Licensing of CAREM prototype - IFNEC
Transcript of Licensing of CAREM prototype - IFNEC
Licensing of CAREM prototype
WORKSHOP ON NEW CHALLENGES FACING
NUCLEAR REGULATORS
IFNEC-NEA
Paris, May 28th – 29th
Néstor Masriera
President of the Board, ARN
• CAREM is a small, advanced, integrated reactor (SMR)
• Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica (CNEA) is the licensee
• Licensing of CAREM began as a non-routine practice licensing procedure,
and a “Use of site and initiation of constructions authorization” was issued
against a “Design Report” (2013)
• From now on it is foreseen to catch up the “standard” NPP licensing
procedure, and a PSAR is due by 2019 . Its approval will lead to the
Commissioning License
Licensing of CAREM prototype
CAREM prototype Project
CNEA is the Responsible Entity / owner / principal Main contracts on:
Detailed engineering (INVAP + others) Civil works (Techint)
BoP (TECNA-Siemens) RPV (IMPSA)
Steam Generators (FAE) fuel (CONUAR)
…
Before Construction Permit
The integration concept qualified (experimentally + analytically)
Fuel / core performance tested
Verification that process systems feature proven design solutions
Today
Containment components are being assembled
Turbine is on site (FAT completed)
RPV is under construction
SG fabrication plan is complete
Detailed Engineering is quite complete
CRD qualification completion is foreseen
Approach to LICENSING CAREM prototype
Our licensing process is between ARN and CNEA
Suppliers support
The Safety Standards to comply are Argentinean ones plus some
“international” standards, being signatories of Conventions and a IAEA MS.
Industrial C&S have a role in the qualification of the components
compliance of engineering requirements. There is not a mandatory one.
Foreign C&S can be proposed by the Utility under proper justification.
We have a shared understanding of the approach with CNEA
Workshops
Interchange
History
CNEA was the “mother” institution of Argentine Utility, Vendor and Regulator
Today it is THE nuclear R&D institution
ARN has a defined identity as a regulator:
• Goal-setting approach (NON prescriptive)
• Adherence to international guidelines (IAEA Safety Standards)
• A clear view of the integrality of the safety assessment, connecting:
– the “safety demonstration” essentially by a deterministic-functional-analysis
– A safety classification by an essentially deterministic method (SSG-30)
Regulatory – safety – engineering requirements are defined for each Class
– Requirements on systems coming from Safety Standards
– Regulatory relevant requirements on components are focused on functional
capability / reliability / robustness and are dealt by specific C&S
• C&S are essentially a qualification means, and the adequacy of their use has
to be justified by the licensee
• Concept of Licensing Basis, to be kept during life cycle
ARN Regulatory Approach
Questions on LICENSING CAREM
Which is the role of Safety Standards on demonstrating Safety?
Setting Safety Requirements
Safety Standards define requirements at Plant level. E.g.
DID – independence of design provisions for each level (*)
Single failure criterion (resistance achieved within system)
specific safety goals - CDF, LERF, Criterion Curve
OLC treatment - SAR content – Plant Programmes
Operating License conditions (*)
Classification based on functional analysis of failures consequences
safety requirements at the Components level are on
• functional capability (effectiveness, safety margins)
• reliability (MTBF – failure rate on demand)
• robustness (mechanical loads, environmental, consequential
failure)
Industrial C&S are focused on qualifying the compliance with Safety
Requirements of components (SSCs in general)
Questions on LICENSING CAREM cont
Can industrial C&S from a country with a prescriptive approach be used in a
project abroad ?
As we discussed yesterday, given certain circumstances, exporting on a
turnkey scheme a plant of certified design WORKS
Applying industrial C&S of a foreign prescriptive approach to SSC of a Plant
whose design is not certified…
• may not link clearly the industrial C&S and Safety Standards
• the compliance of safety-engineering requirements may not be
“demonstrated” by the use of these C&S.
As example issues for discussion:
• In order to have CAREM RPV accomplishing requirements of reliability and
robustness, is it reasonable to apply the same ASME mechanical standards
as for the RPVs of certified PWR design?
• In order to have CAREM in-vessel CRD complying with requirements of
reliability and robustness, is it reasonable to apply ASME mechanical
standards used in some other component of a certified design?
Questions on C&S
Regulators need a view of the role of C&S in the demonstration of safety.
It is already quite clear, in case of a plant of certified design within the frame of
a prescriptive approach.
How clear / accountable are the links among safety goals / standards – safety
engineering requirements – and industrial C&S
When the C&S of countries A and B are analyzed for their use / compatibility in
a non-certified design,
• is it useful to compare the complete text of C&S?
• From a regulator viewpoint, they should only be compared on the elements
contributing to the compliance of Safety Standards (i.e. to functional
capability, reliability and robustness)
More Questions on C&S
Is there any chance of having an internationally complete set of Safety
Standards in the near future?
Not much, if sovereign regulators stick to customized Safety Standards
Would it still be useful to clarify the role of C&S in the demonstration of safety?
In the qualification of compliance of safety requirements?
In demonstrating safety, the role of C&S is focused on the compliance of
engineered requirements, Specifically on function and its failure:
• functional capability (effectiveness, safety margins)
• reliability (MTBF – failure rate on demand)
• robustness (environmental endurance, consequential failure, mech loads)
If this link was explicitly presented (accountable, quantifiable) , even if national
C&S were different, it would be possible to analyze their replacement /
interchange in the demonstration / qualification of safety requirements.
Perhaps this is a path towards a globalized nuclear market