L’état, ce n’est plus moi: Popular Sovereignty and Citizenship over a Century of Thai...

8/3/2019 Ltat, ce nest plus moi: Popular Sovereignty and Citizenship over a Century of Thai Political Development by Fed

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Southeast Asia Research Centre

Federico Ferrara

Ltat, ce nest plus moi: Popular Sovereignty andCitizenship over a Century of Thai Political Development

Working Paper Series

No. 110

October 2011


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The Southeast Asia Research Centre (SEARC) of the City University of Hong

Kong publishes SEARC Working Papers Series electronically

Copyright is held by the author or authors each Working Paper.

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without the permission of the papers author or authors.

Note: The views expressed in each paper are those of the author or authors of the paper.

They do not represent the views of the Southeast Asia Research Centre, its Management

Committee, or the City University of Hong Kong.

Southeast Asia Research Centre Management CommitteeProfessor Mark R. Thompson, Director

Dr Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Associate DirectorDr Chiara Formichi

Dr Nicholas Thomas

Dr Bill Taylor

Editor of the SEARC Working Paper SeriesProfessor Mark R. Thompson

Southeast Asia Research CentreThe City University of Hong Kong

83 Tat Chee Avenue

Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong SAR

Tel: (852 3442 6106

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Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 110, 2011 3

LTAT,CENESTPLUSMOI

POPULARSOVEREIGNTYANDCITIZENSHIPOVER

ACENTURYOFTHAIPOLITICALDEVELOPMENT

FEDERICOFERRARA*

1.KINGOFTHEJUNGLECoups dtatwork by the law of thejungle, not the law of the land.That is to say, an illegal

seizureofpower isonlytrulyillegalso longasitisnotsuccessful.Decidedlymorerecent isthe

notionthatamilitarycoupstagedinThailandstandslittlechanceofbeingsuccessfulinthefirst

place,without the endorsement of King BhumibolAdulyadej. It stands to reason thatArmyCommanderinChief Sonthi Boonyaratglinwould be photographed on his knees at Chitrlada

Palace,justoveranhourafterannouncingthatthemilitaryhadseizedpowerontheeveningof

September 19, 2006. After all, by then the generals every move had been painstakingly

choreographedtoimpressuponthepublicthe ideathatthecouphadbeenstagedintheKings

name,ifnotonhisbehalf.Yellowribbonsandflowersadornedtanks,uniforms,andassaultrifles.

GiantportraitsofKing andQueen served as thebackground formajor announcements.Royal

Commandswere read in elaborate ceremoniesbroadcaston televisionbeforegarish shrines toTheirMajesties.Thejuntasstudiouslyverbosename,theCouncilforDemocraticReformunder

theKing asHeadofState,wasofficially changedmore than tendays after the coup,butnot

beforemakingsurethatthepeoplehadheardthemessage loudandclear.Thailand,tobesure,

hadseenroyalistcoupsbefore,butnoneasawash inroyalsymbolism.Thenagain,themilitary

*Assistant Professor, City University of Hong Kong, Department ofAsian and International

Studies.AnearlierversionofthispaperwaspresentedattheconferenceonFiveYearsaftertheMilitary Coup: Thailands Political Developments since Thaksins Downfall, Institute of

SoutheastAsianStudies,Singapore,September19,2011.


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hadneverremovedaPrimeMinisteraspopularasThaksinShinawatra.Aslifequicklyreturnedto

normal,itwasevidentthatroyalsanctionalonecouldhavemutedpublicoppositiontothecoup,

orstavedoffthepossibilitythatthedeposedPrimeMinistermightputupanyresistance.

Asthejuntadeployeditsarsenalofroyalsymbolstoforestallactiveoppositioninthestreets,the

centralroleplayedbyKingBhumibolinthelegalprocessthatgovernedthetransitioneffectively

thwartedanyattemptThaksincouldotherwisehavemade tochallenge the legalityof thecoup

andcontinuetopresenthimself,internationally,asThailandsrightful,dejurePrimeMinister.By

any reasonable legal standard, the generals had no authority to abrogate Thailands 1997

constitution.Inturn,intheabsenceofaconstitutionspecifyingthescopehispowers,Bhumibol

had no real legal standing to endorse the generals illegal act, grant them immunity from

prosecution,orpromulgate the interimcharterhandeddownonOctober 1,2006.At the sametime,Thaksincouldnotpossiblyhavedared topointout theobvious lackof legal foundations

besettingtheprocess.Challengingthe legalityofhisreplacementwouldnotonlyhaverequired

ThaksintoarguethattheKingssignaturewasinconsequentialtothevalidityofkeydocuments

that governed the transition, but also effectively assert that Bhumibol had enabled an illegal

(indeed, treasonous)act.That forcedThaksinandhissupporters toargueagainst themeritsof

staging the coup, a subjectwhere thedeposedPrimeMinister stoodonmuch shakierground,

giventhatmuchofwhatwassaidabouthimwasactuallytrue.

Quite aside from the strategic import of the monarchys endorsement, the broadbased

acceptanceof the legalityof the coup, and themeasures imposed in its immediate aftermath,

reveals a conception of sovereignty quite different from that undergirding any constitutional

monarchy.InThailand,thatis,themonarchysauthorityexistsquiteindependentlyofwhatthe

constitutionhappenstoprovide.Andwhilemostconstitutionsintroducedsince1932havemade

some reference to the concept of popular sovereignty, the fact that the King conserves his

authorityevenaftertheconstitutionisabrogatedindicatesthatHisMajestyreignsbysomething

moreakintonaturalrightthanpositivelaw.1NotedroyalistPramuanRuchanaseristatedasmuch

in abestsellingbookpublishedbefore thecoup,wherehe argued correctly, as amatterof

empiricalobservationthattheconstitutionisnotabovetheKinginanyway[...]thestatusof

theKingdoesnotcomeundertheconstitution(cited inPasukandBaker2009:255256).That

1Foranaccountofhowthedraftersofthe1997constitutionmanagedtheambiguity,seeConnors

(2008:150151).


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wascertainlynotthecaseinthefirstquartercenturyaftertheremovaloftheabsolutemonarchy.

Overaweekafter stagingThailands lastantiroyalistcoup, the RadioCoupofNovember29,

1951,adelegationledbyGeneralPhinChoonhavanvisitedthepalacetoinformBhumibolthat

thejuntawasreturningpowersthatwereseizedfromhimwhentheconstitutionwasabrogated

(see Bangkok Post, December 7, 1951). By 2006, no military man, much less a Muslim and a

polygamist, couldpresume to takeover anyof theKingspowers,orhave the impudence to

informhimofthejuntasdecisiontorestorehisprerogatives.Indeed,whereasthestatedintent

ofthe1932revolutionhadbeentoplacetheKingundertheConstitution,overhissixtyfiveyear

reignBhumibolhasoverseentheemergenceofasystemofgovernmentthateffectivelyelevates

theKing,andhisassociates,abovetheconstitution.

Thefiveyearssincethe2006couphaveexposedthefatalflawsofThailandsformaldemocracywiththeKingabovetheconstitution.Notonlydidthecoupsetinmotionaseriesofeventsthat

plunged thecountry intoasituationofgreatpolitical instabilityandprolongedcivil strife.The

actionsnecessarytotheremovalofThaksinandhisproxieshavegivenrisetoaseverecrisisof

legitimacymarkedby ahithertounseenmeasureof resentment for the royal family, complete

withexpressionsofpublicdisgust forthemonarchythatwouldhavebeenunthinkablejust five

yearsago.Indeed,thepoliticalcrisisthathasgrippedThailandforthelastfiveyearscouldbesaid

tobetheexpressionofacleavage2thathasvariouslydefinedpoliticalstrugglessincethedaysofthe absolute monarchy the conflict overwhether sovereignty, or constituent power, rests

withthepeopleortheKing.Thisfundamentaldisputehasimportantimplicationsformanyofthe

pressing(ifoftenunspoken)normativequestionsdefiningThailandspresentpoliticaldebate.Do

therights,duties,powers,anddecisionmakingproceduresspelledoutintheconstitutionspring

fromthepeopleortheKing?Inotherwords,totheextentthatthepeoplehaverights,dothey

enjoysuchrightsascitizens that is,as fullmembersof thecommunitywhoare equalwith

respect to the rightsanddutieswithwhich the status isendowed"3oras subjects towhom

certainfreedomsandlegalprotectionsaremerelydelegatedbyahighersovereignpower,perhaps

in measures commensurate with social status? In turn, should the King as well as the

multiplicity of individuals, organizations, and institutions claiming to speak for, or act in the

interestof,themonarchybeinanywayconstrainedbytheconstitution,oreffectivelyaboveit?

2LipsetandRokkan (1967: 10)explain that (functional)cleavages mightbenothingmore than

direct struggles among competing elites for central power, but they might also reflect deeperdifferencesinconceptionsofnationhood,overdomesticpriorities,andoverexternalstrategies.3ThisistheclassicdefinitionofcitizenshipofferedbyT.H.Marshall(1964[1949]:84).


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Anddo theseactorshave legitimateauthoritytoundo, throughextraconstitutionalmeans,the

resultsofprocessesconductedinaccordancewiththeconstitution?

E.E. Schattschneider (1988[1960]) argued that political conflicts tend to be as contagious as

streetfights.Thoughaparticularconflictmaystartoutasadisputelimitedtoasmallnumberof

activeparticipants,boththenatureandtheoutcomeofthefightchangeasalargeraudience

joinsin.Inthespecificcase,overthepastcenturyandahalftheconflictbetweenduelingnotions

ofsovereigntyandcitizenshiphasspilledoverfromahighlyexclusivecircleinthecourtofKing

Chulalongkorn to increasingly broad andvaried constituencies. The progressive contagion of

conflictcanlargelybeattributedtosocioeconomicchange,whichmadevariousgroupsexcluded

fromtheoriginaldebateincreasinglylikelytojointhefight,ofteninresponsetoappealstotheir

desireforpoliticaloreconomicempowerment.Whataccountsfortheuneven,nonlinearnature

ofthecontagion isthattheseconstituencieshadtobeawakened,galvanized,andmobilizedbyone side or the other before they could themselves turn into active participants. Given the

multiplicityof cleavages in Thai society, and the internal diversity of all major constituencies,

different groupsdidnot always enter the fray asblocks,norwere their allegiancesnecessarily

fixed.Atdifferent times,moreover,different sideswerevariously successful in theirattempt to

eitherprivatizeorsocializetheconflict.Fordecades,royalistssuccessfullyremovedthefight

oversovereigntyfromthepublicarenawhilerepressiondiscouragedpubliccallsforlimitations

in royal authority, the states propaganda enforced a false sense of unanimity that allowedroyaliststoprevailwithoutanopenconfrontation.Theconflictsexplosivereemergenceafterthe

2006coupwasdrivenbyacombinationofreasonsofbothastructuralandcontingentnature.

Accounts of the political crisis triggered by the 2006 coup are dominated by three narratives,

whichalternativelydescribetheongoingconflictasafightbetweendemocracyanddictatorship,

thejuxtaposition of twovisions of democracy, or something of a Hobsons choice between

differentformsofauthoritarianism.4Thispapersketchesoutanintegratedapproach,examining

the historical process bywhich both the royalist and populist5 positions, aswell as the

prevailingalignmentsonbothsidesofthefight,havedevelopedoverthepastcentury,drawing

onSchattschneiders logictoaccommodatethemultiplicityofmotivationsanimatingthemajor

4 For a rich sampling, see Montesano, Pavin, and Aekapol (2011). Thongchai (2008) also

demolishes a fourthnarrativeofThailandspolitical crisis,whichdescribes the2006 coupas a

coupfordemocracy.5Thewordpopulistisusedinthiscontextonlyasalabelforsupportersofpopularsovereignty,

withoutanyimplicationfortheireconomicplatformortheirrhetoricalstyle.


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playersandconstituencies involved.At theelite level,nakedpower is treatedasa far stronger

motive,forroyalistsandThaksinitesalike,thantheidealsinwhichbothsidescouchtheirappeals

forpopularsupport.Inparticular,thepropensityofkeyplayerstochangetheirpositions,switch

sides,andatdifferenttimeschoosetoeitherprivatizeorsocializetheconflict isevidenceof

thefactthatelitesseektodefinethetermsofthefightbasedoninterest,strategiccalculus,and

situational factors more than any values or ideals. At the same time, as Schattschneider

(1988[1960]:4)pointedout,eachsizable increase inthenumberofparticipantsmustbeabout

something,beyond simple elite interest, as newcomershave sympathies and antipathies that

make itpossible to involve them.While stipulatingThaksins insincerity, andhispronounced

authoritariantendencies,thisapproachrecognizesthatthereasonsforhisremovalwereothers,

and interprets the backlash against the repeated subversion of the electoral process as both

visceralandprincipled,notjustpatronagebased.6

2.FAIT(IN)ACCOMPLIThailands(thenSiam)absolutemonarchycametoanendwithapredawncoupdtatstagedon

June24, 1932byagroupofmostlyyoung, foreigneducatedmilitaryofficersandcivil servants.

Upon seizing power, the Promoters mapped out a tenyear transition to full representative

democracy.The 1932 coup,however,hadbeen less about democracy than ithadbeen aboutconstitutionalism,7 the ambition to limit royal authority and place the King under a

constitution. The six principles spelled out in the FirstAnnouncement of the Peoples Party

included freedom () and individual autonomy () aswell as the provision of

equalrights(),suchthattheroyalclassdoesnothavemorerightsthanthepeople

(). Crucially, the Promoters declared that the country belongs to the

people, not to the King, as he has fraudulently claimed ( ). The temporary constitution promulgatedwithin aweek of the coupvested supreme

power in the people (Art. 1) and specified that the King, togetherwith the legislature, the

executive,andthecourts,wouldexercisepoweronbehalfofthepeople(Art.2).

6

ForanaccountpresentingthecrisisasaconflictbetweendifferentelementsoftheThaielite,whohavemobilizedrivalpatronagebasednetworksofsupporters,seeMcCargo(2009:9).7SeeElster(1993)forgreaterinsightintothisdistinction.


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The conflict betweendueling notions of sovereignty and citizenship had emerged in the early

period of National Revolution8 set in motion in Siam by the sweeping bureaucratic reforms

enactedbyKingChulalongkorn in the latenineteenth century.Thedebateover limitations to

monarchicalpoweriscustomarilytracedbackto1885,whenelevenmembersoftheSiameseroyal

elitestudyingabroadwrotetoChulalongkorn,advisinghimtoinitiateagradualtransitioninthe

directionofconstitutionalmonarchy.BythetimethequestionwasputdirectlytotheKing,the

conflicthadalreadybeenspreading through theranksof thegreatlyexpandedcivilian/military

bureaucracy, especially the new bureaucratic bourgeoisie recruited from among commoners

whohad received aWesternor Westernstyle education.Theirgrievanceswere amixtureof

private motives and philosophical positions. On the one hand, the coexistence of a salaried,

modern bureaucracywith a system of patronage designed to preserve the privilege of the old

nobilitystifledopportunitiesforcareeradvancementforthosewhoselineagelaggedbehindtheireducational achievement.On theotherhand, the exposure that theseofficialshad received to

Westernliberalideasprovidedideologicalcontenttotheirdiscontentoverarbitraryroyalpower

andprivilege,fosteringagrowingidentificationwithanideaofthenationdissociatedfromthe

personoftheKing(seeKullada2004).

Havingonlyrecentlysucceeded inwrestingpoweraway frommoreconservativeprinceswithin

hisowncourt,Chulalongkornhadinitiallyrespondedtotherequestputtohimin1885byarguingthatlimitationstohisauthoritywouldhaveactuallycompromisedtheimplementationofreforms

necessarytoprotectSiams independence.In theensuingyears,however,theKingmoved from

reasoningexclusivelyongroundsofexpediencytosketchingoutamoreideologicaldefenseofhis

personal power aimed at cementing the loyalty of the bureaucracy. In a series of speeches,

Chulalongkorn elaborated on his opposition to liberal reforms by emphasizing (and vastly

overstating) the differences between European and Siamese conceptions of kingship, thereby

asserting the incompatibility of Western political institutions with local traditions (see

8NationalRevolutionsentailthegrowthofnationalbureaucracies,thewideningofthescopeof

governmental activities, aswell as an effort by the state to foster the emergence of a single

nationalidentitythroughcultural,linguistic,andsometimesreligiousstandardization(seeLipset

andRokkan 1967: 13).Amongother things, theprocess tends togenerateoppositionsbetween

differentgroupsofnationbuildersovertheorganizationofthestate,particularlyoverissuesof

popularsovereignty,rights,secularism,constitutionalism,anddemocracy.Innineteenthcentury

WesternEurope, theprocessushered inthedevelopmentofrepresentative institutionsandtheextensionof the franchise, amongother civil and political rights.For an earlier application to

Siam/Thailand,seeOckey(2005).


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Murashima 1988:8489).His sonandsuccessor,KingVajiravudh (r. 19101925), fleshedout this

argumentindefenseofroyalabsolutismmorefully,craftingatheoryofofficialnationalismthat

stressedtheidentificationofnationandking.Amongotherthings,VajiravudhsvisionofThai

society entailed a by now familiar distinction between phu yai, big men tasked with the

responsibilitytorule,andphunoi,littlepeoplewhoseservicetothenationwastobemeasured

intermsoftheirsubmissionandcompliance(seeBarm1993:31).

WhileKingVajiravudhs ideasprovedquite influential, in the long run, to thedevelopmentof

Thainationalist ideology, in the shorttomedium term theyhad littleeffecton shoringup the

loyaltyof thecountrysofficialdom. In fact,Vajiravudhsreignwasdistinguishedby the further

contagion of conflict. This took place as a result of the diffusion of ideas of progress and

individual equality aswell as contingent factors, particularly the growing dissatisfactionwithVajiravudhsprofligacyandtheselfindulgenceofprominentmembersoftheroyalfamily.Bythe

end of the Sixth Reign, the boom of popular newspapers catering to a bourgeois and upper

middle class readership led to the popularization ofverbal andvisual content that routinely

portrayedroyalsandnoblemenasacorrupt,debauched,parasiticelite(seeBarm2002:Ch.4).

WhenVajiravudhwassucceededbyhisbrother,Prajadhipok, in1925,threatstothemonarchys

continuedexistencefiguredprominentlyinthenewKingswillingnesstoconsiderpromulgatinga

constitution. Ultimately, the failure to enact one reflected unresolved doubts in Prajadhipokscourtoverwhetherthedelegationinsomeofhispowers,insteadofdefusingthepotentialforthe

monarchy to succumb toa rebellion,couldhave in factaccelerated theconflictscontagionby

raisingfurtherquestionsabouttheKingsstrength,competence,andcommitment.9

MuchlikeWesternEurope,wherethecompetitionbetweenliberalsandconservativesdominated

thepoliticalscene throughout theperiodofNationalRevolution, themainpoliticalcleavage in

the aftermath of Siams 1932 coup placed liberalradical proponents of popular sovereignty,

constitutionalism,andgradualdemocraticreformsagainstconservativeroyalistelementsaspiring

to restoreroyalauthority. InWesternEurope,however, liberalsandconservativesweregivena

chancetofightouttheirdifferencesintheelectoralarena,suchthatbythetimeuniversal(male)

suffragewasgranted(mostlyintheaftermathofWorldWarI),conservativepartieshadgivenup

onadvocatingforareturntotheancienrgime(seeCaramani2004:199204).Thingsturnedout

9ForanoverviewofthedebatesonconstitutionalisminPrajadhipokscourt,seeFerrara(2012).


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quite differently in Siam,where the conflictwas never resolved in the liberals favor, giving

royalistsachancetoqualifyandultimatelysubverttheprincipleofpopularsovereignty.

ThedivergenceintheoutcomesproducedbyNationalRevolutionsinWesternEuropeandSiam

canbeexplained largelybydifferencesinthesequenceandtimingoftheprocess.Perhapsmost

important,whereastheWesternEuropeanstruggleforcivilandpoliticalrightsinthenineteenth

centuryintersectedwiththeIndustrialRevolution,whichtriggeredaprogressivemassification

ofpolitics,SiamsNationalRevolutiontookplacewellbeforetheemergenceofanyworkingclass

movement,or forthatmatterany formofmassmobilization.ThecoupstagedonJune24,1932

was broadlywelcomed by Bangkoks small uppermiddle class, but much of the rest of the

country reactedwith indifference to the events in the capital.While the absence of popular

involvement,insupportoroppositiontothecoup,mayhavehelpedensurethesmoothnessoftheoperation, the masses indifference and backwardness discouraged the Promoters from

attempting tobroaden their fight against the royalist establishment.10The timingof the coup,

moreover,aidedtheroyalistsinitialcounterrevolutionaryeffort.Atatimewhengovernmentsin

manycountries inEuropeandelsewhere facedarevolutionarychallengebycommunistparties,

Siameseroyalistsexploitedthespecterofcommunismtounderminethepublicstrustinthenew

government anddriveawedgebetweenmore conservative and radical factionsof thePeoples

Party(seeNattapoll2010).ThecounterrevolutioneventuallyfailedtodislodgethePromoters,orrestore any of the Kings old prerogatives. But the resulting instability, and the authoritarian

measurestakeninresponse,createdanopeningforthesubsequentreassertionofthemonarchys

statusandpower.

Monthsbeforehisabdication,KingPrajadhipokissuedasternwarningtothegovernmentofPhya

PhahonPhonphayuhasena.Therearethosewhostillbelieveintheabsolutemonarchybecause

ofitslonghistory,hewrote,butnobodywillstandfortheabsoluteruleofthekhana.11Infact,

thePeoplesPartynevercameclosetoexercising absoluterule.But theKinghadnonetheless

correctlyidentifiedtheregimesAchillesheelinitstendencytoconferuponthoseinpowerthe

10 The fact that the countrys tiny industrial/commercialbourgeoisiewasdominatedby ethnic

Chinese,whoalsoaccounted forat leasthalfofBangkokssmallurbanworkingclass,served to

further caution the Promoters against the prospect of mobilizing these constituencies. For a

discussionofthedilemmafacedbythePromotersinthisregard,seeSkinner(1957:219).11Thesewordsappear inaRoyalNote () transmitted to thegovernment inDecember

1934(seeOfficialReportontheAbdicationofKingPrajadhipok1935:105).


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roleof soleprotectorsof theconstitutionandonly true representativesof thepeople.Still in

officebutshakenbythefailedcounterrevolutionand lessthanconfident intheirownpullwith

theelectorate,thePromotersoptedtomanagetheconflictinsteadofbroadeningit,andchoseto

controlcivilsocietyratherthantakeachanceonitsmobilization.Intheyearscomprisedbetween

Prajadhipoksabdicationin1935andtheonsetofWorldWarII,Colonel(andthenFieldMarshal)

Phibun Songkhram presided over the countrys slide into military dictatorship, aswell as the

development of avirulent form of nationalism that emphasized social conformity and state

identityoverconstitutionalism(seeChaianan2002:58).

The Peoples Partys departure from ideals of constitutionalism and democracy aggravated the

internal rifts and deficit of legitimacy that royalists successfully exploited to regain their

ascendancyinthe1940sand1950s.Indeed,whereastheconflictbetweenPromotersandroyalistshadoncejuxtaposed competingnotionsof sovereignty (popularv. royal), Thailands reversal

into authoritarianismgave rise tonew,unstablealignments.AfterPhibunsouster in 1944, the

coalition formed duringWorldWar II between civilian Promoter Pridi Banomyong and key

royalistswhojoined the antiJapanese movement Seri Thai fractured. Pridis supporters and

royalists organized in different political parties,which fought bitterly for political power. The

competition, however, was not limited to the electoral/legislative process. Outnumbered in

parliament,royalistssuchasthebrothersKukritandSeniPramojtooktheopportunitytoaccusePridiofKingAnandaMahidolsmysteriousdeath in1946,forcingthegovernmentsresignation.

Then, aristocrats and Democrat Party politicians collaboratedwith the resurgentPhibun,who

stagedacoupin1947andallowedthepromulgationofanewconstitutioncompletewithgreatly

expandedroyalprerogatives(seeKobkua2003:5054).Theensuingroyalistpowergrabwasput

toanendwiththe1951RadioCoup,bywhichthemilitaryintroducedanamendedversionofthe

1932constitution,strippingthemonarchyofthepowersithadrecentlyregained.

At thatpointPhibunwaspresentedwith twomajor threats tohispower.The first threatwas

posedbyroyalists(includingprinces,seniorcivilservants,andDemocratPartypoliticians)who,

despitediminishednumbersinparliamentandthereducedroleofthemonarchy,hadbenefited

fromtheirpostwarreorganizationaswellasthecampaigncarriedoutbetween1946and1951to

bolster the popularity ofyoung King Bhumibol. The second threatwas posed by the other

members of Phibuns new governing triumvirate, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat and Police

DirectorGeneralPhaoSriyanond.Tocounterboththreats,Phibunmadeastrategicdecisionto

socializehispowerstruggles.HerespondedtoBhumibolsgrowingappealwitheffortstoelevate


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hisown standing throughactsofconspicuous generosity,aggressivepromotionofBuddhism,

andappropriationofsomehistoricalsymbolismwithwhichhesoughttoportrayhimselfasthe

fatherofthenation(seeHandley2006: 126130).InanattempttoextricatehimselffromPhao

andSarit,moreover,Phibun introducedaskeletalPoliticalPartiesAct in1955andunexpectedly

liberalizedpoliticalspeechandpressfreedomuponhisreturnfromatriptotheUnitedStatesand

theUnitedKingdominJune1955.ContemporaneousaccountssuggestthatPhibunwasimpressed

with the degree of independence that leaders likeWinston Churchill and Dwight Eisenhower

exercisedthankstotheirelectoralpopularity(seeWilsonandPhillips1958).Itwasalsoreported

at the time that Phibun enjoyed the spectacle of cabinet ministers getting debagged by the

press, andhoped tobenefit from themedias interest in thepolices (i.e.,Phaos)many illegal

dealings(seePickerellandMoore1957).

Phibuns gambit failed spectacularly. On the one hand, the longserving Prime Minister had

underestimated the educated publics dissatisfactionwith the government, aswell as Sarits

growingpopularitywiththepress,thestudents,thedisenchantedpublic,andcertainpoliticians

(Thak2007[1979]:73).On theotherhand,PhaosdiminishedcredibilitydeprivedPhibunofan

effectiveallywithwhomtocounterSaritsrise.Withthesupportofthepalace,Saritexploitedthe

discontentwithPhibunsfraudulentvictoryintheFebruary1957electionsbyfurtherundermining

the government in parliament aswell aswith public opinion in Bangkok.When Sarit finallyseizedpower inSeptember 1957, forcingPhibun andPhao to leave the country forgood,King

Bhumibolofferedhissupport,givingthecoupimmediatelegalsanctionandpubliclypraisingits

intentions.

Sarit didnot show much of a taste for themore liberal climate fosteredby Phibuns reforms,

which had help propel his rise, and rapidly implemented measures designed to prevent any

further contagion of conflict. Deeply dissatisfied over the fact that there still existed a

parliament,politicalparties,afreepresssystemthatcouldcriticizethegovernment,andlabor

unions that could go on strikewhenever theywere unhappywith their employers (see Thak

2007[1979]:95),SaritstagedanothercouponSeptember18,1958.Politicalrightslikefreedomof

speech and association were rescinded under Sarits ironfisted dictatorship. The recurrent

election of legislative representatives was scrapped altogether. Civil liberties like those that

guaranteedcriminaldefendantsameasureofdueprocessweresupplantedbyilliberalprovisions

likeArticle17ofthe1959constitution,whichallowedthePrimeMinistertoordertheexecution

withouttrialofanyonehedeemeda threat tonationalsecurity.Theegalitarian ideals formerly


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championed by some Peoples Party officialswere superseded by the governments unabashed

attempttoperpetuateexistinginequalities.Thecountrysmostpowerfuldomesticcapitalistswere

nurturedbythestateandprotectedfromcompetition;entiresectorsofThailandseconomywere

soldofftoforeignanddomesticoligopolists inexchangeforbillions,paidontheconditionthat

thegeneralsmakelifedifficultforsmaller,localcompetitorsandrepressanylabormovementthat

mightseekbetterpayandworkconditionsforThaiworkers(seeAkira1996:179180).Meanwhile,

themilitarygovernmentinsistedthattheruralpopulationshouldremainforevercontenttoeke

out a simple existence upcountry the refusal of many to embrace their station in life

portendingthedeteriorationofThaisociety(seeThak2007[1979]:105106,122).

Mostimportantly,perhaps,asSaritsoughttoestablishtheabsoluteruleofhisownkhana,hesaw

intherestorationofthemonarchysmystique,prestige,andpowerasourceof legitimacymorepotent than thepretenseofconstitutionalismandelectionsone thatwouldaffordhim,and

many of his successors, the opportunity to dress up harsh dictatorial measures in a benign,

paternalisticattire.Withtheenthusiasticbackingof theUnitedStatesgovernment,Saritbegan

theprocessof exalting anddeifying the monarchy,whilehis ideologues conceived a modelof

governance(ThaiStyleDemocracy)thatcouldbedescribedasaformofPlatonicguardianship

withTheravadacharacteristics.12Themultitalented philosopherking satatopahierarchyof

supposedlynatural inequalitiesofwealth,power,andstatus legitimized, inplaceofPlatosnoblelie,byBuddhistsuperstitionsofkarma,merit,andcharismaticauthority().TheKings

military auxiliaries, meanwhile,were put in charge of running the country and effectively

elevatedabovethelaw.Whatwasdemandedofthepeople,onceagainequatedwithchildren,

notcitizens,wasmerereverenceandobedience.

3.AFEWGOODMENThepalacemilitaryallianceforgedunderSaritreconciledtwo institutionsthathadbeenmostly

atloggerheadsoverthepreviousquartercentury.Atleastinitially,thenewalliancedidnotfindit

especially difficult to consolidate power and manage conflict. Part of this had to dowith the

weaknessoftheopposition,deprivedofmanyofitsleadingpersonalities.PridiandPhibunwere

goneforgood.Manyotherproponentsofdemocracyandconstitutionalism,includinganumber

ofleftistpoliticiansfromtheNortheast,wereexiled,arrested,orexecuted(seeKeyes1967:5054).

12TheconceptofguardianshipiscontrastedwithdemocracyinDahl(1991:5264).


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Withthedefeatofthedemocraticopposition,someremainingdissidentsgravitatedtowardsthe

CommunistPartyofThailand.Butthoughthecommunistinsurgencyneverseriouslythreatened

totopplethegovernmentinBangkok,thethreatofcommunismtrumpedupbythemilitaryand

thepalaceinthe1960sand1970srepeatedlyservedastheexcusetoproscribeandoftenviolently

suppressdissent.

By then, moreover, most of the countrys populationwas not appreciably more involved or

politicized than it had been at the time of the 1932 coup. Writing on the heels of Sarits

conservativerevolution,Wilson(1962:5758)notedacleardistinction,basedprimarilyonthe

levelofeducation,betweenthosewhoareinvolvedinpoliticsandthosewhoarenot.Thosewho

were involved,theeducatedclasses inthecapitalcity,weresaidtoposenothreattothestatus

quo,giventheirvestedinterestinthepreservationoftraditionalnotionsofsocialhierarchy.As

for thepeasantry,estimatedas more thaneightypercentof thepopulation,Wilsondescribedthe fundamental importance of its inarticulate acquiescence to the central government and

indifference tonationalpolitics to the stabilityof thecountrys socialandpolitical structure.13

Whilemuchofthecountryhadexperiencedsignificanteconomicchangesincethesigningofthe

BowringTreatyof1855,theincreasedeconomicinsecurityproducedbythecommercializationof

the agricultural sector and explosive population growth had not been accompanied by the

emergenceofastrongpoliticalconsciousness,perhapsprimarilybecauseeconomicchangehad

failedtotriggermuchinthewayofactualdevelopmentormodernization.14

Asnoted,oneof thereasonswhy theendof theabsolutemonarchydidnot settle the issueof

popularsovereigntyisthatThailandsNationalRevolutiondidnotintersect,asitdidinWestern

Europe, with the massification of politics set in motion by the Industrial Revolution. An

economictransformationofcomparable importdidtakeplace inThailandbeginninginthe late

1950s.Once again,however, thedecouplingofThailands National and IndustrialRevolutions,

andtheoccurrenceofthelatteratatimewhenthepowerofthemonarchyandthemilitarywas

13Morecontroversially,Wilson (1962:5758)attributed thepeasantrys political inaction to a

tolerableeconomicsituationwhichprovidesastablesubsistencewithoutencouraginganygreat

hopeforquickimprovement.Othershavepointedoutthattheruralpopulationwasnotquiteas

freeofpoliticalandeconomicgrievancesasWilsonsuggested,givensignificantandlongstanding

poverty,stratification,andruralindebtedness(Bowie1997:61).14Foranargumentabout the failureofeconomicchange tobringaboutdevelopmentbetween

1850and 1950, see Ingram (1971:216217).Partof the reason is that the expansion ineconomicactivityhad largely followedanexploitative,quasicolonialmodel foundedon theextractionof

wealthfromthecountrysideanditsreinvestmentinBangkok(seeChatthip1999:5159).


15/30


deeply entrenched, accounts for the contradictory effects exerted by the subsequent political

awakeningofnewconstituencies.

Theeconomictransformationthattookplaceinthe1960sunderminedthestructuralfoundations

ofThailandsmilitaryregime.Theboom,whichwasaccompaniedbythedramaticgrowthinthe

serviceeconomyandvastincreasesinthesecondaryandtertiarystudentpopulations,multiplied

thesizeofthepettymiddleclassandtheurbanbourgeoisieseveraltimesover.Atthesametime,

increasedlandlordismintheprovincespushyoungmentojointheranksoftheworkingclassand

the underemployed in Bangkok. These developments not only rearranged Thailands social

structure,givingrisetonewclasseswhoseaspirationswerenotmatchedbythelimitedpolitical

role reserved for them under military rule, but also generated new rivalries, resentments, and

fears.Thepotentialforupheavalincreasedasthebureaucracyapproachedsaturation,foreclosingtraditionalroutestosocialadvancement formillionsofnewgraduates,andespeciallywhenthe

economy slowed as a result ofAmerican disengagement (seeAnderson 1977: 1518). Thailands

militaryrulersmadethingsworsebycallingnewelectionsin1969,overadecadesincethedoors

ofparliamenthadlastbeenshuttered,onlytothendissolvetheNationalAssemblyandrepealthe

newconstitutioninaselfcoupstagedin1971.

In retrospect, it is somewhat ironic that the power and prestige of the monarchy reached itszenithasThailandenteredtheeraofmasspoliticsjustasmoreandmorepeopleenteredthe

systemanddemandeddemocracy,theissueofpopularsovereigntywaseffectivelymuted.Part

ofthereasonisthatbythetimeThailandexperiencedmassparticipationintheearly1970s,the

palacehadbenefitedfromafifteenyearheadstartinpromotingitsimagethroughmodernmeans

of mass communication. For most mainstream political actors, the mere appearance of a

universally revered monarchwas strong enough incentive to frame political demands in a

manner that did not challenge the palace or its extraconstitutional prerogatives. Failing that,

Thailandslsemajestlawseffectivelyrestrictedtherangeofpoliticalcontestationbypunishing,

harshly,thefewinclinedtotestthetruelimitsanddepthsoftheKingsenforcedpopularity.Itis

thusthatthe1930serafighttoplacetheKingundertheconstitutionhadmorphed,bythe1970s,

intomeredemandsforaconstitution,andthatthestrugglefordemocracywagedbyincreasingly

sizableconstituenciesbetween1973and1992neverresultedinthemainstreamingofmoreradical

critiques of the monarchys role and constitutional status. Most of the movements and

organizationsthatcameontothesceneduringthattimesawitfitnottochallengetheroleofthe

Kingassovereign,butratherchosetoframeappealsfordemocracyinroyalsymbolism.Whenever


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the palace felt that its imagewas threatened by events on the streets, moreover, Bhumibols

public and carefully stagemanaged interventions served to privatize, manage, or steer the

courseofconflictinlessmenacingdirections.TheKingsinterventionsin1973and1992,inturn,

furtherelevatedthestatusofthemonarchy,providingsomecoverforthepalacescomplicityin

themobviolenceofthemid1970saswellasmilitarycoupsin1976and1991.

Thepalacessuccess,however,wasalsoinpartafunctionofitswillingnesstoadapt,learnfrom

itsmistakes,andeventuallyallowthecountrytodemocratize,atleastinsofarastheprocessdid

not encroach on its reserve domains.While the 1973 protests definitively brought the era of

outrightmilitarydictatorshiptoaclose,thepalaceplayedamajorroleintheefforttocontainthe

rapidcontagionofconflictthatcharacterizedthe illfatedperiodofrealdemocracycomprised

between 1973 and 1976 (see Morell and Chaianan 1981). The nationalist hysteria and fears of

communisttakeoverhypedbythemilitaryandthepalaceduringthattimeintensifiedthesocialhostilitiesthathademergedasaresultoftheeconomictransformationthecountryhadrecently

experienced, securing the support of the disaffected, the insecure petty bourgeoisie, and

traditionalisteliteswhofeltthreatenedbythemobilizationofstudents,workers,andpeasantsfor

the drastic measures taken in 1976 (seeAnderson 1977: 24).After a brief period of extreme

repression following the 1976 massacre at Thammasat University, the palace remained

determined topreserve itsdominanceoverThailandspolitical system, and to secure the rural

populaces continued acceptance of a subaltern status by placing renewed emphasis on thefamilial unity between the peasantry and the monarchy (see Streckfuss 2010: 213215).15 The

premiership of General Prem Tinsulanonda (19801988), however, was also marked by the

development of functioning representative institutions, and the increased salience of electoral

participation and competition. Thailandwas allowed to transition from aversion of pseudo

democracy to electoraldemocracyuponPrems retirement in 1988,andagainafter the state

violenceofBlackMay1992.

15Perhapsmorethanthemobilizationofstudentsandworkers,mosttroublingforconservatives

hadbeen thedemonstrations stagedbypeasantgroups throughout thecountry todemand the

enforcementofrentcontrolsandlegalprotectionsfromexploitation(seeHaberkorn2011,Ch.2).

ThecultivationofBhumibols imageasabenevolent father,whollydedicated to improving the

lives of his children,was essential to the legitimacy of the social hierarchy overwhich hepresided,giventheinequalityandexploitationthesystemengendered.


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TheousterofGeneralSuchindaKraprayoon in 1992 resulted fromabotched attemptmadeby

militaryandthepalacetorestoreThailandtothedaysofPremocracy,toturntheclockbackto

atimewhenanunelectedmilitarymancouldrunthecountry, legitimizedbytheexistenceofa

functioningparliamentbutnotmeaningfullyencumberedbyanychangeselectionsmightbring

to its composition. The failure of Suchindas restoration gaveway to a new adaptation. The

military was effectively sidelined, the Thai peoples wish to elect their own governments

begrudginglygranted.Still,asaresultoftheKingsintervention,thepalacepreservedmuchofits

influenceandstanding.ThenetworkofgoodmenPremhadbuiltinmoststateinstitutionswas

leveraged throughout the 1990s to shape national policy, as well as manipulate or actively

undermineelectedgovernmentsnotorious for theirweaknessand fragmentation (seeMcCargo

2005:507515). Atthesametime,thepalaceseffortstodiscreditelectedpoliticiansandprevent

the aggregation of political forces capable of challenging its extraconstitutional authoritysoftenedthepublicsconfidence indemocratic institutions,weakenedelectedgovernments,and

favored a style of politics founded on patronage and corruption. This allowed the palace to

conservethemoralhighground,protectthelegitimacyofitsroutineinterferences,andmaintain

itsroleastheultimatearbiterofpoliticaldecisionsintimesofcrisis(McCargo2005:501).

ThoughthefightoverthemonarchysrolewaseffectivelyorganizedoutofpoliticsasBhumibol

reached theapogeeofhispowerandpopularity, theprevalenceof ideasofpopularsovereigntyaroundtheworldmadeitalmostinevitablethatthequestionwouldberevisitedatsomepointas

theKingexitedthescene.Butitwasaconstellationoffactorsofbothastructuralandcontingent

character,andtheconfluenceofhistoricalprocessesofbothalong andshorttermnature,that

accounts for therapidandexplosivereemergenceoftheunresolved fightoversovereigntyand

equal citizenship in thewake of the 2006 coup. Perhaps the most profound reason for the

systems inherent instability beyond the diffusion of new technologies that make it more

difficulttocontroltheflowofinformationwithoutresortingtoconspicuousrepressivemeasures

isthefundamentaltransformationthatThailandssocialstructurehasundergonesincethelate

1970s.

The socioeconomic transformations inquestion transcend thenumerical growthof theurban

middleclass,whichhad formed thebasis formassdemonstrations in 1973and 1992.At the top

level,continuedeconomicgrowthspurredtheriseofnewbusinesselitesfarlessconnectedwith,

andhencelessinvestedin,thepalacesnetworksofpowerinthemilitaryandthecivilservice(see

Anek 1992). This class did not exhibit any particular ideological aversion to the old order.


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Nonetheless,thecapitalavailabletothisnewbusinesselitecreatedconditionsfortheemergence

ofnetworksofpoweralternativetothosecommandedbythepalace.16Possiblymoremomentous

was the transformation that had taken place at the bottom of Thailands social hierarchy,

undermining its foundations. On the one hand, development and modernization transformed

rurallivelihoods,givingrisetoamoreeducated,moreworldly,moreconsumptionmindedmass

of middle incomepeasants (seeWalker 2010a) an increasingly largepercentageno longer

involved in agriculture at all less likely to exhibit the inarticulate acquiescence and

indifferencetonationalpoliticsthatwereonceidentifiedasessentialtothestabilityoftheold

order(seeWilson1962:5758).Ontheotherhand,thepersistenceofextremelevelsofinequality17

rendered this vast segment of the population decidedly more receptive to a discourse of

empowerment. Though neither political consciousness nor economic grievances automatically

translateintopoliticalmobilization,thestrugglesfortherighttohaverights(seeSomchai2006;seealsoMissingham2004)wagedbygroupsrepresentingfarmersandworkers inthe 1980sand

1990sofferedglimpsesofthepotentialheldbythemobilizationoftheprovincialmasses,nowfar

moreinclinedtoregardthemselvesascitizensthanchildren.

Theroyalistcampmadethingsworseinatleasttwoways.First,beginningintheearly1990s,King

Bhumibolbegantospeakintermsthatevidencedthepalacesfailuretoaccepttheimplicationsof

the countrys socioeconomic transformation. Bhumibols rejection of progress, his pleas towalk backwards into a khlong, his insistent portrayal of the desire for selfadvancement as

greed,andeventuallyhisnewtheorycenteredoneconomicsufficiency(seeWalker2010b)

offered avision of the future fundamentally at oddswith the aspirations of upward mobility

increasinglyharboredbymuchofthepopulation.Thatgeneratednoresentmentinandofitself,

giventheKingsfatherlyimageandwellintentionedpresentation,butplacedthepalaceatarisk

of fading rapidly into irrelevance, should someone ever come along with an alternative,

potentiallymoreempoweringvision.Second,intheabsenceofanimminent,majoritarianthreat

tothestatusquo,royalliberals(seeConnors2008)closetothepalacefeltcomfortableenough

tospearheadtheeffortthatculminated inthepromulgationofaconstitution, in1997,thatwas

not only more liberal than its forerunners, but also more protective of the stability of the

executive against thevagaries of Thailands fragmented legislature. This, in turn, constituted

16Forhow thisnewnetwork subsequently coalesced aroundThaksinShinawatra, seeMcCargo

andUkrist(2005:Ch.6).17ForaconciseexplanationofwhyThailandsgrowthrequiredextreme levelsof inequality,see

Montesano(2010:279).


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something of a unilateral disarmament on the part of the royalist establishment. Should a

governmenteverdeveloptheelectoralpopularityandambitiontochallengethepalacesnetworks

of power, the new rules of the game limited the ability of unelected institutions to deter,

undermine,orejectitthroughmeansotherthanbrutemilitaryforce.

4.THEWHOREOFBABYLONThereisconsiderablemerittotheargumentthatThaksinShinawatrahadsoughttoestablishan

electeddictatorshipduringhisfiveyears inoffice.WhileThaksinprovedsingularlycapableof

reducing the fragmentation of Thailands political system, that is, the unprecedentedconcentrationofpowersinthehandsofanelected,civilianleaderalsoallowedhisadministration

topursuepolicies thateroded severalaspectsof thecountryselectoraldemocracy.The ruleof

lawwasweakenedbycorruptionand,especially,bythewaveofstateviolenceunleashed inthe

contextofthe(palaceinspired)WaronDrugs in2003andthe(palaceinstigated)responseto

thesouthern insurgencybeginning in2004.Governmentaccountabilitywasunderminedbythe

attemptmadetovanquishindependentstateagencies.Andfreedomofthepressdeclinedsharply

as a result of legal measures taken against critics of the administration aswell as informal

pressuresplacedontheprintandbroadcastmediatoprovidefavorablecoverage.Afterthe2005

elections,where Thaksins party Thai Rak Thai took three quarters of the lower house seats,

Thailand seemedwell on itsway to developing a form of democracywith a much stronger

delegative(seeODonnell1994:59)thanrepresentativeorliberalflavor.

Far more determinative of his eventual removal is the fact that Thaksins electoral popularity

placed him in a position to mount a historic assault on the reserve domains of unelected

institutionssuchasthepalace,themilitary,andthebureaucracy(seeThitinan2008).And,unlike

mostofhispredecessors,Thaksinhadambitionandhubris in largeenoughsuppliestoactually

take them on, if only to maximize his own standing and power.Aside from the troubling

possibilitythatThaksinmightbeinofficeintheeventofroyalsuccession,whatappearstohave

mostthreatenedthepalacewastheprospectthatthepopularityThaksinenjoyedintheprovinces

might

have

begun

to

overshadow

the

Kings.

Such

fears

were

rendered

particularly

acute

by

the

recognitionthatThaksinsvisionofcapitalistrevolutionwerenotonlyprovingfarmoreinstep


20/30


with theprovincialelectoratesaspirations thanBhumibolsown retrograde ideas,butalso that

theambitionsofupwardmobilitythateventhepoorestThaiswerenowencouragedtoembrace

threatenedtoscramblethesocialhierarchiesuponwhichThaiStyleDemocracyhadoncebeen

founded.18Indeed,whereascriticsoftenjustifytheirdistasteforThaksinonthegroundsthathis

supportisboughtandpaidfor,Thaksinspopularitywithprovincialvotersandtheurbanworking

classhadneverbeenprimarilyaboutthematerialbenefitshewasabletoprovide.Byand large,

Thaksin remains popular with these constituencies for reasons of a more psychological or

emotionalnatureinThaksin,thesevotersfoundanationalleaderwhodidnottellthemitwas

theirpatrioticduty to accept their station in life, but encouraged them to imagine adifferent

future for themselves and their families. In essence that iswhatmadeThaksindangerous, the

capacityhehaddemonstratedtoinvolveinhislargelyprivatestruggleforpoliticalpowerawhole

newmassofactiveparticipants.19

Given Thaksins strength and staying power, the only card his enemies had left to playwas

militaryforce,backedbythemonarchysprestige.Thetask,however,wasfarmorecomplexthan

simplyremovingaPrimeMinister.Indeed,thecomplexityofthetask,andthedeterminationwith

whichThaksinfoughtback,transformedtheattempttostampouthisinfluenceintosomethingof

a bottomless pit, down which the monarchy ended up flushing almost the entirety of the

considerable political capital it had accumulated over decades. While the junta lay the

groundwork for Thaksins prosecution, confiscated his assets, dissolved Thai Rak Thai, and

dismantled theconstitutionalprovisions thatprotectedhisdominance,all thatdidnotprevent

theThaksinbackedPeoplePowerPartyfromwinningalargepluralityinthe2007elections.Nor

didthedesperatemeasureslaunchedin2008bythePeoplesAllianceforDemocracy(PAD),the

military,and thejudiciaryaccomplishmuchmore than furthercompromise the stabilityof the

country and the legitimacy of the royalist establishment. AbhisitVejjajivawas made Prime

Minister in December 2008, on the strengthof a motley legislative coalition patched together

withtheassistanceofthemilitaryandthepalace,ifonlytosufferacrushingdefeatatthehands

18Foramoredetaileddiscussion,seeHewisonandKengkij(2010:194196).

19TheironyisthatThaksinhimselfmaynothaveinitiallyrealizedthehistoricalimportofwhathe

was doing.After all,while his policies may have been designed in part to earn the support

provincialvoters and the urban poor, the largest beneficiaries had been large corporations,

particularlythoseinhisownnetwork(seeMcCargoandUkrist2005:218).Bytheendofhisfirstterm, however, Thaksin had clearly realized the potential trump card he held, and sought to

rebrandhimselfassomethingofaplebeiantribune(seePasukandBaker2009:232233).


21/30


ofThaksinsyoungest sisterYingluck in the2011elections.The intervening thirtymonths rank

amongthemosttumultuousinBhumibolsentirereign.

Inresponsetoaseriesofprotestsstagedagainsthisadministrationinlate2005,Thaksinboasted

thathewasimmunetotherecurrenceofahistoricalpatternthathadseengovernmentselected

bythecountrysideremovedby(orwiththesupportof)Bangkok,ashehadthebackingofboth.

Basedon theresultsof the2005elections, thatassessmentwas largelyaccurate.ThaiRakThai

dominated not only the North and Northeast of the country, but also the more prosperous

CentralregionaswellasmuchofBangkok.Thathadchangedsomewhatbythetimeofthecoup,

towhichBangkokresidentsexhibitedlittleovertopposition,andespeciallyinthe2007elections,

where thePeoplePowerParty lostconsiderableground to theDemocrats in thecapital. In the

interveningtime,itseems,royalistshadmanagedtodentThaksinssupportamongurbanmiddleclassvoters. Taking a page out of the royalist playbook from the mid1970s, the PADwas

particularlyeffective,atleastinitially,initsattempttoarousetheinsecuritiesandfearsofurban

middleclassvoters,warningthatThaksinspopulismwouldcomelargelyattheexpenseoftheir

economicwell being and social status (see Pasuk and Baker 2009: 253, 264266). The PAD,

moreover,wasjoinedby military generals, royalist academics, DemocratParty politicians, and

partsofthenationalpress inappealingtothesenseofmoralsuperiorityofmiddleclassvoters,

playingupcrudeculturalstereotypessuchasthenotionthattheprovincialelectoratesignorance,credulousness,andmoralcorruptionrequiredthederogationofmajorityrule,andtheplacement

ofthemajorityofthepopulationunderthetutelageoftheusualsetofgoodmen.Accordingto

royalist rationalizationsof the coup, theproblemwasnotjustThaksin,but thosewho elected

him.

Thisrhetoricalstrategymayhaveearnedtheurbanmiddleclasssupportfor,oracquiescenceto,

the 2006 coup and the removal of two People Power Party governments in 2008. But the

invalidationofsuchclearelectoralchoices,anditsjustificationintermssooffensive,elitist,and

occasionallydehumanizing,hadtheeffectofradicalizingasizableportionofThaksinssupporters

among provincial voters and the urban working class, making many of them receptive to

argumentsdenouncing the fundamental injusticeofThailands traditionalhierarchiesof status

and power. This, in turn, facilitated Thaksins effort to socialize the conflict by linking the

grievancesofhisconstituents tohisown, aswell asby fostering amonghisdiverse supporters

somethingofacommonidentityassecondclasscitizens.Thehostofilliberalmeasurestakenby

theroyalistestablishmenttoobliterateThaksinsinfluence,moreover,notonlymarkedaradical


22/30


departure from royal liberalism, exposing a decidedly less benevolent side to the royalist

hierarchicalworldview,butalso revealed thehypocrisyofmuchof thecriticism thathadbeen

leveledagainstThaksinsownadministration.

This is thebasisof resentment and frustration that accounts for the rapidgrowthof the Red

Shirt movement in the months followingAbhisits rise to Prime Minister. There can be little

doubt that the establishment of the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD)

reflectedanattemptbyThaksinandhisalliestosocializetheirstruggleforpowerbyinvolving

constituenciesthatcouldtipthebalance intheirfavor.Thaksinscallforapeoplesrevolution

during the Red Shirts failed uprising inApril 2009 contrasts starklywith his plutopopulist

governingphilosophyasonecommentatorputitearly inhisfirstterm,theplutocratsmake

bigmoney,and thepeopledontmakebig trouble (ChangNoi2002).For thepeople tonowmake big trouble,however,Thaksinhad tomake the fightaboutmore thanhimself.And,on

this count, recent Thai history offered a rich repertoire of issues and symbols that fit the

circumstances and mood of his supporters. It was thus that the 1930sera fight for equal

citizenship andpopular sovereigntywas unearthed, albeit now married topoliticalvision that

emphasizeselectoralismoverconstitutionalism.Ontheonehand,UDDleadersspoketothe

issueofcitizenshipbyappealingtotheirsupportersdesiretoberecognizedasfullyThaito

beconsideredfullmembersofthecommunity,irrespectiveofwealth,status,orkarmicstock,andtobetreatedasequalunderthelawwithoutdoublestandards.Ontheotherhand,bytraining

itssightsontheamartayatheKingsmandarinsandpraetorianguardsforthefirsttimein

decades the UDD combined a campaign for democracywith the demand that no unelected

institution, no matter how close its affiliationwith the palace, should have the authority to

overturntheelectoratesdecisions,orinterferewiththeactivitiesofanelectedgovernment.

As the Red Shirts stepped up their activities and mobilization, it is not altogether surprising,

giventhe issuesatstake, thatthe fightwas increasinglypresented through imageryhearkening

backtothedaysoftheabsolutemonarchy.Dismissedbypunditsasanachronistic,theadoption

ofthewordphrai()asanidentifierservedtobothredefinethenatureofthefightandbring

intosharperfocusjusthowradicalachallengetheRedShirtshadgrowntopresent,by2010,to

Thailandsentrenchedstructureofpower.Upuntil1905,thedesignationphraireferredtolowest

commoners

in

Siams

feudal

hierarchy

(sakdina)

freemen

subject

tocorve in the service of the

King,thearmy,oranindividuallandlord.Theembracementoftheiridentityasmoderndayphrai


23/30


reflected not only the Red Shirts newfound sense of pride in their status as commoners, but

perhaps most ominously their rejection of an entire social order founded upon supposedly

natural hierarchies of status and merit. Taking pride in low social status, in particular,

highlightedthefactthatmanyamongthemnolongeracceptedthemyththathighstatusmeans

goodnessandgoodnesslegitimizesprivilegedaccesstopoliticalpower.

ThaksinitesandRedShirtshavebeenfrequentlyaccusedoftheharboringambitionstooverthrow

themonarchy.Fargreaterdamagetothelongtermviabilityofthemonarchy,however,hasbeen

donebythecontinuedexploitationoftheneedtoprotecttheinstitutiontojustifyeveryformof

prevarication and abuse that supposed royalists have carried out since the coup. The

conspicuoususeofroyalsymbolismmayhavehelpedthegeneralsoutmaneuverThaksinonthe

nightofSeptember19,2006.ButThaksinscomebackforcedhisenemiestofallbackontheneedtoprotectthemonarchysooften,andtojustifymeasuressodistasteful,astonotonlydiminish

the power of the argument, but also effectively devalue the institution itself. The airport

occupations, the censorship of the internet, the arrests for lse majest, the recourse to

emergency powers, and even the killings of Red Shirt protesters inAprilMay 2010were all

justifiedonthebasisofdefendingtheKingfromatenebrousconspiracy.AndwhileThaksin,as

most Red Shirt leaders, have continued to publicly profess their loyalty, the royalist

establishmentsconstantmisuseofthemonarchyssupposedendangermentinvitedameasureofscrutiny,bytheinternationalmediaandordinarycitizens,whicheffectivelyshatteredthepalaces

inviolateness and carefully managed image. The heavy crackdown on freedom of expression

launchedasaresulthasonlyattractedgreaterscrutinyinturn.ItdidnothelpmattersthatQueen

Sirikit tookpublic initiativeswidely interpretedassupportiveof thePAD in2008,or thatKing

Bhumibolhasyet touttera singlewordabout themurderofRedShirtdemonstrators in2010.

Withregardtothemonarchy,ThaksinandtheRedShirtsdidnothavetosayordoanythingat

all,saveforsteppingoutofthewayoftheonetimejuggernautcareeningtowardtheprecipiceof

historicaloblivion.

5.SAUVEQUIPEUTE.E.Schattschneider(1988[1960]:66)singledoutthedefinitionofalternativesasthesupreme

instrumentofpower.Thecapacitytodefinealternatives,toshapethedefinitionofwhatconflict

isabout, isamong themost significantandenduringpowersThailandspalaceacquiredunder

Bhumibols leadership.With the coup dtat of September 19, 2006, palace insiders may have


24/30


effectivelywielded this instrument of power for the last time. Nowherewas the fight against

ThaksindefinedinmoreimpactfultermsthaninaspeechPrivyCouncilPresidentGeneralPrem

Tinsulanondadelivered at theChulachomklaoRoyalMilitaryAcademy twomonthsbefore the

coup. Soldiers are likehorses,hememorablyquipped, governments arejockeysbutnot the

owners.Asiftodispelanydoubt,Premremindedhisaudience:YoubelongtotheNationand

HisMajestytheKing(TheNation,July15,2006).Thesimpleimageryinvokedbytheoldgeneral

offersameasureoftheideologicalregressionThailandhasundergoneduringtheNinthReign.In

1932, the revolutionists of the Peoples Party had seized power by asserting that the country

belongs to the people, not to the King, as he has fraudulently claimed. Thevery claim the

Promotershaddismissedasfraudulentwasdecidedlybackinfashionseventyfouryearslater,to

thepointofservingas thecenterpieceof thepubliccasemade to legitimize the removalofan

elected government and the disposal of a democratic constitution. In Prems formulation,sovereigntyrestswiththeKing,aswellasanideaofthenationquitedistinctfromthepeople

whoselected the jockey.To the jockey,and to theoverwhelmingmajorityof theelectorate,

the horse shall pay no heed, if the owner so commands. Elections, after all,weigh each

personsvote equally, thereby distorting thewill of a nationwhosevery essence,whose main

claimtoexceptionalismanduniqueness,isahierarchyofmerit,status,andpoweratopwhichsits

HisMajestytheKing.

AsmuchasThaksinhimself, itwasthankstoroyalists likeGeneralPremthatthefightbecame,

implicitly, about theunfinished businessof the 1932 revolution.Fiveyearson, the decision to

frame the fightasachoicebetweenThaksinand theKing,groundingThaksinsremoval in the

denialofpopularsovereignty,therepudiationofmajorityrule,andtheadvocacyofhierarchical

overegalitarianunderstandingsofthenation,mightseemrecklessandshortsighted.Asidefrom

bringingback to the foreground a centuryold cleavage theyhad largely managed to suppress

over thepastseveraldecades,royalistsdisregarded thedangersofpitting the institutionof the

monarchyagainstapopularPrimeMinister,tosaynothingofthemillionsofvoterswhoelected

him.Whatevertheextent,ifany,ofBhumibolsinvolvementinthe2006coup,the2010massacre,

and the intervening manipulations of Thailandsjudicial system, themere fact that none of it

could have happened but for legitimacy borrowed from the throne inevitably turned the

monarchy intoa focalpoint for theangerand frustrationofmanyamong thosewhosechoices

hadbeenrubbishedsocontemptuously.JudgingfromtheresultsofgeneralelectionsheldonJuly

3, 2011, royalists arenotwinning the fight they helpeddefine in these terms. Notonly did an

overwhelming majority ofvoters defy instructions issued by the CommanderinChief of the


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Army,amongothers,tovotefortheDemocratPartytoprotectthemonarchy(seeBangkokPost,

June15,2011),sidinginsteadwithapartyledbyThaksinsownfleshandblood.PheuThaiinfact

went someway towards replicatingThaiRakThais success in the2005election, regaining the

supportofmanymiddleclassvotersinBangkokwhohaddesertedPalangPrachachonin2007.If

perhapsnottheKinghimself,the2011electionsareacomprehensiverepudiationoftheinformal

networkofpoweroverwhichHisMajestyhaslongpresided.

Inalllikelihood,thejuxtapositionofThaksinwiththeKingwasdesignedtoaccomplishtheexact

opposite the intent, that is,was to privatize,not socialize, the conflict, countingon the

peoples reverence for theKing, and their acceptanceof socialhierarchies that give theKings

associates the right to speak for the nation, to secure the publics acquiescence to Thaksins

removal. In this sense, the approachwas no different from previous royalist coups, exceptionmade for the heavy use of royal symbolism and ritual,whose dosagewas increased to levels

commensuratewiththePrimeMinisterspopularity.WhatPremandhisfellowtravelersfailedto

grasp, or simply chose to ignore, is the extent towhich Thai society had changed over the

previoushalfcentury, intermsofboth thepeoplesprevailingattitudesandtheirpropensity to

joinpoliticalfightsfromwhichthevastmajorityhadoncebeenexcluded.Tobesure,thehorse

effortlesslydismountedthejockey,asThaksinprovedpowerlesstoeitherpreventthecoupor

challengeitslegalityexpostfacto.Unlikemostofhispredecessors,however,Thaksinfailedtorolloveranddie,andstruckbackby leveraginghis supportersambition tobe recognizedasequal

citizens, tobeacknowledgedas thenationsrightfulowners, toturnmuchof theaudience in

the bleachers against those lounging in the owners box. The riot in the stands eventually

transcendeddemandsforthejockeysreinstatement,asthecrowdinthecheapseatswentsofar

astoclaimownershipofthehorseindeed,theentireracetrack.

Afteryearsofinstabilityandturmoil,therearesignsthatatleastsomeintheroyalistcampmay

beinclinedtoaccommodatethejockeysprivatedemands,ratherthandealwiththeriotousmob

hehelpedincite.Asothershavepointedout(seeMontesano2011),therepressivemeasurestaken

afterthedispersaloftheRedShirtdemonstrationsin2010,andthedecisiontokeepUDDleaders

locked up for many months thereafter, had the effect of maximizing Thaksins control over a

movement that had, in the meantime, developed a set of demands independent of his base

personalinterests.Indeed,thatcouldpossiblyhavebeentheobjectivedealwithThaksintofoil

amoreradicalchallengetothestatusquo.Ataminimum,theroyalistestablishmentssubsequent

consenttoanelection,evenatthecostofwalking intoahumiliatingdefeat,reflectsachanged


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strategic calculus inwhich a Thaksindominated administration has become preferable to the

backlash thatpreventingonemighthave incurred.At thispoint there seems tobe littledoubt

that Thaksin thejockey is prepared to cut any deal that might allow him to get back on the

saddle,ortakeaseatintheownersbox,evenatthecostofsacrificinghissupportersdemands

for legal accountability, freedom of expression, and real democracy. How the Red Shirt

movement might react to this eventuality remains an open question, one that may ultimately

reveal whether the Red Shirts have any potential as a transformational force, beyond the

minimumobjectiveofundoingthe2006coup.Still,whateversettlementisreached,andashard

as royalistsmight try to restore itsviability,Thailands formaldemocracywith theKingabove

theconstitutionwillnotoutlive thecurrentmonarch.CrownPrinceVajiralongkornwillnever

exercisetheberconstitutionalroleassertedbyhisfather.

Conservative thinker Sulak Sivaraksa (cited in Schiller 2011) recently speculated that the

monarchys survivalbeyond theNinthReign turnsonwhether thenewking iswilling tobea

puppet. Puppetmaybe too strongaword for it,but the fact remains thatunless thepalace

reconciles itselftoplayingaconstitutional,ceremonialrolethatwhich ithadbeen forcedto

accept,atthebarrelofagun,onJune24,1932intheendtheresultmightwellbearepublic.

Indeed, thoughThailandsroyalistestablishmentretainsmuchof itspower, ithasnow lost the

legitimacythatonceallowedittoimposeitswillwithouttheapplicationofphysicalcoercion.Therecentrecoursetobulletsandemergencyrule,aswellasthehundredsofarrestsforlsemajest,

areinthissensesymptomaticoftheincreaseduselessnessofroyalistpropaganda.Havingalready

squanderedtheauthorityrequiredtoexercisepowerwithoutforce,royalistsmaynowalsobeon

thevergeoflosingtheabilitytogettheirwaythroughforce.AfterthepassingofKingBhumibol,

theonlymemberoftheroyalfamilywhostillcommandstherequisitelevelsofsupport,respect,

andfear,thereisvirtuallynochancethatlargeorsignificantenoughsegmentsoftheThaipublic

willaccepttheoldcanardaboutprotectingthemonarchyasjustificationforthesuspensionof

their civil and political rights, or the draconian measures that currently strangle freedom of

expression.

For avariety of reasons, that itselfwill not suffice tobring about a real democracy,with or

withoutthekingasheadofstate.Ontheonehand,whetherornottheexcuseofprotectingthe

monarchyisstillavailable,themilitarywillremainathreattothestabilityofthecountryandits

democraticprospects for some time tocome.On theotherhand, ifultimatelyallowed to take

place,thereassertionofThaksinselectoraldominancemightsimplyamounttotherevivalofhis


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illiberalbrandofplebiscitarianordelegativedemocracy,possibly ina form imposingcheckson

hispowers evenmore casual than inThaiRakThaisheyday.Eitherway, themonarchysown

survival now likely hangs on its willingness to cease standing in the way of the countrys

democratization, and support aprocessof genuine reform.At present, there is no appetite in

Thailand,onany sideof thecountryspoliticaldivide, foranythingother thanaconstitutional

monarchy. Indeed, there isnocompelling reasonwhyThailand shouldhaveanyother formof

government, which in other contexts has proven quite compatible with a functioning

representativedemocracy.Thenagain,thehungerforalternativesissuretogrowrapidly,should

thenextKingrefusetomakepeacewithreality.

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