Libyas Constitutional Crisis - Atlantic Council

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DECEMBER 2, 2014 Libya's Constitutional Crisis BY NAEEM ALGHERIANY Omar alHassi, prime minister of the Libyan rival government, speaks during an interview with Reuters at the headquarters of his office in Tripoli November 27, 2014. Hassi has warned that attempts by a rival government in the east to assert control over the oil industry could escalate the political conflict dividing the OPEC member state and force it to break in two. Picture taken November 27, 2014. REUTERS/Ismail Zitouny On November 6, 2014, in an unexpected decision, and against a backdrop of continuing political and military polarization, the Constitutional Chamber of Libya's Supreme Court struck down the 7th Amendment to the Constitutional Declaration, the current supreme law of Libya. This amendment, passed by Libya’s transitional legislative body, the General National Congress (GNC), in March 2014, had provided the basis for the election of a House of Representatives in June 2014. The Supreme Court's ruling has been interpreted by many, including the rump GNC and its “Salvation Government” in Tripoli, as signaling the dissolution of the House of Representatives. This interpretation, along with the

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Libyas Constitutional Crisis - Atlantic CouncilNaeem Al-Gheriany2 Dec 2014

Transcript of Libyas Constitutional Crisis - Atlantic Council

  • DECEMBER2,2014

    Libya'sConstitutionalCrisisBYNAEEMALGHERIANY

    OmaralHassi,primeministeroftheLibyanrivalgovernment,speaksduringaninterviewwithReutersattheheadquartersofhisofficeinTripoliNovember27,2014.HassihaswarnedthatattemptsbyarivalgovernmentintheeasttoassertcontrolovertheoilindustrycouldescalatethepoliticalconflictdividingtheOPECmemberstateandforceittobreakintwo.PicturetakenNovember27,2014.REUTERS/IsmailZitouny

    OnNovember6,2014,inanunexpecteddecision,andagainstabackdropofcontinuingpoliticaland

    militarypolarization,theConstitutionalChamberofLibya'sSupremeCourtstruckdownthe7th

    AmendmenttotheConstitutionalDeclaration,thecurrentsupremelawofLibya.Thisamendment,

    passedbyLibyastransitionallegislativebody,theGeneralNationalCongress(GNC),inMarch2014,

    hadprovidedthebasisfortheelectionofaHouseofRepresentativesinJune2014.TheSupreme

    Court'srulinghasbeeninterpretedbymany,includingtherumpGNCanditsSalvationGovernmentin

    Tripoli,assignalingthedissolutionoftheHouseofRepresentatives.Thisinterpretation,alongwiththe

  • rumpHouse'srejectionofit,hasthrownthecountryintoadangerousconstitutionalcrisis,onewhich

    threatenstofurtherintensifytheseeminglyintractablepoliticalandmilitaryconflictthathasplaguedLibya

    overthepastthreeyears.

    Inthewakeofthecourt'sruling,anumberofLibyanlawyersandlegalscholarshaveexpressed

    dissentingopinionsaboutthedecision,withsomearguingthatitdoesnotnecessarilyentaildissolutionof

    theHouse.Theseopinionswillremainpurelyacademic,however,unlessthecourtprovidesclarification

    astotheimplicationsofitsruling.Shouldthecourtdoso,itwouldenabletheresumptionofthe

    GhadamesdialoguethatwasfirstlaunchedinSeptember2014,attheinvitationoftheUnitedNations

    SupportMissioninLibya(UNSMIL),andwhichsoughttobringtogetheropposingfactionsfromthe

    dividedHouseofRepresentativeswithaviewtowardendingthecurrentpoliticalstalemate.However,

    shortofaclearstatementfromthecourtthatitsdecisiondoesnotimplydissolutionoftheHouse,a

    viablepoliticalsolutiontothecrisisremainselusive.

    FourscenariosarepossibleifthecourtsdecisionisinterpretedtosignaldissolutionoftheHouseof

    Representatives.First,competingsidescouldacceptthecourt'sdecisionandrecognizetherumpGNC

    asthesolelegitimatelegislativebodyuntilthenextelectionseitherearlyelectionsorelectionsfollowing

    theratificationoftheconstitution.Thisoptionisunlikelytobechosengiventhatmanymembersofthe

    House,andsomemembersoftheGNC,wouldrejecttheGNCsreturn.

    Asecondoptionwouldbetoignorethecourt'sdecisionandcontinuetorecognizetheHouseof

    RepresentativesasthesolelegitimatelegislativebodyinLibya.Thisoptionisunsatisfactoryinsofarasit

    posessimilarriskstothefirst,withtheaddednegativeramificationsofunderminingthecourtandthe

    independenceofthejudiciaryinastatethatcanillaffordtoerodeoneofitsfewfunctioninginstitutions.

    AthirdscenariowouldbetocallontheConstitutionDraftingAssembly(CDA),thespecialbodyelected

    inFebruary2014todraftanewconstitutionforLibya,tofillthelegislativevoid,limitingitsroleto

    appointingaunitygovernmentandpreparingfornewelections.However,distractingtheCDAcould

    delaycompletionofitsprincipaltask.Inaddition,thisoptioncouldalsofacestrongoppositionfrommany

    parties(includingtheHouseandtheGNC),withnoguaranteethattheconstitutionalityoftheactionwill

    notbechallengedinthecourts.

    SincethereinstatementoftheGNCwouldbeviewedasunacceptabletotherumpHouseof

  • Representatives,aswellastomostoftheforcesineasternLibya,thefirstscenarioisnotaviable

    option.However,itwouldbeimpossiblefortheHousetocontinuewithbusinessasusualinthewakeof

    theSupremeCourt'sdecision.ThisnecessitatestheprorogationoftheHouseuntilapoliticalsettlement

    canbereachedoruntilanewlegislativebodyiselected.TheprorogationoftheHousewould,however,

    resultinariskyperiodoflegislativevacuuminthecountry.WhileLibyanswouldassumeprimary

    responsibilityfornavigatingthisdifficultperiod,thisoptionnecessitatesdirectinvolvementandclear

    leadershipfromtheUnitedNations,giventheincreasinglyintractablepoliticalpolarizationinthecountry.

    Dialoguemediatedbyaneutralthirdpartyistheonlyoptionthatstandsanychanceofsuccess,given

    thatnoneoftheotherthreescenariosisconstitutionallyrobustandeachwouldfacestrongopposition

    fromthedisadvantagedparty.Thisoptionwouldentailaresumptionofthedialogueprocess,firstinitiated

    bytheUnitedNations,butwithanexpandedscope,i.e.,Ghadames2.Thedialogueshouldbe

    inclusive,transparent,andinaccordancewiththeprinciplesofnationalownership.Theeffortshould

    beginbydesignatingmembersofthedialogueteamanddevelopingaclearactionplan.Thedialogue

    teamshouldincluderepresentativesfromtheGNC,theHouse,citycouncils,leadersofthearmed

    groups,politicalparties,religiousleaders,andrepresentativesofcivilsociety.TheUnitedNationsshould

    ensurethattheinterlocutorsreachanagreementonacomprehensiveandverifiableceasefireandthe

    formationofaninterimunitygovernment.Thenewinterimgovernmentshouldonlymanagedaytoday

    affairsandshouldnotundertakeanymajorpolicyinitiatives.Otherissuestobenegotiatedincludethe

    withdrawalofarmedgroupsfrommajorcities,controlofairportsbygovernmentauthorities,handoverof

    statebuildingsandfacilitiestothegovernment,andinterimsecurityarrangements.

    TheroleoftheUnitedNationsinmediatingapoliticalsolutionisindispensablehowever,its

    effectivenessiscontingentonthestrongsupportoftheUnitedStatesandtheEuropeanUnion,andon

    puttinganendtodisruptiveoutsideinterference.Thisrequiresholdingallcountriestocommitments

    madeduringtheSeptember2014NewYorkmeetingonLibya,convenedbyUSSecretaryofStateJohn

    Kerryandattendedbyadozenforeignministers,andtheOctober2014Parismeeting,whichbrought

    togetherSpecialEnvoysoftheAfricanUnion,ArabLeague,EuropeanUnionandanumberofwestern

    governments,withtheSpecialRepresentativeoftheUNSecretaryGeneral,BernardinoLeon.Italso

    requirestakingdeterrentmeasures,asstipulatedbyUNSecurityCouncilResolution2174(2014),

    againstindividualsandentitiesthatthreatenLibyasstability,security,orobstructorundermineits

    peacefulpoliticaltransitionincludingtherenegadeGeneralKhalifaHaftar,amongothers.

  • AsacountrythatstandsatthegeopoliticalcrossroadbetweenAfrica,Europe,andtheMiddleEast,

    Libyaistooimportanttofail.Theriskofitfallingintoafullblownandprolongedcivilwar,ifabandonedat

    thiscriticalmoment,isreal,butthereisstilltimetoputthecountrybackontrack.Ifthepoliticalprocess

    fails,thepresentwindowofopportunitymayclosepermanentlyandthebreakupofthecountrycould

    becomethedefactoscenario.

    Dr.NaeemAlGherianyisaProfessorofNuclearEngineeringattheUniversityofTripoliandamember

    oftheLibyanHouseofRepresentatives.HepreviouslyservedastheMinisterofHigherEducationand

    ScientificResearchinthefirstTransitionalGovernmentinpostQaddafiLibya.

    Libya Original

    2015AtlanticCouncil.

    AllRightsReserved.


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