Fournie's superb article provides us with an excellent overview of the war, plus two scenarios on significant actions. Nonetheless, this editor finds the perspective to be decidedly "Roman" (not exactly a sin, given that all of our primary sources are Roman), and could not resist interjecting some alternative interpretations (most of which are found in the sidebar on page 8). You'll find a few others in italics within the body of this article. - SKT The Second Punic War eclipsed the First Punic War in the magnitude of the forces involved and the geographic scope of the conflict. The first war had been primarily a naval war for the island of Sicily, with only brief forays into Africa and Sardinia. The second war was a massive struggle for dominion of the western Mediterranean waged from the Pillars of Heracles to the Bosporus, from the snowy Alps to the edge of the Sahara. It seems strange then that the recorded naval battles of the first war dwarf the naval combat of the second -the Hannibalic War. There are three main reasons for this anomaly. First, the size of the naval battles in the first war was exaggerated by the methodology employed by Polybius. Second, the fleets in the second war were dispersed in numerous theaters, unlike the earlier war (see Order of Battle Tables). Finally, the Punic navy was broken in the first war and never regained its former fighting spirit and skill. [See the sidebar on page 8 for a "Carthaginian" perspective on the anomaly.] To explain the first factor, the battle of Cape Ecnomus is the best

example. Polybius tells us that Rome had 330 galleys and Carthage 350. He then estimates a quinquereme crew at 300 rowers and sailors and 120 marines per ship. From this he calculated that there were 140,000 Romans and 150,000 Carthaginians present at the battle. Modern historians believe he greatly overestimated the number of quinqueremes versus smaller vessels and the average crew of each ship. Many believe each fleet numbered only about 200 to 230 quinqueremes and assorted smaller vessels, with no more than 80,000 men in the Roman fleet and less then 60,000 in the Carthaginian fleet. So the Roman navy of the second war was not smaller than in the first; it was dispersed into smaller squadrons.

The Carthaginian navy had ruled the Western Mediterranean unchallenged for nearly three centuries, ever since the Greek threat had been turned back at Alalia in 535 BC (scenario soon to appear in C3i). Yet, in the First Punic War, this proud maritime force had been repeatedly and decisively defeated by the upstart navy of Rome, with its corvus (the "crow," a pivoting boarding ramp) and crack legionary marines. The Carthaginians were defeated at Mylae, Tyndaris, Ecnomus, Hermaeum and Aegates, and won only one major victory-at Drepanum.

PRE-WAR PREPARATIONS In the long interwar period, 241 218 BC, Carthage apparently made little effort to reverse the verdict at sea. The Carthaginian navy entered the Hannibalic War as a force already defeated, with

little stomach for a decisive naval encounter. It is ironic that while Hannibal is credited with a long range plan for war with Rome, the Roman fleet was far better prepared for this war than the navy of Carthage. Fleets were very expensive to maintain, so only a skeleton force was normally manned in peacetime. The Romans, as usual, were favored by fortune. In 219, the year before Hannibal crossed the Alps, Rome's consuls conducted a maritime campaign against the Illyrian pirates. So Rome had a fleet of 200 quinqueremes, fully manned and equipped, when the war began. Some 20 additional ships were added to the fleet. Carthage, on the other hand, was able to man and deploy only 87 quinqueremes in 218, although she had quite a few more ships in dry dock. [Indeed, Carthage had the money to hire crews for their many drydocked ships-but perhaps lacked the leadership and will to raise the naval stakes . -SKT]

OPENING ACTIONS The Roman war plan for 218 BC allocated 160 quinqueremes and twelve smaller galleys for the invasion of Africa and 60 quinqueremes for the invasion of Spain. Carthage struck first, however. The home fleet split into two squadrons. Twenty vessels raided the Liparae and Vulcan islands, between Sicily and Italy. The raid was successful, except that three ships were captured by twelve quinqueremes of the royal Syracusan navy, allied at that time with Rome. The captured crews revealed that a second, larger squadron of 35 galleys was to make a surprise assault on the port of Lilybaeum. King Hiero II of Syracuse quickly relayed the warning to Marcus Aemilius, the military governor of Sicily. The main Roman fleet had not yet arrived in Sicily, so Aemilius had to fight with the ships he had on hand, probably about 20 quinqueremes. His squadron did not have the best crews, but Aemilius was able provide each ship with a full

complement of legionary marines. The Carthaginian fleet was undermanned, both for crews and marines. They relied on surprise to carry the day. Since surprise had been forfeited, the Romans handily won the first battle of the war, boarding and capturing seven ships, and taking 1,700 men prisoner. The Roman fleet suffered one galley holed, but they were able to recover this ship as well. Soon thereafter, Consul Tiberius Sempronius Longus arrived with the main fleet. But the planned invasion of Africa soon was canceled so that the consul could hurry north to face Hannibal (and receive a trouncing at Trebia River).

OPERATIONS IN SPAIN In the West, Hasdrubal Barca had manned 32 quinqueremes and 5 triremes, but did not have the strength to confront Gnaeus Scipio's invasion fleet of 60 ships. After securing a base at Tarraco in northeast Spain, Scipio sent 25 galleys back to Rome. By the spring of 217, Hasdrubal had added ten ships to his fleet, which he placed under the command of his deputy, Himilco. [This "expansion" was most probably achieved by hiring the crews to man existing ships. Evidence from the capture of New Carthage indicates that Hasdrubal faced a crew shortage more than a ship shortage (a matter of cash allocation to

mercenaries). That reveals an overall strategic preference for land action certainly understandable in the context of the geography of the Iberian peninsula . -SKT] Hasdrubal advanced up the coast with his army and fleet, to confront Scipio on land and/or sea. Gnaeus Scipio initially planned to bring both his army and fleet out to meet Hasdrubal. But a report that Hasdrubal had levied a very large force of Iberians caused him to move only by sea. Scipio boarded picked marines from his army on his 35 quinqueremes, and moved south, with a few triremes from the allied city of Massilia performing reconnaissance. These Greek sailors managed to scout out Himilco's fleet at the mouth of the Ebro River, and return undetected. They reported that the Punic fleet was drawn up in the mouth of the river, completely unprepared for action. Scipio was only ten miles away. He launched his fleet for an immediate assault. No Carthaginian vessels were posted to detect the approaching enemy. Hasdrubal's army scouts sighted the Roman fleet first, and relayed the warning back by fire signals

from watchtowers. Hasdrubal sent messenger after messenger galloping to the shore to get the sailors and marines to man their ships. It was a scene of absolute confusion, as sailors and soldiers struggled to board their ships and prepare for action. The galleys put out to sea, some half manned, all in an uproar. The Carthaginians emerged from the mouth of the Ebro in total disorder, even as the Roman fleet was bearing down upon them. The battle was decided quickly. Four Carthaginian vessels were rammed and sunk while two were boarded and captured. The Carthaginians remembered that their army was strung along the nearby beach and made for safety. Most of their vessels ran aground, the crews seeking safety with the army. The Roman navy pursued up to shoreline, grappling and towing off an additional 23 ships. It was a total naval victory. Carthage never again challenged Roman control of Spanish waters. [The Romans likewise were complacent enough with not challenging the Carthaginians along the southern coastline of Spain until 206 BC, before which the Carthaginians had no trouble

shipping troops to and from Africa. After the Ebro, both sides were satisfied with keeping their own shipping lanes open for supplies and reinforcements. -SKT]

RAIDS, ESCORTS AND PATROLS There were to be no major battles at sea for the next two years. However, the Carthaginian home fleet slipped into waters off Cosa and seized a merchant convoy bound for Spain in 217 BC. The Roman main fleet of 120 quinqueremes, commanded by Consul Servilius Geminus made its first raid on Africa the same year. This was to become an annual event, something akin to a massive pirate raid. On this first expedition, the foraging parties stayed ashore too long and were caught by Carthaginian cavalry. Over 1,000 sailors and marines were slain before the fleet escaped with its booty. In 216, naval operations were overshadowed by the battle of Cannae. After this Roman disaster, the praetor Marcellus was pulled from command of the fleet to bring his marines inland to reinforce the garrison of Rome. A second raid on Africa also met heavy resistance ashore, and the praetor Publius Furius Philus was badly wounded. Carthage also raided Syracusan lands. The pro praetor Otacilius was unable to come to his aid, as a second enemy fleet threatened Lilybaeum. In 215, the Roman navy scored three notable successes. The army of Manlius Torquatus was escorted to Sardinia where the crews were pressed into service as infantry. Another fleet of 100 ships under Titus Otacilius

Crassus meanwhile raided Africa, and caught Hasdrubal the Bald's escort squadron of 60 galleys returning from Sardinia. In the largest naval battle to date, the Romans boarded and seized seven ships, and the remainder of the Carthaginian fleet scattered and fled. But the Roman navy's greatest coup was the capture of Hannibal's envoys to King Philip V, then sending back confirmation of a Macedonian-Carthaginian treaty. The diligence of the Roman patrol ships under Valerius Flaccus at Brundisium delayed Macedori s entry into the war by a full year. Meanwhile, Bomilcar, the commander of the Carthaginian home fleet slipped through to Locri to bring Hannibal some badly needed reinforcements-4,000 Numidian cavalry and 40 elephants.

SICILY AND GREECE The following year, 214 BC, naval operations picked up when Syracuse under new leaders defected from Rome to Carthage, and Macedon entered the war. Rome reinforced its fleet in Sicily to 100 ships. Bomilcar nonetheless was able to land Himilco's army

of 25,000 foot and 3,000 horse at Heraclea Minoa, and maneuvered around Syracuse with his 55 ships. Philip V of Macedon invaded the Roman protectorate in southern Illyria with a fleet of 120 lembi. Marcus Valerius Laevinius, with 50 quinqueremes and one legion, defeated the Macedonian army at Oricum. With his fleet trapped upriver, Philip burned his ships and retreated overland. Laevinius remained in Greek waters and later formed an alliance with the Aetolian League. By 212, Bomilcar amassed the largest Punic fleet of the war, 130 quinqueremes, and sailed to Sicily in an attempt to break the blockade of Syracuse. With Tarentum now in Hannibal's hands, there was a real opportunity to open up lines of communication between Carthage, Syracuse, Tarentum and Greece. At Cape Pachynum, near Syracuse, Marcellus offered battle with his 100 ships, but Bomilcar declined. This Carthaginian admiral never fought a recorded battle, and his passivity went a

long way towards ruining Carthaginian prospects in this war. Bomilcar passed on to Tarentum and then Corcyra-two places where the main Roman fleet was not. Very little was accomplished by this fleet over the next four years, though Philip V was certainly happy to see it. During 214-207, the Roman squadron in Greece remained active in thwarting Philip V. Both Rome and Macedon gathered more allies, King Attalus of Pergamon contributing 35 ships to Rome while the Achaean League and King Prusias of Bithynia supported Philip with ships. A Carthaginian squadron was also active in Greek waters in 210 207. Yet, no major naval battles developed. The war was finally decided on land, and the result was generally beneficial to Macedon. Nonetheless, the Roman navy had neutralized a serious threat at a critical juncture. The Carthaginian navy continued operations off Sicily through 211, but no major naval battle ensued. Syracuse fell after a two-year siege, and the final Carthaginian stronghold at Agrigentum was betrayed in 210. Another Carthaginian fleet of 40 quinqueremes under Hamilcar raided Sardinia in 210.

featured in an upcoming issue of C3i.)

THE BATTLE OF CLUPEA, 208 It was the Roman practice of dispatching her main fleet on massive raids of Africa that finally produced major naval battles. Fleets of 100-120 galleys struck the African coast nearly every year of the war. These raids provided intelligence, harrassed

the enemy, and most especially brought in booty. For a decade, their opponent made no move in the face of this provocation. By 208 Carthage had a new admiral. We don't know for certain, but it may have been the Hamilcar who raided Sardinia in 210, or the Hasdrubal who commanded the home fleet in 203. Whoever he was, his conduct clearly set him apart from Bomilcar.

The Roman navy suffered its only defeat of the war in 210, but not at the hands of the Carthaginians. The tiny navy of Tarentum, allied with Hannibal, shattered a Roman squadron in a hard fought contest off nearby Sapriportis. Both opponents had only 20 ships. (This battle will be

In 208, Laevinius led 100 quinqueremes to pillage the African coast at Clupea. When his ships were nearly full of booty, Laevinius received the alarming news that a large Carthaginian fleet was fast approaching. The Romans hastily put to sea, just as the enemy's fleet of 83 galleys appeared. The greatest naval battle of the Second Punic War ensued. The Roman fleet was overburdened with booty-and, as a result, slower and less maneuverable than usual. The Carthaginian fleet was manned well for once and launched an immediate attack. The Carthaginians had regained their fighting spirit, but in the battle that ensued, the Romans boarded and captured 18 ships. No Roman losses are recorded, but they may well have lost a number of ships to ramming. In the following year, another Roman raid of 100 galleys under Laevinius was again intercepted. The Romans had pillaged the area around Utica, and once again were returning with booty-laden ships. The Carthaginian home fleet sallied forth once again. However, the Punic navy had been able to replace only a few of the lost vessels and crews. This time 70 Carthaginian galleys attacked the larger Roman fleet. The results were much the same, as Rome captured 17 ships and rammed and sank four more. [This second action raises a serious question regarding Livy's report of the results of the one in the previous year. If so beaten badly in the first action, why were the Carthaginians so eager to fight at worse odds on the next occasion? It is quite probable that the Romans "got as good as they gave" at Clupea, but Livy's patriotism led to an omission of that fact. Given the overall number of losses of Roman war galleys during the course of the war, we must allow for the fact that Livy overlooks losses frequently. -SKT]

MISSED OPPORTUNITIES That was the last open sea battle of the war. Interestingly, in the final years of the war a number of

armies crisscrossed the Western Mediterranean without hindrance by any enemy fleet. Mago sailed from the Balearic Islands to invade the Ligurian coast of Italy in 205 BC. Mago transported 12,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry with a small escort of 30 quinqueremes. Mago retained ten ships and sent the other 20 back to Carthage, as Scipio' invasion was anticipated. In 204, Mago was reinforced by sea with an additional 6,000 foot, 800 cavalry and 7 elephants escorted by 25 galleys. (If only Hannibal had received such support earlier in the war, the war's outcome might have been different!)

Scipio crossed from Sicily to Africa with an army of 25,000 foot and 2,500 horse escorted by a mere 40 quinqueremes! Compare this to the reported armada of 330 ships that had escorted Regulus in the First Punic War. Sempronius' planned invasion of 218 BC had 172 galleys for escort. Scipio's invasion was surely at its most vulnerable while at sea, but the Carthaginian fleet made no move. Scipio obviously did not expect a naval battle, or he would have obtained a larger fleet. It still seems strange that Rome could send 100 galleys to raid Africa every year, yet could spare only 40 ships for this decisive invasion. [The Senate opposed giving Scipio a fleet, so a private fund drive was required even to raise most of the 40 galleys he did have. Yet, it is an overstatement to think Scipio expected no opposition. Rather, he had li t t le choice-being under the scrutiny of the censors regarding incidents at Locri, he feared losing his office, and set sail abruptly (at an odd time of year at that). After landing, he immediately sent the fleet back to Sicily, indicating that he didn't think he could control the coast of Africa in the face of the Carthaginian fleet. - SKTI

However, the Carthaginian navy was not the only one to miss opportunities to destroy enemy armies at sea. The armies of Hannibal and Mago were transported by sea from Bruttium and Liguria to Africa in 202 without the least interference from the superior Roman navy.

THE END OF THE CARTHAGINIAN NAVY

There was one unusual naval battle during Scipio's African campaign. After Scipio's victory at the Great Plains in 203 BC, the Carthaginian navy roused itself for a surprise attack on the Roman fleet. The admiral was Hasdrubal, previously unknown. Scipio's galleys were in port at his fortified base camp, the Castra Cornelia, near Utica. Roman infantry scouts spotted the enemy fleet sailing out of the harbor of Carthage. Scipio raced back and found his fleet completely unprepared for battle. Thinking creatively, Scipio blocked the harbor with a row of merchant ships. He had the ships lashed together, and filled the decks with marines and missile troops. The Carthaginian fleet arrived and drew up in battle order, awaiting a disorganized sortie by the Roman fleet. When the Romans didn't come out, the perplexed Hasdrubal finally attacked the wall of merchant ships. Sixty of these transports were grappled and towed off by the Carthaginians. The fleet sailed home with a hollow victory, little being accomplished, as Scipio's fleet remained intact. The Carthaginians made no further attacks. After Zama, the entire Carthaginian navy was surrendered to Rome for burning, save a small squadron of 10 triremes. The Roman navy maintained its overall superiority in the Second Punic War. Rome was never really challenged, and the lackluster Carthaginian navy never won a single victory in this war (other than the unusual battle at Castra Cornelia). In five recorded naval actions Carthage suffered a total loss of 77 ships captured and eight sunk. Rome's total recorded loss was one ship damaged! Of course, Rome wrote the history books which may have glossed over many losses. Nevertheless, it was a remarkably one-sided result. This disappointing

performance by the once great Carthaginian navy contributed greatly to their eventual loss of the Second Punic War.

Leader Counters The counters for Gn. Scipio, Himilco and Laevinus are included on this

issue's counter insert. Hamilcar can be represented by his grandfather (?) from the First Punic War.

Maps The game uses the "land" map. All land, both A & D, is in play. The area between A and the D coast is the mouth of the Ebro. The D islands are sandbars in the estuary. The Ebro River empties into the Mediterranean in northeast Spain. It was the boundary between the Carthaginian and Roman spheres of influence before the Second Punic War. Carthaginian side is hexrow 60xx (South). Roman side is hexrow 10xx (North).

Balance This is a surprise raid on the unprepared Carthaginian fleet. Carthaginian seamanship will only come into play if Himilco can deploy. The Romans are favored here.

Playing Time and Difficulty This battle should take 3-4 hours to finish. Difficulty Rating is 2.5.

Ship Scale 1 counter = 2 galleys

Initial Deployment: Romans The Roman player receives the following Red ships: 18 Quinqueremes (ID 50-67) 3 Cataphracted Trireme (ID 1

3, Massilian Greeks) The Roman receives the following Squadron Commanders: Gn. Scipio (Admiral), *Fabius, *Drusus. The Roman fleet is deployed as follows: Scipio's Squadron: (line astern) 6

quinqueremes from 4014 to 2906 and 1 trireme at 4215 4114.

Fabius' Squadron: 6 quinqueremes from 4022 to 2916 and 1 trireme at 4223 4122.

Drusus' Squadron: 6 quinqueremes from 4006 to 2900 and 1 trireme at 4207 4106.

Initial Deployment: Carthaginians The Carthaginian player receives the following Green ships. 20 Quinqueremes (ID 11-30) 1 Quadreme (ID 8) 3 Cataphracted Triremes (ID 1

3) The Carthaginian receives the following Squadron Commanders: Himilco (Admiral), *Barbax, *Gisgo. The Carthaginian fleet is deployed with all bows facing north or east as follows: A. 14 quinqueremes (11-24)

beached'al from 5914-6015 to 5927-6028.

B. 6 quinqueremes anchored at 5727-5828, 5725-5826, 5723 5824, 5721-5822, 5719-5820, 5717-5818.

C. 1 quadreme anchored at 5714 5715.

D. 3 triremes anchored at 5308 to 5313.

Note: a Ships are beached with bows

pointing seaward. This was apparently standard practice in ancient galley fleets, to protect the ships from unexpected rough weather and to prevent water-logging of the hulls. It is therefore quite different than being run aground.

Squadron Commanders begin on shore. For color, you can place Hasdrubal Barca at hex 3726 (the big 'A') to watch the proceedings. He is not pleased.

Special Rules

Surprise! The Carthaginian fleet was totally unprepared for action. The crews are resting ashore. Most of the quinqueremes are beached. When Hasdrubal Barca sent the warning, pandemonium set in as all the crews and marines

clambered onto the beach to get their ships. Something like 12,000 men scurrying around gave the appearance of a disturbed ant hill. On turn 1, all Carthaginian ships are individual squadrons. If activated:

1. Anchored ships may only raise anchors, as in Actium.

2. Beached ships may attempt to free themselves, by

rolling a D6: 1-2: The ship is freed and

may move one hex. 3-4: The ship is freed and

may move one hex, BUT it is only half crewed. Replace the C3 / M3 quinquereme with a C1 / M2 (ID 53 85).

5-6: The ship remains beached.

On turn 2, Himilco, Gisgo and Barbax may be placed with any ship, and play progresses normally. But anchored ships still require one turn to weigh anchor, and beached ships must roll to be set free, as above.

Victory The Roman player wins when he has at least 65 VP, and that number is at least twice that of the enemy. The Carthaginian player wins when he has at least 55 VP, and that number is at least twice that of the enemy. If neither of the above happens, and/or the players halt play by mutual agreement, a minor, indecisive victory goes to he who has the most VP.

Maps The game uses the "sea" map. Carthaginian side is hexrow xxOO (North). Roman side is hexrow xx28 (South).

Balance This is another classic match-up of Carthaginian seamanship

versus Roman marines. The Romans have numbers on their side and are favored here.

Playing Time and Difficulty This battle should take about 2-3 hours to finish. Difficulty Rating is 2.0.

Ship Scale 1 counter = 4 galleys

Initial Deployment: Romans The Roman player receives the following Red ships: 25 Quinqueremes (ID 50-74)

The Roman receives the following Squadron Commanders: V. Laevinius (Admiral), *Metellus, *Fabius. The Roman fleet is deployed in line astern, entering the map as follows: V. Laevinius' Squadron: 9

quinqueremes from 3527.

Metellus' Squadron: 8 quinqueremes at 4527.

Fabius' Squadron: 8 quinqueremes at 2527.

Initial Deployment: Carthaginians The Carthaginian player receives the following Green ships: 21 Quinqueremes (ID 31-51)

The Carthaginian receives the following Squadron Commanders: Hamilcar (Admiral), *Hanno, *Gisgo. The Carthaginian fleet is deployed as follows: Left Wing: Hanno with 7

quinqueremes from 4000-4001 to 4600-4601.

Center: Hamilcar with 7 quinqueremes from 3200-3201 to 3800-3801.

Right Wing: Gisgo with 7 quinqueremes from 3000-3001 to 2400-2401.

Special Rule Booty

The Roman fleet was encumbered with plenty of booty and treasure. This extra weight tires out the crew. When rolling for fatigue, the Roman player adds one (+1). (If the Roman player wants to jettison his booty before the battle, on a D6 roll of 1-5, his crew makes him walk the plank.)

Victory The Roman player wins when he has at least 60 VP, and that number is at least twice that of the enemy. The Carthaginian player wins when he has at least 65 VP, and that number is at least twice that of the enemy. If neither of the above happens, and/or the players halt play by mutual agreement, a minor, indecisive victory goes to he who has the most VP.