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Housing Compensation& Disaster Preparedness

in the Aftermath of the July 2006 War in South Lebanon

Sultan Barakat & Steven A. Zyckwith Jenny E. Hunt

BEIRUT,DECEMBER2008


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Housing Compensation

& Disaster Preparednessin the Aftermath of the July 2006 War in South Lebanon

Sultan Barakat & Steven A. Zyckwith Jenny E. Hunt

BEIRUT,DECEMBER2008


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Tableof Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS V

ABOUT THE AUTHORS VII

ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS IX

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY XI

A. INTRODUCTION 1

A1. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 3

A2. CONTEXTUAL OVERVIEW 5

A2.1 Conflict in Lebanon 5

A2.2 The July War 6

A2.3 Socio-Economic Conditions 7

A2.4 Disasters 8

A3. METHODOLOGY 11

A3.1 Sampling 12

A3.2 Methodological Discussion 13

B. HOUSING COMPENSATION 15

B1. PROCESS OF HOUSING COMPENSATION 17

B1.1 Assessing Individual Needs 17

B1.2 Actors and Amounts 20

B1.3 Financing Compensation 23

B1.4 Household-Level Compensation 24

B1.5 Achievements and Progress 26

B1.6 Assistance Owed & Delays 28

B1.7 Beneficiary Satisfaction 28

B1.8 Section Conclusion 30

B2. IMPACT OF HOUSING COMPENSATION 31

B2.1 Socio-Economic Dimensions of Damage and Compensation 31

B2.2 Implications for Female Headed Households 35

B2.3 Socio-Cultural Implications of Housing Compensation 37

B2.4 Reputational Implications of Hous ing Compensation 38

B2.5 Section Conclusion 42


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B3. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HOUSING COMPENSATION 43

B3.1 For the Ongoing Compensation Process 43

B3.2 For Future Compensation Processes 45

C. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS & STRUCTURAL MITIGATION 49

C1. THE NEED FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 51

C1.1 Linking Housing Compensation and Emergency Preparedness 51

C1.2 Other Weaknesses 52

C2. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLANNING 57

C2.1 Levels of Intervention 57

C2.2 Culture of Preparedness 59C2.3 Awareness Raising 60

C2.4 Municipal Emergency Preparedness Planning 62

C2.5 Content of the Plan 63

C2.6 Safe Havens 68

C3. STRUCTURAL MITIGATION 69

C3.1 Purpose of St ructural Mitigation 69

C3.2 Structural Mitigation Measures 69

C3.3 Interior Mitigation 74

C3.4 Interior Reinforcement 76C3.5 Challenges 77

C3.6 Implementation 78

D1. CONCLUSION & PILOT PROPOSAL 81

D1.1 Piloting of EPP and Structural Mitigation 82

BIBLIOGRAPHY 85

APPENDIX A. KEY STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTED 87APPENDIX B. COMMUNITIES STUDIED 91

APPENDIX C. CASE STUDY QLEILEH 93


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Acknowledgements

This study emerges from the foresight and initiative of the Norwegian Refugee Council

(NRC), w hich acted both as a sponsor of this study as well as a partner in its conduct. T he

constant oversight and involvement of Mr Wassim Shmayssani, the National Shelter

Project Coordinator at NRC, and Mr Richard Evans, Project Manager, should, in

particular, be recognised. I am also particularly grateful for the professionalism and

dedication of NRCs field team which collected the vast majority of the data for this

study, particularly Fatma Chehadeh and Sokaina Sadek. Funding for this study ultimately

comes from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affai rs (MFA). This support is g reatly

appreciated, though the findings of this report reflect only those of the authors.

Furthermore, we would like to thank the many international and local leaders and

practitioners who took the time to meet and share their insights with the research team.

The Government of the Lebanese Republic was particularly engaged, as were non-state

actors such as Jihad al Binaa. In particular, we would like to thank the High Commission

for Relief, the Council of the South, the Union of Municipalities of Tyre, and

representatives of the Civil Defence, Lebanese Armed Forces, the Kuwait Fund for Arab

Economic Development and others for their contributions to this report. A full list of

those individuals and institutions which provided input for this report can be found in

Appendix A.

Finally, we would like to thank the more than 500 community members throughout

southern Lebanon who allowed the researchers from NRC and the PRDU into their

homes and shared information regarding damage they experienced and the assistance

they received. Their input forms the core of this report, and I hope the findings will be

used to better address their needs and interests.

Professor Sultan Barakat, Team Leader

Post-war Reconstruction & Development Unit

University of York, UK


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About the Authors

the Authors

PROFESSOR SULTAN BARAKAT,Team Leader & Primary Investigator

The Founding Director of the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU) a t

the University of York, Professor Barakat has conducted research and advised

governments and international organisations in more than thirty post-conflict and

conflict-affected countries. He serves as a Senior Adviser to more than a dozen major

international organisations, including the World Bank, the United Nations, the UKs

Department for International Development and Stab ilisat ion Unit, CARE Interna tional

and the Interna tional Organisation for Migration. Professor Barakat works extensively in

the Middle East and was one of the primary investigators in the creation, in 1999, of the

Regional Socio-Economic Development Programme for Southern Lebanon. He has

undertaken research pertaining to housing reconstruction a nd disaster preparedness in

the region. He is the author of Housing Reconstruction After Conflict and Disaster, a

publication produced for the Overseas Development Institutes Humanitarian Policy

Network.

MR STEVEN A.ZYCK,Co-Primary Investigator

Mr Zyck is a Research Fellow at the University of Yorks PRDU, where he specialises in

conflict analysis, post-conflict stabilisation, social development and private sector

development. A Fulbright Scholar, he has worked for governments, think tanks, NGOs

and universities in the United States, United Kingdom, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the

Pacific Islands, Afghanistan and Central Asia.

MS JENNY HUNT,Analyst

A Researcher at the University of Yorks PRDU, Ms Hunt is a specialist in post-conflict

recovery with dual focuses upon decision-making process and policy implementation. In

particular, she is interested in the effects of community relations with the government

and the dynamics of power between the government and non-state entities. Recently

her research has concentrated on the reconstruction of Beiruts southern suburbs

following the July 2006 War.


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Acronyms & Abbreviations

& Abbreviations

ACTED - Agency for Technical Cooperation & Development

CoS - Council of the South

DMTF - Disaster Mitigation Taskforce

DRM - Disaster Risk Mitigation

DRR - Disaster Risk Reduction

ECHO - European Commission Humanita rian Aid OfficeEPC - Emergency Preparedness Committee

EPP - Emergency Preparedness Planning

FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency

FHH - Female Headed Household

GIS - Geographic Information System

GoLR - Government of the Lebanese Republic

ICS - Incident Command System

ILO - International Labour Organisation

IMC - International Medical Corps

JaB - Jihad al Binaa

KSA - Kingdom of Saudi A rabia

LAF - Lebanese Armed Fo rces

MENA - Middle East and North Africa

MFA - Ministry of Foreign Affai rs (Norway)

NGO - Non-governmental organisation

NRC - Norwegian Refugee Council

NSE - Non-State Entity

PLO - Palestinian Liberation Organisation

PRDU - Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit

RTO - Regional Technical Office

UAE - United Arab Em irates

UNDP - United Nations Development Programme

UN-HABITAT - United Nations Human Settlements Prog ramme

UNIFIL - United Nations In terim Force in Lebanon

UNRWA - United Nations Relief and Works Agency

USAID - United States Agency for International Development

WANA - West Asia and North Africa


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Executive Summary

Summary

This report emerges from the initiative of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and was

produced by the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU) at the

University of York. Having noted the dearth of information available, even among key

stakeholders, regarding the more than US$1 billion housing compensation process, NRC

determined to commission a study of its content and impact. Such an inquiry logically led

to questions of emergency preparedness and structural mitigation, as troubling deficits

in the quality of reconstructed housing became apparent. Furthermore, question

pertaining to southern Lebanons ability to withsta nd further conflict or a major

earthquake emerged.

Methodology

This report involved a triangulated, composite approach which focused primarily upon

the experiences and sentiments of people in communities affected by the July War.

Specifically, it involved the following

379 open-ended questionnaires with housing compensation beneficiaries; 120 surveys with housing compensation beneficiaries; 30 in-depth interviews with housing compensat ion beneficiaries; and 32 key stakeholder consultations involving individuals from regional donors, the

Government of the Lebanese Republic (GoLR), non-state entities (NSEs) and from the

international community.

Two feedback sessions, one concerning housing compensation and another concerning

emergency preparedness, were organised in Beirut in December 2008 in order to allow

key stakeholders an opportunity to respond to and shape preliminary findings.

These methods proved effective in understanding the housing compensation process and

its socio-economic, socio-cultural and reputational impacts. Most importantly, they

helped the authors to develop, for the first time, a coherent portrait of a highlyincoherent housing compensation process. More information regarding the methodology

can be found in section A3 of this report.

Housing Compensation: The Process

The housing compensation process focused upon providing financial assistance to the

approximately 120,000 housing units which had been destroyed or damaged during the

July War. While the process is described at length and carefully analysed within the full

body of the report, the following findings are deemed to be the most significant.

The assessment of damage was not done in a timely or accountable manner (see B1.1).

Differing models were used to assess damage, particularly by the Council of the South

(CoS) and Jihad al Binaa (JaB), none of which appears to have involved credible or


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effective accountability measures. The use of a private firm to audit assistance provided

through the CoS appears to have potentially resulted in increased misappropriation and

partisanship as well as substantial delays.

The funds provided through the compensation process are substantial, in excess of

US$915 million, but remain unknown due to a lack of transparency (see B1.2 a nd B1.4).

It must be noted that no reliable data exists regarding the housing compensation

process. Official figures provided by the HRC were found to be contradicted through

community-level surveys, and contributions from JaB, in particular, have never been

publicly disclosed. While problems regarding transparency, accountability, coordination

and information management are common in post-conflict contexts, rarely have they

taken on such dramatic proportions.

Significant amounts of compensation from CoS were delayed, and large sums are owed

to families in the South (see B1.6). Only one-quarter or recipients of compensation from

CoS have received their second payments, one indication of the severe delays which

have plagued the compensation process. Explanations for these delays seem poorly

justified. The HRC finds that only 60 per cent of compensation has been paid by the

Lebanese government, and surveys conducted during this study indicate that up to 78.4

per cent of households may be owed compensation from CoS. Other actors, particularly

JaB, have delivered compensation in a far timelier manner and owe little outstanding

housing-related assis tance.

Compensation engaged multiple aid modalities, the most successful being that

employed by the Kuwait Fund (see B1.3). Donor countries provided assistance either

through or around public institutions of the Lebanese government. The former approach

resulted in concerns regarding the states capacity and transparency, and the latterapproach, adopted primarily by Qatar and JaB, lacked accountability. A third option

utilised by the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development involved a trust fund

mechanism which allowed compensation c ontributions to grow prior to disbursement.

This approach also allowed public agencies to distribute compensation checks without

ever having fiduciary control or discretion. Such an approach should be utilised by all

donors, through a single, multi-donor trust fund, during future compensation processes.

More than one-fifth of families which suffered housing damage have not yet been able

to return to permanent housing more than two years af ter the end of the July War (see

B1.5). According to surveys, 21.7 per cent of families have not been able to return to

permanent housing and remain displaced within Lebanon. The poorest and those who

suffered the greatest damage have, paradoxically, been the most likely to return home.

Many of them appear to have been coerced by economic circumstances into returning to

severely damaged or partially destroyed homes which are not suitable for habitation.

These populations are, hence, most at risk in the event of a future natural or human-

made disaster.

Housing Compensation: Impact

Housing compensation resulted in a number of impacts related not only to shelter but

also to economic development, poverty alleviation, social exclusion, cultural heritage,

governance and public diplomacy. The most significant such impacts are outl ined below.


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The most socio-economically vulnerable suffered the greatest damage and received the

highest levels of compensation but face considerable challenges related to housing

quality and livelihoods (see B2.1). The poorest households received more than twice as

much assistance as those which were minimally or not vulnerable. However,compensation has rarely been sufficient to re-build destroyed homes, and many of the

most vulnerable, who were the most likely to have had their home destroyed, have been

forced to return to their damaged homes g iven a lack of alternatives. Additiona l

attention and assistance must be provided to this group.

Delayed compensation prolonged displacement and complicated on-farm livelihoods,

thus entrenching the cycle of indebtedness (see B2.1). Delayed compensation made is

more difficult for all households to return to permanent, quality housing, and the

resulting displacement has made is exceptionally difficult for those reliant upon

agriculture, who tend to be the most vulnerable, to earn income. Furthermore, the need

to rebuild homes rather than waiting up to two years to receive compensation from CoS

meant that many families took loans to purchase construction materials, thus initiating

or entrenching a cycle of indebtedness. In all cases, economic impacts, whether related

to livelihoods or loans, affected the poorest the most severely.

Female-headed households (FHHs) were not addressed by any articulated strategy

despite their specific needs, and their social marginalisation resulted in greater

difficulty accessing owed compensation (see B2.2). While FHHs may have received

additional assis tance and reduced corruption through what this report terms informa l

social protection, they also faced the greatest delays and have made the least progress

on housing reconstruction. They are far more likely to remain out of permanent housing,

a fact which, in part, results from the unusua lly extensive delays they experienced and

their lack of agency in the pursuit of compensat ion.

Cultural heritage was not protected during the compensation and reconstruction

processes (B2.3). Regulations pertaining to cultural heritage were not adequately

enforced, and many actors, including the firm engaged in rubble clearing as well as

individual home owners, had financial incentives to destroy culturally or architecturally

significant homes. This loss will affect Lebanese culture and society while also reducing

opportunities for tourism.

Lebanese public institutions were viewed far more poorly as a result of their

involvement with the housing compensation process, while JaB and Qatar gained

enhanced status. Perceptions of and occurrence of corruption influenced such

reputational impacts (B2.4). Survey respondents viewed the CoS and centra l

government far worse for their involvement in the housing compensation process while

the opposite held true for JaB and Qatar. People in the South were far more likely to

view donors more favourably based on the amount provided, the timeliness in which

compensation was provided and the presence of corruption. While detailed statistics are

offered in this section, 22.0 per cent of survey respondents described having experience

corruption firs t-hand within the housing compensation process.

Housing Compensation: Recommendations

A series of recommendations for improving housing compensation within the ongoing

process and within future such processes are offered. While explored further in sectionB3 of this report, the primary recommendations are:


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To conceive the provision of housing com pensation not as an end in itself but as thelaunch of a process of housing reconstruction which must be supported with

technical assistance and the application of quality stan dards; To assess and improve the structural quality of housing rehabilitated through the

ongoing compensation and reconstruction process;

To engage a fully independent firm with a consistent process in assessing, through asingle and unified process, housing damage in the aftermath of conflict and natura l

disasters;

To more closely involve communities in participatory and public assessments ofhousing damage and monitoring of compensation;

To capacity build the professional and lay construction sectors with particularattention to structural integrity and disaste r res istance;

To deliver outstanding compensation owed to the population of the South; To engage NGOs in monitoring and advocating for the equitable and timely delivery

of housing compensation (and its use for reconstruction) by FHHs and the socio-

economically vulnera ble;

To improve the provision of information to recipients in order to diminishperceptions of corruption and allow for rational household-level economic planning;

To establish a cadast ral system for property ownership and land management; To develop the capacities of municipal officials to serve as conduits for information

within the hous ing compensation process;

To utilise a trust fund mechanism, involving all relevant regional, state and non-stateactors, to f inance future compensation so tha t assistance is equitable and based

more on needs than on adoption by regional donors;

To ensure that auditing of reconstruction and compensation is done by atransparently selected and fully independent firm;

To promote rational housing reconstruction, using information campaigns andmaterials already developed by UN-HABITAT, which matches the compensation

provided with the types and sizes of homes which can be constructed; and

To salvage remaining cultura lly signif icant houses and other buildings and to enforceregulations in this sector in the future.

Emergency Preparedness: The Need

The quality of houses built and rehabilitated through the housing compensation process

is unknown. Given the low technical abilities of most builders involved and the rising

price of materials, it is doubtful that southern Lebanon is prepared for a major

earthquake or external attack. Few if any technical standards were applied, and massive

levels of inflation meant that appropriate materials were under-utilised (see C1.1).

Furthermore, high levels of awareness regarding the threat of natural disasters is not

accompanied by due levels of concern. Finally, the uncoordinated nature of governance

in the South and the fragmented series of interventions pursued by the interna tional

community make the threat of a natural or human-made disaster even more dire (see

C1.2).

Preparing for Emergencies

Emergency preparedness planning (EPP) must be pursued. Given the fragmentation in

this sector and the unclear mandate, commitment and effectiveness of many high-levelstakeholders, the authors propose a municipal-level model supported with technical


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assistance and coordination by the Unions of Municipalities, which are the structures

which were specifically created to enhance coordination following the July War (see

C2.1).

The goal of EPP interventions should not simply be to develop plans but to foster wha t

the authors term a culture of preparedness which pervades the GoLR, non-state actors,

the construction sector and civil society (see C2.2). Similar to mainstreaming, this

culture would involve the consideration of emergency preparedness a term used

broadly in this term as to also encapsulate structural mitigation in all aspects of

governance and development.

Specifically, the following emergency preparedness activities are proposed:

Awareness raising regarding the threat posed by and means of preparing for andresponding to various types of disasters and emergencies (see C2.3);

A participatory planning process engaging all key stakeholders (including NSEs),community members and members of ma rginalised groups (see C2.4); and

The development of plans which include: (i) a risk assessment which rationallyidentifies risks which may be feasibly addressed; (ii) a redundant and effective

management system to facilitate decision making, early warning, evacuation and

communication; (iii) a plan for meeting the most dire effects of an emergency

(injury, public safety, fires, food and shelter, etc.); (iv) an inventory of the human

and material resources available within each municipality; (v) procedures for

disseminating, testing and revising the plan; and (vi) strategies for mitigating damage

through structural interventions prior to a disaster and in the reconstruction process

following one (see C2.5).

Detailed information regarding each of these activities, which are provided as

recommendations, is included within section C2 of the report. This section concludes by

proposing safe havens, areas which are recognised by nations, international

organisations and armed groups as neutral zones, for civilians to seek shelter and

protection d uring conflict.

Structural Mitigation

The final section concerning preparedness, section C3, addresses the question of

structural mitigation. While plans may allow communities to respond more effectively to

and mitigate the effects of emergencies, improvements in infrastructure (at the level of

households and public buildings) are necessary to prevent widespread damage and loss

of life.

Community members and regional donors must be convinced of the need to support

structural mitigation given the costs involved in doing so. Such activities must be viewed

as safeguarding families and as protecting investments already made within the housing

sector. Particular attention should be paid to the integrity of life line structures such as

hospitals, Civil Defence facilities, and Army barracks and to the quality of high-value,

highly populated buildings such as schools, medical clinics, community centres a nd places

of worship (see C3.1).

With specific reference to housing, the following components must be considered inconstruction and rehabilitation:


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Robust building form; Firm foundations;

Good quality materials; Strong walls;

Distributed openings; Horizontal reinforcement;

Safe modifications; and Regular maintenance.

These components are discussed in detail in section C3.2 of the report. In addition,

individuals must be provided with information pertaining to interior mit igation

techniques (see C3.3) such as securing appliances, mirrors, televisions and other items

prone to exacerbating earthquake damage. As previously noted, the level of investment

required of structural mitigation must be accompanied by efforts to demonstrate its

value. As such, all structural mitigation must emerge f rom a n understanding of

impediments and constraints. In many cases, particularly among the most vulnerable

(who surveys found to be living in the poorest quality homes), structural mitigation will

require external resources, and the authors encourage regional donors and relevant non-

state actors to invest s trongly in this sector.

Piloting Preparedness & Mitigation

Demonstrating the benefits of emergency preparedness and structural mitigation will be

best accomplished through the implementation of pilot interventions in model

communities (see D1). Given the impact of the 15 February 2008 earthquake upon Srifa

and the ongoing emergency preparedness initiatives being attempted there by the LAF

and others, this area provides a suitable context. The ongoing reconstruction work in the

Nahr el Bared camp in the North will, likewise, allow for the effective integration of

preparedness activities. Both areas may be targeted by the pilot prog ramme, which

should receive substantial support to ensure its success, and the outcomes should bewidely disseminated through the media and through si te visits by municipal officia ls and

others from both public and non-governmental organisations, including the CoS, HRC,

LAF and JaB.

There remains a g reat deal of work to be done to protect southern Lebanon from the

emergencies which have consistently resulted in human, infrastructural and economic

losses. As in the case of housing compensation, all contributions are valuable. However,

also as seen in housing compensation, the effectiveness, equity and efficiency of

interventions would benefit from far greater coordination and cooperation and far less

competition.


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MAP OF LEBANON


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Part A

INTRODUCTION


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A1. Purpose of the Study

Purpose

of the Study

The 33-day July War in 2006 resulted in massive levels of damage. Approximately

120,000 housing units were damaged or destroyed in addition to substantial numbers of

schools, medical facilities, bridges, roads, businesses and government insta llations. Up to

a million people were displaced from their homes. In response, numerous actors from

within Lebanon, the region and the international community intervened in order to

provide housing compensation valued in excesses of at least US$1 billion, likely much

more. Yet, little is understood about this process even among those charged with

coordinating it from within and outside of state institutions. The actors involved, the

sums of money provided and the impact of the intervention remain a matter of

speculation. It has avoided scrutiny by nearly every actor involved, by scholars and by

international organisations. No publicly available report concerning this significant

undertaking exists, and no lessons have been recorded and disseminated to improve

compensation processes in Lebanon and elsewhere in the world.

Potentially more troubling, there is little comprehension of what can be done to better

prepare Lebanon for a future emergency, whether natural or man made. In light ofLebanons long history of violent conflict, particularly with Israel, and the series of major

earthquakes which have shaken the country, such an oversight significantly increases the

human, economic and infrastructural vulnerability. The compensation and reconstruction

process provided an opportunity to strengthen the country, both with regard to its

infrastructure and its institutional arrangements, though it remains uncertain to what

degree it has done so. As such, this report addresses the state of emergency

preparedness planning (EPP) and, critically, attempts to provide a roadmap for future

activities related to structural mitigation as well as to the human and governance

dimensions of EPP.

What distinguishes this report from other ongoing efforts related to EPP in Lebanon is its

focus upon the perspectives and needs of lower-level stakeholders. While national-level

approaches present long-term opportunities, local interventions are critical in ensuring

that attention to EPP has a tangible and life-saving impact in the short term.

This study was implemented by the Univers ity of Yorks Post-war Reconstruction and

Development Unit (PRDU) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). As the co-chair of

Lebanons Shelter Cluster, NRC has been closely involved in southern Lebanon and has

repeatedly noted the need for a comprehensive review of housing compensation and

EPP. This report attempts to meet this need. The study involved more than 500

interviews and surveys in addition to consultations with more than 30 stakeholdersrelevant to the reconstruction of southern Lebanon from the wider region, from the


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Government of the Lebanese Republic (GoLR), from the private sector, from

international organisations and from Lebanese civil society.

The report, following the introduction (Pa rt A), is divided into two main parts. Part Baddresses housing compensation with specific reference to the following:

An overview of actors and financing mechanisms related to hous ing compensation; An examination of the socia l and economic dynamics of housing with reference to

livelihoods, gender, marginalisation and cultural heritage; and

A discussion of the compensation processs implications for the reputations ofregion donors and non-s tate entities.

Part C, which is closely focused upon EPP and structural mitigation, includes the

following sub-components:

A review of the state of emergency preparedness in s outhern Lebanon; A study of options pertaining to EPP focused on community-level interventions; and An overview of key principles of household-level structural and interior mitigation.Together these two parts will contribute to the primary purposes of this report: to assess

the residual needs of residents in southern Lebanon, to evaluate the complex array of

assistance packages offered and to establish lessons learned. The scale of the destruction

after the July War highlighted, broadly, the relative weakness of the regions

infrastructure, and the need, therefore, to build back better. In order to provide

guidance on how GoLR, non-state actors, regional donors and international NGOs maybuild back better and mit igate destruction, each pa rt concludes with a series of practical,

actionable recommendations.


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A2. Contextual Overview

Contextual OverviewOverview

This section provides a brief overview of the context of southern Lebanon. It focuses

particularly upon conflict and the July War while also addressing related issues pertaining

to social and economic development. Fu rthermore, it brie fly addresses the major na tural

hazards which threaten Lebanon as a whole with a par ticular focus upon the South.

A2.1 Conflict in Lebanon

Lebanon, particularly southern Lebanon, has experienced a lengthy legacy of conflict.

Lebanon gained independence from France in 1941 in a context of intense divisions

between Shias, Sunnis, Druze and Maronite Christians. An unwritten National Covenant

in 1943 established a power-sharing ar rangement which avoided conflict, though

tensions were to flare following the 1948 arrival of Palestinian refugees. Following its

expulsion from Jordan in 1970, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) based its

operations in Lebanon, a move which drew Israeli military interventions in 1973, 1978,

1981 and 1982. This second attack against southern Lebanon impelled the arrival of the

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which remains there to this day. The

1982 Israeli intervention, which comprised a full-scale invasion, was followed by anoccupation of parts of the South, both directly and through Lebanese Christian proxies,

which lasted up to 18 years.

Regular conflict with Israel took place amidst Lebanons civil war from 1975 to 1991.

While the specific and evolving nature of the conflict is too complex to address here, the

conflict resulted in strengthened ethno-religious and political identities and agendas. At

various phases, fighting took place between Christians and Palestinians, among

Palestinian organisations, among Muslim militias and between reformers and power

holders. As a result of this fighting, more than 100,000 people were killed with a similar

number permane ntly disabled. Nearly a million people were displaced from their homes,

and a quarter of these emigrated within the region and, particularly, to Europe and North

America. The Taif Agreement, first put forward in 1989, began to wind down the

conflict, which formally ended in 1991.

The years after the wa r witnessed an increased role for Syria, which had intervened in

(and subsequently occupied) Lebanon in 1976 to attempt and end the civil war while

reigning in the PLO. (Syrian troops and political pressure was to remain until 2005, at

which point Syria was perceived to have played a role in the assassination of Lebanese

Prime Minster Rafic Hariri.) Tensions continued between Israel and armed elements in

southern Lebanon, particularly involving the non-state entity (NSE) Hezbollah. These

tensions culminated in the 1996 invasion by Israel during what came to be known asOperation Grapes of Wrath, which launched two-week period of intense fighting


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marked by attacks on civilians by both sides. Israeli forces unilaterally withdrew from

Lebanon in May of 2000, and Lebanons southern border remained relatively calm until

July 2006.

A2.2 The July War

On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah launched a cross-border raid on Israel which resulted in the

killing of eight Israelis and the kidnapping of two. Israel responded with a blockade and,

later, attacks against Hezbollah sites and Shia-identified areas.

FIGURE 1. Israeli Strikes in Lebanon, As of 30 July (left) and 10 August 2006 (right)1

The conflict ended following a mid-August ceasefire without a definitive victory. The

United Nations reports that the following damage resulted from the 33 days of fighting,

though it must be noted that estimates of damage differ s lightly.2

Nearly 1,200 civilians were killed and 5,000 injured; 15 per cent of those injuredwere permanently injured or disabled.

Approximately 800,000 people were displaced. More than one million unexploded cluster sub-munitions were dispersed, thus

posing a substantial r isk to peoples lives and livelihoods (particularly agriculture).

Approximately 125,000 housing units,3 612 public schools, several hospitals, 97bridges, 151 sections of road and 850 commercial enterprises were either totally or

1These images were created by Samidoun Media based upon news reports. Avail able at:

http://lebanonupdates.blogspot.com.2

United Nations (2007) Lebanon Recovery Fund.. Available at: http://www.un.org.lb/unnew/LRF/index.html

accessed on 7 October, 2008; Minist ry of Economic and Trade for the Republic of Lebanon (2008) EconomicReport, J uly. Av ailable at : http://www.economy.gov.lb/NR/rdonlyres/A52C19B8-F3EF-4E13-8A7A-

83FEA03C229A/0/MacroeconomicIndicators2007En.htm , accessed on 20 June, 2008.3

A housing unit is considered to be a house, or an apartment, or a group of rooms, or a single room that is

occupied (or if vacant, is intended for occupan cy) as separate living quarters.


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7

partially destroyed, as were the Rafic Hariri International Airport and the Jiyyeh

Power Plant.

15,000 tons of oil was spilt, thus contaminating the Lebanese coast; 20,000 tons offuel burned for 20 consecutive days, and the Ouzai fishermans wharf and marketwere totally destroyed.

Real Gross Domestic Product growth decreased relative to 2005. The rate of unemployment has doubled and stands in excess of 20 per cent. In some

areas of the country and in some economic sectors, unemployment reaches even

higher, to 30 per cent and more.

Since the beginning of the July War, total pledges for relief, reconstruction and recovery

from international donors, including those from within the Middle East and North Africa

(MENA) region, have reached over US$2 billion. Sev eral countries chose to directly target

beneficiaries by sponsoring projects, such as the building of bridges or, by ear-ma rking

funds for the end beneficiaries. In this manner Qatar, the United Arab Emirate, European

Commission, United States, Germany, Italy, South Korea, Syria and Iran have given

around US$319 million. The Government of the Lebanese Republic (GoLR) saw the

largest recordedpercentage of aid pledged during the phase immediately after the War,

estimated at US$1.14 billion.4

The Stockholm and Paris III conferences coordinated a

renewed financial commitment to the GoLR. The Stockholm Conference raised US$940

million, and Paris III drew pledges of $7.6 billion designed to help the government deal

with a $41 billion public debt and the reconstruction efforts.5

A2.3 Socio-Economic Conditions

The conflict and subsequent reconstruction process have taken place within and shaped

the socio-economic context of southern Lebanon. The best statistics concerning the

South comes from UNDP and were gathered in 2004.6

The UNDP report includes the

following indicators:

The popula tion of southern Lebanon is 401,000, which is comprised of 89,000households.

16.5 per cent of the households are headed by females, a legacy of decades ofconflict and, to a lesser extent, labour migrat ion.

The population is also aging, with a relatively high 21.2 per cent of households beingled by individuals older than 65.

15.2 per cent of the population (of Lebanon as a whole) is classified as disabled. Educational deficits are evident, w ith less than a quarter of the population having

graduated form high school; illiteracy rates are higher than 10 per cent, and

secondary school enrolment among young men is particularly low.

4For some organisations providing assistance, such as Jihad al Binaa, it is impossible to quantify the amount of

funds they have received, as is often the case when a non-state actor is providing a service: there is a reduced

transparency in operations with little pressure to reveal the amount or, source of funding through a decreased

need to be democrat ically accountable.5

BBC (2006a ) Do nors make huge Leba non pledge, 1st

September. Available at:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/5303410.stm, ac cessed on 20th June, 2008.6

Ministry of Social Affairs, Central Administration for Statistics, and the United Nations Development

Programme (2004) The National Survey of Households Living Conditions 2004.


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8

As implied in the statistics above, there are particular impacts which have resulted from

conflict. In particular, households are commonly led by female and the elderly given the

death of young men in conflict. These populations, like the handicapped who have also

emerged from decades of warfare, are pa rticularly critical to this study g iven the addedchallenge they may have in re-building housing and in preparing for and responding to

disasters.

A2.4 Disasters

In addition to a legacy of conflict, Lebanon faces a constant threat from disasters,

particularly earthquakes though also landslides, flooding, avalanches, droughts, chemical

spills and industrial accidents. Earthquake trem ors have been felt with increasing

frequency in the southern region. On 15 February 2008, Tyre, a southern Lebanese city,

was affected by an earthquake recorded at a magnitude of 4.2 on the Richter scale,

causing aftershocks that were felt across the region. Geologists estimate that 640,000

people in Lebanon experienced moderate or strong shaking.7

FIGURE 2. Major and Minor Fault Lines in Lebanon8

While Lebanon experienced only one significant earthquake with a magnitude of 5.0

during the twentieth century, the country has previously experienced catastrophic

7USGS (2008) EstimatedPopulation Exposed to Earthquake Shaking. Washington, DC: US Geological Survey.

8The figure was located at: http://lat imesblogs.latimes.com/photos/uncateg orized/2008/02/15/faults.jpg


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9

seismic events with a magnitude greater than 7.0.9

As a result, many have concluded that

Lebanon is presently overdue for a major earthquake.

Current programme documents from the government, international and national NGOs,international bodies and construction agencies do not adequately address the threat of

natural disasters or the ability and imperative to mitigate the destructive effects of

future conflicts. The current reconstruction of sou thern Lebanon presents an opportunity

for strengthening the resilience of southern communities to future emergencies. As one

resident of Braykea, in an interview, stated: The most important thing is to educate

people about an emergency plan in case of future conflict and natural disasters and how

to protect the kids.10

9A. S alah-Eldin Elnashi and R. El-Khoury, Ear thquake hazard in Lebanon, Imperial College Press, London, 2004.

10Personal communication, Braykea, Lebanon, 24 Oct. 2008.


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11

A3. Methodology

Methodology

The research team which conducted this study was led by Professor Sultan Barakat of the

University of Yorks Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU). Data

collection and analysis took part in two phases, the first under the guidance of the

Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the second in close cooperation between the

PRDU and NRC. The first phase focused upon the completion of open-ended

questionnaires, designed by NRC, with 379 individuals, interviews with 36 municipal

officials and a small number of municipality-level case studies. The second phase

involved a multiple-choice and short-answer survey of 120 households in 15 additionalvillages across the South and 30 in-depth interviews with individuals whose households

had experienced damage during the July War. In total, 51 of South Lebanons 250

municipalities, or 20.4 per cent, were covered by this study.11

These interviews, surveys

and questionnaires were supplemented by interviews with representatives of relevant

governmental, non-governmental, civilian, military, local, regional and international

institutions.

FIGURE 3. Data Collection Tools an d Samples

Data Collection Method Sample Size Municipalities Involved

Phase One

Open-ended questionnaires with

households379 36

Open-ended questionnaires with

municipal officials36 36

Phase Two

Surveys with households 120 15

Interviews with households 30 15

Stakeholder consultations 32 -

During both phases, data collection was conducted by NRC staff members, though,

during the second phase, NRC personnel were trained by the PRDU on data collection

and entry. In order to enhance the validity of data collected by such seemingly vested

individuals, whose organisationa l affiliation was conveyed to all respondents, NRC

personne l stated that the research was not linked t o any planned or potential future

assistance programme and that it was being conducted in collaboration with academic

researchers. Furthermore, as discussed later in this section, site selection during the

second phase aimed to avoid regions in which the NRC had previously implemented

assistance programmes o r engaged in simila r research activities.

11These include those municipalities in the Nabatieh and South Lebanon mohafathas.


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12

The second phase also involved a variety of key stakeholder consultations with

international organisations and bodies relevant to housing and shelter interventions in

the South, including the following:

the High Relief Commission (HRC), the Council of the South (CoS), Jihad al Binaa (JaB), the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), the Lebanese Civil Defence, the Unions of Municipal ities of Tyre and Nabatieh, the Kuwait Fund fo r Arab Economic Development, the Saudi Public Campaign for Lebanese People Relief, the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), the United Nat ions Development Prog ramme (UNDP), the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), the House in the South, a local NGO, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), ROSS, I talian Cooperation, the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED), the International Medical Corps (IMC), the Governor of Tyre, the Lebanese Red Cross, Islamic Rissala Scout and Al Kayan.These same stakeholders were invited to dissemination and feedback sessions on 17 and

18 December 2008 in Beirut. These workshops allowed individuals and institutions

engaged in both housing compensat ion and emergency preparedness to clarify and

respond to the studys preliminary findings.

Each of the research encounters surveys, interviews and stakeholder consultations

attempted to gain perspectives upon both housing reconstruction and compensation as

well as upon emergency preparedness planning (EPP). The combination of these two

topics was pragmatic as well as strategic given that potential, future interventions

related to emergency preparedness will involve an infrastructural context closely related

to and in some ways dependent upon the housing compensation and reconstruction

processes. Furthermore, EPP and, in particular, st ructural mitigation are critica l for

safeguarding the more the US$1 billion investment made in housing since 2006 by the

GoLR, regional governments, the international community, non-state entities and

individuals.

A3.1 Sampling

Sampling during Phase One, which was conducted by NRC, focused upon those most

severely damaged communities. The sampling methodology used during Phase Two was

developed by the PRDU using 3 July 2008 figures from the Lebanon Shelter Cluster, which

included village-level data concerning housing damage from the CoS. Twelve households


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13

from each village were to be engaged in the study. Only those villages within the South

Lebanon and Nabatieh mohafathas were included (250 villages, total). Forty-one villages

with fewer than 24 damages or destroyed housing units were excluded, as they would

present a challenge in locating sufficient numbers of respondents.

Each of the remaining 209 villages was assigned a damage quotient in order to provide

a single indicator of vi llage-level damage. This quotient took into account the numbers of

totally and partially destroyed houses, the number of severely damaged houses and the

number of partially damaged houses within each village as assessed by the CoS and

verified by a private firm, Khatib and Alami. Each communitys quotient was weighted so

that a village with simila r numbers of affected housing units but with relatively severe

damage that is, more destroyed rather than damaged units would be assigned a

higher damage quotient.12

Once damage quotients had been assigned and the villages had been sorted based on

their level of destruction, every 14th

village was selected according to a periodic sampling

methodology . A periodic technique was used in order to provide a range of levels of

damage, from least to greatest. As no 210th

village was available, which would have

provided the 15th

village, the final (209th

) village (the most damaged) was selected. Any

villages in which NRC had previously implemented projects or conducted research were

replaced with villages with similar damage quotients. In total, three villages were

replaced on these criteria, and another three villages were replaced given challenges

gaining the approval of local power holders.13

The final list of sampled villages from both Phase One and Phase Two may be found inAppendix B of this report.

A3.2 Methodological Discussion

The methodology, which utilised a composite approach combining qualitative as well as

quantitative approaches, is deemed to have been highly effective. While the diversity of

southern Lebanon mak es the pursuit of a representative sample challenging, the

methodology was able to include areas with varied sectarian, political and socio-

economic profiles. Villages had experienced widely different levels of damage and

reflected urban as well as remote, rural contexts. The forms of assistance which the

sampled villages had experienced also allowed for a comparison of aid modalities, from

direct cash injections by regional donors and non-state actors to state-driven processes

involving the CoS and HRC.

The use of surveys, interviews and key stakeholder consultations allowed for the

triangulation of data and the gathering of multiple perspectives on the compensation

process. Still, the methodology also raises legitimate issues, though none which

12The quotient did not account for the extent of damage relative to the total size of the community or total

number of houses given the lack of recent population statistics.13

In one case, a vi llage was replaced given that most homes served as se condary residences and w ere unlikely

to be sufficiently populated on weekdays. Issues of access were posed primarily by non-state actors who hoped

to obtain higher-level clearance before allowing data collection to take place. Local stakeholders were

furnished copies of the r esearch tools and carefully informed of its purpose in order to allay concerns.


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14

undermine the validity of key findings. For instance, the involvement of an international

non-governmental organisation (NGO) in the research inextricably led to concerns that

needs would be exaggerated and that NGOs would somehow feature in respondents

answers. The question of exaggerated needs is common to all post-conflict anddeveloping country contexts. Despite assurances that the research is pure and removed

from considerations of aid financing, respondents were primarily familiar with research

in the context of needs assessments and programming. PRDU-designed research tools

used methods to identify and isolate biases by using multiple means and questions in

order to ascertain individual pieces of data. In doing so, variations can be identified, and

more valid responses may be systematically identified. The latter concern, regarding

NGO-centric responses was not a concern given that NGO rarely featured within

questionnaires, surveys or interviews.

Calculating Vulnerability in South Lebanon

Throughout this report, references to respondent vulnerability will be made. The

research team felt it necessary to examine how individuals at differing socio-economic

levels were affected by housing damage, how they benefited from housing

compensation and reconstruction and how they would likely engage with EPP activities.

The research team utilised self-reported data from surveys in order to provide each

individual with a v ulnerability score. The score was ultimately comprised of data

concerning adult unemployment within the household, the level of household pre-war

income (relative to the sample as a whole rather than to a national average) and the

decline in household income following the war. The first piece of data contributed 40 percent of the total vulnerability score with the latter two contributing 30 per cent each. The

final piece of data, which measured the decline in income, attempted to reflect the

fragility of livelihoods and their vulnerability as in the case of micro enterprise owners

and those dependent upon agriculture to political shocks, conflict or natural disasters.

Thus, vulnerability is not understood as poverty but as socio-economic stability in a

dynamic and challenging context. Given that only approximately half of the survey

respondents provided sufficient data to calcula te a vulnerab ility score, these f indings

apply to only tha t half rather than to the total sample.


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Part B

HOUSING COMPENSATION


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B1. Process of Housing Compensation

Process

of Housing

Compensation

The process of housing compensation in southern Lebanon was exceptionally complex,

even when compared to comparable undertakings in other post-conflict countries, and

involved numerous actors, large sums of money and varied political interests. This

section attempts to put together the first-ever portrait of housing compensation in

southern Lebanon.

This portrait begins by discussing the damage assessment before examining how these

needs were addressed with financing from donors from Lebanon, the Middle East and

North Africa (MENA) region and beyond. Finally, it demonstrates the progress which has

been made, the compensation which is still owed and how satisfied beneficiaries have

been with the process.

B1.1 Damage Assessment

Determining the level of damage done to individual housing units proved to be one of

the most important and contentious components of the compensation process. The

assessment of needs determined the level of assistance to be del ivered to beneficiaries.

It proved exceptionally difficult given the lack of governmental land management and

legal records indicating which structures had existed in which areas. While a damaged

but intact housing unit may have been relatively simple to assess, engineers and others

involved in the process frequently found it difficult to ascertain how many floors and

units had existed in a particular building. For examp le, a single destroyed structure may

have been a single housing unit or may have included up to three separate units, thus

allowing the owner or owners to claim substantially greater amounts of compensation.

Similarly, the size of a particular unit frequently became a source of contention given

that the GoLR intended to provide compensat ion on the basis of 140 m2

units.

Government-Led Assessment Process

The assessment process involved two separate approaches. The first (Fig. 4) was

designed by the GoLR and drawn upon all international donors involving in housing

compensation, including those from the MENA region.14

It involved an informal

assessment of needs by local officials which were then verified during the first formal

14 The only exception is assistance provided by Iran through the Iran Fund for the Support of the Lebanese

People, which was provided directly to non-state entities in Lebanon and was not able to be accounted for

within this study.


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assessment by the CoS and audited by a private engineering consultancy, Khatib and

Alami, operating under the GoLR-funded War Damage Assessment Project.

FIGURE 4. CoS-led Assessment of Housing Damage

This assessment method attempted to prioritise accountability by involving two

assessments, including one by a presumably neutral, non-state actor, Khatib and Alami.

The assessment process, which appears straightforward in the above diagram, became

more complex in approximately 15 per cent of cases, according to Khatib and Alami,

when second or even third assessments of a single destroyed or damaged structure were

needed in order to ascertain the numbe r of floors or units within the building.

Assessments of need for f irst payments a re still ongoing nearly two and a half years after

the July War.

Houses were provided with one of five designations through this process: (i) totally

destroyed, (ii) partially destroyed, (iii) severely damaged, (iv) partially damaged or (v) not

damaged. Records regarding the numbers of units which were not damaged are not

available, and no houses were classified as pa rtially damaged. As such, for opera tional

purposes, only those houses in the f irst three categories are applicable.

According to CoS records provided to the research team, 84,473 housing units had been

destroyed or damaged and provided with compensation. This figure appears to be

incomplete given that a figure of 120,000 units (or 70,000 buildings) is comm only used by

actors involved in the process. Of these, 12.2 per cent (10,319) have been totally

destroyed, 1.8 per cent (1,534) have been partially destroyed and 86.0 per cent (72,620)

have been severely damaged.15

Jihad al Binaa-Led Assessment Process

The second assessment process, which was solely utilised by Jihad al Binaa (JaB), was

relatively simple and, as a result, rapid. According to JaB representatives, a team ofengineers and volunteers from Lebanon and from foreign countr ies, including the United

States, was dispatched immediately following the July War. Between 3,000 and 4,000

such individuals reportedly worked with mayors and municipal officials to identify

destroyed houses and to distribute assistance. Again according to JaB representatives,

assistance for individuals with destroyed houses was provided from 15 days following the

15Data provided by the CoS and the South Lebanon Shelter Cluster, valid as of July 2008. This data, which

includes housing damage for all of Lebanon, was filtered to include only the South Lebanon and Nabatieh

mohafathas a nd furt her refined to include only t hose vil lages adopted by countries or institutions, including

CoS, involved in the housing compensation process.

Identification of

damaged houses

by municipal

officials

Assessment of

level of damage

by CoS

personnel

Verification of

CoS assessment

by Khatib and

Alami

Distribution of

first

compensation

payments


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19

end of the conflict, and 80 per cent of all initial, housing-related assistance had been

distributed within three to four months.16

Analysis

The two assessment processes entailed strengths and weaknesses. The GoLR-led process

allowed for accountability by engaging an external firm to validate findings by CoS

personnel. It was, however, an exceptionally slow process, and only approximately 60

per cent of beneficiaries have received their full compensation. The process also, due to

its complexity, allowed for numerous opportunities for validation, though it may have

inadvertently enabled increased corruption. For insta nce, key stakeholders, supported

by beneficiary interviews, felt that engineers hired locally, from the South, by Khatib

and Alami had at times added to rather than detracted from corruption and

partisanship. Furthermore, while additional research needs to be conducted, it appears

that individuals not assessed by municipal officials as having experienced housing

damage were not included in subsequent assessments. While officials reportedly

attempted to claim as much damage as possible, and more than actually occurred, there

remains a possibility that individuals out of favour with municipal officials due to

sectarian or political consideration may have been fully ignored in the compensation

process. Again, this possibility was raised but not confirmed through this study, and

additional research into exclusion from the housing compensation process should be

conducted.

The approach taken by JaB allowed for a far faster assessment and a more timely

delivery of assistance to beneficiaries. Yet, it does not appear to have involved anyexternal accountability mechanisms similar to those utilised by most NGOs and

international organisations. While JaB admirably operates according to a policy of non-

discrimination according to political, sectarian or other affiliations, the implementation

of this policy by the Shia and Hezbollah-identified organisations staff and volunteers in

the field remains a matter of speculation rather than record.

The Phase One survey indicates that 48.8 per cent of respondents were not at all

satisfied with the assessment of their housing damage though it does not indicate

which assessment process, with most beneficiaries have undergone both with another

22.7 per cent only partially satisfied. The remainder were not at all satisfied. While

assessment procedures are always contentious, and while beneficiaries are likely to

pursue as much assistance as possible through them, it seems that room for

improvement exists. Suggestions for improving assessment procedures for future

compensation processes, if unfortunately necessary, are identified in the

recommendations section of Part B of this report.

16 The term housing-related assistance is purposely used in order to reflect the fact that JaBs initial payments

were primarily intended to fund temporary rental housing. Given that such funds were commonly used to

support housing reconstruction as well, they are included wit hin discussions of compensation.


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B1.2 Actors and Amounts

Based on these two assessment procedures, resources were mobilised from myriadactors within and beyond Lebanon. These actors, whose interventions were driven by

numerous motives, provided for a heterogeneous approach to housing compensation,

both with regard to the process and to the amounts provided. The various actors are

described below.

Government of t he Lebanese Republic17

The Lebanese government provided assistance, primarily c ontributed by Western

bilateral and multilatera l donors, to the hous ing compensation process. The total amount

is, according to the HRC, US$293 mil lion. HRC was tasked with overseeing the housing

compensation process within the GoLR, though it utilised the CoS in order to conduct the

damage assessment and in order to distribute payments.

Predominantly Western Donors

Bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors injected substantial sums of money for Lebanons

reconstruction at the Stockholm and Paris III conferences. The amount utilised in the

housing compensation process was, according to the HRC, US$293 million. These funds

were distributed, as indicated above, through the GoLR and its appointed bodies, the

HRC and CoS.

Jihad al Binaa

JaB, a privately funded NGO, provided a range of assistance in, primarily, southern

Lebanon. While its contribution could not be ascertained from JaB personnel or

independently, the funds are presumed to be in the hundreds of millions of US dollars.

Working outside of the GoLR, JaB assessed needs independently and distributed funds

itself. According to JaB representatives, housing assistance took three forms, including:

(i) funds for rental housing for individuals with inhabitable houses, (ii) funds for

furnishing damaged or destroyed houses and (iii) funds for housing reconstruction. No

evidence of this last form of assistance was found during the study, though JaB

representatives indicated that it was the most recent and motivated primarily by the

slow pace of GoLR-led housing compensation. JaB will be providing such compensation

based on a calculation of the gap between the actual cost of reconstruction and the

amount provided by CoS or other actors. Finally, JaB also reportedly engaged in some

direct reconstruction activities, though these primarily focused upon public

infrastructure and only had a marginal impact upon housing. JaB-conducted

reconstruction following conflicts and crises had previously been the norm, though a

desire to ensure a speedy return of populations to the South (in order to minimise risk of

an Israeli occupation) led them to switch to cash disbursement in this insta nce.18

17Information in t his section is drawn from interv iews with personnel from the HRC, 2 Dec. 2008.

18Personal communication, JaB personnel, Beirut, 17 Dec. 2008.


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Kuwait

The Kuwaiti government, through the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development,provided US$300 million to the reconstruction of Lebanon, including US$115 million for

housing compensation. With a 42-year presence in Lebanon, the Kuwait Fund has

consistently supported the countrys development and was a major player in housing

compensation. Perceiving the GoLR as reflecting too many competing interests and

tensions, the Kuwait Fund provided checks for individual beneficiaries to the HRC which

were then distributed by CoS. No funds were transferred into GoLR accounts. The Kuwait

Fund provided assistance for housing compensation through three payments to

individuals whose homes had been destroyed or severely damaged.

Qatar19

Qatar adopted four of the most damaged towns and cities in southern Lebanon and

provided them directly with compensation.20

Substantial funds we re dedicated to

housing compensation in these areas, though the research team was not able to verify

the contribution, which did not involve or pass through the GoLR. Qatar provided checks

directly to individuals whose homes had been destroyed. That said, based upon

assessments of damage in these areas, the amount is likely to have been approximately

US$150 million.

Syria

Despite its troubled legacy within Lebanon, the Syrian government aimed to adopt

particularly damaged villages and conduct, unlike all other actors, construction work for

individuals who had experience housing destruction or damage. Though reportedly

having provided up to US$42 million for housing reconstruction, assistance from Syria

has been delayed by political tensions with Lebanon. Anecdotal reports (see Appendix C)

indicate that reconstruction assistance was only received as of May 2008, though the

study provided insufficient information regarding Syrian assistance to provide any

definitive conclusions.

Kingdom of S audi Arabia

The government of KSA, through the Saudi Public Campaign for Lebanese People Relief,

provided US$315 million for housing compensation according to Saudi and GoLR

personnel. These funds were provided directly to the Lebanese government and

distributed to 87 communities adopted by KSA in southern Lebanon.21

Funds were

provided in the name of the GoLR or CoS rather than in the name of the Saudi

government or people.

19The reports authors were unable to interview personnel involved in the provision of assistance by Qatar. As

a result, information is primarily drawn from CoS records and interviews with other key stakeholders.20 These four towns/cities are Aainata, Aita Ech Chaab, Bent J beil and Khiam, according to CoS records.21

The 87 communities were identified from those in the South Lebanon and Nabatieh mohafathas using data

provided by the CoS.


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Other MENA or Islamic Donors

A wide variety of other MENA or Islamic countries provided assistance in the samemanner as had KSA. These countries, which provided a total of US$42 million according

to the HRC, include the following: Bahrain, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, the United

Arab Emirates (UAE) and Yemen. Funds were transferred directly to the GoLR and

provided through and in the name of the CoS.

International Organisations

A number of international organisations, both inter-governmental and non-

governmental, have been involved in shelter, though not housing compensation, in

southern Lebanon. The United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT)

has provided technical assistance through Regional Technica l Offices (RTOs) located

within three Unions of Municipalities since autumn 2007. While much of the housing

reconstruction was ongoing or completed by this point, the half dozen engineers and

other technical experts included within each RTO provided guidance to individuals whose

homes were not yet complete. UN-HABITAT, through the RTOs, provided guidance on

designing structurally sound homes which could be constructed for the US$40,000 which

the CoS was intended to provide to individuals whose homes had been totally destroyed.

The Paris-based INGO, the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED),

was involved in implementing this programme. The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC),

with which this study was conducted, has been engaged in shelter rehabilitation,

primarily focusing upon neglected issues such as the waterproofing of roofs.

Khatib and Alami22

Though not a donor entity, this private sector firm was awarded the contract, based on

an agreement established in 1994 with the GoLR, to audit all compensation claims. In

completing this task, Khatib and Alami engaged more than 100 engineers, many of them

newly hired for this War Damage Assessment Project, which is still ongoing. The

assessment involved an initial verification of CoS findings and an assessment to

determine whether or not second compensation payments should be made by the GoLR

through HRC and CoS.

According t o the countries for which data is available or able to be approximated, the

total amount provided is US$915 million. Syria, it is believed though not confirmed,

provided an additional US$42 million, bringing the total to US$957 million. When

including assistance provided by JaB, the total amount easily surpasses US$1 billion and

is likely to be far greater.

22Information in this section is drawn from interviews with Khatib and Alami personnel responsible for the

management of the War Damage Assessment Project, 3 Dec. 2008.


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B1.3 Financing Compensation

This substantial amount of money was provided via several aid modalities, or models ofdonorship. While multiple forms of assistance provision are common within post-conflict

situations, these models influenced the effectiveness and the amount of the

compensation delivered to beneficiaries. The aid modalities employed are outlined

below. Assistance provided directly to individuals may involve less diversion and greater

accountability than assistance mediated through a number of governmental or non-

governmental entities, though doing so tends to increase transaction costs for the donor

entity.

Modality Donors Invo lved Description

Sector-SpecificBudgetary

Support

GoLR (HRC/CoS),with funds from bi-

and multi-lateral

donors as well as

MENA donors

The international community, comprised oftraditional bi- and multi-lateral donors as

well as MENA region donors, provided

direct budgetary support to the GoLR for

use in the reconstruction of housing. These

funds entered into GoLR accounts and were

distributed through the HRC and CoS. In the

case of donors from the MENA region, the

funds were targeted at specific

communities adopted by each country.

Government-

Mediated

AssistanceProvision

Kuwait, via the

Kuwait Fund for

Arab Econom icDevelopment

In this instance, funds were provided

through the HRC and CoS but without

entering into governmental accounts.Kuwait, hav ing adopted particular

communities, provided the government

with individual assistance checks for each

individual household. The GoLR was tasked

solely with distributing these checks.

Donor-Led Direct

Execution

Qatar, Syria and

Jihad al Binaa

Donors and other actors provided

assistance directly to communities with no

governmental involvement. Traditionally

this modality has been employed where

public institutions are not cons idered

suitable partners due to capacity oraccountability concerns or because of poor

political relations between donor and

recipient states. It is also commonly used in

order to providing rapid impacts and in

order to allow donors to receive the

maximum amount of credit or visibility for

their assistance.

Each of these modalities was utilised with varied levels of Lebanese governmental

involvement. The effectiveness and suitability of these modalities and recommendations

concerning financing vehicles for future compensation processes, if necessary, areincluded within section B3 of this report.


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Compensation Distribution

Funds were not only distributed through different modalities but through varyingnumbers of payments. The GoLR, through the HRC and CoS, chose to provide

compensation through two payments, of which 24.5 per cent have, according to surveys,

been paid. The Kuwait Fund employed a three-payment system, and Jihad al Binaa,

given that funds were primarily for housing rental and furnishings, provided assistance in

one lum p payment.

B1.4 Household-Level Compensation

While the previous section addressed the total amounts provided by different donor

organisations, it remains unclear to what degree these funds reached their intended

beneficiaries. In the course of the surveys, interviews and questionna ires conducted

through this study, differing amounts were provided by beneficiaries. It is, unfortunately,

impossible to categorically identify the amounts received by each individual. Donor

entities, aside from those which provided assistance directly to communities, have either

limited or confidential accountability measures. Individual recipients themselves may

have been unable to differentiate between housing compensation and other forms of

assistance or may be inclined to claim lower amounts than actually received in hopes of

receiving additional assistance. The following table (Fig. 5) were calculated based on data

provided by the HRC.

FIGURE 5. Housing Compensation Figures by Adoptive Country or Entity, HRC Data23

Donor/Adopted ByHousing

UnitsAmount (US$)

Amount pe r

Household (US$)

Qatar Adopted24

9,446 149,981,620 15,877.79

KSA Adopted 315,000,000

Kuwait Adopted 115,000,000

Other Regional Donors25

73,561

42,000,000

6,416.44

GoLR Adopted26

35,61127

293,000,000 8,227.79

23These statistics were provided during a 2 December 2008 interview with the High Relief Commission.

Information regarding assistance from KSA and Kuwait were corroborated with representatives of those donorcountries.24

As prev iously noted, the research team did not interv iew personnel involved with the Qatari contribution,

and the GoLR had no records pertaining to the actual assistance provided. However , given that Qatar based its

assistance upon the CoS assessment of needs, it is possible to gauge the likely, though not definitive, Qatari

contribution.25

These figures only include those regional donors who provided assistance through the High Relief

Commission and the Council of the So uth. It, most notably, does not include assistance provided by Qatar and

Iran.26

These funds were provided by the Government o f the Lebanese Republic (GoLR) but were orig inallycontributed by bi- and multi-latera l donors, excluding those from the MENA reg ion, at the Stockholm and Paris

III conferences. A GoLR-adopted community i s one which was not adopted by reg ional donors.27

It should be noted that, nation-wide, Lebanon Shelter Cluster figures, based upon CoS estimates, indicate

that the GoLR (through the CoS) adopted communities with, in total, only 7,425 destroyed or damaged units.


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From the above table, it is apparent that KSA and Kuwait were the largest donors to the

process with other regional donors offering relatively smalle r sums. The GoLR, with funds

from donor conferences, is reportedly a major donor and, according to the table above,

provided more funds per unit than regional donors. Yet these figures are challenged insome ways by the results of the Phase One and Phase Two surveys (Fig. 6). A degree of

caution must, however, be exercised in interpreting the results. The Phase One survey,

while including a 379-household sample size, focused overwhelmingly upon totally

destroyed houses. In contrast, the 120-household Phase Two survey sought a more

balanced portrait, with 27.4 per cent of houses having been totally destroyed, 21.8 per

cent having been partially destroyed and 50.8 having been severely damaged. As such,

the per-unit findings from Phase One are higher than in the case of Phase Two. The

similarity of the amounts provided for totally destroyed houses, however, implies that

the sample sizes rather than any differences in methodology or perception among

respondents is responsible for the variation.

FIGURE 6. Housing Compensation Figures by Donor/Adoptive Country, Survey Results28

Donor/Adopted By

Amount per H ousing

Unit (US$), Phase

One Survey

Amount per Housing

Unit (US$), Phase

Two Survey

Amount per Totally

Destroyed Housing Unit

(US$); Phase 1 (Phase 2)

Qatar Adopted 36,760.00 32,388.89 40,000.00 (40,000.00)

Regional Donor

Adopted29

24,225.33 10,943.37 25,231.59 (27,000.00)

GoLR Adopted30

N/A31

2,757.69 N/A (29 ,875.00)

Jihad al Binaa 9,928.74 6,221.53 10,222.63 (10,870.10)

From these figures, it is apparent that Qatar provided the greatest amount. Other

regional donors also provided a substantial sum, particularly in the case of totally

destroyed housing units. The range of communities that regional donors adopted, from

those with the greatest damage to those with relatively little damage, makes their

average, per-unit amount s ignificantly and understandably lower.

A similar conclusion can be drawn concerning communities adopted by the GoLR. While

survey data implies that they provided a high level of assistance to individuals whose

homes were totally destroyed, these comprise an exceptionally small proportion of theirassistance (94 per cent) were damaged rather than totally or partially destroyed.

However, given that the Phase Two survey includes only partially destroyed and severely

28Findings in this table are based upon 499 surveys, 379 from Phase One and 120 from Phase Two.

29These figures exclude assistance provided by Qatar . The assistance re ferenced in this row is that which was

provided by MENA donors, in addition to Indonesia, and which was provided to the HRC to distribute through

the CoS.30

These funds were provided by the Government o f the Lebanese Republic (GoLR) but were orig inallycontributed by bi- and multi-latera l donors, excluding those from the MENA reg ion, at the Stockholm and Paris

III conferences. A GoLR-adopted community i s one which was not adopted by reg ional donors.31

No such communities were included within the Phase One questionnaire/survey given that NRC had sought

to include the most heavily damaged villages, which had been adopted by donors from the MENA region.


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damaged houses, the figure of US$2,757.69 is likely too low.32

When accounting for the

under-sampling of tota lly destroyed houses, the per-unit av erage would increase to

approximately US$3,800. Given that, according to the HRC, only approximately half of all

GoLR assistance has been disbursed, the Phase Two survey seems accurate. When thefull amount of assistance is provided, households should be expected to receive, on

average, US$7,500 to US$8,000.33

The greater question concerning GoLR-adopted communities those which were

provided assistance by the state and not adopted by regional donors is the numerical

discrepancy in their number. While the HRC indicates that the GoLR was responsible for

providing assistance, much if no t all of it provided through internationa l donor

conferences, to 35,611 units. However, data from July 2008 provided by the CoS

indicated that the number of units for which the GoLR is responsible is 7,425. T hese

figures must be resolved, and GoLR spending on housing compensation must be more

closely tracked and accounted for by a genuinely independent firm.

Assistance provided by Jihad al Binaa was, according to interview and survey

respondents, given for rental housing or furniture. As such, the amounts are lower than

those provided for actual housing reconstruction and, as previously noted, the

discrepancy between the two per-unit average amounts can be attributed to the greater

focus on totally destroyed houses during Phase One. While JaB representatives indicated

that they had provided between US$25,000 and US$150,000 per unit for housing

reconstruction, no evidence of JaB-provided housing compensation was found during

interviews or surveys. Also as previously noted, this discrepancy may result from the

recent onset of housing compensation from JaB, a process which has been driven,according to JaB representatives, by the slow pace of GoLR-led hous ing compensation.

B1.5 Achievements and Progress

Surveys attempted to ascertain the current residence of individuals whose homes had

been damaged or destroyed by asking respondents to identify whether they were living

in a re latives house, a rented house, their own repaired house or a newly built house.

The results are mixed in that 69.6 per cent of respondents are residing in their repaired

house, with another 8.7 per cent in newly built houses. The remaining 21.7 per cent of

respondents, however, have not been able to return to a permanent residence more

than two years after the end of the conflict. This statistic is strikingly high, particularly

when considering the large numbers of individuals who migrated out of Lebanon during

or following the July War.

These findings are supported by survey data pertaining to the state of housing

reconstruction. In total, 83.3 per cent of respondents indica ted that the ir house had

been totally (63.3 per cent) or mostly (20.0 per cent) rebuilt or repaired wit

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