EN BANC[G.R. No.117577. December 1, 1995.]ALEJANDRO B. TY AND MVR PICTURE TUBE INC.,petitioners,vs.THE HON. AURELIO C. TRAMPE, in his capacity as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. THE HON. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR OF PASIG AND THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF PASIG,respondents.Medel, Macam, Del Rosario, Collado & Polinesfor petitioners.Chuchi D.S. Tanfor respondents Pasig Municipal Treasurer and Municipal Assessors.The Solicitor Generalfor respondents.SYLLABUS1.STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; REPEALS BY IMPLICATION NOT FAVORED;P.D. 921, NOT REPEALED BYRA 7160(LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE). Although RA. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) has a repealing provision (Section 534), if the intention of the legislature was to abrogateP.D. 921, it would have included it in such repealing clause. Hence, any repeal or modification ofP.D. 921can only be possible under par. (f) of Section 534 which partakes of the nature of a general repealing provision. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are so clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist. This is based on the rationale that the will of the legislature cannot be overturned by the judicial function of construction and interpretation. Their function is to try to harmonize, as much as possible, seeming conflicts in the laws and resolve doubts in favor of their validity and co-existence.PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 921was promulgated on 12 April 1976, with the aim of,inter alia, evolving "a progressive revenue raising program that will not unduly burden the tax payers . . ." in Metropolitan Manila. Hence, it provided for the "administration of local financial services in Metropolitan Manila" only, and for this purpose, divided the area into four Local Treasury and Assessment Districts, regulated the duties and functions of the treasurers and assessors in the cities and municipalities in said area and spelled out the process of assessing, imposing and distributing the proceeds of real estate taxes therein. Upon the other hand,Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise, "known and cited as the 'Local Government Code of 1991'" took effect on 01 January 1992. It declared "genuine and meaningful local autonomy" as a policy of the state. Such policy was meant to decentralize government "powers, authority, responsibilities and resources" from the national government to the local government units "to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals." In the formulation and implementation of policies and measures on local autonomy, "(l)ocal government units may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them." From the above, it is clear that the two laws are not co-extensive and mutually inclusive in their scope and purpose. WhileR.A. 7160covers almost all governmental functions delegated to local government units all over the country,P.D. 921embraces only the Metropolitan Manila area and is limited to the administration of financial services therein, especially the assessment and collection of real estate (and some other local) taxes. Coming down to specifics, Sec. 9 ofP.D. 921requires that the schedule of values of real properties in the Metropolitan Manila area shall be preparedjointlyby the city assessors in the districts created therein; while Sec. 212 ofR.A. 7160states that the schedule shall be prepared "by the provincial, city and municipal assessors of the municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area for the different classes of real property situated in their respective local government units for enactment by ordinance of the sanggunian concerned. . . ." It is obvious that harmony in these provisions is not only possible, but in fact desirable, necessary and consistent with the legislative intent and policy.cdrep2.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; RULE ON EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; EXCEPTION IS WHERE CONTROVERSY INVOLVED IS ONLY QUESTION OF LAW. Although as a rule, administrative remedies must first be exhausted before resort to judicial action can prosper, there is a well-settled exception in cases where the controversy does not involve questions of fact but only of law. In the present case, the parties already agreed "that the issues in the petition are legal" and thus, no evidence was presented. In laying down the powers of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals,R.A. 7160provides in Sec. 229 (b) that "(t)he proceedings of the Board shall be conducted solely for the purpose of ascertaining the facts . . . ." It follows that appeals to this Board may be fruitful only where questions of fact are involved. Again, the protest contemplated under Sec. 252 ofR.A. 7160is needed where there is a question as to the reasonableness of the amount assessed. Hence, if a taxpayer disputes the reasonableness of an increase in a real estate tax assessment, he is required to "first pay the tax" under protest. Otherwise, the city or municipal treasurer will not act on his protest. In the case at bench however, the petitioners are questioning the very authority and power of the assessor, acting solely and independently, to impose the assessment and of the treasurer to collect the tax. These are not questions merely of amounts of the increase in the tax but attacks on the very validity ofanyincrease.3.STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY; RULE. The constitutionality of a law, regulation, ordinance or act will not be resolved by courts if the controversy can be, as in this case it has been, settled on other grounds. In the recent case ofMacasiano vs. National Housing Authority, this Court declared: "It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the verylis motapresented. To reiterate, the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law are: (a) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, (b) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party, (c) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity, and (d);the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case. "In view of the foregoing ruling, the question may be asked: what happens to real estate tax payments already made prior to its promulgation and finality? Under the law, 'the taxpayer may file a written claim for refund or credit for taxes and interests . . . ."THCSAED E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN,Jp:ARE THE INCREASED REAL ESTATE TAXES imposed by and being collected in the Municipality (now City) of Pasig. effective from the year 1994, valid and legal? This is the question brought before this Court for resolution.The PartiesPetitioner Alejandro B. Ty is a resident of and registered owner of lands and buildings in the Municipality (now City) of Pasig, while petitioner MVR Picture Tube Inc. is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws and is likewise a registered owner of lands and buildings in said Municipality. 1Respondent Aurelio C. Trampe is being sued in his capacity as presiding judge of Branch 163, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region. sitting in Pasig, whose Decision dated 14 July 1994 and Order dated 30 September 1994 in Special Civil Action No. 629 (entitled "Alejandro B. Ty and MVR Picture Tube. Inc. vs. The Hon. Secretary of Finance, et al.") are sought to be set aside. Respondent Secretary of Finance is impleaded as the government officer who approved the Schedule of Market Values used as basis for the new tax assessments being enforced by respondents Municipal Assessor and Municipal Treasurer of Pasig and the legality of which is being questioned in this petition.2The Antecedent FactsOn 06 January 1994, respondent Assessor sent a notice of assessment respecting certain real properties of petitioners located in Pasig. Metro Manila in a letter dated 18 March 1994, petitioners through counsel "request(ed) the Municipal Assessor to reconsider the subject assessments." 3Not satisfied, petitioners on 29 March 1994 filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 163, presided over by respondent Judge, a Petition for Prohibition with prayer for a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to declare null and void the new tax assessments and to enjoin the collection of real estate taxes based on said assessments. In a Decision4dated 14 July 1994, respondent Judge denied the petition "for lack of merit" in the following disposition:"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, petitioners' prayer to declare unconstitutional the schedule of market values as prepared by the Municipal Assessor of Pasig, Metro Manila, and to enjoin permanently the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, Metro Manila. from collecting the real property taxes based thereof (sic) is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Cost (sic)de oficio."Subsequently, petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was also denied by respondent Judge in an Order5dated 30 September 1994.Rebuffed by said Decision and Order, petitioners filed this present Petition for Review directly before this Court, raising pure questions of law and assigning the following errors:"The Court aquogravely erred in holding thatPRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 921was expressly repealed byR.A. 7160and that said presidential decree including its Implementing Rules (P.D. 464) went down to the statutes' graveyard together with the other decision(s) of the Supreme Court affecting the same."The Court aquowhile holding that the new tax assessments have tremendously increased ranging from 418.8% to 570%, gravely erred in blaming petitioners for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies provided for by law."The Court aquoblatantly erred in not declaring the confiscatory and oppressive nature of the assessments as illegal, void ab initioand unconstitutional constituting a deprivation of property without due process of law."6In a resolution dated 21 November 1994, this Court, without giving due course to the petition, required respondents to comment thereon. Respondents Municipal Treasurer and Municipal Assessor, through counsel, filed their Comment on 19 December 1994, and respondent Secretary of Finance, through the Solicitor General, submitted his on 11 May 1995. Petitioners filed their Reply to the Comment of respondent Assessor and Treasurer 06 January 1995, and their Reply to that of the respondent Secretary on 18 May 1995. After careful deliberation on the above pleadings, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition, and, inasmuch as the issues are relatively simple, the Court dispensed with requiring the parties to submit further memoranda and instead decided to consider the respondents' respective comments as their answers and memoranda. Thus the case is now considered submitted for resolution.The IssuesThe issues brought by the parties for decision by this Court are:1.WhetherRepublic Act No. 7160, otherwise known asThe Local Government Code of 1991, repealed the provisions ofPRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 921;2.Whether petitioners are required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial relief; and3.Whether the new tax assessments are oppressive and confiscatory, and therefore unconstitutional.In disposing of the above issues against petitioners, the court aquoruled that the schedule of market values and the assessments based thereon preparedsolelyby respondent assessor are valid and legal, they having been prepared in accordance with the provisions ofThe Local Government Code of 1991(R.A. 7160). It held also that said Code had effectively repealed the previous law on the matter,P.D. 921, which required, in the preparation of said schedule,jointaction by all the city and municipal assessors in the Metropolitan Manila area. The lower court also faulted petitioners with failure to exhaust administrative remedies provided under Sections 226 and 252 ofR.A. 7160. Finally, it found the questioned assessments consistent with the tremendously increased . . . price of real estate anywhere in the country."7Stated the court:'This Court is inclined to agree with the view of defendants thatR.A. 7160in its repealing clause provide (sic) that Presidential Decree Nos. . . . 464 . . . are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect. Hence said presidential decrees including their implementing rules went down to the statutes'graveyard together with the decisions of the Supreme Court on cases effecting (sic) the same."This Court is also in accord with respondents (sic) view that petitioners failed to avail of either Section 226 ofR.A. 7160, that is by appealing the assessment of their properties to the Board of Assessment Appeal within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the written Notice of Assessment, and if it is true that petitioner (sic) as alleged in their pleadings was not afforded the opportunity to appeal to the board of assessment appeal, then they could have availed of the provisions of Section 252, of the sameR.A. 7160by paying the real estate tax under protest. Because of petitioners (sic) failure to avail of either Sections 226 or 252 ofR.A. 7160, they failed to exhaust administratives (sic) remedies provided for by law before bringing the case to Court. (Buayan Cattle Co., Inc. vs. Quintillan 128 SCRA 276) Therefore the filing of this case before this Court is premature, the same not falling under the exception because the issue involved is not a question of law but of fact. (Valmonte vs. Belmonte. Jr., 170 SCRA 256)"Petitioners also alleged that the New Tax Assessments are not only oppressive and confiscatory but also destructive in view of the tremendous increase in its valuation, from P855,360.00 to P4,121, 280.00 a marked increase of 418.8% of one of its properties, while the other, from P857,600.00 to P4,374,410.00, an increased (sic) of 510%. This Court agree (sic) with petitioners (sic) observation, but the reality (sic) the price of real property anywhere in the country tremendously increased. This is shown in the Real Estate Monitor of Econotic Incorporated (copy attached withthe memorandum of respondents). For example real properties in Pasig in 1991 located at the Ortigas Commercial Complex command (sic) a price of P42,000.00 per square meter which price is supported by a case filed before this Court (civil case no. 64506, Jesus Fajardo, et al. vs. Ortigas and Co.) for Recovery (sic) of agents (sic) commission. The property subject of the sale which was also located at the Ortigas Commercial Complex at Pasig, Metro Manila was sold to a Taiwanese at P42,000.00 per square meter. It is therefore not surprising that the assessment of real properties in Pasig increased tremendously. Had petitioners first exhausted administrative remedies they would have realized the fact that prices of real estate has (sic) tremendously increased and would have known the reason/reasons why."8In its Order dated 30 September 1994 denying the Motion for Reconsideration, the court aquoruled:'This Court despite petitioners' exhaustive and thorough research and discussion of the point in issue, is still inclined to sustain the view thatP.D. 921was impliedly repealed byR.A. 7160.P.D. 921to the mind of this Court is an implementing law ofP.D. 464, Sections 3, 6, 9, 12 and 13 of said P.D. provide how certain provisions of PD. 464 shall be implemented. SinceP.D. 464was expressly repealed byR.A. 7160,P.D. 921must necessarily be considered repealed, otherwise, what should Sections 3, 6, 9, 12 and 13 ofP.D. 921implement? And, had the law makers intended to have saidP.D. 921remain valid and enforceable they would have provided so inR.A. 7160. Since there is none,P.D. 921must be considered repealed."9Re:The First Issue Repeal of P.D.921 ?To resolve the first issue, it is necessary to revisit the following provisions of law:1.Section 15 ofP.D. No. 464, promulgated on 20 May 1974, otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code:"SECTION 15.Preparation of Schedule of Values. Before any general revision of property assessments is made, asprovided in this Code, there shall beprepared for the province or city a Schedule of Market Value for the different classes of real property therein situated in such form and detail as shall be prescribed by the Secretary of Finance."Said schedule, together with an abstract of the data (on) which it is based, shall be submitted to the Secretary of Finance forreview not later than the thirty-first day of December immediately preceding the calendar year the general revision of assessments shall be undertaken. The Secretary of Finance shall have ninety days from the date of receipt within which to review said schedule to determine whether it conforms with the provisions of this Code."2.Subsequently, on 12 April 1976,P.D. 921was promulgated, which in Section 9 thereof, states:"SECTION 9.Preparation of Schedule of Values for Real Property within the Metropolitan Area. The Schedule of Values that will serve as the basis for the appraisal and assessment for taxation purposes of real properties located within the Metropolitan Area shall be prepared jointly by the City Assessors of the Districts created under Section one hereof, with the City Assessor of Manila acting as Chairman, in accordance with the pertinent provisions ofPresidential Decree No. 464, as amended, otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code, and the implementing rules and regulations thereof issued by the Secretary of Finance."3.Section One ofP.D. 921, referred to above, provides:"SECTION 1.Division of Metropolitan Manila into Local Treasury and Assessment Districts. For purposes of effective fiscal management, Metropolitan Manila is hereby divided into the following Local Treasury and Assessment Districts:First DistrictManilaSecond DistrictQuezon City, Pasig, Marikina,Mandaluyong and San JuanThird DistrictCaloocan City, Malabon, Navotasand ValenzuelaFourth DistrictPasay City, Makati, Paranaque,Muntinlupa, Las Pinas, Pateros andTaguig"Manila, Quezon City, Caloocan City and Pasay City shall be the respective Centers of the aforesaid Treasury and Assessment Districts."4.On 01 January 1992,Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known asThe Local Government Code of 1991, took effect, Section 212 of said law is quoted as follows:"SECTION 212.Preparation of Schedule of Fair Market Values. Before any general revision of property assessment is made pursuant to the provisions of this Title, there shall be prepared a schedule of fair market values by the provincial. city and the municipal assessors of the municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area for the different classes of real property situated in their respective local government units for enactment by ordinance of the sanggunian concerned. The schedule of fair market values shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, city or municipality concerned, or in the absence thereof, shall be posted in the provincial capitol cityormunicipal hall and in two other conspicuous public place therein."LexLib5.The repealing clause ofR.A. 7160found in Section 534 thereof is hereby reproduced as follows:"SECTION 534.Repealing Clause. (a). . .(b). . .(c). . .;and Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 626, 632,752, and 1136 arehereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect.xxx xxx xxx(f)All general and special laws, acts, city charter, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." (Emphasis supplied)It is obvious from the above provisions ofR.A. 7160, specifically Sec. 534, thatP.D. 921was NOT EXPRESSLY repealed by said statute. Thus, the question is: WasP.D. 921IMPLIEDLY repealed byR.A. 7160?Petitioners contend that, contrary to the aforequoted Decision of the lower court. "whether the assessment is made before or after the effectivity ofR.A. 7160, the observance of, and compliance with, the explicit requirement ofP.D. 921is strict and mandatory either" becauseP.D. 921was not impliedly repealed byR.A. 7160and is therefore still the applicable statute, or because the Supreme Court, in three related cases10promulgated on 16 December 1993 after theLocal Government Code of 1991already took effect ruled that a schedule of market values and the corresponding as assessments based thereon "preparedsolelyby the city assessor . . . failed to comply with the explicit requirement (of collegial and joint action by all the assessors in the Metropolitan Manila area underP.D. 921) . . . and are on that account illegal and void."On the other hand, respondents aver that Section 9 ofP.D. 921and Section 212 ofR.A. 7160are clearly and unequivocally incompatible because they dwell on the same subject matter, namely, the preparation of a schedule of values for real property within the Metropolitan Manila Area. UnderP.D. 921, the schedule shall be preparedjointlyby the city assessors of the District, while, underR.A. 7160, such schedule shall be prepared "by the provincial, city and municipal assessors of the municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila area . . . ". Furthermore, they claim that "Section 9 (ofP.D. 921) merely supplement(ed) Section 15 ofP.D. 464in so far as the preparation of the schedule of values in Metro Manila (is concerned)." Thus, "with the express repeal ofP.D. 464. . .P.D. 921. . . can not therefore exist independently on its own." They also argue that although the aforecited Supreme Court decision was promulgated afterR.A. 7160took effect, "the assessment of the Municipal Assessors in those three (3) cited cases were assessed in 1990 prior to the effectivity of the Code." Hence, the doctrine in said cases cannot be applied to those prepared in 1994 underR.A. 7160.We rule for petitioners.R.A. 7160has a repealing provision (Section 534) and, if the intention of the legislature was to abrogateP.D. 921, it would have included it in such repealing clause, as it did in expressly rendering of no force and effect several other presidential decrees. Hence, any repeal or modification ofP.D. 921can only be possible underpar. (f) of said Section 534, as follows:"(f)All general and special laws, acts, city charter, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly."The foregoing partakes of the nature of a general repealing provision. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are so clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist. This is based on the rationale that the will of the legislature cannot be overturned by the judicial function of construction and interpretation. Courts cannot take the place of Congress in repealing statutes. Their function is to try to harmonize, as much as possible, seeming conflicts in the laws and resolve doubts in favor of their validity and co-existence.InVillegas v.Subido11the issue raised before the Court was whether the Decentralization Act had the effect of repealing what was specifically ordained in the Charter of the City of Manila. Under the Charter, it was provided in its Section 22 that "The President of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on Appointments shall appoint . . . the City Treasurer and his Assistant." Under the Decentralization Act, it was provided that "All other employees, except teachers paid out of provincial, city or municipal general funds and other local funds shall . . . be appointed by the provincial governor, city or municipal mayorupon recommendation of the head of office concerned."The Court, in holding that there was no implied repeal in this case,12said:. . . It has been the constant holding ofthis Court that repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the legislature so intended. Such a doctrine goes as far back as United States v. Reyes, a 1908 decision (10 Phil. 423. Cf. U.S. v. Academia, 10 Phil. 431 [1908]). It is necessary then before such a repeal is deemed to exist that it be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. (Cf. Calderon V. Provincia del Santisimo Rosano, 28 Phil. 164 [1914]). There must be a showing of repugnancy clear and convincing in character. The language used in the latter statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what has been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice. What is needed is a manifest indication of the legislative purpose to repeal. [Citing numerous cases]"More specifically, a subsequent statute, general in character as to its terms and application, is not to be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment. unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest. This is so even if the provisions of the latter are sufficiently comprehensive to include what was set forth in the special act. This principle has likewise been consistently applied in decisions of this Court from Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty (40 Phil. 224),decided as far back as 1919. A citation from an opinion of Justice Tuason is illuminating. Thus: From another angle the presumption against repeal is stronger. A special law is not regarded as having been amended or repealed by a general law unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest. Generalia specialibus non derogant.And this is true although the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the matter in the special statute. . . . At any rate, in the event harmony between provisions of this type in the same law or in two laws is impossible, the specific provision controls unless the statute, considered in its entirety, indicates a contrary intention upon the part of the legislature. . . . A general law is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class, while a special act is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class.' (Citing Valera v. Tuason, 80 Phil. 823, 827-828 [1948])"In the relatively recent case ofMecano vs.Commission on Audit,13the Court en banc had occasion to reiterate and to reinforce the rule against implied repeals, as follows:"Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the law maker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment."There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law."Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency take place when the two statutes cover the same subject matter; they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled or harmonized; and both cannot be given effect, that is that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the other."In the same vein, but in different words, this Court ruled inGordon vs.Veridiano: 14"Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor to reconcile the same instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one as against the other. Such alacrity should be avoided. The wise policy is for the judge to harmonize them if this is possible, bearing in mind that they are equally the handiwork of the same legislature, and so give effect to both while at the same time also according due respect to a coordinate department of the government. It is this policy the Court will apply in arriving at the interpretation of the laws above-cited and the conclusions that should follow therefrom."In the instant case, and using the Courts' standard for implied repeal inMecano,we compared the two laws.PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 921was promulgated on 12 April 1976, with the aim of,inter alia,evolving "a progressive revenue raising program that will not unduly burden the tax payers. . ."15in Metropolitan Manila. Hence, it provided for the "administration of local financial services in Metropolitan Manila" only, and for this purpose, divided the area into four Local Treasury and Assessment Districts, regulated the duties and functions of the treasurers and assessors in the cities and municipalities in said area and spelled out the process of assessing, imposing and distributing the proceeds of real estate taxes therein.Upon the other hand,Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise "known and cited as the 'Local Government Code of 1991'"16took effect on 01 January 1992.17It declared "genuine and meaningful local autonomy" as a policy of the state. Such policy was meant to decentralize government" powers, authority, responsibilities and resources" from the national government to the local government units "to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals."18In the formulation and implementation of policies and measures on local autonomy, "(l)ocal government units may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them."19From the above, it is clear that the two laws are not co-extensive and mutually inclusive in their scopeand purpose. WhileR.A. 7160covers almost all governmental functions delegated to local government units all over the country,P.D. 921embraces only the Metropolitan Manila area and is limited to the administration of financial services therein, especially the assessment and collection of real estate (and some other local) taxes.Coming down to specifics, Sec. 9 ofP.D. 921requires that the schedule of values of real properties in the Metropolitan Manila area shall be preparedjointlyby the city assessors in the districts created therein; while Sec. 212 ofR.A. 7160states that the schedule shall be prepared "by the provincial, city and municipal assessors of the municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area for the different classes of real property situated in their respective local government units for enactment by ordinance of the sanggunian concerned. . . ."It is obvious that harmony in these provisions is not only possible, but in fact desirable, necessary and consistent with the legislative intent and policy. By reading together and harmonizing these two provisions, we arrive at the following steps in the preparation of the said schedule, as follows:1.The assessor in each municipality or city in the Metropolitan Manila area shall prepare his/her proposed schedule of values, in accordance with Sec. 212,R.A. 7160.2.Then, theLocal Treasury and Assessment District shall meet, per Sec. 9,P.D. 921. In the instant case, that district shall be composed of the assessors in Quezon City, Pasig, Marikina, Mandaluyong and San Juan, pursuant to Sec. 1 of said P.D. In this meeting, the different assessors shall compare their individual assessments, discuss and thereafter jointly agree and produce a schedule of values for their district, taking into account the preamble of said P.D. that they should evolve "a progressive revenue raising program that will not unduly burden the taxpayers".3.The schedule jointly agreed upon by the assessors shall then be published in anewspaper of general circulation and submitted to the sanggunian concerned for enactment by ordinance, per Sec. 212,R.A. 7160.By this harmonization, both the preamble ofP.D. 921decreeing that the real estate taxes shall "not unduly burden the taxpayer" and the "operative principle of decentralization" provided under Sec. 3,R.A. 7160encouraging local government units to "consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services and resources" shall be fulfilled. Indeed, the essence of joint local action for common good so cherished in the Local Government Code finds concrete expression in this harmonization.LLphilHow about respondents' claim that. with the express repeal ofP.D. 464,P.D. 921 being merely a "supplement" of said P.D. cannot "exist independently on its own"? Quite the contrary is true. By harmonizingP.D. 921withR.A. 7160, we have just demonstrated that it can exist outside ofP.D. 464, as a support, supplement and extension ofR.A. 7160, which for this purpose, has replacedP.D. 464.Since it is now clear thatP.D. 921is still good law, it is equally clear that this Court's ruling in the Mathay/Javier/Puyat-Reyes cases(supra)is still the prevailing and applicable doctrine. And, applying the said ruling in the present case, it is likewise clear that the schedule of values preparedsolelyby the respondent municipal assessor is illegal and void.Re:The Second Issue Exhaustion of Administrative RemediesWe now come to the second issue. The provisions ofSections 226 and 252 ofR.A. 7160, being material to this issue, are set forth below:"SECTION 226.Local Board of Assessment Appeals.Any owner or person having legal interest in the property who is not satisfied with the action of the provincial, city or municipal assessor in the assessment of his property may, within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the written notice of assessment, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the province or city by filing a petition under oath in the form prescribed for the purpose, together with copies of the tax declarations and such affidavits or documents submitted in support of the appeal."SECTION 252.Payment under Protest.(a)No protest shall be entertained unless the taxpayer first pays the tax. There shall be annotated on the tax receipts the words "paid under protest". The protest in writing must be filed within thirty (30) days from payment of the tax to the provincial, city treasurer or municipal treasurer, in the case of a municipality within Metropolitan Manila Area, who shall decide the protest within sixty (60) days from receipt.(b)The tax or a portion thereof paid under protest shall be held in trust by the treasurer concerned.(c)In the event that the protest is finally decided in favor of the taxpayer, the amount or portion of the tax protested shall be refunded to the protestant, or applied as tax credit against his existing or future tax liability.(d)In the event that the protest is denied or upon the lapse of the sixty-day period pre-scribed in subparagraph (a), the taxpayer may avail of the remedies as provided for in Chapter 3, Title Two, Book II of this Code."Respondents argue that this case is premature because petitioners neither appealed the questioned assessments on their properties to the Board of Assessment Appeal, pursuant to Sec. 226 nor paid the taxes under protest, per Sec. 252.We do not agree. Although as a rule, administrative remedies must first be exhausted before resort to judicial action can prosper, there is a well-settled exception in cases where the controversy does not involve questions of fact but only of law.20In the present case, the parties, even during the proceedings in the lower court on 11 April 1994, already agreed "that the issues in the petition are legal"21, and thus, no evidence was presented in said court.In laying down the powers of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals,R.A. 7160provides inSec. 229 (b) that "(t)he proceedings of the Board shall be conducted solely for the purpose of ascertaining the facts . . .". It follows that appeals to this Board may be fruitful only where questions of fact are involved. Again, the protest contemplated under Sec. 252 ofR.A. 7160is needed where there is a question as to the reasonableness of the amount assessed. Hence, if a taxpayer disputes the reasonableness of an increase in a real estate tax assessment, he is required to "first pay the tax" under protest. Otherwise, the city or municipal treasurer will not act on his protest. In the case at bench however, the petitioners are questioning the very authority and power of the assessor, acting solely and independently, to impose the assessment and of the treasurer to collect the tax. These are not questions merely of amounts of the increase in the tax but attacks on the very validity ofanyincrease.Finally, it will be noted that in the consolidated cases of Mathay/Javier/Puyat-Reyes cited earlier, the Supreme Court referred the petitions (which similarly questioned the schedules of market values prepared solely by the respective assessors in the local government units concerned) to the Board of Assessment Appeal, not for the latter to exercise its appellate jurisdiction, but rather to act only as a fact-finding commission. Said the Court22thru Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa:"On November 5, 1991, the Court issued a Resolution clarifying its earlier one of May 16, 1991. It pointed out that the authority of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals 'to take cognizance of the factual issues raised in these two cases by virtue of the referral by this Court in the exercise of its extraordinary or certiorari jurisdiction should not be confused with its appellate jurisdiction over appealed assessment cases under Section 36 ofP.D. 464otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code. The Board is not acting in its appellate jurisdiction in the instant cases, but rather, it is acting as a Court-appointed fact-finding commission to assist the Court in resolving the factual issues raised in G.R. Nos. 97618 and 97760.'"In other words. the Court gave due course to the petitions therein in spite of the fact that the petitioners had nota priori,exhausted administrative remedies by filing an appeal before said Board. Because there were factual issues raised in the Mathay, et al. cases, the Supreme Court constituted the Central Board of Assessment Appeals as a fact finding body to assist the Court in resolving said factual issues. But in the instant proceedings, there are no such factual issues. Therefore, there is no reason to require petitioners to exhaust the administrative remedies provided inR.A. 7160. nor to mandate a referral by this Court to said Board.Re:The Third Issue Constitutionality of the AssessmentsHaving already definitively disposed of the case through the resolution of the foregoing two issues, we find no more need to pass upon the third. It is axiomatic that the constitutionality of a law, regulation, ordinance or act will not be resolved by courts if the controversy can be, as in this case it has been, settled on other grounds. In the recent case ofMacasiano vs. National Housing Authority,23this Court declared:"It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the verylis motapresented. To reiterate, the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law are: (a) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, (b) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party, (c) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity, and (d) theresolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case." (Emphasis supplied)The aforequoted decision inMacasianomerely reiterated the ruling inLaurel vs.Garcia,24where this Court held:"The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions unless these questions are properly raised in appropriate cases and their resolution is necessary for the determination of the case (People V. Vera. 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other found such as the application of a statute or general law(Siler v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, [1909], Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 [1941])."25(Emphasis supplied)In view of the foregoing ruling, the question may be asked: what happens to real estate tax payments already made prior to it's promulgation and finality?Under the law,26"the taxpayer may file a written claim for refund or credit for taxes and interests . . .."Finally, this Tribunal would be remiss in its duty as guardian of the judicial branch if we let pass unnoticed the ease by which the respondent Judge consigned "to the statutes' graveyard" a legislative enactment "together with the (three) decisions of the Supreme Court" promulgated jointly and unanimously en banc. An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws and the stability of judicial doctrines laid down by superior authority should have constrained him to be more circumspect in rendering his decision and to spell out carefully and precisely the reasons for his decision to invalidate such acts, instead of imperiously decreeing an implied repeal. He knows or should have known the legal precedents against implied repeals. Respondent Judge, in his decision, did not even make an attempt to try to reconcile or harmonize the laws involved. Instead, he just unceremoniously swept them and this Court's decisions into the dustbin of "judicial history." In his future acts and decisions, he is admonished to be more judicious in setting aside established laws, doctrines and precedents.WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the questioned Decision and Order of respondent Judge, DECLARING as null and void the questioned Schedule of Market Values for properties in Pasig City prepared by respondent Assessor, as well as the corresponding assessments and real estate tax increases based thereon; and ENJOINING the respondent Treasurer from collecting the real estate tax increases made on the basis of said Schedule and assessments. No|||(Ty v. Trampe, G.R. No. 117577, December 01, 1995)

EN BANC[G.R. No. L-31156. February 27, 1976.]PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,plaintiff-appellant,vs.MUNICIPALITY OF TANAUAN, LEYTE, THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR, ET AL.,defendants-appellees.Sabido, Sabido & Associatesfor plaintiff-appellant.Assistant Solicitor General Conrado T.LimcaocoandSolicitor Enrique M.Reyesfor defendants-appellees.SYNOPSISPepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc., filed a complaint with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Leyte to declare Section 2 ofR.A. No. 2264, (known as the Local Autonomy Act) unconstitutional as an undue delegation of the taxing authority and declare null and void Municipal Ordinance No. 23, which levies and collects from soft drinks producers and manufactures a tax of 1/16 of a centavo for every bottle of soft drinks corked, and Municipal Ordinance No. 27 which levies and collects on soft drinks produced or manufactured within the territorial jurisdiction a tax of one centavo on each gallon of volume capacity. The trial court dismissed the complaint and upheld the constitutionality of Sec. 2 ofR.A. No. 2264and declared Municipal Ordinances Nos. 27 valid and constitutional. Appealed to the Court of Appeals, the case was certified to the Supreme Court as involving pure question of law.The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the delegation to Municipal Corporation or authority to tax and likewise the validity of Municipal Ordinance No. 27, which repealed Municipal Ordinance No. 23.SYLLABUS1.TAXATION; NATURE; NON-DELEGATION OF POWER, EXCEPTION. The power of taxation is an essential and inherent attribute of sovereignty, belonging as a matter of right to every independent government, without being expressly conferred by the people. It is a power that is purely legislative and which the central legislative body cannot delegate either to the executive or judicial department of government without infringing upon the theory of separation of powers. The exception, however, lies in the case of municipal corporations, to which, said theory does not apply. Legislative powers may be delegated to local governments in respect of matters of local concern. This is sanctioned by immemorial. By necessary implication, the legislative power to create political corporations for purpose of local self-government carries with it the power to confer on such local government agencies the power to tax.2.ID.; ID.; ID.; SCOPE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT'S POWER TO TAX. The taxing authority conferred on local governments under Section 2,Republic Act No. 2264, is broad enough as to extend to almost "everything, excepting those which are mentioned therein." As long as the tax levied under the authority of a city or municipal ordinance is not within the exceptions and limitations in the law, the same comes within the ambit of the general rule, pursuant to the rules ofexpresio unius est exclusio alterius, and exceptio firmat regulum in casibus non excepti. Municipalities are empowered to impose not only municipal license taxes upon persons engaged in any business or occupation but also to levy for public purposes, just and uniform taxes.3.ID.; ID.; ID.; LIMITATION. Municipalities and municipal districts are prohibited to impose "any percentage tax on sales or other in any form based thereon nor impose taxes on articles subject to specific tax, except gasoline, under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code." For purposes of this particular limitation, a municipal ordinance which prescribes a set of radio between the amount of the tax and the volume of sales of the taxpayer imposes a sales tax and is null and void for being outside the power of the municipality to enact.4.ID.; ID.; ID.; DELEGATION OF POWER TO TAX UNDER NEW CONSTITUTION. Under the New Constitution, local governments are granted autonomous authority to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes. Section 5, Article XI Provides: "Each local government unit shall have the power to create its sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Withal, it cannot be said that Section 2 ofRepublic Act No. 2264emanated from beyond the sphere of the legislative power to enact and vest in local governments the power of local taxation.5.ID.; ID.; ID.; VALIDITY THEREOF. The plenary nature of the delegated power of local governments under Section 2, ofR.A. No. 2264would not suffice to invalidate the law as confiscatory and oppressive. In delegating the authority, the State is not limited to the measure of that which is exercised by itself. When it is said that the taxing power may be delegated to municipalities and the like, it is meant that there may be delegated such measure of power to impose and collect taxes the legislature may deem expedient. Thus, municipalities may be permitted to tax subjects which for reasons of public policy the State has not deemed wise to tax for more general purposes.6.ID.; REQUISITES FOR LAWFUL EXERCISE OF TAXING POWER. Constitutional injunction against deprivation of property without due process of law may not be passed over under the guise of the taxing power, except when the taking of the property is in the lawful exercise of the taxing power, as when, (1) the tax is for a public purpose; (2) the rule on uniformity of taxation observed; (3) either the person or property taxed is within the jurisdiction of the government levying the tax; and (4) in the assessment and collection of certain kinds of taxes, notice and opportunity for hearing are provided.7.ID.; ID.; INSTANCES WHERE DUE PROCESS IS VIOLATED. Due process is usually violated where the tax imposed is for a private as distinguished from the public purposes; a tax a imposed on property outside the State, i.e., extra-territorial taxation; and arbitrary or oppressive methods are used in assessing and collecting taxes. But, a tax does not violate the due process clause, as applied to a particular taxpayer, although the purpose of the tax will result in an injury rather than a benefit to such taxpayer. Due process does not require that the property subject to the tax or the amount of tax to be raised should be determined by judicial inquiry, and a notice and hearing as to the amount of tax and the manner in which it shall be apportioned are generally not necessary to due process of law.8.ID.; DOUBLE TAXATION; GENERALLY NOT FORBIDDEN. The delegated authority under Section 2 of the Local Autonomy Act cannot be declared unconstitutional on the theory of double taxation. It must be observed that the delegating authority specifies the limitations and enumerates the taxes over local taxation may not be exercised. The reason is that the State has exclusively reversed the same for its own prerogative. Moreover, double taxation, in general, is not forbidden by the fundamental law, since the injunction against double taxation found in the Constitution of the United States and some states of the Union has not been adopted as part thereof.9.ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION. Double taxation becomes obnoxious only where the taxpayer is taxed twice for the benefit of the same governmental entity or by the same jurisdiction for the same purpose, but not in a case where one tax is imposed by the State and the other by the city or municipality.10.ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANT CASE. Where, as in the case at bar, the municipality of Tanauan enacted Ordinance No. 27 imposing a tax of one centavo on each gallon of volume capacity while in the previous Ordinance No. 23, it was 1/16 of a centavo for every bottle corked, it is clear that the intention of the municipal council was to substitute Ordinance No. 27 to that of Ordinance No. 23, repealing the latter.11.ID.; TAX LEVIED ON PRODUCE, NOT PERCENTAGE TAX. The imposition of "a tax of one centavo (P0.01) on each gallon (128 fluid ounces, U.S.) of volume capacity" on all soft drinks produced or manufactured under Ordinance No. 27 does not partake of a nature of a percentage tax on sales, or other taxes in any form based thereon. The tax is levied on the produce (whether sold or not) and not on the sales. The volume capacity of the taxpayer's production of soft drinks is considered solely for purposes of determining the tax rate on the products, but there is no set ratio between the volume of sales and the amount of tax.12.ID.; ID.; ID.; MUNICIPALITY ALLOWED TO INCREASE TAX AS LONG AS AMOUNT IS REASONABLE. The tax of one centavo (P0.01) on each gallon (128 fluid ounces, U.S.) of volume capacity of all soft drinks, produced or manufactured or an equivalent of 1-1/2 centavos per case, cannot be considered unjust and unfair. An increase in the tax alone would not support the claim that the tax is oppressive, unjust and confiscatory. Municipal corporations are allowed much discretion in determining the rates of impossible taxes. This is in line with the constitutional policy of according the widest possible autonomy to local government in matters of taxation, an aspect that is given expression in the Local Tax Code (PD No. 231, July 1, 1973).13.ID.; SPECIFIC TAXES; ARTICLES SUBJECT TO SPECIFIC TAX. Specific taxes are those imposed on specified articles, such as distilled spirits, wines, fermented liquors, products of tobacco other than cigars and cigarettes, matches, firecrackers, manufactured oils and other fuels, coal bunker fuel oil cinematographic films, playing cards, saccharine, opium and other habit forming drugs.FERNANDO, J., concurring:1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; TAXATION; POWER OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION TO TAX UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTION. The present Constitution is quite explicit as to the power of taxation vested in local and municipal corporations. It is therein specifically provided: "Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources to revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law."2.ID.; ID.; LIMITATION ON POWER TO TAX UNDER THE1935 Constitution. The only limitation on the authority to tax under the1935 Constitutionwas that while the President of the Philippines was vested with the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus, or offices, he could only "exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law." As far as legislative power over local government was concerned, no restriction whatsoever was placed in the Congress of the Philippines. It would appear therefore that the extent of the taxing power was solely for the legislative body to decide.3.ID.; ID.; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION'S POWER TO TAX MUST BE CLEARLY SHOWN. Although the scope of municipal taxing power had been enlarged by subsequent legislations, the Court, in Golden Ribbon Lumber Co. vs. City of Butuan, L-18534, December 24, 1964, reaffirmed the traditional concept, thus: "The rule is well-settled that municipal corporations, unlike sovereign states, are clothed with no power of taxation; that its charter or a statute must clearly show an intent to confer that power of the municipal corporation cannot assume and exercise it, and that any such power granted must be construed strictly, any doubt or ambiguity arising from the terms of the grant to be resolved against the municipality."4.ID.; ID.; DOUBLE TAXATION. The objection to the taxation as double may be laid down on one side. The 14th Amendment (the due process clause) no more forbids double taxation than it does doubling the amount of a tax, short of confiscation or proceedings unconstitutional on other grounds.D E C I S I O NMARTIN,Jp:This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in its Civil Case No. 3294, which was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals on October 6, 1969, as involving only pure questions of law, challenging the power of taxation delegated to municipalities under the Local Autonomy Act (Republic Act No. 2264, as amended, June 19, 1959).On February 14, 1963, the plaintiff-appellant, Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc., commenced a complaint with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Leyte for that Court to declare Section 2 ofRepublic Act No. 2264,1otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, unconstitutional as an undue delegation of taxing authority as well as to declare Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27, series of 1962, of the Municipality of Tanauan, Leyte, null and void.aisa dcOn July 23, 1963, the parties entered into a Stipulation of Facts, the material portions of which state that,first, both Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27 embrace or cover the same subject matter and the production tax rates imposed therein are practically the same, andsecondthat on January 17, 1963, the acting Municipal Treasurer of Tanauan, Leyte, as per his letter addressed to the Manager of the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Plant in said municipality, sought to enforce compliance by the latter of the provisions of said Ordinance No. 27, series of 1962.LLprMunicipal Ordinance No. 23, of Tanauan, Leyte, which was approved on September 25, 1962, levies and collects "from soft drinks producers and manufacturers a tax of one-sixteenth (1/16) of a centavo for every bottle of soft drink corked."2For the purpose of computing the taxes due, the person, firm, company or corporation producing soft drinks shall submit to the Municipal Treasurer a monthly report of the total number of bottles produced and corked during the month.3On the other hand, Municipal Ordinance No. 27, which was approved on October 28, 1962, levies and collects "on soft drinks produced or manufactured within the territorial jurisdiction of this municipality a tax of ONE CENTAVO (P0.01) on each gallon (128 fluid ounces, U.S.) of volume capacity."4For the purpose of computing the taxes due, the person, firm, company, partnership, corporation or plant producing soft drinks shall submit to the Municipal Treasurer a monthly report of the total number of gallons produced or manufactured during the month.5The tax imposed in both Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27 is denominated as "municipal production tax."On October 7, 1963, the Court of First Instance of Leyte rendered judgment "dismissing the complaint and upholding the constitutionality of [Section 2,Republic Act No. 2264]; declaring Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27 valid, legal and constitutional; ordering the plaintiff to pay the taxes due under the oft-said Ordinances; and to pay the costs."From this judgment, the plaintiff Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, in turn, elevated the case to Us pursuant to Section 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.There are three capital questions raised in this appeal:1.Is Section 2,Republic Act No. 2264an undue delegation of power, confiscatory and oppressive?2.Do Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27 constitute double taxation and impose percentage or specific taxes?3.Are Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27 unjust and unfair?1.The power of taxation is an essential and inherent attribute of sovereignty, belonging as a matter of right to every independent government, without being expressly conferred by the people.6It is a power that is purely legislative and which the central legislative body cannot delegate either to the executive or judicial department of the government without infringing upon the theory of separation of powers. The exception, however, lies in the case of municipal corporations, to which, said theory does not apply. Legislative powers may be delegated to local governments in respect of matters of local concern.7This is sanctioned by immemorial practice.8By necessary implication, the legislative power to create political corporations for purposes of local self-government carries with it the power to confer on such local governmental agencies the power to tax.9Under the New Constitution, local governments are granted the autonomous authority to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes. Section 5, Article XI provides: "Each local government unit shall have the power to create its sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Withal, it cannot be said that Section 2 ofRepublic Act No. 2264emanated from beyond the sphere of the legislative power to enact and vest in local governments the power of local taxation.The plenary nature of the taxing power thus delegated, contrary to plaintiff-appellant's pretense, would not suffice to invalidate the said law as confiscatory and oppressive. In delegating the authority, the State is not limited to the exact measure of that which is exercised by itself. When it is said that the taxing power may be delegated to municipalities and the like, it is meant that there may be delegated such measure of power to impose and collect taxes as the legislature may deem expedient. Thus, municipalities may be permitted to tax subjects which for reasons of public policy the State has not deemed wise to tax for more general purposes.10This is not to say though that the constitutional injunction against deprivation of property without due process of law may be passed over under the guise of the taxing power, except when the taking of the property is in the lawful exercise of the taxing power, as when (1) the tax is for a public purpose; (2) the rule on uniformity of taxation is observed; (3) either the person or property taxed is within the jurisdiction of the government levying the tax; and (4) in the assessment and collection of certain kinds of taxes notice and opportunity for hearing are provided.11Due process is usually violated where the tax imposed is for a private as distinguished from a public purpose; a tax is imposed on property outside the State, i.e., extra-territorial taxation; and arbitrary or oppressive methods are used in assessing and collecting taxes. But, a tax does not violate the due process clause, as applied to a particular taxpayer, although the purpose of the tax will result in an injury rather than a benefit to such taxpayer. Due process does not require that the property subject to the tax or the amount of tax to be raised should be determined by judicial inquiry, and a notice and hearing as to the amount of the tax and the manner in which it shall be apportioned are generally not necessary to due process of law.12There is no validity to the assertion that the delegated authority can be declared unconstitutional on the theory of double taxation. It must be observed that the delegating authority specifies the limitations and enumerates the taxes over which local taxation may not be exercised.13The reason is that the State has exclusively reserved the same for its own prerogative. Moreover, double taxation, in general, is not forbidden by our fundamental law, since We have not adopted as part thereof the injunction against double taxation found in the Constitution of the United States and some states of the Union.14Double taxation becomes obnoxious only where the taxpayer is taxed twice for the benefit of the same governmental entity15or by the same jurisdiction for the same purpose,16but not in a case where one tax is imposed by the State and the other by the city or municipality.172.The plaintiff-appellant submits that Ordinance Nos. 23 and 27 constitute double taxation, because these two ordinances cover the same subject matter and impose practically the same tax rate. The thesis proceeds from its assumption that both ordinances are valid and legally enforceable. This is not so. As earlier quoted, Ordinance No. 23, which was approved on September 25, 1962, levies or collects from soft drinks producers or manufacturers a tax of one-sixteen (1/16) of a centavo for every bottle corked, irrespective of the volume contents of the bottle used. When it was discovered that the producer or manufacturer could increase the volume contents of the bottle and still pay the same tax rate, the Municipality of Tanauan enacted Ordinance No. 27, approved on October 28, 1962, imposing a tax of one centavo (P0.01) on each gallon (128 fluid ounces, U.S.) of volume capacity. The difference between the two ordinances clearly lies in the tax rate of the soft drinks produced: in Ordinance No. 23, it was 1/16 of a centavo for every bottle corked; in Ordinance No. 27, it is one centavo (P0.01) on each gallon (128 fluid ounces, U.S.) of volume capacity. The intention of the Municipal Council of Tanauan in enacting Ordinance No. 27 is thus clear: it was intended as a plain substitute for the prior Ordinance No. 23, and operates as a repeal of the latter, even without words to that effect.18Plaintiff-appellant in its brief admitted that defendants-appellees are only seeking to enforce Ordinance No. 27, series of 1962. Even the stipulation of facts confirms the fact that the Acting Municipal Treasurer of Tanauan, Leyte sought to compel compliance by the plaintiff-appellant of the provisions of said Ordinance No. 27, series of 1962. The aforementioned admission shows that only Ordinance No. 27, series of 1962 is being enforced by defendants-appellees. Even the Provincial Fiscal, counsel for defendants-appellees admits in his brief "that Section 7 of Ordinance No. 27, series of 1962 clearly repeals Ordinance No. 23 as the provisions of the latter are inconsistent with the provisions of the former."That brings Us to the question of whether the remaining Ordinance No. 27 imposes a percentage or a specific tax. Undoubtedly, the taxing authority conferred on local governments under Section 2,Republic Act No. 2264, is broad enough as to extend to almost "everything, excepting those which are mentioned therein." As long as the tax levied under the authority of a city or municipal ordinance is not within the exceptions and limitations in the law, the same comes within the ambit of the general rule, pursuant to the rules ofexpresio unius est exclusio alterius, andexceptio firmat regulum in casibus non excepti.19The limitation applies, particularly, to the prohibition against municipalities and municipal districts to impose "any percentage taxon salesor other taxes in any formbased thereonnor impose taxes on articles subject tospecific tax, except gasoline, under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code." For purposes of this particular limitation, a municipal ordinance which prescribes a set ratio between the amount of the tax and the volume of sales of the taxpayer imposes a sales tax and is null and void for being outside the power of the municipality to enact.20But, the imposition of "a tax of one centavo (P0.01) on each gallon (128 fluid ounces, U.S.) of volume capacity" on all soft drinks produced or manufactured under Ordinance No. 27 does not partake of the nature of a percentage tax on sales, or other taxes in any form based thereon. The tax is levied on theproduce(whether sold or not) and not on the sales. The volume capacity of the taxpayers production of soft drinks is considered solely for purposes of determining the tax rate on the products, but there is no set ratio between the volume of sales and the amount of the tax.21Nor can the tax levied be treated as a specific tax. Specific taxes are those imposed on specified articles, such as distilled spirits, wines, fermented liquors, products of tobacco other than cigars and cigarettes, matches, firecrackers, manufactured oils and other fuels, coal, bunker fuel oil, diesel fuel oil, cinematographic films, playing cards, saccharine, opium and other habit-forming drugs.22Soft drink is not one of those specified.cdphil3.The tax of one centavo (P0.01) on each gallon (128 fluid ounces, U.S.) of volume capacity on all soft drinks, produced or manufactured, or an equivalent of 1-1/2 centavos per case,23cannot be considered unjust and unfair.24An increase in the tax alone would not support the claim that the tax is oppressive, unjust and confiscatory. Municipal corporations are allowed much discretion in determining the rates of imposable taxes.25This is in line with the constitutional policy of according the widest possible autonomy to local governments in matters of local taxation, an aspect that is given expression in the Local Tax Code (PD No. 231, July 1, 1973).26Unless the amount is so excessive as to be prohibitive, courts will go slow in writing off an ordinance as unreasonable.27Reluctance should not deter compliance with an ordinance such as Ordinance No. 27 if the purpose of the law to further strengthen local autonomy were to be realized.28Finally, the municipal license tax of P1,000.00 per corking machine with five but not more than ten crowners or P2,000.00 with ten but not more than twenty crowners imposed on manufacturers, producers, importers and dealers of soft drinks and/or mineral waters under Ordinance No. 54, series of 1964, as amended by Ordinance No. 41, series of 1968, of defendant Municipality,29appears not to affect the resolution of the validity of Ordinance No. 27. Municipalities are empowered to impose, not only municipal license taxes upon persons engaged in any business or occupation but also to levy for public purposes, just and uniform taxes. The ordinance in question (Ordinance No. 27) comes within the second power of a municipality.ACCORDINGLY, the constitutionality of Section 2 ofRepublic Act No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, as amended, is hereby upheld and Municipal Ordinance No. 27 of the Municipality of Tanauan, Leyte, series of 1962, repealing Municipal Ordinance No. 23, same series, is hereby declared of valid and legal effect. Costs against petitioner-appellant.cdtaSO ORDERED.|||(Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines, Inc. v. Municipality of Tanauan, G.R. No. L-31156, February 27, 1976)FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No.156252. June 27, 2006.]COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC.,petitioner,vs. CITY OF MANILA, LIBERTY M. TOLEDO City Treasurer and JOSEPH SANTIAGO Chief, Licensing Division,respondents.D E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO,Jp:Before Us is a Petition for Review onCertiorariunder Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Order1of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 21, dated 8 May 2002, dismissing petitioner's Petition for Injunction, and the Order2dated 5 December 2002, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.Petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. is a corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling beverages and maintains a sales office located in the City of Manila.On 25 February 2000, the City Mayor of Manila approved Tax Ordinance No. 7988, otherwise known as "Revised Revenue Code of the City of Manila" repealing Tax Ordinance No. 7794 entitled, "Revenue Code of the City of Manila." Tax Ordinance No. 7988 amended certain sections of Tax Ordinance No. 7794 by increasing the tax rates applicable to certain establishments operating within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Manila, including herein petitioner.Aggrieved by said tax ordinance, petitioner filed a Petition3before the Department of Justice (DOJ), against the City of Manila and its Sangguniang Panlungsod, invoking Section 1874ofThe Local Government Code of 1991(Republic Act No. 7160). Said Petition questions the constitutionality or legality of Section 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7988. According to petitioner:STIEHcSection 21 of the Old Revenue Code of the City of Manila (Ordinance No. 7794, as amended) was reproduced verbatim as Section 21 under the new Ordinance except for the last paragraph thereof which reads: "PROVIDED, that all registered businesses in the City of Manila that are already paying the aforementioned tax shall be exempted from payment thereof", which was deleted; that said deletion would, in effect, impose additional business tax on businesses, including herein petitioner, that are already subject to business tax under the other sections, specifically Sec. 14, of the New Revenue Code of the City of Manila, which imposition, petitioner claims, "is beyond or exceeds the limitation on the taxing power of the City of Manila under Sec. 143 (h) of theLGCof 1991; and that deletion is a palpable and manifest violation ofThe Local Government Code of 1991, and the clear mandate of Article X, Sec. 5 of the1987 Constitution, hence Section 21 is "illegal and unconstitutional."On 17 August 2000, then DOJ Secretary Artemio G. Tuquero issued a Resolution declaring Tax Ordinance No. 7988 null and void and without legal effect, the pertinent portions of which read:After a judicious scrutiny of the records of this case, in the light of the pertinent provisions ofThe Local Government Code of 1991, this Department finds for the petitioner.The Local Government Code of 1991provides:"Section 188. Publication of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures. Within ten (10) days after their approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city and municipal tax ordinances or revenue measures shall bepublished in full for three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation; Provided, however, that in provinces, cities, and municipalities where there are no newspapers or local circulations the same may be posted in at least two (2) conspicuous and publicly accessible places."(R.A. No. 7160) (stress supplied)Upon the other hand, theRules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Codeof 1991, insofar as pertinent, mandates:"Art. 277.Publication of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures. (a) within ten (10) days after their approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city and municipal tax ordinances orrevenue measures shall be published in full for three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulationprovided that in provinces, cities and municipalities where there are no newspapers of local circulation, the same may be posted in at least two (2) conspicuous and publicly accessible places.If the tax ordinances or revenue measure contains penal provisions as authorized under Art. 279 of this Rule, the gist of such tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation within the province, posting of such ordinance or measure shall be made in accessible and conspicuous public places in all municipalities and cities of the province to which the sanggunian enacting the ordinance or revenue measure belongs.xxx xxx xxx."(emphasis ours)It is clear from the above-quoted provisions ofR.A. No. 7160and its implementing rules that the requirement of publication isMANDATORYand leaves no choice. The use of the word "shall" in both provisions is imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be enforced (Soco v. Militante, 123 SCRA 160, 167;Modern Coach Corp. v. Faver173 SE 2d 497, 499).Its essence is simply to inform the people and the entities who may likely be affected, of the existence of the tax measure. It bears emphasis, that, strict observance of the said procedural requirement is the only safeguard against any unjust and unreasonable exercise of the taxing powers by ensuring that the taxpayers are notified through publication of the existence of the measure, and are therefore able to voice out their views or objections to the said measure. For, after all, taxes are obligatory exactions or enforced contributions corollary to taking of property.xxx xxx xxxIn the case at bar, respondents, by its failure to file their comments and present documentary evidence to show that the mandatory requirement of law on publication, among other things, has been met, may be deemed to have waived its right to controvert or dispute the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner which indubitably show that subject tax ordinance was published only once, i.e., on the May 22, 2000 issue of the Philippine Post. Clearly, therefore, herein respondents failed to satisfy the requirement that said ordinance shall be published for three (3) consecutive days as required by law.xxx xxx xxxIn view of the foregoing, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised by the petitioner.WHEREFORE, premises considered, Tax Ordinance No. 7988 of the City of Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID and WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT for having been enacted in contravention of the provisions ofThe Local Government Code of 1991and its implementing rules and regulations.5The City of Manila failed to file a Motion for Reconsideration nor lodge an appeal of said Resolution, thus, said Resolution of the DOJ Secretary declaring Tax Ordinance No. 7988 null and void has lapsed into finality.SDHCacOn 16 November 2000, Atty. Leonardo A. Aurelio wrote the Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF) requesting in behalf of his client, Singer Sewing Machine Company, an opinion on whether the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila has the right to enforce Tax Ordinance No. 7988 despite the Resolution, dated 17 August 2000, of the DOJ Secretary. Acting on said letter, the BLGF Executive Director issued an Indorsement on 20 November 2000 ordering the City Treasurer of Manila to "cease and desist" from enforcing Tax Ordinance No. 7988. According to the BLGF:In the attached Resolution dated August 17, 2000 of the Department of Justice, it is stated that ". . . Ordinance No. 7988 of the City of Manila is hereby declared NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT for having been enacted in contravention of the provisions ofThe Local Government Code of 1991and its implementing rules and regulations."xxx xxx xxxIn view thereof, that Office is hereby instructed to cease and desist from implementing the aforementioned Manila Tax Ordinance No. 7988, inviting attention to Section 190 of theLocal Government Code (LGC) of 1991, quoted hereunder:"Section 190. Attempt to Enforce Void or Suspended Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures. The enforcement of any tax ordinance or revenue measures after due notice of the disapproval or suspension thereof shall be sufficient ground to administrative disciplinary action against the local officials and employees responsible therefore."Be guided accordingly.6Despite the Resolution of the DOJ declaring Tax Ordinance No. 7988 null and void and the directive of the BLGF that respondents cease and desist from enforcing said tax ordinance, respondents continued to assess petitioner business tax for the year 2001 based on the tax rates prescribed under Tax Ordinance No. 7988. Thus, petitioner filed a Complaint with the RTC of Manila, Branch 21, on 17 January 2001, praying that respondents be enjoined from implementing the aforementioned tax ordinance.On 28 November 2001, the RTC of Manila, Branch 21, rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner, the decretal portion of which states:The defendants did not follow the procedure in the enactment of Tax Ordinance No. 7988. The Court agrees with plaintiff's contention that the ordinance should first be published for three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation aside from the posting of the same in at least four (4) conspicuous public places.xxx xxx xxxWHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the injunction permanent. Defendants are enjoined from implementing Tax Ordinance No. 7988. The bond posted by the plaintiff is hereby CANCELLED.7During the pendency of the said case, the City Mayor of Manila approved on 22 February 2001 Tax Ordinance No. 8011 entitled, "An Ordinance Amending Certain Sections of Ordinance No. 7988." Said tax ordinance was again challenged by petitioner before the DOJ through a Petition questioning the legality of the aforementioned tax ordinance on the grounds that (1) said tax ordinance amends a tax ordinance previously declared null and void and without legal effect by the DOJ; and (2) said tax ordinance was likewise not published upon its approval in accordance with Section 188 ofThe Local Government Code of 1991.EcAHDTOn 5 July 2001, then DOJ Secretary Hernando Perez issued a Resolution declaring Tax Ordinance No. 8011 null and void and legally not existing. According to the DOJ Secretary:After a careful examination/evaluation of the records of this case and applying the pertinent provisions ofThe Local Government Code of 1991, this Department finds the instant petition of Coca-Cola Bottlers, Philippines, Inc. meritorious.It bears stress, at the outset, that the subject ordinance was passed and approved by the respondents principally to amend Ordinance No. 7988 which was earlier nullified by this Department in its Resolution Dated August 17, 2000, also at the instance of the herein petitioner. . . .xxx xxx xxx. . . [T]he only logical conclusion, therefore, is that Ordinance No. 8011, subject herein, is also null and void, it being a mere amendatory ordinance of Ordinance No. 7988 which, as earlier stated, had been nullified by this Department. An invalid or unconstitutional law or ordinance does not, in legal contemplation, exist (Manila Motors Co., Inc. vs. Flores, 99 Phil. 738). Where a statute which has been amended is invalid, nothing, in effect, has been amended. As held inPeople vs. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091:"If an order or law sought to be amended is invalid, then it does not legally exist. There would be no occasion or need to amend it; . . ." (at p. 1097)Instead of amending Ordinance No. 7988, herein respondent should have enacted another tax measure which strictly complies with the requirements of law, both procedural and substantive. The passage of the assailed ordinance did not have the effect of curing the defects of Ordinance No. 7988 which, any way, does not legally exist.xxx xxx xxxWHEREFORE, premises considered, Tax Ordinance No. 8011 is hereby declaredNULL and VOIDandLEGALLY NOT EXISTING.8Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the DOJ was subsequently denied in a Resolution,9dated 12 March 2002.The City of Manila appealed the DOJ Resolution, dated 12 March 2002, denying its Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution nullifying Tax Ordinance No. 8011 before the RTC of Manila, Branch 17, but the same was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in an Order, dated 2 December 2002. According to the trial court:From whatever angle the recourse of herein petitioners was viewed, either from the standpoint of Section 1, Rule 43, or Section 1 and the last sentence of the second paragraph of Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the conclusion was inevitable that petitioners' remedial measure from dispositions of the Secretary of Justice should have been ventilated before the next judicial plane. . . .Accordingly, by reason of the foregoing premises, Civil Case No. 02-103372 for "Certiorari" is DISMISSED.Consequently, respondents appealed the foregoing Order, dated 2 December 2002,viaa Petition for Review onCertiorarito the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 157490. However, said appeal was dismissed in our Resolution, dated 23 June 2003, the dispositive of which reads:DHEACIPursuant to Rule 45 and other related provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended governing appeals bycertiorarito the Supreme Court, only petitions which are accompanied by or which comply strictly with the requirements specified therein shall be entertained. On the basis thereof, the Court resolves toDENYthe instant petition for review oncertiorariof the orders of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 17 dated December 2, 2002 and March 7, 2003 for the late filing as the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days fixed in Sec. 2, Rule 45 in relation to Sec. 5(a), Rule 56.The omnibus motion of petitioners for reconsideration of the resolution of April 23, 2003 which denied the motion for an extension of time to file a petition isDENIEDfor lack of merit.Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently denied in a Resolution, dated 11 August 2003, in which the Court resolved as follows:Acting on the motion of petitioners for reconsideration of the resolution of June 23, 2003 which denied the petition for review oncertiorariand considering that there is no compelling reason to warrant a modification of this Court's resolution, the Court resolves toDENYreconsideration withFINALITY.Meanwhile, on the basis of the enactment of Tax Ordinance No. 8011, the City of Manila filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the RTC of Manila, Branch 21, of its Decision, dated 28 November 2001, which the courta quogranted in the herein assailed Order dated 8 May 2002, the full text of which reads:Considering that Ordinance No. 7988 (Amended Revenue Code of the City of Manila) has already been amended by Ordinance No. 8011 entitled "An Ordinance Amending Certain Sections of Ordinance No. 7988" approved by the City Mayor of Manila on February 22, 2001, let the above-entitled case be as it is hereby DISMISSED. Without pronouncement as to costs."10Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the abovequoted Order was denied by the trial court in the second challenged Order, dated 5 December 2002; hence the instant Petition.cTIESDThe case at bar revolves around the sole pivotal issue of whether or not Tax Ordinance No. 7988 is null and void and of no legal effect. However, respondents, in their Comment and Memorandum, raise the procedural issue of whether or not the instant Petition has complied with the requirements of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure; thus, the Court resolves to first pass upon this issue before tackling the substantial matters involved in this case.Respondents insist that the instant Petition raises questions of fact that are proscribed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which states that Petitions forCertioraribefore the Supreme Court shall raise only questions of law. We do not agree. There is a question of fact when doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a question of law.11A thorough reading of the Petition will reveal that petitioner does not present an issue in which we are called to rule on the truth or falsity of any fact alleged in the case. Furthermore, the resolution of whether or not the courta quoerred in dismissing petitioner's case in light of the enactment of Tax Ordinance No. 8011, allegedly amending Tax Ordinance No. 7988, does not necessitate an incursion into the facts attending the case.Contrarily, it is respondents who actually raise questions of fact before us. While accusing petitioner of raising questions of fact, respondents, in the same breath, proceeded to allege that the RTC of Manila, Branch 21, in its Decision, dated 28 November 2001, failed to take into account the evidence presented by respondents allegedly proving that Tax Ordinance No. 7988 was published for four times in a newspaper of general circulation in accordance with the requirements of law. A determination of whether or not the trial court erred in concluding that Tax Ordinance No. 7988 was indeed published for four times in a newspaper of general circulation would clearly involve a calibration of the probative value of the evidence presented by respondents to prove such allegation. Therefore, said issue is a question of fact which this Court, not being a trier of facts, will decline to pass upon.Respondents also point out that the Petition was not properly verified and certified because Nelson Empalmado, the Vice President for Tax and Financial Services of Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. who verified the subject Petition was not duly authorized to file said Petition. Respondents assert that nowhere in the attached Secretary's Certificate can it be found the authority of Nelson Empalmado to institute the instant Petition. Thus, there being a lack of proper verification, respondents contend that the Petition must be treated as a mere scrap of paper, which has no legal effect as declared in Section 4, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.An inspection of the Secretary's Certificate attached to the petition will show that Nelson Empalmado is not among those designated as representative to prosecute claims in behalf of Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. However, it would seem that the authority of Mr. Empalmado to file the instant Petition emanated from a Special Power of Attorney signed by Ramon V. Lapez, Jr., Associate Legal Counsel/Assistant Corporate Secretary of Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. and one of those named in the Secretary's Certificate as authorized to file a Petition in behalf of the corporation. A careful perusal of said Secretary's Certificate will further reveal that the persons authorized therein to represent petitioner corporation in any suit are also empowered to designate and appoint any individual as attorney-in-fact of the corporation for the prosecution of any suit. Accordingly, by virtue of the Special Power of Attorney executed by Ramon V. Lapez, Jr. authorizing Nelson Emplamado to file a Petition before the Supreme Court, the instant Petition has been properly verified, in accordance with the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.DACTSHHaving disposed of the procedural issues raised by respondents, We now come to the pivotal issue in this petition.It is undisputed from the facts of the case that Tax Ordinance No. 7988 has already been declared by the DOJ Secretary, in its Order, dated 17 August 2000, as null and void and without legal effect due to respondents' failure to satisfy the requirement that said ordinance be published for three consecutive days as required by law. Neither is there quibbling on the fact that the said Order of the DOJ was never appealed by the City of Manila, thus, it had attained finality after the lapse of the period to appeal.SICaDAFurthermore, the RTC of Manila, Branch 21, in its Decision dated 28 November 2001, reiterated the findings of the DOJ Secretary that respondents failed to follow the procedure in the enactment of tax measures as mandated by Section 188 ofThe Local Government Code of 1991, in that they failed to publish Tax Ordinance No. 7988 for three consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation. From the foregoing, it is evident that Tax Ordinance No. 7988 is null and void as said ordinance was published only for one day in the 22 May 2000 issue of the Philippine Post in contravention of the unmistakable directive ofThe Local Government Code of 1991.Despite the nullity of Tax Ordinance No. 7988, the courta quo, in the assailed Order, dated 8 May 2002, went on to dismiss petitioner's case on the force of the enactment of Tax Ordinance No. 8011, am