Looking to the Future (In Transit #30)

Looking to the future

Looking to the future issue #30 - September 2014

This edition of In Transit commemorates the tercentenary of the tragic ending of the first truly global conflict, the War of the Spanish Succession, which was fought in the territories that are now Italy, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Austria, the United States, Canada, the Caribbean islands, Brazil, and finally in Catalonia, where Barcelona surrendered to Bourbon troops on 11 September 1714.

That was the beginning of a darker period in our history; our ancient freedoms and institutions were suspended or abolished by a centralising government, and our very identity was attacked. But in the nineteenth century, our national revival, the Renaixença, brought forth a surge of innovative art, writing, and architecture from the Catalan people. Despite attempts to erase us from the map, Catalonia continued as a strong presence in our people’s souls and our ancient institutions and symbols have been strongly protected and defended by catalan people. The brief restoration of our autonomy in the 1930s ended in catastrophe – our leadership imprisoned and tortured, our president murdered by order of the Spanish state, and our language banned by Franco’s regime. But we endured, and when Franco’s Spain came to an end, we were ready to help build a new democratic and plural Spain, one in which Catalans could be equal partners. We helped our Spanish friends to embrace a new, open society, and we became the economic powerhouse of the country. Our ancient culture became the kernel of something very new.

We had hoped that Spain would be understanding, tolerant, and above all respectful of Catalonia’s personality, of its culture, its language, its longterm institutional frame (we currently have our 129th president), and of the hopes for progress and wellbeing of the Catalan people. But recent events have forced us to think differently. Our statute of autonomy, agreed between our parliament and the Spanish parliament in 2006, and then supported by our people in a referendum, was unilaterally rewritten by the Spanish constitutional court in 2010, in a case brought by Mariano Rajoy, now prime minister of Spain. When we proposed to Madrid in 2012 that we should have the same fiscal relationship with the central government as is enjoyed by the Basque country and Navarre, our approach was brusquely rejected. The Spanish education minister has made explicit threats against Catalan language education.

We have been willing to pay more than our fair share to the central government to support poorer regions of Spain, but it has gone too far. Catalonia now receives less public expenditure per capita than more than half the other regions of Spain, though we contribute far more than average. In addition the Spanish government has failed to carry out its investment obligations. All of this has changed the relationship between our citizens and the Spanish state.

The will of our people is clear. On 11 September in 2012, and in 2013, and in 2014, more than a million and a half people took to our streets peacefully, to demonstrate in favour of Catalonia’s right to choose its own future; the overwhelming majority of our elected politicians and of those asked in opinion polls, agree with them. That is why our political leaders and our parliament have decided to hold a popular consultation on 9 November, with the two-part question, “Do you want Catalonia to become a State? If so, do you want this State to be independent?”

The recent referendum in Scotland has shown that in the twenty-first century, we can find new and better ways to resolve issues that date back three hundred years or more. Nothing could be more democratic or reasonable than allowing people to decide their own future. If our friends in Madrid have a positive alternative proposal which addresses the concerns of our people, it too should be put to a popular vote.

Catalonia would be a new kind of state: European, open for trade, cosmopolitan and welcoming and protective of its many diverse inhabitants, including the millions of people from around the world who have come in recent decades. This is not old-fashioned “nationalism”, but a new vision of dynamic autonomy, in which a nation and its capital are able to take the right decisions for themselves: democracy on a human scale.It is wrong, and divisive, to oppose this vision. The world does not stand still, and neither do countries or cities. We must all evolve, to respond to a changing world but above all to meet the needs of people for economic security and prosperity and the democratic right to govern themselves as they – the people – see fit. Catalonia exemplifies this approach.

This process must be, and will be, scrupulously democratic, and endorsed by the direct decision of our people. We will be demonstrably transparent about our plans. We intend to be absolutely peaceful, with a positive and open attitude. And of course we are and will always be European – Catalonia is already fully integrated with the European Union and intends to remain within the framework of the EU and the euro. With its innovative, dynamic, export-led economy, an independent Catalonia would be an asset to the wider European economy – not a liability.

Francesc Homs. Minister of the Presidency and Spokesperson of the Government of Catalonia.

seven communities, one languageeurocatalan newsletter

EDITORIAL

We are not rushing to isolation. Catalonia has always been diverse, dynamic and open, at the cen-tre of trade routes across the Mediterranean and further afield, absorbing from the world’s cul-tures, and contributing our own creativity in turn. But the terms on which business is conduc-ted are crucial, and the Spanish state has not discharged its obligations to Catalonia and its citizens.

Catalans passionately want to create an open, free, plural society with more and better opportunities for all our citizens. That’s why our people are now so determined to make their own decision about how Catalonia will pro-gress as a country. We want the best possible future for Catalonia, and we want to make that decision ourselves.

What did Catalonia lose in 1714?


No one can ignore that the tense political climate today has conditioned the historical discourse around the Tercentenary of 1714. If, in general, the pro-sovereignty discourse has marked the commemoration, characterized by idealization and simplification at the expense of analysis, in the pro-Spanish ranks things haven’t been any different. Various historians and writers have glossed over the alleged praises of the new Bourbon regime that swept away the old Catalan political structure and brought into being the economic boom, thanks to the kindness of this supposedly enlightened despotism.

One doesn’t have to be nationalistic to argue that the constitutional evolution that ended in the Cortes of 1701 and 1706 was an undeniable improvement in the line of parliamentarianism, because the laws were above the Prince.

The Catalan Constitutions protected collective social benefits in the areas of war, taxation, economics, justice and liberty, beyond what the privileged classes already enjoyed. This is something to keep in mind to understand the popular resistance of 1714 in favor of liberties that were not at all ethereal.

Those who question such evidence by stating that it is nothing more than virtual speculation or mythologizing, only serve to deny the reality of the Catalan model, founded on a firmly rooted constitutionalist culture that went against the power of the King, which was different from that of Castille, which was within the composed monarchy.

What are real and tangible are the legislative results of those Cortes that, according to Philip V, made the Catalans more republican than the abusive English government. It included advances such as the Court of Litigations (Tribunal de Contrafaccions), which took account of claims against actions carried out by royal and noble officials that were against the law.

The liquidation of the Catalan state and the mechanisms of political participation (The Catalan Corts, the General Provincial Council, the municipalities) was a clear political setback. It was not a democracy, but a representative system that gave voice to the social classes. It was a system that admitted in municipal councils the presence of craftsmen, that is, the common man, which was why the Marquis of Gironella advised Philip V that he should take advantage of the conquest to exalt the authority of true nobility, sweeping away what was seen as an excessive authority of the people.

On the contrary, what kind of modernity did the Nueva Planta Decree signify? A system that imposed direct appointment of positions or their outright sale, which established a militarization that even affected the position of the chief magistrate, which gave wings to municipal corruption that falsified the distribution of the land registry, under the protection of the Capitan General.

There were so many union protests between 1740 and 1770 (always evoking the better, previous, system) that the Council of State was obliged to initiate investigations: the Governor of Lleida, Mateo de Cron, was found guilty of mismanagement, entanglements and misappropriations, without being removed from office because he belonged to the military, as was the case with the Captain General Marquis de la Mina.

In Catalonia, as the century progressed and while economic development took hold, the divorce between political power and society grew. As if no time had passed, in 1773 during the revolt against the military draft, the guilds created a Diputació, or Council, a body designed to deal with the situation.

The Bourbon authorities did not hesitate to qualify it as a republican body that was incompatible with sovereignty in order to establish in Barcelona a democracy that was against the law. They based this on the clairvoyant (and unproven) assumption that only the glory of obeying was incumbent upon these vassals. This is a principle, imposed by force in 1714, which is extraneous to the political culture of the Catalans.

First published in El País.

Joaquim Albareda Salvadó, tenured professor of Modern History at the UPF. Sep 18th 2014.


FURTHER READING

The Catalan Courts gave social and collective benefits to the people, hence the popular resistance to the troops of Philip V

It’s not about the past, it’s about the future


Three hundred years ago today the city of Barcelona fell to the Bourbon troops. But I don’t want to talk too much about history, instead, I want to talk about the present. The end of the War of Succession and the arrival to the throne of Philip V represented the birth of a uniform, centralized and monolingual Spain in the hands of the Castilian powers. The political culture of the imposition triumphed over the political culture of agreements and respect for difference. Three centuries have gone by and, despite having gone from absolute monarchy to a democratic state (by way of much pain, violence and tyranny), Madrid remains true to that concept and way of doing things based on the more reactionary “command-and-control” mindset.

The reality –a happy reality- is that the world moves forward and, at the start of the 21st century, it is difficult for developed societies to accept to live under the kinds of rules that don’t allow people to express what they want. The large V-shaped demonstration that will be held today in the Catalan capital is a peaceful cry being made to the world: we are a national community and we want to vote on our future. As the Scots will do, thanks to an agreement with the British Government, a civilized method that is part of the same pacifist culture that had been stamped out by force at the start of the 18th century. That Hispanic project did not aim to seduce the Catalans, instead it saw them as mere property and as an anomaly, which is exactly what is happening today. Now, however, the big argument they have for undervaluing the Catalans’ demand is the Constitution of 1978. A text that, as is well known, the Catalan national minority could never change because that would depend (structurally-speaking) on the two big Spanish political parties, which are nationalists (without having to call themselves so). Here we have the perverse mechanism of the political framework that is presented to us as something that is “untouchable.”

The majority of people who will be at the V today will not be thinking about history too much. Thus, those who repeat incessantly that the pro-sovereignty movement is a romantic, nostalgic, irrational and irredentist movement, as my good friend Puigverd esteems it to be, can stop worrying; the only irredentism that I can see is that of Spanish governments demanding Gibraltar’s return to Spain. I can affirm –from what I experience, see and hear—that what is primarily propelling the great majority of people in Catalonia to mobilize themselves is the future and not the past. What encourage people to participate are the reflections they’ve been making on the world we will be leaving our children and grandchildren, more than the stones of the Born or the bones in the grave of the Fossar de les Moreres. The goal is not to restore powers from a time that is long past, but to build a more democratic and a more just country where Catalans no longer live under permanent suspicion as second-class Spaniards in economic, cultural and political terms. A country that has more power in a world in which sovereignties are transformed, but do not disappear.

They are right those who say that this undertaking presents many uncertainties, but the same could be said about the continuity of Catalonia within an official Spain that denies that there is more than one nation, which makes laws to Hispanicize schoolchildren, which fiscally stifles the progress and growth of a society, which each day insults and scorns a considerable part of those who sustain this Spanish state. To be honest, I don’t want that for my children or my grandchildren, and I would rather take on the risks of an exceptional transition than have to continue on a path that leads us to permanent victimhood or folkloric residualization. Ultimately, I am sure that no matter what difficulties there may be, it will not be worse than what my parents went through in post-war Spain, a period that was dominated by hunger, fear, poverty, illiteracy and the stick. I do not underestimate for one minute the instruments of coercion that Madrid has at its disposal, I am only stressing that we come from where we come from, and that this should give us more confidence.

José Luis Villacañas Berlanga has written “The History of Political Power in Spain” (RBA), a powerful essay that offers keys to how we have interacted with, lived with and killed each other in this part of the world. In 1714, after the victory of Berwick, the occupiers of Catalonia had a clear objective: “Militarization was seen,” writes Villacañas, “as the best medical remedy against the ‘the evil hopes of these naturals’ to regain their freedoms, as the defenders of this policy called it. It is not by chance that this language, which recalls the way new Christians were treated, who were also deemed to be sick with an evil blood. Castelrodrigo, the Captain General, suggested to the King that a public ceremony be held marking the introduction of the new Court, in which the books of the Catalan Constitutions would be burned. The purpose was that ‘no memory of them should remain.’ The proposal truly resembled an auto de fe.” So it was, from that moment on, that the Catalans became heretics in the eyes of the new Spanish King and his officials. Today, when I listen to some politicians and journalists in Madrid, it is evident this inquisitorial mentality persists and that, instead of generating adherence to a Spanish national project, it has become a factory of pro-independence supporters.

Many people will be out on the streets today, one year later, to reiterate that they want to vote. There are those who think that this can be stopped. They are wrong.

First published in Francesc-Marc Álvaro’s blog

Francesc-Marc Álvaro. Sep 11th 2014


FURTHER READING

The end of the Catalan nation


In 1905 Salvador Sanpere i Miquel published Fin de la nación catalana (“The end of the Catalan nation”), a comprehensive work on 1714 and its consequences. Despite the powerful title, the author did not believe that the 1714 date had been the end of the Catalan nation, as past authors had proclaimed, both with joy and with sadness. On the contrary, what Sanpere said was that “the only thing that died was a State, a political organization, not a nation.” Because “a nation lives so long as its language lives.” Thus he situated himself in the Catalan tradition that, unlike others, distinguishes between a nation and a state. The state is the political organization, it has to do with power and administration. The nation would be a community that shares significant features (like a language), that has more to do with social ties than political citizenship, and that recognizes itself as such.

Three hundred years after 1714, if we distinguish nation from state, it is evident that the Catalan nation did not die. Not even to come back to life in a renaissance. The state died, and it could be that this state will be brought back to life three hundred years later precisely because the Catalan nation did not die. If there is a nation, there can be a state once again. Of course, if you have a state –a very powerful one and with a huge capacity for symbolic integration—you can get to the point where you can build a tailor-made nation. France is the proof of this. But it is no guarantee: in 1714 the Spanish state was born, unitary and standardizing, and in three hundred years its success in having created a Spanish tailor-made nation, homogenous and similar to the French one, is rather questionable.

This coming 2014 will be one of intense debate and political action about the state. That’s perfect. In the modern world it is difficult for a cultural nation to survive without the complicity of a state. And the Spanish state has not wanted to be an accomplice of the Catalan nation, of its language, of its interests as a community. But, if the state is a necessary tool, it is not sufficient. The year 2014, which will be the year of the state, also has to be the year of the nation. It is what Sanpere always said: a nation lives if its language lives. The language is the most visible symbol. But the nation is much more. It is the language, culture, history, tradition, and law. The legacy. But it is also about its project for coexistence, social cohesion, everything that makes people living side by side become a community. The language –and even more so in our case, precisely because we come from so many different places—but also our urban planning, communication, economy, a productive mentality, shared values, social justice. The year 2014 is also the year of all of this. It’s not just about the state, which is a central issue and calls for strong efforts whether one has a state or doesn’t.

A few words on the language. It is important, but it is not the only distinguishing feature. It is a symbol of a sense of belonging. It is not true that where there is a language, there is a nation. Different nations can share a language, and nations that place the core of their identity in another area may have different languages. In our case the health of the nation depends on the health of the language wherever it is spoken. To have a language that is alive, useful, a tool of a powerful culture, which has prestige and social use, means to defend it where it is spoken. The year 2014 will also have to be the year of the defense of Catalan wherever it is spoken. It will need it.

The year 1714 was not the end of the Catalan nation. The Catalan nation was able to survive without a state in its favor, and at times with a state that was openly hostile against it. In the 21st century a cultural nation –understanding that culture here includes art and creativity, tradition and innovation, but also social cohesion and co-existence—can no longer survive without the complicity of a political power. Some of us are calling for a state precisely because of this: to serve the nation, as do all states of the world, and the Spanish state just like everyone else. There are those who are not calling for a state because they believe that the nation does not need it, and what we have today is enough. There are those who want to prevent there being a state because the nation bothers them or they couldn’t give a damn either way. There are those who are calling for a state because they like states, but also because they couldn’t give a damn about the nation. Fine. We will vote to see how many of us are out there. But the year 2014, for some people, is not just the year to work for the state, but also for the nation. Or, if you will, working for the state is the most urgent way (but not the only way) to work for the nation.

First published in diari ARA.

Vicenç Villatoro


FURTHER READING

V for “Vote”


The overwhelming success of the big V yesterday confirmed three things: the central and most dynamic sector of Catalan society will not accept any other route than that of voting about their future; the Pujol case has not in any way affected the will of thousands of people, and the unitary nature of the civil pro-sovereignty movement requires parties and political leaders to disregard any discrepancies and work cohesively to achieve goals, the first of which is the consultation on November 9th. It is true that, as happened in 2012 and last year as well, the challenge is to transfer the energy of the streets into political decisions. But this time everyone has the feeling that the mandate from the people is very clear: we want to vote and be heard. Artur Mas and Oriol Junqueras know this. And those in Madrid should also know this.

The unique demonstration held yesterday in Barcelona, perhaps the largest that has ever been held in Europe, also certifies that we have a new country that has disconnected itself from the Spanish authorities, and that feels that it is capable of living with the same (more or less limited) sovereignty as that of all the other member states of the European Union, without having to ask permission from Madrid. An official country that is also a very real country. The dominant attitude among people who yesterday were part of the V led by the ANC and Òmnium is trust: in ourselves, in the spirit of the times, in the reasoned force of democracy... Sometimes there are doubts about our current politicians. The demonstration was also a way to reiterate our commitment to each other.

It is true that the civil pro-sovereignty movement is too optimistic when it states that on this Diada, third time lucky, and that this time we are victorious, because everyone knows –no matter how they see the issue- that such processes are long or very long, the obstacles are enormous and –regardless of the reactions from Madrid- achieving statehood requires a number of important, delicate and complex steps, which cannot happen from one day to the next. Everything is extremely difficult, but we should be careful that there isn’t a moment when the social disconnect becomes a political and institutional disconnect. Timing is key and we should be careful to not to lose sight of this, to avoid mistakes.

Starting today we are entering an intense period marked by the November 9th milestone. The legality of the Parliament and the legality of the Spanish government will inevitably collide and we will see who can act and argue better to get through this next round. Our heads, and not our hearts, should dominate here. I have written before about how the bloc in favor of the consultation will be strong if it is smart and works together with trust. Spanish authorities are fueling discord, confusion and mistrust, which are their only hope. The people who formed the human V yesterday are expecting the hour of great politics.

First published in Francesc-Marc Álvaro’s blog.

Francesc-Marc Álvaro. Sep 12th 2014


FURTHER READING

The Scottish issue has only been postponed


Independence is no longer an option for Scotland. At least, not for the next twenty or thirty years. Or then again, maybe it is. This issue may come up again much sooner than it might seem today, given the words of the Scottish First Minister, according to which the referendum “is, perhaps, a unique opportunity to put the future Scotland in the hands of the Scottish.”

The results were clear. Just over 2 million Scots decided to stay in the union and only 1.6 million chose to become a new state. But the Scots, by responding yesterday to the big –and main- question that had been raised in Edinburgh, other questions have now been raised as a result of the campaign. In particular, regarding the promises that the three major parties in Westminster committed to in order to ensure the “no” vote. Because the consequences of the decision yesterday in Scotland run so deep that this will either force the UK to carry out a sweeping reform of its political structures, and to do this in record time, -which would be extremely complex-, or in fewer years than anybody would dare to predict today, the calls for independence for Scotland will appear yet again, and they may be even louder this time.

In accordance with the solemn promise, the vow, signed by the three unionist leaders David Cameron, Nick Clegg and Ed Miliband, and published on the front page of the Scottish tabloid Daily Record, Scotland will get new powers soon. The impetus given to the “Better Together” campaign in recent weeks by Gordon Brown, even setting a timetable to proceed with the extension of the Holyrood devolution, puts pressure on Downing Street and Westminster. Before the 15th of January, in fact, a draft of a new Scotland Bill should be presented to the Commons. London, however, won’t be able to handle it all alone. It will have to count on the support of the Scottish Government and eventually reach an agreement. And Nicola Sturgeon, the most likely successor to the First Minister position that Salmond will vacate in November, will not make it easy. No matter if it is Nicola Sturgeon or another First Minister, the SNP will govern Holyrood at least until 2016. The road is not completely cleared, then. But there are many more problems ahead.

In Cameron’s appearance at Downing Street that followed the announcement of the final results, the Premier made it clear that the constitutional changes that Scotland will experience after September 18th will not take place until after the general election of May 2015: “ We’ve heard the voice of Scotland, but now the millions of voices of England must also be heard.” And he even remarked that the future powers being returned to Edinburgh will not only depend only on the outcome of the next election, but the establishing a different constitutional framework that affects the entire state, including a point that would end up excluding Scottish MPs from taking part in decisions that only affect English territory, a particular phenomenon in English politics known as the West Lothian Question.

In this scenario, one based more on intentions than on hard facts, there is another –equally significant- problem. Because the plan to return powers to Scotland and to do it quickly clashes or could clash with the election timetable in Britain today and the coming months and years. If the parliament that emerges in 2015 does not deliver what it has promised in Scotland, due to opposition of the second row of Tory MPs from the English constituencies, or if it slows down too much, the Scottish elections of 2016 or 2021 could witness not just the consolidation of the SNP’s strength, but even its growth, including a renewed pro-independence movement.

Right now no one is thinking about a new referendum. It makes no sense. But if the promises that were made are not fulfilled, then it is a guarantee that we will see, much earlier than even Alex Salmond might think, new calls for separation. No longer under his leadership, of course, but probably under that of Nicola Sturgeon. Ten years? Fifteen? Eight?

One final note. On the day when the Catalan law is approved for the holding of consultations, the Scottish referendum will have taught us about a good number of factors to consider. The first, perhaps most importantly, it that it is not possible to lead a democratic process without the involvement of a significant part of the opposition, on a social and political level. Resolving this almost ethical issue that is inherent to Catalonia’s process is the great challenge for a pro-independence Catalonia, or at least, a Catalonia that is committed to defending the right to decide. And it must happen before November 9th. The difficulties, however, are so huge that it does not seem that this will be possible.

First published in Fundació CatDem’s website.

Quim Aranda. Sep 19th 2014


OPINION

No arguments about this vote, but another referendum will be unavoidable


When the turn-out is huge and the margin is clear, there can be no arguments.There need be no argument now. Scotland has said No to independence.

Whether Scotland yet knows what that choice implies is another matter. Whether those who run Britain have solved their Scottish problem for good or for a while remains, given that turn-out, to be seen.

At the time of writing 46% of the great majority of Scottish voters were content to break up the United Kingdom. They were outvoted by fellow Scots who chose an undefined offer of more powers for the Holyrood parliament. Two attitudes remain unreconciled.

There will be trouble, obviously enough, if the bigger Westminster parties do not, in the parlance, “deliver”. The Scottish National Party will seize upon any failure. But the signs, for No voters, are not promising.

Which powers? When? And how - if it’s even possible - can such concessions be reconciled with the growing sense in England that justice has not been done by its citizens?

In victory, the Better Together campaign might have made things difficult indeed for those who would keep the UK together.

How can you allow “English votes over English laws” while giving the Scots the luxury, as it is regarded, of the Barnett formula? [...]

You can read the full article, published in Herald Scotland, here: http://bit.ly/1p4aGYq

First published in Herald Scotland.

Ian Bell. Herald Scotland. Sep 19th 2014


OPINION

Getting to “sí”


THEY put a brave face on it in Catalonia. The Scottish “no” vote, said Catalan president Artur Mas, was a triumph for democracy and an enviable example of how to resolve nationalist tension within a European state. But it was also a setback. A Scottish “yes” would have proved that a European Union state can break up, and obliged EU leaders to find a way to cope. Catalan separatists would have tried to fall into Scotland’s slipstream, using its vote to boost support for a movement that has grown rapidly; some polls show a majority of Catalans favour a split.

But while the Scottish referendum was jointly proposed by the British and Scottish governments, Mr Mas is treading a more dangerous path. Madrid has refused to hold a referendum, so he is going it alone. On Friday Catalonia’s parliament passed a so-called “law of consultations”, with a view to allowing Mr Mas to call a referendum on November 9. Spain’s conservative prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, will try to block the referendum by sending the law to the constitutional court for study. They will almost certainly suspend it for several months, and may strike it down.

Mr Mas may try to call the referendum over the weekend, before the court has a chance to suspend it. But the court could then ban the referendum. If Mr Mas obeys and cancels the referendum, his minority nationalist government, propped up by the separatist Catalan Republican Left (ERC), may fall. The ERC has called for civil disobedience if the referendum does not take place. [...]

You can read the full article, published in The Economist, here: http://econ.st/1rOEhtS

First published in The Economist.

The Economist. Sep 19th 2014


OPINION

Catalonia’s march toward self-determination


In recent years Catalonia has witnessed an extraordinary political transformation. Turning their backs to what was a secular struggle for political autonomy within Spain, an overwhelming majority of Catalans now favor holding a referendum on Catalan independence where a majority would cast a positive vote for separation from Spain.

According to the results of two surveys conducted for Cadena Ser, one of the biggest radio stations in Spain, this September and one year ago, four out of five individuals favor holding a referendum on self-determination. Less than 15 percent are opposed to it. As amatter of fact, this level of support for such a referendum has been constant in recent years – as attested in the report on a political referendum that has been published by the Advisory Council on the National Transition set up by the Catalan Government and that compiles a long temporal series of surveys undertaken by a very diverse number of media and opinion poll institutes (CATN 2013). When asked as towhether they would support or oppose independence for Catalonia in a referendum, a half of the population would vote yes, a fourth would vote no and the rest of those surveyed would either abstain or express no opinion.

The majority in favor of independence barely changes even when individuals are offered a fiscal pact similar to the generous tax-and-spend arrangements in place in the Basque country – point- ing to the fact that pro-independence positions are motivated by more than purely economic or fiscal motivations. Similarly, almost a half of Catalans still prefer independence even when they are told this could hypothetically lead to being excluded from the European Union. In short, the Catalan movement toward self-determination has become widespread, has strong democratic roots and cannot be simply reduced to a fiscal revolt by a rich region battling an economic crisis.

A long historical march toward Catalan autonomy

Today’s conflict between Spain and Catalonia is often portayed by the Spanish side as a case of one part wanting to detach itself from the whole: alleging real or perceived grievances against the capital, a self-centered province uses the threat of separation to blackmail the state into making concessions that run counter to a presumed common good. Catalans describe instead their present difficulties with Spain as just the latest episode in the centuries-old friction between two human communities with different worldviews and conflicting political cultures – two national realities that were historically linked in an unequal partnership and have never found a way to live together in harmony.

When trying to present their case to the world, Catalans are at a disadvantage. They must start by asserting, and then proving, their existence. Spain, on the other hand, is taken for granted, not only as a political entity but as a social, cultural and historical reality. Indeed, a common claim of Spanish nationalists is that theirs is ‘the oldest nation in Europe’. It is true that, in the mid-fifteenth century, the medieval kingdoms of Aragon (led since its inception by the Catalan House of Barcelona) and Castile came under the joint rule of their respective monarchs. A royal marriage does provide a practical symbol of unity, but the fact is that each of those kingdoms kept its independence and continued to be governed separately and according to its own laws. It would take centuries for Castile’s avowed expansionist designs over the whole peninsula to be realized, gradually turning a collection of royal possessions into a unified state. Some commentators maintain that Spain as we know it is in fact a fairly recent creation.

In 1516 a Flemish prince, Charles V, inherited the Iberian kingdoms together with several other territories in Europe. Betting on the future of the American enterprise, which was being launched as a Castilian monopoly, he set the stage for his heir, Philip II, to make Castile the center of the em pire. Castilian bureaucracy relentlessly promoted a pattern of administrative and political homogenization for the whole Peninsula. As Spain’s grip on Europe declined in the seventeenth century, thanks to imperial overreach and the re-emergence of France, political tensions flared among the different peoples governed by the Spanish king. In 1640 both Portugal and Catalonia rebelled against royal power and for independence. In the case of Catalonia, the war ended in a political stalemate with Castile (and the loss of Roussillon and Conflent to France). However, sev- enty years later, the War of Succession led to the defeat of the Catalan army, the imposition of absolute rule by the Bourbon dynasty, and the banning of all Catalan institutions, including its powerful, five-hundred-year-old parliament.

The unified Spain that had finally been created by right of conquest in the eighteenth century was a backward society, with the state living on the wealth wrested from a shrinking empire. The decadence was made more obvious after the loss of most of the American colonies in the early nineteenth century. From then on, the history of Spain can be seen as the story of a society’s inability to evolve from a failed empire to a workable nation-state.

The only relative exceptions to the general decline were the so-called historic nations. The industrial revolu- tion only took hold in Catalonia and the Basque country in the nineteenth century. In Catalonia, the economic recovery would allow a rebirth of a culture that had been, and would remain, persecuted. And from there, a

Carles Boix and J.C. Major. Catalan Internationa View.


IN DEPTH

budding political project would emerge. Although at the time Europe’s borders were being redrawn and new states were appearing as nations struggled to pull themselves free from crumbling empires, Catalonia chose to carry on within Spain for two reasons: the military strength and authoritarian tendencies of Spain reminded Catalans of the terrible consequences they endured the last time they defied the state; and, at a time of economic nationalism and captive markets, the need to have access to the Spanish market for their industrial products. Nevertheless, Catalonia pursued a modicum of cultural and political autonomy through different strategies. They led an attempt to establish a federal state under the first republic of 1873-74 – which was quickly put to rest by a military coup and the restoration of the Bourbouns to the Spanish throne. Challenging the corrupt electoral system of that period, they finally obtained a minimal level of administrative autonomy in the pre-World War I period. In the wake of World War I and Woodrow Wilson’s international doctrine on the right of selfdetermination, the Catalan regionalist movement launched a campaign for a fully-fledged autonomous status. The campaign, that finally failed due to Spain’s resistance, eventually triggered the imposition of a military dictatorship in 1923 and the outright repression of Catalan language and culture.

With the collapse of the monarchy and the introduction of democracy and the Spanish republic in 1931, the Catalan question once more came to the fore. For the Republic to prevail over its many enemies (the royalists, the military, the church establishment and a small but troublesome group of newcomers, the fascists) the Catalans’ participation was essential. In exchange, the Spanish republican parties agreed to grant Catalonia a measure of au tonomy in the form of a self-rule charter, the first Estatut. Even though that concession came without an honest acknowledgement of Catalonia’s national nature, thereby upsetting the Catalan public, many in Spain considered it excessive and led to the first military insurrection (in 1932) against what many saw as the breakup of Spain. This was the prelude to a further coup, in 1936, and the start of a three-year civil war. That the ‘Catalan question’ was an important motivation for those supporting the military uprising is clear from statements the coup’s instigators made at the time.

Most Catalans stood by the Republic and lost once again. With the occupation by Franco’s nacionales, another dark period began for Catalonia. All the government institutions which had been re-established were dissolved, and anything that might suggest that Catalans were anything other than ordinary Spaniards, beginning with their language, was ruthlessly persecuted. Once more, the Catalans had no choice but to work quietly to build their economy while trying to preserve as much as they could from their culture, often in clandestine ways. This was the state of affairs at the time of Franco’s death in 1975.

The promise of constitutional rule

After Franco’s death a new regime that was acceptable to the other Western European nations had to be installed in Spain. For the forces of change to prevail over a still-powerful Francoist old guard, the Catalans and Basques needed to be brought on board. A long-standing demand by both communities was the recognition of their national character and the need to give it a political expression. The principle had been endorsed by all the political parties in the Spanish pro-democracy movement during the dictatorial period, but when the time came to make it effective, the political players leading the transition in Madrid proved to be as intrinsically centralist as their predecessors. The notion of various national communities coexisting as equals within the state was strongly resisted, and the result was the ambiguous wording that finally found its way into the 1978 Constitution. In an article that would prove to be open to conflicting interpretations, a distinction was made between the constituent ‘regions’ and ‘nationalities’, while the Spanish state reserved the title of ‘Nation’ 5 for itself.

Many Catalans chose to read into this a recognition of their historic rights and, consequently, the acceptance of a differential status for their community, allowing it to develop on its own terms and in line with its specific needs. A charter laying down the bases for the effective exercise of Catalan self-government, a second Estatut, became an organic law in 1979. This was thought to mark the beginning of a mutually beneficial relationship with the state, and the Catalans earnestly set out to fit in with the new order. It was hoped that nudging a self-absorbed Spain to open itself up to European influences and promoting the country’s economic prosperity and political stability would bring about the necessary societal change on which to build such a relationship.

Nonetheless, if a deal had ever been struck, Spain soon gave signs of wanting to go back on it. As early as 1981, an attempted coup was interpreted as a signal from the military to scrap the idea of differential treatment for Catalans and Basques. In 1982, the two parties that held the majority in Spain (though not in Catalonia) agreed on a process leading to the virtual equalization of all ‘autonomous communities’. Diluting the meaning of political autonomy by sharing it among 17 entities, most of them artificially created only months earlier, was their way of rejecting the principle of genuine selfgovernment for the historic nations.

This indicated a fundamental disagreement about what the new organization of the state was about. When signing up for the Spanish project in 1978, the Catalans had thought that it would eventually evolve into a federalstyle arrangement, in which most matters would come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the re-established Catalan parliament and government, and that a bilateral relationship would be instituted with the central state. Now, however, it was becoming apparent that from the Spanish point of view, autonomy meant little more than decentralizing part of the administration and farming out the onerous provision of services like health and education, while the central government would still have the last word on all essential policy-making, not least through its control of the collection and allocation of fiscal revenues.

These two opposing views as to the shape that the post-Franco regime should take were not to converge in the next thirty years. On the contrary, throughout that period Catalans found themselves having to use a lot of energy defending certain basic notions they thought had been settled for good. A pattern emerged of constant encroach- ment on self-government through laws and regulations, in an effort to exert control over areas that were supposed to be beyond the state’s jurisdiction, always in a way that suited the central government’s interests.6 Even more worrying was the realization that the Catalan cultural exception was not going to be accepted by unitary Spain. The traditional hostility towards the Catalans’ distinct personality, expressed most visibly in their language, had clearly not died away.

Despite a climate of growing disenchantment, frequent attempts were made by the Catalan side to change the course of events, with little success. Finally, in 2005, the Catalan Socialist Party, then leading the tripartite coalition in power in Catalonia, saw an opportunity after a presumably more receptive government had been elected in Madrid under Zapatero’s fellow Socialists. On the strength of the promise made by Zapatero in November of 2003 to support a new Estatut approved by the Catalan parliament, all political parties in Catalonia were enlisted (except the PP, which opposed the idea and worked to sabotage it from the start) in an effort to draft a new self-rule charter incorporating the quasi-federal concept of devolution that the Catalan side had

always advocated. Moreover, to guarantee the autonomy of the Catalan government against the central state’s systematic interventionism, the new Estatut was drafted employing highly detailed, almost cumbersome wording.

Even before its contents or its purpose were known, the idea of a new Estatut for Catalonia was greeted with suspicion throughout Spain, where it was viewed as a separatist ploy. The fiercest attacks (coming mostly, but not exclusively, from the PP) included calls to boycott Catalan products and found considerable popular support among large sectors of Spanish society. The process carried on regardless, in full compliance with the procedures laid down by Spanish law. The Catalan parliament debated and agreed on a consensus text taking into account the more tepid thinking about self-government advocated by the Socialist Party. This was submitted to the Spanish Cor- tes, where, presaging what was to follow, several important elements from the original were struck down. This watered-down version was then endorsed by the Catalans out of a feeling of resignation in a referendum in which the low turnout was a first sign of their disenchantment with the whole process. The new Estatut was duly signed by the King and thus became an organic state law, but that didn’t keep the PP from challenging it on constitutional grounds.

In 2010, ending a five-year period of uncertainty, Spain’s Constitutional Court (with one vacant position and three members serving with expired mandates due to a lack of agreement between Spain’s two main parties in the appointment of new judges) gave its ruling. Alleging technical adjustments needed to align the text with the 1978 Constitution, various articles were totally or partially invalidated, while others were seriously undermined thanks to an interpretation that was contrary to their original spirit. In the end, the resulting Estatut was no better than the previous one, and in any case it didn’t solve any of the problems that had called for the revision. But, beyond the more practical aspects, there was in the Court decision an ugly undercurrent that went to the heart of the matter. It was expressly stated that the term ‘nation’ used to refer to Catalonia in the preamble had no legal value. And to rub that in, the new text included eight references to the ‘indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation’. This meant denying the Catalans their collective rights as a people and shutting the door on any possibility of a bilateral relationship with central government.

What was essentially a unionist proposal, in so far that it aimed to find a practical solution to the state organization by defining the place of an autonomous Catalonia in a decentralized Spain, had been misinterpreted as a step towards separation. So everyone in Spain was happy with the court’s decision. By pulling the teeth of the Estatut, it was thought that the latest Catalan scheme had been derailed, and the intractable ‘Catalan question’ had been put off, for a few years at least. This was a serious mistake. If accepted in its original form, the new Estatut would have guaranteed the continuation of the Spanish enterprise. Of course, the price of unity would have been some loss of the control enjoyed by the Madrid-centered establishment. So, for the powers that be in the capital, the dilemma was between ceding part of that control, as the Catalans proposed, or taking a hard line, even if it meant antagonizing the Catalan people and risking an escalation of tension. Madrid chose the latter. What they failed to realize was that the new Estatut represented a strict minimum in order for the Catalans to go ahead with the Spanish venture. The message from the Court served to set the limits to Catalan self-rule and, subsequently, to what Catalans could expect from belonging to Spain. In Catalonia this naturally generated a feeling of indignation. Catalans felt they had been cheated when they agreed to a game in which the deck was stacked against them. It was all the more irritating because they had wasted almost five years and considerable energy on the Estatut project.

Although pro-secessionist sentiment had been growing since the rebuttal of the new Estatut in the Spanish Cortes, the Constitutional Court’s decision marked a decisive tipping point. Beginning in the fall of 2009, Catalans had been organizing local referenda on independence involving more than half a million voters without any institutional support. In July 2010, barely two weeks after the ruling on the Estatut had been made public, close to a million people marched in protest in Barcelona under the slogan ‘We are a nation, we decide’. From then on, more and more Catalans came to the conclusion that the Span- ish way had been closed to them and chose to start on a separate road.

Catalan political representatives were taking good note of those developments. A new administration led by President Artur Mas was elected in November 2010. They were times of crisis and the economy had taken center stage. It was deemed necessary to put more resources at the disposal of Catalan society by stopping the constant drainage of funds from Catalonia to the central government. This was an issue around which every social and political group in Catalonia was in agreement, and Mas made a commitment to propose to the central government what he called ‘a new fiscal pact with the state’.

But by then the Catalans’ exasperation had grown far beyond the financial aspects, creating a gradual but steady shift in public opinion. Pro-independence feeling that only a few years before barely represented one sixth of the electorate was fast becoming the majority option. On September 11 , 2012, most of the 1.5 million who marched during the Catalan National Day demonstration that made headlines around the world were openly calling for independence.

Only a few days later Mas made a last-ditch attempt to put across his proposal for a negotiation on the fiscal pact, which was contemptuously spurned by Spanish President Mariano Rajoy. This prompted Mas to call a snap election with just one major campaign promise: the Catalan people would be given the chance to vote in an official referendum as to their future relationship with the Spanish state. Although Mas’ coalition didn’t win by the landslide it expected, it was because many voters opted for a more openly pro-independence party. All in all, the elections of November of 2012 gave a two-thirds parliamentary majority to the parties in favor of holding a referendum – the remaining third being equally split between those opposed to any consultation and the Socialist Party, which mainly wanted to hold a referendum to promote a federal reform of the constitution.

The road ahead

After issuing a parliamentary declara- tion stating that Catalonia is sovereign to decide its future, the Catalan government has started to lay the necessary groundwork to hold a referendum in 2014. As part of the process, the regional government has promoted several political initiatives: (1) it has gathered a panel of experts in the form of an Advisory Council for the National Transion (CATN) to examine the legal and institutional steps that are needed to hold a referendum; (2) it has convened a broad civic platform, that now includes the main Catalan trade unions, a significant part of the business community and a broad swath of social and civic associations, including representatives of immigrant communities, all of which have agreed to support the right to hold a consultation: (3) it has recently committed itself (with the support of two thirds of the parliamentary seats) to

set a date and a question for a referendum to be held in 2014; (4) it has informed the Spanish government as to these steps and has invited it to agree to the holding of a referendum.

As thoroughly discussed in the first report issued by the Advisory Council (CATN), holding a referendum on self- determination is legitimate and legally possible. As of today, the legitimate use of the principle of self-determination is defined by two main bodies of legal and jurisprudence doctrine. On the one hand, the opinion of Canada’s Supreme Court on the case of Quebec (followed by the Clarity Act), where the Court acknowledges that even if the Quebecois government cannot ‘invoke a right of self-determination to dic- tate the terms of a proposed secession to the other parties to the federation’, Canada has ‘no basis to deny the right of the government of Quebec to pursue secession’. The ideals that inspire this opinion lie behind the recent agreement between Scotland and Britain on the Scottish referendum of September 2014. On the other hand, an opinion issued by the International Court of Justice in 2010 on the case of Kosovo states that international law does not forbid the right of self-determination provided it is conducted through peaceful and democratic means.

The Spanish legal order provides at least five channels through which to consult the Catalan people as to their opinion about the future status of Catalonia. Three of them depend on the explicit will of the Spanish government, which may directly authorize a (non-binding) referendum in Catalonia (art. 92 of the Spanish constitution), delegate the power to hold one to the Catalan government (art. 150.2), or reform the constitution (through the procedures estalished in art. 167 and previously employed in the summer of 2012 to constitutionalize the deficit limits agreed by the EU). At this point, however, the Spanish government has declined to respond to the Catalan government’s request one way or another. In fact, the Spanish government has not even entertained the possibility (raised by a reduced minority of Spanish intellectuals and journalists) to engage in some form of meaningful dia- logue or negotiations that could accom- modate the demands of Catalan society.

In turn, the Catalan government can hold referenda directly through two means: according to the current Catalan law on referenda; and using a new law (now under discussion in the Catalan Parliament) on political consultations. In both cases, however, the central state could always challenge the law (or its application) before the Constitutional Court: given the dubious independence of this court (the current president was a former member of the Partido Popular author of a book that contains de- meaning remarks about Catalans), the likelihood that the Catalan referendum could be technically blocked is high.

As pointed out earlier, both the Catalan government and the Catalan Parliament have committed themselves to holding a referendum in 2014, as a response to massive popular demands, as confirmed by numerous opinion polls. If, for purely political reasons, the Spanish government blocks it, the Catalan government could (and in fact it has already stated that it would) resort to holding fresh parliamentary elections. Those elections would then work ‘as if ’ they were a referendum, that is, the electoral campaign would most likely pivot around the exercise of self-determination and the will of the Catalans to become independent or not.

Although the Spanish Senate is empowered by art. 155 of the constitution to suspend an autonomy, the likelihood of this happening seems remote as of today. It would certainly not resolve a problem that would arise in every election (local, Spanish, European) to be held in the future. There are two factors that make the current Catalan movement strong. First, it is a truly grassroots movement that has developed spontaneously and independently from political parties. As such, it cannot be put back into the bottle through some kind of shady deal between political elites. Second, it is an extraordinary civic and peaceful movement, as attested most recently by the demonstration of September 11th, 2013, where 1.6 million people held hands along a 400 km human chain from northern Catalonia to the region of Valencia demanding independence in a festive, orderly manner. This has nothing to do with the violent and exclusive activities that have sometimes accompanied other national popular movements in Europe. On the contrary, the Catalan process toward self-determination invokes, both in its form and substance, the true spirit of democracy. It therefore calls for a generous political response from Spain – in the form of a political referendum on the future status of Catalonia.

Carles Boix: Is the Robert Garrett Professor of Politics and Public Affairs at Princeton University and a member of the Advisory Council for the National Transition of the Government of Catalonia.

J. C. Major: is one of the founders of Col·lectiu Emma and the editor of its webpage ‘Explaining Catalonia’.

First published in Catalan International View.

The War of the Spanish Succession. Nueva Planta Decrees. Suppression of the Catalan State.


Catalonia’s gamble on Charles of Austria and against Philip V, in the succession conflict for the Spanish crown, supposed the loss of all its rights and governing institutions which it held, as a state, within the Spanish monarchy. The international factor completely determined Catalonia’s destiny in the War of the Spanish Succession.

The European powers shook when, in 1701, Charles II left, in his will, the throne of the Spanish monarchy to Philip of Anjou, the grandson of Louis XIV of France. Leopold I, Holy Roman Emperor, and a descendant of Philip III of Spain, also reclaimed the right of his lineage to the throne, in favour of his grandson Charles of Hapsburg. Although the Hispanic Empire was in decline, the American colonies were a source of coveted richness. Therefore, when Philip of Anjou was crowned, England, the Netherlands and the Germanic Empire, who became alarmed by the power France was acquiring, signed the Treaty of The Hague in 1701, and declared war on France and Spain. The dynastic question, however, was only the visible face of a European conflict in which, what was really in play, was the economy and the equilibrium of strengths.

From the beginning Catalonia accepted Philip V as King. In turn, as his grandfather had advised him, he took great pains to make a good impression and soon visited Barcelona, where he convoked the Courts, the first to be held since 1632, and swore the Constitutions. In Catalonia, the sector which was more economically entrepreneur had recovered after the upheaval of the Reapers’ War and feared the new monarch. Furthermore, the anti-French sentiment had become rooted in many sectors of the population. For example, it was especially deep on the plain of Vic, due to Louis XIV’s constant attempts to annex the area, the most recent attempt being during the Nine Years’ War in 1697.

A group of constitutional leaders was formed that supported the candidature of Charles of Austria against the more absolutist way of thinking of the French bourbons. The mirroring of those who backed the house of Austria’s candidate in the political regimes of representative nature, like England and Holland, and their commercial power, encouraged them to search for the support in The Hague’s Alliance and to position themselves on the side of Charles of Austria.

The house of Austria’s supporters soon found support in the sermons of numerous ecclesiastics who spread their ideas, ably assisted by the viceroy Velasco and the royal official’s arrogant attitude, which became very evident during the first years of Philip V’s rule. So, as well as the anti-Bourbon detractors on the plane of Vic, who were known as ‘vigatans’, other groups, in favour of the house of Austria’s candidate, appeared around the ‘Acadèmia dels Desconfiats’ [Academy of Distrustful] in Barcelona, amongst whom we find the old lieutenant Jordi de Hesse-Darmstadt, who was known for the important role he played against the French occupation during the Nine Years’ War.

The conversations with the allies were initiated and they agreed upon a precipitated disembarkation of British and Dutch boats commanded by Jordi de Darmstadt at Barcelona, in May 1704. This first attempt to enter into Barcelona failed, mainly because it was not backed by the Catalan institutions and was rebuked by the troops of viceroy Velasco.

In spite of this failure, on June 20th 1705, the ‘vigatans’ Antoni de Peguera and Domènec Parera signed the Treaty of Geneva with England, by which the English promised to facilitate the necessary military support to put Charles of Austria on the thrown and afterwards guarantee the respect of Catalonia’s Constitutions. A second allied disembarkation, first at Altea, and later in Barcelona, was possible, and allowed the Austrian supporters’ revolt to spread to the Valencian region and Catalonia. In October, the Anglo-Catalan forces accomplished an important victory in Barcelona, with the taking of Montjuïc, and finally, Charles III was recognised as King by the Catalan institutions.

During a first period when it seemed that victories favoured them, the allied army conquered Saragossa and Madrid, but the defeat in the battle of Almansa, in April 1707, provoked the fall of the Kingdoms of Valencia and Aragon under the power of Philip V, who constituted the Nueva Planta Decree, liquidating their own institutions and privileges. From that moment onwards, the war background was concentrated in Catalonia. The later victory at the battle of Almenar in July 1710, saw the Austrian supporters’ advance, however, the sudden death of Joseph I, brother of King Charles of Austria, forced him to return to Vienna to take charge of the empire. This event influenced the allies’ support in Catalonia, which was principally English, because the Tory government was already defending a peace negotiated with France. At that time they had a decisive argument: avoid the formation of a large Germanic-Hispanic imperial block.

England and France began secret negotiations in 1711 to establish a new European equilibrium, which formally materialised in the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. Already alerted, Catalonia sent ambassadors to try to save the situation by defending its rights and the validity of the pact with England, but they were not given the opportunity to take part. At the same time, Charles of Austria, who had already been crowned emperor, ordered the transfer of the regent Queen to Vienna, who until then had been in Barcelona. The Catalan leaders started to witness, with incredulity, the abandonment of their allies.

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Of the peace treaties of Utrecht and later Rastatt, the English obtained a considerable profit. From the French side, the cession of American territories and, from Philip V, other than Gibraltar and Minorca, which had already been conquered, there were other stable commercial positions in the western Mediterranean and America. The ‘Catalans’ case’, as the debate in the English Parliament over the convenience and even moral of abandoning or not an ally in a position of weakness was known, continued for many years in the European political circles.

The allied forces evacuated Catalonia and, by July 1713, excepting Barcelona city and Cardona strong square, the region had already been occupied by Philip V’s army. They had to reach a decision, and the Diputació del General convoked an extraordinary meeting of the ‘Junta de Braços’ [Flanks’ Meeting], to decide upon surrendering or continuing the resistance. The members of the ecclesiastical flank, alleging that it was a military problem, did not pronounce on the matter. A part of the military flank backed negotiating a capitulation, but the royal flank, formed by the cities and the lesser privileged classes, voted in favour of resisting and continued with the fight. Finally, the military flank joined in and, on July 9th 1713, the Diputació del General assumed the decision of the Flanks’ Meeting and communicated the agreement to the nation.

On July 25th, the troops of the duke of Populi supporting Philip arrived with 25.000 soldiers and the siege of Barcelona commenced. During thirteen months of the siege, other revolts erupted all over Catalonia, but they were quickly suppressed by the army, in a bloody manner. After a year of heroic resistance by the Barcelonans, Louis XIV substituted the duke of Populi for the duke of Berwick, who arrived in July 1714 with a new contingency of troops. Taking advantage of the wear and tear on the Catalan army led by Rafael Nebot and Antoni de Villarroel, Berwick’s troops won on September 11th and Barcelona finally capitulated. After the fall of the city, its own institutions and laws were abolished and those of Castilla were imposed by the force of weapons and the right of conquest. These laws also implied the disappearance of the historical territorial division of the region. Thus, there commenced a new period in the history of Catalonia which was characterised by the Bourbon repression by the leaders of the Austrian side. This is exemplified by the capture, quartering and public exhibition of the head of General Moragues who, for twelve years, had been one of the most representative Catalan military men.

Between 1714 and 1716, which is the date when the Nueva Planta Decree was finalised and published, Philip V set-up in Catalonia a provisional governing administration called ‘Real Junta Superior de Gobierno y Justicia’ [Real Superior Meeting of Government and Justice], which was presided over by José Patiño. The idea of Philip V and his closest councillors, amongst whom there was Patiño, was to accomplish the disappearance of the region’s institutional system, that is to say, its legislative voice, to put an end to the break with what were the pacts and the Constitutions for the monarchy. The region must be given some institutions related to the absolutist scheme of the Bourbon’s politics. In accordance with Nueva Planta, the Principality’s government would be held by a Capitan general, a military man and the Royal Audience, as a mere consulting organ which, together, formed the ‘Real Acuerdo’ [Royal Agreement]. The decree stipulated the working of the Audience and of the new administrative and political system. Later, the ‘Real Cédula’ of 1718, known as the ‘Nueva Planta Municipal’, developed the working of the new municipal regime.

Philip V did not only abolish Catalonia’s own institutions and Constitutions that had developed as organs of its own and independent stately government since the middle of the thirteenth century, but he also substituted them with a regime that excluded the representation of society, with the objective of making military authority prevail over civil authority.

First published in Culturcat.

ISSN: 2014-9093 | Legal deposit: B. 2198-2013

Looking to the Future (In Transit #30)

News & Politics

Transcript of Looking to the Future (In Transit #30)