Lewis Taylor - Environmentalism and Social Protest: The Contemporary Anti-mining Mobilization in the...

Environmentalism and Social Protest:The Contemporary Anti-mining Mobilization

in the Province of San Marcos and theCondebamba Valley, Peru

LEWIS TAYLOR

During recent years, a rapid expansion in large-scale mining activity has generated a hostof protests in Peru, as rural populations have attempted to defend their livelihood andenvironment.This article examines the genesis and trajectory of one such mobilization thatemerged in the province of San Marcos and neighbouring Condebamba Valley, located in thenorthern Andean department of Cajamarca. The social movement’s internal organization,strategy, tactics and repertoires of struggle are analyzed. Practices inherited from the rondascampesinas (nightwatch patrols) are seen to have exercised an important influence in shapingits modus operandi, which contrasts in key respects with the behaviour of other anti-miningprotests in Peru, such as Majaz.The article concludes with an assessment of how shiftingpower relations within the state might influence the chances of successful collective action inthe countryside.

Keywords: Peru, social movements, rondas campesinas, anti-mining protest,decentralization

INTRODUCTION

Against a backdrop of neo-liberal policies devised to facilitate investment opportunities forforeign capital and fuelled by an exponential rise in world commodity prices, since the early1990s large-scale mining and hydrocarbon operations in Peru have grown significantly, stimu-lating a plethora of often bitterly contested disputes involving rural communities (Bebbington2007). Similar trends can be observed in neighbouring republics. ‘Resource wars’ are currentlyoccurring throughout the Andean region, as peasant smallholders concerned to defend liveli-hood and environment have pitted themselves in seemingly hopeless David and Goliath stylecontests against powerful multinational corporations and central governments of both the left(Evo Morales, Rafael Correa) and right (Alvaro Uribe).1 The struggle over land and naturalresources attained international attention through events in the Amazonian province of Baguaon 5 June 2009, when a protest against the García administration’s concession of petroleumexploration rights on indigenous territory sparked a confrontation costing the lives of ten

Lewis Taylor, Latin American Studies, University of Liverpool, 86 Bedford Street South, Liverpool L69 7WW, UK.E-mail: [email protected]

Fieldwork for this paper was conducted in Peru during March–April 2008 and December 2008–January 2009.The article could not have been written without the collaboration of participants in the mobilization analyzedhere. Their support is gratefully acknowledged, but in order to avoid potentially untoward consequences, theyremain anonymous. Where individual names are cited, the information is already in the public domain. I wouldalso like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their critical comments on an earlier draft.1 Bebbington (2009) provides an insightful discussion on ‘new extraction’ conflicts.

Journal of Agrarian Change, Vol. 11 No. 3, July 2011, pp. 420–439.

© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

civilians and 24 dead police. Indeed, with commendable prescience, on 31 May 2009 the highlyrespected Defensoría del Pueblo (Ombudsman’s Office) published a report that identified 268social conflicts in Peru, of which 79 per cent were deemed ‘live’; some 38 per cent related tomining activities. Confrontations have not only involved those opposed to natural resourceexploitation. Individuals engaged in illegal operations that usually cause dire environmentalconsequences have increasingly entered into battle against state authorities keen to restrict theirwork. During April 2010, a protest in the Amazonian department of Madre de Dios resulted insix informal gold miners being shot by the police. In the same month, a clash betweenapproximately 6,000 informal prospectors and 1,000 police in the southern department ofArequipa produced a similar number of dead protesters and 80 injured – among them eightpolice who received gunshot wounds.

Within this wider scenario, in its latest report (June 2010) the Ombudsman’s Office recorded250 conflicts, 169 being categorized as active. Of these, 18 were occurring in the northernhighland department of Cajamarca; 13 (11 ‘live’, two latent) concerned mineral extraction(Defensoría del Pueblo 2010, 5). This paper focuses on one of these encounters: the socialmovement that emerged post-2005 in the province of San Marcos and the adjacent Conde-bamba Valley, a mobilization that gained the participation of thousands of smallholders and alsoattracted support among an increasing swathe of the urban population. The catalyst forcollective action followed moves by the Peruvian subsidiary of Brazilian corporation Vale toexploit gold and copper deposits located at Cerro Mogol, a mountain overlooking the smallsettlement of Cachachi, after the administration of Alejandro Toledo (2001–2006) cededexploration rights over 13,000 hectares in 2004.2

Like elsewhere in Peru, this concession directly threatened the livelihood of peasant farmersby granting the multinational legal authority to drill on cropland, pasture and woodland.Furthermore, excavation raised serious environmental concerns, especially over the distributionand pollution of (frequently scarce) water supplies used for farming pursuits and humanconsumption.3 To compound matters, mining in this particular location had the potential toexercise a deleterious impact on agriculturalists and ecology far removed from the immediatearea of operations. Cerro Mogol forms part of the headwater feeding the fecund CondebambaValley (one of the largest and most fertile inter-Andean basins in Peru), and provisions a riversystem that eventually flows into the Marañón, an important tributary of the Amazon. Theproject not only envisaged open cast operations requiring the movement of substantial quan-tities of rock and consumption of massive amounts of water. Mineral extraction would alsoutilize cyanide and mercury, exacerbating the potential negative environmental and socialconsequences of exploitation.4 The risks and possible impact on the local population werecompounded by the fragile state of the peasant economy. Over 70 per cent of agriculturalistscultivated minifundios of less than five hectares, their situation mirroring Richard Tawney’s

2 The state-owned enterprise Vale do Rio Doce was privatized and renamed Vale. The second largest miningcorporation in the world after BHP Billington, it comprises the world’s biggest producer of iron ore and possessedcash reserves of £12.6 billion on its balance sheet at the end of financial year 2008.3 For informed, detailed discussion regarding the livelihood impact of mining activity on Cajamarca’s ruraleconomy, see Bury (2004, 2005).4 Indicative of the remarkable insensitivity that came to characterize its treatment of the local population, thePeruvian subsidiary of the Brazilian corporation was initially named ‘Miski Mayo’, which perversely signifies ‘ríodulce’ (‘sweet river’) in Quechua. In 2008 the enterprise renamed itself ‘Vale Perú’, to coincide with the switch inownership of the parent organization in Brazil and also as part of a public relations rebranding exercise in the faceof increasingly hostile media coverage.The title Miski Mayo will be employed when referring to events prior tothis name change, to reflect the content of internal company documents, official correspondence, social movementdeclarations and newspaper articles. For a review of different perspectives on mining as a pathway to development,see Bebbington et al. (2008).

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famous description likening the rural Chinese to a man standing up to his neck in water andleading a life so precarious ‘that even a single ripple is sufficient to drown him’. In consequence,the slightest disruption to prevailing complex household survival strategies constructed arounda melange of farm and non-farm pursuits could propel smallholders into the ranks of the urbandispossessed, eking out an uncertain hand-to-mouth existence.5

A survey of contemporary Latin American rural social movements has emphasized the needto ‘look back at historical processes’, while also noting that ‘new peasant movements defendsustainable agriculture, reduced land concentration, reduced dependency on environmentallydestructive techniques, and fuller utilization of indigenous inputs such as native seeds’ (Welchand Fernandes 2009, 4). It was further observed ‘how important peasant movements have beento democratization processes in Latin America’ (Welch and Fernandes 2009, 5).Another reviewbemoaned that ‘few of these studies provide a full understanding of the internal dynamics of theagrarian movements themselves’ (Borras et al. 2008, 179). When considering recent develop-ments in Peru’s mining sector, Arellano-Yanguas noted that studies adopting a ‘resource curse’perspective have traditionally ‘given insufficient attention to the relevance of local politicaldynamics and to the actors involved in them’; even though ‘analysis at the sub-national level iscrucial’ for understanding the origins and trajectory of conflicts, as well as their outcomes, ‘thelocal dimension remains unsatisfactorily examined’ (2008, 12, 14). Following such admonish-ments, this article opens with a summary of the historical antecedents to the San Marcos–Condebamba Valley mobilization, before proceeding to analyze the movement’s strategy andtactics, internal organization, the problems activists encountered and moves made to surmountthese. The discussion also engages with relevant literature on the characteristics of otheranti-mining protests in Peru (particularly Majaz), as well as considering their wider implicationsvis-à-vis governance, political legitimacy and shifting power relations within the Peruvian state.It concludes with an assessment of how the latter might affect the chances of successfulcollective action by rural people.

HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS

To comprehend the warp and woof of the San Marcos–Condebamba Valley movement, it isnecessary to pass brief comment on the populace’s socio-political experiences over recentdecades. During the reformist military government of Juan Velasco (1968–1975), freeholders,estate tenants and workers agitated in favour of land reform. Simultaneously, activists affiliatedto the left and the Confederación Campesina del Perú (at the time the nation’s largestindependent peasant syndicate), mounted land invasions aimed at accelerating the expropriationprocess and implementing a grassroots via campesina alternative to the agrarian productionco-operatives being established by the Ministry of Agriculture in a top-down fashion. Followinga crime wave in the countryside during the early 1980s, rondas campesinas (nightwatch patrols)were created in an effort to eradicate rustling, petty theft and, once socially embedded,expanded their remit to settling all manner of inter- and intra-village disputes. They soondeveloped a quick, cheap and honest alternative system of transparent justice outside thecorrupt and overtly bureaucratic official system that usually discriminated against rural people.6

Despite registering considerable success, which garnered the rondas widespread popularsupport, especially when compared with compromised state institutions, post-1982 these grass-

5 Additional data on local agrarian structure and household economy is available in Taylor (2006, 71–80).6 On the origins of the rondas campesinas in Peru’s northern highlands, see Gitlitz and Rojas (1983). Starn (1999)provides the fullest account of their structure and operation.

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roots entities quickly found themselves caught in the crossfire between Partido Comunista delPerú – Sendero Luminoso (PCP-SL) insurgents and the repressive organs of the Peruvian state.Prominent figures involved in the nightwatch patrols received death threats from the PCP-SL,as guerrilla commanders wished to control all social and political activity in the countryside.For their part, army and police officers viewed the rondas with considerable suspicion, fearingthat they might be ‘captured’ by the insurgents, an alignment that would have greatly compli-cated counter-insurgency operations.This resulted in high-profile activists being falsely accusedof ‘terrorism’, suffering repeated detentions, beatings and the threat of being handed a 20- or30-year jail sentence after a summary 30-minute trial conducted by a ‘faceless’ judge. Unsur-prisingly, in the face of such hostility, by the mid-1980s most rondas campesinas in San Marcosand the Condebamba Valley had collapsed.7

The struggle for land reform during the 1970s and the bitter experience of civil war duringthe following decade has, nevertheless, facilitated the creation, as well as influenced the strategyand tactics, of the protest movement against attempts by Miski Mayo to open a mine at CerroMogol. Living through such turbulent times compelled an older generation of organizers tohone their political skills. It also instilled a circumspect approach to dealings with stateauthorities and logically produced a degree of ‘militant burn out’. In consequence, an examin-ation of the contemporary movement reveals that the layer of compañeros politically involvedfrom the Velasco period have taken a back seat, while their sons and daughters figure promi-nently among the network of activists who provide backbone and coherence to the recentmobilization.That said, the oldsters have not withdrawn altogether, allowing the movement tobenefit from a valuable font of social capital. Parents who cut their political teeth in the late1960s and 1970s employ their long experience to proffer advice on an array of practicalmatters, such as the drawing up of demands to be presented to officialdom and the meticulousorganization of demonstrations. Their input on how best to handle confrontations with thepolice, or respond to provocations emanating from armed vigilantes hired by the Company, hasbeen particularly beneficial during certain intense moments in the struggle.The well-developednetwork of urban contacts they had cultivated over several decades could also be employed togood effect when it became necessary to liaise with local and regional officials (both electedand bureaucratic).Ties with strategically placed journalists provided a conduit to help promotethe movement’s cause through the national and local media.

MODES OF PROTEST, STRATEGY AND TACTICS

It has been noted that agrarian movements pass ‘through the natural dynamics of ebb and flowover time’, and the San Marcos–CondebambaValley protest conforms to such a pattern (Borraset al. 2008, 184). For analytical purposes, the trajectory of the struggle can be divided into threephases: (i) prostelytizing in hamlets and villages in order to garner grassroots support andconstruct a network for mobilization during 2005–2006; (ii) the initiation of multiple ‘reper-toires’ of direct action, 2007–2008; and (iii) a period of open protest combined with politickingin and around state institutions, which eventually produced a halt to drilling operations at CerroMogol (December 2008) and the withdrawal of Vale Perú’s heavy equipment (April 2009), andculminated in a legal victory for activists being accused of public order offences (December2009).

As is commonplace with social movements, the initial task was to construct a social base.Thefirst inkling the denizens of San Marcos gleaned about the project to mine Cerro Mogol

7 Additional information concerning the trajectory of the rondas campesinas at this juncture can be found in Taylor(2006).



happened in November 2004, when the local mayor invited Miski Mayo representatives tooutline their plans at the cabildo abierto (open forum) held every Sunday morning in themunicipality. Following this event, news spread and sparked debate, conducted formally via asuccession of village meetings convened over 2005 and 2006.The message driven home at thesegatherings held that although mining generated wealth, it only reached the pockets of a tinyminority. It was necessary to defend sustainable agricultural development that would providefuture generations with a living.The consequences of polluted water supplies, as had occurredin other areas where mining took place, also comprised a potent argument.

Historical ‘memory’ in the shape of the legacy of the rondas campesinas proved invaluable ingetting the movement started and facilitated the swift building of support. In this regard, thecrucial point is that the nightwatch patrols created during the early 1980s still enjoyedwidespread legitimacy among the rural population. Although the rondas had ceased to exist bythe late 1980s, or in a few cases operated clandestinely below the radar of army and guerrilla,they continued to be viewed with a mixture of nostalgia and pride, having emerged as anauthentic peasant solution to peasant problems. A model for village-level organization wastherefore readily available, one that was comprehensible, commanded loyalty and was based ondeep-rooted community traditions of discussing issues in open assemblies.8

Minds became concentrated in December 2006 when an access road was constructed to theexcavation site, and by the time drilling commenced in April 2007 a rapid rebirth of the rondascampesinas had occurred. The existence of networks constructed around an adequate level oftrust and possessing the capacity to speedily transmit and act on information explain thisdevelopment.9 Tellingly, such a quick response and recuperation in grassroots organization wasfacilitated by efforts made during the mid-1990s (under trying circumstances in the face ofhostility from the Fujimori regime) by the aforementioned younger generation of compañeroswho, encouraged by their parents, were determined to keep the rondas alive. Furthermore,through their commitment they were already well known to the local population and possesseda web of contacts within San Marcos’ villages and hamlets that could be quickly tapped intoonce the mining issue arose.Their fathers’ history of activism and positive reputation also actedto enhance mutual confidence – trust being a valuable commodity in a social context wherecaution and suspicion had deepened due to the civil war – facilitating acceptance of theirmessage.As a result, by early 2007 the rondas campesinas emerged reinvigorated to an extent thatthey had attained greater strength and density throughout the countryside than when PCP-SLcadres began to target the area in 1982.10 This cat’s-cradle of base organizations underpinnedthe creation of the Frente de Defensa de la Cuenca del Río Cajamarquino (Front for the

8 Importantly, participants in the San Marcos–Condebamba Valley mobilization did not only rely on their own‘historical memory’. Links were established with other anti-mining protests, particularly those at Tambogrande andMajaz (Piura) and against Minera Yanacocha in Cajamarca. Activists in San Marcos could take heart from notablevictories (such as occurred at Tambogrande in December 2003, when the Manhattan Minerals Corporation wasbanned from excavating), as well as learn from their experiences and mistakes.Visits were made from San Marcosto talk through issues confronting the movement with participants in other struggles. This repeated certainpractices from the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the denizens of San Marcos travelled to the provinces of Chotaand Bambamarca to learn from communities that had already created rondas campesinas. In the new struggle, thenightwatch patrol movement throughout the departments of Cajamarca and Piura provided an established networkof contacts that could be readily tapped.9 The existence of a historical ‘memory’ of organization in the countryside, which enables ‘reactivation’ andanti-mining protest movements to take root, has also been emphasized by De Echave et al. (2009, 180, 183, 195).10 The organizational drive at this juncture garnered valuable support from rural schoolteachers, a number ofwhom came from peasant households, still worked the land and possessed useful internet skills, which assisted therapid circulation of information inside and outside Peru. They were also comfortable in both rural and urbanmilieu, a blurring of the town–country divide noted by Kay (2008, 925–6).

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Defence of the Cajamarquino River Basin) in spring 2007, an umbrella organization that actedas a coordinating vehicle for propaganda and mobilization.

Once the desired level of base support had been established, the movement proceeded toadopt a variety of measures aimed at raising its regional and national profile.The first significantprotest within the second phase of the struggle took place on 21 May 2007, when approxi-mately 400 campesinos from ten villages marched on the drilling site intent on conducting an‘inspección ocular’ (‘direct observation’) to acquire first-hand knowledge of Miski Mayo’s opera-tion.At the entrance to the site the protesters found themselves confronted by armed vigilanteshired by the mining company, who were backed by villagers from the adjacent peasantcommunity of Mogol, some of whom at this stage favoured exploration on their land (to bediscussed below). Fearful of a violent confrontation, two elected representatives of the RegionalGovernment appeared on the scene and, through promising to meet a commission of repre-sentatives to discuss grievances on 13 June at the head office located in the town of Cajamarca,managed to persuade the demonstrators to disperse. When negotiations failed to addressconcerns satisfactorily, the Frente de Defensa convened a second action, to commence on 9August 2007. An estimated 2,000 smallholders participated in this mobilization, which deter-mined to conduct another ‘inspección ocular’. As the organizers had notified the authorities oftheir intentions, upon arrival at the entrance to Miski Mayo’s concession they found themselvesfaced by approximately 80 armed police, who, being heavily outnumbered, allowed a delegationinto the exploration area to examine the drilling platforms. A mass squat then commencedoutside the main gates, so preventing all movement of personnel or equipment.

A hastily convened general assembly adopted a collective decision to continue the blockade.It also resolved that a delegation consisting of high-ranking functionaries from the Ministry ofEnergy and Mines and the Cabinet Office in Lima, accompanied by officials from Cajamarca’sRegional Government, present themselves to hear grievances and negotiate a settlement.Withthe blockade holding firm and gathering attention in the national press, on 15 August 2007 thiscommission arrived at Cerro Mogol and, under the psychological pressure emanating from sucha large and determined body of protesters, accepted a number of their central arguments. It wasagreed that mining activity was inappropriate at Cerro Mogol given its strategic positionvis-à-vis water supplies. A demand that heavy earth-moving equipment be removed from thesite was also granted by the authorities, who further conceded that a ‘comisión técnica’ would bedispatched from Lima to undertake a more detailed study into the wider environmentalimplications of mineral exploitation.

Despite the apparent conciliatory stance adopted by these functionaries, the protesters’ longmemories of dealing with the state fed doubt as to their trustworthiness.The blockade thereforecontinued until 26 August, being sustained by food supplies and blankets supplied by themunicipality of San Marcos, as well as donations originating from solidarity networks based inEurope.11 Scepticism appeared justified, when on 29 August a letter from Miski Mayo execu-tives to the Regional Government stating that the Company had no intention of suspendingoperations at Cerro Mogol, was leaked by a sympathetic functionary employed inside thereceiving institution. Such duplicity gave impetus to a ‘hunger march’ (‘marcha de sacrificio’) fromthe Condebamba Valley to Cajamarca.This took place between 5 and 7 September 2007, againsustained by provisions donated by the municipality, and culminated with demonstrationsoutside the prefect’s office and the headquarters of the Regional Government.While the action

11 The support network operated in an informal manner and never attained the level of institutional backing (e.g.from OXFAM or the Peru Support Group) enjoyed by the Tambogrande and Majaz mobilizations (De Echaveet al. 2009, 38, 65).



attracted considerable media attention and mostly sympathetic coverage in the press and localtelevision, efforts to sustain pressure on the authorities led to the organization of an inter-provincial strike covering all of San Marcos and Condebamba. Held from 28 to 30 September2007, this stoppage received widespread backing, paralyzing most commercial activity andtransportation.

Together the protest march and strike produced the desired effect. Employees in differentstate bureaucracies realized that the movement was gathering momentum and would notdisappear, rendering some serious official response inevitable. Under the watchful gaze of 150police, on 26 October 2007 a ‘mesa de diálogo’ (arbitration meeting) was held in the main plazaof San Marcos, where the populace could debate directly with representatives of Miski Mayo,the Regional Government, Ministry of Energy and Mines and Ministry of Agriculture. Thisday-long meeting adjourned without reaching any significant or binding accords. It did,however, reveal differences in outlook between wholehearted support for the project by theMinistry of Energy and Mines and a more circumspect position voiced by officials from theother institutions, which did not go unnoticed. For many attendees the lack of concreteproposals represented an unsatisfactory outcome, sentiments that produced another protestmarch and blockade of the excavation site at Cerro Mogol (18 December 2007), an event thatmarked the end of the mobilization’s second phase.

Analyzing the tactics employed to attain the strategic goal of preventing full-scale miningoperations at Cerro Mogol, several features stand out. Direct action went hand-in-hand with avariety of behind the scenes initiatives aimed at minimizing the likelihood of outright staterepression. To this end, links were established with the departmental Ombudsman’s Officelocated in the town of Cajamarca, whose personnel were informed regularly about planneddemonstrations. Usually these letters would originate from elected representatives, such asChanel Ruiz (the councillor for San Marcos province to the Regional Government), in theexpectation that they would carry more weight in bureaucratic circles. The Ombudsman’sOffice would then communicate with the prefecture, the local police headquarters and thepublic prosecutor’s office, reminding them that protest represented a constitutional right. Aflavour of these letters can be gleaned from one such memorandum sent to the chief of policein December 2007, on the eve of a march from the Condebamba Valley to Cerro Mogol:

As on occasions protests relating to environmental issues have resulted in violent clashes,causing violations of the human right of citizens, public employees and even deaths . . . theOmbudsman’s Office REQUESTS that, considering your responsibility for the main-tenance of public order, you adopt measures that comply with the State’s duty to guaranteefull respect for human rights, in accordance with Article 44 of the Constitution.

Moreover, remembering that one of the principles that guide our public administration isto ‘serve the citizen’, we ask that your institution undertakes actions that contribute to theprevention of any violent incident. Priority should be given to dialogue and the avoidanceof any irrational and disproportionate use of force, as is required by Article 10 of theNational Police Code, Law 27238.12

Through evoking the Constitution and Police Code, it was subtly hinted that unfortunaterepercussions might befall personnel responsible for any inappropriate response that producedbloodshed.The Ombudsman’s Office also intervened to encourage police restraint by sending

12 Letter from the Ombudsman for Cajamarca to the departmental Chief of Police, General Víctor Fernández,17 December 2007. A similar letter was written to the head of the judiciary.

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its staff (carrying official accreditations and wearing the institution’s uniform) to film demon-strations in a purposely conspicuous fashion.

Other official paths were utilized by movement activists to advance the struggle.Through theintervention of sympathetic parliamentarians in Lima, the Committee of Andean and Ama-zonian Peoples for the Environment and Ecology was regularly informed about unfoldingevents in San Marcos and Condebamba, particularly legal violations committed by theCompany and incidents concerning threats of violence. The chair of this congressional com-mittee would then forward copies of correspondence to the national Ombudswoman andPrime Minister, requesting an investigation and appropriate action.13 Parallel to these initiatives,prosecutions were launched against the Company, alleging violations of articles in the Consti-tution and other legal provisions relating to environmental protection, the defence of agricul-tural property and water supplies. To add weight to the charges, these would be filed bysympathizers who occupied positions in the state’s own elected bodies, while friendly lawyerspursued cases at no cost – a matter of some import given the constant shortage of cash. Publicmessages of support were also elicited from individuals positioned within the lower echelons ofthe civil arm of the state apparatus, such as the mayor of San Marcos, the local governor andjustices of the peace. In another move designed to demonstrate wide backing and give themovement added legitimacy, on 15 August 2007 nuns and priests from different parishes in theSan Marcos–Condebamba area issued an open letter stating their opposition to the miningproject and calling for ‘the defence of life and the environment’.14

Paralleling efforts to build multiple sources of support from within and outside the stateapparatus, the movement implemented a number of internal procedures designed to improve itschances of success. Prior to embarking on a particular action, careful preparation at the villagelevel was undertaken through the forum of the rondas campesinas. These discussions typicallyinvolved an assessment of current developments and the response best suited to advancing themovement’s agenda. If a public action was decided upon, agreement would be reached abouthow to behave and react to anticipated scenarios. Designated stewards were issued with bibsannouncing that wearers were ‘official’ appointees from the Federación de Rondas Campesinas,a practice copied from the Ombudsman’s Office, whose officials don similar livery whenmonitoring elections, conducting training workshops and observing demonstrations. Once aprotest commenced, these stewards placed themselves at strategic points at the front and sidesof the main body, forming a ‘cushion’ between the rank-and-file, the police or any unofficialhostile elements intent on provocation. Owing to these measures, demonstrations unfolded ina disciplined fashion, as evinced during the first blockade of the drilling site: on 15 August 2007participants detected a police informer within their ranks (who was posing as working for anenvironmental NGO), as well as four members of the intelligence services. They were con-fronted and overpowered, but not mistreated, having their notebooks confiscated before beinghanded back to the police. As will be seen, the thoughtful fashion in which actions wereplanned and conducted contrasted sharply with the less measured behaviour of certain MiskiMayo employees.

The third (and to date final) phase in the struggle commenced in autumn 2008 and unfoldedin a socio-political environment shaped by an increasingly hostile attitude to social movementson the part of central government. Egged on by the business community, the García admin-istration sought to impose its authority through a more vigorous application of legal measures.

13 Examples include the letter from Gloria Ramos, chair of the parliamentary committee, to Beatriz Merino,head of the Defensoría del Pueblo, 26 June 2008 (in the author’s possession).14 Liberation theology elements within the Catholic Church have played important roles in the Tambograndeand Majaz protests, department of Piura (De Echave et al. 2009, 54, 263).



Granting permission to the police for the use of firearms against protesters also became morerelaxed, particularly in cases concerning extractive industry investments, which the executiveregarded as a motor of GDP growth and tax revenue. Reflecting these shifting political sands,on 23 September 2008 arrest warrants were issued against four leaders of the San Marcos–Condebamba Valley mobilization. During the following month, the number of accused rose toten: seven ronda campesina leaders, two rural schoolteachers and Chanel Ruiz, elected memberto the Regional Government for the province of San Marcos. Being charged with organizingroadblocks, the prosecution called for 6–7 years’ detention, along with the imposition of a20,000 soles fine (approximately £4,500), to be paid as compensation toVale Perú for disruptionto its business.

Recourse to legal measures failed to exercise the dampening impact desired by the Companyand national government. Rather, litigation bred popular anger, being widely interpreted as acrude attempt to use the law in favour of a foreign multinational against the wishes of its owncitizens. Such a sense of injustice provided the backdrop to additional mobilization.15 InDecember 2008,Vale Perú had been issued with a judicial order to halt operations after beingaccused of falsifying signatures supposedly giving the enterprise permission to drill on campesinoland. Three months later this decree was lifted and the enterprise aimed to recommenceexploration on 30 April 2009, the site being protected by 50 police.This turn of events sparkeda new wave of protests, including another marcha de sacrificio to lobby the Regional Governmentin Cajamarca (29 to 30 April 2009), followed by a mass demonstration in the town of SanMarcos on 2 May.At this meeting Vale Perú was issued with an ultimatum: abandon the site by10 May or an indefinite blockade would be instigated. Fearful that it would be unable to defendits concession despite the substantial police presence, the Company removed all its equipment.

Attention now switched from Cerro Mogol to the legal dispute proceeding through thecourts. With feelings running high in town and country, on 8 May 2009 the judge in SanMarcos postponed sentencing the ten accused activists when, in a show of solidarity, demon-strations protesting the prosecutions occurred throughout the zone to the slogan ‘¡Agro sí,minería no!’These actions proved a prelude to a department-wide mobilization, mounted by theFederación Regional de Rondas Campesinas de Cajamarca, which called for the annulment ofall mining concessions in Cajamarca, in addition to an end to government attempts at thecriminalization of protest and the harassment of ronda campesina leaders. Pressure on the streetshortly bore fruit with breakthroughs in the official sphere. Following an internal EnvironmentImpact Assessment, on 2 July 2009 the Director of the Environment and Natural ResourcesUnit within the Regional Government,Tulio Mondragón, declared at a press conference that:‘Contamination will occur due to the extractive procedures Minera Vale Perú proposes to useat Cerro Mogol’, adding that agriculture should form the development priority in the area.16

This decision was backed by the President of the Regional Government, Jesús Coronel, who

15 Arrellano-Yanguas also noted the ‘widespread public suspicion of collusion between Peru’s government andmining companies that erodes the authority and legitimacy of the state’, an outcome being that ‘the state is unableto fulfill its role as arbitrator between the people and the companies’ (2008, 27).16 Mondragón’s declaration was reported in Panorama Cajamarquino (Cajamarca), 3 July 2009. In a timely studyanalyzing the bureaucratic micro-politics surrounding the Environmental Impact Assessment process conducted inrelation to the Yanacocha gold mine in the neighbouring province of Cajamarca, Li (2009) found that the termsof reference and conduct of the inquiry were shaped by the consortium headed by the Newmont Gold Company,who furthermore contracted the US-based multinational consultancy enterprise charged with evaluating theconsequences of exploitation on water quality and supply. It was noted that: ‘To date, only one major miningproject at the EIA stage has been halted due to public opposition: the Tambogrande project in Northern Peru’(2009, 220).The similar outcome registered in the San Marcos–Condebamba Valley case reflected growing publicscepticism about the neutrality and transparency of such exercises, with locally elected representatives beingparticularly susceptible to the consequences of popular anger.

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opined: ‘This location should not be exploited or contaminated. Priority should be given toagriculture and livestock rearing, which is important in this zone’.17

With the social movement’s argument gaining ground at the political level, more positivenews emerged on the legal front. Besieged inside her modest courthouse in San Marcos by amass protest and defended by only 13 police, on 9 July 2009 Judge María Castro had once againpostponed sentencing the ten accused. Her verdict was finally announced on 21 August 2009,when 200 police surrounded the court and hundreds demonstrated through the streets.The tenaccused received 4 years’ imprisonment and a 20,000 soles fine. Fearing a repetition of the tragicevents at Bagua (and exhibiting uncharacteristic dispatch), however, the sentences were im-mediately suspended on appeal, with the compensation payment being reduced to 2,000 soles.Later, on 22 December 2009, the ruling was overturned by a higher court sitting in Cajamarca,charges being dropped and the file archived.18

PROBLEMS

Although the protest movement had by July 2009 won an important battle, if perhaps not thewar given that continuing high commodity prices might encourage another attempt at exploit-ing Cerro Mogol and the possibility exists that new legal proceedings might be initiated, thisoutcome was not achieved in an uncomplicated fashion. As the struggle unfolded it becamenecessary to confront several important problems. A first obstacle concerned schisms amongthe rural population, which were promoted by the mining company as part of a premeditateddivide-and-rule policy. In a confidential report penned in 2004 by Dante Vera, an ex-memberof the Maoist Patria Roja (‘Red Homeland’) party and currently an occasional consultant forPeru’s Ministry of Energy and Mines, it was recommended that enterprises establish a ‘pro-tective cordon’ around their installations. This, Vera argued, was to be accomplished throughchannelling benefits to the denizens of strategically placed communities.19

Following Vera’s recommendations, on 17 July 2005 Miski Mayo employees embarked on a‘hearts and minds’ campaign aimed at building support within peasant communities located inthe immediate vicinity of the concession. Barbecues were organized, with presents for thechildren, free drink, football competitions and similar entertainments. ‘Educational workshops’,delivered by graduates from the university in Cajamarca, emphasized the benefits that wouldflow from a fully functioning mine: jobs, social investment in village schools, housing, healthcentres, electrification, including road improvements to facilitate mobility and the transportationof agricultural produce. Considering the harsh living conditions in these villages, such blan-dishments understandably proved highly attractive, especially as Miski Mayo representativespromised to utilize the latest technology which, they argued, would avoid negative environ-mental consequences.

Evidence of raised expectations is forthcoming in the various ‘Actas de Permiso’ (agreements)signed between Miski Mayo and local communities. In an initial accord struck with the hamletof Huayanmarca on 5 September 2005, it was decided that the enterprise would: ‘Improve theroad from Jesús to Huayanmarca. Furthermore, if the project proceeds, the Company agrees to

17 Panorama Cajamarquino, 3 July 2009.18 Panorama Cajamarquino, 22 August 2009; La República, 22 August 2009; Panorama Cajamarquino, 11 January 2010.19 The report stated that: ‘Mining companies should regard a social investment plan as a crucial initiative, seekingan agreement or alliance with rondas campesinas at village, district and provincial level.The objective should be toconstruct a secure preventative social cordon (“un cordon social de seguridad preventiva”) to protect mining activity,before radical political forces (such as Patria Roja) end up controlling these organizations for their own purposes’(Vera 2004, 106).



give preference to citizens of this zone when hiring workers. It also undertakes to provideassistance in the areas of education, health, basic services and social programmes’. A seconddocument, recording the minutes of a meeting held on 28 November 2006, stipulated that themultinational committed itself to ‘improve economic and social standards of living’ in Huay-anmarca. Significantly, it also indicated an increased desire within the community to obtainmore specific promises from Miski Mayo representatives and provided an early inkling ofgrowing concerns among some villagers:

During the assembly, Jesús Jara Ramos, Asencio Jara Bada, Marcelino Quispe Rumay,Teodoro Cerna López, Javier Cotrina Jara and others voiced a number of preoccupations.These involved questions of personal security, job stability, accidents at work, hours ofwork, the use of mining equipment, etc. These issues and concerns were addressed bycompany consultants, with the smallholders who spoke being satisfied with the guaranteesprovided.20

Miski Mayo representatives informed villagers that the daily wage would be 25 soles (approxi-mately £5) for an eight-hour shift, paid weekly; if the workers used their own tools, anadditional 5 soles would be paid; employees were prohibited from turning up for work drunk;health costs arising from work accidents would be covered by the Company; foremen wouldnot come from the zone, in order to avoid favouritism when hiring, among other measures.Given these assurances, the document recorded that: ‘The smallholders give full consent toMiski Mayo to commence exploration . . . and the Company will periodically inform aboutthe progress of the work being undertaken’. Similar agreements were struck with three adjacentcommunities, Mogol, Pashul and El Chirimoyo.

This development forced activists enrolled in the Frente de Defensa to make importanttactical decisions: how best to erode acquiescence to mining operations and consolidate aunited front? To this question, the movement adopted a conscious policy to eschew violentconfrontation and embark upon a counter hearts-and-minds campaign aimed at persuadingpro-mining elements in the four communities to alter their stance.Arriving at this position wasfacilitated by practices common to the rondas campesinas vis-à-vis their treatment of rustlers andother felons; the legacy of the civil war also assisted in reaching this decision. Within thenightwatch patrols the emphasis has been on convincing people as to the error of their waysand reintegrating them into the community (Starn 1999). Memories of the armed conflict stillbeing fresh in the minds of many country people, they needed little reminding about thepotential dangers of using force to achieve their goal. Engagement in illegal acts would providea convenient excuse for state repression, gift a propaganda opportunity to Miski Mayo andultimately be counterproductive, in that it could provoke deeper schism within the ruralpopulation, so facilitating the Company’s objectives.21

The ensuing exercise in ‘consciousness-raising’ bore fruit, as backing for Miski Mayo startedto weaken, a trend encouraged by basic faux pas committed by the multinational. Despitepledges made in village assemblies, job creation never exceeded 56 workers employed when theaccess road was being constructed to the excavation site (December 2006) and soon declinedto 30 watchmen employed on three shifts. Promised levels of financial compensation paid to

20 ‘Minutes of agreements and commitments between Huayanmarca village and consultants of the Miski MayoMining Company’, mimeo, 28 November 2006. Copies of these documents in my possession.21 Engaging in uncontrolled violence and succumbing to provocations mounted by government actors or miningcompanies have been seen as factors that have led to the defeat of protests elsewhere in Peru (De Echave et al.2009, 209–10).

430 Lewis Taylor


campesinos whose land was directly affected by drilling never materialized, while according tothe original agreement, the Company stated that it would only undertake exploration opera-tions for three months, another commitment it failed to honour. Alienation also spread owingto the behaviour of the police detachment stationed to protect the mining camp: inadequatelyprovisioned, the guardias resorted to living off the local population, extracted firewood withoutasking permission and dumped rubbish carelessly in the fields surrounding their billet. Tocompound matters, Miski Mayo employees falsified the signatures of some smallholders topurportedly grant the Company permission to begin drilling on their property.

This act and other irritants that could have easily been avoided if the enterprise had actedwith a modicum of political adroitness, helped build opposition within those communities thathad initially favoured drilling, a sea change in attitude that can be appreciated from internalMiski Mayo documents. At the bottom of a receipt originally signed on 1 February 2007between Isidoro Fernández for the multinational (his activities will be discussed presently) andthe concerned smallholder, the Company’s representative added the comment: ‘Owner of landto access the site. States he never gave permission and that we tricked him’. Another receiptsigned on 11 April 2007 contains the appendage, again in Fernández’ hand: ‘Today anopposition leader’, while a third dated 2 March 2007 records: ‘Owner of land. Now he is notin agreement’. Miski Mayo’s social base was undergoing erosion, while simultaneously theprotest movement’s message was gaining traction.22

A second thorny issue that emerged when Miski Mayo first appeared in the zone concerneddivisions between town and country. A sector of the petit-bourgeoisie settled in the town ofSan Marcos looked favourably on the project, anticipating that an upsurge in mining activitywould increase sales in shops, restaurants and bars, as well as boost the market for rentedaccommodation. One activist from San Marcos noted: ‘Until now, we have been growingstrongly in the countryside.With the townspeople it is more complicated. Many are undecided,as they hope to take advantage and make money.They expect more business, but don’t realizehow they could be affected’. To counter such notions, the Frente de Defensa stressed thepotential health impact of polluted water supplies, while also highlighting the negative socialconsequences (increases in street crime and prostitution) that followed the opening of theYanacocha gold mine outside the town of Cajamarca in 1993. In this campaign, support fromthe local radio station helped get the message across and weakened pro-Miski Mayo sentimentamong townspeople.23

A third and more tangled set of issues concerned the increasingly aggressive stance adoptedby the mining company and national government once the protest movement moved fromconsciousness-raising to direct action.The situation was aptly summarized by one activist, whoopined:

We know we have to act with a lot of caution. Although some officials are sympatheticto us, García’s APRA government want the project to go ahead at full steam.Therefore,they will look for any excuse to arrest us and break the movement. We need to avoid

22 Raising expectations that mining companies failed to meet fueled mistrust, discontent and ultimately con-tributed to protest in other localities. One such case concerned the Las Bambas mine in the department ofApurímac (De Echave et al. 2009, 152–65). On this question, also see Arellano-Yanguas (2008, 25).23 The movement’s ‘hearts-and-minds’ initiative was facilitated by the widespread disbelief that exists among theurban (and rural) poor vis-à-vis the positive development consequences of mining activity. Loudly promisedbenefits have bypassed the majority of households. Mistrust of water testing programmes financed and controlledby the mining corporations also abounds, as does a lack of confidence in the independence and competence ofstate institutions charged with overseeing environmental regulation and policing company activities. On theseissues, see Bebbington and Bury (2009).



giving them the opportunity.At the same time we must keep up the pressure. Getting thebalance right is going to be hard, but we need to think carefully and find a way forward.

From within the multinational, the campaign of intimidation was orchestrated by IsidoroFernández, a member of its community relations division, even though his attitude to ‘com-munity relations’ proved more akin to the Camorra than any advice forthcoming from socialcooperation or development manuals. In an effort to silence Miski Mayo’s most vociferouscritics, Fernández assembled a group of thugs who engaged in a series of illegal acts. Unbowed,however, prominent figures in the mobilization denounced these threats to reporters from animportant national newspaper. A few examples suffice to give a flavour of the actions beingundertaken by Fernández and his band. Ronda campesina stalwart Francisco Roncal, from thehamlet of Campo Alegre in the CondebambaValley, informed journalists from La República that:‘On 26 May 2007 in the district of Eduardo Villanueva, several delinquents who are employedas security personnel for Miski Mayo attempted to kidnap me’.24 In similar vein, David andWalter Dilas, smallholders from Cochas, one of the first villages to adopt an unambiguousposition of opposition to the mine, informed the press that on 3 June 2007 in a shop adjacentto the central market in San Marcos town they had been sworn at by Isidoro Fernández, whothen prodded a pistol in their chest and stated that he was going to kill them.The presence ofother members of the public helped calm the situation.25

Perhaps the most disconcerting experience involved José Lezma, resident of Campo Alegreand a driving force behind the formation of rondas campesinas during the early 1980s. In 1988he was elected president of the Federación de Rondas Campesinas de Cajamarca, the body thatcoordinated base organizations throughout the department. Lezma’s activism and high profilein local peasant politics led to his arrest on 18 September 1989, when along with five othermembers of the rondas campesinas, he was detained as a suspected ‘terrorist’. On 20 October1990 their innocence was substantiated and they were released. This background gave hisdispute with Miski Mayo added poignancy, as the Company attempted to neutralize hisopposition by launching a defamatory campaign in the local media, which unsurprisinglyincluded claims ventilated on local television concerning the former charge of ‘terrorism’.Company officials also resorted to other underhand tactics, spreading rumours that he had askedfor money, supposedly telling them he would discontinue his opposition in return for $30,000.When bribery failed to work, Isidoro Fernández resorted to violence, physically threateninghim in May 2006.Then on 22 July 2006, while attending the weekly market in the hamlet ofAguas Calientes, Lezma was surrounded by three men in civilian clothes, bundled into a vehicleand driven to his smallholding, where: ‘They forced me to open my house, which they searchedexpecting to find a rifle.They found nothing . . . They warned me to stop being a leader anddedicate myself to personal affairs’.26

A survey of those pinpointed for personal intimidation indicates that Fernández and hisacolytes were targeting strategically placed activists, hoping that they could pressurize them tostop participating. A ‘decapitated’ movement would potentially lose direction, momentum andbecome easier to control. In any event, the ploy backfired seriously, primarily because theactivists concerned refused to be cowed; on the contrary, their resolve stiffened, helped throughstrong moral support from the rank-and-file. In another unexpected twist for Fernández and hisassociates, the publicity generated by such illegal acts attracted widespread sympathy for the

24 La República (Lima), 1 July 2007.25 According to the Dilas brothers, Fernández shouted: ‘You mother fuckers! Today it’s your turn to die . . . Iknow you. I have your photos’ (La República, 3 July 2007).26 José Lezma denounced these actions in La República, 3 July 2007.

432 Lewis Taylor


individuals concerned, and with it, their cause; being targeted also consolidated their legitimacyinside the protest movement. Paradoxically, the threats even enhanced their personal safety.Media criticism of its behaviour in this regard lost Miski Mayo credibility. It raised concern inofficial and police circles about the resort to violence by non-state actors – a sensitive questionin the aftermath of the traumatic experiences surrounding the PCP-SL insurgency during the1980s and 1990s.27

Nor was the Company’s image enhanced by the unsavoury background of a number ofindividuals who staffed its ‘defence squad’. One 37-year-old from San Marcos had beenundergoing prosecution since 2002 on drug dealing charges; another from the neighbouringprovince of Cajabamba was being tried for homicide. A third member happened to be anex-senderista, who had taken advantage of the Repentance Law (passed in May 1992 by theFujimori administration as part of its counter-insurgency campaign) to surrender to theauthorities.While involved in the insurgency, he participated in the murder of the president ofa local ronda campesina committee, as well as an assassination attempt against the sub-prefect ofOtuzco province (October 1990). The hiring of such dubious characters, whose personalhistory was well known in the zone, helped deepen Miski Mayo’s public relations problemand contributed to the Company losing the propaganda war – while providing activists withanother useful argument that could be employed in their efforts to win over wavering sectorsof the rural population.28

Although ultimately counter-productive, attempts to undermine the social movementthrough intimidation received succour following headline pronouncements emanating from theapex of the APRA government. In October 2007, Alan García published his ‘El syndrome delperro del hortelano’ (‘The Dog in the Manger Syndrome’) article, which firmly committed hisadministration to a neo-liberal agenda wholly favourable to foreign mining and hydrocarboncorporations.According to the President, the nation’s natural resources needed to be opened forexploitation forthwith, overriding objections by local communities and misguided environ-mentalists, who were holding the majority of Peruvians to ransom through hindering devel-opment.29 Such unambiguous support voiced from the centre of power in Lima clearlyprovided an additional cause for concern among members of the San Marcos–CondebambaValley mobilization, who happened to be engaged in direct conflict with one of the multi-nationals García was so enthusiastically promoting. How, then, to reconfigure relations with thestate given this changing political conjuncture?

This question attained growing salience over 2008 when, as mentioned, the APRA govern-ment resorted to the judicial system in an effort to undermine the protest.Although establishedlinks at the institutional and individual level in Lima continued to be accessed as necessary,during 2008 and 2009 extra effort was devoted to lobbying locally, with the RegionalGovernment being pinpointed as a key player. These entities had been established in 2002,with strong backing from APRA, and possessed important powers over environmental affairs.30

27 Once critical reporting about Miski Mayo’s defence squad appeared in the media, the departmental policechief sent a detachment of officers to requisition illegal arms in the vicinity of Cerro Mogol and summonedCompany officials to a meeting to explain their actions. Isidoro Fernández was issued with an arrest warrant forattempted homicide in January 2008. Although not acted upon, the measure further tarnished his personalreputation, along with that of his employer.28 Commenting more widely, Arellano-Yanguas records that the ‘arrogant behaviour of managers, miners andother mining actors generates a sense of grievance among the population’ (2008, 25).29 García’s article appeared in El Comercio (Lima), 28 October 2007. See Bebbington (2009) for details of relatednewspaper articles and commentary.30 Decree Law 28611, enacted in December 2004, devolved decision-making on various environmental questionsto regional governments.



Importantly, APRA had lost control of Cajamarca’s Regional Government in the 2006 elec-tions; having ‘independents’ in office presented political opportunities. Activists also noted thatthe institution had recently demonstrated its ecological concerns. With anti-mining mobiliza-tions occurring in many provinces, an open session of the Regional Government assembly heldon 6 July 2007 agreed to send a communiqué to the Ministry of Energy and Mines ‘demandingthat in the Cajamarca region no new mining concessions or expansion of existing miningprojects be approved, without previously consulting the regional authorities and undertakingan ecological and economic study’.31 Clearly, currents favourable to the objectives of the SanMarcos mobilization were to be found inside the institution’s political membership. Addition-ally, Chanel Ruiz enjoyed an official status as the Regional Government’s elected representativefor San Marcos province, enabling access to strategically placed officials and internal documen-tation, while the ‘agriculture yes, mining no’ argument echoed positively among his fellowcouncillors elected by other provinces in Cajamarca that faced similar difficulties vis-à-vismining corporations.

The social movement’s endeavour to gain a positive response from the Regional Govern-ment was also facilitated by the longstanding contacts that existed between certain oldergeneration activists in San Marcos and functionaries occupying strategic decision-makingpositions within the institution. Neither was their cause hindered by a hardening of attitudesamong many residents of Cajamarca against Minera Yanacocha, who operated Latin America’slargest gold mine on the city’s doorstep, where Regional Government bureaucrats resided.Attempts by this enterprise to excavate Cerro Quilish, a mountain viewed by the urbanpopulation as a major source of its domestic water supply, engendered a succession of massiveprotests in 2004. Apart from the undoubted serious environmental issues raised by miningCerro Mogol, these factors help explain the Regional Government’s ruling in favour of thesocial movement, in opposition to the wishes of the García administration in Lima.

CONCLUSION

In a perceptive review of contemporary developments, Víctor Caballero observed a markedincrease in social conflict in Peru post-2007. Since attaining office in 2006, Caballero held thatAlan García’s APRA government had not only demonstrated ‘a weak capacity to resolve them’(2009, 15). The executive’s proclivity for ‘adopting hastily conceived policies without con-sidering their impact on the population . . . and implementing them without consent’ stimu-lated disputes; in particular, laws permitting the sale of community land, affecting water use andexercising a negative environmental impact, rendered conflict ‘inevitable’ (2009, 15, 18, 30).Moreover, official inertia when faced with popular discontent, Caballero argued, spread alien-ation and promoted ‘a climate of violence and a breakdown in governance’ at the local level(2009, 19). With reference to anti-mining protest movements, he added:

The longer it takes to resolve a conflict, the mobilized population interprets governmentinaction as a snub or a sign of official disinterest, which leads to a collapse in dia-logue . . . and also promotes the emergence of radical leaders who call for aggressiveprotests that enable them to gain ascendency among the populace, undermining theauthority of local or regional government (2009, 21–22).

Movements engaged in violent acts in order to attract attention from state authorities and as aploy to strengthen their negotiating position.This dynamic created an environment conducive

31 Letter from Jesús Coronel, President of the Regional Government, to the Ministry of Energy and Mines, 24July 2007.

434 Lewis Taylor


to the rise of extremist ‘outsiders’ whose actions were not tempered via collective restrainingmechanisms emanating from political parties or effective grassroots accountability. Such leaders,Caballero posited, operated with considerable autonomy, possessed tenuous links to the baseorganizations they claimed to represent and ‘conduct conflicts primarily with the aim ofreinforcing their own position’ (2009, 22–3).32 Protests consequently ‘spin out of control,without planning or coordination.Wholly spontaneous actions predominate, deepening a crisisof representation and legitimacy for political organizations’ (2009, 23–4). In effect, the com-portment of protest movement leaders mirrored that of the traditional Andean gamonal, orcaudillo: authoritarian attitudes prevailed and self-interest motivated their behaviour. For itspart, Caballero opined, the executive’s response proved ham-fisted. Repression comprisedthe most resorted to ‘solution’ when faced with popular protest, whose emergence was believedto originate from the manipulation of gullible and ignorant masses by ‘anti-system forces’(2009, 53).33

As will be discussed shortly, Caballero’s arguments may reflect protest movement–statedynamics in other localities across Peru, but his analysis does not conform to the course of theSan Marcos–CondebambaValley mobilization, a crucial explanatory factor being the legacy andcurrent practice of the rondas campesinas.The nightwatch patrols not only provided an extensivenetwork throughout the countryside that could be summoned to get the movement started,they also supplied certain ‘repertoires’ or accepted patterns of conduct, such as an emphasis onre-education and re-insertion into village life, rather than imposing excessive punishments andexpulsion. This tradition helped the movement to adopt a position that rejected the use ofviolence and emphasized employing weight of argument to win over smallholders in thosevillages who initially supported the mining project. Equally instructive is the high level ofpreparation, organization and discipline with which the protest movement functioned – actionsdid not occur in a ‘spontaneous’, directionless fashion, or ‘spin out of control’. To date theprotest has been conducted to a satisfactory conclusion with no deaths or serious injury.The positive contribution of established ronda campesina praxis gives credence to Welch andFernandes’ admonition to ‘look back at historical processes’ (2009, 4) when analyzing ruralsocial movements.

These features of the San Marcos–Condebamba Valley mobilization raise questions ofeffective rank-and-file control and the prevalence of patron–client relationships, seen by Cabal-lero as a feature of contemporary Peruvian protests. More broadly, ‘effective representation’ hasbeen identified as a ‘problem’ common to agrarian movements across continents (Borras et al.2008, 182–3). Without perceiving events through rose-tinted glasses, the ronda campesina tradi-tion bequeathed certain accepted – even assumed – modes of behaviour that have acted tocounter the emergence of a layer of entrenched ‘movement entrepreneurs’ who orchestrateevents in accordance with a private agenda, even if this ends in bloodshed. Decisions on whatactions should be pursued, and how, are taken in assemblies where the whole village has theright to participate and the prevalent ethos prioritizes the reaching of consensual agreements.Although assemblies on their own are by no means a guarantee against domination by aself-perpetuating clique, when linked to other practices they have been able to prevent such asituation arising. Officeholders are subject to regular recall and have to account for their actions(or inaction). Nightwatch patrol leaders are rotated on a regular basis (usually every 2 years),enabling a degree of scrutiny and popular recall which is unusual in Peru – and undermined

32 The pernicious influence of some protest movement leaders is also noted in De Echave et al. (2009, 184–5).33 This was President García’s interpretation of the Bagua protest, allusion being made to external interferencefrom Bolivia and Venezuela.



Company attempts to suborn activists. Revolving committee membership in turn signifies thatthe composition of delegations representing the village before second-tier organs at the districtor provincial level regularly alters. It also counters tendencies for grassroots organizations to fallunder kulak domination, which has been identified as an important issue confronting contem-porary Latin American agrarian movements (Borras et al. 2008, 194–5). Transparency, allied toan ‘organic’ interplay between leaders and led, helped sustain the movement’s legitimacy andwith it grassroots participation.

Key characteristics of the San Marcos–Condebamba Valley mobilization therefore stand incontrast to the protest mounted against Minera Majaz’s Río Blanco project, located in theneighbouring department of Piura, which conforms more closely to Caballero’s portrayal.Popular discontent being fuelled by similar livelihood concerns, this conflict has on occasionsspun ‘out of control’, violent confrontations between villagers, company employees and thepolice producing several deaths, many injuries and significant numbers of detentions.34

Although rondas campesinas occupy a central role in both movements, important differences inthe nature of leader–grassroots relations, the influence of external political interests and resultantsocio-political practice help explain the dissimilarities. In Piura, the nightwatch patrols becameinternally factionalized along ideological and party lines, a development reinforced by thestrong links that arose with urban ‘outsiders’, notably schoolteachers affiliated to Patria Roja,whose cadres seek to expand the Maoist party’s social base while simultaneously underminingopposing currents of both left and right (De Echave et al. 2009, 56, 215–18, 242;Vera 2004,91–3). These rivalries generated a more overtly aggressive stance against communities andindividuals holding pro-mining positions, resulting in the apportionment of physical punish-ments beyond normal ronda campesina practice (including severe beatings and kidnappings).‘Historical process’ (Welch and Fernandes 2009, 4), specifically contrasting experiences duringthe civil conflict, have influenced the adoption of divergent stances with regard to levels ofacceptable violence, the emphasis placed on persuasion employed by the two movements, aswell as the role of ‘outsiders’.Whereas Andean districts of Piura were only marginally affectedby the insurgency, the CondebambaValley and its environs witnessed considerable turmoil, withcountry people being killed by guerrilla detachments and security forces (Taylor 2006). Livingthrough difficult years during the 1980s and early 1990s not only heightened awareness aboutthe negative consequences of resorting to excessive violence. Being targeted for forced recruit-ment into the ranks of the PCP-SL or the Civil Defence Committees created by the army aspart of its counter-insurgency strategy sensitized the denizens of San Marcos and the Conde-bamba Valley to the dangers of their organizations becoming controlled by external politicalforces or the state. As a result, although urban activists have backed the movement, theirinfluence in decision-making has been restricted; unlike the Majaz protest, non-peasant actorssuch as schoolteachers, although present, have not occupied leadership positions.

34 In 2001, the mining enterprise Minera Majaz, Peruvian subsidiary of the British firm Monterrico Metals,acquired concessions for the project ‘Río Blanco’ to exploit copper and molybdenum deposits on land belongingto the peasant communities of Segunda y Cajas (Huancabamba province) and Yanta (Ayabaca province). Monter-rico was later purchased by Xiamen Zijin, a Chinese consortium (April 2007). During a march on the miningcamp in April 2004, one campesino was killed after being hit with a tear gas canister. Protesters claim that followinga mass demonstration in August 2005, 29 community members were kidnapped for three days, handcuffed, beatenand tortured by the police in collusion with Forza, a private security firm hired by the company. One detaineebled to death after being shot. Over a hundred participants were processed at court as a result of the protests, withcharges including ‘terrorism’ and drug trafficking. Photographs of the victims’ injuries were later released to thepress (La República, 13, 14 and 15 January 2009). Additional details on the Majaz protest are forthcoming in PeruSupport Group (2007) and De Echave et al. (2009, 45–72).

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If the social movement proved able to retain legitimacy through its inclusive organizationalstructure, what is the significance of protests like that in the San Marcos–Condebamba Valleyfor the overall health of the Peruvian polity? An important contemporary study of ‘real existingdemocracy’ in Latin America highlighted the need to address issues of poverty and exclusion,the prevalence of ‘low intensity citizenship’ and stressed the desirability to advance from asituation of ‘elected democracy’ to a ‘citizens’ democracy’ (UNDP 2005).The recommendationwas that this should be achieved by expanding socio-economic and political rights, with avehicle for attaining these objectives being the promotion of civil society grassroots organiza-tions that could enhance popular participation and help overcome public apathy towards formalpolitical processes and institutions.

Suffice to say, President García’s hostile response to mobilization, epitomized by his ‘dogin a manger’ rhetoric, has contributed to the creation of a Habermasian ‘legitimation crisis’,whereby the interests of the political class in fuelling capital accumulation clash withdemands by an important sector of the rural population for sustainable livelihoods allied toan extension of social and political rights. Since 2000, considerable numbers of Peruvianshave been lifted out of poverty through a decade of sustained economic growth, yet threeyears into his term in office, García’s popularity had plummeted, the approval rating standingat 21 per cent in July 2009. Public disapproval of Congress and politicians also remainsconsistently high (Krishnan 2009). A significant percentage of electors distrust and rejecttraditional political parties and their leaders. Part of the explanation for this bifurcationbetween economic growth and satisfaction with the political system lies in the administra-tion’s negative attitude towards popular mobilization, alienation being especially prevalent inAndean departments, where most ‘resource wars’ happen to occur.35 While Caballero cor-rectly warns about a crisis in governability and anti-mining protests have undoubtedly con-tributed to undermining ‘the authority of local or regional government’ (2009, 22), such anoutcome does not unfold everywhere. Although criticism directed at the San Marcos munici-pality and Cajamarca’s Regional Government abounds (largely over operational inefficienciesin delivering services and development aid to rural areas), the standing of these institutionsdid not suffer as a consequence of the protest movement. Instead, the support they providedat key moments in the struggle was appreciated. ‘Legitimization crises’ may not affect all stateagencies in equal measure.

What might the San Marcos–Condebamba Valley mobilization tell us about the changingnature of the Peruvian state, an important player in anti-mining struggles?36 The Peruvianstate has usually been viewed as one of the most centralized in Latin America, a situation thatreached its zenith during the Fujimori regime (1990–2000). Even so, events surrounding thisprotest suggest that a dispersion of power has been underway since Fujimori’s demise.This canbe observed at two levels: the bureaucratic sphere involving the civil service, and secondly, themore overtly ‘political’ institutions within the overall state structure whose membership isdetermined by popular vote. Regarding the latter, in November 2002 the first ballot for regionalgovernments took place, creating a new layer of elected representatives. As elsewhere in LatinAmerica, decentralization policies aimed to bring government closer to the populace, inthe process hopefully ‘deepening’ democracy. An examination of the San Marcos–CondebambaValley protest indicates that while Alan García and APRA might exercise suzerainty in Lima –over the executive, Congress and upper echelons of the civil service – the formation of regional

35 The impact of anti-mining mobilization on voting patterns in the 2006 elections is discussed in Taylor (2008).36 Kay laments the lack of consideration of the state in much recent work on Latin American social movementsthat adopt a ‘new rurality’ approach (2008, 934).



governments has fragmented and tangled decision-making processes. Despite the centralgovernment’s wish that the Cerro Mogol project go ahead, it was eventually blocked through aruling made by Cajamarca’s regional government. Locally elected politicians, such as ChanelRuiz, possessing other concerns and subject to different pressures, played an important part indetermining this outcome – both on the street and in the assembly chamber. Such a role clearlystands in contradistinction to the claim that: ‘Although present, regional governments do notfigure among the most important players in mining conflicts’ (De Echave et al. 2009, 257).

A related indication of decentring power structures concerns the bureaucracy.To an ordinarycitizen or group of citizens engaged in protest, the state machine no longer appears such amonolithic or daunting entity as it did in the 1990s. This is significant, as it creates anopportunity for social movements to take advantage of contradictions and navigate betweendifferent layers and institutions inside the state apparatus. During the latter years of thefujimorato, the Ombudsman’s Office emerged as the only nation-wide institution enjoying ameasure of autonomy from the all-powerful Fujimori–Montesinos clique, an independence thatcontinues today. During the San Marcos–Condebamba Valley mobilization, the Ombudsman’sOffice in Cajamarca provided welcome support: free legal advice, including intervention withthe police and judicial authorities to modify repressive behaviour. Activists were also able tolobby and receive a favourable hearing from officials in the Ministry of Agriculture, to helpcounterweight the position of the Ministry of Energy and Mines, while backing from theenvironment unit within the Regional Government proved decisive in putting an end todrilling. It is also worth noting that the recently established (in May 2008) Ministry of theEnvironment played no important role in determining the outcome of this protest. Once thisdepartment consolidates an institutional identity and operational culture, the prospect arises thatit will emerge as another potential source of bureaucratic influence open to grassroots organ-izations. Recent developments relating to the Peruvian state consequently suggest a morecomplex maze of competing power centres, whose interests might not coincide.This opens upnew opportunities for rural social movements to manoeuvre in the gaps between jurisdictions– providing they possess the political abilità to take advantage of them.

REFERENCES

Arellano-Yanguas, J., 2008. A Thoroughly Modern Resource Curse? The New Natural Resource Policy Agenda and the MiningRevival in Peru. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, IDS Working Paper 300.

Bebbington, A., ed., 2007. Mineria, movimientos sociales y repuestas campesinas: una ecologia política de transformacionesterritoriales. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.

Bebbington, A., 2009. ‘The New Extraction: Rewriting the Political Ecology of the Andes?’ NACLA Report on theAmericas, 42 (5): 12–20.

Bebbington, A. and J. Bury, 2009. ‘Institutional Challenges for Mining and Sustainability in Peru’. Proceedings of theNational Academy of Sciences, 106 (41): 17296–301.

Bebbington, A., L. Hinojosa, D. Humphreys Bebbington, M.L. Burneo and X. Warnaars, 2008. ‘Contention andAmbiguity: Mining and the Possibilities of Development’. Development and Change, 39 (6): 965–92.

Borras, S., M. Edelman and C. Kay, 2008. ‘Transnational Agrarian Movements: Origins and Politics, Campaign andImpact’. Journal of Agrarian Change, 8 (2–3): 169–204.

Bury, J., 2004. ‘Livelihoods in Transition: Transnational Gold Mining Operations and Local Change in Cajamarca,Peru’. The Geographical Journal, 170 (1): 78–91.

Bury, J., 2005. ‘Mining Mountains: Neoliberalism, Land Tenure, Livelihoods, and the New Peruvian Mining Industryin Cajamarca’. Environment and Planning A, 37 (2): 221–39.

Caballero, V., 2009. El rayo que no cesa: conflicto y conflictividad social 2009. Lima: Asociación de Servicios EducativosRurales – SER.

De Echave, J., A. Diez, L. Huber, B. Revesz, X. Lanata and M. Tanaka, 2009. Minería y conflicto social. Lima: Institutode Estudios Peruanos.

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Defensoría del Pueblo, 2010. Adjuntía para la Prevención de Conflictos Sociales y la Gobernabilidad, Reporte deConflictos Sociales, Lima.

Gitlitz, J. and T. Rojas, 1983. ‘Peasant Vigilante Committees in Northern Peru’. Journal of Latin American Studies, 15(1): 163–97.

Kay, C., 2008.‘Reflections on Latin American Rural Studies in the Neoliberal Globalization Period: a New Rurality?’Development and Change, 39 (6): 915–43.

Krishnan, A., 2009. ‘García’s Decline in Peru’. Council on Hemispheric Affairs, July np.Li, F., 2009. ‘Documenting Accountability: Environmental Impact Assessment in a Peruvian Mining Project’. Political

and Legal Anthropology Review, 32 (2): 218–36.Peru Support Group, 2007. Mining and Development in Peru with Special Reference to the Rio Blanco Project, Piura. London:

Peru Support Group.Starn, O., 1999. Nightwatch: the Politics of Protest in the Andes. Durham: Duke University Press.Taylor, L., 2006. Shining Path: Guerrilla War in Peru’s Northern Highlands, 1980–1997. Liverpool: Liverpool University

Press.Taylor, L., 2008.‘¿Cómo y por qué votaron los campesinos?: las elecciones generales y regionales del 2006 en el campo

cajamarquino’. Debate Agrario, 43: 105–34.UNDP, 2005. Democracy in Latin America:Towards a Citizen’s Democracy. Buenos Aires: Aguilar, Altea,Taurus, Alfaguara

S.A.Vera, D., 2004. Minería: oportunidades y amenazas en la región Cajamarca. Lima: mimeo.Welch, C. and B. Fernandes, 2009. ‘Peasant Movements in Latin America: Looking Back, Moving Ahead’. Latin

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