Living With Contradictions the Taken for Granted in Israeli Political Discourse

7/29/2019 Living With Contradictions the Taken for Granted in Israeli Political Discourse

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Living with Contradictions: The Taken-for-Granted in Israeli Political DiscourseAuthor(s): William A. Gamson and Hanna HerzogSource: Political Psychology, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Jun., 1999), pp. 247-266Published by: International Society of Political PsychologyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3792076 .

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Political Psychology, Vol.20, No. 2, 1999

Living with Contradictions: The Taken-for-Grantedin Israeli Political DiscourseWilliam A. GamsonSociology DepartmentBoston CollegeHanna HerzogSociology DepartmentTel Aviv University

Twoapparentlycontradictorydeas are closely linked n Israelipolitical discourse: Israelispowerfulandindependent nd Israelis vulnerableanddependent.Thisstudyusedcontentanalysis andfocus groups,as well as existing surveydata analyzedby others,to explorehow thisparadoxhas been reflected n newspapersand conversationsduringsix differenttimeperiodsfrom 1948 to 1996. Thegoal was not to explaintheparadoxbut to examine tsconsequences or Israeliperceptionsof U.S.policy in theMiddleEast-and, in theprocess,to exploreIsraeliself-images.Thenatureof U.S. strategicinterestswas originallytreatedas problematicand in need ofpolitical discussion,but in thepast 25 years these interestshave become taken or granted.Surprisingly, venafterthe endof the ColdWar,a criticaldiscourse moment in which a reexaminationof U.S. interests in the Middle East wouldseem inevitable,the U.S. role remains takenfor grantedand largely unexamined.Thestrong/vulnerablearadoxexplainsthis absenceofdiscussion:ExaminingU.S.interests ooclosely upsetsthedelicate balance thatkeepsthe sense of vulnerabilityn check.KEYWORDS:politicalculture,discourse, raming, srael,focus groups,mass media,contentanalysis.

In the Middle East, without the support of a superpower, you're in trouble.But only up to a certain point. We're not another star on the Americanflag. We don't need their agreement for everything.-Participant in a 1988 Israeli focus group

2470162-895X ? 1999 International ociety of PoliticalPsychologyPublishedby Blackwell Publishers,350 MainStreet,Malden,MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford,OX4 1JF,UK.


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GamsonandHerzogWe will not trust in othersany longer,generousas they maybe: only us,onlyourselves.We willprotectourselves.-Prime MinisterYitzhakRabin,in anApril 1993 speechcommemoratinghe WarsawGhettouprising,commentingon the mostimportantesson of theHolocaust(quotedfromArian, 1995, p. 175)Utteredby a national leader and by ordinarypeople in entirely differentsituations, hese two statementsreveal a deep masterframeinterwoven n Israelidiscourse. We arguethatthis frame-with its paradoxicalmessage-shapes theway Israelis udge manysocial events andpolicies, includingU.S. involvement nthe Middle East.Framecriticalanalysistypically involves the study of symbolic contests inwhich sponsorsof differentmeaning systemsbattle it out over which frame willprevail nthe mass media orin some other orum.Suchcontestsare egionin Israelipoliticaldiscourse.Indeed,the conventionalwisdom,which we do not dispute, sthatIsrael s deeplypolarized ntocampsthatdrawentirelydifferentmeanings romthe same events.We wish to examinea stratumbelow thatof symboliccontests-a domain ofsharedmeanings that are uncontested.The social constructions n this stratumrarely appearas such to the readerandmaybe largelyunconsciouson thepartofthe image's produceras well. They appearas transparent escriptionsof reality,notasinterpretations,ndsometimesasdevoid of politicalcontent.Theycut acrossthecleavagelinesdividingthe "national"ampandthepeace camp,orthereligiousand secularcommunities.Our focus is not on some deeper layer of agreementor common groundunderlyingthe battleground,but on a paradox-the presenceof two apparentlycontradictorydeas that are simultaneously aken for granted n Israelipoliticaldiscourse: Israel is powerful and independent and Israel is vulnerable and

dependent.How do these two ideascoexist in thesamemeaningsysteminsteadofcompetingandcreatingcontinualdissonance?1We explorehow this paradoxof strengthand vulnerabilityhelps to explaincertainsurprising eatures of Israelipolitical discourse about U.S. policy in theMiddle East. We argue that these two contradictorydeas are not only deeplyembeddedin a shared Israeli culturalframe,but also function as a mentalmapthroughwhich the Israelimedia andpublicdiscoursesee "others"in this case theUnited States)and evaluate andinterpretheirpolicy in the region.Althoughthetext is abouttheother,the subtext urnsout to be a discourseon how Israelisthinkaboutthemselves.

1This paradox s present only in IsraeliJewish culture. IsraeliPalestinianvulnerabilityhas its ownhistoricalroots andrequiresa parallelanalysisto whatwe attempthere.

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Livingwith ContradictionsPolitical Discourse on Policy

Academic research has examined U.S. Middle East policy andregionalin-volvementprimarily n termsof its strategicsignificance.Scholarly questionsonthe subject tend to addressthe unfoldingof events and subsequentpatternsofbehavior,decision-makingprocesses entailedby a particularpolicy, analysis ofpolitical programsmandatedby the policy, and the impact on Israel of U.S.involvement Ben-Zvi,1986, 1993;Evron,1973).Hence,this lineof research reatspoliticaleventsas objective"social facts."In contrast, he presentstudy attempts o understand ow politicalevents areconstructed;t derives froma research radition hat considerspublicdiscourse tobe based on interpretive ultural rames. These framesorganizeboth realityandthe social and symbolic meaningconferredupon it (Cohen & Wolfsfeld, 1992;Fiske & Kinder,1981; Gans, 1979; Tuchman,1978). A frame or organizing deais an active mechanismthatguides people to "see"and interpretan event in aparticularway. By theirnature, ramesareconstraining; y directingustoperceiveandinterpretan event in a particularway, they reduce ouroptionsof seeing theevent in otherways. Yet they are also a liberating actor:Withoutthem,it wouldbe impossible to see anythingat all throughthe incoherent umble of facts andeventspresented o us.Thepresentworkattempts o add another ayerof understandingo the seriesof studies conductedby Gamson,with variouscolleagues, in an attempt o com-prehendthe various aspects of political discourse and its place in processes ofpolicy-shapingand social change(Gamson,1992, 1998;Gamson & Lasch, 1983;Gamson& Modigliani,1987, 1989). Itfocuses attentionon theimageof theactorsinvolved and theirrelationship. n an earlierstudy,Gamson(1992) considered heimagesof the actors nvolved in the Arab-Israeli onflict thatprevail n Americandiscourse.Here,we soughtacomparablessue for anIsraelicounterpart tudy.Theubiquityandcentralityof discourse on the Arab-Israeli onflict, compared o themore bounded andlimiteddomain in the UnitedStates,meant we needed some-thingmorecomparablen scope.Hence,we chose to focus on how theU.S. role intheArab-Israeli onflict is understoodandinterpretedn Israel.We thought nitiallythat we were merelylookingat how Israelisviewed theUnited States, but we found that we were actually seeing how Israelis look atthemselves hrough heprismof theirunderstandingf U.S.-Israelirelations.Fromthisperspective,we founda strikingshift in thediscourse.Initially,U.S. interestswere treated as problematicand meritingdiscussion. The interpretation f U.S.intentions andmotives was contested,although(as discussedbelow) the contestwas an unevenone from thebeginning.But overtime,U.S. interestsmovedinto adomain thatis unexamined,self-evident,and taken for granted.

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Gamson ndHerzogResearch Methods

Discourseanalysisinvolves two dimensions:substantiveandstructural.Theformerrefers othetotalityof meaningsraisedbythepublicconcerningaparticularissue. This is thecultural epertoireromwhichmeaningscanbeconstructed, itherto interpret new eventorto reinterpret astevents.Whenaneventoccurs,it maybe interpretedwith the use of existing framesand used to reinforceself-evident,taken-for-grantedtruths";lternatively,new patternsof referencemaybe createdto understandwhat is takingplace.The structuraldimensionof discourseanalysisrefers to the relativepromi-nence of the variousinterpretive rames. Do certain modes of thoughtbecomedominantwithrespectto social issues anddislodgealternativenterpretations? ocertain modes of interpretation chieve permanence,becoming self-evident de-scriptionsof situationsthat are unquestionedand unchallengedperceptionsofreality?Or,alternatively,do assumptionshatwere once takenforgrantedbecomeobjectsof contestedinterpretation?Public discourse is conducted in different arenas: in print and broadcastmass media, within the academic community, among decision-makers,and, ina highly politicized society such as Israel, in Fridayevening social gatheringsas well. The present study focuses on two forums-newspapers and conversa-tions. More specifically, it includes a systematic analysis of frames in thediscourse in Israeli newspapersin sample periods between 1948 and 1981; ananalysis of frames as these emerged in discussion groups that took place in1988; and,finally, a return o media texts, this time in the Israelipress in 1996.Newspapers were chosen as a medium not only because of their practicaladvantagesas a recoverableand continuoussource, but also because they offera broadpolitical range, enabling us to see framingelements thattranscendthepolitical partyspectrum.

By drawing heirframesfrom the cultural epertoire f thesociety, journalistsserve simultaneouslyas progenitors,transmitters, nd reproducersof a broaderpublicdiscourse.Ofthevarious orumsofpublicdiscourse, he mass mediaprovidethe most generallyavailableand sharedset of cultural ools. They are the majorsite of contest politically, in partbecause all the would-beor actualsponsorsofmeaning-politicians, challengers,and the public-assume pervasiveinfluence(whether ustifiedornot).The initial stage of the research entailed choosing four critical discoursemoments relatedto U.S. involvementin the Middle East, events thatprovokedpublicdiscourseto interprethem(Chilton,1987; Gamson, 1992,pp. 26-27). Wemake nojudgmenton the criticalimportanceof these events in shapingpoliticaloutcomesorchangesin policy. Because the fourevents occurred n different ime

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Living with Contradictions

periods, we can sketch, however roughly, the contours of the evolution and/orentrenchment f frames.2The sampledarticlesappearedduringthe week in which the event occurred.The criticaldiscoursemomentschosen were the establishment f theStateof Israel(May1948),theIDF's (IsraelDefenseForces)withdrawal romSinai after heSinaiwar (January1957), President Nixon's visit to the Middle East after the YomKippurWar(June1974), and the enactmentof the GolanHeightsLaw(December1981).Thediscussion groups(see below) met at the end of 1988 and thebeginningof 1989. Finally, to update the time period, we addeda fifth critical discoursemoment to supplement the content analysis of newspaper commentary. Thestimulus event (October 1996) was U.S. mediation between Palestinian Author-ity Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahuafter the opening of the new exit to the Western Wall tunnel in Jerusalem andthe violence this act triggeredin the West Bank and Gaza between Israelis andPalestinians.The articles selectedfromnewspaperswere commentariesdealingexplicitlywith theAmericanroleintheMiddleEast.We excludednews accountsof the actualevents, focusing on editorialsand commentaries rom a wide varietyof Hebrew-languagedailies,3encompassingpapersthat define themselves as politicallynon-alignedand others that areplatforms orpoliticalmovements.4Between March 1988 and the end of February1989, 25 discussion groupswere held. Half the groupswere established specifically for this purpose;theycame into being when one personinvited a numberof friends to his or her hometo hold a discussion. All of these groups were gender-mixed. The other halfconsisted of "encountergroups"that met regularlyat community centers andwere askedto devote one evening to discusspublic issues in the news.5 Of these,

2A movie of the discoursewouldbe preferable o a series of snapshots,buta continuous amplewouldhave requiredresourcesbeyondthose available to us. That the stimulusevents differ in their naturehas the advantage hat whenrecurrent hemesoccur,one can have more confidencethatthey are notpeculiar o a particular ype of event. Butthevariablenatureof the eventsthemselvesconfoundsthecomparisonovertimeby introducinganadditionalpossible explanation orchange.3 Limitingthe pressto the Hebrewlanguagealso limits the discussion to the public discourseamongJewishIsraelis,who constitute82% of the country'spopulation.4 The daily newspaperschosen for the study were as follows. Nonpartypapers: YediotAchronot,Ma'ariv (or its incarnationas YediotMa'ariv in 1948), andHa'aretz.Left-wing papers:Davar,AlHamishmar,andLamerhav only for the secondevent, 1957).Religiouspapers:Hatzofe.CommunistPartypapers:Kol Ha'am (apart rom the thirdevent, 1974) and its metamorphosisnto ZoHaderekh(forthe fourthevent, 1981).Right-wingand centerpapers:Hamashkif forthe firstevent, 1948) andits reincarnation s Herut(forthe secondevent).For the 1996event, we usedonly the threenonpartynewspapers.5The studyalso covered additional ssues (attitudes owardIsrael's Arabcitizens andtowardethnicand class equality n Israelieducation).

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fourgroupsconsistedof womenonly,twoof menonly,and he othersweremixed.6Each groupcontainedbetween6 and 10 participants.The use of conversationaldiscourseas well as that foundin newspapers s anattemptat triangulation.Newspapercommentary s ultimatelya forum of elitediscourse.By supplementingt withpopulardiscourse,we can ask whether ramesidentifiedin one forum arealso found in this very differentforum. To maximizethe difference,we ensuredthat the discussiongroupswere composedof Israeliswho had notpassedthebagrut,the matriculation xamsrequired or thepursuitofhighereducation n Israel.7Most of theparticipants ead eitherMa'arivor YediotAchronot, Israel's two mass-circulationdailies, but rarely read editorials andcommentaries.

Inthe discussiongroups,we examinedhowpeopleconfermeaningonan issuethat has been presented o them and how they negotiateover meanings.The unitof analysis was the conversation.We examined the degree to which the framesfromnewspaperdiscoursewere reflected here as well. We began with a generalquestiononeachissue to allowparticipantso introduce heirownwaysof framingit. After about 10 minutes of open-endeddiscussion, the facilitatorpresentedcompeting ramesbymeansof politicalcartoons,showingthemtotheparticipants,explainingtheircentral dea,andaskingtheparticipantso react.8The discussionswerevideotapedand transcribed y the facilitators.The textsof both themedia andthe conversationswere coded independentlyby two researchers,and in cases ofdisagreementby an additionalresearcher.

Discourse Analysis of NewspapersFollowing Gamson and Modigliani (1989), we use the term interpretive

package to mean an underlying rame and the set of condensing symbolsused toinvoke it. We found threecompeting packages in the media discourse on U.S.Middle Easternpolicy. Eachpackage appears n differentvariations or differentevents,andnot all packagesappear orevery event.The firstinterpretive ackage-Interests-has two variants hatareimportanttodistinguish.Thegenericframe s theclassicalRealpolitikof geopoliticalstrategyandnationalinterestsdefined in terms of nationalpower. The United States is aworld power, and as such has a continuing interest in the region's strategicwaterwaysand oil resources.According to this interpretation,he Middle East

6Gendercompositionorothergroupdifferences,however,did notproverelevant or the issue discussedhere.The themesemphasizedappear o applyoverthe wholerangerather hanbeinglimitedto groupswith certaincharacteristics.7 We alsosoughttoreplicate heU.S. study,whichconducteddiscussionsamongpeoplewith obsratherthanwith careers equiring redentials.Thatstudyexcluded hose who werecurrently ttending ollegeorhadgraduated romcollege.8For a more detaileddiscussion of the advantagesanddisadvantages f this focus groupmethodology,see Gamson, 1992,pp. 189-196.

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Living with Contradictionsconflict is notself-contained;t is anintegralelementin the Cold War n whichthechiefadversaries rethe Soviet Union andthe United States.The states n theregionare portrayedas pawns on a chessboard,at the mercy of extra-regional"play-ers"-the superpowers.Note that"interests"n this variation xcludes the domestic nterestsof partiesandpoliticians.IndividualAmericanpoliticians mayhave an interest n maintain-ing the supportof Jewish voters, but policies are not governed by the personalinterestsof politicians, who ultimatelymust follow the prevailingdefinitionofnational nterestsandjustify theirpolicies in these terms.Otherwise, hesepoliti-cianswill runthe riskof beingaccusedof puttingpoliticalconsiderationsaheadofthecountry'sinterest.

The Bargainingvariationelevates Israel and otherregional powers as co-players rather hanpawns, albeitplayerswith less power thanthe extra-regionalprotagonists.In the Bargainingframe,the very existence of the conflict permitsnegotiationsandbargainingorleveragebetween thesuperpowers ndtheregionalstates. Although the Bargainingframeis a variationof the Interestsframe, wedistinguish t becauseof the differentassumptionsabout the role of the regionalstates vis-a-vis the superpowers.Althoughthe latterremain he leadingactors,thelocal countriesareperceivedto takean active and nfluentialroleinthearticulationandimplementation f superpowerpolicy. Forexample,Now both sides [Israeland the U.S.] will have to ... createproceduresfor existingharmoniouslyand to clarifythe spiritof theirrelations.Thatspirit, accordingto the Americaninterpretation, as only one meaning:Israel will be able to enjoy American aid andsupportonly if it behavesproperlyand does not sabotageinterestsof the United States. (Y. Priel,"MoaningandHidingTheirAnger,"Davar, 25 December1981)Domesticpoliticalinterestsdo matter n this variation.To the extentthatany

given U.S. administrations dependenton and concernedabout losing Jewishsupport,hisstrengthenssrael n thebargaining elationship-especially by weak-ening the abilityof the United States to put pressureon Israel.To the extent thatthe American Jewish communityis divided on policy toward Israel or supportspressureon Israel,this weakens Israel n thebargaining elationship.In theBargainingvariation, srael'sabilityto mobilize domesticsupportntheUnited Statesgoes beyond the influence of the American Jewish community.A1974 article n Davar (18 June)emphasizeda "wide coalitionof variousforces inthe United States,a coalition that no otherforeign state could mobilize as Israeldoes." Thiscoalition includesthose Christianswho see in Israelthe realizationofa biblicalprophecyandthose who admire ts militarypowerandcourageanditsloyalty to the United States in the internationalarena,as well as the AmericanJewishminority.In contrast o the two Interestvariations, he Valuespackage emphasizestheculturalaffinitybetween the United States andIsrael.Elements here include the

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Gamson and Herzogdesire of the United States to assist the only democracy in the Middle East,America's sympathyfor the underdogand its efforts to protect the weak andvulnerable,and the presence of the majorChristianholy places in Israel, withperhaps ome Holocaustguiltthrown n. Forexample,"Whatwill beputto the testinthisperiod s notonlytheSecurityCouncilbut also thesincerityof thefriendshipof the U.S. administrationoward us" (Ha'aretz,27 May 1948). The AmericanJewishcommunity, n this package,has a specialrole and interest n articulatingthese commonvalues,butbeyondthat, t has no specialrelevance.Finally,the Lackof Interestpackagechallengestheassumptionhat he UnitedStateshascentralorenduring nterests n theMiddleEast. It sees theUnited Statesas treatingArab-Israeli onflict as afightbetween distantcountriesorpeopleswhoare of littleconcernto most Americans.Theveryfact of its local charactermpliesthat it is notdependenton extra-regional lements:

The situation here,on thefront, s difficult.AndinWashington vil windshave begun to blow. Devil's advocateshave begun to raise their headsand speak slander:"Is there really any point in the United States andBritain being envious of each other because of the Jews?" . . . "Becauseof the Jews we will becomeentangled n a war ... Is it worthourwhile?"(D. Pinnes, "America'sJews Hold TheirHeadsHigh,"Davar, 30 May1948)In this frame,the AmericanJewishcommunity s too weak and vulnerable omatternthedefinitionof U.S. interests.A 1948 article n YediotAchronot6 May)dismisses the idea that sensitivity to the American Jewish community mightinfluenceU.S. policy:"Awaragainstthe Jews is notdangerousand does not evenharmelection [chances]."The localized conflict idea has two versions: one that sees the conflict as a

strugglebetween sovereignstates, the other as a strugglebetween nations. Bothversionsshare he centralLackof Interest rame:Americansregard he MiddleEastconflict as secondaryto theirmajorconcerns,that is, domesticpolicy and otherinternational heaters uch asEuropeandAsia.Hence,U.S. involvement s ephem-eral andvolatile,dependingon whetherothercore interestsarecurrently ccupyingits attention.9Thenewspapersample (Figure1) showsthe dominanceof the Interest ramewith its two variations.The rareappearancesof the Values frameare foundonlyin Hatzofe,the paperof the NationalReligious Party,and in the liberalHa'aretz.

9 Something very close to this frameis, in fact, the most prominentone in U.S. media and populardiscourseon Israel.Gamson 1992) describedaFeudingNeighbors ramewith its centralconcern hatthe United States not get dragged nto a distantquarrel.Overthe entire40-year period,it accountedforhalf the framedisplaysin the U.S. mass mediasamplewhile its majorcompetitorsaveragedaboutone-fifth overall. It was also the most prominent rame in the U.S. focus groupconversations.Ofcourse,a Strategic nterests ramedominates hediscourseof publicofficials andforeignpolicy elites.

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yalues100% ._

in contpackf (bargaining) e60%

40%

1948 1957 1974 1981 1996Figure1. Changesn discourseatternrom1948 o 1996.Sample ize:220 articles42in 1948,46

The Interestframe,in contrast,appearswith almost the same prominencein allpapersacross the party spectrumand across the religious-secularcleavage. TheLack of Interest frame appearsvery rarelyand only duringthe 1948 and 1974samples.The disappearanceof the Values frame after 1948 probably reflects theincorporation f weakerassumptionsaboutvalueaffinitythatare takenforgrantedin the Interestpackages. One need not make the strong assumptionthat valueaffinity is irrelevant,but merely the widely shared weakerassumptionthat it isinsufficient.One cannotcount on the soft coin of valueaffinities,andto do so wouldbe naive and even dangerouson Israel'spart.Hence, one must focus attentiononthe underlyinginterests of states and the nature of the exchange relationshipbetween them.ThegenericRealpolitikversionof the Interest rame,as we notedabove,leavesopenandproblematichecorrespondence f U.S. and Israeli nterests,and herewefind a significantevolutionover time. In the first half of the time period,Israel'srole in the Cold Warwas still unresolvedfor two reasons.First,its clearalliancewith the Western bloc was not yet in place. Israel wanted to attend the 1954Bandungconferenceof nonalignednations,but wasexcluded when Arabcountriesthreatened boycottif Israelwas allowed toparticipate. srael's decision to choosesidesin theColdWarwas more a matterof defaultthanan active choice. Moreover,the United States sided withEgyptandthe Soviet Unioninpressuring srael,againstits will, to withdraw from Sinai after the 1956 war. To many Israelis, thegeopolitical interestsof the United States and the inclination of its professional

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Gamson and HerzogdiplomatssuggestedthatWashingtonwouldhave likedto conclude a U.S. alliancewithArab countries n the Middle East.

Inthe secondhalf,theperceptionof U.S. geopolitical nterests hifted.Increas-ingly, Arab countries(albeitwith important xceptions)became Soviet clients, adevelopmentthatmore neatly alignedthe Arab-Israeli onflict with the broaderCold Wardispute.MiddleEasterncountriesappearedas superpowerproxies,andIsrael'smilitary victoryin 1967 established t as a valuablestrategicasset in theeyes of its citizens:It is hard o believe thatthe U.S. move in the Middle East[anundertakingto build a nuclearplant n Egypt]will weaken ts supportorIsrael,whichrests not only on a moralcommitment,and not only on the pressureofAmerican Jewry, but mainly on American interests. A strong Israelmerges well with the basic principlesof Americanforeign policy. (A.Shapira,Al Hamishmar,14 June1974)With thischange,U.S. supportorIsraelwasperceivedashavingbecome lessproblematicandmore taken for grantedas self-evident; t no longerneeded to beexplainedor examined,havingbecomepartof thenaturalorderof the Cold War.The United States and Israelwere assumed to share an obvious common interestin preventing he Soviet Union fromobtaininga stronger ootholdin theregion.But as the reasonsfor U.S. involvementdisappearedromthe discourse,thenatureof thebargainingrelationshipbetween the UnitedStatesand Israel oomedlarger.In the genericversionof the Interest rame,the Arab-Israeli onflict is notself-containedbut anintegralelement in the ColdWar,where the chief adversariesare the Soviet Union and the United States. U.S. policy was describedby themainstream ewspapersasan efforttostem SovietimperialismMa ariv,6 January1957) and as an attempt o createa balance of powerbetweenthe superpowersnthe Middle East (Ma'ariv, 16 June 1974). The CommunistParty paperin Israel

offered analternativenterpretation:TheMiddleEastcountriesarenot threatenedby 'Communistaggression,'which was invented n Washington,butby Americanimperialism,which would make our area an American colonial region" (KolHa'am, 7 January1957). Despite such differences,the idea that the countries ntheregionwerepawnson a chessboardof superpowerplayers appearedacross thepoliticalspectrum.The morethe MiddleEast becamea majortheaterof Cold Warconflict, themore Americaninterests were taken for grantedin the discourse.As Figure 1shows, the Bargainingvariationemerges only in the later time period, withdiscoursefocusing on whetherthere is a fairquid pro quo in this relationship. sthe United States demandingmore from Israel than it gives in return? s Israelgiving theUnited Statesenoughin return or whatit gets? "TheUnited States hasscored a tremendousdiplomaticachievement[thanks o Egypt],and it mustgivesomethingin return;apparentlySadatis expecting a reward n the form of U.S.

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LivingwithContradictionssupport or thelegitimaterightsof thePalestinians," otedMa'ariv(12 June1974)in the languageof the Bargainingvariation.Althoughthesuperpowers emained heleadingactors,exchangeand nterde-pendence replaced dependenceas the basic currencyof the relationshipbetweenregionalstates and superpowers.Regional statescan providetheirsponsorswithstrategicassets in thebroaderdisputeand thus enhancetheirbargainingposition.The Cold War was generallyseen as enhancingwhatIsraelcouldofferthe UnitedStates,lesseningthe one-sidednessof a dependencerelationship.TheBargainingvariation reatsUnitedNationsvetoes, sanctions,embargoes,threats,and militaryor economic aid as resources to be used in the exchange.Althoughthe relationships not one of equals,economic, strategic,security,anddiplomaticbenefits are neverthelessascribed o both thesuperpowers ndthelocalcountries. The distinctive elementof this variation s that it does not questionorattemptto explain the superpower nterests in the region;instead,it accepts theCold War framingof superpower nterests as self-evident, implying that suchinvolvement andinterventions unavoidableand will persist.Thegenericversionof the frame emphasizesIsrael's dependenceon the United States and Israel'svulnerability,whereas heBargainingversionunderscores srael'sstrengthandtheunderlyingmutualdependenceof the two parties.IntheBargainingversion,a discourseon thenatureof U.S. interests s replacedby a discourse on the terms of the U.S.-Israeliexchange. No longer need onewonder whether the powers have regional interestsor what they might be; soself-evident arethose intereststo the carriersof this frame thattheirstabilityandsubstance s neverquestioned.As attentionshifts to a considerationof the meansfor negotiating, bargainingtactics by which a particularside advances its owninterestsbecome the focus. The substance of U.S. interests becomes so deeplyunexamined hateven afterthe UnitedStateshas become the only superpowerntheregion,no one questionsthenatureof its interests:

The Israelis expect the United States to exert pressureand solve theproblem.(Y. Esteron,Ha'aretz,6 October1996)The Arabshavegraduallyearned hatIsrael s apowerfulstatewhich willnot easily be destroyed. Sadat made the Arab world understand hatconcessions from Israel can be extractedonly throughWashington.(E.Inbar,"TheProcessWill Continue,"Ha'aretz,3 October1996)Nothingin thecontemporary ewspapersamplechallengesthe ideathatU.S.policy is motivated by geopolitical interests as traditionallydefined. On thecontrary, hisperception s reasserted, houghat a higher evel of abstraction handuring heCold War.The UnitedStates s thepreeminentglobalpowerandas suchhas interests everywhere, hence also commitments that must be honored. Aneditorial n Ha'aretzcaptures he spirit:

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Gamson ndHerzogClintonhas a majorrole inbringingthe [peace] processto fruition.He isthe godfatherof the Oslo agreement,he is a signatoryas a guarantor fits implementation, ndhe, as theheadof the world'sstrongestpower,isconcerned about the regional implicationsliable to ensue should theprocess collapse. (2 October1996)Themostsurprising inding ntheanalysisof the 1996 discourse s thatdespitethe considerablepress reportageof President Clinton's mediation efforts, nocommentariesaddressthe underlyingrationaleof U.S. policy. That Americahasstronginterests n the region is assumed,with no one asking why, or whattheseinterestsmight be in a post-Cold War world. When U.S. interests arise in thediscourseatall,the writers peculateabouthow domesticAmericanpoliticsaffectsthe intensityandtimingof U.S. interventionor constrains heabilityof the UnitedStatesto applypressure n bargaining:Thepresidenthasprovedthat"hehasgonethe extramile."The Americanpeople are not about to changethe thrustof theirvote on foreignpolicyissues unless a gallingfailureoccurs,which directlyinvolves Americansoldiersorcivilians.Clintongot throughNetanyahuwith a smile,but hewill makehis realmove inthe arenaafter he[presidential lection onthe]5th of November.(H.Shibi,"HeDidn'tGettheGoods,"YediotAchronot,4 October1996)

Like others, this journalistis certainthat it is in the United States' interest tointerveneand that the sides to theconflict can at best delaysuchintervention.Theunexaminednatureof U.S. interests s all themoreremarkable ecause itsurvivesthe end of the Cold War,a watershedevent that would have seemed tomake discussion of the issue unavoidable. The strategicinterest of containingSoviet influencein theMiddle Easthas faded. If Israelwas clearlya strategicassetto Washingtonn its pursuitof thatgoal during heColdWar,the situationnow isthatboth U.S. strategicgoals andthe ways in which Israel can abetthem are nolonger obvious. The failure of Israelidiscourse to addressthis puzzle is highlysignificant-a case of thedog that didn'tbark n thenight.We suggestthat,given the paradoxof strengthandvulnerability,o examinethe underlyingnatureof U.S. strategic nterestswould be discomfiting.It wouldagainforce anexplorationof the truenatureof thepower-dependence elationshipbetweentheUnitedStatesandIsrael.How muchdoes the UnitedStatesreallyneedIsrael?Domestic politics aside, how muchwould it have to lose by withdrawingits diplomaticsupportandcultivatingties with Arab nations?Even to raise suchquestions-however they might be answered-heightens anxiety by threateningthedelicate balancebetween"Israels strong"and "Israels vulnerable,"esolvingtheparadox n favorof the secondassertion.

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Living with ContradictionsThe Strength and Vulnerability Paradox

The two conceptualelements thatform the paradoxare located in differentlayersof politicalculture.The vulnerability heme,we contend,lies in a stratumof politicalculturebelow thatof symbolic contests. It remains argelyuntouchedand uncontestedin the competing interpretations ver the meaningof politicalevents.Itis sodeeplyentrenchednthetaken-for-grantedtratum f Jewishculture,bothinIsraelandtheDiaspora, hat t is, inthissense,immune ocontrary vidence.No matterhow apparently espectedor assimilateda Jewishcommunitymaybe,no matterhow many stunningmilitaryvictories Israel achieves, the lesson ofvulnerability emains.It is anidentitybelief, partof whatit meanstobe Jewish.Inthe wordsof the classic "Jewish" elegram:"Startworrying.Letterfollows."Thisparadox s expressed n Israeli culture n variousways:theethosof "thefew against hemany," nvokedto describe he Arab-Israeli onflict(Ben-Yehuda,1995; Zerubavel,1995), and the commemorationof the tragedythat befell theJewish people in the Second World War on "Holocaust and Heroism Day"(Liebman& Don-Yehiya, 1983). The well-known Israeli writerAmos Oz de-scribed"the Israeli who wins battlesby day and dreamsof Auschwitzby night"(citedin Weitz, 1979).

Of course,theparadoxmaybe reinforcedby unfoldingevents,andevents thatcontribute o such reinforcementassume special salience in Israeli culture.Thesense of vulnerabilityand dependencewas dramaticallyreinforcedby the 1973Yom KippurWar,when theIDFcameperilouslyclose to runningout of ammuni-tion and neededto be urgentlyresuppliedby the United States.The "Jewish ate"was againevokedbitterlyduring he 1991 GulfWar,whenalmostevery dayfor 6weeks airraidsirenssenttheentirepopulationof Israelscurrying o enter"sealedrooms"and to carrygas masks with themeverywhere.Thefeeling of helplessnessas Scud missiles fired by Iraq slammed into Israeli cities was only partiallyassuagedbythecomfortingnotion-which laterproved ohavebeenillusory-thatsalvation was at handin the form of U.S. Patriotmissiles. Duringthe Gulf Warscare of February1998, worriedIsraelisflocked to gas mask centers n near-panicdespitethe effortsof governmentofficials todownplay hedangerof attack.Eventssuchas theseweavethethreadsof vulnerability nddependencento asinglefabric.This theme has always been prominent n Israelipolitical discourse: "Thepresidentof a persecutedand torturedpeople is meetingwith the presidentof therichest andmightiestof nations,"says a Ha'aretzeditorialof May 1948, referringto a meetingbetween ChaimWeizmannandHarryTruman.Or,"Theprospects orthe futurearebad, not only for us but for the entirenation,which has placed itstrust nAmerica.... Years will passbefore theconscienceof JeffersonandLincolnwill againhover over the Statueof Liberty" Hamashkif, 9 May 1948).Or,in lesspictorial anguage:

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Gamson and HerzogThis move [theU.S. threat o impose economic sanctions]is proofthatfor a country like Israel to conduct an independentpolicy . . . is anextremelydifficulttask,whichentanglesIsraelandplacesit indiplomaticisolationsuchas it has never beforeexperienced. Hatzofe,25 December1981)CantrilandFree(1962), in a cross-national tudyof 13 countries n theearly1960s, describedIsraelis'pervasivefear of war with the Arabsbut notedthat"thisfear was not intenseenoughto be a sourceof dissatisfactionwith thepresentor ofanxietyabout the future."Antonovskyand Arian(1972), writinga decade later,

suggested that "in an overall sense there is greaterself-assurancetoday than adecadeago, [but]we would also expectto findgreaterconcern n a morepersonalsense about the dangerof war with the Arabs."Similarly, Kimmerling(1993)observed hatIsraelisaredeeplydistrustful f theiradversaries'ambitions,arewaryof wars and obsessed with the security threat,yet at the same time are quiteoptimisticaboutthecountry's abilityto overcome the dire situation.This dual attitudewas reexploredby Arian (1995) in an analysisof publicopinionsurveysthat were conductedbetween 1962 and 1994. He demonstratedrecurrentpattern:Israelis perceive (in varying degrees) that the countryfacesthreats,but at the sametimethey professconfidence that Israel can overcome thesecurityrisks. The most compellingevidence concerns the persistentbelief thatIsrael exists in a deeply hostile world. As recentlyas 1991, more than two-thirdsof IsraeliJews believed that"worldcriticism of Israelipolicy stemsmainlyfromanti-Semitism."As recentlyas 1987,more thanhalfagreedwiththe statement hat"the whole world is againstIsrael."Not all Israelis who held such beliefs were immune from evidence to thecontrary.After the Oslo accords, internationalcriticism of Israelipolicies wasmuted almost to the point of nonexistence, and many previously unfriendlycountriesestablisheddiplomaticrelations.PrimeMinisterRabincalled on Israelisto stopthinkingthat "the whole world is againstus." The numberof Israeliswhoagreedwith such statements n nationalsurveysdeclinedsignificantly.Still, morethan one-third 35%)continuedto think that "thewhole world is againstIsrael,"and more than half (51%) agreed that "criticismof Israel stems mainly fromanti-Semitism"Arian,1995).Butif manystillrefused oheed Rabin's advice on thispoint, theyoverwhelm-ingly acceptedhis admonition hatIsraelisultimatelyshouldtrustonly themselves.When asked to identifytheir main guardian romthe list provided,most Israelisnamed the IDF (60%);about 20%pickedGod, and fewer than 5%puttheir trustin the United States.Moreover, herewasverylittlechangeovertimeinthe answerto thisquestionin the surveysthat Ariananalyzed.Our findings, though stemming from different kinds of data, supportthesaliency of the simultaneousexistence of attitudesof strengthandvulnerability.Althoughthe studiesquotedabovepresented ntervieweeswith thetwo options, n

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Living with Contradictionsour case the dual attitudesemerged spontaneously romtheconversations.More-over, these conversationswere not ostensiblyaboutthe self-imageof Israelisbutabouttheperceptionof "others" in thiscase, of the UnitedStates).Israelidependenceon the United States-expressed sometimes with accep-tance, at other times with resentment-is a strong,recurrent heme in the focusgroupdiscussions. We did not ask the participants pecificallyabout the paradoxof strengthandvulnerability,butboththemesemergedspontaneouslyn responseto anopen-endedquestion:"Whydo you thinkthe United States s involved in theMiddle East?"10

The strongrules the weak. (Group#12)We are theirclients. (Group#25)The UnitedStates ... is the masterthat tells the dog whatto do, when itmay andwhen it maynot [do something].(Group#1)He who pays the pipercalls the tune.If we don't heed the tune,we willget nothing. (Group#1)Theyhold us by thehands,andif we don't do as they say-(Group #3)We have to danceto their tune.(Group#2)We rely on them,they are oursupport. Group#3)Withoutthem,we could not exist. (Group#19)

In all groups,Israelidependenceon the United States was a leadingidea. But inmost groups,thedegreeof dependencewas a matterof debate,especiallyin termsof whether t allowedWashington o imposeits views on Israel,and how farIsraelcould resist this.Ourmedia sample from the past suggests that the paradoxof strengthandvulnerabilitywas mutedin theearly daysof the state,withthedependence hemeratherweaklybalancedby confidence.Thecountriesof theMiddleEast,includingIsrael, are portrayedas pawns on a chessboard,at the mercy of extra-regionalplayers-the superpowers.Accordingto this frame,theproclamationof the Stateof Israel,in common with otherpoliticalevents in the region,was madepossiblebytheexistence of aparticular,ortunate,nternationalonstellation,andthefutureof thenascent stateis equallyintertwinedwiththe internationalontext.In 1948, the leading actors are Britainand the United States, which haveconflicting nterests n thedivisionof spheresof influence,strategic onsiderations,andcontroloveroil sources.As aneditorialn YediotMaariv(A. Carlebach,"From10After he open-endeddiscussion, participantswere shown a series of cartoons,each expressingadifferent rame.Oneof theseshowed the UnitedStatesas afishmongerwrapping fishlabeled"Israelfor sale,"directly nvokingthe dependence heme.But the idea hadalreadybeen expressedsponta-neously in most groupsduring he open-endeddiscussion.

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the Campaign-A GreatDifference,"26 May 1948) puts it, "Thepeace negotia-tions in the Land of Israel are not being conductedbetween Arabs and Jews butbetween Britainand the UnitedStates,thatis, between Bevin andMarshall."In theanalysisof Israel's withdrawal rom Sinai in 1957,reality s constructedinCold Warterms.Theportrayal f theprincipalsnvolved haschanged:No longeris the United Statespitted againstBritainbut,explicitly, againstthe Soviet Union.This redefinitionof thekey playershasoccurred venthough n the Suez crisis thatpreceded hewar,the United StatesandtheSoviet Union werealignedon the sameside againstBritainand France.The perceptionof the event thusemphasizesthedecline of the "oldempires"andtheemergenceof the newinternationaluperpow-ers: the United States and the Soviet Union. A dependentIsrael is presentedas

havingno choice otherthanto follow thedictatesof thesuperpowers:eave Sinai.It is only after the 1967 Six-Day Warthat the paradoxemergesfull-blown.Israelismayhave thoughtof themselves as a fiercely independentDavidbringingdownthe ArabGoliath,but the media magesof aformidable egionalpowercomelater. Comparedto the vulnerabilitytheme, the theme of Israeli strengthandindependenceies closerto thesurface,moreheavilyaffectedby competing nterpre-tationsof anunfolding equenceof pertinentvents.The dramatic ecisivenessof theIsraelimilitaryvictory n 1967 and the development f U.S.-Israelirelationsduringthisphaseof the Cold Warprovidedhegrowthmedium or its emergence. tdidnotreplace hevulnerabilityhemebutgrewinthetopsoilabove it.In the 1974 and 1981 mediasamples,the paradoxhas emerged,andIsrael isseen as having choices, some of which may-perhaps unwisely-displease itsAmericanally. Nixon, the first Americanpresident o visit the MiddleEast,waswarmly welcomed by the Israeli media in 1974, at the height of Watergate.Nevertheless,adeepanxietywasexpressed nlightof U.S. intentions ohelpEgyptbuild nuclearreactors.Nixon was describedas "a friend of two rivals [IsraelandtheArabs]" YediotAchronot,14 June1974)."The wo sides,Israelandthe UnitedStates,sing in differentvoices that do not alwaysblendintofull harmony.... TheU.S. presumes hatas afriend, t gives Israelgood advicethatIsraelshouldaccept.In otherwords,the U.S. seeksto determinewhat'sgood for Israel.MaybetheU.S.does not see this as a 'dictate,'but fromthe Israeliprimeminister'scommentsoneshouldunderstandhatonly Israel will decide the natureof its security" Ma ariv,15 June1974).Theenactmentof the GolanHeightsLaw in December 1981 is describedas a"slapin the face" to the superpower hatsupportsIsrael(Hatzofe,25 December1981). "Wearedefinitely 'a vassal state' of the United States. We aredependenton Americaneconomicandsecurityaid. This is thebig cardtheyhold ... we liveon borrowed ime, andthe clock is in Americanhands, 'ourfeudalmasters.'Thepopular eeling is thatthanks o Israel'sstrongposition,andespeciallybecause ofwhat ourprimeministersaid to the Americanambassador,we can hold our headsup once again"(YediotAchronot,24 December1981).

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Livingwith ContradictionsBy the time of the 1988-1989 focus groupdiscussions,there are increasingassertionsof Israelistrengthandindependence:We are the muscleof theU.S. (Group#3)We arestrong.(Group#4)We safeguardAmerican nterests.(Group#17)We control the Middle East. TheU.S. cancount on us. (Group#3)We give [the U.S.] a footholdin the Middle East.Throughus it controlsthe MiddleEast.If they need us, it shouldbe a matterof give and take.Just as we give to the U.S., it should give to us. That is a position ofstrength. Group#8)We are the only stablecountry n the Middle East.(Group#4)We aretheheartof the MiddleEast,a strategicasset. (Group#2)Throughus they know what is going on in the Arabstates.(Group#10)We also contribute: ombatexperience, intelligenceinformation hat nootherarmy n the world cangive them.(Group#16)

Assertions of Israeli independencefrequentlyhave a resentful tone in the focusgroups:We are not anotherstaron the American lag. (Group#1)Israel is trulystrong,[but]the U.S. wantsto portrayIsraelas weak andwretchedbecause that serves its interests.(Group#4)We are grown-upchildren . . . with all due respect to thatbig daddy.(Group#16)They allow themselves too much. We should listen to thembutonly upto a certainpoint.(Group#22)What do you wantfrom the U.S.? If you turnyourselfinto a fish in waterand you are readyto send all kinds of emissaries to beg, then you areaskingforpressureandthey will pressure or sure.(Group#4)[America's] ove can crush us. (Group#11)The closeness of the ideas of strengthandvulnerabilityareunderlinedn ourfocus groupsby the existence of a "yes-but"dialogue.Theexpressionof one ideaoften stimulates he expressionof the other-not in the formof disagreementbutto round off an incomplete thought."We need them" nvokes the response"Yes,but they need us" and vice versa. "We are dependent" vokes "Yes, but we are

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strong.""Weareindependent"ngenders hereminder,"Yes,but we needthem."Thefollowing exchangeis typical:Boaz:"Theyaren'tgoingto runourcountry.It's not a matterof moneyhere,my life is here.Andtheycan't come withmoneyto stick theirnosein here."Shuki:"Ithinkthatwe're lookingfor themto interveneon ourside,weneed theirsupport n the world."

In sum, these arenot simplytwo independentorparallelthemes;they aresoclosely linked thattheexpressionof oneoftenprovokestheexpressionof theotherto completethethought.Theyare heldin delicatebalance,with the reassurance f"we arestrongandindependent"mitigating heanxietyand discomfortof "we arevulnerableanddependent."

ImplicationsThis articlewas written at a particularhistoricalmoment.By the time thesewords areread,theU.S.-Israelirelationshipmaywell haveundergone omeshifts.Affection for the UnitedStatesand the desire for its embracearelikely to follow

pro-andanti-governmentines, with supporters f the peace camp wantingmoreactive U.S. interventionrom a presidentwho shares heirviews and the "nationalcamp"wanting ess.If ouranalysisof theparadoxof strengthandvulnerabilitys correct,however,thepeace camphas a built-instructuraldvantage hat s likelyto work ncreasinglyin its favor politically. U.S. displeasurewith Israel will trigger the "Israel isvulnerable"hemein thedeepeststratum f the culture. t will threaten omove thenatureof U.S. interests n the Middle East fromtaken-for-grantedntoa contestedrealmin Americanpoliticaldiscourse.Intimations of such a contest could be heard in the remarks of PatrickBuchanan,candidate or theRepublicanPartypresidentialnomination n 1992and1996, when he suggested during he 6-monthpreamble o the 1991 GulfWar that"there are only two groups that are beating the drums for war in the MiddleEast-the IsraeliDefense Ministryand its amen corer in theUnitedStates" NewYorkTimes,14 September1990). The mere existence of a contested discourseismoreimportanthere than the relativeprominenceof one or another ramewithinit. What must be defended s no longer safely taken forgranted.

To the extent thatpolicies of the presentIsraeligovernmentprovokesuch acontested discourse n the UnitedStates,theywill upsetthebalance and stimulatethe vulnerability heme-with an attendant oss of political support.The fear thatIsraeli policies and their manner of implementationwill provoke a full-scalereexamination f U.S. strategic nterests n theMiddleEast,possiblyeven leading

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Living with Contradictionsto anIsraeli-Americanstrangement,spowerfulbecause tresonatesat thedeepeststratumof Israelipoliticalculture, ranscendinghepolarizedcamps.

ConclusionsWe offer herea geographyof politicalculture.At thedeepestlevel arebeliefsthat areso culturallyembedded hattheygo essentiallyuntouchedby themeaningof passing events. These bedrock culturalbeliefs areexposed by events and thesymboliccontests around hem but are not alteredby anythingshortof a culturalearthquakehat undamentallyhakesworldviews.Inthislayer,we placethebeliefthat Israel is vulnerable. It may not be voiced, but it is beyond challenge and

refutationwithin theculture.Above this,and closer to thesurface, s a layerin which ideas move in and outof thecontestedandtaken-for-grantedomains.At thislevel, some ideas are takenfor grantedfor a while but become contested later. For example, Gamson andModigliani(1989) argued haton thenuclearpowerissue in theUnitedStates,thedualismof atoms for peace versus atomsfor war was taken for granteduntil the1970s, whennuclearpowerbecame controversialandheavilycontested n publicdiscourse.Ourcase reverses hisprocess:The natureof U.S. interests n the MiddleEast,once amatterof somediscussion,disappearsromthediscourse nto therealmof the taken-for-granted,where it remains to this day, despite the demise of theCold War.Criticaldiscoursemomentscreateperturbationst thislevel-they force someframesponsorsto defendtaken-for-grantedssumptionsandothers to droptheirchallengeto beliefs that now move into therealm of the uncontested.Thiscontestover meaningdetermineswhich beliefs at the deeperlevel will be activatedandbrought nto the discussion and which will remainpresentbut dormant.Changesin the taken-for-grantedometimesexpose and sometimes shieldandinsulate thelayerbelow. Thefailureof Israelipoliticaldiscourse o examinethe natureof U.S.strategic nterests n the aftermath f the Cold Waris anexampleof the latter:Todo so threatens o activatetheideaof Israelivulnerability,allowingit to trump heideathat Israel s strongandindependentnsteadof balancing t.Finally,theconceptof a "yes-but"dialoguecanbe applied n analyzingotherdiscourse in whichcontradictory eliefs areheld together n a delicatebalance.Itoffers a meansof flagging andidentifyingthis balancingact. Symbolic contestscan then be analyzedin terms of theirpotentialfor disrupting he balance,as thedomainsof the taken-for-grantedndthe contestedarerearranged.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTSThis paperis jointly authoredwith names listed in alphabeticalorder. Theauthorsare ndebted o theU.S.-IsraelBinationalScienceFoundation orproviding

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Gamson and Herzogresearch upport,o AdrianaKempandGiliDroriwho servedas researchassistants,to CharlotteRyanandotherparticipantsn the BostonCollegeMediaResearchandActionProject,andto theanonymousreviewersforprovidinghelpfulcriticismonan earlier draftof this paper.Correspondence oncerningthis article shouldbeaddressed to William A. Gamson, 5 Boston Hill Road, Chilmark,MA 02535.E-mail:[email protected]

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