issues. In effect, petitioner would have us analyze or weigh all over again the evidence presented in the courts a quo in complete disregard of the well-settled rule that"the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to the reviewand revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact aredeemed conclusive. This Court is not bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidencealready considered in the proceedings below."8 Indeed, It is not the function of the Supreme Court to

assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial and evidentiary, adduced by the partiesparticularly where the findings of both the trila court and the appellate court on the matter coincide. 9

This Court has held in Republic vs. Doldol 10 that, originally, "Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 providedfor possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This wassuperseded by R.A. No. 194211 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, hasalready been amended by Presidential Decree no. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977." Asamended Section 48(b) now reads:

"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the

public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filling of the application for confirmation of title, exceptwhen prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to haveperformed all the conditions to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter."

Interpreting the above-quoted provision, the Court stated in Republic vs. Court of Appeals 12 that thePublic Land Act requires that the applicant must prove the following:



"(a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive andnotorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are compliedwith, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a governmentgrant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.'

There is no dispute that the subject lot is alienable and disposable tract of public land. Sinceclaimant Romeo Divinaflor acquired ownership of Lot 10739 from Marcial Listana by deed of absolute sale dated May 21, 1973,13the pivotal issue is whether his predecessor-in-interest MarcialListana has been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945 under a bona fide claim of ownership.

The determination of whether claimants were in open, continuous, exclusive and notoriouspossession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 1945 as required by law, is a question of fact14 which was resolved affirmatively by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Such factualfinding will not be reversed on appeal except for the most compelling reasons. None has beenadduced in the case at bar.

Petitioner questions the credibility of claimant Divinaflor who testified on the possession of MarcialListana for the period required by law. The issue on having personally heard the witnesses testifyand observed their deportment and manner of testifying.15 Being in a better position to observe thewitnesses, the trial court's appreciation of the witness' testimony, truthfulness, honesty, and candor,deserves the highest respect.16

Further, it is axiomatic that a witness' "interest in the outcome of a case shall not be ground for disqualification, and that such an interest, if shown, while perhaps, indicating the need for caution inconsidering the witness' testimony, does not of itself operate to reduce his credit; indeed, histestimony must be judged on its own merits, and if ** (it) is otherwise clear and convincing and notdestroyed by other evidence on record, it may be relied upon."17 In this case, both the trial court andthe Court of Appeals found Divinaflor's testimony to be convincing, a finding with which, in thepremises, this Court will not and cannot take issue.

In the same vein, the issue of incompetence of Divinaflor to testify on the possession of hispredecessor-in-interest since 1939 in likewise unavailing and must be rejected. A timely objectionwas never made by petitioner on the ground of incompetence of Divinaflor to testify on this matter atany stage of the proceedings. It is an elementary rule in evidence that:

"When a witness is produced, it is a right and privilege accorded to the adverse party toobject to his examination on the ground of incompetence to testify. If a party knows beforetrial that a witness is incompetent, objection must be made before trial that a witness isincompetent, objection must be made before he has given any testimony; if theincompetence appears on the trial, it must be interposed as soon as it becomes apparent."18

Simply put, any objection to the admissibility of evidence should be made at the time such evidenceis offered or as soon thereafter as the objection to its admissibility becomes apparent, otherwise theobjection will be considered waived and such evidence will form part of the records of the case ascompetent and admissible evidence.19 The failure of petitioner to interpose a timely objection to thepresentation of Divinaflor's testimony results in the waiver of any objection to the admissibility thereof and he is therefore barred from raising said issue on appeal.

Be that as it may, a person is competent to be a witness if (a) he is capable of perceiving at the timeof the occurrence of the fact and (b) he can make his perception known. 20 True, in 1939, Divinaflor



was not born yet, but in 1945, he was four years old, residing in Maramba, Oas, Albay, where thesubject lot is located. As his testimony goes, he and Marcial Listana were barrio mates, and that heusually passes by the subject land. The fact that Divinaflor was only a child at the required inceptionof possession does not render him incompetent to testify on the matter. It is well-established that anychild regardless of age,can be a competent witness id he is capable of relating truthfully facts for which he is examined.21 The requirements of a child's competence as a witness are: (a) capacity of

observation; (b) capacity of recollection; and (c) capacity of communication.22

There is no showingthat as a child, claimant did not possess the foregoing qualifications. It is not necessary that awitness' knowledge of the fact to which he testifies was obtained in adulthood. He may have firstacquired knowledge of the fact during childhood that is at the age of four, which knowledge wasreinforced through the years up until he testified in court in 1990. There is reason to rejectpetitioner's claim that Divinaflor is incompetent to testify regarding Listana's possession since itappears undisputed that Divinaflor grew up in Maramba, Oas, Albay, and had occasion to seeListana possessing the land.

Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the belated declaration of the property for taxpurposes does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that law not in possession of the land asrequired the predecessors since 1945. Petitioner capitalizes on the fact that the earliest taxdeclaration presented took effect only in 1980 while the certificate of tax payment is dated 1990.While this Court has held in a long line of cases 23 that tax declarations or tax receipts are goodindicia of possession in the concept of owner, it does not necessarily follow that belated declarationof the same for tax purposes negates the fact of possession, especially in the instant case wherethere are no other persons claiming any interest in Lot 10739.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Court resolves to AFFIRM thechallenged decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 8, 1994 which sustained theJUDGEMENT of the Regional Trial Court rendered on July 27, 1990 granting the registration of littleto herein private respondent.

SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt

Melo, Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez.,JJ.:



[G.R. No. 63528. September 9, 1996]

ATOK BIG-WEDGE MINING COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. HON.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TUKTUKANSAINGAN,respondents .

D E C I S I O N

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J .:

In the face of two sets of divergent rulings of the Supreme Court on the nature of the rights of mining claimants over the land where their claim is located, the partiesherein seek a definitive ruling on the issue: What is actually the right of a locator of amining claim located and perfected under the Philippine Bill of 1902 over the landwhere the claim is found? Does he have an absolute right of ownership thereof or does

he have the mere right to possess and claim the same? Whose right to the land should,therefore, prevail: the mining claimant’s or that of an applicant for landregistration? Does the mere recording or location of a mining claim ipso facto andirreversibly convert the land into mineral land, notwithstanding the fact that the miningclaimant failed to comply with the strict work requirement under the Philippine Bill of 1902?

Petitioner Atok Big Wedge Mining Company appeals from the decision[1]

of theCourt of Appeals

[2]which reversed the decision

[3]of the then Court of First Instance

of Baguio City[4] in a land registration case.[5] The court a quo denied andcorrespondingly dismissed the application for registration of title filed by private

respondent Tuktukan Saingan, finding no merit in Saingan’s claim of adverse, open andcontinuous possession in concept of an owner of the tract of land applied for by him,which happened to be claimed by petitioner as part of its mining claim duly recorded bythe Mining Recorder of Benguet. Respondent appellate court found petitioner to haveabandoned its mining claim over the said tract of land and, on the other hand, adjudgedprivate respondent to be the owner thereof by virtue of his having possessed the sameunder a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty (30) years prior to the filing of hisland registration application in 1965.

The court a quo made the following findings of fact:

“Applicant [private respondent] seeks the registration of a parcel of land with an area

of 41,296 square meters situated in the barrio of Lucnab, Itogon, Benguet, which is

shown in survey plan Psu-209851 x x x.

The evidence for the applicant [private respondent] who was 70 years old at the time

he testified shows that he acquired the land from his father-in-law, Dongail, when he

married his daughter; that he was then 18 years old; that at the time of his

acquisition, it was planted with camotes, casava [sic], langka, gabi, coffee and



avocados; that he lived on the land since his marriage up to the present; that he has

been paying the taxes during the Japanese occupation and even before it; that he was

never disturbed in his possession. Supporting his oral testimony, applicant [private

respondent] submitted tax declarations x x x both dated March 20, 1948, the former

for a rural land and the latter for urban land and improvement therein. The receipt

showing payment of the taxes on such tax declarations is dated Feb. 8, 1949 x x x. The said tax declarations x x x show that they cancel tax declaration No. 439 dated

Feb. 10, 1947 which was presented by the Oppositor [petitioner] Atok Big Wedge

Mining Company as its Exhibit 14, and the land tax under Exh. 14 was paid by

applicant [private respondent] in 1947 x x x. Applicant [private respondent] has also

submitted Exh. `C’, which indicates that all pre-war records of tax declarations and

real property receipts of the municipality of Itogon where the property is located were

burned and destroyed during the last world war.

The Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forestry, represented by the Provincial fiscal,

oppose [sic] application. The Atok Big Wedge Mining Company came in also as

oppositor claiming that the land in question is within its mineral claims - Sally,

Evelyn and Ethel x x x Atok Big Wedge Mining Company submitted Exhibits 6, 7 and

8, all showing that the annual assessment work of these mineral claims were

maintained from 1932 to 1967 for Sally and Evelyn and from 1946 to 1967 for

Ethel. It was likewise shown that these mineral claims were recorded in the mining

recorder’s office; Sally and Evelyn on Jan. 2, 1931 and Ethel on March 18, 1921 x x

x.”[6]

The respondent appellate court additionally found that the tract of land in question

“according to the evidence, Exh. 2, covers portion of mineral claims, Sally, Evelyn, andEthel, the first two located by one Reynolds in 1931 and the last, also by Reynolds in1921”

[7]but “Atok x x x has not even been shown how connected with locator

Reynolds.”[8]

Private respondent reiterates this fact in his Comment:

“x x x (T)he mining claims have become vested rights and properties of the locators,

Messrs. H. I. Reynolds and E. J. Harrison.

However, the locators, Reynolds and Harrison, or the PETITIONERS herein,

assuming that there is any relation between Atok Big Wedge Mining Co., and the

locators, Reynolds and Harrison, have never shown that their rights have been preserved or remain vested.

x x x

Furthermore, when the land in question was registered in the office of the Mining

Recorder in 1921, and 1931, respectively, the mineral claims covering the land in



question namely: Sally, Evelyn and Ethel were in the name of the Locators E. J.

Harrison and H. I. Reynolds. No evidence was ever presented as to how Petitioner

herein obtained ownership over said claims during the hearing of this case in

the Lower Court up to this time. It was not even shown how Petitioner herein, Atok

Big Wedge Mining Co., is connected or related to locator Reynolds. x x x”[9]

Significantly, nothing in the subsequent pleadings filed by petitioner rebuts, disputesor proves otherwise, the aforecited issue raised by private respondent with regard to itspersonality, interests and authority to oppose the application for registration filed byprivate respondent respecting land to which petitioner claims rights but as to which it isnot the duly recorded mining locator.

The Director of Lands, thru the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed privaterespondent’s application on the ground that the applicant did not have title in fee simpleover the questioned land and that he had not exercised continuous, exclusive andnotorious possession and occupation over the said land for at least thirty (30) years

immediately preceding the filing of the application. However, the Solicitor General nolonger joined petitioner in this ultimate appeal, the Solicitor General later concedingexistence of private respondent’s rights.

Petitioner’s presentation of evidence proving registration of the mining claims of petitioner in the Mining Recorder of Benguet dating back to 1931, at the latest, notablyabout sixteen (16) years before private respondent declared the land in question for taxation purposes and thirty four (34) years before private respondent filed the landregistration proceedings in 1965, apparently impressed the court a quo . And so it ruledin favor of petitioner as oppositor in the land registration proceedings, the court a quo ratiocinating in this wise:

“x x x (T)he mining claims were recorded ahead of the time when theapplicant [private respondent] declared the land for taxation purposes based on his

documentary exhibits. So the evidence of the applicant [private respondent] cannot

prevail over the documentary exhibits of the oppositor Atok Big Wedge Mining

Company. The government oppositors adopted the evidence of the mining company.

Moreover, if applicant [private respondent] was already in possession and occupation

of the land in the concept of owner, as claimed, it is strange that he did not oppose its

survey when the mining company surveyed the area preparatory to its recording in

the mining recorder’s office. The conclusion is that he was not yet there when the

survey by the mining company was conducted or if he was already there the nature of his occupation was not in the concept of owner for otherwise he could have asserted it

at the time.

The foregoing facts show that the mining company had established its rights long

before applicant [private respondent] asserted ownership over the land. The

perfection of mining claims over the mineral lands involved segregate [sic] them from



the public domain and the beneficial ownership thereof became vested in the

locator .”[10]

The trial court having dismissed private respondent’s application for registration onthe ground that petitioners had already acquired a vested right over the subject land,

private respondent appealed to the respondent court. The Director of Lands, thru theSolicitor General, adopted as his own, the appellee’s brief filed by petitioner.

The respondent appellate court, on its part, correctly considered inadequate,however, the mere recording of petitioner’s mining claims in the Mining Recorder of Benguet and the corresponding, albeit religious, payment of annual assessment feestherefor, to vest in petitioner ownership rights over the land in question. Truly, under Executive Order No. 141[11], the payment of annual assessment fees is only proof of compliance with the charges imposed by law and does not constitute proof of actualassessment work on the mining land concerned. Respondent court ruled in thisconnection:

“x x x (I)t must be conceded that the same having been located and e xisting since

1921 and 1931, the rights of locator if correspondingly preserved, remained vested, -

but as this Court also examines the evidence, what has been shown is that affidavits of

assessment work had been filed, yes, from 1932 in connection with claim Sally and

from 1933 as to Evelyn, and from 1936 as to claim Ethel, but tsn. would not show that

in truth and in fact, there had been that assessment work on the claims, [sic] witness

Pelayo of Atok admits that he had not gone over the area x x x in fact he joined the

company in 1962 only, [sic] in other words, all that Atok has shown as to assessment

work is the affidavit thereon, but as Ex. Order 141 of 1 August, [sic] 1968 has said:

“(W)hat matters is [sic] maintaining and preserving possessory rights to the claims is

the continuous performance of the required assessment work, not the filing of an

affidavit which may be disproved by findings of [sic] the ground,'

and here, the very fact that applicant has possessed continuously apparently without

protest from Atok x x x must disprove the truth that locator or Atok had indeed done

assessment work x x x.”[12]

Private respondent, in support of respondent court’s quoted findings, points out inhis pleadings that:

“x x x The APPLICANT [private respondent] constructed various improvements on

the land consisting of his 3 residential houses, fruit trees, ricefields and other

permanent improvements. x x x

x x x



On the other hand, the PETITIONER Mining company has not shown that it has

introduced a single improvement (‘assessment work’) on the property. It has only

paid the minimum annual assessment required by law of P200.00 a year. There was

no evidence, whatsoever, of its alleged `factual’ possession of the property. No

assessment work was shown during the ocular inspection ordered by the Honorable

Trial Court neither during the ocular inspection conducted by the Bureau of Forestry.

THIS ritual of paying the uniform sum of P200.00 a year for alleged assessment work

is not enough evidence that such assessment work was actually made. It is precisely

for this reason that Executive Order 141 dated August 1, 1968 was issued by the

President of the Philippines. This order made it mandatory that it is not enough to

pay P200.00 a year but there must be actual continuous assessment work done on the

surface of the mineral claims. x x x” [Underscoring supplied by private respondent.][13]

Also, private respondent also additionally informs this court that:

“x x x PETITIONER Atok Big Wedge Mining Company has, on October 12, 1978,

converted its application on mineral claims in question (SALLY, EVELYN and

ETHEL) into mining lease only in compliance with Presidential Decree

1214. PETITIONER mining company is now a mere lessee of the mining claims. And

as such lessee, it has no right on the surface rights of such mineral claims. An official

certification to that effect by the Bureau of Mines & Geo-Sciences, Regional Office

No. 1 of the City of Baguio is hereby attached as Annex `A’ and made integral part

hereof. x x x.”[14]

an allegation which obviously clinches this case in his favor.

Respondent court having reversed the trial court’s decision on the ground thatprivate respondent had, by sufficient evidence, shown his right to registration over thecontested parcel of land, petitioner elevated its cause to this court. The Director of Lands, however, did not join in petitioner’s appeal. Thus, in a Manifestation and Motion,dated June 21, 1983,[15] the Director of Lands, thru the Solicitor General, acknowledgedthat “the respondent Court’s decision has become final with respect to the Director of Lands.”[16]

Petitioner, left to its own by the Director of Lands, cites the following grounds for thegrant of the instant petition:

“I

THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION HAD LONG BEEN SEGREGATED FROM THE

PUBLIC DOMAIN AND OWNERSHIP THERETO HAD LONG BECOME VESTED

IN HEREIN PETITIONER WHEN ITS MINING CLAIMS IN QUESTION WERE

REGISTERED IN THE OFFICE OF THE MINING RECORDER IN 1921 AND 1931

RESPECTIVELY.



II

THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE APPLICANT WAS IN CONTINUOUS OPEN

AND ADVERSE POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION .”[17]

We find these arguments to be devoid of merit.

The records bear out that privaterespondent has been in possession of subject parcel of land in concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years

----------------------------------------------------

The court a quo made the following factual findings based on the testimony of private respondent:

“The evidence x x x shows that he [private respondent] acquired the land from his

father-in-law, Dongail, when he married his daughter; that he was then 18 years old;

that at the time of his acquisition, it was planted with camotes, casava [sic], langka,

gabi, coffee and avocados; that he lived on the land since his marriage up to the

present; that he has been paying the taxes during the Japanese occupation and even

before it; that he was never disturbed in his possession. Supporting his oral

testimony, applicant submitted tax declarations x x x both dated March 20, 1948, the

former for a rural land and the latter for urban land and improvement therein.”[18]

Substantiating the aforecited testimonial evidence of private respondent’s actual,adverse and continuous possession of the subject land for more than thirty (30) yearsare the observations of the court commissioner during the ocular inspection of thesubject land on February 1, 1969, pertinent transcribed portions of which read asfollows:

“Upon verification of the extent of the area applied for by the applicant which tallies

with the plan on record, we find the following improvements;

The land applied for is almost 90% improved with numerous irrigated rice terraces

newly planted to palay at the time of the ocular inspection and others planted to

vegetables such as potatoes, banana plants, flowering plants and fruit trees such asmangoes, jackfruits, coffee plants, avocados and citrus - all fruit bearing.

Most of the fruit trees such as the mango trees are about one half (1/2) meter in

diameter.

There are four houses owned by the applicant [private respondent] and his children.



There is a creek traversing the middle portion of the land which serves as irrigation

for the numerous rice paddies.

Upon verification of the surrounding area which we did by hiking all the way, there

are no assessment tunnels or any sign of mining activities.

x x x

There are earthen dikes and fences surrounding the property applied for.

It also appears that the surrounding area of the land applied for is also fully

cultivated especially on the western portion, southern portion and also on the

northern portion.

On the northwestern ridge are numerous terraces planted to various vegetables and

on the edges of the property is a plantation of tiger grass used for brooms.

On the eastern slope are also numerous terraces planted to flowering plants and

numerous banana plants.

There are only two (2) pine trees growing situated on the eastern slope of the land in

question.

On the northern portion are terraces and ricefields and mango tree as well as banana

plants.

At the northern slope of the land applied for is [sic] fully cultivated with the

exception of whatever portions are planted to bananas and tiger grass.

The terraces at the time of the ocular inspection is planted to vegetables and

flowering plants such as African dishes [sic].

On the northwestern portion of the land are numerous terraces planted to seasonal

vegetable crops. The rest are planted to banana except the small steep portion

planted to tiger grass to prevent the land from eroding.

On the western portion is a big irrigation canal with plenty of water which serve [sic]

as a water supply to irrigate the ricefields which are found around the property.

An estimate of around 90 to 120 big and small trees are scattered all over the

property. Around the houses are full of fruit trees.

x x x



The mining compound of Itogon is very far from this place and this land is at the

boundary of Baguio City and Itogon. That is why it is more suitable for residential

and agricultural purposes. Nowhere do we find any mining work done, any cable or

anything that would show any mining operation in this area.

Around the yard of the houses of the applicant are numerous coffee trees, jackfruits, pomelos, papaya, pineapples, banana plants, guava trees and carrots.

The orchard is fully planted to coffee trees. The area is estimated to be more than one

hectare which is planted to coffee trees and other plants.”[19]

Private respondent, it must be emphasized, offered in evidence in the landregistration proceedings before the court a quo , tax declarations, dated March 20, 1948,and tax payment receipts, dated February 8, 1949.

Significantly, petitioner did not present any evidence in rebuttal of private

respondent’s aforestated claims of having acquired the subject land from his wife’sfather and having lived on the land since his marriage at the age of eighteen(18). Neither has petitioner taken exception to the aforecited observations of the courtcommissioner during the ocular inspection of the subject land. There is nary a showingin petitioner’s numerous pleadings filed before us that there exists substantial basis for us not to believe petitioner’s claims, and this is understandable, for petitioner largelyanchored its cause on its alleged vested rights to its mining claims under the mandateof the Philippine Bill of 1902 and our rulings in McDaniel vs . Apacible and Cuisia

[20]and

the catena of cases subsequent thereto.

Considering the aforestated evidence borne out by the records of the instant case,

their credibleness and the lack of adequate opposition thereto, we agree withrespondent Court of Appeals that “a reading of tsn. would rather persuade that applicant[private respondent] had shown quite well that subject property had been in (the)continuous and adverse possession, first, of his predecessor-in-interest, Dongail and,after the death of the latter, (by respondent) himself, years before, that is, long beforethe outbreak of the last war.” [21]

Petitioner is deemed to have abandonedhis mining claims under E.O. No. 141 andP.D. No. 1214

-------------------------------------------

All mineral lands, as part of the country’s natural resources, belong to the PhilippineState. This concept of jura regalia enshrined in past and present Philippineconstitutions, has not always been the prevailing principle in this jurisdiction, however,the abundant resources within our coastal frontiers having in the past filled not just onecolonizer’s booty haul. Indeed, there was a time in our history when the mining lawsprevailing in this jurisdiction were compromising, to say the least, of the Filipino people’sinherent rights to their natural wealth.



Before the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States under the Treaty of Paris, the prevailing mining law in the colony was the Royal Decree of May, 1867,otherwise known as The Spanish Mining Law.

In the advent of American occupation, the Philippines was governed by means of organic acts which were in the nature of charters serving as a Constitution of the

occupied territory from 1900 to 1935.[22] Among the principal organic acts of thePhilippines was the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 through which the United StatesCongress assumed the administration of the Philippine Islands.

The Philippine Bill of 1902 contained provisions for, among many other things, theopen and free exploration, occupation and purchase of mineral deposits and the landwhere they may be found. It declared “all valuable mineral deposits in public lands inthe Philippine Islands, both surveyed and unsurveyed x x x to be free and open toexploration, occupation, and purchase, and the land in which they are found tooccupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States, or of said Islands x x x.” [23]

Any qualified person desiring to locate a mineral claim may enter upon the same

and locate a plot of ground measuring, where possible, but not exceeding, onethousand feet in length by one thousand feet in breadth, in as nearly as possible arectangular form.[24] Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the holder of the mineral claim solocated is entitled to all the minerals which may lie within his claim, but he may not mineoutside the boundary lines of his claim. [25] The mine claim locator must have his claimrecorded in the mining recorder within thirty (30) days after the location thereof;otherwise, he will be deemed to have abandoned the same.

[26]

One of the continuing requirements for the subsistence of the mining claim isperformance of not less than one hundred dollars’ worth of labor or undertaking of improvements of the same value every year.[27] This is a strict requisite, the locator’s

failure to comply with which shall operate to open the claim or mine to relocation in thesame manner as if no location of the same had even been made.[28] Unequivocal is themandatory nature of the work or labor requirement on the mine that the Philippine Billspecifically designates the time when the work or labor required to be done annually onall unpatented mineral claims, shall commence.[29]

Subsequently, among a few laws passed amending the Philippine Bill of 1902 was Act No. 624 passed by the United States Philippine Commission and approved onFebruary 7, 1903. Said Act prescribed regulations to govern the location and themanner of recording mining claims and the amount of work necessary to holdpossession thereof. Such regulations reinforced the annual work or labor requirementof not less than one hundred dollars’ worth as provided for in the Philippine Bill of 1902,

in accordance with Section 36 thereof which limits the power of the United StatesPhilippine Commission to make regulations but “not in conflict with the provision of this

Act [i.e., the Philippine Bill of 1902], governing the location, manner of recording, andamount of work necessary to hold possession of a mining claim x x x.”

On November 15, 1935, the Constitution of the Commonwealth took effect. The1935 Constitution declared all natural resources of the Philippines, including minerallands and minerals, to be property belonging to the State.

[30]However, as it turned out,



not really all of the Philippines’ natural resources were considered part of the publicdomain. Those natural resources, and for that matter, those mineral lands and mineralswith respect to which there already was “any existing right, grant, lease, or concessionat the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution,”were then considered outside the application of the jura regalia doctrine or at least not

unconditionally or totally within the contemplation of said doctrine.On November 7, 1936, the First National Assembly enacted Commonwealth Act No.

137, otherwise known as the Mining Act. In contradistinction with the Philippine Bill of 1902 which was patterned after the United States Federal Mining Acts which rejectedthe regalian doctrine, the Mining Act expressly adopted the regalian doctrine followingthe provisions of the 1935 Constitution. Since said Constitution necessarily prohibitsthe alienation of mining lands, the Mining Act granted only lease rights to miningclaimants who are proscribed from purchasing the mining claim itself. These provisionsof the Mining Act, however, were expressly inapplicable to mining claimants who hadlocated and recorded their claims under the Philippine Bill of 1902.

The nationalism underlying the adoption of the regalian doctrine in the 1935Constitution was further eroded by the amendment thereto which was adopted by theFirst Congress on September 18, 1946 and approved by a majority at the elections heldon March 11, 1947. This amendment which came in the form of an “Ordinance

Appended to the Constitution” is what is known as the “Parity Rights” amendment. Itprovided that, notwithstanding the adoption in the Constitution of the regalian doctrineand the proscription against aliens participating in the natural wealth of the nation,excepted therefrom were the citizens of the United States and its business enterpriseswhich would have the equal right in the disposition, exploitation, development andutilization of our natural resources, among them, our mining lands and minerals for theperiod from July 4, 1946 to July 3, 1974.

In the meantime, the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 regarding miningclaims, insofar as the mining lands and mining claims acquired before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution are concerned, continued to be in effect. Annual performance of labor or undertaking of improvements on the mine remained an annual requirement,non-compliance with which resulted in the mine becoming again open to relocation butnow subject to the lease provisions of the Mining Act. The intention for this annual workrequirement to be a strict prerequisite to maintenance of a claimant’s rights under thePhilippine Bill of 1902 apparently not lost on subsequent legislators, they took the sameas an absolute prerequisite with grave consequences and believed it necessary toexpressly enact a law

[31]waiving this requirement during the period from January 1,

1952 to January 1, 1954 as the circumstances then necessitated the same.

The Philippine Bill of 1902 clearly required the annual performance of work on themine or the undertaking of improvements thereon in order for the mine claim locator tocontinue enjoying all the rights accruing to him as such under the said Bill. This andnothing short of this was the requirement. The filing of affidavits of annual assessmentwork, which procedure is not even provided for in the Philippine Bill of 1902, is requiredonly for purposes of proving that there had actually been work or improvementsdone. Such filing could not have been intended to replace the actual work requirement,



and nary is there a basis in law to support any conclusion to the contrary,notwithstanding what was appearing to be the practice of mine claim locators of annually filing affidavits of annual assessment but willfully not undertaking actual workor tangible improvement on the mine site.

On August 1, 1968, then President Marcos issued Executive Order (E.O.) No.

141. Whereas mining claim holders under the Philippine Bill of 1902 “x x x are of theimpression that they may hold on to their claims indefinitely by the mere filing of affidavits of annual assessment work x x x,” E.O. No. 141 precisely declared that “suchimpression is not correct, for what matters in maintaining and preserving possessorytitle to the claim is the continuous performance of the required assessment work, not thefiling of an affidavit which may be disproved by findings on the ground.” Consequently,E.O. No. 141 established the status of such unpatented mining claims which have notcomplied with the annual work requirement, as having been abandoned and open for relocation, their declarations of location being accordingly cancelled.

On January 17, 1973, the 1973 Constitution came into force and effect. Unlike the

former Charter, the 1973 Constitution did not expressly qualify the application of theregalian doctrine as being subject to any right granted before the effectivity of the 1935Constitution or the 1973 Constitution for that matter. It provided:

“SEC. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other

mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural

resources of the Philippines belong to the State. x x x.”[32]

But the conditional application of the regalian doctrine under the 1973 Constitutioncould be found in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 463, enacted on May 17, 1974, whichrevised the Mining Act (C.A. No. 137). While the said decree declares that “x x x all

mineral deposits in public or private lands x x x belong to the State, inalienably andimprescriptively x x x,” it also recognizes whatever rights or reservations had alreadybeen existing with respect to certain mining lands,[33] apparently alluding to the rights of mining claim holders under the Philippine Bill of 1902.

Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the procedure was that a mining claim locator need not apply for a patent soon after locating the mine. The patent may come later,and the said locator, for as long as he complies with the annual actual workrequirement, enjoyed possessory rights with respect to such mining claim with or without a patent therefor. It has already been stated that under E.O. No. 141,unpatented mining claims shall be deemed abandoned upon a finding that the holdersthereof had not been actually performing any work or labor or undertaking anyimprovement at the mine site notwithstanding their having religiously filed annualaffidavits of assessment.

Even under P.D. 463 which was enacted in 1974, the possessory rights of miningclaim holders under the Philippine Bill of 1902 remained effective for as long as saidholders complied with the annual actual work requirement. But on October 14, 1977,P.D. No. 1214 required all the holders of unpatented mining claims to secure mininglease contracts under P.D. No. 463. Faced with the grave consequence of forfeiture of



all their rights to their claims, holders of subsisting and valid patentable mining claimslocated under the Philippine Bill of 1902 were to file mining lease applications therefor within one (1) year from the effectivity of the said decree.[34] The filing of such mininglease applications was considered a waiver of the holders’ rights to the issuance of mining patents for their claims.

[35]Corollarily, non-filing of applications for mining lease

by the holders thereof within the one-year period would cause the forfeiture of all their rights to their claims.[36]

Against the backdrop of the afore-chronicled evolution of the pertinent mining laws,past and present, in this jurisdiction, we now proceed to resolve the controlling issue inthis case: Whether or not the ownership of subject land had long been vested onpetitioner after it had allegedly located and recorded its mining claim in accordance withthe pertinent provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902.

This issue is certainly not a novel one. It has been first ruled upon by this court inthe 1922 case of McDaniel vs . Apacible and Cuisia.[37] There, applying Americanprecedents, we stated:

“The moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located,

and perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of the United States

Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of

the located claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and they were

exempted from lands that could be granted to any other person. The reservations of

public lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected located

locations; and of course, if a valid mining location is made upon public lands

afterward included in a reservation, such inclusion or reservation does not affect the

validity of the former location. By such location and perfection, the land located is

segregated from the public domain even as against the Government. x x x.”[38]

We reiterated this ruling in the subsequent cases of Gold Creek Mining vs .Rodriguez (1938),

[39]Salacot Mining Company vs . Abadilla (1939),

[40]Salacot Mining

Company vs . Rodriguez (1939),[41] Bambao vs . Lednicky (1961),[42] Comilang vs .Buendia (1967),[43] Benguet Consolidated, Inc. vs . Republic (1986),[44] Republic vs .Court of Appeals (1988)

[45]and Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc. vs . Court of Appeals

(1991).[46]

Notwithstanding our ruling in the aforecited cases, however, there came aboutthereafter a catena of cases where we declared that the rights of the holder of a miningclaim located under the Philippine Bill of 1902, are not absolute or are not strictly of

ownership. This declaration was a necessary premise in our affirmation of theconstitutionality of P.D. No. 1214 in the 1987 case of Santa Rosa Mining Co., Inc. vs .Leido, Jr.

[47]where we stated:

“Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the affected land or mining

claim. It merely segregates the located land or area from the public domain by

barring other would-be locators from locating the same and appropriating for



themselves the minerals found therein. To rule otherwise would imply that location is

all that is needed to acquire and maintain rights over a located mining claim. This,

we cannot approve or sanction because it is contrary to the intention of the lawmaker

that the locator should faithfully and consistently comply with the requirements for

annual work and improvements in the located mining claim.”[48]

And our ruling there was upheld in the tradition of stare decisis in the subsequent casesof Director of Lands vs . Kalahi Investments, Inc. (1989),

[49]Zambales Chromite Mining

Company, Inc. vs . Leido, Jr. (1989),[50] Poe Mining Association vs . Garcia(1991),[51] United Paracale Mining Company, Inc. vs . De la Rosa (1993),[52] andManuel vs . Intermediate Appellate Court (1995).

[53]

While petitioner adamantly insists that there is only one construction of theprovisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 as regards his mining claim rights, and this isthat the same are absolute and in the nature of ownership, private respondent posits theultimate question of which between the aforecited seemingly inconsistent rulings is the

correct interpretation of the Philippine Bill of 1902 in relation to E.O. No. 141 and P.D.1214 insofar as the rights of mining claim holders under the said Bill are concerned.

This is not the first time either that we are asked to, in all awareness of theprecedents, resolve these postulations of this court that are perceived to becontradictory. In the 1994 case of United Paracale Mining Company vs . Court of

Appeals,[54]

posed before us by petitioner therein was the same question that hereinprivate respondent asks us to resolve in the ultimate. We noted in that case:

"The query of petitioner: ‘What is actually the right of a locator of mining claim

located and perfected under the Philippine Bill of 1902. Does he have an absolute

right of ownership, or merely a right to possess and claim?’

Petitioner contends that there are two (2) conflicting rulings made by this Court on

the same issue. In Director of Lands vs. Kalahi Investments, Inc. (169 SCRA 683), a

locator of mining claims perfected under the Philippine Bill of 1902 has been held not

to have an absolute right of ownership over said claims but merely a possessory right

thereto. In Atok-Big Wedge Mining Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and Liwan

Consi (193 SCRA 71), however, a locator of mining claim perfected under the

Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court has ruled, does have an absolute right of ownership

over his claim being thereby removed from the public domain.”[55]

In that case of United Paracale Mining , it would have been premature for us to rule onthe query, not all indispensable parties therein having been joined. That is not thesituation in this present controversy, however, and so we shall forthwith resolve thematter at hand once and for all.

The earlier chronicle of the evolution of the mining laws, past and present, in this jurisdiction was not without a predetermined purpose. The detailing of the provisions of those laws, especially of the Philippine Bill of 1902, was certainly deliberate. It is



undeniable at this point that the determination of the rights of a mining claim holder under the said Bill is best undertaken on the basis of the very source of those rights,that is, the Bill itself. And any alteration or change in the nature of those rights must beconceded for as long as such is statutorily and constitutionally sanctioned, for evenvested rights may be taken away by the State in the exercise of its absolute police

power.Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the mining claim holder, upon locating and

recording of his claim, has the right to acquire for himself all mineral deposits foundwithin his claim to the exclusion of everyone, including the Government. Such rights arenecessarily possessory as they are essentially utilitarian and exploitative. Such rightsaccruing to the mining claim locator are personal to him in the sense that no conclusionas to the nature of the land may definitively be made based solely on the fact that amining claim has been recorded as regards a particular land. However, insofar as hisrights are exclusive and no other person may undertake mining activities on a recordedmining claim, unless the same has been abandoned or the works thereon not done, themining locator’s rights are also protected against adverse mining claims of third

persons. He also has the right to immediately or eventually secure a patent on hismining claim and in the event that he postpones securing a patent, his rights toexclusive possession and exploitation of his mining claim subsist for as long as hecomplies with the continuing requirement of annually performing work or undertakingimprovements at the mine site. Insofar as the Philippine Bill of 1902 does not provide aspecific time within which the mining claim holder must secure a patent, his rights topossession and use of the mining land appear to be unconditional, the option not at allto secure a patent being available to him in the absence of a deadline or ultimatumtherefor. The Philippine Bill of 1902, however, did not foreclose a subsequent act onthe part of the State to limit the time within which the said patent must be secured under threat of forfeiture of rights provided for under the Philippine Bill of 1902. Thus, in the

sense that the rights of a mining claim holder may in the future be curtailed by failure toobtain a patent, especially if we recall that Section 36 of the said Bill itself foretold thesubsequent promulgation of regulations regarding mining claims, such rights cannotalso be said to be truly unconditional or absolute.

We also learn from our reading of our past and present mining laws in their proper historical perspectives, that the process of recording mining claims could not have beenintended to be the operative act of classifying lands into mineral lands. The recording of a mining claim only operates to reserve to the registrant exclusive rights to undertakemining activities upon the land subject of the claim. The power to classify lands intomineral lands could not have been intended under the Philippine Bill of 1902 to bevested in just anyone who records a mining claim. In fact, this strengthens our holdingthat the rights of a mining claimant are confined to possessing the land for purposes of extracting therefrom minerals in exclusion of any or all other persons whose claims aresubsequent to the original mining locator. Thus, if no minerals are extracted therefrom,notwithstanding the recording of the claim, the land is not mineral land and registrationthereof is not precluded by such recorded claim. Thus, in the case at bench, the miningclaimant, who had failed to comply with the annual minimum labor requirement, couldnot, all the more, be expected to have extracted minerals from the mining



location. Utter lack of proof of even its potential deposits on the part of the petitioner,thus, does not surprise us at all.

Thus, it can be said (1) that the rights under the Philippine Bill of 1902 of a miningclaim holder over his claim has been made subject by the said Bill itself to the strictrequirement that he actually performs work or undertakes improvements on the mine

every year and does not merely file his affidavit of annual assessment, whichrequirement was correctly identified and declared in E.O. No. 141; and (2) that the samerights have been terminated by P.D. No. 1214, a police power enactment, under whichnon-application for mining lease amounts to waiver of all rights under the Philippine Billof 1902 and application for mining lease amounts to waiver of the right under said Bill toapply for patent. In the light of these substantial conditions upon the rights of a miningclaim holder under the Philippine Bill of 1902, there should remain no doubt now thatsuch rights were not, in the first place, absolute or in the nature of ownership, andneither were they intended to be so.

Applying the aforecited ruling to the facts of this case, we find that, not only has

petitioner failed to sufficiently show compliance with actual annual work requirement onits mining claims but also that credible are the transcribed observations of the trialcommissioner that nowhere on the subject land could be found tangible works or improvements of an extent that would have existed had petitioner really complied withthe annual work requirement from 1931 when it allegedly first located said miningclaims. In fact, no mining infrastructure or equipment of any sort can be found on thearea. Understandable thus is the action of the Director of Lands not to further appealfrom respondent court’s decision, Director of Lands eventually conceding the subjectland to be registrable, considering petitioner’s non-performance of mining worksthereon, private respondent’s adverse possession of the subject land more than thirty(30) years and its use thereof for as many years solely for agricultural purposes.

Equally borne out by the records is the fact that petitioner has indeed applied for amining lease under P.D. No. 1214. For that reason, it has, in effect, waived its right tosecure a patent and it shall have been governed, if private respondent’s claim of adverse and open possession of the subject land for more than 30 years were notestablished, by P.D. No. 463 in its activities respecting its mining lease.

WHEREFORE, the petition is HEREBY DISMISSED, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ ., concur.



G.R. No. L-31189 March 31, 1987

MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIAS, petitioner,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, NORMA LEUENBERGER and FRANCISCO SOLIVA, respondents.

Enrique I. Soriano, Jr. for private respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent Court of Appealspromulgated on September 29, 1969 in CA-G.R. No. 35036-R (Rollo, p. 11) setting aside thedecision ** of the Court of First Intance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, dated September 24, 1964which dismissed the complaint for recovery of possession in Civil Case No. 181-S and declared thecemetery site on Lot No. 76 in Victorias as property of the municipality of Victorias (Record on

Appeal, p. 9).

The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the lower court is hereby set asideand another is hereby rendered:

(1) Ordering the defendant municipality and/or thru its appropriate officials to returnand deliver the possession of the portion of Lot 76 used as cemetery or burial site of the plaintiff-appellant.

(2) Ordering defendant municipality to pay the plaintiff-appellant the sum of P400.00a year from 1963 until the possession of said land is actually delivered.

Lot No. 76 containing an area of 208,157 sq. meters forms a part of Cadastral Lot No. 140 (Rollo, p.11), a 27.2460 ha. sugar land located in Bo. Madaniog, Victorias, Negros Occidental, in the name of the deceased Gonzalo Ditching under Tax Declaration No. 3429 of Negros Occidental for the year 1941 (Exh. "3," Folder of Exhibits, p. 22). He was survived by his widow Simeona Jingeo Vda. deDitching and a daughter, Isabel, who died in 1928 (TSN, July 1, 1964, p. 7) leaving one off-spring,respondent Norma Leuenberger, who was then only six months old (TSN, July 1, 1964, p. 34).

Respondent Norma Leuenberger, married to Francisco Soliva, inherited the whole of Lot No. 140from her grandmother, Simeona J. Vda. de Ditching (not from her predeceased mother IsabelDitching). In 1952, she donated a portion of Lot No. 140, about 3 ha., to the municipality for theground of a certain high school and had 4 ha. converted into a subdivision. (TSN, July 1, 1964, p.

24).

In 1963, she had the remaining 21 ha. or 208.157 sq. m. relocated by a surveyor upon request of lessee Ramon Jover who complained of being prohibited by municipal officials from cultivating theland. It was then that she discovered that the parcel of land, more or less 4 ha. or 33,747 sq.m. usedby Petitioner Municipality of Victorias, as a cemetery from 1934, is within her property which is nowIdentified as Lot 76 and covered by TCT No. 34546 (TSN, July 1, 1964, pp. 7-9; Exh. "4," Folder of Exhibits, p. 23 and Exh. "A," Folder of Exhibits, p. 1).



On May 20, 1963, Respondent wrote the Mayor of Victorias regarding her discovery, demandingpayment of past rentals and requesting delivery of the area allegedly illegally occupied by Petitioner (Exh. "G, Folder of Exhibits, p. 15). When the Mayor replied that Petitioner bought the land sheasked to be shown the papers concerning the sale but was referred by the Mayor to the municipaltreasurer who refused to show the same (TSN, July 1, 1964, pp. 32-33).

On January 11, 1964, Respondents filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of NegrosOccidental, Branch 1, for recovery of possession of the parcel of land occupied by the municipalcemetery (Record on Appeal, p. 1). In its answer, petitioner Municipality, by way of special defense,alleged ownership of the lot, subject of the complaint, having bought it from Simeona Jingco Vda. deDitching sometime in 1934 (Record on Appeal, p. 7). The lower court decided in favor of theMunicipality. On appeal Respondent appellate Court set aside the decision of the lower court(Record on AppeaL p. 9); hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

This petition was filed with the Court on November 6, 1969 (Rollo, p. 2), the Record on Appeal onDecember 19, 1969 (Rollo, p. 80). On January 5, 1970, the Court gave due course to the petition(Rollo, p. 84).

The Brief for the Petitioner was filed on April 1, 1970 (Rollo, p. 88), the Brief for Respondents wasfiled on May 18, 1970 (Rollo, p. 92).

On July 8, 1970, the Court resolved to consider the case submitted for decision without Petitioner'sReply Brief, Petitioner having failed to file the brief within the period which expired on June 10, 1970(Rollo. p. 99).

On motion of counsel for the Respondents (Rollo, p. 104), the Court resolved on June 30, 1972 toallow respondent Francisco Soliva to continue the appeal in behalf of the estate of respondentNorma Leuenberger who died on January 25, 1972, Respondent Francisco Soliva having beenappointed special administrator in Special Proceedings No. 84-V of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (Rollo, p. 110).

In their brief, petitioner raised the following errors of respondent Court of Appeals: (Brief for thePetitioner, p. 1-3);

I.

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondents NormaLeuenberger and Francisco Soliva are the lawful owners of the land in litigation asthey are estopped from questioning the possession and ownership of hereinpetitioner which dates back to more than 30 years.

II.

The Honorable Court of Appeals also erred in ordering the petition petitioner todeliver the possession of the land in question to the respondents Nomia Leuenberger and Francisco Soliva, by holding that non-annotation on the Torrens Certificate of Title could not affect the said land when the possession by the petitioner of the saidland for over 30 years and using it as a public cemetery for that length of time aresufficient proof of purchase and transfer of title and non-annotation of the Certificateof Title did not render the sale ineffectual



III.

The Honorable Court of Appeals further erred in ordering the petitioner Municipalityof Victories to pay the respondents the sum of P400.00 a year from 1963 untilpossession is actually delivered because under the law, an owner of a piece of landhas no obligation to pay rentals as it owns and possesses the same.

There is merit in the petition.

It is undisputed that petitioner failed to present before the Court a Deed of Sale to prove its purchaseof the land in question which is included in the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-34546 in the nameof private respondent Norma Leuenberger.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the secondary evidence presented by the petitioner municipality is sufficient to substantiate its claim that it acquired the disputed land by means of aDeed of Sale.

Under the Best Evidence Rule when the original writing is lost or otherwise unavailable, the law in

point provides:

Sec. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed. — When the originalwriting has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of itsexecution and loss or destruction or unavailability, its contents may be proved by acopy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the recollectionof witnesses. (Rule 130, Rules of Court).

In lieu of a Deed of Sale, petitioner presented a certificate issued by the Archives Division of theBureau of Records Management in Manila, of a page of the 1934 Notarial Register of Vicente D.

Aragon with the following entries:

Nature of Instrument — Compra venta 2 porciones Terrenos: Lotes Nos. 140-A y140-B, Victorias, Neg. Occidental pago por esso despues aprobacion Jusgado laInstance, Neg. Occidental causa civil 5116 Vendedora: — Simeona Jingco Vda. deDitching . . . administradora Abint. G. Ditching

Comprador: — Municipio Victorias, Neg. Occidental . . . . por su Pres.Mpal VicenteB. Arnaes

Valor: — P750.00 ...

Vease copia correspondiente.

Names of-persons Executing/ Acknowledging:

Simeona Vda. de Ditching

Adm. Abint actuacion especial No. 5116

Jusgado la Instance Neg. Occidental

Vendedora



Vicente B. Arnaes

Pres. Municipal. Victorias

Comprador

Witnesses to the Signatures:

Esteban Jalandoni

Gregorio Elizalde

Date: Month

9 Julio 1934

Fees: P2.00

Cedulas:

Exenta por susexo

F1027880 Enero 26/34 Victories, Neg. Occidental

Remarks.

En Victorias, Neg. Occidental

Los annexes A. y B. estan unidos

solamente en el original de la

escritura.

Respondent Court of Appeals was of the view (Rollo, p. 16) that a mere entry in the notarial register of a notary public of an alleged sale cannot prove that a particular piece of land was sold by oneperson to another, one of the important requirements being the indication of the area and thetechnical description of the land being sold. In the present case, since no deed of sale could beproduced, there is no way of telling what particular portion of the property was sold to defendantmunicipality and how big was the sale of the land conveyed to the defendant municipality.

It will be observed that the entries in the notarial register clearly show: (a) the nature of theinstrument. — a deed of sale; (b) the subject of the sale — two parcels of land, Lot Nos. 140-A and140-B; (c) the parties of the contract — the vendor Simeona J. Vda. de Ditching in her capacity as

Administrator in Civil Case No. 5116 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental and thevendee, Vicente B. Ananosa, Municipal Mayor of Victorias; (d) the consideration P750.00; (e) thenames of the witnesses Esteban Jalandoni and Gregoria Elizado; and the date of the sale on July 9,1934.



It is beyond question that the foregoing certificate is an authentic document clearly corroborated andsupported by: (a) the testimony of the municipal councilor of Victorias, Ricardo Suarez, (OriginalTSN Hearing of September 14, 1964, pp. 1222) who negotiated the sale; (b) the testimony of EmilioCuesta, (Original TSN Hearing of September 14, 1964, pp. 2238) the municipal treasurer of saidmunicipality, since 1932 up to the date of trial on September 14, 1964, who personally paid theamount of P750.00 to Felipe Leuenberger as consideration of the Contract of Sale; (c) Certificate of

Settlement (Original Exhibits, p. 20) "as evidence of said payment;" (d) Tax Declaration No. 429(Ibid ., p. 22) which was cancelled and was substituted by Tax Declaration No. 3600 covering theportion of the property unsold (Decision, CFI, Neg. Occidental Orig. Record on Appeal, p. 6) and (e)Tax Declaration No. 3601 (Ibid , p. 23) in the name of the Municipal Government of Victorias coveringthe portion occupied as cemetery.

Tax Declaration No. 3601 shows on its face the boundaries as follows:

North — NE — Lot No. 140-C of the Subdivision

South — SW — Lot No. 140-C of the Subdivision

West — NW — Lots Nos. 140-C & 140-B of the Subdivision.

The area is 33,747 sq.m.

At the back Exh . 4-A, the sale of a portion of the lot to the Municipality of Victorias was clearlyexplained as follows:

Note: The whole Lot No. 140, belongs to Norma Leuenberger as evidenced by aTransfer of Cert. of Title No. 18672. Portion of this Lot, (30,000 sq.m. was sold toMunicipality of Victories for Cemetery Site as evidenced by a Deed of Sale executedby Simeona Jingco Vda. de Ditching in favor of the aforesaid Municipality and ratifiedby Notary Public Mr. Vicente Aragon under Doc. No. 132; Page No. 2; Book No. 10,

Series of 1934.

At the lowest portion under Memoranda it was explained that —

The area under this declaration includes 3,746 sq. meters donated by Mrs. SimeonaJingco Vda. de Ditching and used as road leading to the cemetery. " (EXIL 4; OriginalExhibits, p. 23).

The above-mentioned testimonies and documentary evidence sufficiently Identify the land sold bythe predecessors-in-interest of private respondent. To insist on the technical description of the landin dispute would be to sacrifice substance to form which would undoubtedly result in manifestinjustice to the petitioner.

Moreover, it is expressly provided by law that the thing sold shall be understood as delivered, whenit is placed in the control and possession of the vendee. (Civil Code Art. 1497). Where there is noexpress provision that title shall not pass until payment of the price, and the thing gold has beendelivered, title passes from the moment the thing sold is placed in the possession and control of thebuyer. (Kuenzle & Streiff vs. Watson & Co., 13 PhiL 26 [1909]). Delivery produces its natural effectsin law, the principal and most important of which being the conveyance of ownership, withoutprejudice to the right of the vendor to payment of the price. (Ocejo, Perez & Co. vs. InternationalBanking Corp., 37 PhiL 631 [1918]).



Similarly, when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall beequivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed, thecontrary does not appear or cannot be clearly inferred. (Civil Code Art. 1498). The execution of thepublic instrument operates as a formal or symbolic delivery of the property sold and authorizes thebuyer to use the document as proof of ownership. (Florendo v. Foz, 20 PhiL 388 [1911]).

In the case at bar it is undisputed that petitioner had been in open, public, adverse and continuouspossession of the land for a period of more than thirty years. In fact, according to the municipaltreasurer there are over 1000 graves in the cemetery. (Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, pp. 11-22).

As correctly observed by Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan in his dissenting opinion (Rollo, pp. 23-28) inthe decision of this case by the Court of Appeals, the evidence establishes without debate that theproperty was originally registered in 1916. Plaintiff was born only in 1928 and cannot possibly be theregistered owner of the original lot 140 at the time. Indeed, according to her own evidence, (Exhibit

A; Original Record pp. 13) she became the registered owner only in 1963. Likewise, it is undisputedthat in the intestate estate of Gonzalo Ditching, the grandfather of private respondent NormaLeunberger, it was her grandmother, Simeona, the surviving spouse of Gonzalo who was named

judicial administratrix. According to Norma's own testimony, Isabel her mother, died in 1928 (TSN Aug. 12, 1964, p. 34) while Simeona the grandmother died in 1942. (Ibid .) Therefore, as of 1934when a document of sale was executed by Simeona in favor of the municipality of Victories asindubitably shown in the notarial register (Exhibit 5.A) in question, Simeona was still theadministratrix of the properties left by her husband, Gonzalo and of their conjugal partnership.Consequently, she is the only person who could legally dispose of by sale this particular four-hectare portion of Lot 140. And so it is, that in 1934, Simeona Ditching in her capacity as judicialadministratrix made and executed the document described in the Report as Lots 140-A and 140-B,showing clearly that they are portions of the original big Lot 140. As this conveyance was executedby the judicial administratrix, unquestionably the party authorized to dispose of the same, thepresumption must be that she did so upon proper authority of the Court of First Instance.

As to the description of the property sold, the fact that a notarial report shows that they are portionsof Lot 140 and the property in question occupied by the public cemetery is admittedly a portion of

said lot in the absence of evidence that there were other portions of Lot 140 ceded unto thepetitioner municipality, the inevitable conclusion is that the sale executed in the Notarial Register refers to the disputed lot.

Unfortunately, the purchaser Municipality of Victorias failed to register said Deed of Sale; hence,when Simeona Jingco Vda. de Ditching died, her grand-daughter, respondent Norma Leuenberger claimed to have inherited the land in dispute and succeeded in registering said land under theTorrens system. Said land is now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-34036 (Exhibit A,supra) issued by the Register of Deeds of -Negros Occidental on March 11, 1963 in the name of Norma Leuenberger, married to Francisco Soliva, containing an area of 208,157 square meters. Asregistered owner, she is unquestionably entitled to the protection afforded to a holder of a TorrensTitle.

Admittedly, it is well-settled that under the Torrens System "Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, . . . shall hold the same free of all encumbrance exceptthose noted on said certificate ... " (Sec. 39, Act 496; now Sec. 43, PD 1529).

In the instant case, however, respondent Norma Leuenberger admitted that she inherited the landcovered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-34036 from her grandmother, who had already sold theland to the petitioner in 1934; hence, she merely stepped into the shoes of her grandmother and shecannot claim a better right than her predecessor-in-interest. When she applied for registration of the



disputed land, she had no legal right to do so as she had no ownership of the land since landregistration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but only of confirming ownership of the land.(Grande, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 115 Phil. 521.)"The Torrens System was not establishedas a means for the acquisition of title to private land, ..." It is intended merely to confirm and register the title which one may already have on the land. Where the applicant possesses no title or ownership over the parcel of land, he cannot acquire one under the Torrens system of Registration.

(Torela, et al., vs. Torela, et al., L-27843, October 11, 1979).

While an inherently defective Torrens title may not ordinarily be cancelled even after proof of itsdefect, the lawnevertheless safeguards the rightful party's interest in the titled land from fraud andimproper use of technicalities by snowing such party, in appropriate cases, to judicially seekreconveyance to him of whatever he has been deprived of as long as the land has not beentransferred or conveyed to a purchaser in good faith. (Pedro Pascua, et al., vs. Mariano Gopuyoc etal., L-23197, May 31, 1977.)

The Civil Code provides:

Art. 1456. If the property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it

is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of theperson from whom the property comes.

Thus, it has been held that where the land is decreed in the name of a person through fraud or mistake, such person is by operation of law considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the persons from whom the property comes. The beneficiary shag have the right t enforce the trust,notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title and the trustee and his successors-in-interestare bound to execute the deed of reconveyance. (Pacheco vs. Arro, 85 Phil. 505; Escobar vs.Locsin, 74 Phil. 86).

As the land in dispute is held by private respondents in trust for the Municipality of Victorias, it islogical to conclude that the latter can neither be deprived of its possession nor be made to payrentals thereof. Private respondent is in equity bound to reconvey the subject land to the cestui que

trust the Municipality of Victorias. The Torrens system was never calculated to foment betrayal in theperformance of a trust. (Escobar vs. Locsin, 74 Phil. 86).

For a more expeditious disposition of the case at bar, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 10. Judgment for Specific acts; vesting title. — ... If real or personal property iswithin the Philippines, the court in lieu of directing a conveyance thereof may enter

judgment divesting the title of any party and vesting it in others and such judgmentshall have the force and effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law.

Finally, the conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight on appealand should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons because the trial court is in a

better position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses whiletestifying in the case. (Chase v. Buencamino, Sr., 136 SCRA 365 [1985]).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the judgment of the respondent appellate court is hereby SET ASIDEand the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I-Silay City in Civil CaseNo. 181-S declaring the cemetery site (Exh. E-2) on Lot No. 76 in Victories as the property of themunicipality of Victorias, is hereby REINSTATED. Additionally, We hereby order (a) the petitioner tohave the disputed land segregated by a licensed surveyor from the rest of Lot No. 76 described inTransfer Certificate of Title No. T-34036 and to have the corresponding subdivision plan, duly



approved by the Land Registration Commission, submitted to the court of origin for approval; (b) theprivate respondents Norma Leuenberger and Francisco Soliva to be divested of their title to thedisputed land under Rule 39, Sec. 10, Rules of Court; and (c) the Register of Deeds of NegrosOccidental to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34036 and issue, in lieu thereof, one title in thename of the Municipality of Victories for the disputed land and another title in the names of theprivate respondents Norma Leuenberger and Francisco Soliva for the rest of Lot No. 76. Without

costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.

LTD batch 3

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