Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

DELFIN LAMSIS, MAYNARD

MONDIGUING, JOSE VALDEZ,

JR. and Heirs of AGUSTIN KITMA,

represented by EUGENE KITMA,

G.R. No. 173021

Present:

Petitioners, CORONA, C. J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

- versus - DEL CASTILLO, and

PEREZ, JJ.

MARGARITA SEMON DONG-E, Promulgated:

Respondent. October 20, 2010

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.

There is laches when a party is aware, even in the early stages of the proceedings,

of a possible jurisdictional objection, and has every opportunity to raise said objection,

but fails to do so, even on appeal.

This is a Petition for Review[1]

assailing the March 30, 2006 Decision[2]

of the

Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78987 as well as its May 26, 2006

Resolution[3]

which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for

lack of merit and the judgment dated January 8, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of

Baguio City in Civil Case No. 4140-R is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Factual antecedents

This case involves a conflict of ownership and possession over an untitled parcel

of land, denominated as Lot No. 1, with an area of 80,736 square meters. The property is

located along Km. 5 Asin Road, Baguio City and is part of a larger parcel of land with an

area of 186,090 square meters. While petitioners are the actual occupants of Lot No. 1,

respondent is claiming ownership thereof and is seeking to recover its possession from

petitioners.

According to respondent Margarita Semon Dong-E (Margarita), her familys ownership and occupation of Lot No. 1 can be traced as far back as 1922 to her late

grandfather, Ap-ap.[5]

Upon Ap-aps death, the property was inherited by his children, who obtained a survey plan in 1964 of the 186,090-square meter property, which

included Lot No. 1.[6]

On the same year, they declared the property for taxation purposes

in the name of The Heirs of Ap-ap.[7] The 1964 tax declaration bears a notation that reads: Reconstructed from an old Tax Declaration No. 363 dated May 10, 1922 per true of same presented.[8]

The heirs of Ap-ap then executed, for a P500.00 consideration, a Deed of

Quitclaim[9]

on February 26, 1964 in favor of their brother Gilbert Semon (Margaritas father).

Sometime between 1976 and 1978,[10]

Gilbert Semon together with his wife Mary

Lamsis, allowed his in-laws Manolo Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma, to stay on a

portion of Lot No. 1 together with their respective families.[11]

They were allowed to

erect their houses, introduce improvements, and plant trees thereon. When Manolo

Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma died sometime in the 1980s, their children, petitioners

Delfin Lamsis (Delfin) and Agustin Kitma (Agustin), took possession of certain portions

of Lot No. 1. Delfin possessed 4,000 square meters of Lot No. 1, while Agustin occupied

5,000 square meters thereof.[12]

Nevertheless, the heirs of Gilbert Semon tolerated the acts

of their first cousins.

When Gilbert Semon died in 1983,[13]

his children extrajudicially partitioned the

property among themselves and allotted Lot No. 1 thereof in favor of Margarita.[14]

Since

then, Margarita allegedly paid the realty tax over Lot No. 1[15]

and occupied and

improved the property together with her husband; while at the same time, tolerating her

first cousins occupation of portions of the same lot.

This state of affairs changed when petitioners Delfin and Agustin allegedly began

expanding their occupation on the subject property and selling portions thereof.[16]

Delfin

allegedly sold a 400-square meter portion of Lot No. 1 to petitioner

Maynard[17]

Mondiguing (Maynard) while Agustin sold another portion to petitioner Jose

Valdez (Jose).[18]

With such developments, Margarita filed a complaint[19]

for recovery of

ownership, possession, reconveyance and damages against all four occupants of Lot No.

1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City. The case was docketed as Civil

Case No. 4140-R and raffled to Branch 59. The complaint prayed for the annulment of

the sales to Maynard and Jose and for petitioners to vacate the portions of the property

which exceed the areas allowed to them by Margarita.[20]

Margarita claimed that, as they

are her first cousins, she is willing to donate to Delfin and Agustin a portion of Lot No. 1,

provided that she retains the power to choose such portion.[21]

Petitioners denied Margaritas claims of ownership and possession over Lot No. 1. According to Delfin and Agustin, Lot No. 1 is a public land claimed by the heirs of

Joaquin Smith (not parties to the case).[22]

The Smiths gave their permission for Delfin

and Agustins parents to occupy the land sometime in 1969 or 1970. They also presented their neighbors who testified that it was Delfin and Agustin as well as their respective

parents who occupied Lot No. 1, not Margarita and her parents.

Delfin and Agustin also assailed the muniments of ownership presented by

Margarita as fabricated, unauthenticated, and invalid. It was pointed out that the Deed of

Quitclaim, allegedly executed by all of Ap-aps children, failed to include two Rita Bocahan and Stewart Sito.

[23] Margarita admitted during trial that Rita Bocahan and

Stewart Sito were her uncle and aunt, but did not explain why they were excluded from

the quitclaim.

According to Maynard and Jose, Delfin and Agustin were the ones publicly and

openly in possession of the land and who introduced improvements thereon. They also

corroborated Delfin and Agustins allegation that the real owners of the property are the heirs of Joaquin Smith.

[24]

In order to debunk petitioners claim that the Smiths owned the subject property, Margarita presented a certified copy of a Resolution from the Land Management Office

denying the Smiths application for recognition of the subject property as part of their ancestral land.

[25] The resolution explains that the application had to be denied because

the Smiths did not possess, occupy or utilize all or a portion of the property x x x. The actual occupants (who were not named in the resolution) whose improvements are visible

are not in any way related to the applicant or his co-heirs.[26]

To bolster her claim of ownership and possession, Margarita introduced as

evidence an unnumbered resolution of the Community Special Task Force on Ancestral

Lands (CSTFAL) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),

acting favorably on her and her siblings ancestral land claim over a portion of the 186,090-square meter property.

[27] The said resolution states:

The land subject of the instant application is the ancestral land of the herein

applicants. Well-established is the fact that the land treated herein was first declared for

taxation purposes in 1922 under Tax Declaration No. 363 by the applicants grandfather Ap-Ap (one name). Said application was reconstructed in 1965 after the original got lost

during the war. These tax declarations were issued and recorded in the Municipality of

Tuba, Benguet, considering that the land was then within the territorial jurisdiction of the

said municipality. That upon the death of declarant Ap-Ap his heirs x x x transferred the

tax declaration in their name, [which tax declaration is] now with the City assessors office of Baguio.

The land consisting of four (4) lots with a total area of ONE HUNDRED

EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND NINETY (186,090) SQUARE METERS, is covered by

Psu-198317 duly approved by the Director of Lands on October 4, 1963 in the name of

Ap-Ap (one name). In 1964, the same land was the subject of a petition filed by Gilbert

Semon, as petitioner, before the Court of First Instance of the City of Baguio in the

reopening of Judicial Proceedings under Civil Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 for the

registration and the issuance of Certificate of Title of said land. The land registration case

was however overtaken by the decision of the Supreme Court declaring such judicial

proceedings null and void because the courts of law have no jurisdiction.

It has been sufficiently substantiated by the applicants that prior to and at the

time of the pendency of the land registration case and henceforth up to and including the

present, the herein applicants by themselves and through their predecessor-in-interest

have been in exclusive, continuous, and material possession and occupation of the said

parcel of land mentioned above under claim of ownership, devoting the same for

residential and agricultural purposes. Found are the residential houses of the applicants

as well as those of their close relatives, while the other areas planted to fruit trees, coffee

and banana, and seasonal crops. Also noticeable therein are permanent stone and earthen

fences, terraces, clearings, including irrigation gadgets.

On the matter of the applicant[s] indiguinity [sic] and qualifications, there is no doubt that they are members of the National Cultural Communities, particularly the Ibaloi

tribe. They are the legitimate grandchildren of Ap-Ap (one name) who lived along the

Asin Road area. His legal heirs are: Orani Ap-Ap, married to Calado Salda; Rita Ap-Ap,

married to Jose Bacacan; Sucdad Ap-Ap, married to Oragon Wakit; and Gilbert Semon,

a former vice-mayor of Tuba, Benguet, [who] adopted the common name of their father

Semon, as it is the customary practice among the early Ibalois. x x x

On the matter regarding the inheritance of the heirs of Ap-Ap, it is important to

state [that] Gilbert Semon consolidated ownership thereof and became the sole heir in

1964, by way of a Deed of Quitclaim executed by the heirs in his favor. As to the respective share of the applicants[] co-heirs, the same was properly adjudicated in 1989 with the execution of an Extrajudicial Settlement/ Partition of Estate with Waiver of Rights.

With regard to the overlapping issue, it is pertinent to state that application No.

Bg-L-066 of Thomas Smith has already been denied by us in our Resolution dated

November 1997. As to the other adverse claims therein by reason of previous

conveyances in favor of third parties, the same were likewise excluded resulting in the

reduction of the area originally applied from ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX

THOUSAND NINETY (186,090) SQUARE METERS, more or less to ONE

HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTY TWO (110,342)

SQUARE METERS, more or less. Considering the foregoing developments, we find no

legal and procedural obstacle in giving due course to the instant application.

Now therefore, we hereby [resolve] that the application for Recognition of

Ancestral Land Claim filed by the Heirs of Gilbert Semon, represented by Juanito

Semon, be granted [and] a Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim (CALC) be issued to the

herein applicants by the Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources,

Visayas Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City, through the Regional Executive Director,

DENR-CAR, Diego Silang Street, Baguio City. The area of the claim stated herein

above is however subject to the outcome of the final survey to be forthwith executed.

Carried this 23rd day of June 1998.[28]

The resolution was not signed by two members of the CSTFAL on the ground that the

signing of the unnumbered resolution was overtaken by the enactment of the Republic

Act (RA) No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA). The IPRA removed the authority of the DENR to issue ancestral land claim certificates and

transferred the same to the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).[29]

The

Ancestral Land Application No. Bg-L-064 of the Heirs of Gilbert Semon was transferred

to the NCIP, Cordillera Administrative Region, La Trinidad, Benguet and re-docketed as

Case No. 05-RHO-CAR-03.[30]

The petitioners filed their protest in the said case before

the NCIP. The same has been submitted for resolution.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court[31]

After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court found

that it preponderates in favor of respondents long-time possession of and claim of ownership over the subject property.

[32] The survey plan of the subject property in the

name of the Heirs of Ap-ap executed way back in 1962 and the tax declarations thereafter

issued to the respondent and her siblings all support her claim that her family and their

predecessors-in-interest have all been in possession of the property to the exclusion of

others. The court likewise gave credence to the documentary evidence of the transfer of

the land from the Heirs of Ap-ap to respondents father and, eventually to respondent herself. The series of transfers of the property were indications of the respondents and her predecessors interest over the property. The court opined that while these pieces of documentary evidence were not conclusive proof of actual possession, they lend

credence to respondents claim because, in the ordinary course of things, persons will not execute legal documents dealing with real property, unless they believe, and have the

basis to believe, that they have an interest in the property subject of the legal documents x

x x.[33]

In contrast, the trial court found nothing on record to substantiate the allegations of

the petititioners that they and their parents were the long-time possessors of the subject

property. Their own statements belied their assertions. Petitioner Maynard and Jose both

admitted that they could not secure title for the property from the Bureau of Lands

because there were pending ancestral land claims over the property.[34]

Petitioner

Agustins Townsite Sales Application over the property was held in abeyance because of respondents own claim, which was eventually favorably considered by the CSTFAL.[35]

The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

the [respondent] and against the [petitioners]

(1) Declaring the transfer of a portion of Lot 1 of PSU 198317 made by the

[petitioner] Delfin Lamsis to Menard Mondiguing and Jose Valdez, Jr. null and void;

(2) Ordering the [petitioners] Delfin Lamsis, Agustin Kitma, Menard

Mondiguing and Jose Valdez, Jr., to vacate the area they are presently occupying that is

within Lot 1 of PSU 198317 belonging to the [respondent] and to surrender possession

thereof to the [respondent];

(3) To pay [respondent] attorneys fees in the amount of P10,000.00; and

(4) To pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[36]

It appears that no motion for reconsideration was filed before the trial

court. Nevetheless, the trial court issued an Order[37]

allowing the petitioners Notice of Appeal.

[38]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals[39]

The sole issue resolved by the appellate court was whether the trial court erred in

ruling in favor of respondent in light of the adduced evidence. Citing the rule on

preponderance of evidence, the CA held that the respondent was able to discharge her

burden in proving her title and interest to the subject property. Her documentary

evidence were amply supported by the testimonial evidence of her witnesses.

In contrast, petitioners only made bare allegations in their testimonies that are

insufficient to overcome respondents documentary evidence.

Petitioners moved for a reconsideration[40]

of the adverse decision but the same

was denied.

Hence this petition, which was initially denied for failure to show that the CA

committed any reversible error.[41]

Upon petitioners motion for reconsideration,[42] the petition was reinstated in the Courts January 15, 2007 Resolution.[43]

Petitioners arguments

Petitioners assign as error the CAs appreciation of the evidence already affirmed and considered by the trial court. They maintain that the change in the presiding judges

who heard and decided their case resulted in the appreciation of what would otherwise be

inadmissible evidence.[44]

Petitioners ask that the Court exempt their petition from the

general rule that a trial judges assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded great respect on appeal.

To support their claim that the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling in favor of

respondent, they assailed the various pieces of evidence offered by respondent. They

maintain that the Deed of Quitclaim executed by the Heirs of Ap-ap is spurious and lacks

the parties and witnesses signatures. Moreover, it is a mere photocopy, which was never authenticated by the notary public in court and no reasons were proferred regarding

the existence, loss, and contents of the original copy.[45]

Under the best evidence rule, the

Deed of Quitclaim is inadmissible in evidence and should have been disregarded by the

court.

Respondent did not prove that she and her husband possessed the subject property

since time immemorial. Petitioners argue that respondent admitted possessing and

cultivating only the land that lies outside the subject property.[46]

Petitioners next assail the weight to be given to respondents muniments of ownership, such as the tax declarations and the survey plan. They insist that these are not

indubitable proofs of respondents ownership over the subject property given that there are other claimants to the land (who are not parties to this case) who also possess a survey

plan over the subject property.[47]

Petitioners then assert their superior right to the property as the present possessors

thereof. They cite pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code which presume good faith

possession on the part of the possessor and puts the burden on the plaintiff in an action to

recover to prove her superior title.[48]

Petitioners next assert that they have a right to the subject property by the

operation of acquisitive prescription. They posit that they have been in possession of a

public land publicly, peacefully, exclusively and in the concept of owners for more than

30 years. Respondents assertion that petitioners are merely possessors by tolerance is unsubstantiated.

[49]

Petitioners also maintain that the reivindicatory action should be dismissed for

lack of jurisdiction in light of the enactment of the IPRA, which gives original and

exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving ancestral lands and domains to the

NCIP.[50]

They assert that the customary laws of the Ibaloi tribe of the Benguet Province

should be applied to their dispute as mandated by Section 65, Chapter IX of RA 8371,

which states: When disputes involve ICCs/IPs,[51] customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve the dispute.

In the alternative that jurisdiction over an accion reivindicatoria is held to be

vested in the trial court, the petitioners insist that the courts should dismiss the

reivindicatory action on the ground of litis pendentia.[52]

They likewise argue that NCIP

has primary jurisdiction over ancestral lands, hence, the courts should not interfere when the dispute demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring special

knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal x x x In cases where

the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto

itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged

with an administrative body of special competence.[53] The courts should stand aside in order to prevent the possibility of creating conflicting decisions.

[54]

Respondents arguments

Respondent opines that the appellate court did not commit any reversible error in

affirming the trial courts decision. The present petition is a mere dilatory tactic to frustrate the speedy administration of justice.

[55]

Respondent also asserts that questions of fact are prohibited in a Rule 45

petition.[56]

Thus, the appreciation and consideration of the factual issues are no longer

reviewable.[57]

The issue of lack of jurisdiction is raised for the first time in the petition before this

Court. It was never raised before the trial court or the CA. Thus, respondent insists that

petitioners are now barred by laches from attacking the trial courts jurisdiction over the case. Citing Aragon v. Court of Appeals,

[58]respondent argues that the jurisdictional issue

should have been raised at the appellate level at the very least so as to avail of the

doctrine that the ground lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case may be

raised at any stage of the proceedings even on appeal.[59]

Respondent maintains that there is no room for the application of litis

pendentia because the issues in the application for ancestral land claim are different from

the issue in a reivindicatory action. The issue before the NCIP is whether the

Government, as grantor, will recognize the ancestral land claim of respondent over a

public alienable land; while the issue in the reivindicatory case before the trial court is

ownership, possession, and right to recover the real property.[60]

Given that the elements of lis pendens are absent in case at bar, the allegation of

forum-shopping is also bereft of merit. Any judgment to be rendered by the NCIP will

not amount to res judicata in the instant case.[61]

Issues

The petitioners present the following issues for our consideration:

1. Whether the appellate court disregarded material facts and circumstances in

affirming the trial courts decision;

2. Whether petitioners have acquired the subject property by prescription;

3. Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the case in light of the

effectivity of RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 at the time that the complaint was instituted;

4. If the trial court retains jurisdiction, whether the ancestral land claim pending

before the NCIP should take precedence over the reivindicatory action.[62]

Our Ruling

Whether the appellate court disregarded

material facts and circumstances in affirming

the trial courts decision

Both the trial and the appellate courts ruled that respondent has proven her claims

of ownership and possession with a preponderance of evidence. Petitioners now argue

that the two courts erred in their appreciation of the evidence. They ask the Court to

review the evidence of both parties, despite the CAs finding that the trial court committed no error in appreciating the evidence presented during trial. Hence,

petitioners seek a review of questions of fact, which is beyond the province of a Rule 45

petition. A question of fact exists if the uncertainty centers on the truth or falsity of the

alleged facts.[63]

Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether the

proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a

proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact.[64]

Since it raises essentially questions of fact, this assignment of error must be

dismissed for it is settled that only questions of law may be reviewed in an appeal

bycertiorari.[65]

There is a question of law when there is doubt as to what the law is on a

certain state of facts. Questions of law can be resolved without having to re-examine the

probative value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being

admitted.[66]

The instant case does not present a compelling reason to deviate from the

foregoing rule, especially since both trial and appellate courts agree that respondent had

proven her claim of ownership as against petitioners claims. Their factual findings, supported as they are by the evidence, should be accorded great respect.

In any case, even if petitioners arguments attacking the authenticity and admissibility of the Deed of Quitclaim executed in favor of respondents father are well-taken, it will not suffice to defeat respondents claim over the subject property. Even

without the Deed of Quitclaim, respondents claims of prior possession and ownership were adequately supported and corroborated by her other documentary and testimonial

evidence. We agree with the trial courts observation that, in the ordinary course of things, people will not go to great lengths to execute legal documents and pay realty taxes

over a real property, unless they have reason to believe that they have an interest over the

same.[67]

The fact that respondents documents traverse several decades, from the 1960s to the 1990s, is an indication that she and her family never abandoned their right to the

property and have continuously exercised rights of ownership over the same.

Moreover, respondents version of how the petitioners came to occupy the property coincides with the same timeline given by the petitioners themselves. The only

difference is that petitioners maintain they came into possession by tolerance of the Smith

family, while respondent maintains that it was her parents who gave permission to

petitioners. Given the context under which the parties respective statements were made, the Court is inclined to believe the respondents version, as both the trial and appellate courts have concluded, since her version is corroborated by the documentary evidence.

Whether petitioners have acquired the subject

property by prescription

Assuming that the subject land may be acquired by prescription, we cannot accept

petitioners claim of acquisition by prescription. Petitioners admitted that they had occupied the property by tolerance of the owner thereof. Having made this admission,

they cannot claim that they have acquired the property by prescription unless they can

prove acts of repudiation. It is settled that possession, in order to ripen into ownership,

must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Possession not in

the concept of owner, such as the one claimed by petitioners, cannot ripen into ownership

by acquisitive prescription, unless the juridical relation is first expressly repudiated and

such repudiation has been communicated to the other party. Acts of possessory character

executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of

acquisitive prescription. Possession by tolerance is not adverse and such possessory acts,

no matter how long performed, do not start the running of the period of prescription.[68]

In the instant case, petitioners made no effort to allege much less prove any act of

repudiation sufficient for the reckoning of the acquisitive prescription. At most, we can

find on record the sale by petitioners Delfin and Agustin of parts of the property to

petitioners Maynard and Jose; but the same was done only in 1998, shortly before

respondent filed a case against them. Hence, the 30-year period necessary for the

operation of acquisitve prescription had yet to be attained.

Whether the ancestral land claim pending

before the National Commission on Indigenous

Peoples (NCIP) should take precedence over

the reivindicatory action

The application for issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title pending

before the NCIP is akin to a registration proceeding. It also seeks an official recognition

of ones claim to a particular land and is also in rem. The titling of ancestral lands is for the purpose of officially establishing ones land as an ancestral land.[69] Just like a registration proceeding, the titling of ancestral lands does not vest ownership

[70] upon the

applicant but only recognizes ownership[71]

that has already vested in the applicant by

virtue of his and his predecessor-in-interests possession of the property since time immemorial. As aptly explained in another case:

It bears stressing at this point that ownership should not be confused with a certificate

of title. Registering land under the Torrens system does not create or vest

title because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is

merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described

therein. Corollarily, any question involving the issue of ownership must be threshed

out in a separate suit x x x The trial court will then conduct a full-blown trial wherein

the parties will present their respective evidence on the issue of ownership of the subject

properties to enable the court to resolve the said issue. x x x[72]

(Emphasis supplied)

Likewise apropos is the following explanation:

The fact that the [respondents] were able to secure [TCTs over the property] did not

operate to vest upon them ownership of the property. The Torrens system does not create

or vest title. It has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership x x x If the

[respondents] wished to assert their ownership, they should have filed a judicial

action for recovery of possession and not merely to have the land registered under their

respective names. x x x Certificates of title do not establish ownership.[73]

(Emphasis

supplied)

A registration proceeding is not a conclusive adjudication of ownership. In fact, if

it is later on found in another case (where the issue of ownership is squarely adjudicated)

that the registrant is not the owner of the property, the real owner can file a reconveyance

case and have the title transferred to his name.[74]

Given that a registration proceeding (such as the certification of ancestral lands) is

not a conclusive adjudication of ownership, it will not constitute litis pendentia on a

reivindicatory case where the issue is ownership.[75]

For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties,

or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of

rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c)

the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any

judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is

successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.[76] The third element is missing, for any judgment in the certification case would not constitute res judicata or be

conclusive on the ownership issue involved in the reivindicatory case. Since there is

no litis pendentia, there is no reason for the reivindicatory case to be suspended or

dismissed in favor of the certification case.

Moreover, since there is no litis pendentia, we cannot agree with petitioners contention that respondent committed forum-shopping. Settled is the rule that forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final

judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.[77]

Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to

decide the case in light of the effectivity of RA

8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 at the time that the complaint was

instituted

For the first time in the entire proceedings of this case, petitioners raise the trial

courts alleged lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter in light of the effectivity[78] of the IPRA at the time that the complaint was filed in 1998. They maintain that, under the

IPRA, it is the NCIP which has jurisdiction over land disputes involving indigenous

cultural communities and indigenous peoples.

As a rule, an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time

of the proceedings. This is because jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties or vested

by the agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is vested by law, which prevails at the time

of the filing of the complaint.

An exception to this rule has been carved by jurisprudence. In the seminal case

of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,[79]

the Court ruled that the existence of laches will prevent a

party from raising the courts lack of jurisdiction. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by

exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or

omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the

party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.[80] Wisely, some cases

[81] have cautioned against applying Tijam, except for the most exceptional cases

where the factual milieu is similar to Tijam.

In Tijam, the surety could have raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction in the trial

court but failed to do so. Instead, the surety participated in the proceedings and filed

pleadings, other than a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. When the case reached

the appellate court, the surety again participated in the case and filed their pleadings

therein. It was only after receiving the appellate courts adverse decision that the surety awoke from its slumber and filed a motion to dismiss, in lieu of a motion for

reconsideration. The CA certified the matter to this Court, which then ruled that the

surety was already barred by laches from raising the jurisdiction issue.

In case at bar, the application of the Tijam doctrine is called for because the

presence of laches cannot be ignored. If the surety in Tijam was barred by laches for

raising the issue of jurisdiction for the first time in the CA, what more for petitioners in

the instant case who raised the issue for the first time in their petition before this Court.

At the time that the complaint was first filed in 1998, the IPRA was already in

effect but the petitioners never raised the same as a ground for dismissal; instead they

filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the value of the property did not meet the

jurisdictional value for the RTC. They obviously neglected to take the IPRA into

consideration.

When the amended complaint was filed in 1998, the petitioners no longer raised

the issue of the trial courts lack of jurisdiction. Instead, they proceeded to trial, all the time aware of the existence of the IPRA as evidenced by the cross-

examination[82]

conducted by petitioners lawyer on the CSTFAL Chairman Guillermo Fianza. In the cross-examination, it was revealed that the petitioners were aware that the

DENR, through the CSTFAL, had lost its jurisdiction over ancestral land claims by virtue

of the enactment of the IPRA. They assailed the validity of the CSTFAL resolution

favoring respondent on the ground that the CSTFAL had been rendered functus

officio under the IPRA. Inexplicably, petitioners still did not question the trial courts jurisdiction.

When petitioners recoursed to the appellate court, they only raised as errors the

trial courts appreciation of the evidence and the conclusions that it derived therefrom. In their brief, they once again assailed the CSTFALs resolution as having been rendered functus officio by the enactment of IPRA.

[83] But nowhere did petitioners assail

the trial courts ruling for having been rendered without jurisdiction. It is only before this Court, eight years after the filing of the complaint, after the

trial court had already conducted a full-blown trial and rendered a decision on the merits,

after the appellate court had made a thorough review of the records, and after petitioners

have twice encountered adverse decisions from the trial and the appellate courts that petitioners now want to expunge all the efforts that have gone into the litigation and

resolution of their case and start all over again. This practice cannot be allowed.

Thus, even assuming arguendo that petitioners theory about the effect of IPRA is correct (a matter which need not be decided here), they are already barred by laches from

raising their jurisdictional objection under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is denied for lack of

merit. The March 30, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78987

and its May 26, 2006 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration

are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case

was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

[1] Rollo, pp. 11-24. [2] CA rollo, pp. 124-133; penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De los Santos and concurred in by Associate

Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Arturo G. Tayag. [3] Id. at 153. [4] CA Decision, p. 10; id. at 133. [5] Records, p. 100. [6] Id. at 276. [7] Id. at 277. [8] Exhibit B-1; id. at the back of p. 277. [9] Id. at 100 and 297. [10] Id. at 101. [11]

Id. [12] Id. at 102-103. [13] Id. at 99. [14] Id. at 102 and 300-301. [15] There were two tax receipts in the name of Margarita Semon available in the records. One is dated 12-20-

1990 (id. at 293), while the other is dated 4-22-1991 (id. at 292).

[16] Id. at 103-104. [17] Sometimes spelled as Menard in some parts of the records. [18] Records, p. 105. [19]

Id. at 99-109. Upon petitioners motion (id. at 62-64), the original complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction since the value of the property (at P500 and improvements valued at P200) did not meet the

jurisdictional amounts for the RTC (Order dated February 3, 1999; id. at 69-70). The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and to admit the amended complaint (id. at 71-87), which motion was granted by the trial

court (id. at 98). [20] Id. at 107-108. [21] Id. at 103. [22] TSN Folder, pp. 116-117 and 140. [23] Records, pp. 142-146. [24] Id. at 138-141. [25] Id. at 309-310. [26] Id. at 309. [27] The Heirs of Ap-ap applied for a certificate of ancestral land claim over the 186,090 square meters but the

CSTFAL approved their claim over 110,342 square meters only (id. at 505). [28] Id. at 504-506. [29] Testimony of Guillermo S. Fianza (Chairman of CSTFAL), p. 263; testimony of Alfonso P. Aroco (Member

of the CSTFAL), pp. 297-306. [30] In the Matter of Application for Recognition of Ancestral Land Claim over a Parcel of Land Located at Res.

Sec. L Km. 5, Asin Road, Baguio City: Heirs of Gilbert Semon, represented by Juanito Semon, applicant, Delfin Lamsis, et al. Protestants, Peter Sito, Protestant-Intervenor (rollo, pp. 169-173).

[31] Records, pp. 644-653. Penned by Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes. [32] Decision, p. 5; id. at 648. [33] Id. at 6; id. at 649. [34] Id. at 6-7; id. at 650-651. [35] Id. at 9-10; id. at 652-653. [36] Id. at 10; id. at 653. [37] Records, p. 656. [38] Id. at 655. [39] CA rollo, pp. 124-133. [40] Id. at 134-144. [41] Resolution dated August 23, 2006 (rollo, p. 153). [42] Id. at 159-167. [43] Id. at 179. [44] Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 18-19; id. at 233-234. [45] Id. at 19-20; id. at 234-235. [46] Id. at 27; id. at 242. [47] Id. at 27-30; id. at 242- 245. [48] Id. at 34-35; id. at 249-250. [49] Id. at 38-41; id. at 253-356. [50] Id. at 14; id. at 229. [51] Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. [52] Petitioners Memorandum, p. 14; rollo, p. 229. [53] Id. at 15; id. at 230. [54] Id. at 17; id. at 232. [55] Respondents Memorandum, p. 8; id. at 205. [56] Id. at 8; id. at 205. [57] Id. at 11-12; id. at 208-209. [58] 337 Phil. 289 (1997). [59] Respondents Memorandum, p. 9; rollo, p. 206. [60] Id. at 10-11; id. at 207-208. [61] Id. at 13; id. at 210. [62] Petitioners Memorandum, p. 10; id. at 225. [63] New Regent Sources, Inc. v. Tanjuatco, Jr., G.R. No. 168800, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 329, 335.

[64] Paterno v. Paterno, G.R. No. 63680, March 23, 1990, 183 SCRA 630, 636. [65] Heirs of Clemente Ermac v. Heirs of Vicente Ermac, 451 Phil. 368, 377 (2003). [66] New Regent Sources, Inc. v. Tanjuatco, Jr., supra. [67]

Decision, p. 6; records, p. 649. [68] Esguerra v. Manantan, G.R. No. 158328, February 23, 2007, 516 SCRA 561, 572-573. [69] Section 7 (c), Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as The

Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997. [70] Heirs of Clemente Ermac v. Heirs of Vicente Ermac, supra note 64 at 377; Amoroso v. Alegre, Jr., G.R. No.

142766, June 15, 2007, 524 SCRA 641, 653-655; Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 387

Phil. 283, 295 (2000); Heirs of De Guzman Tuazon v. Court of Appeals, 465 Phil. 114, 126 (2004); Heirs of

Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 652, 660-661 (1998). [71] Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 107, 118 (1999); Spouses Rosario v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil 729, 748

(1999); Heirs of De Guzman Tuazon v. Court of Appeals, supra. [72] Heirs of De Guzman Tuazon v. Court of Appeals, supra note 70 at 126-127. [73] Heirs of Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, supra note 70. [74] The Land Registration Act as well as the Cadastral Act protects only the holders of a title in good faith and

does not permit its provisions to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or that one should enrich

himself at the expense of another. The above-stated Acts do not give anybody, who resorts to the provisions thereof, a better title than he really and lawfully has. If he happened to obtain it by mistake or to secure, to the

prejudice of his neighbor, more land than he really owns, with or without bad faith on his part, the certificate of

title, which may have been issued to him under the circumstances, may and should be cancelled or

corrected. Angeles v. Samia, 66 Phil. 444, 449 (1938). Citations omitted. The Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA Law likewise provides for cancellation of illegally

acquired titles and reconveyance to the rightful ICCs/IPs (Section 9, Part I, Rule VIII). [75] An accion de reivindicatoria x x x is a suit to recover possession of a parcel of land as an element of

ownership. It is an action whereby the plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of

its full possession. The judgment in such a case determines the ownership of the property and the awards the

possession of the property to the lawful owner. Amoroso v. Alegre, Jr., supra note 70 at 653. [76] City of Caloocan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145004, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 45, 55-56. [77] Development Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses Gatal, 493 Phil. 46, 53 (2005). [78] Effective November 22, 1997. [79] 131 Phil. 556 (1968). [80] Id. at 563. [81] Figueroa v. People, G.R. No. 147406, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 63; Calimlim v. Ramirez, 204 Phil. 25 (1982). [82] TSN Records, pp. 234-286. [83] Appellants Brief, p. 17; CA rollo, p. 63.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-67583 July 31, 1987

BASILISA S. ESCONDE, petitioner, vs. HON. SAMILO N. BARLONGAY and RAMON V. DELFIN, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the April 16, 1984 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Bulacan, Branch CLXXII, dismissing petitioner's complaint.

The facts admitted by the parties are the following:

Private respondent Ramon V. Delfin is the applicant in the "Application for Registration of Title" dated April 14, 1969, docketed as LRC Case No. 710-V at the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, Valenzuela, Metro Manila (now RTC, NCJR, Branch 171, Valenzuela). The land subject of the Application, Reconveyance and the present petition is one and the same parcel of land containing an area of 2,273 sq. m. The application was granted in a "Decision" dated December 8, 1969, and private respondent received copy thereof on the same date. Said parcel of land is now covered by OCT No.-05002 issued on January 23, 1971 by the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. On February 13, 1978 said private respondent Ramon V. Delfin as applicant in the LRC Case filed his "Petition for Writ of Possession" against the spouses Francisco and Basilisa Esconde (Brief for Petitioner, pp. 6-7, Rollo, p. 120).

On March 6, 1978, Judge Crispin V. Bautista issued an Order denying for lack of merit the opposition filed by the Esconde spouses to the petition for Writ of Possession.

On September 26, 1978, Judge Avelino M. Constantino, who took over the same branch presided over by Judge Bautista, issued an Order for a writ of possession against the said spouses.

Petitioner filed with the same court a Petition to quash the Writ of Possession to which an Opposition was filed by the private respondent (Comment, Rollo, pp. 88-90).

On October 6, 1978, herein petitioner filed with the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan, 5th Judicial District, Branch VIII (now RTC, NCJR, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Bulacan) a complaint for reconveyance, against the herein private respondent, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 721-V-78 (Record, pp. 24-28).

On October 14, 1978, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint with prayer for stay of execution of judgment in LRC Case No. V-710 (Ibid., p. 29-33).

Private respondent, in a Motion to Dismiss dated December 26, 1978, moved for the dismissal of the case on the grounds, among others, that (1) the cause of action, if any, is barred by res judicata; (2) the complaint fails to state sufficient cause or causes of action for reconveyance; and (3) the plaintiff is barred by prescription or laches from filing the case (Ibid, pp. 34-39).

On January 15, 1979, petitioner filed a Rejoinder to Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Leave of Court to Amend Complaint to Include Plaintiff's Husband as Party-Plaintiff (Ibid, pp, 40-44). On the same date, the Amended Complaint was filed (Ibid, pp. 45-50).

Private respondent filed a Reply to Rejoinder (Opposition) to Motion to dismiss with Opposition to the Motion For Leave of Court to Amend Complaint, dated January 18, 1979 (Ibid, pp. 51-54).

On June 5, 1979, Judge Constantino denied Petition to Quash Writ of Possession (Rollo, p. 108). The Sheriff then delivered possession to the private respondent, but then petitioner re-entered the premises and took possession thereof, hence private respondent filed a Motion for an Alias Writ of Possession on March 2, 1983.

On March 4, 1983, an order directed the issuance of an alias writ of possession.

On March 29, 1983, the Sheriff turned over possession of the premises to the representative of the private respondent. This notwithstanding, when private respondent went to the premises, he was barred by the petitioner from entering the property. Consequently, private respondent asked for a writ of demolition for the removal of any construction of the Esconde family on the premises and to cite petitioner Basilisa Esconde for contempt of court.

On November 17, 1983, private respondent moved for a second alias writ of possession in view of the failure of the petitioner to turn over possession of the premises to private respondent and the same was granted in the Order of November 21, 1983.

Petitioner then filed with Judge Avelino M. Constantino of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan a Motion to Quash and/or to Hold in Abeyance Execution of Second Alias Writ of Possession on the ground that they have filed a civil action for reconveyance.

On February 1, 1984, petitioner filed a Motion to Expedite Resolution of Pending Incidents and Motion For Issuance of Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction (Ibid, pp. 5759).

On February 13, 1984, private respondent filed a Manifestation With Opposition to Motion for Issuance of Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction (Ibid, pp. 60-62).

Respondent Judge, in an Order dated April 16, 1984 (Ibid, pp. 63-64), dismissed the complaint for reconveyance on the grounds: (1) that plaintiff's cause of action is barred by res judicata and (2) that the Motion to Admit Amended Complaint and for Issuance of Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction is not proper as it seeks to enjoin the enforcement of a writ of possession issued by another branch of this Court which is not allowed. Hence, the instant petition (Ibid, pp. 10-23).

The Second Division, in a Resolution dated August 29, 1984, resolved to require the respondents to comment (Ibid, p. 75).

On October 20, 1984, respondents, in compliance with the above-mentioned Resolution, filed their Comment (Ibid, pp. 87-101).

In a Resolution dated December 3, 1984, the Second Division resolved to give due course to the petition; and to consider respondents' comment to the petition as an answer (Ibid, p. 110).

In a letter dated January 21, 1985, counsel for the petitioner was required to file petitioner's brief (Ibid, p. 112). In compliance therewith, said brief was filed on March 23, 1985 (Ibid., p. 120).

On April 1, 1985, petitioner filed a Motion to Include Additional Party-Respondent and Motion for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction, praying, among others, that the Sheriff be included as additional party-respondent (Ibid, pp. 122-126).

The Second Division, in a Resolution dated April 17, 1985, resolved to require the respondents to comment on the motion by counsel for the petitioner to include an additional party-respondent and the motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction (Ibid., p. 141).

On May 7, 1985, respondents filed their Opposition to Motion to Include Additional Party-Respondent and Motion for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction (Ibid., pp. 142-146).

On June 21, 1985, Brief for the Respondents was filed (Ibid, p. 148).

The Second Division, in a Resolution dated November 11, 1985, resolved to consider the case submitted for deliberation (Ibid., p. 158).

On November 26, 1985, petitioner filed a Motion for Immediate Resolution of her motion of April 1, 1985-motion to include the Sheriff as party-respondent and for the issuance of a preliminary injunction (Ibid., pp. 159-162). This motion of petitioner, in a Resolution dated December 11, 1985, was noted by said Division (Ibid., p. 165).

On February 1, 1986, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion, praying, among others, for the inclusion of the Sheriff as party-respondent, and thereafter, for an injunction directing the Sheriff to restore the peaceful possession of the land to petitioner (Ibid., pp. 166-171).

The Second Division, in a Resolution dated February 17, 1986, resolved to issue a temporary restraining order directing the Sheriff and private respondent to refrain from enforcing and/or carrying out the Third Alias Writ of Possession (Ibid, p. 176).

On March 4, 1986, petitioner filed a Motion to Amend Resolution and Temporary Restraining. Order both dated February 17, 1986, either nullifying the Third Alias Writ of Possession served or in the alternative to issue a mandatory injunction (Ibid, pp. 179-183). This motion was denied by the Division in a Resolution dated May 21, 1986 (Ibid, p. 185).

The issues in this case are

1. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA; and

2. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER'S MOTION TO ADMIT AMENDED COMPLAINT AND FOR ISSUANCE OF RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS PROPER.

The petition is devoid of merit.

Land registration proceedings in this case commenced on April 14, 1969 and decision thereon was rendered on December 8, 1969. Hence, the law in force at the time was Act 496, P.D. 1529 (otherwise known as Property Registration Decree) having taken effect only on Jan. 23, 1979.1 The pertinent provisions of said Act 496 read:

SEC. 34. Any person claiming an interest, whether named in the notice or not, may appear and file an answer on or before the return day or within such further time as may be allowed by the court. The answer shall state all the objections to the application, and shall set forth the interest claimed by the party filing the same and apply for the remedy desired, and shall be signed and sworn to by him or by some person in his behalf. (As amended by Sec. 1, Act No. 3621).

SEC. 35. If no person appears and answers within the time allowed, the court may at once upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default to be recorded and the application to be taken for confessed. By the description in the notice, "To all whom it may concern," an the world are made parties defendant and shall be concluded by the default and order. After such default and order, the court may enter a decree confirming the title of the applicant and ordering registration of the same. (As amended by Sec. 8, Act No. 1699).

On the other hand, under Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, the effect of such order is as follows:

SEC. 2. Effect of order of default. Except as provided in section 9 of Rule 13, a party declared in default shall not be entitled to notice or subsequent proceedings, nor to take part in the trial.

Petitioner's claim that she came to know of the land registration case only upon receipt of a Petition for Writ of Possession is completely rebutted by private respondent's evidence. In the notice of Initial Hearing (Rollo, p. 148-a) she is one of those cited to appear; in the Survey Notification Letter (Rollo, p. 148-c) her husband was notified of the scheduled survey of the land as indicated by his signature opposite his name and in the Surveyor's Certificate (Rollo, p. 148-b) her husband was reported one of the adjoining owners present. There is no question that notice to her husband is notice to her under the law, her husband being the administrator of the conjugal partnership (Art. 165,

Civil Code). Otherwise stated, there was no concealment on the part of private respondent. In fact, the records show that private respondent stated in his application for registration of title that a portion of the land was being occupied by petitioner sometime in September 1967, by breaking the stone wall fence without his knowledge and consent (Application for Registration of Title; Rollo, p. 102). However, petitioner and her husband, despite the chance given them to be heard in the land registration proceedings, opted not to appear.

Thus, as aptly stated by respondent Judge, "A land registration proceedings which is in rem, is valid and conclusive against the whole world. The failure of the plaintiff and her husband, despite the notice of the publication and posting by the sheriff of the notice of hearing, to oppose the defendant's application for registration will bar her from filing this action." (Order, dated April 16, 1984; Civil Case No. 721-V-78; Rollo, p. 64).

Under Section 38 of Act 496 ... Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto ... . It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice or citation or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern." That under said section, this decree became conclusive after one year from the date of the entry, is not disputed (Severino v. Severino, 44 Phil. 354 [1923]). On the contrary, this Court has invariably ruled that "Land Registration is a proceeding in rem, and binds all persons known and unknown." (Moscoso v. C.A., 128 SCRA 70 [1984]). It is a settled doctrine that when a decree of registration has been obtained by fraud, the party defrauded has only one year from entry of the decree to file a petition for review before a competent court, provided that the land has not been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value. Said Section 38 categorically declares that "upon the expiration of the said term of one (1) year, every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible (Albienda v. C.A., 135 SCRA 406-407 [1985]).

Hence, it was established that when no answer in writing nor any opposition is made to an application for registration of property in Court, all the allegations contained in the application shall be held as confessed by reason of the absence of denial on the part of the opponent. A person who has not challenged an application for registration of land even if the appeal afterwards interposed is based on the right of dominion over the same land, cannot allege damage or error against the judgment ordering the registration inasmuch as he did not allege or pretend to have any right to such land (Cabanas v. Director of Lands, 10 Phil. 393).

In the same manner, it has been held that a claimant having failed to present his answer or objection to the registration of a parcel of land under the Torrens System or to question the validity of such registration within a period of one year after the certificate of title had been issued, had forever lost his right in said land even granting that he had any right therein (De los Reyes v. Paterno, 34 Phil. 420).

However, an action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another for the purpose of compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the land to him (Bilog, "Remedies Available to Aggrieved Parties As a Consequence of Registration Under the Torrens System"; Property Registration 1979; pp. 122-123). The prevailing rule in this jurisdiction does not bar a landowner whose property was wrongfully or erroneously registered under the Torrens System from bringing an action, after one year from the issuance of the decree, for the reconveyance of the property in question. Such an action does not aim or purport to re-open the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration, but only to show that the person who secured the registration of the questioned property is not the real owner thereof (Rodriguez v. Toreno, 79 SCRA 357 [1977]). An ordinary civil action for reconveyance does not seek to set aside the decree but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks to transfer or reconvey the land from the registered owner to the rightful owner (Director of Lands, et al. v. Register of Deeds, et al., 92 Phil. 827 [1953]). lawph!l

Under the circumstances in the case at bar, it is apparent that reconveyance is not the proper remedy. As earlier stated, there was no proof of irregularity in the issuance of title, nor in the proceedings incident thereto, nor was it established that fraud had indeed intervened in the issuance of said title, and the period of one year within which intrinsic fraud could be claimed had long expired. Under similar conditions, the Court ruled that the land should be adjudicated to the registered owner (Paterno, et al. v. Salud, 118 Phil. 933-934 [1963]). Even more implicitly this Court held in Rural Bank of Paranaque, Inc. v. Remolado (135 SCRA 412 [1985]) that: "Justice is done according to law. As a rule, equity follows the law. There may be a moral obligation, often regarded as an equitable consideration (meaning compassion), but if there is no enforceable legal duty, the action must fail although the disadvantaged party deserves commiseration or sympathy."

Moreover, petitioner's action for reconveyance had already prescribed. An action for reconveyance of real property on the ground of fraud must be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to

have taken place from the issuance of an original certificate of title (Balbin v. Medalla, 108 SCRA 666; and Alarcon v. Bidin, 120 SCRA 390).

The first issue being without merit and the second issue being a mere incident thereto, there appears to be no necessity to discuss the latter.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Bulacan is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 83432 May 20, 1991

RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY, petitioner, vs. MANUELITO S. PALILEO, respondent.

Rolando A. Calang for petitioner.

Sisenando Villaluz, Sr. for respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:p

If the same piece of land was sold to two different purchasers, to whom shall ownership belong? Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides that in case of double sale of an immovable property, ownership shall be transferred: (1) to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property; (2) in default thereof, to the person who in good faith was first in possession; and (3) in default thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith. There is no ambiguity regarding the application of the law with respect to lands registered under the Torrens System. Section 51 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (amending Section 50 of Act No. 496 clearly provides that the act of registration is the operative act to convey or affect registered lands insofar as third persons are concerned. Thus, a person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or certificate of title. 1 Following this principle, this Court has time and again held that a purchaser in good faith of registered land (covered by a Torrens Title) acquires a good title as against all the transferees thereof whose right is not recorded in the registry of deeds at the time of the sale. 2

The question that has to be resolved in the instant petition is whether or not the rule provided in Article 1544 of the Civil Code as discussed above, is applicable to a parcel of unregistered land purchased at a judicial sale. To be more specific, this Court is asked to determine who, as between two buyers of unregistered land, is the rightful ownerthe first buyer in a prior sale that was unrecorded, or the second buyer who purchased the land in an execution sale whose transfer was registered in the Register of Deeds.

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

On April 13, 1970, defendant spouses Enrique Castro and Herminia R. Castro sold to plaintiff-appellee Manuelito Palileo (private respondent herein), a parcel of unregistered coconut land situated in Candiis, Mansayaw, Mainit, Surigao del Norte. The sale is evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. "E"). The deed was not registered in the Registry of Property for unregistered lands in the province of Surigao del Norte. Since the execution of the deed of sale, appellee Manuelito Palileo who was then employed at Lianga Surigao del Sur, exercised acts of ownership over the land through his mother Rafaela Palileo, as administratrix or overseer. Appellee has continuously paid the real estate taxes on said land from 1971 until the present (Exhs. "C" to "C-7", inclusive).

On November 29, 1976, a judgment was rendered against defendant Enrique T. Castro, in Civil Case No. 0103145 by the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIX, to pay herein defendant-appellant Radiowealth Finance Company (petitioner herein), the sum of P22,350.35 with interest thereon at the rate of 16% per annum from November 2,

1975 until fully paid, and the further sum of P2,235.03 as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs. Upon the finality of the judgment, a writ of execution was issued. Pursuant to said writ, defendant provincial Sheriff Marietta E. Eviota, through defendant Deputy Provincial Sheriff Leopoldo Risma, levied upon and finally sold at public auction the subject land that defendant Enrique Castro had sold to appellee Manuelito Palileo on April 13,1970. A certificate of sale was executed by the Provincial Sheriff in favor of defendant- appellant Radiowealth Finance Company, being the only bidder. After the period of redemption has (sic) expired, a deed of final sale was also executed by the same Provincial Sheriff. Both the certificate of sale and the deed of final sale were registered with the Registry of Deeds. 3

Learning of what happened to the land, private respondent Manuelito Palileo filed an action for quieting of title over the same. After a trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision in his favor. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

In its petition, Radiowealth Finance Company presents the following errors:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE (EXHIBIT B) ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED BY ENRIQUE CASTRO IN FAVOR OF APPELLEE MANUELITO PALILEO, WAS SIMULATED OR FICTITIOUS.

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING APPELLEE MANUELITO PALILEO AS ADMINISTRATOR ONLY OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY; AND

3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY OWNER OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY BY REASON OF THE CERTIFICATE OF SALE AND THE DEED OF FINAL SALE WHICH WERE ALL REGISTERED IN THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, HENCE, SUPERIOR TO THAT OF THE DEED OF SALE IN POSSESSION OF MANUELITO PALILEO, FOR BEING NOT REGISTERED. 4

As regards the first and second assigned errors, suffice it to state that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on this Court and will not be disturbed unless there is grave abuse of discretion. The finding of the Court of Appeals that the property in question was already sold to private respondent by its previous owner before the execution sale is evidenced by a deed of sale. Said deed of sale is notarized and is presumed authentic. There is no substantive proof to support petitioner's allegation that the document is fictitious or simulated. With this in mind, We see no reason to reject the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that private respondent was not a mere administrator of the property. That he exercised acts of ownership through his mother also remains undisputed.

Going now to the third assigned error which deals with the main issue presented in the instant petition, We observe that the Court of Appeals resolved the same in favor of private respondent due to the following reason; what the Provincial Sheriff levied upon and sold to petitioner is a parcel of land that does not belong to Enrique Castro, the judgment debtor, hence the execution is contrary to the directive contained in the writ of execution which commanded that the lands and buildings belonging to Enrique Castro be sold to satisfy the execution. 5

There is no doubt that had the property in question been a registered land, this case would have been decided in favor of petitioner since it was petitioner that had its claim first recorded in the Registry of Deeds. For, as already mentioned earlier, it is the act of registration that operates to convey and affect registered land. Therefore, a bona fide purchaser of a registered land at an execution sale acquires a good title as against a prior transferee, if such transfer was unrecorded.

However, it must be stressed that this case deals with a parcel of unregistered land and a different set of rules applies. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is "without prejudice to a third party with a better right". The aforequoted phrase has been held by this Court to mean that the mere registration of a sale in

one's favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having previously sold the same to somebody else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded.

The case of Carumba vs. Court of Appeals 6 is a case in point. It was held therein that Article 1544 of the Civil Code has no application to land not registered under Act No. 496. Like in the case at bar, Carumba dealt with a double sale of the same unregistered land. The first sale was made by the original owners and was unrecorded while the second was an execution sale that resulted from a complaint for a sum of money filed against the said original owners.

Applying Section 35, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, 7 this Court held that Article 1544 of the Civil Code cannot be invoked to benefit the purchaser at the execution sale though the latter was a buyer in good faith and even if this second sale was registered. It was explained that this is because the purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriffs execution sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and merely acquires the latter's interest in the property sold as of the time the property was levied upon.

Applying this principle, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the execution sale of the unregistered land in favor of petitioner is of no effect because the land no longer belonged to the judgment debtor as of the time of the said execution sale.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 10788 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.