Lexoterica_Remedial Law_Oct2011 to Present

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January 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Remedial Law

Civil Procedure

Annulment of Judgment; exception to final judgment rule; lack of due process as additional ground. A petition for

Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional

circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial,

appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly provides that it is not available as a

substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the party‘s own neglect in promptly availing of the same. ―The

underlying reason is traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of

judgment, litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an affective

administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause involved therein should be

laid to rest.‖

While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based only onthe grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional

ground to annul a judgment. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, this Court declared that a final and executory

judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having been

issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law. Leticia Diona, represented by her Attorney-in-fact,

Marcelina Diona v. Romeo Balangue, Sonny Balangue, Reynaldo Balangue, and Esteban Balangue, Jr.; G.R. No.

173559. January 7, 2013

Appeal; filing of motion for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration in CA does not toll fifteen-day

period to appeal; rule suspended in exceptional cases to serve substantial justice. The assailed CA resolution

upheld the general rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration in the CA does not toll the fifteen-day

period to appeal, citing Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japson. However, in previous cases we suspended this rule

in order to serve substantial justice.

In Barnes v. Padilla, we exempted from the operation of the general rule the petitioner whose motion for

extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA. In the Resolution denying the motion

for reconsideration of our Decision dated September 30, 2004, we held that:

A suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since the procedural infirmity was not entirely attributable to

the fault or negligence of the petitioner. Petitioner‘s counsel was understandably confused with the absence of an

explicit prohibition in the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (IRCA) that the period of filing a motion for

reconsideration is non-extendible, which was expressly stated in the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of

Appeals that was in effect prior to the IRCA. The lawyer‘s negligence without any participatory negligence on the

part of the petitioner is a sufficient reason to set aside the resolution of the CA.

More significantly, a careful study of the merits of the case and the lack of any showing that the review sought is

merely frivolous and dilatory, dictated the setting aside of the resolutions of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 69573 and

Branch 215 in Civil Case NO. Q-99-37219, as both are patently erroneous. x x x

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/january2013/173559.pdf








Certification against forum shopping and Verification; requirements not jurisdictional. In any case, it is settled

that the requirements of verification and certification against forum shopping are not jurisdictional. Verification is

required to secure an assurance that the allegations in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and

correct, and not merely speculative. Non-compliance with the verification requirement does not necessarily render

the pleading fatally defective, and is substantially complied with when signed by one who has ample knowledge

of the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition, and when matters alleged in the petition have been

made in good faith or are true ad correct. On the other hand, the certification against forum shopping us required

based on the principle that a party litigant should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in

different fora. While the certification requirement is obligatory, non-compliance or a defect in the certificate could

be cured by its subsequent correction or submission under special circumstances or compelling reasons or on the

ground of ―substantial compliance.‖ Sps. Eugene L. Lim and Constancia Lim v. The Court of Appeals-Mindanao

Station, et al.; G.R. No. 192615, January 30, 2013

Contempt of Court; definition. Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition

to its authority, justice and dignity, and signifies not only a willful d isregard of the court‘s order, but such conduct

which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner,

to impede the due administration of justice. To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to

or prohibited by the order of the court. Thus, a person cannot be punished for contempt for disobedience of an

order of the Court, unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that

there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required. Rivulet

Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Anthony Parungao, Narciso B. Nieto, in their capacity as Undersecretaries of Legal

Affairs and Field Operations of the Department of Agrarian Reform, et al., G.R. No. 197507. January 14, 2013

Ejectment; possession de facto ; distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases. At the outset, it

bears to reiterate the settled rule that the only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who

is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession

de jure. It does not even matter if a party‘s title to the property is questionable. In an unlawful detainer case, the

sole issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim

of ownership by any of the party litigants. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts

may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is,

however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to

the property. Juanita Ermitaño, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Isabelo Ermitaño v. Lailanie M. Paglas ; G.R.

No. 174436. January 23, 2013

Execution; issuance of writ is trial court‘s ministerial duty once decision is final; writ of execution must conform to

dispositive portion of judgment; order of execution which varies tenor of judgment is void. In the present case,

the Court finds meritorious grounds to admit the petition and absolve the petitioners from their procedural lapse.

It is undisputed that the CA Decision dated September 29, 2006 is already final and executory. As a rule, once a

judgment becomes final and executory, all that remains is the execution of the decision which is a matter of right

The prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution, the issuance of which is the trial court‘s ministerial duty.

The writ of execution, however, must conform substantially to every essential particular of the judgment

















promulgated. It must conform, more particularly, to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the

decision.

Clearly, the RTC exceeded its authority when it insisted on applying its own construal of the dispositive portion of

the CA Decision when its terms are explicit and need no further interpretation. It would also be inequitable for the

petitioners to pay and for the respondents, who did not appeal the CA decision or questioned the deletion of the

12% per annum interest, to receive more than what was awarded by the CA. The assailed RTC order of execution

dated December 21, 2009 and the alias writ of execution dated May 17, 2010 are, therefore, void. Time and

again, it has been ruled that an order of execution which varies the tenor of the judgment, or for that matter,

exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity. Spouses Ricardo and Elena Golez v. Spouses Carlos and Amelita

Navarro ; G.R. No. 192532. January 30, 2013

Forcible entry; when proper; when issue of ownership can be material and relevant in resolving the issue of

possession. Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides when an action for forcible entry, and unlawful

detainer, is proper:

SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. — Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding

section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or

stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is

unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract,

express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person

may at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action

in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of

possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together withdamages and costs. [emphasis ours; italics supplied]

Under this provision, for a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiff must allege and prove: (1) prior physical

possession of the property; and (2) unlawful deprivation of it by the defendant through force, intimidation,

strategy, threat or stealth. As in any civil case, the burden of proof lies with the complainants (the respondents in

this case) who must establish their case by preponderance of evidence. In the present case, the respondents

sufficiently alleged and proved the required elements.

We agree, too, as we have indicated in passing above, that the issue of ownership can be material and relevant

in resolving the issue of possession.

The Rules in fact expressly allow this: Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that the issue of

ownership shall be resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the question of possession is intertwined with

the issue of ownership. But this provision is only an exception and is allowed only in this limited instance – to

determine the issue of possession and only if the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the







issue of ownership. Save for this instance, evidence of ownership is not at all material, as in the present

case. Nenita Quality Foods Corporation v. Crisostomo Galabo, et al.; G.R. No. 174191, January 30, 2013

Forum Shopping; definition and nature. ―Forum shopping is defined as an act of a party, against whom an

adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion

in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action forcertiorari. It may also be the institution of two or

more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would

make a favorable decision. x x x It is expressly prohibited xxx because it trifles with and abuses court processes,

degrades the administration of justice, and congest our court dockets. A willful and deliberate violation of the rule

against forum shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of the case, and may also constitute direct

contempt.‖ Estrellla Aduan Orpiano v. Spouses Antonio C. Tomas and Myrna U. Tomas ; G.R. No. 178611. January

14, 2013

Grave abuse of discretion; proper ground in a petition for certiorari but not in a petition for review on certiorari. It

is to be noted that the above issues raised by petitioner alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA,

which is proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, but

not in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Heirs of Faustino C. Ignacio v. Home Bankers

Savings and Trust Company, et al., G.R. No. 177783. January 23, 2013

Hierarchy of courts; concurrence of jurisdiction; non-observance results in dismissal. We emphasize that the

concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts to issue the

writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners

the unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. An undue disregard of this policy against direct resort to the

Court will cause the dismissal of the recourse. In Banez, Jr. v. Concepcion, we explained why, to wit:

The court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy is

not to be ignored without serious consequences, the strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court from

having to deal with causes that are also well within the competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time to

the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it,

the Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only when

absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons justify an exception to the policy. xxx

Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the only judicial forum from which to seek and

obtain effective redress of his or her grievances. As a rule, the Court is a court of last resort, not a court of first

instance. Hence, every litigant who brings petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and

mandamus should ever be mindful of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, the observance of which is explicitly

defined and enjoined in Section 4 of Rule 65. Spouses Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia Dacudao v. Secretary of

Justice Raul Gonzales of the Department of Justice ,G.R. No. 188056. January 8, 2013

Interlocutory and Final orders; distinction. This Court has laid down the distinction between interlocutory and fina

orders, as follows:

xxx A ―final‖ judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the

Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the





















trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a

judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once

rendered, the task of the court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and

liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the court except to await the parties‘

next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the

taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes ―final‖ or,

to use the established and more distinctive term, ―final and executory.‖

xxxx

Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court‘s task of adjudicating

the parties‘ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates

that other things remain to be done by the court is ―interlocutory‖ e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss

under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing

amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of

documents or things, etc. unlike a ―final‖ judgment or order, which is appealable. As above pointed out, an

―interlocutory‖ order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be

taken from the final judgment rendered in the case. Ma. Carmina Calderon represented by her Attorney-in-fact,

Marycris V. Baldevia v. Jose Antonio Roxas and Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 185595. January 9, 2013

Interlocutory and Final orders; application to provisional remedies especially to support pendente lite . The

assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendent lite and support in arrears, as the term suggests, were

issued pending the rendition of the decision on the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage and aretherefore interlocutory. They did not finally dispose of the case nor did they consist of a final adjudication of the

merits of petitioner‘s claims as to the ground of psychological incapacity and other incidents as child custody,

support, and conjugal assets. Ma. Carmina Calderon represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Marycris V. Baldevia v.

Jose Antonio Roxas and Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 185595. January 9, 2013

Interlocutory and Final orders; remedy against interlocutory order is not appeal. The remedy against an

interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 provided that the

interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Having

chosen the wrong remedy in questioning the subject interlocutory orders of the RTC, petitioner‘s appeal was

correctly dismissed by the CA. Ma. Carmina Calderon represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Marycris V. Baldevia v.

Jose Antonio Roxas and Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 185595. January 9, 2013

Judgment; compromise agreement. There is no question that the foregoing Agreement was a compromise that

the parties freely and voluntarily entered into for the purpose of finally settling their dispute in this case. Under

Article 2028 of the Civil Code, a compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions,

avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Accordingly, a compromise is either judicial, if the

objective is to put an end to a pending litigation, or extrajudicial, if the objective is to avoid a litigation. As a

contract, a compromise is perfected by mutual consent. However, a judicial compromise, while immediately















binding between the parties upon its execution, is not executory until it is approved by the court and reduced to a

judgment. The validity of a compromise is dependent upon its compliance with the requisites and principles of

contracts dictated by law. Also, the terms and conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law, morals,

good customs, public policy and public order.Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Spouses Jorja Rigor Soriano

and Magin Soriano , G.R. No. 178312. January 30, 2013

Jurisdiction; personal jurisdiction in civil cases; voluntary appearance. In civil cases, jurisdiction over the person

of the defendant may be acquired either by service of summons or by the defendant‘s voluntary appearance in

court and submission to its authority.

In this case, the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz by reason of the latter‘s

voluntary appearance in court. In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy, we had occasion to

state:

Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal

processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who seeks

an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that

we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for

reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered

voluntary submission to the court‘s jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional

appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court‘s

jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.

Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that: (1) special appearance operates as an exception to thegeneral rule on voluntary appearance; (2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person

of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; (3) Failure to do so constitutes

voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking

affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution. Optima Realty Corporation v. Hertz Phil.

Exclusive Cars, Inc., G.R. No. 183035. January 9, 2013

Litis pendentia; elements. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) identity of

parties, or at least their representation of the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and

reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding

particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of

which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case. Optima Realty Corporation v. Hertz Phil


Motion to dismiss; remedy against denial is not appeal; denial may be assailed through a petition for

certiorari. The denial of a motion to dismiss, as an interlocutory order, cannot be the subject of an appeal until a

final judgment or order is rendered in the main case. An aggrieved party, however, may assail an interlocutory

order through a petition for certiorari but only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of















jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.Sps. Eugene L. Lim and Constancia Lim v. The Court of Appeals-

Mindanao Station, et al.; G.R. No. 192615. January 30, 2013

Parties; authority of private counsel to represent local officials in suit. The present case stemmed from Special

Civil Action 2002-0019 for mandamus and damages. The damages sought therein could have resulted in personal

liability, hence petitioner cannot be deemed to have been improperly represented by private counsel. In Alinsug

v. RTC Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental,the Court ruled that in instances like the present case where

personal liability on the part of local government officials is sought, they may properly secure the services of

private counsel, explaining:

it can happen that a government official, ostensibly acting in his official capacity, is later held to have exceeded

his authority. On the one hand, his defense would have then been underwritten by the people‘s money which

ordinarily should have been his personal expense. On the other hand, personal liability can attach to him without,

however, his having had the benefit of assistance of a counsel of his own choice. In Correa v. CFI, the Court held

that in the discharge of governmental functions, municipal corporations are responsible for the acts of its officers,

except if and when, and only to the extent that, they have acted by authority of the law, and in conformity with

the requirements thereof.

In such instance, this Court has sanctioned the representation by private counsel. In one case, We held that

where rigid acceptance to the law on representation of local affairs in court actions could deprive a party of his

right to redress for a valid grievance, the hiring of a private counsel would be proper. And in Alburra v.

Torres, this Court also said that a provincial governor sued in his official capacity may engage the services of

private counsel when the complaint contains other allegations and a prayer for moral damages, which, if due

from the defendants, must be satisfied by them in their private capacity. Romeo Gontang, in his official capacityas Mayor of Gainza, Camarines Sur v. Engr. Cecilia Alayan; G.R. No. 191691. January 16, 2013

Parties; dropping of parties; remedies for joinder or misjoinder. Under the Rules, parties may be dropped or

added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such

terms as are just. Indeed, it would have been just for the collection court to have allowed Estrella to prosecute

her annulment case by dropping her as a party plaintiff in the collection case, not only so that she could protect

her conjugal share, but also to prevent the interests of her co-plaintiffs from being adversely affected by their

conflicting actions in the same case. By seeking to be dropped from the collection case, Estrella was foregoing

collection of her share in the amount that may be due and owing from the sale. It does not imply a waiver in any

manner that affects the rights of the other heirs.

While Estrella correctly made use of the remedies available to her – amending the complaint and filing a motion

to drop her as a party – she committed a mistake in proceeding to file the annulment case directly after these

remedies were denied her by the collection court without first questioning or addressing the propriety of these

denials. While she may have been frustrated by the collection court‘s repeated rejection of her motions and its

apparent inability to appreciate her plight, her proper recourse nevertheless should have been to file a petition

for certiorari or otherwise question the trial courts denial of her motion to be dropped as plaintiff, citing just

reasons which call for a ruling to the contrary. Issues arising from joinder or misjoinder of parties are the proper











subject of certiorari. Estrella Aduan Orpiano v. Spouses Antonio C. Tomas and Myrna U. Tomas, G.R. No. 178611.

January 14, 2013

Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); contents; not an absolute rule that will lead to dismissal; liberal

construction. The court significantly pointed out in F.A.T Kee Computer Systems, Inc. v. Online Networks

International, Inc. that the requirement in Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is not meant to be an absolute

rule whose violation would automatically lead to the petition‘s dismissal. The Rules of Court has not been

intended to be totally rigid. In fact, the Rules of Court provides that the Supreme Court ―may require or allow the

filing of the such pleadings, briefs, memoranda, or documents, as it may deem necessary within such periods and

under such conditions as it may consider appropriate‖; and ―[i]f the petition is given due course, the Supreme

Court may require the elevation of the complete record of the case or specified parts thereof within fifteen (15)

days from notice.‖ These provisions are in keeping with the overriding standard that procedural rules should be

liberally construed to promote their objective and to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy, and inexpensive

determination of every action or proceeding. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Absolute Management

Corporation, G.R. No. 170498. January 9, 2013

Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); only questions of law may be raised; exceptions. It is a settled rule,

indeed, that in the exercise of our power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally

undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case.

The Court relies on the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals or of the trial court, and accepts such findings as

conclusively and binding unless any of the following exceptions, obtains, namely: (a) when the findings are

grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,

absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a

misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the Court

of Appeals or the trial court went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of

both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (h) when the findings

are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the

petition as well as in the petitioner‘s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (j) when the

findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record;

and (k) when the Court of Appeals or the trial court manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by

the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. However, none of the

aforementioned exception applies herein. Special People, Inc. Foundation, represented by its Chairman, Roberto

P. Cericos v. Nestor M. Canda, et al., G.R. No. 160932. January 14, 2013

Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); only questions of law may be raised; exceptions. It is well settled that

in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised.

This Court, in numerous instances, has had the occasion to explain that it is not its function to analyze or weigh

evidence all over again. As a rule, the Court respects the factual findings of the CA and of quasi-judicial agencies

like the DAR, giving them a certain measure of finality. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule,

one of which is when the findings of fact are conflicting. Heirs of Luis A. Luna and Remegio A. Luna, et al. v.

Ruben S. Afable, et al., G.R. No. 188299. January 23, 2013





















Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); only questions of law may be raised; exceptions. We first address the

procedural issue raised. Resolving the contentions raised necessarily requires us to delve into factual issues, a

course not proper in a petition for review on certiorari, for a Rule 45 petition resolves only questions of law, not

questions of fact. This rule is read with the equally settled dictum that factual findings of the CA are generally

conclusive on the parties and are therefore not reviewable by this Court. By way of exception, we resolve factual

issues when, as here, conflict attended the findings of the MTCC and of the RTC, on one hand, and of the CA, on

the other. Of minor note, but which we deem important to point, the petition needlessly impleaded the CA, in

breach of Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Nenita Quality Foods Corporation v. Crisostomo Galabo, et

al.; G.R. No. 174191. January 30, 2013

Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); only questions of law may be raised; applicable to expropriation cases.

This Court is not a trier of facts. Questions of fact may not be raised in a petition brought under Rule 45, as such

petition may only raise questions of law. This rule applies in expropriation cases. Moreover, factual findings of the

trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are generally binding on this Court. An evaluation of the case and the issues

presented leads the Court to the conclusion that it is unnecessary to deviate from the findings of fact of the trial

and appellate courts.

Under Section 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the trial court sitting as an expropriation court may, after

hearing, accept the commissioners‘ report and render judgment in accordance therewith. This is what the trial

court did in this case. The CA affirmed the trial court‘s pronouncement in toto. Given these facts, the trial court

and the CA‘s identical findings of fact concerning the issue of just compensation should be accorded the greatest

respect, and are binding on the Court absent proof that they committed error in establishing the facts and in

drawing conclusions from them. There being no showing that the trial court and the CA committed any error, we

thus accord due respect to their findings. Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public

Works and Highways v. Heirs of Spouses Pedro Bautista and Valentina Malabanan ,G.R. No. 181218. January 28,

2013

Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); review errors of judgment; orders granting execution are interlocutory

and should be subject of petition for certiorari under Rule 65; exceptions. The petition filed in this case is one for

review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitions filed under this rule bring up for review errors

of judgment. It is an ordinary appeal and the petition must only raise questions of law which must be distinctly

set forth and discussed. The present petition, however, assails the RTC Order of execution dated December 21,

2009 and alias writ of execution dated May 27, 2010. It is a settled rule that orders granting execution are

interlocutory orders; hence the petitioners should have filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. This is

categorically provided in Rule 41, viz :

Section 1. Subject of appeal. – An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes

of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be applicable.

No appeal may be taken from:

x x x x













(f) An order of execution;

x x x x

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file anappropriate special civil action under Rule 65.

Nevertheless, there are exceptions to this rule, one of which is when the writ of execution varies the judgment.

Thus, in Shugo Noda & Co., Ltd. V. Court of Appeals the Court acknowledged that, in the past, it considered an

appeal to be a proper remedy when it is perceived that the order varies, or may not be in consonance with, the

essence of the judgment. Other exceptions include: (1) There has been a change in the situation of the parties

making execution inequitable or unjust; (2) Execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from

execution; (3) It appears that the controversy has been submitted to the judgment of the court; (4) The terms of

the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or (5) It appears that the

writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or issued against the wrong

party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ issued without authority.

In such case, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be some remedy available to the aggrieved

party. Likewise, the Court, in the interest of equity or when justice demands, may interchangeably treat an

appeal as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, and vice versa.

In the present case, the Court finds meritorious grounds to admit the petition and absolve the petitioners from

their procedural lapse. Spouses Ricardo and Elena Golez v. Spouses Carlos and Amelita Navarro , G.R. No.

192532. January 30, 2013

Pleadings; relief. It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what

is being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining the evidence presented in

court. In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Tecson, this Court expounded that:

Due process considerations justify this requirement, it is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of

relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice, which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with

respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement that allegations of the complaint

must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant.

Notably, the Rules is even more strict in safeguarding the right to due process of a defendant who was declared

in default than of a defendant who participated in trial. For instance, amendment to conform to the evidence

presented during trial is allowed the parties under the Rules. But the same is not feasible when the defendant is

declared in default because Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court comes into play and limits the relief that

may be granted by the courts to what has been prayed for in the complaint. xxx The raison d‘etre in limiting the

extent of relief that may be granted is that it cannot be presumed that the defendant would not file an Answer

and allow himself to be declared in default had he know that the plaintiff will be accorded a relief greater than or









different in kind from that sought in the Complaint. No doubt, the reason behind Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules

of Court is to safeguard defendant‘s right to due process against unforeseen and arbitrarily issued judgment.

This, to the mind of the Court, is akin to the very essence of due process. It embodies ―the sporting idea of fair

play‖ and forbids the grant of relief on matters where the defendant was not given the opportunity to be heard

thereon. Leticia Diona, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Marcelina Diona v. Romeo Balangue, Sonny

Balangue, Reynaldo Balangue, and Esteban Balangue, Jr.; G.R. No. 173559. January 7, 2013

Preliminary injunction; abuse of discretion if writ issued despite absence of clear legal right. The issuance of a

preliminary injunction rests entirely within the discretion if the court taking cognizance of the case and is

generally not interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse. For the issuance of the writ of preliminary

injunction to be proper, it must be shown that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and

substantial, that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable, and that there is an urgent and paramount

necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of a writ of

injunction constitutes grave abuse of discretion. TML Gasket Industries, Inc. v. BPI Family Savings Bank,

Inc., G.R. No. 188768. January 7, 2013

Preliminary injunction; injunctive relief not issued for self-inflicted losses which are damnum absque injuria. In

arriving at a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals dwelt on the ―grave and irremediable‖ financial losses

respondent was poised to sustain as a result of EO 156‘s enforcement, finding such prejudice ―inequitable.‖ No

doubt, by importing used vehicles in contravention of the ban under EO 156, respondent risked sustaining losses.

Such risk, however, was self- imposed. Having miscalculated its chances, respondent cannot look to courts for an

injunctive relief against self-inflicted losses which are in the nature of damnum absque injuria.Injunction will not

issue on the mere possibility that a litigant will sustain damage, without proof of a clear legal right entitling the

litigant to protection. Executive Secretary, Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Customs, District Collector of

Customs, Port of Aparri, Cagayan, District Collector of Customs, Port of San Fernando La Union, and Head of the

Land Transportation Office v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 199324. January 7, 2013

Preliminary injunction; requirement of actual and existing right. Petitioners‘ argument fails to impress. The CA did

not nullify the October 15, 2004 Order merely because of the interchanged pages. Instead, the CA determined

that the applicant, Vitaliano, was not able to show that he had an actual and existing right that had to be

protected by a preliminary injunction. The most that Vitaliano was able to prove was a future right based on his

victory in the suit. Contrasting this future right of Vitaliano with respondents‘ existing right under the GIS, the CA

determined that the trial court should not have disturbed the status quo. Vitaliano Aguirre II and Fidel Aguirre v.

FQB+7, Inc., Nathaniel Bocobo, Priscila Bocobo, and Antonio De Villa, G.R. No. 170770. January 9, 2013

Preliminary injunction; requirement of clear legal right. It is a deeply ingrained doctrine in Philippine remedial law

that a preliminary injunctive relief under Rule 58 issues only upon a showing of the applicant‘s ―clear legal right‖

being violated or under threat of violation by the defendant. ―Clear legal right,‖ within the meaning of Rule 58,

contemplates a right clearly founded in or granted by law. Any hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal right

precludes the grant of preliminary injunctive relief. For suits attacking the validity of laws or issuances with the

force and effect of law, as here, the applicant for preliminary injunctive relief bears the added burden of

overcoming the presumption of validity inhering in such laws or issuances. These procedural barriers to the



















issuance of a preliminary injunctive writ are rooted on the equitable nature of such relief, preserving the status

quo while, at the same time, restricting the course of action of the defendants even before adverse judgment is

rendered against them. Executive Secretary, Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Customs, District collector of

customs, Port of Aparri, Cagayan, District Collector of Customs, Port of San Fernando La Union, and Head of the

Land Transportation Office v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 199324. January 7, 2013

Preliminary injunction; requisites. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court lists the grounds for the issuance of a

writ of preliminary injunction:

Sec.3. Grounds for the issuance of preliminary injunction. – A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is

established:

(a) that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists un

restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an

act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) that the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the

litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c) that a party, court, agency, or a person doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or

suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the right of the applicant respecting the subject of

the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual

As such, a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an existing legal right to be

protected during the pendency of the principal action. The requisites of a valid injunction are the existence of a

right and its actual or threatened violations. Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected

and the violation against that right must be shown. TML Gasket Industries, Inc. v. BPI Family Savings Bank,

Inc., G.R. No. 188768. January 7, 2013

Res judicata; conclusiveness of judgment. A perusal of the allegations in the present case evidently shows that

the petitioner broaches the issues similarly raised and already resolved in G.R. No. 172942.

Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined

by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the

court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them.

Stated differently, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question already

settled in a previous case.

The adjudication in G.R. No. 172942 has become binding and conclusive on the petitioner who can no longer

question the respondent‘s entitlement to the 12% legal interest awarded by the CA. The Court‘s determination in

G.R. No. 172942 on the reckoning point of the 12% legal interest is likewise binding on the petitioner who cannot

re-litigate the said matter anew through the present recourse.











Thus, the judgment in G.R. No. 172942 bars the present case as the relief sought in the latter is inextricably

related to the ruling in the former. City of Cebu v. Apolonio M. Dedamo, Jr.; G.R. No. 172852. January 30, 2013

Res judicata; elements. In Heirs of Maximino Derla v. Heirs of Catalina Derla Vda. de Hipolito, we enumerated the

following as the elements of res judicata:

a) The former judgment or order must be final;

b) It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or

stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case;

c) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and

d) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of

action. This requisite is satisfied if the two (2) actions are substantially between the same parties.

In the case at bar, the validity of the subject mortgage between PALI and PNB was the primary issue raised by

the parties and resolved by the RTC after the conclusion of a full -blown trial. On September 10, 2004, the issue

was finally laid to rest. A final and executory judgment, no matter how erroneous, cannot be changed even by

this Court. Inevitably, res judicata operates to bar PALI and PNB from raising the same issue lest there will be no

end to litigation. Philippine National Bank, substituted by Tranche 1 (SPV-AMC), Inc. v. Rina Parayno Lim and

Puerto Azul Land, Inc., G.R. No. 171677. January 30, 2013

Res judicata; effect of minute resolutions. In Alonso, we declared that a ―minute resolution may amount to a final

action on the case but it is not a precedent.‖ However, we continued to state that ―it can not bind non-parties to

the action.‖ Corollary thereto, we can conclude that a minute resolution, while not a precedent relative to

strangers to an action, nonetheless binds the parties therein, and calls for res judicata‘s application.

Nationwide Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Valderama is instructive anent the effects of the issuance of a

minute resolution, viz:

It is true that, although contained in a minute resolution, our dismissal of the petition was a disposition of the

merits of the case. When we dismissed the petition, we effectively affirmed the CA ruling being questioned. As a

result, our ruling in that case has already become final. x x x

With respect to the same subject matter and the same issues concerning the same parties, it constitutes res judicata. However, if other parties or another subject matter (even with the same parties and issues) is involved,

the minute resolution is not binding precedent. x x x (Underlining ours)

It is therefore clear from the above that for purposes of the application of res judicata, minute resolutions issued

by this Court are as much precedents as promulgated decisions, hence, binding upon the parties to the

action Philippine National Bank, substituted by Tranche 1 (SPV-AMC), Inc. v. Rina Parayno Lim and Puerto Azul

Land, Inc., G.R. No. 171677. January 30, 2013















Special Civil Action for Certiorari (Rule 65); nature; distinction between excess of jurisdiction, acts without

jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. A certiorari proceeding is limited in scope and narrow in character. The

special civil action for certiorari lies only to correct acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or

with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or

mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any

alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of

judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, and not a petition

for certiorari.

In a petition for certiorari, the public respondent acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to

determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being clothed with the power to

determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law. There is grave abuse of discretion where the

public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as

to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.

Excess of jurisdiction, as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means that an act, though within the general

power of a tribunal, board or officer is not authorized, and invalid with respect to the particular proceeding,

because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it are wanting. The

supervisory jurisdiction of the court to issue a certiorari writ cannot be exercised in order to review the judgment

of the lower court as to intrinsic correctness, either upon the law or the facts of the case. In the absence of a

showing that there is a reason for the court to annul the decision of the concerned tribunal or to substitute its

own judgment, it is not the office of the Court in a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the

assailed decision or resolution. Winston F. Garcia, in his capacity as President and General Manager of theGSIS v. Court of Appeals and Rudy C. Tesoro , G.R. No. 169005. January 28, 2013

Special Civil Action for Certiorari (Rule 65); nature; an extraordinary remedy; judicial and quasi-judicial functions.

The decision on whether or not to accept a petition for certiorari as well as to grant due course thereto, is

addressed to the sound discretion of the court. A petition for certiorari being an extraordinary remedy, the party

seeking to avail of the same must strictly observe the procedural rules laid down by law, and non-observance

thereof may not be brushed aside as mere technicality.

As provided in Section 1, Rule 65, a writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-

judicial functions. Judicial functions are exercised by a body or officer clothed with authority to determine what

the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with respect to the matter in controversy. Quasi-judicial

function is a term that applies to the action or discretion of public administrative officers or bodies given the

authority to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them

as a basis for their official action using discretion of a judicial nature.

The Central Bank Monetary Board (now BSP-MB) was created to perform executive functions with respect to the

establishment, operation or liquidation of banking and credit institutions, and branches and agencies thereof. It

does not perform judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Certainly, the issuance of CB Circular No. 905 was done in







the exercise of an executive function. Certiorari will not lie in the instant case. Advocates for Truth in Lending,

Inc. & Eduardo B. Olaguer v. Bangko Sentral Monetary Board, Represented by its Chairman, Governor Armando

M. Tetangco, Jr., etc., G.R. No. 192986. January 15, 2013

Special Civil Action for Certiorari (Rule 65); requisites; burden of proof For a special civil action of certiorari to

prosper, therefore, the following requisites must concur, namely: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, board

or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) the tribunal, board or officer, must have acted without

or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c)

there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The burden of

proof lies on petitioners to demonstrate that the assailed order was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or

with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Spouses Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia

Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales of the Department of Justice, G.R. No. 188056. January 8, 2013

Special Civil Action for Certiorari (Rule 65); when available. The writ of certiorari is available only when any

tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his

jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal,

nor any plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. ―The sole office of the writ of

certiorari,‖ according to Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:

xxx is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance

of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power

was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the

respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to

act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial

powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Spouses Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales of the Department of

Justice, G.R. No. 188056. January 8, 2013

Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 64; proper mode of review of COMELEC en banc Resolutions not

relating to pre-proclamation controversies. Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution in part substantially

provides that any decision, order or ruling of any of the Constitutional Commissions may be brought for review to

the Supreme Court on certiorari within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. The orders, ruling and decisions

rendered or issued by the COMELEC en banc must be final and made in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-

judicial power. Further, Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states that it shall govern the review of final

judgments and orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.

In the case at bar, the now assailed Resolutions dated December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010 were issued with

finality by the COMELEC en banc. Under the Constitution and the Rules of Court, the said Resolutions can be

reviewed by way of filing before us a petition for certiorari. Besides, the issues raised do not at all relate to

alleged irregularities in the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or

to the composition and the proceedings of the board of canvassers. What the instant petition challenges is the















authority of the MBOC to suspend Ibrahim‘s proclamation and of the COMELEC en banc to issue the assailed

resolutions. The crux of the instant Petition does not qualify as one which can be raised as a pre-proclamation

controversy.Kamarudin K. Ibrahim v. Commission on Elections and Rolan G. Buagas, G.R. No.192289. January 8,

2013

Special Civil Action for Mandamus; exhaustion of administrative remedies. It is axiomatic, to begin with, that a

party who seeks the intervention of a court of law upon an administrative concern should first avail himself of all

the remedies afforded by administrative processes. The issues that an administrative agency is authorized to

decide should not be summarily taken away from it and submitted to a court of law without first giving the

agency the opportunity to dispose of the issues upon due deliberation. The court of law must allow the

administrative agency to carry out its functions and discharge its responsibilities within the specialized areas of its

competence. This rests on the theory that the administrative authority is in a better position to resolve questions

addressed to its particular expertise, and that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be

rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so. Special People, Inc. Foundation, represented by its

Chairman, Roberto P. Cericos v. Nestor M. Canda, et al., G.R. No. 160932. January 14, 2013

Special Civil Action for Mandamus; nature; when available. Similarly, the petition could not be one for mandamus ,

which is a remedy available only when ―any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the

performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or

unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and

there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby

may file a verified petition in the proper court.‖ The main objective of mandamus is to compel the performance of

a ministerial duty on the part of the respondent. Plainly enough, the writ of mandamus does not issue to control

or review the exercise of discretion or to compel a course of conduct, which, it quickly seems to us, was what

petitioners would have the Secretary of Justice do in their favor. Consequently, their petition has not indicated

how and where the Secretary of Justice‘s assailed issuances excluded them from the use and enjoyment of a

right or office to which they were unquestionably entitled. Spouses Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia Dacudao v.

Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales of the Department of Justice, G.R. No. 188056. January 8, 2013

Special Civil Action for Mandamus; nature; compels performance of ministerial duties. A key principle to be

observed in dealing with petitions for mandamus is that such extraordinary remedy lies to compel the

performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary. A purely ministerial

act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in

obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment upon the

propriety or impropriety of the act done. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the

exercise of official discretion or judgment. Special People, Inc. Foundation, represented by its Chairman, Roberti

P. Cericos v. Nestor M. Canda, et al., G.R. No. 160932. January 14, 2013

Unlawful detainer; nature. Going to the main issue in the instant petition, it is settled that in unlawful detainer,

one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession

under any contract, express or implied. In such case, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by

the expiration or termination of the right to possess; hence the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such





















action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiff‘s cause of action is the termination of the

defendant‘s right to continue in possession. Juanita Ermitaño, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Isabelo

Ermitaño v. Lailanie M. Paglas , G.R. No. 174436. January 23, 2013

Unlawful detainer; failure to pay rentals and expiration of lease as grounds. We find that the RTC‘s ruling

upholding the ejectment of Hertz from the building premises was proper. First, respondent failed to pay rental

arrearages and utility bills to Optima; and second, the Contract of lease expired without any request from Hertz

for a renegotiation thereof at least 90 days prior to its expiration.Optima Realty Corporation v. Hertz Phil.


Unlawful detainer; award of monthly compensation and attorney‘s fees. As to the award of monthly

compensation, we find that Hertz should pay adequate compensation to Optima, since the former continued to

occupy the leased premises even after the expiration of the lease contract.

Finally we uphold the award of attorney‘s fees in the amount of P30, 000 and judicial costs in the light of Hertz

unjustifiable and unlawful retention of the leased premises, thus forcing Optima to file the instant case in order to

protect its rights and interest. Optima Realty Corporation v. Hertz Phil. Exclusive Cars, Inc., G.R. No. 183035.

January 9, 2013

Special Proceedings

Settlement of Estate; claims include quasi-contract and contingent claims; In Maclan v. Garcia,Maclan filed a civil

case to recover from Ruben Garcia the necessary expenses he spent as possessor of a piece of land. Garcia

acquired the land as an heir of its previous owner, he set up the defense that this claim should have been filed in

the special proceedings to settle the estate of his predecessor. Maclan, on the other hand, contended that his

claim arises from law and not from contract, express or implied. Thus, it need not be filed in the settlement of theestate of Garcia‘s predecessor, as mandated by Section 5, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (now Section 5, Rule 86).

The court held under these facts that a claim for necessary expenses spent as previous possessor of the land is a

kind of quasi-contract. Citing Leung Ben v O‘Brien, it explained that the term ―implied contracts,‖ as used in our

remedial law, originated from the common law where obligations derived from quasi-contracts and from law are

both considered as implied contracts. Thus, the term quasi-contract is included in the concept ―implied contracts‖

as used in the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the liabilities of the deceased arising from quasi-contracts should be

filed as claims in the settlement of his estate, as provided in Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.

A distinctive character of Metrobank‘s fourth-party complaint is its contingent nature – the claim depends on the

possibility that Metrobank would be adjudged liable to AMC, a future event that may or may not happen. This

characteristic unmistakably marks the complaint as a contingent one that must be included in the claims falling

under the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Absolute

Management Corporation, G.R. No. 170498. January 9, 2013

Settlement of Estate; specific rules on settlement prevail over general rules. We read with approval the CA‘s use

of statutory construction principle of lex specialis derogate generali, leading to the conclusion that the specific

provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court should prevail over the general provisions of Section 11,





















Rule 6 of the Rules of Court; the settlement of the estate of deceased persons (where claims against the

deceased should be filed) is primarily governed by the rules on special proceedings, while the rules provided for

ordinary claims, including Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, merely apply suppletorily. Metropolitan Bank &

Trust Company v. Absolute Management Corporation, G.R. No. 170498. January 9, 2013

Other Proceedings

Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) jurisdiction; requisites. Based on Section 4 of E.O. No. 1008,

in order for the CIAC to acquire jurisdiction, two requisites must concur: ―first, the dispute must somehow be

related to a construction contract; and second, the parties must have agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration

proceedings.‖ The Manila Insurance Company, Inc. v. Spouses Roberto and Aida Amurao, G.R. No. 179628.

January 16, 2013

Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) jurisdiction; monetary claims under a construction

contract. In William Golangco Construction Corporation v. Ray Burton Development Corporation, we declared that

monetary claims under a construction contract are disputes arising from ―differences in interpretation of the

contract‖ because the ―matter of ascertaining the duties and obligations of the parties under their contract all

involve interpretation of the provisions of the contract. Following our reasoning in that case, we find that the

issue of whether respondent-spouses are entitled to collect on the performance bond issued by petitioner is a

―dispute arising in the course of the execution and performance of [the CCA] by reason of difference in the

interpretation of the contract documents.‖ The Manila Insurance Company, Inc. v. Spouses Roberto and Aida

Amurao, G.R. No. 179628. January 16, 2013

Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) jurisdiction; performance bond. A careful reading of the

Performance Bond reveals that the ―bond is coterminous with the final acceptance of the project.‖ Thus, the factthat it was issued prior to the execution of the Construction Contract Agreement does not affect its validity or

effectivity.

In fact, in Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. v. Anscor Land, Inc., we rejected the argument that the

jurisdiction of CIAC is limited to the construction industry, and thus cannot be extended to surety contracts. In

that case, we declared that ―although not the construction contract itself, the performance bond is deemed as an

associate of the main construction contract that it cannot be separated or severed from its principal. The

Performance Bond is significantly and substantially connected to the construction contract that there can be no

doubt it is the CIAC which has jurisdiction over any dispute arising from or connected with it.‖ The Manila

Insurance Company, Inc. v. Spouses Roberto and Aida Amurao, G.R. No. 179628. January 16, 2013

Election Cases; review extends only to final decisions or resolutions of COMELEC en banc and not to interlocutory

orders issued by a division. The petitioners‘ resort to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to assail and

interlocutory order issued by the COMELEC First Division is amiss. ―A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order

issued by a Division of the COMELEC in an election protest may not directly assail the ordr in this Court through a

special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal of

the decision of the Division in due course.

x x x





















Thus, exceptionally, this Court may take cognizance of a certiorari action directed against an interlocutory order

issued by a Division of the COMELEC when the following circumstances are present: first, the order was issued

without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of

jurisdiction; and second, under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the subject of the controversy is a matter which

(1) the COMELEC en banc may not sit and consider or (2) a Division is not authorized to act or (3) the members

of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Governor Sadikul A. Sahali and Vice-Governor

Ruby M. Sahali v. Commission on Elections (First Division), Rashidin H. Matba and Jilkasi J. Usman, G.R. No.

201796. January 15, 2013

Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act; prospective application of the law. Sec. 146 of the FRIA, which makes

it applicable to ―all further proceedings in insolvency, suspension of payments and rehabilitation cases xxx except

to the extent that in the opinion of the court, their application would not be feasible or would work injustice,‖ still

presupposes a prospective application. The wording of the law clearly shows that it is applicable to all further

proceedings. In no way could it be made retrospectively applicable to the Stay Order issued by the rehabilitation

court back in 2002. Situs Dev. Corporation, et al., v. Asiatrust Bank, et al., G.R. No. 180036. January 16, 2013

HLURB; jurisdiction; annulment of mortgage; ruling of HLURB affects only the lot subject of the buyer‘s

complaint. The jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade is broad enough to include jurisdiction

over complaints for annulment of mortgage. This is pursuant to the intent of P.D. No. 957 to protect hapless

buyers from the unjust practices of unscrupulous developers which may constitute mortgages over condominium

projects sans the knowledge of the former and the consent of the HLURB.

In Far East Bank, we held that:

Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void. Hence, the mortgage overthe lot is null and void insofar as private respondent is concerned.

The remedy granted by the HLURB and sustained by the Office of the President is proper only insofar as it refers

to the lot of respondent. In short, the mortgage contract is void as against him. Since there is no law stating the

specifics of what should be done under the circumstances, that which is in accord with equity should be ordered.

The remedy granted by the HLURB in the first and the second paragraphs of the dispositive portion of its Decision

insofar as it referred to respondent‘s lot is in accord with equity.

The HLURB, however, went overboard in its disposition in paragraphs 3 and 4, which pertained not only to the lot

but to the entire parcel of land mortgaged. Such ruling was improper. The subject of this litigation is limited only

to the lot that respondent is buying, not to the entire parcel of land. He has no personality or standing to bring

suit on the whole property, as he has actionable interest over the subject lot only. (Citations omitted and

underlining ours)

In Far East Bank, we sustained the HLURB when it declared the mortgage entered into between the subdivision

developer and the bank as unenforceable against the lot buyer. However, we were categorical that the HLURB

acted beyond bounds when it nullified the mortgage covering the entire parcel of land, of which the lot subject of

the buyer‘s complaint is merely a part.













In the case now before us, while it is within Lim‘s right to file a complaint before the HLURB to protect her right

as a condominium unit buyer, she has no standing to seek for the complete nullification of the subject mortgage.

She has an actionable interest only over Unit 48C of Cluster Dominiko of Vista de Loro, no more and no

less. Philippine National Bank, substituted by Tranche 1 (SPV-AMC), Inc. v. Rina Parayno Lim and Puerto Azul

Land, Inc., G.R. No. 171677. January 30, 2013

HLURB; jurisdiction; annulment of mortgages of condominium or subdivision units. Section 1 of PD No. 957 l imits

the HLURB‘s jurisdiction to three kinds of cases: (a) unsound real estate business practices; (b) claims involving

refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against the project owner,

developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and (c) cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory

obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker

or salesman. While paragraphs (b) and (c) limit the HLURB cases to those between the buyer and the subdivision

or condominium owner, developer, dealer, broker, or salesman, (a) is broad enough to include third parties to the

sales contract.

Jurisprudence consistently recognizes the rationale behind the enactment of PD No. 957 – to protect innocent lot

buyers from scheming developers. For this reason, the Court has broadly construed the jurisdiction of the HLURB

to include complaints for annulment of mortgages of condominium or subdivision units. Indeed, in Manila Banking

Corporation v. Spouses Rabina , even if the mortgagee bank was under receivership/liquidation, the Court

declared that the HLURB retains jurisdiction over an action for the annulment of the mortgage:

The jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade is broad enough to include jurisdiction over

complaints for annulment of mortgage. To disassociate the issue of nullity of mortgage and lodge it separately

with the liquidation court would only cause inconvenience to the parties and would not serve the ends of speedyand inexpensive administration of justice as mandated by the laws vesting quasi-judicial powers in the

agency. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Pridisons Realty Corporation, Antonio Gonzales, Bormacheco, Inc.,

Nazario Santos, Teresita Chua Tek, Charito Ong Lee, and Ernesto Sibal, G.R. No. 155113. January 9, 2013

Intra-corporate disputes; elements. Thus, to be considered as an intra-corporate dispute, the case: (a) must arise

out of intra-corporate or partnership relations; and (b) the nature of the question subject of the controversy must

be such that it is intrinsically connected with the regulation of the corporation or the enforcement of the parties‘

rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal rules of the corporation. So long as these two

criteria are satisfied, the dispute is intra-corporate and the RTC, acting as a special commercial court, has

jurisdiction over it. Vitaliano Aguirre II and Fidel Aguirre v. FQB+7, Inc., Nathaniel Bocobo, Priscila Bocobo, and

Antonio De Villa, G.R. No. 170770. January 9, 2013

Intra-corporate disputes; application to dissolved corporations. It bears reiterating that Section 145 of the

Corporation Code protects, among others, the rights and remedies of corporate actors against other corporate

actors. The statutory provision assures an aggrieved party that the corporation‘s dissolution will not impair, much

less remove, his/her rights or remedies against the corporation, its stockholders, directors and officers. It also

states that corporate dissolution will not extinguish any liability already incurred by the corporation, its

stockholders, directors or officers. In short, Section 145 preserves a corporate actor‘s cause of action and remedy















against another corporate actor. In so doing, Section 145 also preserves the nature of the controversy between

the parties as an intra-corporate dispute.

The dissolution of the corporation simply prohibits it from continuing its business. However, despite such

dissolution, the parties involved in the litigation are still corporate actors. The dissolution does not automatically

convert the parties into total strangers or change their intra-corporate relationships. Neither does it change or

terminate existing causes of action, which arose because of the corporate ties between the parties. Thus, a cause

of action involving an intra-corporate controversy remains and must be filed as an intra-corporate dispute despite

the subsequent dissolution of the corporation. Vitaliano Aguirre II and Fidel Aguirre v. FQB+7, Inc., Nathaniel

Bocobo, Priscila Bocobo, and Antonio De Villa, G.R. No. 170770. January 9, 2013

Just compensation; compromise agreement. There is no question that the foregoing Agreement was a

compromise that the parties freely and voluntarily entered into for the purpose of finally settling their dispute in

this case. Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, a compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making

reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Accordingly, a compromise is

either judicial, if the objective is to put an end to a pending litigation, or extrajudicial, if the objective is to avoid a

litigation. As a contract, a compromise is perfected by mutual consent. However, a judicial compromise, while

immediately binding between the parties upon its execution, is not executory until it is approved by the court and

reduced to a judgment. The validity of a compromise is dependent upon its compliance with the requisites and

principles of contracts dictated by law. Also, the terms and conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to

law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order.Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Spouses Jorja

Rigor Soriano and Magin Soriano , G.R. No. 178312. January 30, 2013

Evidence

Evidence; conclusive presumptions; estoppel against tenants. The conclusive presumption found in Section 2 (b),

Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, known as estoppel against tenants, provides as follows:

Sec. 2.Conclusive presumptions. – The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:

x x x x

(b) the tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation

of landlord and tenant between them. (Emphasis supplied)

It is clear from the above-quoted provision that what a tenant is estopped from denying is the title of his landlord

at the time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation. If the title asserted is one that is alleged to

have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation, the presumption will not apply. Hence,

the tenant may show that the landlord‘ s title has expired or been conveyed to another or himself; and he is not

estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he has been ousted or evicted by title paramount. In the present case, what

respondent is claiming is her supposed title to the subject property which she acquired subsequent to the

commencement of the landlord-tenant relation between her and petitioner. Hence, the presumption under











Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court does not apply. Juanita Ermitaño, represented by her Attorney-in-

fact, Isabelo Ermitaño vs. Lailanie M. Paglas ; G.R. No. 174436. January 23, 2013

Evidence; disputable presumptions; presumption of regularity. The court is inclined to give more evidentiary

weight to the certification of the zoning administrator being the officer having jurisdiction over the area where the

land in question is situated and is, therefore, more familiar with the property in issue. Besides, this certification

carried the presumption of regularity in its issuance and respondents have the burden of overcoming this

presumption. Respondents, however, failed to present any evidence to rebut that presumption. Heirs of Luis A.

Luna, et al. v . Ruben S. Afable, et al.; G.R. No. 188299. January 23, 2013.

February 2013 Philippines Supreme Court Decisions on Remedial Law

Civil Procedure

Actions; cause of action; elements; failure to state a cause of action is ground for dismissal. A complaint states a

cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements of a cause of action, namely:

(a) The legal right of the plaintiff;

(b) The correlative obligation of the defendant and

(c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.

If the allegations in the complaint do not aver the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes

vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of. A perusal of the Amended

Complaint in the present case would show that there is, indeed, no allegation of any act or omission on the part

of respondents which supposedly violated the legal rights of petitioners. Thus, the CA is correct in dismissing the

complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Padilla Mercado, Zulueta Mercado, et al. v. Spouses

Aguedo Espina and Lourdes Espina ; G.R. No. 173987. February 25, 2013

Actions; moot and academic principle. Verily, in Gancho-on v. Secreatry of Labor and Employment, the Court

emphatically stated that:

It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will

not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And

where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon

would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled

and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.

Applying the above pronouncement, there was no justiciable controversy anymore in the instant petition in view

of the expiration of the Compromise Agreement sought to be enforced. There was no longer any purpose in

determining whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the RTC Orders dated October 31, 2001 and April 10,

2002 since any declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. By the very admission of PLDT, it can







http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/february2013/173987.pdf








no longer be compelled to undo its act of blocking the telecommunication calls and data from the Philippines to

Hong Kong passing through the REACH-ETPI circuits since, effectively, there were no more circuits to speak of.

Clearly, any decision of this Court on the present petition, whether it be an affirmance or a reversal of the

Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, would be equivalent in effect to an affirmance or an invalidation of

the challenged Orders of the RTC. But as can be gleaned from the above discussion, and as succinctly put by

PLDT in its Memorandum, there is nothing more for the RTC to enforce and/or act upon. As such, any discussion

on the matter would be a mere surplusage.Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. v. Eastern Telecom

Philippines; G.R. No. 163037. February 6, 2013

Actions; moot and academic principle; nature and exceptions. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to

present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no

practical use or value. Although the controversy could have ceased due to the intervening appointment of and

assumption by Cadiz as the Solicitor General during the pendency of this suit, and such cessation of the

controversy seemingly rendered moot and academic the resolution of the issue of the constitutionality of the

concurrent holding of the two positions by Agra, the Court should still go forwards and resolve the issue and not

abstain from exercising its power of judicial review because this case comes under several of the well-recognized

exceptions obtained, namely: (1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a situation

of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the constitutional issue raised required the

formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; (4) the case was capable of

repetition, yet evading review.

It is the same here. The constitutionality of the concurrent holding by Agra of the two positions in the Cabinet,

albeit in acting capacities, was as issue that comes under all the recognized exceptions. The issue involves aprobable violation of the Constitution, and relates to a situation of exceptional character and of paramount public

interest by reason of its transcendental importance to the people. The resolution of the issue will also be of the

greatest value to the Bench and the Bar in view of the broad powers wielded through said positions. The situation

further calls for the review because the situation is capable of repetition, yet evading review. In other words,

many important and practical benefits are still to be gained were the Court to proceed the ultimate resolution of

the constitutional issue posed. Dennis A.B. Funa v. Acting Secretary of Justice Alberto C. Agra, etc., et al.; G.R.

No. 191644. February 19, 2013

Actions; separate trials; exception to the general rule; rationale. The rule on separate trials in civil actions is

found in Section 2, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

Section 2. Separate trials. – The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate

trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number

of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues.

The text of the rule grants to the trial court the discretion to determine if a separate trial of any claim, cross-

claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims,













counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues should be held, provided that the exercise of such discretion is in

furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice to any party.

The rule is almost identical with Rule 42(b) of the United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules), a

provision that governs separate trials in the United States Federal Courts (US Federal Courts), x x x.

The US Federal Courts have applied Rule 42(b) by using several principles and parameters whose application in

this jurisdiction may be warranted because our rule on separate trials has been patterned after the original

version of Rule 42(b). There is no obstacle to adopting such principles and parameters as guides in the

application of our own rule on separate trials. This is because, generally speaking, the Court has randomly

accepted the practices in the US Courts in the elucidation and application of our own rules of procedure that have

themselves originated form or been inspired by the practice and procedure in the Federal Courts and the various

US State Courts.

x x x

Bearing in mind the foregoing principles and parameters defined by the relevant US case law, we conclude that

the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of its discretion in ordering a separate trial as to Asian Bank

(Metrobank) on the ground that the issue against Asian Bank was distinct and separate from that against the

original defendants. Thereby, the Sandiganbayan veered away from the general rule of having all the issues in

every case tried at one time, unreasonably shunting aside the dictum in Corrigan, supra, that a ―single trial will

generally lessen the delay, expense, and inconvenience to the parties and the courts.‖

Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when there are extraordinary grounds for conducting separate

trials on different issues raised in the same case, or when separate trials of the issues will avoid prejudice, or

when separate trials of the issues will further convenience, or when separate trials of the issues will promote

justice, or when separate trials of the issues will give a fair trial to all parties. Otherwise, the general rule must

apply. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, as successor-in-interest of Asian Bank Corporation v. Hon. Edilberto

G. Sandoval, et al.; G.R. No. 169677. February 18, 2013

Appeals; issues raised for first time on appeal and not raised in proceedings in lower court are barred by

estoppel. As to the first issue, there is no dispute that the issue of timeliness of respondents‘ Motion to Dismisspetitioners‘ Amended Complaint was not raised by petitioners before the RTC. Neither was this issue raised in

their Comment to respondents‘ petition forcertiorari filed with the CA. It was only in their Motion for

Reconsideration of the CA Decision that this matter was raised. It is well established that issues raised for the first

time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law,

theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a

reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Basic considerations of due process impel







the adoption of this rule. Padilla Mercado, Zulueta Mercado, et al. v. Spouses Aguedo Espina and Lourdes

Espina; G.R. No. 173987. February 25, 2013

Contempt; distinction between criminal and civil contempt. In People v. Godoy, this Court made a distinction

between criminal and civil contempt. The Court declared:

A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or judge acting

judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or

disrespect. On the other hand, civil contempt consists in failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in

a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose

behalf the violated order is made.

A criminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of the court, is an offense against organized

society and, in addition, is also held to be an offense against public justice which raises an issue between the

public and the accused, and the proceedings to punish it are punitive. On the other hand, the proceedings to

punish a civil contempt are remedial and for the purpose of the preservation of the right of private persons. It has

been held that civil contempt is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor, but a power of the court.

It has further been stated that intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and that no one can be

punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it cleat that he intended to commit it. On the

contrary, there is authority indicating that since the purpose of civil contempt proceedings is remedial, the

defendant‘s intent in committing the contempt is immaterial. Hence, good faith or the absence of intent to violate

the court‘s order is not a defense in civil contempt.Philip Sigrid A. Fortun v. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas, et

al.; G.R. No. 194578. February 13, 2013 Contempt; contempt akin to libel and principle of privileged communication may be invoked in contempt

proceeding. In People v. Castelo, the Court ruled that contempt is akin to libel and that the principle of privileged

communication may be invoked in a contempt proceeding. The Court ruled:

While the present case involves an incident of contempt the same is akin to a case of libel for both constitute

limitations upon freedom of the press or freedom of expression guaranteed by our Constitution. So what is

considered a privilege in one may likewise be considered in the other. The same safeguard should be extended to

one whether anchored in freedom of the press or freedom of expression. Therefore, this principle regarding

privileged communications can also be invoked in favor of the appellant.

Philip Sigrid A. Fortun v. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas, et al.; G.R. No. 194578. February 13, 2013

Execution; execution pending appeal; not a bar the continuance of the appeal on the merits. First of all, as held

in Legaspi v. Ong, ―[e]xecution pending appeal does not bar the continuance of the appeal on the merits, for the

Rules of Court precisely provides for restitution according to equity in case the executed judgment is reversed on

appeal. O. Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation v. Adelina S. Tan and Sheriff Reynante G. Velasquez, Presiding

Judge; G.R. No. 180325. February 20, 2013



















Execution; execution of RTC judgment does not automatically mean that issues on appeal have become moot and

academic; Moot and academic principle. Moreover, even assuming that the writ of execution in the instant case

were not void, the execution of the RTC judgment cannot be considered as a supervening event that would

automatically moot the issues in the appealed case for accion publiciana, which is pending before the CA.

otherwise, there would be no use appealing a judgment, once a writ of execution is issued and satisfied. That

situation would be absurd. On the contrary, the Rules of Court in fact provides for cases of reversal or annulment

of an executed judgment. Section 5 of Rule 39 provides that in those cases, there should be restitution or

reparation as warranted by justice and equity. Therefore, barring any supervening event, there is still the

possibility of the appellate court‘s reversal of the appealed decision – even if already executed – and,

consequently, of a restitution or a reparation.

In any case, the issues in the appealed case for accion publiciana cannot, in any way, be characterized as moot

and academic. In Osmena III v. Social Security System of the Philippines, we defined a moot and academic case

or issue as follows:

A case or issue is considered not and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue

of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or adeclaration on the issue would be of no

practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would

be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction

over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness – save when, among others, a compelling constitutional

issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; or when

the case is capable of repetition yet evading judicial review.

Applying the above definition to the instant case, it is obvious that there remains an unresolved justiciable

controversy in the appealed case for accion publiciana. In particular, did respondent-spouses Oria really encroach

on the land of the petitioner? If they did, does he have the right to recover possession of the property?

Furthermore, without preempting the disposition of the case for accion publiciana pending before the CA, we note

that if the respondents built structures on the subject land, and if they were builders in good faith they would be

entitled to appropriate rights under the Civil Code. This Court merely points out that there are still issues that the

CA needs to resolve in the appealed case before it. Macario Diaz Carpio v. Court of Appeals, spouses Gelacio G.

Gloria and Marcelina Pre Oria; G.R. No. 183102. February 27, 2013

Execution; effects of void writ of execution; requirement of good reason in execution pending appeal. In any

case, proceed to rule that because the writ of execution was void, all actions and proceedings conducted

pursuant to it were also void and of no legal effect. To recall, this Court affirmed the Decision of the CA in CA-

G.R. SP No. 84632, annulling the RTC‘s Omnibus Order granting the Motion for Immediate Execution pending

appeal. We affirmed the CA Decision because of the RTC‘s failure to state any reason, much less good reason, for

the issuance thereof as required under Section 2, Rule 39. In the exercise by the trial court of its discretionary

power to issue a writ of execution pending appeal, we emphasize the need for strict compliance with the







requirement for the statement of good reason, because execution pending appeal is the exception rather than the

rule.

Since the writ of execution was manifestly void for having been issued without compliance with the rules, it is

without any legal effect. In other words, it is as if no writ was issued at all. Consequently, all actions taken

pursuant to the void writ of execution must be deemed to have not been taken and to have had no effect.

Otherwise, the Court would be sanctioning a violation of the right of due process of the judgment debtors –

respondent-spouses herein. Macario Diaz Carpio v. Court of Appeals, spouses Gelacio G. Gloria and Marcelina Pre

Oria; G.R. No. 183102. February 27, 2013

Hierarchy of courts; exceptions. Second, while the principle of hierarchy of courts does indeed require that

recourse should be made to the lower courts before they are made to the higher courts, this principle is not an

absolute rule and admits of certain exceptions under well-defined circumstances. In several cases, we have

allowed direct invocation of this Court‘s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari on the ground of special

and important reasons clearly stated in the petition; when dictated by public welfare and the advancement of

public policy; when demanded by the broader interest of justice; when the challenged orders were patent

nullities; or when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified our immediate and

direct handling of the case. Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Ramon S. Caguioa, etc., et al.; G.R. No. 174385.

February 20, 2013

Judgments; immutability of judgments. The issue on the nullity of Maniego‘s title had already been foreclosed

when this Court denied Maniego‘s petition for review in the Resolution dated 13 July 2011, which became final

and executory on 19 January 2012. It is settled that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and

unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous

conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the

land. This is without prejudice, however, to the right of Maniego to recover from Poblete what he paid to

Kapantay for the account of Poblete, otherwise there will be unjust enrichment by Poblete. Land Bank of the

Philippines v. Barbara Sampaga Poblete; G.R. No. 196577. February 25, 2013

Judgments; pro hac vice; nature. Petitioners point out that this Court has had occasion to grant a motion for new

trial after the judgment of conviction had become final and executory. In People v. Licayan, all the accused were

convicted of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to death by the trial court. More than two years

after their conviction became final and executory, the accused Lara and Licayan filed an Urgent Motion to Re-

Open the Case with Leave of Court. They attached thereto the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by two of their co-

accused in the case, to the effect that Lara and Licayan had not participated in the commission of the crime.

Since the OSG also recommended the opening of the case, this Court remanded the case to the trial court for the

reception of newly discovered evidence.

It is worth pointing that the motion in Licayan was granted pro hac vice, which is a Latin term used by courts to

refer to rulings rendered ―for this one particular occasion.‖ A ruling expressly qualified as such cannot be relied

upon as a precedent to govern other cases. Reynante Tadeja, et al. v. People of the Philippines; G.R. No. 145336

February 20, 2013























Judgments; void judgment; nature and effect; may be resisted in any action or proceeding. A void judgment or

order has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-

existent. Such judgment or order may be resisted in any action or proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not

even necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment or final order; it may simply be ignored.

x x x

Accordingly, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor of any obligation. All

acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become

final, and any writ of execution based on it is void: ―x x x it may be said to be a lawless thing which can be

treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head.‖ Land Bank of the Philippines v.

Spouses Placido and Clara Dy Orilla; G.R. No. 194168. February 13, 2013

Liberal construction of the rules. In many instances, the Court adopted a policy of liberally construing its rules in

order to promote a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. The rules can be

suspended on the following grounds: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (2) the existence of special or

compelling circumstances, (3) the merits of the case, (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or

negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought

is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. Secretary Leila M.

De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R.

No. 204528. February 19, 2013

Motions; notice and hearing requirements; effect of non-compliance; notice requirement in the issuance of

preliminary injunction. A motion for intervention, like any other motion, has to comply with the mandatory

requirements of notice and hearing, as well as proof of its service, save only for those that the courts can actupon without prejudice to the rights of the other parties. A motion which fails to comply with these requirements

is a worthless piece of paper that cannot and should not be acted upon.

x x x

The notice requirement is even more mandatory when the movant asks for the issuance of a preliminary

injunction and/or a TRO. Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, no preliminary injunction shall be

granted without a hearing and without prior notice to the party sought to be enjoined, the prior notice under this

requirement is as important as the hearing, as no hearing can meaningfully take place, with both parties present

or represented, unless a prior notice of the hearing is given. Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Ramon S.

Caguioa, etc., et al.; G.R. No. 174385. February 20, 2013

Motions; motion to dismiss; defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer

are deemed waived; exceptions. Under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not

pleaded in the answer are deemed waived, with the following exceptions: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject

matter; (2) litis pendentia; (3) res judicata; and (4) prescription of the action. Clearly, petitioner cannot change

its defense after the termination of the period of testimony and after the exhibits of both parties have already

been admitted by the court. The non-inclusion of this belated defense in the pre-trial order barred its

















consideration during the trial. To rule otherwise would put the adverse party at a disadvantage since he could no

longer offer evidence to rebut the new theory. Indeed, parties are bound by the delimitation of issues during the

pre-trial. Licomcen, Inc. v. Engr. Salvador Abainza, etc.; G.R. No. 199781. February 18, 2013

New trial; newly-discovered evidence; requisites. Petitioners premise their motion for a new trial on the ground of

newly-discovered evidence, i.e. Plaridel‘s extrajudicial confession, executed with the assistance of Atty. Cirilo

Tejoso, Jr., and the spot report of the police on Plaridel‘s apprehension.

Newly discovered evidence refers to that which (a) is discovered after trial; (b) could not have been discovered

and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) is material, not merely cumulative,

corroborative or impeaching; and (d) is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted.

The most important requisite is that the evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even

with reasonable diligence; hence, the term ―newly-discovered.‖ The confession of Plaridel does not meet this

requisite. He participated in the trial before the RTC and even gave testimony as to his defense. It was only after

he and petitioners had been convicted by the trial court that he absconded. Thus, the contention that his

confession could not have been obtained during trial does not hold water. Reynante Tadeja, et al. v. People of

the Philippines; G.R. No. 145336. February 20, 2013]

Parties; duty of party to inform court of counsel‘s death. The Court strikes down the argument that the CA

Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 58817 did not attain finality because petitioner‘s counsel, who died while the case was

pending before the CA, was unable to receive a copy thereof. The CA was correct in ruling that there is no

extraordinary circumstance in this case that would merit a recall of the entry of judgment to reopen the case. The

reason given by petitioner, that its former counsel had died before the CA Decision was promulgated, hence, it

was not properly notified of the judgment, is too tenuous to be given serious consideration. In Mojar, et al. v. Agro Commercial Security Service Agency, Inc., the Court explained that it is the party‘s duty to inform the court

of its counsel‘s demise, and failure to apprise the court of such fact shall be considered negligence on the part of

said party. Expounding further, the Court stated:

x x x It is not the duty of the courts to inquire, during the progress of a case, whether the law firm or partnership

representing one of the litigants continues to exist lawfully, whether the partners are still alive, or whether its

associates are still connected with the firm.

x x x They cannot pass the blame to the court, which is not tasked to monitor the changes in the circumstances

of the parties and their counsel. x x x x

In Ampo v. Court of Appeals, this Court explained the vigilance that must be exercise by a party:

x x x x

Litigants who are represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await

the outcome of their cases. Relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the











judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence. The circumstances of this case

plainly show that petitioner only has himself to blame. Neither can he invoke due process. The essence of due

process is simply an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and

reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy. Where a party, such as petitioner, was

afforded this opportunity to participate but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. If

said opportunity is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee.

Thus, for failure of petitioner to notify the CA if the death of its counsel of record and have said counsel

substituted, then service of the CA Decision at the places or law office designated by its counsel of record as his

address, is sufficient notice. The case then became final and executory when no motion for reconsideration was

filed within the reglementary period therefor. O. Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation v. Adelina S. Tan and Sheriff

Reynante G. Velasquez, Presiding Judge; G.R. No. 180325. February 20, 2013

Partition; stages; requisites. The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue of ownership.

Such an addition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest in the subject property. In fact, the parties

filing the action are required by the Rules of Court to set forth in their complaint the nature and the extent of

their title to the property. It would be premature to effect a partition until and unless the question of ownership is

first definitely resolved. Carolina (Carlina) Vda. De Figuracion, et al. v. Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla; G.R. No. 151334.

February 13, 2013]

Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); issues not raised before the courts a quo cannot be raised for the first

time on appeal; rationale for the rule; exceptions. The inconsistent postures taken by the petitioners breach the

basic procedural tenet that a party cannot change his theory on appeal as expressly adopted in Rule 44, Section

15 of the Rules of Court, which reads:Sec 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. – whether or not the appellant has filed a motion for new trial in

the court below, he may include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact that has been raised in

the court below and which is within the issues framed by the parties.

Fortifying the rule, the Court had repeatedly emphasized that defenses not pleaded in the answer may not be

raised for the first time on appeal. When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided

upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change the same on appeal, because to permit to

do so would be unfair to the adverse party. The Court had likewise, in numerous times, affirmed that points of

law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily

will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage. Basic

considerations of due process underlie this rule. It would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no

opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory, which it could have done had it been aware

of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court.

While a party may change his theory on appeal when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of

any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new













theory, this exception does not, however, obtain in the case at hand.Carolina (Carlina) Vda. De Figuracion, et al.

v. Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla; G.R. No. 151334. February 13, 2013

Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); questions of fact generally not reviewable; exceptions; difference

between question of fact and question of law. We note that the matters raised by petitioner ATI involve questions

of fact which are generally not reviewable in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of

Civil Procedure, as amended, as the Court is not a trier of facts. Section 1 thereof provides that ―[t]he petition x x

x shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth.‖

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence

to a certain set of facts; or when the issued does not call for an examination of the probative value of evidence

presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference

arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering

mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well

as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.

The well-entrenched rule in our jurisdiction is that only questions of law may be entertained by this Court in a

petition for review on certiorari. This rule, however, is not ironclad and admits certain exceptions, such as when

(1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken,

absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of

facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual

findings are based; 7) the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record;

(8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the findings of the Court of

Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify adifferent conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such

findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Simon Enterprises, Inc.; G.R. No.

177116. February 27, 2013

Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); only questions of law may be raised. A petition for review under Rule

45 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that only questions of law may be raised, subject to exceptional

circumstances which are not present in this case. Hence, factual findings of the trial court, especially if affirmed

by the CA, are binding on us. In this case, both the RTC and the CA found that the signatures of Poblete and her

deceased husband in the Deed dated 11 August 2000 were forged by Maniego. In addition, the evidence is

preponderant that Maniego did not pay the consideration for the sale. Since the issue on the genuineness of the

Deed dated 11 August 2000 is essentially a question of fact, we are not duty-bound to analyze and weigh the

evidence again. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Barbara Sampaga Poblete; G.R. No. 196577. February 25, 2013

Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); resolves only questions of law, not questions of fact. We stress the

settled rule that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court resolves only questions of

law, not questions of fact. A question, to be one of law, must not examine the probative value of the evidence

presented by the parties; otherwise, the question is one of fact. Whether an express trust exists in this case is a

question of fact whose resolution is not proper in a petition under Rule 45. Joseph Goyanko, Jr., as administrator

















of the Estate of Joseph Goyanko, Sr. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, Mango Avenue Branch; G.R. No. 179096.

February 6, 2013

Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); change of theory on appeal generally not allowed.Second, we find that

the petitioner changed the theory of his case. The petitioner argued before the lower courts that an express trust

exists between PALII as the trustee and the HEIRS as the trustor-beneficiary. The petitioner now asserts that the

express trust exists between PALII as the trustor and UCPB as the trustee, with the HEIRS as the beneficiaries. At

this stage of the case, such change of theory is simply not allowed as it violates basic rules of fair play, justice

and due process. Our rulings are clear – ―a party who deliberately adopts a certain theory upon which the case

was decided by the lower court will not be permitted to change [it] on appeal‖, otherwise, the lower courts will

effectively be deprived of the opportunity to decide on the merits of the case fairly. Besides, courts of justice are

devoid of jurisdiction to resolve a question not in issue. Joseph Goyanko, Jr., as administrator of the Estate of

Joseph Goyanko, Sr. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, Mango Avenue Branch; G.R. No. 179096. February 6, 2013

Pleadings; amended complaint; nature. Moreover, respondent‘s filing of their Motion to Dismiss Amended

Complaint may not be considered as a circumvention of the rules of procedure. Under Section 8, Rule 10 of the

Rules of Court, an amended complaint supersedes an original one. As a consequence, the original complaint is

deemed withdrawn and no longer considered part of the record. In the present case, the Amended Complaint is,

thus, treated as an entirely new complaint. As such, respondents had every right to move for the dismissal of the

said Amended Complaint. Were it not for the filing of the said Motion, respondents would not have been able to

file a petition for certiorari before the CA which, in turn, rendered the presently assailed judgment in their

favor.Padilla Mercado, Zulueta Mercado, et al. v. Spouses Aguedo Espina and Lourdes Espina; G.R. No. 173987.

February 25, 2013

Service of Pleadings; petition should be served on counsel of party; effect of service on party represented by

counsel of record; exceptions. Lastly, under our rules of procedure, service of the petition on a party, when the

party is represented by a counsel of record, is a patent nullity and is not binding upon the party wrongfully

served. This rule, however, is a procedural standard that may admit of exceptions when faced with compelling

reasons of substantive justice manifest in the petition and in the surrounding circumstances of the case.

Procedural rules can bow to substantive considerations through a liberal construction aimed at promoting their

objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Republic of the

Philippines v. Hon. Ramon S. Caguioa, etc., et al.; G.R. No. 174385. February 20, 2013

Special civil action for certiorari (Rule 65); reglementary period. First, we find that the present petition was filed

within the reglementary period. Contrary to the private respondents‘ position, the 60-day period within which to

file the petition for certiorari is counted from the Republic‘s receipt of the July 5, 2006 order denying the latter‘s

motion for reconsideration. Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear on this point – ―In case a motion

for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed,whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day

period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.‖ Republic of the Philippines v. Hon.

Ramon S. Caguioa, etc., et al.; G.R. No. 174385. February 20, 2013

Special civil action for certiorari (Rule 65); requisites. The following requisites must concur for a Petition

for Certiorari to prosper, namely:


























―(a) The writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;

(b) Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and

(c) There is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.‖ Salvacion

Villanueva, et al. v. Palawan Council for Sustainable Development, etc., et al.; G.R. No. 178347. February 25,

2013

Special Proceedings

Writ of amparo; nature; special proceeding. The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary

remedy to safeguard the right of the people to life, liberty and security as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. The

Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued as an exercise of the Supreme Court‘s power to promulgate rules

concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. It aims to address concerns such as, among

others, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

x x x

It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-

boggling how this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the

application of summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special

proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact. It is not a civil

nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously

misplaced. Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v.

Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013

Writ of amparo; procedure. Due to the delicate and urgent nature of these controversies, the procedure was

devised to afford swift but decisive relief. It is initiated through a petition to be filed in a Regional Trial Court,

Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court. The judge or justice then makes an ―immediate‖

evaluation of the facts as alleged in the petition and the affidavits submitted ―with the attendant circumstances

detailed‖. After evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the Writ of Amparo or immediately dismiss the

case. Dismissal is proper if the petition and the supporting affidavits do not show that the petitioner‘s right to lie

liberty or security is under threat or the acts complained of are not unlawful. On the other hand, the issuance of

the writ itself sets in motion presumptive judicial protection for the petitioner. The court compels the respondents

to appear before a court of law to show whether the grounds for more permanent protection and interim relies

are necessary.

The respondents are required to file a Return after the issuance of the writ through the clerk of court. The

Return serves as the responsive pleading to the petition. Unlike an Answer, the Return has other purposes aside

form identifying the issues in the case, Respondents are also required to detail the actions they had taken to

determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.













If the respondents are public officials or employees, they are also required to state the actions they had taken to:

(i) verify the identity of the aggrieved party; (ii) recover and preserve evidence related to the death or

disappearance of the person identified in the petition; (iii) identify witnesses and obtain statements concerning

the death or disappearance; (iv) determine the cause, manner, location, and time of death or disappearance as

well as any patter or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance; and (v) bring the

suspected offenders before a competent court. Clearly these matters are important to the judge so that s/he can

calibrate the means and methods that will be required to further the protections, if any, that will be due to the

petitioner.

There will be a summary hearing only after the Return is filed to determine the merits of the petition and

whether interim reliefs are warranted. If the Return is not filed, the hearing will be done ex parte. After the

hearing, the court will render the judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for

decision.

If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such

reliefs as may be proper ans appropriate. The judgment should contain measures which the judge views as

essential for the continued protection of the petitioner in the Amparo case. These measures must be detailed

enough o that the judge may be able to verify and monitor the actions taken by the respondents. It is this

judgment that could be subject to appeal to the Supreme Court via Rule 45. After the measures have served

their purpose, the judgment will be satisfied. In Amparo cases, this is when the threats to the petitioner‘s life,

liberty and security cease to exist as evaluated by the court that renders the judgment. Parenthetically, the case

may also be terminated through consolidation should a subsequent case be filed – either criminal or civil. Untilthe full satisfaction of the judgment, the extraordinary remedy of Amparo allows vigilant judicial monitoring to

ensure the protection of constitutional rights. Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy

Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013

Writ of Amparo; writ is an interlocutory order. The ―Decision‖ dated 20 March 2012 assailed by the

petitioners could not be the judgment or final order that is appealable under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ

of Amparo. x x x

This ―Decision‖ pertained to the issuance of the writ under Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, not

the judgment under Section 18. The ―Decision‖ is thus an interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact that

temporary protection, production and inspection orders were given together with the decision. The temporary

protection, production and inspection orders are interim reliefs that may be granted by the court upon filing of

the petition but before final judgment is rendered. Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and

Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013

Writ of Amparo; the Return is the proper responsive pleading; memorandum is a prohibited pleading. First the

insistence on filing an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading for

petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention of the

Court to provide a speedy remedy to those whose right to life, liberty and security are violated or are threatened











to be violated. In utter disregard of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing summons

and requiring an Answer.

x x x

The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject to a hearing. Hence, it should be

done prior to the hearing, not after. A memorandum, on the other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of the party

litigants and is a final pleading usually required before the case is submitted for decision. One cannot substitute

for the other since these submissions have different functions in facilitating the suit.

More importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the writ of Amparo.Secretary Leila

M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B.

Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013

Writ of Amparo; difference between the privilege of the Writ of Amparo and the actual order called the Writ of

Amparo. The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called the Writ

of Amparo. The privilege includes the availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the rule

on the Writ of Amparo. After examining the petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence

presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should detail the required acts from the respondent that will

mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or threat to the petitioner‘s life, liberty or security.

A judgment which simply grants ―the privilege of the writ‖ cannot be executed. It is tantamount to a failure of the

judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to the petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ

of Amparo arise out of very real and concrete circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic

or ritualistic as ―granting the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.‖ Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R.Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013

Evidence

Administrative proceedings; quantum of proof; substantial evidence. It is well-entrenched that in an

administrative proceeding, the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt is only substantial evidence or such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and not proof beyond

reasonable doubt which requires moral certainty to justify affirmative findings. Office of the Ombudsman v.

Rodrigo v. Mapoy and Don Emmanuel R. Regalario; G.R. No. 197299. February 13, 2013]

Civil cases; quantum of proof; preponderance of evidence; evidence of fraud. In civil cases, basic is the rule that

the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. Moreover, parties

must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their

proponent. This principle equally holds true, even if the defendant had not been given the opportunity to present

evidence because of a default order. The extent of the relief that may be granted can only be as much as has

been alleged and proved with preponderant evidence required under Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Revised Rules

of Evidence.














Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually

considered to be synonymous with the term ―greater weight of the evidence‖ or ―greater weight of the credible

evidence.‖ Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is

evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition

thereto.

As to fraud, the rule is that he who alleges fraud or mistake affecting a transaction must substantiate his

allegation, since it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns and that private transactions

have been fair and regular. The Court has stressed time and again that allegations must be proven by sufficient

evidence because mere allegation is definitely not evidence. Moreover, fraud is not presumed – it must be proved

by clear and convincing evidence.Spouses Nilo Ramos and Eliadora Ramos v. Raul Obispo and Far East Bank and

Trust Co.; G.R. No. 193804. February 27, 2013

January 2014 Philippine Supreme Court Rulings on Remedial Law

Civil Procedure

Action to annul judgment or final order; jurisdiction. In 1981, the Legislature enacted Batas

Pambansa Blg.129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980). Among several innovations of this legislative

enactment was the formal establishment of the annulment of a judgment or final order as an action independent

from the generic classification of litigations in which the subject matter was not capable of pecuniary estimation,

and expressly vested the exclusive original jurisdiction over such action in the CA. The action in which the subject

of the litigation was incapable of pecuniary estimation continued to be under the exclusive original jurisdiction of

the RTC, which replaced the CFI as the court of general jurisdiction. Since then, the RTC no longer had

jurisdiction over an action to annul the judgment of the RTC, eliminating all concerns about judicial stability. To

implement this change, the Court introduced a new procedure to govern the action to annul the judgment of the

RTC in the 1997 revision of the Rules of Court under Rule 47, directing in Section 2 thereof that ―[t]he annulment

may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.‖ Pinausukan Seafood House-Roxas

Blvd., Inc. v. Far East Bank and Trust Cp., now Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 159926, January

20, 2014.

Action to annul judgment or final order; lack of jurisdiction; types. Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial

court in rendering the judgment or final order is either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the

action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The former is a matter of substantive law because

statutory law defines the jurisdiction of the courts over the subject matter or nature of the action. The latter is a

matter of procedural law, for it involves the service of summons or other process on the petitioner. A judgment or

final order issued by the trial court without jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action is always

void, and, in the words of Justice Street in Banco Español-Filip ino v. Palanca (37 Phil 949 [1918]), ―in this sense it

may be said to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and

whenever it exhibits its head.‖ But the defect of lack of jurisdiction over the person, being a matter of procedural




http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/january2014/159926.pdf









law, may be waived by the party concerned either expressly or impliedly. Pinausukan Seafood House-Roxas Blvd.,

Inc. v. Far East Bank and Trust Cp., now Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 159926, January 20,

2014.

Action to annul judgment or final order; nature. The Court has expounded on the nature of the remedy of

annulment of judgment or final order in Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of Appeals (681 SCRA 580,

586-587 [2012]), viz :

―A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of

only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be

annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being

exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final

judgments, orders or resolutions. The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for the

annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of

Court that the petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other

appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that

ignores or disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper. x x x‖

The objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order is to undo or set aside the judgment or final

order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute his cause or to ventilate his defense. If the

ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the entire proceedings are set aside without prejudice to the original

action being refiled in the proper court. If the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the ground of

extrinsic fraud, the CA may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for new trial had

been granted therein. The remedy is by no means an appeal whereby the correctness of the assailed judgment orfinal order is in issue; hence, the CA is not called upon to address each error allegedly committed by the trial

court. Pinausukan Seafood House-Roxas Blvd., Inc. v. Far East Bank and Trust Cp., now Bank of the Philippine

Islands, et al., G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014.

Action to annul judgment or final order; prescriptive period. The third requirement sets the time for the filing of

the action. The action, if based on extrinsic fraud, must be filed within four years from the discovery of the

extrinsic fraud; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by laches or

estoppel. Pinausukan Seafood House-Roxas Blvd., Inc. v. Far East Bank and Trust Cp., now Bank of the Philippine

Islands, et al., G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014.

Action to annul judgment or final order; requisites. The first requirement prescribes that the remedy is available

only when the petitioner can no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or

other appropriate remedies through no fault of the petitioner. This means that the remedy, although seen as ―a

last remedy,‖ is not an alternative to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal and petition for relief. The

petition must aver, therefore, that the petitioner failed to move for a new trial, or to appeal, or to file a petition

for relief without fault on his part. But this requirement to aver is not imposed when the ground for the petition is

lack of jurisdiction (whether alleged singly or in combination with extrinsic fraud), simply because the judgment

or final order, being void, may be assailed at any time either collaterally or by direct action or by resisting such

















judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless the ground of lack of

jurisdiction is meanwhile barred by laches.

The second requirement limits the ground for the action of annulment of judgment to either extrinsic fraud or

lack of jurisdiction.

Not every kind of fraud justifies the action of annulment of judgment. Only extrinsic fraud does. Fraud is extrinsic

according to Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals (265 SCRA 168, 180 [1996]), ―where the

unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by

his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant

never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney

fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has never

been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set

aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing.‖

The third requirement sets the time for the filing of the action. The action, if based on extrinsic fraud, must be

filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be

brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel.

The fourth requirement demands that the petition should be verified, and should allege with particularity the facts

and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioner‘s good and substantial cause of

action or defense, as the case may be. The need for particularity cannot be dispensed with because averring the

circumstances constituting either fraud or mistake with particularity is a universal requirement in the rules of

pleading. The petition is to be filed in seven clearly legible copies, together with sufficient copies corresponding to

the number of respondents, and shall contain essential submissions, specifically: (a) the certified true copy of the

judgment or final order or resolution, to be attached to the original copy of the petition intended for the court and

indicated as such by the petitioner;

(b) the affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting the cause of action or defense; and (c) the sworn

certification that the petitioner has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the

Supreme Court, the CA or the different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other

action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same, and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action

or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the CA, or different divisions thereof, or

any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the said courts and other tribunal or agency

thereof within five days therefrom. Pinausukan Seafood House-Roxas Blvd., Inc. v. Far East Bank and Trust Cp.,

now Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014.

Appeal; trial court‘s factual findings as affirmed by CA are binding on appeal. To start with, considering that the

Court of Appeals (CA) thereby affirmed the factual findings of the RTC, the Court is bound to uphold such

findings, for it is axiomatic that the trial court‘s factual findings as affirmed by the CA are binding on appeal due







to the Court not being a trier of facts. Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) v. Guariña Agricultural and

Realty Development Corporation ,G.R. No. 160758. January 15, 2014.

Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; covers questions of law only; exceptions. The Court has consistently held that

as a general rule, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers questions of law only. The rule,

however, admits of exceptions, subject to the following exceptions, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded

entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd,

or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misappreciation

of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to

the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)

when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the

facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner‘s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the

respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and

contradicted by the evidence on record. Rodolfo Laborte, et al. v. Pagsanjan Tourism Consumers‘ Cooperative, et

al. ,G.R. No. 183860, January 15, 2014

Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; effect of failure to file motion for reconsideration within 15-day reglementary

period. The Court emphasized that the 15-day period for filing a motion for new trial or reconsideration is non-

extendible. Hence, the filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration did not toll the

15-day period before a judgment becomes final and executory. Rivelisa Realty, Inc., represented by Ricardo P.

Venturina v. First Sta. Clara Builders Corporation, represented by Ramon A. Pangilinan, as President ,G.R. No.

189618. January 15, 2014.

Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; factual questions may not be raised. Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the

rule that factual questions may not be raised before this Court in a petition for review on certiorari as this Court is

not a trier of facts.

Thus, it is settled that in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be put in issue. Questions of

fact cannot be entertained.

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence

to a certain set of facts, or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence

presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference

arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering

mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well

as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.

v. BPI/MS Insurance Corp., and Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co., Ltd. ,G.R. No. 193986, January 15, 2014.

Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; factual findings of trial court, when affirmed by CA, are binding on Supreme

Court. Considering that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on the Court,

the Court affirms the judgment of the CA upholding Eduardo‘s exercise of the right of repurchase. Roberto could

no longer assail the factual findings because his petition for review on certiorari was limited to the review and

determination of questions of law only. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a




http://www.scribd.com/doc/206341587/183860

















certain set of undisputed facts, while a question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of

the alleged facts. Whether the conditions for the right to repurchase were complied with, or whether there was a

tender of payment is a question of fact.Roberto R. David, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact Atty. Proceso M.

Nacino v. Eduardo C. David, acting through his Attorney-in-Fact Edwin C. David ,G.R. No. 162365. January 15,

2014.

Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; scope of review limited. Anent the correct amount of surety bond, it is well to

emphasize that our task in an appeal by petition for review on certiorari is limited, as a jurisdictional matter, to

reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the CA. The allegations of incorrect computation of

the surety bond involve factual matters within the competence of the trial court. LZK Holdings and Development

Corporation v. Planters Development Bank ,G.R. No. 187973, January 20, 2014.

Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; scope of review. At the outset, it must be pointed out that the petitioners‘

assignment of errors calls for the Court to again evaluate the evidence to determine whether there was a

partition of the property and whether the 1/3 portion of the southern half was sold to the respondent spouses.

These clearly entail questions of fact which are beyond the Court‘s ambit of review under Rule. Theresita, Juan,

Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria, all surnamed Dimaguila v. Jose and Sonia A. Monteiro ,G.R. No.

201011, January 27, 2014.

Ejectment; immediate execution of judgment; requisites for stay. The ruling in Chua v. Court of Appeals (286

SCRA 437, 444-445 [1998]) is instructive on the means of staying the immediate execution of a judgment in an

ejectment case, to wit:

As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, in order to

prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of the property in question. To stay the

immediate execution of the said judgment while the appeal is pending the foregoing provision requires that the

following requisites must concur: (1) the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3)

he periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal. The failure of the

defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the duty

of the court in this respect being ―ministerial and imperative.‖ Hence, if the defendant-appellant perfected the

appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would automatically

follow. Conversely, the filing of asupersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal is not

perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the

appeal.

In short, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, but the defendant, to

stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an appeal; (2) file a supersedeas bond; and (3) periodically

deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency of the appeal. Herminia Acbang v. Hon. Jimmy Luczon, Jr.,

et al. ,G.R. No. 164246, January 15, 2014.

Execution; Terceria; when proper. The right of a third-party claimant to file a terceria is founded on his title or

right of possession. Corollary thereto, before the court can exercise its supervisory power to direct the release of

the property mistakenly levied and the restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the claimant must first

unmistakably establish his ownership or right of possession thereon. In Spouses Sy v. Hon. Discaya (260 Phil. 401























[1990]) we declared that for a third-party claim or a terceria to prosper, the claimant must first sufficiently

establish his right on the property:

―[A] third person whose property was seized by a sheriff to answer for the obligation of the judgment debtor

may invoke the supervisory power of he court which authorized such execution. Upon due application by the third

person and after summary hearing, the court may command that the property be released from the mistaken

levy and restored to the rightful owner or possessor. What said court can do in these instances, however, is

limited to a determination of whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his duties in

the execution of judgment, more specifically, if he has indeed taken hold of property not belonging to the

judgment debtor. The court does not and cannot pass upon the question of title to the property, with any

character of finality. It can treat of the matter only insofar as may be necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted

correctly or not. It can require the sheriff to restore the property to the claimant‘s possession if warranted by the

evidence. However, if the claimant‘s proofs do not persuade the court of the validity of his title or right of

possession thereto, the claim will be denied.‖

Magdalena T. Villasi v. Filomena Garcia, substituted by his heirs, namely, Ermelinda H. Garcia, et al. ,G.R. No.

190106, January 15, 2014.

Execution of judgments; Immediate execution in Small Claims cases. Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for

Small Claims Cases states that the decision shall immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court in the court docket

for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties. A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v. Emma Mondejar,

accompanied by her husband, Efren Mondejar ,G.R. No. 200804. January 22, 2014.

Execution of judgments; rationale. It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of the suit. Hailing it

as the ―life of the law,‖ ratio legis est anima , this Court has zealously guarded against any attempt to thwart therigid rule and deny the prevailing litigant his right to savour the fruit of his victory. A judgment, if left unexecuted,

would be nothing but an empty triumph for the prevailing party. Magdalena T. Villasi v. Filomena Garcia,

substituted by his heirs, namely, Ermelinda H. Garcia, et al. ,G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014.

Grave abuse of discretion; concept. To be sure, grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal

patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. Here, while the RTC had initially issued a writ

of possession in favor of Sps. Marquez, it defied existing jurisprudence when it effectively rescinded the said writ

by subsequently granting Sps. Alindog‘s prayer for injunctive relief. Spouses Nicasio C. Marquez and Anita J.

Marquez v. Spouses Carlito Alindog and Carmen Alindog ,G.R. No. 184045. January 22, 2014.

Grave abuse of discretion; concept. It is settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion when there is a

capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is

exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent

and gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to

act at all in contemplation of law. Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, RTC,

Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua ,G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014.

Judicial power; issuance of protection orders. Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that ―the

Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may

























not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.‖ Hence, the primary

judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is primarily the function of

the legislature. The act of Congress entrusting us with the issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of our

authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable

before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A.

Mangrobang, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, RTC, Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua, G.R. No. 170701.

January 22, 2014.

Judgments; enforceability of money judgments. It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are

enforceable only against the property incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and if the property

belonging to any third person is mistakenly levied upon to answer for another man‘s indebtedness, such person

has all the right to challenge the levy through any of the remedies provided for under the Rules of

Court. Magdalena T. Villasi v. Filomena Garcia, substituted by his heirs, namely, Ermelinda H. Garcia, et al. ,G.R.

No. 190106, January 15, 2014.

Judgments; Law of the case; concept. Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former

appeal, and means, more specifically, that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of

decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on

general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of

the case before the court.

The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore, that when an appellate court has once declared the law

in a case, its declaration continues to be the law of that case even on a subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that

the rule thus laid down may have been reversed in other cases. For practical considerations, indeed, once the

appellate court has issued a pronouncement on a point that was presented to it with full opportunity to be heard

having been accorded to the parties, the pronouncement should be regarded as the law of the case and should

not be reopened on remand of the case to determine other issues of the case, like damages. But the law of the

case, as the name implies, concerns only legal questions or issues thereby adjudicated in the former

appeal. Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) v. Guariña Agricultural and Realty Development

Corporation ,G.R. No. 160758. January 15, 2014.

Judgments; remedies of third person claiming property taken by sheriff. Section 16, Rule 39 specifically provides

that a third person may avail himself of the remedies of either terceria , to determine whether the sheriff has

rightly or wrongly taken hold of the property not belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor, or an independent

―separate action‖ to vindicate his claim of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed property. However,

the person other than the judgment debtor who claims ownership or right over levied properties is not precluded

from taking other legal remedies to prosecute his claim. Magdalena T. Villasi v. Filomena Garcia, substituted by

his heirs, namely, Ermelinda H. Garcia, et al. ,G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014.

Jurisdiction; concurrence of jurisdiction and hierarchy of courts. To be sure, the Court, the Court of Appeals and

the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari. Such concurrence of jurisdiction,

however, does not give a party unbridled freedom to choose the venue of his action lest he run afoul of the

doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Instead, a becoming regard for judicial hierarchy dictates that petitions for the























issuance of writs of certiorari against first level courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those

against the latter, with the Court of Appeals, before resort may be had before the Supreme Court. A.L. Ang

Network, Inc. v. Emma Mondejar, accompanied by her husband, Efren Mondejar ,G.R. No. 200804. January

22, 2014.

Jurisdiction; Justiciable question; definition. The Court clarified, too, that the issue of whether a Deputy

Ombudsman may be subjected to the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the President (concurrently with

that of the Ombudsman) is a justiciable – not a political – question. A justiciable question is one which is

inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law, as where the court finds that there are

constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of the powers conferred on a political branch of the

government. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N.

Ochoa, Jr., et al. ,G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.

Jurisdiction; Small Claims cases. Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction

of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial

Courts, certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed before their corresponding Regional Trial

Courts. This petitioner complied with when it instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC which, as

previously mentioned, has jurisdiction over the same. A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v. Emma Mondejar, accompanied by

her husband, Efren Mondejar ,G.R. No. 200804. January 22, 2014.

Motions; motion to extend time to file motion for reconsideration prohibited in all courts except in the Supreme

Court. While a motion for additional time is expressly permitted in the filing of a petition for review before the

Court under Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a similar motion seeking to extend the period for filing a

motion for reconsideration is prohibited in all other courts. This rule was first laid down in the case of Habaluyas

Enterprises v. Japzon (226 Phil. 144 [1986]) wherein it was held that:

Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion

for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or

Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be

filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion

either grant or deny the extension requested.

Rivelisa Realty, Inc., represented by Ricardo P. Venturina v. First Sta. Clara Builders Corporation, represented by

Ramon A. Pangilinan, as President ,G.R. No. 189618. January 15, 2014.

Motion for reconsideration; effect of non-filing. At the outset, the Court noted that Gonzales and Sulit did not file

a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court‘s September 4, 2012 Decision; only the Office of the

President, through the OSG, moved for the reconsideration of our ruling reinstating Gonzales.

This omission, however, poses no obstacle for the Court‘s review of its ruling on the whole case since a serious

constitutional question has been raised and is one of the underlying bases for the validity or invalidity of the

presidential action.





















If the President does not have any constitutional authority to discipline a Deputy Ombudsman and/or a Special

Prosecutor in the first place, then any ruling on the legal correctness of the OP‘s decision on the merits will be an

empty one. In other words, since the validity of the OP‘s decision on the merits of the dismissal is inextricably

anchored on the final and correct ruling on the constitutional issue, the whole case – including the constitutional

issue – remains alive for the Court‘s consideration on motion for reconsideration. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office

of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al. ,G.R. No. 196231/G.R.

No. 196232, January 28, 2014.

Pleadings; Defense and objections not pleaded either in motion to dismiss or in answer are deemed waived;

exceptions. Significantly, the Rule requires that such a motion should be filed ―within the time for but before filing

the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.‖ The time frame indicates that thereafter, the motion

to dismiss based on the absence of the condition precedent is barred. It is so inferable from the opening sentence

of Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the

answer are deemed waived. There are, as just noted, only four exceptions to this Rule, namely, lack of

jurisdiction over the subject matter; litis pendentia ; res judicata ; and prescription of action. Failure to allege in

the complaint that earnest efforts at a compromise has been made but had failed is not one of the

exceptions.Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr., represented by their co-heirs and attorneys-in-fact, Mercedes A. Favis

and Nelly Favis-Villafuente v. Juana Gonzales, her son Mariano Favis, all minors represented herein by their

parents, Sps. Mariano Favis and Larcelita D. Favis ,G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014.

Pleadings; Failure to allege compromise efforts in complaint not jurisdictional defect. Why the objection of failure

to allege a failed attempt at a compromise in a suit among members of the same family is waivable was earlier

explained in the case of Versoza v. Versoza (135 Phil. 84, 94 [1968]), a case for future support which was

dismissed by the trial court upon the ground that there was no such allegation of infringement of Article 222 of

the Civil Code, the origin of Article 151 of the Family Code. While the Court ruled that a complaint for future

support cannot be the subject of a compromise and as such the absence of the required allegation in the

complaint cannot be a ground for objection against the suit, the decision went on to state thus:

The alleged defect is that the present complaint does not state a cause of action. The proposed amendment

seeks to complete it. An amendment to the effect that the requirements of Article 222 have been complied with

does not confer jurisdiction upon the lower court. With or without this amendment, the subject-matter of the

action remains as one for support, custody of children, and damages, cognizable by the court below.

To illustrate, Tamayo v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc., allowed an amendment which ―merely corrected a defect in

the allegation of plaintiff-appellant‘s cause of action, because as it then stood, the original complaint stated no

cause of action.‖ We there ruled out as inapplicable the holding in Campos Rueda Corporation v. Bautista, that an

amendment cannot be made so as to confer jurisdiction on the court x x x

Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection is wholly applicable to

respondent. If the respondents as parties-defendants could not, and did not, after filing their answer to

petitioner‘ s complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the required allegation on earnest efforts at a













compromise, the appellate court unquestionably did not have any authority or basis to muto proprio order the

dismissal of petitioner‘s complaint. Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr., represented by their co-heirs and attorneys-in-

fact, Mercedes A. Favis and Nelly Favis-Villafuente v. Juana Gonzales, her son Mariano Favis, all minors

represented herein by their parents, Sps. Mariano Favis and Larcelita D. Favis ,G.R. No. 185922, January 15,

2014.

Pleadings; motu proprio dismissal. Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu

proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia ; (c) res

judicata ; and (d) prescription of action.

Specifically in Gumabon v. Larin (422 Phil. 222, 230 [2001]), cited in Katon v. Palanca, Jr. (481 Phil. 168, 180

[2004]), the Court held:

―x x x [T]he muto proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly had no

jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his

action for an unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court.

Outside of these instances, any motu proprio [sic] dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the

plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the

Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change. Under

the new rules, a court may muto proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on

record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another cause of action pending between

the same parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of

limitations. x x x.‖

Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr., represented by their co-heirs and attorneys-in-fact, Mercedes A. Favis and NellyFavis-Villafuente v. Juana Gonzales, her son Mariano Favis, all minors represented herein by their parents, Sps.

Mariano Favis and Larcelita D. Favis ,G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014.

Preliminary injunction; improper where act sought to be enjoined is already consummated. Case law instructs

that injunction would not lie where the acts sought to be enjoined had already become fait accompli (meaning,

an accomplished or consummated act). Hence, since the consummation of the act sought to be restrained had

rendered Sps. Alindogs injunction petition moot, the issuance of the said injunctive writ was altogether

improper. Spouses Nicasio C. Marquez and Anita J. Marquez v. Spouses Carlito Alindog and Carmen Alindog ,G.R.

No. 184045. January 22, 2014.

Res judicata ; conclusiveness of judgment. Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, the right of Planters

Bank to a writ of possession as adjudged in G.R. No. 167998 is binding and conclusive on the parties.

The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment postulates that when a right or fact has been judicially

tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given,

the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in

privity with them.

All the elements of the doctrine are present in this case. The final judgment in G.R. No. 167998 was rendered by

the Court pursuant to its jurisdiction over the review of decisions and rulings of the CA. It was a judgment on the



















merits of Planters Bank‘s right to apply for and be issued a writ of possession. Lastly, the parties in G.R. No.

167998 are the same parties involved in the present case.LZK Holdings and Development Corporation v. Planters

Development Bank ,G.R. No. 187973, January 20, 2014.

Writ of possession; nature. No hearing is required prior to the issuance of a writ of possession. This is clear from

the following disquisitions in Espinoza v United Overseas Bank Phils. (616 SCRA 353) which reiterates the settled

rules on writs of possession, to wit:

The proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in nature. It is a judicial proceeding

brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to any person adverse of interest. It is a

proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the person against whom the relief is sought an opportunity

to be heard. By its very nature, an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious

proceeding. It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one‘s r ight of possession as purchaser in a

foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement of a

wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. LZK Holdings and Development

Corporation v. Planters Development Bank ,G.R. No. 187973, January 20, 2014

Other Proceedings

Barangay Protection Order (BPO); Function of Punong Barangay purely executive in nature. The issuance of a

BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the

perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the

woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in

pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to ―enforce all laws and ordinances,‖ and to ―maintain

public order in the barangay.‖ Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, RTC,

Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua, G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014.

Extra-judicial foreclosure; ministerial duty to issue writ of possession to purchaser; exception. It is an established

rule that the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the possession of the property and can

demand that he be placed in possession of the same either during (with bond) or after the expiration (without

bond) of the redemption period therefor. To this end, the Court, in China Banking Corp. v. Sps. Lozada (579 Phil

454 [2008]), citing several cases on the matter, explained that a writ of possession duly applied for by said

purchaser should issue as a matter of course, and thus, merely constitutes a ministerial duty on the part of the

court.

The ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale,

however, admits of an exception. Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (Rules) pertinently provides that the

possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to a purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure unless a

third party is actually holding the property by adverse title or right. In the recent case of Rural Bank of Sta.

Barbara (Iloilo), Inc. v. Centeno (693 SCRA 110 [2013]), citing the case of China Banking Corp., the Court

illumined that ―the phrase ‗a third party who is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor‘

contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as that of a co-

owner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner, agricultural tenant, and usufructuary possess the property in their

own right, and they are not merely the successor or transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or















the owner of the property. Notably, the property should not only be possessed by a third party, but also held by

the third party adversely to the judgment obligor.‖ In other words, as mentioned in Villanueva v. Cherdan

Lending Investors Corporation (633 SCRA 173 [2010]), the third person must therefore claim a right superior to

that of the original mortgagor. Spouses Nicasio C. Marquez and Anita J. Marquez v. Spouses Carlito Alindog and

Carmen Alindog, G.R. No. 184045. January 22, 2014.

Protection Order under Section 15 of RA 9262; concept. In Garcia v. Drilon (699 SCRA 352, 401 [2013]), wherein

petitioner therein argued that Section 15 of RA 9262 is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution,

we struck down the challenge and held:

A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their

family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended

parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to

regain control of their life. The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or

offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves

to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household

member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the

employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to

protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial

support. The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner

thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since ―time is of the essence

in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,‖ the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after

raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is

reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent

danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur. There need not be any fear that the judge

may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in

the petition, but also to attach her witnesses‘ affidavits to the petition. The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot,

therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which

is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable

the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have

suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing

were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary

requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, among

which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. x x x

Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, RTC, Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado

Tua ,G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014.

Temporary Protection Order (TPO) under Section 15 of RA 9262; court‘s authority to issue ex parte . Clearly, the

court, under Section 15 of RA 9262, is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of the filing of the application

after ex parte determination that there is basis for the issuance thereof. Ex parte means that the respondent need

not be notified or be present in the hearing for the issuance of the TPO. Thus, it is within the court‘s discretion,











based on the petition and the affidavit attached thereto, to determine that the violent acts against women and

their children for the issuance of a TPO have been committed. Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang,

Presiding Judge, Branch 22, RTC, Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua ,G.R. No. 170701. January 22,

2014.

Evidence

Admissions; contradiction. Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a

party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may be contradicted only by

showing that it was made through palpable mistake. The petitioners argue that such admission was the palpable

mistake of their former counsel in his rush to file the answer, a copy of which was not provided to them. This

contention is unacceptable. It is a purely self-serving claim unsupported by any iota of evidence. Bare allegations,

unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and

Gloria, all surnamed Dimaguila v. Jose and Sonia A. Monteiro ,G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014.

Admissions; rendered conclusive through estoppel. Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel,

an admission is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the

person relying thereon. The respondent spouses had clearly relied on the petitioners‘ admission and so amended

their original complaint for partition to one for recovery of possession of a portion of the subject property. Thus,

the petitioners are now estopped from denying or attempting to prove that there was no partition of the

property. Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria, all surnamed Dimaguila v. Jose and Sonia A.

Monteiro ,G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014.

Best evidence rule; concept and exception. Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the

subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original

document itself, except when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a

public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a document is in the custody of a

public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public

officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may be evidenced

by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody or the record.

Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of claimants of the area covered by

the map were presented by two public officers. x x x The cadastral maps and the list of claimants, as certified

true copies of original public records, fall under the exception to the best evidence rule. Theresita, Juan,

Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria, all surnamed Dimaguila v. Jose and Sonia A. Monteiro , G.R. No.

201011, January 27, 2014.

Burden of proof in civil cases; quantum of evidence. Land Bank failed to prove that the amount allegedly

―miscredited‖ to Oñate‘s account came from the proceeds of the pre-terminated loans of its clients. It is worth

emphasizing that in civil cases, the party making the allegations has the burden of proving them by

preponderance of evidence. Mere allegation is not sufficient. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Emmanuel C.

Oñate ,G.R. No. 192371, January 15, 2014.

Hearsay rule; entries in official records as exception. As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules

of Court similarly provides that entries in official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that



























entries in official records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person

in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The

necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official‘s attendance as a witness

to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. The document‘s trustworthiness consists in

the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.

Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to execute, supervise

and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. It is, therefore, clear that the cadastral map and the corresponding

list of claimants qualify as entries in official records as they were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As

such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Theresita,

Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria, all surnamed Dimaguila v. Jose and Sonia A. Monteiro ,G.R. No.

201011, January 27, 2014.

Judicial notice; discretionary notice of records of other cases. The taking of judicial notice is a matter of

expediency and convenience for it fulfills the purpose that the evidence is intended to achieve, and in this sense,

it is equivalent to proof. Generally, courts are not authorized to ―take judicial notice of the contents of the records

of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge.‖

They may, however, take judicial notice of a decision or the facts prevailing in another case sitting in the same

court if: (1) the parties present them in evidence, absent any opposition from the other party; or (2) the court, in

its discretion, resolves to do so. In either case, the courts must observe the clear boundary provided by Section 3,

Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises ,G.R. No. 172551,

January 15, 2014.

Offer of evidence; court considers evidence only when formally offered; exceptions. Section 34, Rule 132 of the

Revised Rules on Evidence provides the general rule, to wit:

Section 34. The Court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the

evidence is offered must be specified.

From the above provision, it is clear that the court considers the evidence only when it is formally offered. The

offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the trial court to base its findings of fact and its judgment

only and strictly on the evidence offered by the parties. A piece of document will remain a scrap of paper without

probative value unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which it is

offered. The formal offer of evidence allows the parties the chance to object to the presentation of an evidence

which may not be admissible for the purpose it is being offered.

However, there are instances when the Court relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally

offered to be admitted. Citing People v. Napat-a and People. v. Mate the Court in Heirs of Romana Saves, et al.,

v. Heirs of Escolastico Saves, et al. (632 SCRA 236 [2010]), enumerated the requirements for the evidence to be

considered despite failure to formally offer it, namely: ―first, the same must have been duly identified by

testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case.‖ In

People v. Vivencio De Roxas et al. (116 Phil 977 [1962]), the Court also considered exhibits which were not















formally offered by the prosecution but were repeatedly referred to in the course of the trial by the counsel of the

accused.

In the instant case, the Court finds that the above requisites are attendant to warrant the relaxation of the rule

and admit the evidence of the petitioners not formally offered. As can be seen in the records of the case, the

petitioners were able to present evidence that have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded. To identify is

to prove the identity of a person or a thing. Identification means proof of identity; the proving that a person,

subject or article before the court is the very same that he or it is alleged, charged or reputed to be. Rodolfo

Laborte, et al. v. Pagsanjan Tourism Consumers‘ Cooperative, et al. ,G.R. No. 183860, January 15, 2014.

Preponderance of evidence; definition. Spouses Monteiro, as plaintiffs in the original case, had the burden of

proof to establish their case by a preponderance of evidence, which is the weight, credit, and value of the

aggregate evidence on either side, synonymous with the term ―greater weight of the evidence.‖ Preponderance of

evidence is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in

opposition thereto. Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria, all surnamed Dimaguila v. Jose and

Sonia A. Monteiro ,G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014.

Question of law distinguished from question of fact. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy

concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts, or when the issue does not call

for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being

admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or

when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the

existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the

whole, and the probability of the situation.Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. BPI/MS Insurance Corp., and MitsuiSumitomo Insurance Co., Ltd. ,G.R. No. 193986, January 15, 2014.

Question of law distinguished from question of fact. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the

law is on a certain set of undisputed facts, while a question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or

falsity of the alleged facts. Whether the conditions for the right to repurchase were complied with, or whether

there was a tender of payment is a question of fact.Roberto R. David, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact Atty.

Proceso M. Nacino v. Eduardo C. David, acting through his Attorney-in-Fact Edwin C. David ,G.R. No. 162365.

January 15, 2014.



















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