Liberal Politics and the Grey Conspiracy of 1921

Liberal Politics and the Grey Conspiracy of 1921Author(s): Michael BentleySource: The Historical Journal, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Jun., 1977), pp. 461-478Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2638540 .

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The Historical Journal, 20, 2 (I977), pp. 461-478. Printed in Great Britain

LIBERAL POLITICS AND THE GREY CONSPIRACY OF 1921

MICHAEL BENTLEY University of Sheffield

I

The possibility of Viscount Grey's return to active political life after his resignation from the Foreign Office in I9I6 is one which historians have treated with understandable scepticism. Grey's well-documented distaste for political intrigue, his love of things pastoral and aesthetic, his failing health in general and eyesight in particular and his patent joy at being released from office in I9I6 lend force to the thought that he was never likely to be brought back to the world of politics. '[H]e was always too blind and often too ill to lead a party, or to aspire to office,' his friend and biographer G. M. Trevelyan wrote a few years after Grey's death;' and more recently Professor Robbins, whilst he concedes that there was a political dimension within Grey's make-up which Trevelyan was wont to ignore, likewise examines the period after I9I6 rather dismissively.2 One consequence of this view of Grey's political biography has been the neglect of what has been seen to be an attempt on the part of some Liberals to remove Asquith from the leadership of the Liberal party in I 92 I and to substitute Grey. The assumption has been that because Grey personally was likely to have been a poor conspirator, conspiracies involving him must have been unpromising or trivial. It is, on the contrary, the point of this article to suggest that the Grey conspiracy of i92i should be seen as a significant development in the three-party situation which characterized post-war politics; and to argue that the conspiracy had little to do with Grey and a great deal to do with other politicians, of diverse background, party affiliation, position and ambition, who were looking for a new way to obtain some purchase on the politics of the centre.

One option which came to appeal to those unafflicted by ideology in the confused cross-currents of i920/I was that of creating an anti-Lloyd George bloc which could combine in one unit all that was most moderate and sensible in the Liberal, Conservative and Labour parliamentary groups. The idea was best articulated by Lord Robert Cecil in the

1 G. M. Trevelyan, Grey of Falloden (London, x937), p. 337. The conspiracy of I92I

received at Trevelyan's hands one short paragraph of recollection contributed by Lord Robert Cecil (op. cit. p. 357).

2 Keith Robbins, Sir Edward Grey: a biography of Lord Grey of Falloden (London, I 97 1), pp.

345-72.

46I



462 MICHAEL BENTLEY

Conservative party and by Gilbert Murray among the Liberals; and it formed the rationale behind their suggestion that Asquith should resign in favour of Grey as a necessary prelude to the latter's acting as a symbolic focus for the uncommitted:

He embodies more than any other living man the spirit which should direct our policy ... Whence ... can Liberalism - constitutional democracy - peace, re- trenchment, co-operation - call it what you will - obtain reinforcement? From two sources; (i) the great mass of non-political voters, (2) the non-reactionary Conservatives who passionately desire clean Govt. If Grey can be presented as a super-party rallying point for these electors much may be done.3

This was Cecil's position but he was not the only Conservative to assume it. Oswald Mosley participated in some of the discussions and Steel Maitland showed some interest at a later stage. In the Liberal party Grey was half persuaded to believe in this destiny by Gilbert Murray, Herbert Gladstone, Sir Robert Hudson, Viscount Cowdray, J. A. Spender, Walter Runciman and Arthur Murray. Possibly some important Labour politicians were also involved; it is often implied in the letters and memoranda which have survived that Clynes was privy to the discussions and Hen- derson may also have been involved4 though there seems to be no clear documentary evidence to connect either man with the conspirators. Names of this calibre in all three parties suggest that what was being contemplated went beyond some weird creation of Cecil's eccentric mind: it commanded support in important quarters and highly placed politicians were prepared to spend time and money in furthering it. Just as an understanding of the conspiracy must embrace more than Grey's abilities and ambitions, so must an explanation for its failure contain more than reference to Grey's health and political diffidence.

That is not to deny that these two elements formed a crucial background to the decisions Grey (as opposed to observers and supporters of Grey) made between I9I6 and I922. The public record of Grey's lack of political participation is by itself a sufficient index of the former statesman's reluctance to be manoeuvred back onto the political stage. By the end of I9I8 he had lost the ability to read5 though it was by no means clear that he would not recover. He made no speeches in the House of Lords until his intervention in the debate on the Railways Bill in August I92I.6 His appearances on public platforms were few: he took virtually no part in the election campaign of I9I8 and during I9I9 spoke only at League of Nations functions.7 The public record, moreover, is fully

3 Cecil to Spender, 30 Aug. I92I, Spender MSS 46393, fos. 57-8. 4 For Henderson see Mosley's reference to 'a meeting at my house in the early I920S'

quoted in Roy Douglas, The history of the Liberal party (London, '97 ), p. I58. 5 See The Times, 3 Mar. I9I9.

6 Hansard (Lords), ss (46), 738. Grey was a director of the North Eastern Railway. 7 He appeared only once at a major event - the Albert Hall meeting of June I9I9,

reported in The Times, 14 June 91 9.



THE GREY CONSPIRACY OF I92I 463

corroborated by the private one. His letters of I9I7, for example, speak only two sentences: that he does not wish to be 'sucked into the whirlpool again' and that he does not even intend writing anything for publication.8 The Lansdowne letter sparked him into writing a letter of support and occasionally he said he felt the impulse to intervene. But he had in any case promised Asquith that he would not do so: 'when Asquith asked me to go to the Lords I agreed on the ground that I meant to go out altogether'.9 Even the Lansdowne affair moved him only temporarily and despite Runciman's attempts to rouse him he had decided by the end of the year to scrap much of what he had written about it.'0 On the last day of I9I7 he wrote to Lord Courtney that although he ruminated about many things, 'they [were] mostly connected with private life'."

A mild change began in I9I8 for two reasons. In the first place Grey's arguments against returning to politics were wearing thin. He was obliged to fall back on his poor health as a last line of defence which might not be strong enough to hold back friends who wanted him to play an active role again. Lord Hardinge, Grey's former colleague at the Foreign Office, wrote to him in March I9I8: 'I have thought a great deal over your remark to me that you would never return to public life. I think you will have to if your health holds good."2 Secondly, the development of the League of Nations idea could not but affect Grey's political involvement since he was one of its most distinguished proponents. It is significant that the League movement could extract from him a fifteen-page pamphlet which proved so popular that it was reprinted within months of its publication.'3 Grey's private resolve to preserve his independence of politics was undiminished. In a letter to Montagu in September, for example, he saw his options as freedom on the one hand and captivity on the other. 'Having had the cage door opened', he wrote, 'and having been invited to leave the cage I am not likely to come back... I have now gone into another world that is congenial after 30 years of life that was uncongenial."14 Nevertheless the possibility of Grey's return was being

8 Examples of Grey's reticence are contained in Grey to Bryce, 27 July 1917, Bryce MSS, UB7; Grey to Murray, 12 Sept. 1917, Murray MSS; Grey to Runciman, 5 Dec. 1917, Runciman MSS.

9 Grey to Runciman, 9 Dec. 1917, Runciman MSS. He did concede, however, that the 'impulse to intervene in public affairs often c[ame]'.

10 Lansdowne to Runciman, 9 Dec. 1917; and Grey to Runciman, 15 Dec. 1917, Runciman MSS.

" Grey to Courtney, 3I Dec. 1917, quoted in G. P. Gooch, Life of Lord Courtney (London, 1920), p. 605.

12 Hardinge to Grey (copy), I4 Mar. I9I8, Hardinge MSS 36, fo. 313. For Grey's favourable opinion of Hardinge, see Elizabeth Haldane, From one century to another(London, I937), p. 299.

13 Viscount Grey of Falloden, The League of Nations (London, I9I8). 14 Grey to Montagu, 9 Sept. I 9 I 8, Montagu MSS. Montagu was by this time a firm member

of Lloyd George's retinue and not someone, therefore, with whom Grey would be very open. For Montagu's view of the Liberal split see S. D. Waley, Edwin Montagu (London, I964), pp. 113-I6.



464 MICHAEL BENTLEY

articulated and it is noticeable that even Asquith did not rule out that possibility, though he thought it unlikely, when Gilbert Murray tried to prod Grey into activity in the autumn.'5

In retrospect it is I919 which can be seen to mark Grey's reluctant readmission to the kind of life he had been hoping to avoid. The year began very quietly. Grey spent much of his time salmon fishing and indulging in his favourite intellectual and spiritual reflexions which tended to place him 'more and more outside current life and thought'.'6 His interest in the League continued but when in June he wrote to Balfour it was only to request the establishment of an international bird sanctuary in Heligoland.'7 In the following month, however, Lloyd George asked Grey to become special ambassador to the United States. Doubtless Grey was flattered; he thought over the offer, suggested that Herbert Fisher ought to go instead,'8 but eventually persuaded himself that he might do some good by imposing on Lloyd George conditions for his acceptance including stipulations about League and Irish policy. The conditions were ignored as freely as they were granted, the mission was a failure and Grey came home depressed at the beginning of I92o.'9 But the practical consequences of the overture from Lloyd George were less significant than the fact that one had been thought politically worth while. Lloyd George wanted Grey for the same reason he valued Fisher: he was an untainted Liberal who would be an important acquisition for a ministry which desperately needed to acquire respectable Liberal clothing. Such a decision would also detach Grey from Asquith, a strategy which Lloyd George continued into i920. Indeed the latter was even prepared to pretend to C. P. Scott that he would be.prepared to serve under Grey.20 By the beginning of I920 Grey had become a useful counter in high politics almost despite himself and it could not be expected that Liberals would not want to play.

II

The Grey 'movement' came to a head (because it became semi-public) in the summer of I 92 I but preparations for the re-emergence had begun early in I920. Within the framework of Liberal politics the inspiration of the movement came from two sources. There was an intellectual,

15 Asquith to Murray, 4 Oct. I9I8, Murray MSS: 'It will be a great thing to bring Grey into the open - even for a moment.'

16 Grey to Murray, 9 Mar. I919, Murray MSS; also quoted in Trevelyan, Grey, p. 350. 17 Grey to Balfour, 3 June I919, Balfour MSS 49731, fos. 184-5. 18 Fisher diary, I4 Feb. 1920, Fisher MSS. 19 For the American visit, see Robbins, Grey, pp. 352-3. 20 Scott Diary, I6/17 Mar. 1920: 'I asked would he serve under Grey and he at once said

unhesitatingly and cordially "Certainly". I said in that case the succession would inevitably be his. He said he was not troubling about that.' See Trevor Wilson (ed.), The political diaries of C. P. Scott, 1911-28 (London, 1970), p. 384.



THE GREY CONSPIRACY OF 1921 465

idealist strand of Liberalism which can be identified by a concern with the decline of European civilization and the fading of Britain's role as a moral agent in the international conmmunity. This concern was best represented in Professor Gilbert Murray, Regius Professor of Greek at Oxford since I908. It was he who was struck by the force of Lord Robert Cecil's internationalist ideas during and after the war and he who canvassed Liberal colleagues about the possibility of closer co-operation between the Liberal party and the kind of Conservatism which Cecil embodied.2' A second centre of energy was located in what was left of the Asquithian party machine and in particular in the persons of Sir Robert Hudson, Herbert Gladstone and his brother Henry. Here the motive was less than idealistic. These men were critics of Asquith's leadership who wanted to reintroduce Grey into Liberal politics in order eventually to dish Asquith and build a revitalized party with Grey at its head and a converted Cecil sitting at his right hand. It was inevitable that when these two cores admitted to their strategies other important Liberals - Runciman and Maclean in the ruling clique, Arthur Murray as Grey's former secretary and present intimate, Spender and Massing- ham with their journals, Cowdray with his cheque book - confusion would follow about what the Grey conspiracy was supposed to achieve. Was it a cross-party movement or a Liberal one? Was it meant to reinforce Liberalism or make it into something else? Most pregnant of all, was it meant to buttress Asquith or to supplant him?

Cecil's reply was that the inclusion of Grey required the exclusion of Asquith, a view that he addressed to Runciman for the first time in January I920:

I hope you won't think it treason if I venture to say that I can imagine nothing which would be of greater public service than for Asquith to retire from leadership of the Liberal Party in favour of Grey! If that can be arranged the Liberal Party has a great future before it.22

Cecil seems to have been motivated by a deep admiration for Grey's espousal of the cause of the League of Nations and by the refreshing atmosphere which Grey radiated to a 'devout, public-spirited, high- minded Anglican'23 like Cecil. Murray was more of this world and realized that Runciman might require more than a letter from Cecil to convince him; he therefore sent a letter himself to endorse Cecil's message that 'Grey h[eld] the key to the situation'. 24 The die having been cast, Cecil and Murray worked together through I920 to advance the cause of Grey redivivus. In July Murray aimed at Grey a manifesto enjoining him 'to come forward and take a more active part in public life'. 25 The

21 E.g. Runciman to Murray, i i Dec. 1919, Murray MSS. 22 Cecil to Runciman, 24 Jan. 1920, Runciman MSS. 23 Maurice Cowling, The impact of Labour, 1920-24 (Cambridge, 1971), p. 6o. 24 Murray to Runciman, 30 Jan. 1920, Runciman MSS. 25 Murray to Buckmaster (enc.), I0 July 1920, Murray MSS.



466 MICHAEL BENTLEY

appeal was a non-party one which was meant to be a call to figures like Lansdowne and Clynes as well as to Grey. The latter prevaricated but at least conceded that the force of the request made it impossible for him to plead his own opinion against it; he would wait until the House of Lords met in the autumn and then see how foreign affairs were moving. During the same month Murray went to see Grey whilst the latter was staying with the Glenconners to put the position to him more fully. Asquith's views had already been sought. According to Murray he had discussed the possibility of his own resignation 'quite objectively' and given the impression that he 'would probably not have been displeased with a position like that which Balfour occupied in the years after the war '.26

Granted that Asquith had just achieved his own return to the House of Commons at the Paisley by-election, and that he was sensitive at this time about the accusation from some quarters that he was a broken reed, the possibility of his resigning the Liberal leadership stretches credibility. He was merely taking up his usual posture of appearing magnanimous about a contingency he was confident would not arise; and there is little doubt that when the contingency came within the bounds of possibility in I 92 I his smile grew more nervous. Grey was probably playing the same game. He was allowing himself to be pressed only after a thorough scrutiny of who was doing the pressing. Relations between the two men meanwhile deteriorated because of a divergence of view about Ireland.27 Grey assured Asquith that he would be ready to discuss the matter if the latter thought it worth while but that he still maintained his determina- tion to avoid 'getting into regular political work either of Govt or Opposition'. 28 But it was already too late for such pronouncements; the idea of Grey's return was being discussed within the Liberal hierarchy and the range of opinion consulted was widening. On I5 December, for example, Crewe, Harcourt, Denman, Hudson, Gladstone, Sir William Plender,29 Geoffrey Howard30 and Walter Rea3' dined with Cowdray to discuss party matters - 'all .., of a highly confidential character'32 - and it is hard to believe that Grey was not among the subjects discussed. The wider audience which the Grey issue was now reaching is further

26 Murray, 'Notes about Lord Grey' (dated 1933), Murray MSS. 27 Grey discussed the differences with artificial charity in a public letter: see 'The Times,

9 Oct. 1920. The Lloyd Georgians were naturally delighted by the division and played on it in their propaganda; see, for example, Lloyd George Liberal Magazine, Nov. 1920.

28 Grey to Asquith, 20 Oct. 1920, Asquith MSS 34, fo. I. 29 Business man and administrator, chairman of innumerable government committees.

Gladstone found him 'an interesting man - direct and shrewd'. 30 Son of the earl of Carlisle and Gilbert Murray's brother-in-law. M.P. for Westbury,

191i -i8. The Liberal year book for 192I describes him as being, with Rea and Sir Arthur Marshall, 'responsible for organization work in constituencies'.

31 M.P. for Scarborough, I906-i8; contested Oldham in I9I8 and Nelson and Colne in by-election in 1920; former Liberal whip. Asquith met him for the first time in I919 and was 'favourably' impressed (Asquith to Murray, 30 Sept. I919, Murray MSS).

32 Herbert Gladstone to Henry Gladstone, i6 Dec. 1920, Glynne-Gladstone MSS.




suggested by the identity of the agent who is found 'working strenuously' at Grey over Christmas: it was neither Cecil nor Gladstone but Arthur Murray.33

It was nevertheless Gladstone who was at the centre of the web of negotiations at the beginning of I 92 I and who found in February 'a very strong movement in favour of Grey'. 'And indeed', he wrote to his brother, 'a Grey Cecil Asquith Govt is the best hope. They would get much support from Thomas, Clynes and the moderate Labour men. It would involve a double deposition as Crewe would cease to lead in the Lords.'34 From this it would seem that Gladstone either had not made up his mind whether Asquith would have to be dished or had decided that the Liberal leader might be persuaded to stay on and serve with or under Grey. Henry Gladstone certainly replied in a tone suggesting co-operation rather than conspiracy and thought a constructive start could be made by Asquith, Grey, Cecil and Clynes meeting together and collaborating to frame a common Irish policy.35 This introduction of Labour politicians into the thinking of Liberal politicians indicates the level of strategy which the discussions were now approaching and the non-party terms in which Liberal thinking was still couched. In March Hudson saw Cowdray in the South of France where there was 'much talk of a very confidential order'36 - probably about Cecil (since later in the year Cowdray was financing him37) or about co-operation with Labour, or both. It may have been a result of this meeting that Cowdray sent to Gladstone in April a memorandum concerning the best strategy to adopt over the Labour issue.

About Labour and about Cecil's intentions Hudson and Cowdray had by now every reason to be disturbed. It was true that Cecil had begun the Grey movement because of certain cross-party views about the need to inaugurate a new style of government. For the men involved in running the Liberal machine, it had taken on a different and for them more promising character. They wanted Cecil in order to make a Liberal out of him. If Cecil could be seen through the eyes of Grey's cohort Arthur Murray as 'a most admirable leader of all sane and progressive Liberal thought in the country ,38 he could also be seen as a disgruntled politician who had something that the Asquithians did not have.39 To

33 Arthur Murray diary, 23 Dec. 1920, Elibank MSS 8815, fo. 47. 34 Herbert Gladstone to Henry Gladstone, 27 Feb. 1921, Glynne-Gladstone MSS. Crewe

had been leader in the Lords since early in 1919: see J. Pope Hennessy, Lord Crewe (London, 1955), pp. 152-3. Grey did in fact succeed him in 1923.

35 Henry Gladstone to Herbert Gladstone, i o Mar. 1921, Glynne-Gladstone MSS. They could 'go solid to the Country on this question'.

36 Hudson to Gladstone, 25 Mar. 1921, Gladstone MSS 46475, fo. i.

37 Cowling, Impact of Labour, p. 103. Cf. Cowdray to Maclean, 31 Dec. 1921: 'I have asked Gladstone to let me know when I should contribute to R.C.'s fund - as I strongly feel I must' (Maclean MSS 466, fo. i i6).

38 Arthur Murray to Wiseman, 28 July 1919, Elibank MSS 88o8, fos. 30-1. H9 Iludson to Gladstone, 28 June 1921, Gladstone MSS 46475, fo. 15.



468 MICHAEL BENTLEY

those who wanted to use the conversations about Grey as a useful device to help in rebuilding the Liberal party, Cecil's continual harping on the need to introduce other political elements was an annoying distraction from the main objective. They wanted Cecil to revert to the man he had been the previous year, the politician who had conceived a profound distaste for the 'Asquith entourage' with its 'too little serious purpose' and 'intellectual laziness'.40 and who would concentrate on putting the Liberal house in order. Gladstone decided in April I92I that Cecil should be made aware of these worries and it seems from the account he sent to Cowdray~ that he believed his mission to have been accomplished after going to see Cecil: 'I hear this morning from Gladstone that he had had a very satisfactory interview with R. Cecil and that it was agreed that Labour should only be seen after the Liberal party had become consolidated.'4' If the movement could be turned in upon itself, the Liberal party might again become its vortex and 'EE[dward] G[rey] ... the all important centre.'42

It was a strategy which nevertheless could not be expected to work. There were Liberals like Massingham (editor of the Nation), for example, who were 'all for' Cecil43 precisely because he was a man who wanted to override party labels and achieve an understanding with moderate Labour. To believe that Cecil could be turned to some narrowly Liberal use was to misunderstand what Cecil wanted to do. Worse, it was also to misunderstand what Grey might be enticed into doing. Only Cecil and possibly Arthur Murray recognized the formidable problems they would encounter in trying to revive the political animal in Grey. By the beginning of I92I Cecil was already depressed at the difficulties44 and some months later it is clear from Arthur Murray's letters that he had come to conclude that badgering Grey would not be enough: some account would need to be taken of Grey's 'special and rather peculiar characteristics '.4 Perhaps Cecil came closest to touching upon the in- stincts which lay behind these in a letter he wrote to Grey in April I92I

but later decided not to send:

I appeal to you to come forward and put yourself at the head of all those who desire ordered progress on well-considered lines under the aegis of the Constitution. The country cries aloud for the lead of a man not prominently identified with recent Party controversies, and has yet the character, abilities and experience which entitles him to the confidence of his fellow citizens.46

I Runciman to Murray, 27 Jan. 1920, Murray MSS. 41 Cowdray to Arthur Murray, 28 Apr. 192I, Elibank MSS 88o8, fo. 104. (Emphasis in

original.) 42 Gladstone to Gilbert Murray, 29 Apr. 1921, Murray MSS. I Hammond to Murray (copy), I5 Apr. 1922, Murray MSS. 44 E.g. Cecil to Runciman, 13 Jan. 192 I: 'I am very much afraid... that Grey will not

accept candidature as rival Prime Minister.' Runciman MSS. 45 Gladstone to Gilbert Murray, 22 Apr. 1921, Murray MSS. 46 Cecil to Grey (not sent), 12 Apr. 1921, Cecil MSS 51073, fo. 8i.




This was not the language that Asquithians wanted to speak. Nor was a failure fully to understand the Cecil/Grey viewpoint limited to them; there were observers in other parties who watched the developing conspiracy through equally poor lenses. Despite his brother's opinions, for example, Hugh Cecil had decided by the beginning of I 92 I that all Grey was waiting for was a more positive offer than he had heretofore received and that if he were to be offered a guaranteed entry to Downing Street he would hesitate no longer.47 Lloyd George, on the other hand, seems later to have believed that the Grey conspiracy was an offshoot of the Conservative Die-Hard resistance to his government with the ultimate aim of constructing a coalition to be led by Grey, Cecil and Salisbury.48

The decision to withold his letter to Grey may reflect Cecil's dwindling expectations of Grey's willingness to co-operate or his reticence in the face of what Gladstone, Hudson and Cowdray were now wanting him to do. At any rate the initiatives were taken by others after April and Cecil did not intervene again until the summer though Gilbert Murray, the person closest to Cecil in the Liberal party, continued to play some part. Until io August, when Grey finally made up his mind to make a speech at Berwick in October, the attack was two-pronged. Half of it was directed at Asquith whom Murray confronted again. Murray remained impressed by Asquith's attitude -'faultlessly generous and public spirited from end to end'4 -but the purpose of his visit was this time specific: to urge Asquith to write a letter inviting Grey back to the political arena and thus end the period of personal tension between the two men. The other half of the conspirators' activities were of course aimed at Grey. Arthur Murray and Runciman were sent to see Grey in order to follow up Asquith's letter but were annoyed to discover when they arrived that he had not received one. Runciman suspected that there was no real animus between Grey and Asquith but 'without that letter' nothing further could be done.50 Cowdray and Gladstone were thrown into confusion: the letter was 'the very base on which [they were] building' and they knew (as did Asquith) that Grey could not be pinned down in London for long.51 The capital therefore provided the setting for a crescendo of Liberal activity. It was arranged at once that Hudson should lunch with Violet Bonham-Carter on i i May and take tea with Arthur

47 Hugh Cecil to Robert Cecil, 12 jan. 1921, Cecil MSS 51157, fo. 47. 48 Fisher diary, 4 Oct. 1922, Fisher MSS. In February Frances Stevenson had seen the

two groups as part of one problem: 'D. is anxious to have a 'go' at the Wee Frees & especially Grey. On the other hand the Unionists are very disgruntled and there are rumours that some are making an effort to get rid of the Coalition' (Diary, 3 Feb. 1922

in A. J. P. Taylor (ed.), Lloyd George: a diary by Frances Stevenson (London, I97I), p. 240). 49 Murray to Gladstone (copy), 24 Apr. 1921, Murray MSS. so Runciman to 'Peter', 6 May 192I, Elibank MSS 88o8, fo. io6. 51 Cowdray to Arthur Murray, 6 May 1921, and Gladstone to same, io May 1921, Elibank

MSS 88o8, fos. 107, 1 10.



470 MICHAEL BENTLEY

Murray, Gladstone and Cowdray the same day to exchange news. On the following day Hudson contrived to lunch with Asquith whilst Grey was being fed by Gilbert Murray. 'Meantime A[squith] still hasn't written to G[rey],' Hudson groaned to Maclean, and an explanation was hastily evolved to the effect that the letter had been lost in the post.52

Almost certainly it had never been written. Asquith knew that the rebels would be hamstrung without his help; he was playing a cautious game and was not to be rushed into committing himself on paper, at least until he had examined the balance of power more closely. This attitude of resistance has been missed by commentators who, like Asquith's biographer, begin the story too late53 - in June or July by which time the Liberal leader had been ilanoeuvred by the rebels into a position he had wanted to avoid.

Murray was deputed to see Asquith once more and to apply pressure; he went and duly 'got the undertaking' that Asquith would write. Still nothing happened. The delay was this time attributed by Gladstone to Geoffrey Howard's influence for it had been known for some months that Howard was the chief opponent within the Asquithian court of the entire Grey strategy and he was thought to be 'putting in his weight'.54 Something stronger than mere advocacy was plainly required if the letter was to be extracted and the rebels held conclaves during June to decide what to do. Since Cowdray was one of the conspirators the most obvious sanction lay in the power of the purse and steps were taken to acquaint Asquith of it:

... Spender undertook to ask A[squith] for a serious interview today or to- morrow ... Cowdray, advancing a long step, authorized him to say - if necessary - that he would not give a further sixpence without the desired development. Spender if pressed will refer A. to the custodians of the p[arty] f[und] who are ready to support Spender. So the heavy artillery is in position.55

Judging from the speedy response of Asquith to Spender's visit (he immediately called in Maclean for talks) Hudson was probably right to conclude that Spender had 'played the Cowdray card'. Geoffrey Howard suddenly underwent conversion in the proselytizing atmosphere of a weekend at the Bonham-Carters '.56

Asquith had found his position undermined and then frontally at- tacked. He now had no alternative but to write the letter to Grey and the latter responded to it by going to see Asquith on 29 June. What followed

52 Hudson to Maclean, io May ig2i, Maclean MSS 466, fo. 42. 53 Roy Jenkins, Asquith (London, 1 964), pp. 490-I. Mr Jenkins appears to accept Asquith's

explanation for the delay in contacting Grey, i.e. that he (Asquith) was concerned about Grey's health.

5' Gladstone to Gilbert Murray, 2 June ig2i, Murray MSS. 55 Gladstone to Gilbert Murray, 20 June ig2i, Murray MSS. 56 Hudson to Gladstone, 28 June ig2i, Gladstone MSS 46475, fos. 13-I4.




that meeting is already known in considerable detail.57 A series of memoranda and letters58 show Grey's continuing reluctance to co-operate; doubts -and hesitations about the wisdom of the scheme from Crewe, Maclean and even Runciman; and the persistent discovery of 'pitfalls' by Asquith. At the beginning of July Cecil rocked the boat again with his insistence that Grey should be projected in a way which would attract people 'who [were] not Liberal in a party sense... His return to political life should be in answer to an appeal made to him from a non-Liberal source.' He meant, of course, from himself and this deviation into cross-party thinking immediately disturbed Liberals like Crewe who were not looking towards a 'very complete reconstruction' of this kind. It was therefore greatly to the relief of the old guard that Grey turned out to be 'very difficult' at a conclave on io August and proposed to do nothing until October when he would address his former constituents at Berwick-upon-Tweed.

The advantage of using the platform to effect Grey's return was that it obviated the sending of public letters and their attendant difficulties of authorship and content. The disadvantage was that the secrecy in which the movement had been conceived was bound to be violated by the preparations necessary for an influential public pronouncement. Not that the secret had been kept very well. As early as May, for example, Henry Gladstone had taken it upon himself to ascertain Beauchamp's views about the importance of Grey within the party59 and Beauchamp, as undistinguished in his discretion as was Gladstone in political nous, moved in Lloyd Georgian circles. By July Tom Jones had heard 'remote rumours of serious attempts to get Mr Asquith to withdraw from public life to make room for Lord Grey... .'6O Come August the rumour was doing the round of editors' offices. Mary Agnes Hamilton of the Review of Reviews found her staff 'very much excited about a report - which they seem to believe - that there is pending a reconstruction of the Indepen- dent Liberals with Lord Grey as Leader ... I don't know how much truth there really is in this'. 61 It is not likely to have been coincidental that she decided, moreover, to address her angling remarks to Gilbert Murray. As October approached rumour circulated more widely as Liberal workers strove to create 'the proper atmosphere around [Grey], and to induce him to "go on"'.62 The press was thoroughly tuned. The Manchester Guardian was brought into the conspiracy through its editor,

57 See, for example, Jenkins, Asquith, pp. 491-2; Douglas, History of the Liberal Party, p. I58; Cowling, Impact of Labour, p. I03.

58 Most accounts are based on a run of documents in the Asquith MSS, vol. xxxiv. Particularly relevant are folios 3-4, 6, 8-9, II, I7-I8, 24-5, 26-8, 30-3I.

59 Henry Gladstone to Herbert Gladstone, 25 May I92I, Glynne-Gladstone MSS. 60 Jones to Law, 22 July 192I, Law MSS 107/1/46. Jones did not take the conspiracy very

seriously. 61 Hamilton to Gilbert Murray, 9 Aug. 1921, Murray MSS. 62 Arthur Murray to Reading (copy), 7 Oct. 192I, Elibank MSS 88o8, fo. 132.



472 MICHAEL BENTLEY

C. P. Scott, and Maclean persuaded Grey to let him have a precis of the speech in advance so that it could be sent to Liberal leader-writers before the speech was actually delivered.63

Events, however, were to prove the preparations to be pointless since Grey did not understand what was expected of him. Berwick he saw as a peg on which others could hang the kind of propaganda which the Asquithians had been trying to make electorally attractive since I 9 I 9; and once he had made his speech his work would be over.64 Even as late as the third week of September Runciman could see that Grey still 'shud- der[ed] at continuous responsibility'.65 Yet rather than face reality the Asquithians were willing to pin their hopes on Grey's charisma and public reputation. Asquith himself was doubtless pleased that his followers did no more than this for he had enough political acumen to know that, if he kept silent and did nothing further to augment Grey's return, the idea would die a natural death. So when Hudson spent a weekend at the Wharf in September, Asquith avoided any reference to politics.66 It was Asquith's resistance, Grey's crotchets and the suspicions of some highly placed Liberals that prevented Grey's return from having the impact it might have done. All that the speech accomplished was a reinforcement of Grey's political image and a mild attack on the government for its 'jumble and changing of policies which ha[d] impaired public confidence, and been ... exceedingly costly '.67 The Northern Echo did its best by bolstering the speech as a review 'by a man of clear vision, who has never been accused of intolerance or excessive partisanship' of the record of Lloyd George which was 'revealed as a continuous and stupendous failure '.68

The point was pressed home a week later through a comparison with the duke of Devonshire in his later years, the importance of both men stemming from 'the remarkable faith which the public at large shows in regard to integrity and steadiness of character'.69

Most of the responses which the speech provoked were easily pre- dictable. Cecil was ecstatic and sent a memorandum to the king70 suggesting that if Lloyd George were to fall over Ireland the natural order of calling would be Clynes, Asquith, Law - but Grey would be better than any of them.71 The Lloyd Georgians tried to take out what sting there was in

63 For Scott's entry into the preparations, see Scott Diary, 9 Aug. 192 1, in Wilson, Political diaries, pp. 398-9, and Scott to Maclean, 12 Aug. 1921, Maclean MSS 466, fo. 74. For what Asquith called the 'salting' of the press, see Maclean to 'Peter', 28 Sept. 192 1, Elibank MSS 88o8, fo. 126.

64 Runciman to Cecil, 22 Aug. 192 I, Cecil MSS 5 I I 63, fo. I I . 65 Runciman to 'Peter', 22 Sept. 192i, Elibank MSS 88o8, fo. I25.

66 Hudson to Gladstone, 30 Sept. 192i, Gladstone MSS 46475, fo. i6. 67 Grey's speech was fully reported in The Times, II Oct. 1921.

68 Northern Echo, II Oct. 1921. 69 Northern Echo, I8 Oct. 1921.

70 Hardinge to Cecil, 15 Nov. ig21, Cecil MSS 51i63, fo. 37. The king, according to Hardinge, read the memorandum 'with great interest'.

71 There is a copy of the memorandum, dated II Nov. 192I, in Cecil MSS 51163, fos. 31-5.




Grey's attack by accusing him of being a coalitionist and thus tarring him with the very brush he was wanting to use himself; this riposte also had the virtue of suggesting a rift between Grey and Asquith.72 But reactions like these overestimated the impact that Grey had been able to make. Those who had spent the last year agitating on Grey's behalf were more aware of anti-climax than success. Asquith tried to convince the agitators that Grey had refused the idea of being leader on account of his health, but this did not accord with what Gladstone had heard from 'the E.G. side'. Further promptings from Henry Gladstone, however, elicited only perfunctory noises about 'careful consideration'73 and by Christmas the affair was practically over, at least in so far as it posed any danger to Asquith. Gladstone and Hudson said they had done their best and were going to leave the rest of the work of encouragement to Maclean, who drew from Grey a few elegant phrases but little more.74 '(T)he question is still asked Is G. to be P.M.,' Gladstone wrote in February I922,75 but enough evidence had already accumulated to suggest that he was not. With the pressure now removed, Margot Asquith could afford to be expansive. 'I know Grey by heart,' she wrote to Gilbert Murray. 'He is a dear and fine fellow but he is vain, and thinks it is loyalty that prevents him stepping forward. It is wisdom.'76 Grey wanted to sleep and Asquith preferred that those who were sleeping should be allowed to lie. As Gladstone was able eventually to perceive, Asquith had no intention of pushing Grey and Grey had no intention of pushing himself.77

The latter had shown himself quite unwilling to pursue the course he had begun at Berwick. Only two days after the speech he had an opportunity to develop, or at least repeat, his message at Alnwick but chose to relapse into his non-partisan mood and he did exactly the same at Brighton a fortnight later.78 But even in the new year Gladstone was hoping that Asquith could be compelled to make a public statement to the effect that Grey would become leader in the event of a Liberal government being formed.79 There was a spark of hope at the end of the month when Grey addressed a successful meeting of the Scottish division of the National Liberal Federation where his attack on Churchill and the Coalition Liberals led some to believe in his potential and aroused the interest of Rothermere who probably wanted to annex Grey's appeal to his own economy campaign.80 Speculation of this sort had

72 Lloyd George Liberal Magazine, Nov. I92I and June 1922.

73 Gladstone to Crewe, I2 Dec. I92I, Crewe MSS C/i6. 74 Herbert Gladstone to Henry Gladstone, 23 Dec. I92I, Glynne-Gladstone MSS; memo.

by Gladstone, i9 Jan. I922, Maclean MSS 466, fo. I38. 75 Gladstone to Hudson, 5 Feb. I922, Gladstone MSS 46475, fo. 24. 76 Margot Asquith to Gilbert Murray, 4 May I922, Murray MSS (emphasis in original). 77 Gladstone to Cecil, I8 July I922, Cecil MSS 5I I63, fo. I O. 78 The Times, I3 and 24 Oct. 1921.

79 Gladstone to Gilbert Murray, i8 Jan. I922, Murray MSS. 80 Sunday Pictorial, 29 jan. I 922.



474 MICHAEL BENTLEY

already become unrealistic; it was to be ended for good by Grey's collapsing health. On 22 February a bulletin from his doctors announced the presence of a kidney stone which would require treatment and Grey's convalescence was itself overtaken by a duodenal ulcer which demanded an immediate operation.81 Grey was kept out of politics until June by which time the configuration of national politics had altered and the possibility of an effective intervention rendered negligible.

There remained one possible advantage which the party managers might be able to salvage from the Grey imbroglio and that, paradoxically, concerned Cecil. The latter had been mostly responsible for making the work of Gladstone and Hudson that much more difficult. Gladstone, however, was now back in his chair at Liberal headquarters and therefore had more to offer Cecil than was previously the case. Perhaps he could entice Cecil with the offer of a suitable constituency so that he and Grey could continue their co-operation inside the Liberal party? To Gladstone the thought was not absurd because he drew little distinction between the ambitions of Asquith, Grey and Cecil: the problem was simply one of fusing the elements together. Moreover by January I922 he could see signs of this happening, as he explained diagrammatically to Gilbert Murray:

At first the position was

EG

HHA/ RC

Now it is EG

HHA RC

It is a great advance.82 On the basis of this thinking Gladstone persuaded himself that the best policy was to ensure that Cecil was given 'every encouragement 83 to move over to the Liberals and complete the triangle.

The geometry, had Cecil known of it, would have seemed strange since he had been insisting for two years that one of the points of the triangle should be severed from the other two. It should not have been unex- pected, therefore, that when the Asquithian advances came he seemed less than enthusiastic. The most he would concede was the promise of a 'manifesto' about the political situation, a document which finally appeared in April and turned out to be an open letter to the chairman of Cecil's constituency party.84 It was hardly a coup for the Liberals

81 The Times, 23 Feb. and 8 Mar. I922. 82 Gladstone to Murray, 25 Jan. I922, Murray MSS. 83 Gladstone to Phillipps, I3 Feb. I922, Gladstone MSS 45989, fo. 244. 84 The letter, dated I9 April, was printed in The Times, 22 Apr. I922.




despite their use of Berwick tactics in tuning the press.85 All that the Cecil manifesto accomplished was the filling of two columns of The Times with studiously distant and impersonal comment about Revolution, the League of Nations and what political parties ought to be doing in the post-war world. There was no reference to Grey or, explicitly, to the need for an anti-coalition centre party. Nevertheless the Liberals did what they could with it. Letters of support were sent to The Times, Gilbert Murray to suggest that the manifesto was not really a centre party appeal but rather 'a Liberal document' which made it impossible for its author to 'avoid co-operation with the Liberal party ';86 and a Captain Berkeley to urge that Cecil should 'come forward now and tell us, the moderates, precisely what he would have us do'. What he meant, he told Cecil privately, was that he should form a partnership with Grey and a new Liberal party to sweep the country.87 Cecil was unmoved. He pointed out in reply to Berkeley that it would be pointless for him to join the Liberals unless Asquith was removed and this patently was not going to happen.88

It is likely that this was as much an excuse as a considered judgement. It reflected Cecil's feeling that the chance had existed in October the previous year but that the Liberals had bungled it through their failure to push Grey to the front. Cecil did not give up the Grey idea completely in I922: the rhetoric which he employed was still often fashioned around the charisma of his old ally and as late as July he could be seen publicly to observe that party labels did not carry great weight with him.89 But it is noticeable that when he was pressed by the Liberals he always fell back on his reply that the second part of the Grey conspiracy - the substitution of Grey for Asquith - had not taken place.90 Gladstone's last carrot was unfortunately chosen; he tried to tempt Cecil with the constituency of Warrington which would hardly suit the needs of a renegade Conservative looking for a safe seat. The offer brought from Cecil a contemptuous dismissal91 which was confirmed by a damping- down letter in September designed to leave Gladstone in no doubt that Cecil had ceased to be interested in Liberal politics.92

85 Gladstone to Murray, 20 Apr. I922, Murray MSS. 8 Letter from Murray, The Times, 26 Apr. 1922.

87 Letter from Berkeley, ibid.; and Berkeley to Cecil, 27 Apr. I922, Cecil MSS 5I I63, fo. 88.

88 Cecil to Berkeley (copy), 2 May I922, Cecil MSS 5I I63, fos. 90-I .

89 See, for example, a draft of a speech to his constituents, dated I 2 May I 922, Cecil MSS 5I073, fos. 27-8, and his speech of 2I July I922, reported in the Lloyd George Liberal Magazine, Aug. I922.

90 Cecil to Gladstone (copy), I 2 July I922, Cecil MSS 5I I63, fos. I078. 91 Gladstone to Cecil, I Sept. I922, Cecil MSS 5I I63, fo. I I2; Cecil to Lady Gladstone,

i6 Sept. I922, ibid. fo. i I8. It is worth recalling that Lady Gladstone had gained the confidence of Cecil through her position in the League of Nations Union and may have acted as a go-between throughout the negotiations. Cf. Herbert to Henry Gladstone, 20 July I920, Glynne-Gladstone MSS.

92 Cecil to Gladstone (copy), 30 Sept. I922, Cecil MSS 5I I63, fo. I I8.



476 MICHAEL BENTLEY

The approaching anniversary of the Berwick speech was a more likely spur than Gladstone's inept encouragement to Cecil's decision to address one last plea to Asquith to make a 'public declaration' that he would be willing to serve under Grey.93 The Liberal leader 'considered' for a week and then replied in a letter full of his highly developed instinct for theatre. 'As you say,' the relevant part began, 'I have no personal bias in the matter.' However:

I must ... tell you frankly that I have abundant evidence from many quarters that any such arrangement as you suggest would be conceived in the party as a whole with bewilderment, and in its active and militant section with something like consternation ... After grave consideration ... I have come to the conclusion that it is my duty to keep my hands free.94

It was a fitting curtain to an odd performance. Nor was it ever to be re-staged. Grey allowed others to persuade him to take the Liberal lead in the House of Lords in I923 but the Lloyd Georgians soon squeezed him out. Thereafter his political involvement was limited to League affairs and the futilities of the Liberal Council. Cecil, on the other hand, immersed himself in the internationalist cause and worked his way back into Conservative favour. Even in I922 speculation about a Cecil/Grey bloc was superseded by wider discussions about the likely fall of Lloyd George and his government. On the very day when Asquith donned his dignity to write his letter of refusal to Cecil, the Conservative party met at the Carlton Club.

III

The Grey conspiracy forms part of the litter of post-war politics: its significance lies not in its success or failure but in its value as an indicator of whorls of opinion and the currents between them. What it shows is that in the confused post-war world politicians were casting about for ways of returning to a kind of political civilization they believed England to have possessed before the war. That more of them did not declare themselves supporters of the Grey movement was as much a result of the movement's failure than a cause of it. For there could be no doubting Grey's stature within British politics. He had never been 'a close ally of Lloyd George or involved in the petty party manoeuvres'95 that had characterized the war years. This detachment, indeed, could raise him in the eyes of the right to almost Gaullist proportions. The editor of the Spectator, for example, thought he was 'in politics like a good bank reserve is in commerce. If anything goes wrong we have always got him in the background to serve and save the state.'9f The idea of basing a political campaign on this charisma was not in itself unintelligent. (Those

93 Cecil to Asquith, 9 Oct. I922, Asquith MSS i8, fo. 8i; copy in Cecil MSS 5I073, fos.

30-3- 94 Asquith to Cecil, I9 Oct. I922, Cecil MSS 5I073, fos. 36-9. 95 Sir Alfred Pease, Elections and recollections (London, I932), p. I03.

96 Strachey to Lady Grey (copy), 24 Oct. I922, Strachey MSS S/7/8/36.




who, like Simon, thought it a mistake to treat Grey 'like a god'97 were always likely to be motivated as much by personal ambition and resent- ment as by objective judgement.) It was a natural impulse for Liberals to turn, at a time when Asquith's political leadership was patently failing, to the man who had been seen before the war as his obvious successor,98 especially when the centre-ground of political debate was bound to concern international relations in the aftermath of a world war. '[W]e want to know exactly what Grey will do', Sir Willoughby Dickinson had felt in I9I9.99 It would have been remarkable if others had not asked the same question.

No unambiguous answer was ever forthcoming. Grey was reluctant to commit himself to anything and those who sought his return differed among themselves about the objectives they wanted him to pursue. The cross-party strategy of Cecil was of a kind to which Grey felt drawn but which would receive little support from a Liberal party trying to recapture a lost identity and project it to an agnostic public. A small group of men in that party had the means to dislodge Asquith and help Grey back to power but their understanding of what Grey wanted, and of what Cecil was telling Grey that he ought to want, was very restricted. And so impasse: one section of Grey's support had an attractive doctrine but no power, the other had considerable power which could only be used to further ends to which Grey did not subscribe. The tension between these sections enabled Asquith's position to remain firm and the task of promoting a 'purist ' campaign against Lloyd George fell not to Cecil but to his brother Lord Salisbury who built on a formula which was based not on the attenuated Liberalism of Grey but on the backwoods Die- Hardism of Gretton and Northumberland.100

More important than the impact of the Grey conspiracy on party politics in general, however, was its significance for the Liberal party in particular. The attack on Asquith through Grey constituted the last attempt by the old party machine to impose its view of politics on the parliamentary leadership; and the reluctance of Grey to come to terms with the new world marked also the failure of Gladstone and Hudson to do so. Both men symbolized an aspect of Liberal politics which was out of joint with post-war realities. Hudson still carried with him his apprenticeship under Schnadhorst back in the I88os and his title as 'organizer of victory' in io06.101 Gladstone was still in spirit the Chief

Stansgate diary, 6 Feb. I922, Stansgate MSS. 98 See, for example, McKenna's insistence in I91 I that Grey be kept in the Commons

so that he could succeed Asquith: Pease diary, I Mar. I9I I, Pease MSS. 99 Dickinson to Gilbert Murray (copy), io Apr. I919, Dickinson MSS 403, fo. I40.

'00 For an exhaustive account of the development of Die-Hard politics, see Cowling, The impact of Labour, pp. 70-2 I 2.

101 When Arthur Murray saw 'that splendid fellow' Hudson in I92I he was still seeing the man 'who gave Alick [Murray]... such immense help in Parliament Bill days.' See Murray to Reading, Mar. I923, quoted in Arthur Murray, Master and brother (London, I945),

p. I89.



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Whip of Edwardian days, prepared if necessary to make overtures to the moderate left, but nevertheless convinced (as he later told Grey himself) that the party 'must win the confidence of a right wing'.102 They were unfitted for a world of cross-party thinking where labels mattered little. Lloyd George therefore had as little chance of enticing Hudson into his centre party in I920 as he had had in persuading him to accept office in 19I6.103 He did not understand Hudson's view of politics just as Hudson and Gladstone did not understand Cecil's. It required the sharply alienated mind of Alexander MacCallum Scott to perceive that the men of Abingdon Street were 'visible symbol[s] that represented a tradition so powerful that it was almost an instinct'.104 This instinct and tradition lay at the heart of the attempt to make Grey a statesman again; and in retrospect the conspiracies which took Grey as their focus are interesting precisely because they demonstrate the power of the challenge which the past could mount on the present during a period of exceptional political flux.

102 Gladstone to Grey, 6 Aug. I929, Gladstone MSS, 45992, fo. I64. 103 For the I9I6 overture see Hudson's D.N.B. entry. The later one is suggested by an

undated memo. by Gladstone, probably written after Hudson's death in 1927, Gladstone MSS 4602 I, fo. i 83.

104 MacCallum Scott diary, 26 Nov. 1927. The author is very grateful to Mr John MacCallum Scott for granting access to this source.



Liberal Politics and the Grey Conspiracy of 1921

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