Let us entertain you! · 8 Let us entertain you! Traditionally, the regional policy in Norway, as...

Let Us Entertain You! - On Norwegian politicians’ choice of culture as a regional

development strategy -

Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo

Master’s Thesis

Department of Political Science

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO May 2007

To Anne and Synne.

PREFACE

In August 2000 I went through the doors of the administration building on Blindern

campus to ask where I could find a building called ‘CN’. At Chateau Neuf I attended

my first lecture as a student at the University of Oslo. Today, when I sit on the 8th

floor, writing this preface, I can look back at some of the best years of my life – spent

here at Blindern.

The last year has mostly been spent working on my master’s thesis. During this

period I have received excellent guidance from Professor Harald Baldersheim, I am

deeply grateful.

Since 2005 I have worked on the project “Norden i regionenes Europa”, and I would

like to thank Morten Øgård and Jarle Trondal for the opportunity to do this, and for

trusting my knowledge enough to let me include my own question in their survey.

And to Morten especially, thank you for letting me use your office and “library”, and

for your good advice and support along the way.

My mother and father also deserve an appreciation for their never‐ending support

throughout these years as a student. I would like to give my mother extra thanks for

this one. reading and commenting on a number of student papers, including

Thank you also Tim, Odd and Shekira for proof‐reading my thesis.

And last, but not the least, I would like to thank my two roommates, Maja and Martin,

promise, from now on I will do my share of the dishes. I

Blindern, May 2007.

Table of Contents

PREFACE ......................................................................................................................................................... 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................................. 4

CHAPTER 1.................................................................................................................................................... 6

CU R LTU E= ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT?............................................................................................... 6

HA I OING ON IN NORWAY?........... ................. ................. 1.1 W T S G ... ... ....................................................................7

HY I HIS SUBJECT O TEREST 1.2 W S T F I TO POLITICAL SCIENTISTS?..............................................................10

CUS, TRUCTURE AND OBJECTI

N

1.3 FO S VES..............................................................................................................12

HAT IS A ULTURAL STRATEGY? .. 1.4 W C ................................................................................................................13

1.5 CULTURAL STRATEGIES IN NORWAY. ..............................................................................................................14

CHAPTER 2...................................................................................................................................................19

A T OR HE ETICAL POINT OF DEPARTURE............................................................................................19

2.1 THE WORK OF NATIONS: A THEORETICAL POINT OF DEPARTURE............................................................19

2.1.2 The Network Society and Globalized Elites. ..............................................................................22

2.2.2 From Symbolic Analysts to Creative Class Members..............................................................23

2.2.3 Fourth Wave Politicians and Working Cities. ...........................................................................24

2.2.4 Local and Regional Policy Responses: Improving Competitiveness and Creating Entertainment Machines........................................................................................................................................27

2.2 ependent ariable .5 D V ..............................................................................................................................30

2.2 WHO PRIORITIZES CULTURAL STRATEGIES? .................................................................................................31

2.2.2 Independent Variables.........................................................................................................................33

CHAPTER 3...................................................................................................................................................38

DATA, M ETHODOLOGY, DESIGN AND OPERATIONALIZING THE VARIABLES. .......................38

3.1 WHAT KIND OF DATA DO I NEED?..................................................................................................................38

3.1.1 Presentation of Data ............................................................................................................................39

3.1.2 Problems Related to the Data ..........................................................................................................41

3.1.3 Criteria For Linear Regression Analysis. .....................................................................................42

3.1.4 Design and Structure............................................................................................................................43

5 Aase Marthe Johansen Horrigmo

3.2 OPERATIONALIZING THE VARIABLES...............................................................................................................44

3.2.1 Dependent Variable ..............................................................................................................................44

3.2.2 Gender.........................................................................................................................................................46

3.2.3 Age................................................................................................................................................................46

3.2.4 Education ..................................................................................................................................................46

3.2.5 Party Preference.....................................................................................................................................47

3.2.6 Position.......................................................................................................................................................48

3.2.7 Economic Crisis.......................................................................................................................................48

3.2.8 CenterPeriphery....................................................................................................................................49

3.2.9 Region Versus Kommune....................................................................................................................51

CHAPTER 4...................................................................................................................................................53

AN YSI AL S......................................................................................................................................................53

UTTING CULTURA STRATEGIES TO THE TES 4.1 P L T ............................................................................................53

4.2 LOOKING FOR THE NEW POLITICAL CULTURE ...............................................................................................58

4.2.1 Female, Young, Educated, and Cultural?.....................................................................................58

4.2 Per .2 ipheral, Poor and Innovative?...................................................................................................66

4.3 SUMMARY .............................................................................................................................................................71

CHAPTER 5...................................................................................................................................................75

CO LU NC SION................................................................................................................................................75

IN INDINGS .... ............5.1 M F .... ...............................................................................................................................75

WO N WEGIAN TR NDS ...............................................................

A

5.2 T OR E ................................................................78

5.3 IS THIS THEORY TOO AMERICAN TO FIT THE CASE OF NORWAY? ..............................................................80

APPENDIX.....................................................................................................................................................82

LITERATURE................................................................................................................................................88


CHAPTER 1

Culture= Economic Development?

The overall purpose of this master thesis is to analyze the Norwegian local and

regional politicians’ attitudes toward using culture as a strategy for regional

economic development. The thesis will focus on answering three research questions:

1) Why is culture a strategy for regional economical development? 2) Are Norwegian

politicians positive to cultural strategies? and 3) Which politicians are positive toward

cultural strategies? Question number one will be treated and answered through a

theoretical discussion. Questions number two and three are subjects for the thesis’

analysis.

These and similar questions have been examined in the United States by, among

others, Terry Nichols Clark. His research resulted in the publishing of “The City as an

Entertainment Machine” (Clark 2004a). His findings concluded that, indeed, some

American cities and politicians had stopped thinking of production and

entertainment as different and independent concepts. Now they are adopting

cultural strategies in order to attract talented young workers to their city‐‐and these

cities are prospering. This study will use his findings as a point of departure for

examining the case of Norway. Are Norwegian politicians as willing as their

American counterparts to adopt new strategies in order to strengthen the regional

t economy? What characterizes the poli icians that are in favor of cultural strategies?

Today economic issues can hardly be discussed without mentioning the term

globalization. The introduction of this concept has changed our outlook on the world.

Whereas the borders of the nation‐states in earlier times used to double as economic

borders, today’s economy is no longer national, it is transnational. We have moved

away from what some authors (Clark & Lloyd 2000, Reich 1991) have labelled the

Fordist‐economy and into a post‐Fordist or informational networking (Castells 2000)

production society. The traditional view that financial capital is a prerequisite for

economic growth has been challenged by a belief in human capital in the form of an


educated and mobile workforce as the quintessence for economic growth (Reich

1990, Clark and Lloyd 2000, Clarke 2004, Clarke and Gaile 1998, Keating and

Loughlin 1997). The level of economic development is no longer a question of the

number of national industries, as the economy no longer is divided into national

areas. The new economy is both global and regional (Clarke & Gaile 1998). As the

globalization process has moved forth, the national, regional and local politicians

have had to change their political strategies to meet new economic challenges. Cities

and regions across the world are implementing innovative policy strategies and

using culture and amenities to develop their regions into economic centers. To pin‐

point the argument: Cities are becoming entertainment machines as the political

elites are trying to persuade educated and creative individuals to settling in their city

or community.

1.1 What Is Going on In Norway?

So, why are cultural strategies relevant in Norway? The problem in Norway is as

follows: peripheral and rural areas have, over the last decades, experienced a net

migration. People are moving away and the rural populations are decreasing. The

tendency over the last ten years has been that larger cities and areas surrounding

them have had a net immigration, whereas most municipalities in northern Norway,

northwest Norway and the rural portions of southern Norway have had a net

migration (Statistics Norway 2007). In other words, there is an ongoing process of

centralization. People are moving to the urbanized parts of Norway. A direct

consequence of this is lower tax revenues and a corresponding rise in dependency on

state finances in the areas hit by migration. The regional policy in Norway is

searching for a solution to this problem. Cultural strategies could be a way out of the

situation. The ongoing Norwegian debate on regional policy has been marked by two

distinct trends. The first trend concerns the increased focus on the regional level of

government as a development agent and less as a traditional service provider. The

second trend is the declining weight of the rural areas (distrikts‐Norge) in the

regional policy.

8 Let us entertain you!

Traditionally, the regional policy in Norway, as in the rest of Europe, was an attempt

to rectify market imperfections and redistribute resources better within the borders

of the nation‐state (Keating 1997, Ellefsen 2005, Stortingsmelding nr 29 1988‐1989).

Within this context, Norwegian regional politicians sought to strengthen and uphold

the population in the more rural areas of Norway (Bukve et. al 2004), in order to

keep up tax revenue. The citizens were all part of what Reich (1991) labeled the

‘national economic system,’ which meant that no matter where in Norway you lived,

you should be able to enjoy the same standard of living and receive the same services

as the rest of the population. This position on regional policies as a system of

redistribution with state run top‐down aid‐programs was the leading view until the

1970’s. This period was marked by policies like grants and incentives, restrictions on

investments in booming locations and the investment in public infrastructure even

before it was in demand (Keating 1997). Around 1980 there was a shift of focus

within the political sphere. The regional policy field changed from relying heavily on

top‐down programs to stressing a bottom‐up approach with a focus on development

and “self‐help” (Onsager 2004; Bukve, Onsager & Selstad 2004; Amdam & Bukve

2004b). At the same time, the idea of national economies was faltering (Reich 1990).

This change meant a shift from government to governance, from a hierarchical to a

dialogue‐ or network‐based approach to regional policy (Amdam & Bukve 2004a).

The change also meant a shift in understanding regions and society. In the post‐

modern state of Norway, terms like “learning regions”, network‐societies and

regional partnerships were adopted. The 2000‐2001 white paper (Stortingsmelding

nr. 34 2000‐2001) on regional policy stated, like the white paper from 1988‐1989

(Stortingsmelding nr 29 1988‐1989), that the focus of the regional policy should be

on knowledge, innovation, competence, and human capital. The international trend

had been moving toward the view that the main task for local and regional mayors

was to position their region in the global economy through developing comparative

advantages (Clarke & Gaile 1998). Now Norway was following suit.

The Norwegian regions should act as development agents and guidance counselors

for the municipalities and private businesses, as well as stimulate the establishment

of partnerships between local governments, private entrepreneurs and non‐


governmental organizations (Onsager 2004; Bukve et. al 2004). The counties should

be regional or local entrepreneurs. This view was fronted in the 2006 white paper

(Stortingsmelding nr. 12 2006‐2007) where the main focus was on utilizing the

comparative advantages of each region. Empirical evidence shows that this change in

politics has lead to a change in practice. Baldersheim (2000) found that the

fylkeskommune were actively pursuing their new roles as development agents. They

were in fact establishing partnerships with the state, private businesses and non‐

governmental organizations. Through these initiatives, they were able to boost their

regional resources and put them to use.

During the 1990’s, yet another paradigm shift could be registered. The peripheral

areas of Norway lost some of their political value as national politicians shifted their

stance on regional policy. Where the classic attitude had been to seek to uphold the

population in rural areas, the new attitude was to seek to strengthen the population

and economic growth in all regions (Stortingsmelding nr 34 2000‐2001;

Stortingsmelding nr. 25 2004‐2005). The implication of this shift was that instead of

wanting population growth in isolated areas, the politicians would now be satisfied

as long as the regions as a whole had a stabile or growing population. This resulted in

an increased attention toward the regional capitals and mid‐sized cities in Norway.

The shift was grounded in the cities’ important position in the development of the

surrounding regions (Stortingsmelding nr 31 2002‐2003). In the next white paper on

the regional policy (Stortingsmelding nr 21 2005‐2006) from the Labor‐led coalition

cabinet, the new course of action was upheld. However, the need for balanced

development in both urban and rural areas was also stressed (ibid)1. As Øgård

(2001:143) writes, both cities and regions have become critical agents for economic

development. This change of opinion was based on the escalating economic growth

of the cities that followed the de‐industrialization process of the 1970’s had ended

1 The latter white paper (Stortingsmelding nr 21 2005‐2006) fronts a more traditional view on regional policy when the importance of the rural areas once again is stresses. However, this seems to be more of a change in rhetoric than in practice, as the strategies for regional development that are introduced, are the same as in the previous white papers.


(Bukve et. al. 2004) and the tertiary sector had started to grow. In other words, the

Norwegian debate followed the international trends that focused on the importance

of clusters of competence for research and innovation. From this point of view, cities

were essential (ibid.). The cities were again in focus.

To conclude the Norwegian debate; Norway has followed the international trends

described by Clarke & Gaile (1998). The Norwegian regions were, as was the case in

the U.S, encouraged to act as entrepreneurs and development agents in order to

make the most of their comparative advantages. The new focus on the cities is

continuing along this line. Today, cities are regional growth engines (ibid.), and their

surrounding areas benefit from the economic strength and cultural diversity of the

cities. What differentiates the Norwegian debate on regional policy from the

European and American trend of regional expansion (Loughlin & Peters 1997,

Putnam 1993) is that instead of increasing the regional responsibilities; the

Norwegian fylkeskommune has lost important responsibilities. This could open up

new roles for the regional level. As they, in return for lost responsibility, have gained

resources to nurture their development capabilities. Within this new framework of

economic structures and absent responsibilities, the Norwegian regions, much like

their European counterparts, are beginning to transcend the nation‐state (Keating &

Loughlin 1997); consequently, it is imperative that the comparative advantages of

each area are utilized to its full potential. Moreover, cities have an advantage simply

by being cities. Among the most crucial features that can be developed into the

comparative advantages essential for attracting and establishing new businesses,

human capital is paramount. In this perspective it is crucial that the local politicians

are able to make the right policy choices to attain a high‐quality workforce. This

leads me into the next section‐‐why is this subject of interest to a student of political

science?

1.2 Why Is This Subject of Interest to Political Scientists?

First, this subject involves potential conflicts between supporters of different

policies. Politicians can chose from a wide range of possible development strategies


in order to triumph in the global competition for capital and investments.

Traditionally, such strategies have involved tax incentives, lowering production costs

for the businesses in the region and building or upgrading the region’s infrastructure

or becoming a better service provider. Today, the development of natural, as well as

constructed, amenities within the cultural sector is also considered an effective

strategy. While some of these strategies are partly overlapping, others are

conflicting. In the fierce competition for financial support, only a narrow range of

strategies will win. Herein lies the potential conflict.

Creating a comparative geographical advantage has been an important strategy

(Clarke and Gaile 1998:57); however, in today’s cities and regions, this strategy is no

longer regarded as the only road to wealth and success (ibid:1). A change in the

priorities of policies of the local officials and policy makers has been detected in the

United States; is this true for Norway, too? Are these conflicts really an indicator of a

new emerging political struggle, where supporters of traditional strategies‐‐such as

p lbecoming a better service provider‐‐are fighting against the su porters of cu ture?

This leads me to the second reason for studying this subject‐‐the growing

significance of culture and the consumption of amenities is said to be related to the

emergence of a new political culture (Clark 2004). Ronald Inglehart’s Silent

Revolution (1977) first put forth the claim that Western populations were

undergoing a value change from materialist to post‐materialist values. Clark (2004)

has cultivated the ideas of Inglehart by introducing the consumption of amenities by

the creative and educated elites in affluent societies. As the societies’ wealth has

grown, materialist desires have been replaced by “quality of life” demands, such as

culture and focus on environmental issues. The consumption of amenities is seen as a

way of creating an identity, not to show off economic superiority, thus moving away

from Veblen’s “conspicuous consumption” (Veblen 1899/1965) and his moral

critique of consumption (Bugge 2006). In other words, a cultural strategy is not a

modern version of Juvenal’s “bread and circuses” and the entertainment machine is

not an attempt to pacify the electorate or arrange for its constituents to become

modern Dorian Grays. The intention is to strengthen the local or regional economy

by responding to the needs and wants of potential inhabitants, as well as those


already living in the area. In this sense, there is not necessarily a debate over

whether or not to choose between providing better services or developing amenities.

It is instead simply a strategy to attract the needed human capital so that, for

pulation increaseexample, the service level can be upheld and the po d.

Third, the subject is important because it involves policy innovation. As the economic

structures have changed, new policies have been innovated in order to meet the new

needs of cities and regions. The public sector’s ability to adapt and respond with new

policies addressing new problems is imperative in a period of rapid changes in

modes of production and technology and a greater mobility of people and capital. Do

local politicians manage to invent new policies? Clarke and Gaile argue that this is

exactly what cities are doing: ...cities are adapting to restructuring and globalization

trends with a range of policy choices unanticipated by scholars and unheard of just a

few years ago... (Clarke & Gaile 1998:1). Does this apply to Norway, too?

1.3 Focus, Structure and Objectives.

The focus in this thesis paper will be on the case of Norway. The literature on this

subject has so far been concentrated on America; however a new political culture has

been observed in Europe, too; especially in Germany (Gabriel et. al. 1998). This study

is an attempt to apply the theory concerning the new political culture and

entertainment/culture to the Norwegian political society. In light of the ongoing

Norwegian debate on the future of the regional political and administrative level, this

is getting more and more interesting, as even the existence of the fylkeskommune

now is up for debate. The Official Norwegian Report (NOU) on the subject (NOU

2000:2) has recommended a new regional structure consisting of 10 ‐ 15 large

regions, each with responsibility for the counties in fields like regional development,

specialized health care, child welfare and “care for substance abusers” (rusomsorg).

In spite of this report, the counties have been stripped of their responsibility for

these tasks. To compensate for this loss, the fylkeskommune was promised more

financial resources to extend its role as an economic development agent. Whether or

not the counties so far have succeeded in this field is a contentious issue. According


to the 2006 white paper on regional policy (Stortingsmelding nr 12 2006‐2007), they

have failed; however, others argue the opposite (Baldersheim 2000). Despite the

disputed success rate, the white paper stresses that, in the near future, the regions

shall be the leading players within regional development, and that their planning

capacities must be improved (ibid.). Thus, it can be expected that Norwegian regional

politicians are willing to invent and implement new strategies.

I seek to study the use of cultural strategies in light of regional development. The

analysis’ main focus will not be on how these strategies work, the actual extent of

these strategies or even whether they are effective or not. The analysis will scrutinize

Norwegian local and regional politicians’ attitudes toward cultural strategies. The

data and the design of the thesis reflect this. However, the theoretical section will, to

a certain extent, deal with how and why these strategies work.

The data was collected during the fall and winter of 2006/07 as part of the research

project Norden i regionenes Europa, using a postal survey in which I had the

opportunity to include questions regarding cultural strategies. The data will be

presented in the second chapter. This chapter will also discuss the background for

these cultural strategies and how the theory on entertainment and culture is built up.

The chapter ends with the presentation of a hypothesis. In the third chapter,

methodological questions are discussed and the variables based on the hypotheses

are operationalized. Chapter Four will analyze the data and test the hypotheses

brought forth in Chapter Two‐‐this will mainly be done through the use of regression

analysis. The fifth and final chapter will conclude on the findings in Chapter Four.

1.4 What Is a Cultural Strategy?

Before I move on to the theoretical discussion, I will give a short explanation as to

what a cultural strategy is. The term ‘culture’ is frought with many connotations; a

more precise definition is therefore warranted. When I use the phrase “culture as a

regional development strategy,” I ascribe to culture a rather broad meaning. First,

the term ‘strategy’ reflects the institutionalized nature of today’s culture


(Nilson2003:34). First of all, culture includes the construction of buildings intended

to house cultural productions, such as a symphony hall or an opera house – i.e. the

most institutionalized parts of the cultural life. Second, it includes the production of a

theatrical play, a symphonic concert, or a painting. Moreover, culture in this thesis, is

understood as both the parts of the cultural life that can exist in a free market and

the culture that is in need of public finances in order to survive (Nilson 2003:484).

The implication of this is that also parts of the cultural life that traditionally has been

seen as independent of the public agenda on culture, now is taken into account when

creating a cultural strategy or cultural policies.

The two first statements above can be classified as a more traditional approach to

culture. However, I want to apply a broader definition. Therefore, thirdly, a cultural

strategy also represents the production and consumption of natural amenities like

recreational opportunities and city beautification. Moreover, also what is labelled

“commercial” culture is a part of this understanding of culture. Last, but not the least,

as the art and cultural life is becoming more and more integrated with the

production system and the knowledge‐system (Nilson 2003:318), cultural strategies

are becoming strategies to increase the competence and knowledge in society. Clark

(2004b) takes the importance of knowledge one step further in his understanding of

‘cultural strategies’ as the creation and/or development of existing natural or

constructed amenities with the intention of attracting human and financial resources

to the region. Thus, improving the knowledge and competence in the region affected.

1.5 Cultural Strategies in Norway.

These cultural strategies have been applied in Norway too. This section will illustrate

the definition of cultural strategies through introducing some examples of how

culture is used as a development tool in the city of Kristiansand and the county of

Vest‐Agder. The municipality of Kristiansand, in the Vest‐Agder County, is a city that

seems to have acknowledged the notion that jobs alone not are enough to attract

people to an area. The assumption relies on two facts. First, Kristiansand has an

overall plan for the cultural sector which explicitly states that culture, business and


the development of the city are linked together. The municipality’s strategic plan on

culture (Kristiansand kommune 2007b) introduces ten objectives for its cultural

policies. The ten objectives will not be presented here, however several concern

what has been labeled ‘cultural strategies.’ Objective Number One states that

Kristiansand should be an attractive city to live and work in, a city in which quality of

life and a sense of belonging are central values (ibid: 3). Moreover, the list of

objectives emphasizes that the cultural policy in Kristiansand is part of a general

regional development strategy. Finally, the policy on culture should contribute to the

establishment of a culture‐based education and research program, as well as a

culture‐based business sector. The plan on culture expands from this into the

meaning of culture for the development of the city life. In this field, the plan stresses

that citizens’ need for an identity and experiences is a central element of the modern

cultural habitat in which the citizens increasingly become consumers of culture. The

practical implication of this thought is that in order to meet the modern culture‐

consuming citizen, Kristiansand must focus on culture‐based businesses. In other

words, an instrumental approach to culture is necessary. Within this school of

thought, the cultural sector is seen as a significant contributor to the general

economic growth in the region, in addition to being an important employer. To reach

the objectives stated in the plan, several important tasks and priorities are listed,

such as the construction of a theatre/ concert hall, Agder Theater, the city’s Cinema,

museums, city beautification, festivals, development of the library and programs for

youth culture (ibid.). Basically, Kristiansand is using culture as a method to attract

and develop a competence‐ and knowledge‐based workforce. To meet the

requirements of this group of workers, the city has developed the cultural sector’s

infrastructure and is focusing on providing a city centre that is visually attractive,

d nenergetic and safe in a pattern similar to that set up by Flori a a d Clark.

The second fact concerning the cultural commitment in Kristiansand is the

establishment of Cultiva, a foundation set up to provide financial support to the

cultural sector. The foundation of Cultiva was grounded in a wish to maintain control

of the profit garnered by selling shares in a local energy producer. The amount

earned from the sale was approximately 1.4 billion NOK (www.cultiva.no/english).


The annual returns from the foundation’s investments are spent in such a way that it

benefits the citizens of Kristiansand by securing jobs and good living conditions

(ibid.). To meet this criterion, Cultiva supports projects within the educational and

cultural sector that can contribute to innovation, development and competence‐

building in Kristiansand. Financial support is primarily given to projects within one

of the four following fields: 1) strengthening the climate for creative and innovative

thinking, thus creating an attractive region, 2) non‐commercial projects and

businesses, 3) commercial concentration – projects that create lasting jobs and 4)

projects that add to the development of Kristiansand as a competence‐center within

the field of experience economy (Cultiva 2006). In 2006, a total of 27 million NOK

was paid out to festivals, research projects, filmmakers, musicians, opera and

theatrical productions, museums, conferences, and different projects aimed at

marketing the city of Kristiansand (ibid.). In Kristiansand, a cultural sector with a

budget of approximately 110 million NOK in 2006, (Kristiansand kommune 2007a)

Cultiva accounts for app. 20 % of the total public funding of culture. In other words,

the foundation is a significant contributor to the cultural sector in Kristiansand.

The sale of the energy producer, Agder Energi, in the Vest‐Agder region, did not only

lead to the founding of Cultiva, however. In 2000, the fifteen local authorities2 in

Vest‐Agder County, including Kristiansand, donated shares worth 590 million NOK

for the establishment of a regional competence development fund, Sørlandets

Kompetansefond. The foundation’s objective is to:

…contribute to improved competence in the county of Vest‐Agder in order to secure and

create jobs and good living conditions, including assisting in the development of the

University of Southern Norway.

(Sørlandets kompetansefond, Articles of Association)

2 The fifteen local authorities are Kristiansand, Mandal, Farsund, Flekkefjord, Vennesla, Songdalen, Søgne, Mandal, Åseral, Audnedal, Lindesnes, Lyngdal, Hægebostad, Kvinesdal and Sirdal.


The Article of Association reveals an objective that is similar to the aims of Cultiva

and the objectives stated in Kristiansand’s strategy document; to secure a good and

attractive city/region in which to live and work. The competence development fund

prioritizes three strategic areas; 1) establishment and development of competence‐

bases, 2) utilization of these competence‐bases, and 3) stimulation of new and

existing industry and businesses (Sørlandets kompetansefond 2007). In 2006, the

competence fund granted 50 million NOK to, among others, the construction of a

“knowledge‐park” in Kristiansand, PhD programs, projects to improve the teaching

of mathematics (TBM) in elementary school and a conference on experience

economy (Sørlandets kompetansefond 2006).

In 2005, the municipality of Kristiansand decided to construct a new theater and

concert hall, later named Kilden. This is an excellent example of a partnership

strategy for regional development. This building was to be a regional house of

culture for the citizens of Sørlandet, not exclusively for Kristiansand’s citizens. To

achieve this, the construction was organized as an inter‐municipal company and

the funding of the construction was split between the county of Vest‐Agder, the

local authority of Kristiansand, the Norwegian state, and Cultiva (Valvik 2007).

The total cost of the construction is 1, 1 billion NOK. The opening of Kilden is

estimated to take place in 2011. The inhabitants of Sørlandet will then enjoy a

theater and concert hall that houses the local symphony orchestra, Opera Sør,

and the regional theater, as well as displaying the regional cultural life of

Sørlandet. The building will be situated on the old port in Kristiansand. The

structure of the financial funding of this project is an example of how local

agents, through the establishment of partnerships, can increase the funds

available to their region.

Another example of the partnership model is Global Future. The project aims to

mobilize the segment of the immigrant population with higher education living in

Sørlandet. The partners are, among others, the two counties of Aust‐ and Vest‐

Agder, Cultiva, LO, NHO, Agder College University, Kristiansand municipality and

the Directorate of Integration and Diversity (http://www.cultiva.no/Global). The

main objective of Global Future is to utilize an unused and competent workforce,

http://www.cultiva.no/Global


contributing to overall growth in the region. Other objectives are to work toward

a functional and inclusive labor market, and to create incentives to start up new

businesses and venture thinking. In this strategy lies a wish that Sørlandet will

excel and market the region as an attractive place in which to live.

The examples show a wide range of initiatives that all seek to develop the region.

Attraction is a word that is used on multiple occasions, and this reveals a strong

desire to increase the population, as well as satisfy the citizens of the region. Culture

is one of many strategies that are implemented in this struggle. All the approaches

mentioned here aim at strengthening the knowledge and competence of the region’s

workforce and citizens. This use of new strategies has, however, not garnered

universal support.

The unwillingness to support cultural strategies has created a debate in Kristiansand,

a city that has come a long way in implementing new and partly innovative

strategies. Members of Demokratene (D), a right‐wing Norwegian political party,

have actively criticized the official policy on culture in the regional newspaper

(Kleppe & Messel 2007), where they questioned the municipality’s spending on

culture instead of providing food with a higher nutritional value to the city’s elderly

population. Moreover, D and Fremskrittspartiet (FrP) were both against the

establishing of Cultiva, Kristiansand’s newly‐established foundation for financial

support to the cultural sector. Instead, they suggested spending the money on

welfare (Kristiansand kommune 2006). FrP also opposed the construction of Kilden

theater and concert hall (Bystyret 2007). This debate illustrates the controversy

around cultural strategies, as well as underlining the fact that these strategies are

actually being used!


CHAPTER 2

A Theoretical Point of Departure

In this chapter, I will establish a theoretical framework within which the data will be

analyzed and interpreted. This framework will consist of a theoretical argument set

up to answer the following question: why is culture becoming a strategy for regional

economical development? The first part of the chapter will culminate in the

presentation of the first hypothesis and dependent variable in the analysis. The

second part will focus on the prerequisites necessary in order to answer the

question: who are the politicians most likely to favor cultural strategies? Since

politicians are my objects of study, each passage will end with the presentation of a

hypothesis concerning the variation in the dependent variable. Each hypothesis

represents an independent variable.

2.1 The Work of Nations: A Theoretical Point of Departure

The theoretical argument starts with the work of Robert Reich, especially his book

The Work of Nations: Preparing ourselves for 21st Century Capitalism (1991). With the

American society as an example, he responded to the fact that the modes of

production in industrialized societies had changed. Traditionally, modern, western

industry had high‐volume production as the ultimate goal; however, toward the end

of the 20th century, the production mode had shifted to producing high‐value goods.

As the high volume production of goods made for the large markets of middle class

Americans and Europeans failed to generate the large earnings this mode of

production once had generated, the larger Western firms shifted their focus and

locked it upon supplying particular customers with goods produced to meet their

particular needs (Reich 1991:82pp). This new process was the result of the fact that

the nations that had formerly chosen a policy of protection of home markets were

becoming less and less able to secure their nations’ standard of living solely through

domestic production. The protection of national business in America had helped

larger firms to keep their revenues up for a limited time period. However, this policy


turned out to be unsustainable when Japanese and European firms became able to

produce standard goods cheaper and sometimes even better than American firms

(ibid: 71pp).

This enlarged competition in the home markets increased the need for “home

companies” to cut costs and improve quality. Standard goods were imported from

nations that could produce at lower costs. This resulted in a globalization of

production. Products formerly designated “Made in America” or “Made in Germany”

were no longer made in the US or Germany. A car might have been assembled in

Detroit, but its components were produced in Europe, South‐East Asia or Japan. The

car had been produced in what Reich terms “the Global Web” (ibid: 110). With the

globalization of production, national economies became part of the global economy,

leaving the term “national” more and more superfluous. From this change, Reich

argues, follows that one must see the …future of American society as distinct from the

American economy… (ibid: 9). The implication of the global economy, unattached to

any nation‐state is that …All that will remain rooted within national borders are the

people who comprise a nation… (ibid: 3). Hence, the people’s skills and insights are

the primary assets of the nation. America’s competitiveness is no longer a function of

how well GE and IBM are doing, but instead lies in how much the world is prepared

to spend on services performed by Americans because

…The real economic challenge facing the United States in the years ahead – the same as

that facing every other nation – is to increase the potential value of what its citizens can

add to the global economy, by enhancing their skills and capacities…

(Reich 1991: 8).

In his book, Reich moves on to criticize the old division of the labor force into either

business class or working class. As a response to this, he comes up with three new

categories that he believes would better describe the laborer’s different positions in

the economic hierarchy, routine production services, inperson services and symbolic

analytic services (ibid; 174p). Each category corresponds to the three different

competitive positions in which workers find themselves. Workers in the routine

production services are, as the label indicates, performing routine tasks. This category

contains traditional blue collar jobs, as well as those performing routine supervisory


jobs. These jobs are, however, not only found in heavy industry, but also in the high‐

tech industry, among others. Inperson services are services that must be provided

person‐to‐person. The tasks they perform are also simple and repetitive. The person‐

to‐person dimension means that these services are not sold worldwide, because the

worker must be physically present at the scene where the work is delivered. The

third category is symbolicanalytic services. The workers in this sector include those

working with problem‐solving, problem‐identifying, and strategic‐brokering

activities. This group of workers, along with the workers in the first category, can,

unlike the in‐person service personnel, be replaced with workers all over the world.

They are thus competing with others providing the same services in the global

market over the opportunity to receive a paycheck.

Who are the Symbolic Analysts? Reich’s eyes are on the latter category, the symbolic analysts. He argues that this

category is the winner in the new system of global economies. The symbolic analyst,

trained in skills such as abstraction, system thinking, experimentation and

collaboration, possesses knowledge that is crucial in order to succeed in the global

web. She or he is typically a scientist, a design engineer, an investment banker or a

public relations executive, and her job title is Communications Strategy Director or

Creative Management Adviser (Reich 1991:183). This group of workers is highly

exposed to global competition; however, they have a tendency to cluster together in

what Reich calls symbolic‐analytic zones, where they specialize in …common kind of

problemsolving, identifying, and –brokering. (ibid: 234). The meaning and value of

these zones is treasured around the world because clusters like Silicon Valley,

Hollywood or Wall Street cannot easily be duplicated anywhere else (ibid: 235). No

matter how strongly a state or region might wish to develop its own Silicon Valley,

this is a task that takes more than money. These zones represent skills, knowledge

and institutions that have evolved over time. Even though the inventions and

knowledge created in these zones are shared and transported to other states, cities

and people, the cumulative, shared learning that have made innovation possible do

not travel around the globe at the same speed. Within these clusters the participants

gain from the insights of others. Rapid, informal communication among the workers


increases the possibility of sharing information and expertise. Being in the zone is

important for the individual trying to move up in “the business”.

Being in the zone is also important for those who are not symbolic analysts. Due to

the number of workers in these areas and the type of work they do, the demand for

different types of in‐person services in the region also grows. In this way, the zones

are creating jobs for workers outside of the symbolic‐analytic services. This

contributes to an increased economic and population growth, which again creates

new demands, thereby contributing to an even greater growth and development rate

in symbolic‐analytic zones (ibid: 238p). Their effect on the regional economy

expands therefore beyond the worth of each film, microchip or financial service

provided, and lines the pockets of cashiers, waiters, chauffeurs and secretaries. These

zones are regional growth machines.

2.1.2 The Network Society and G

Manuel Castells writes in his book, The Rise of the Network Society (1996/2000),

about the impact of the Informational Revolution on work and productivity. He

argues that a new economy emerged in the last 25 years of the 20

lobalized Elites.

th century on the

basis of the above‐mentioned revolution and its consequences for production and

manufacturing. The new informational, global and networked (Castells 2000:77)

economy corresponds to Reich’s global web. He states that the economy is

informational because it is based on the ability of central players to …generate,

process, and apply efficiently knowledgebased information… (ibid: 77). The economy

is global because its components are globally organized. Lastly, the new economy is

networked because productivity and competition is played out in a worldwide

network of interaction between business networks (ibid.).

Castells argues that in this new, global economy, the concept of competitive

advantage is of increasing importance (Castells 2000:122p). Strategic alliances, ad‐

hoc cooperation projects, decentralized units and networks are the new structures of

production. The combination of these elements in a firm or an enterprise is essential

to the firms’ place in the global competition and hence is determining whether the

firm can survive in the global jungle. Within this new economy, some authors have


claimed that labor follows production and is thus going through a process of

globalization. However, Castells argues, this is not true for all groups of workers.

Only the specialized fraction of the work force is in high demand in the entire world.

Who Belongs to Castells’ Globalized Workforce? This specialized and globalized group of workers comprises anyone that has the

capacity to add an exceptional value to any market, and because this group is

…decisive to the performance of business networks, of media networks, and of political

networks… the market for most valuable labor is indeed becoming globalized…

(Castells 2000:130).

The global worker typically belongs to the group of high‐level professionals that

inhabits positions such as high‐level business manager or financial analysts.

Alternatively they can be scientists, engineers or computer programmers, designers,

artists, sports stars, political consultants or professional criminals (ibid: 130). The

global worker is not unlike Reich’s symbolic analysts; in fact, Castells uses this term

himself to describe the global workforce (ibid: 295).

2.2.2 From Symbolic Analysts to Creative Class Members

I want to stick to the subject of symbolic analysts a little longer before I take the

argument one step further. In 2002, Robert Florida published The Rise of the Creative

Class… and how it’s transforming work, leisure, community, & everyday life. His work

focuses on the consequences of new production modes and technologies that were

analyzed by Reich and Castells. He argues that in this world of new production, there

is a new class emerging; the Creative Class. The class is constituted of scientists,

engineers, artists, musicians and people working in knowledge‐based professions, i.e.

Reich’s Symbolic Analysts or Castells’ globalized workforce. Not unlike the two

theorists, he claims that the function of the Creative Class within the economic

production hierarchy is to add economic value to different processes through their

creativity (ibid: 68).


The members of the Creative Class see themselves, not surprisingly, as members of a

creative force. They are mobile and prone to moving around (ibid: 79), seeking other

creative environments; hence linking the economic geography to class identity

(Florida 2002:11). This corresponds to Reich’s ideas about Symbolic‐Analytic Zones;

the talented young workers cluster together in zones where they can exchange skills,

information and even jobs. Florida draws up a picture of blossoming creative zones

rich in talent, technology and tolerance that act as magnets on talented individuals.

In this sense, these creative zones are talent aggregators (Florida 2002:30). The

creative class members are drawn to …organic and indigenous streetlevel culture…

(ibid: 182), in areas where both the creators and the patrons of the culture live near

each other. This culture is clustered around streets with certain types of small

venues like music bars, art galleries, and small‐ to mid‐sized theatres for film or live

performance and coffee bars, hence the label street‐level. In other words, culture and

art are both being produced and experienced in these areas. The venues and the

inhabitants of the streets, together, make up a cultural community. Visitors that enter

this community to watch a play or drink a tall latte get to experience more than just a

play or a cup of coffee; they experience a way of living. Creative Class members might

occasionally visit “big‐ticket” football games or high‐art cultural events, but the

street‐level culture is their way of life (ibid: 183p).

2.2.3 Fourth Wave Politicians and Working Cities.

This section takes the argument one level further from street‐level culture and into

the world of policy making. Susan E. Clarke and Gary L. Gaile published in 1998, The

Work of Cities. This work was inspired by the ideas that Reich put on to paper in The

Work of Nations (Clarke & Gaile 1998: ix). Their starting point is the actions and

policy choices of cities and regions in a climate of national retrenchment, rapid

globalization and economic restructuring. The two authors take Reich’s thoughts one

step further, through adding a regional dimension to the argument. They claim the

shift from many national economies to one global economy and the rise of the global

web has not only meant a transcendence of scale upward from the national

administrative level to the international level; this change has also meant a


downward transcendence on the geographic scale (ibid: 4), in which regions and

localities have become important administrative, decision and economic arenas.

Drawing on Reich’s ideas, the authors guide the reader through six propositions on

the local policy, thus presenting a short version of their main argument. First, a new

geography of value‐added production processes underlies the work of cities. Second,

economic and geographic changes encourage shifts in national relations. Third, local

political arenas are expanding as localities receive more entrepreneurial economic

roles and broader political responsibilities. Fourth, different localities choose

different paths when responding to globalization depending on contextual variables.

Fifth, a fourth wave of policy initiatives tries to link the localities to the global web

and invest in human capital

…local policy initiatives investing in human capital initiatives and linking local economies

to global markets through trade and telecommunications strategies…

(Clarke & Gaile 1998: 9).

Sixth, lack of attention to the erosion of citizenship and social capital will help

undermine development efforts (ibid: 5‐10).

In short, as the economy is changing and the competition between regions escalates,

local politicians meet the new challenges with innovative policies attempting to

strengthen the competitiveness of their constituency. In essence, this competition is

a fight over the symbolic workers or the creative class members (Baldersheim

2001:117) that combines the ideas of Reich, Castells and Florida. Clarke & Gaile

argue that we are seeing a new geography of value‐added processes, centered on the

local accumulation of human capital. The changes in production, outlined by Reich,

encourage a new localism, with cities and localities looking for new economic and

political roles. The main task for the local mayors in the new geography is to link

local business to the global web. However, the two authors argue, globalization is not

a one‐way street; although local wealth is shaped in a global force, the different

localities are taking part in shaping these global processes (Ibid:31). Economic and

political functions are being transferred from the national level to the regional and

local level, but not through a top‐down enacted process, because the national level

has lost its opportunity to be a development agent. The nation‐state is still important,


but now as an enabler for localities, not a regulator (ibid: 34). Instead local mayors

must fight for their communities’ local competitive advantages as the state no longer

possesses the tools needed to fight for the national competitiveness.

So what do the sub‐national politicians do to link their business to the global web?

Clarke & Gaile stress the US cities’ newfound roles as entrepreneurial cities that

promote innovative economic growth strategies. However, this is not a simple task.

With little state finances they have had an incentive to implement policies that

contribute to the city’s economic development in order to raise tax revenues.

Simultaneously, the cities must satisfy their citizens’ need for services in addition to

jobs‐‐not doing so would mean a difficult re‐election campaign. However, with low

tax revenues, paying for services is even harder. To deal with this political Catch‐22,

local and regional politicians are on a constant search for new policy approaches

(ibid: 55).

The policy objectives, then, are to work out local economic development strategies that

will increase revenue stability, decrease vulnerability to external “shocks”, provide good

jobs to local citizens, and increase the overall satisfaction of city residents (…) Because

they increasingly rely on local resources, local officials have strong incentives to find the

most efficient uses of their funds for development purposes.

(Clarke and Gaile 1998:55)

In spite of limited resources, cities are continuing to use entrepreneurial strategies

which have substantial opportunity costs and risks for their own revenues.

The argument so far states that a globalized working elite is emerging. The members

of this elite are working in knowledge‐based professions, professions which are as

in‐demand in China as they are in Germany. This part of the labor force is labeled

symbolic analysts by Reich. The symbolic analysts, although in high demand, are also

exposed to global competition, as a European system analyst, to a certain degree, can

be replaced with a Japanese one. However, as Castells argues, this group’s expertise

is highly valued and they therefore have the…chance to shop [for jobs] around the

globe… (Castells 2000:130). As both Reich and Florida point out, symbolic analysts or

creative class members tend to cluster in zones with other specialized workers.

These zones, rich in Creative Class members, tolerance, talent, and technology, also


promote growth in adjacent sectors and areas. Clarke & Gaile add that there is a

regional dimension to the puzzle and that local political arenas are experiencing

increased importance as the globalization process and economic change continues.

In other words, there is an economic incentive for a region or a city to join in the

competition over this group of workers. In order to do this, Clarke & Gaile argue that

politicians are innovating policies as a response to the need of their particular city or

region. The question that then needs to be answered is this: what characterizes the

symbolicanalytic zones, or: which policies improve a region’s or city’s competitiveness?

2.2.4 Local and Regional Policy Responses: Improving Competitiveness and Creating Entertainment Machines

Terry Nichols Clark might provide us with the answer to this question. He edited The

City as an Entertainment Machine (2004a), in which he picks up the thread where it

was left by Reich, Castells, Florida and Clarke & Gaile and contributes to the theory

by including the concept of consumption. He continues down the road of Clarke &

Gaile when stressing the meaning of local policy choices and the role of cities. His

argument is that the supply of natural and constructed amenities is central to where

the Creative Class settles. He attacks the traditional conception of what drives cities,

namely work and production. This belief according to Clark is simply wrong in

today’s world. His response to this mistake is to explore the reversing of the causal

process that has been assumed to drive urban growth (Clark 2004b:1). The

traditional growth model has a built‐in division between work and culture, with

culture subordinate in explanatory power to work (Clark, Lloyd et. al. 2004: 291).

The trends emerging parallel with globalization and post‐industrial societies have

contributed to the increase in the importance of culture as an explanation of urban

economic growth. Clark suggests that the causal relationship in traditional growth

models should be reversed and that …consumption, amenities, and culture [should be

recognized] as drivers of urban policy… (Clark 2004b:2). His argument is that with

increased capital and business mobility, independent of distinct geography or

localities, the meaning of location has changed. Location near a river does not

provide cheap energy or competitive advantages for microchip producers. Instead,

the challenge for new business is to locate where they can easily find and attract


knowledge‐based workers‐‐i.e. human capital is an essential element. However, Clark

argues, that human capital has been treated like a factor of production, either as fixed

in a location like the more traditional land, labor and capital, or as something that

follows jobs and capital, thus not locating autonomously (Clark 2004c: 106). Clark’s

critique against this human capital theory is that it is …contextually incomplete…it

does not explain where and why human capital locates… (ibid: 106). Hence, it does not

explain what a region or a city should do in order to attract this type of workers. This

brings me to Clark’s most important theoretical contribution. His amenity theory

builds on traditional growth models, as well as human capital theory; however, the

theory takes these thoughts one step further and concludes that amenities attract

mobile talented and innovative workers (ibid: 105). In other words, amenities are

central for economic development, as can be seen in Figure 1. The implication of his

growth model is that the responsibility for economic development lies on the sub‐

national level; from this follows that local and regional politicians must implement

policies to enhance the level of amenities in their community in order to increase

their revenues.

Traditional Model of Urban Economic Growth

II Human Capital Model

III Amenity Model

Urban Amenities

Human Capital

Economic Growth

Population (Attracted by

Jobs)

Classic Factors of Production: Land, Labor, Capital and Management

+

+

+ +

Figure 2.1. Three Successive Models of Urban Development.

(Clark 2004a:106)


2.2.4.1 Defining Amenities and How Do They Attract Human Capital? According to the authors cited above, workers are not like they once were. The

creative elite have moved away from Weber’s Protestant ethic (1920/1995) and

Veblen’s moral judgment on consumption (Bugge 2006, Veblen 1899/1965). Work

no longer brings you closer to God, and non‐work activities and the consumption of

luxury goods are not sinful pleasures. Today, leisure activities are not only morally

rehabilitated; they constitute an important part of the life of the creative class

members (Florid 2002). From this follows, that, on an aggregate level, the creative

class does not choose to live in a specific area solely based on possible job options. To

the creative elite that seeks to fulfill “quality of life demands” (Clark, Lloyd et. al.

2004: 292) and emphasizes aesthetic concerns, other elements than work and career

goals matter when searching for a place to settle. According to Clark, these other

elements include amenities such as restaurants:

Some analysts who think individualistically neglect amenity aspects of restaurants, since

they are conceived as providing a purely private good – food – to discrete individuals. But

for persons pondering where to live and work, restaurants are more than food on the

plate. The presence of distinct restaurants redefines the local context, even for persons

who do not eat in them.

(Clark 2004c:104)

What are these amenities, in addition to the aforementioned restaurants? Clark

answers that amenities are a form of public good, as they benefit all firms and

citizens in the surrounding area. They do not make an area cheaper for businesses to

move in; amenities help improve localities by offering green areas, waterfronts and

the like. Moreover, constructed amenities underline and develop an area’s distinct

features, thus redefining the local context, as mentioned in the quotation above, even

for persons that do not use the particular amenity in question. The concept of

amenities, according to Clark, includes as diverse elements as good education, low

crime rates and juice bars. Clark roughly categorizes amenities into four different

types (ibid: 111):

Natural physical amenities (climate, water access, green space, overall natural attractiveness).


Constructed amenities (number of bigger institutions like research libraries, fi limuseums and opera, or small rms ke used and rare bookstores, juice bars,

black‐box theaters, and Starbucks). Socio‐economic composition and diversity (income and education of

p eresidents, number of foreign‐born citizens and the ercentage of, specially, gay male households).

Values and attitudes of residents (friendliness or hostility, tolerance, individualism etc.).

Some of these amenities, such as climate, are, although today’s climate researchers

might argue otherwise, fixed. No matter how excellent the mayor in Oslo or Quebec

City might be at policy innovation, he or she cannot make a tropical haven out of Oslo

or Quebec. On the other hand, research libraries and operas can be built, small firms

can be welcomed and city beautification processes can be enacted. This leaves room

for policy innovation.

Clark finds that Americans move into amenity‐rich areas. Consequently, growth is

stronger in areas rich in amenities. The innovative sub‐population, measured by

Clark as those who take out patents, live in areas rich in both natural and constructed

amenities (ibid:124pp). However, natural amenities are more or less fixed. The socio‐

economic composition of different regions can be both a consequences and a cause

for regional policies‐‐this subject will, however, not be dealt with in this paper. This

is also the case for values of residents; a question that will also not be dealt with

here. The focal point in this thesis will be on constructed amenities rather than on

natural or socio‐economic composition. The main concern of this political science

paper is policy choices, because this is the field in which politicians have the

opportunity to contribute. This means that investments in amenities, including cafes,

small galleries and city beautification, in this paper, represent cultural strategies.

2.2.5 Dependent Variable

To conclude this section, overall, amenities do drive urban growth. Depending on

which group of workers an area seeks to attract, different amenities should be

ascribed different values. However, as natural amenities are more or less fixed, the

priorities of local and regional politicians should be on developing natural amenities


already there and on constructed amenities, as these are elements that politicians

can alter, create or encourage. After all, culture, here in the meaning of opera,

libraries, juice bars and cafes are driving urban growth as they gradually help turn

cities into Entertainment Machines. Finally, this brings me to my first hypothesis and

dependent variable.

H1: Politicians prioritize cultural strategies over other strategies in

order to meet the increased competition among regions and cities

zinduced by globali ation.

However, I do not expect all politicians to prioritize cultural strategies. Supporting

culture and consumption instead of traditional policy choices is a controversial

stance. To prioritize culture over, for instance, care for the elderly is a subject that

creates conflict in Norway (Kleppe & Messel 2007). So, what I am expecting to find is

that some groups are prioritizing cultural strategies while other groups, for instance

members of certain political parties, are unwilling to support these types of

strategies.

2.2 Who Prioritizes Cultural Strategies?

Having established a theoretical framework which states that cultural investments

can be used as strategies to increase the attractiveness of a city or region, another

question is in need of an answer: who are the politicians favoring cultural strategies?

Clarke and Gaile (1998:11) find evidence that, in the US, politicians in distressed

communities lacking natural resources are more likely to try innovative and

experimental strategies. Can this assumption be transferred to the case of Norway? If

it can, then I would expect to find support of cultural strategies among politicians in

less central areas with traditional, and maybe even faltering, economies. The

question that will be answered in this section is which individual characteristics and

contextual variables correlate with support of cultural strategies? However, a more

thorough and detailed approach is required.

Ronald Inglehart introduced a new approach to the study of voting patterns when he

published the book The Silent Revolution (1977). He argued that there had been a


major intergenerational value shift in (post)‐modern, Western societies, from

materialist to what he labeled post‐materialist values. He presented two hypotheses

concerning this subject. The first hypothesis, the scarcity hypothesis, postulated that

individuals brought up in times of scarcity tend to emphasize materialist values such

as physical sustenance and safety. Alternatively, individuals brought up in times of

prosperity tend to stress post‐materialist values like quality of life, belonging and

self‐esteem (Inglehart 1990: 66). The second hypothesis concerns socialization

processes, and states that the economic and security conditions in which an

individual is raised, influences their values and beliefs later in life. This means that

post‐materialists value changes are first visible in the electorate only after a certain

time period. Inglehart’s studies showed this pattern in the American population;

younger generations growing up under favorable economic conditions strayed from

the values of the elder generations who grew up in a time of scarcity and world wars.

The younger generations were less focused on material values such as police and

security issues and more concerned with environmental issues, freedom of speech,

city beautification and aesthetic concerns (Inglehart 1977, 1990). Clark, along with

Hoffman‐Martinot (1998), has cultivated this materialism/post‐materialism (M/PM)

theory into a related theory on New Political Culture (NPC). With the

intergenerational value change as a point of departure, Clark & Hoffmann‐Martinot

(ibid:17) argues that, as Inglehart found, as economic wealth has increased and

become more evenly distributed among the population in the Western World, there

has been a shift away from emphasizing materialist values to PM values. Instead

…needs for belonging, esteem, and intellectual and aesthetic satisfaction… (ibid: 17)

have become more important as post‐modern society has moved away from

collective identities (Fukuyama 2007). Individuals that have adopted the NPC are

critical of an ever‐expanding welfare state, although not in favor of large welfare cut‐

backs. This fiscal conservatism is combined with a liberal view on social issues (Clark

& Inglehart 1998).

This theory can explain why the members of the Creative Class seek to satisfy their

quality of life demands through experiencing culture, music, cafés and clothes and

not solely through job options. However, can this theory explain why politicians


choose differently in the case of cultural strategies? In other words, are these

assumptions of Inglehart, Clark and Hoffmann‐Martinot as valid for politicians as for

the electorate? According to the citation above, culture can be regarded as a New

Political Culture value. Culture, understood as amenities such as aesthetics and city

beautification, are a part of Inglehart’s M/PM index (Inglehart 1990:75). A strong

emphasis on economic growth is seen as a materialist point of view; however, I will

argue that using culture to sustain economic growth still is in a PM/NPC spirit. The

argument follows the initial prerequisites of PM/NPC; high economic levels and a fair

distribution of wealth within the population as a whole. What has the NPC to do in

this thesis that mainly concerns cultural strategies for economic growth? Clark

(2004c) argues that:

New Political Culture emphasizes and [...] invests more in public good for all citizens […]

many feel these policies are paying off in the new global economy…

(Clark, Lloyd et. al. 2004:320)

I.e. NPC mayors or politicians can use cultural strategies to secure their comparative

advantages in the modern international economy. With this as a backdrop, I will

examine whether or not these assumptions are true for Norwegian regional and local

politicians. Are the politicians with an inclination toward a New Political Culture

more positive toward cultural strategies? If so, factors associated with NPC/PM

should have a high explanatory power when explaining which politicians support

cultural strategies.

2.2.2 Independent Variables

The independent variables (IV) that will be used to explain the changes in the

dependent variable are grouped in two categories. The first group of IVs concerns the

individual characteristics of each respondent based on the NPC/PM implications.

First of all, gender is important. Women and men are known to have different voting

patterns and Norwegian women have shown a tendency to be more positive toward

post‐materialists values (Aardal & Narud 1999) and thus fit the NPC scheme better


than men. In this case, the implication of the gender gap is that women would be

more willing to support cultural strategies. The first hypothesis on IVs is:

H2: Women are more likely than men to support cultural strategies

because they have a less materialist orientation.

Inglehart’s second hypothesis regards age. His findings revealed that the younger

respondents are more prone to be PM than older respondents. His explanation

concerns the scarcity hypothesis. Younger people, who have grown up in a society

with a stable economic growth rate, a high standard of living, and high levels of

security, are more inclined to pursue quality of life demands and PM values than

older respondents. Hence, they are expected to be more supportive of cultural

strategies than older politicians:

H3: Young respondents are more likely than older respondents to

support cultural strategies.

Education has been a good predictor for NPC/PM support. The well‐educated have a

tendency to be more prone to support NPC politics than the less‐educated, especially

in …affluent societies with extensive welfare state programs… (Clark & Inglehart

1998:55):

H4: Respondents with a higher education are more likely to support

cultural strategies than uneducated respondents.

There is a distinct difference between the members of different parties and their

scores on the NPC scheme. The left‐right spectrum is hard to apply here; after all,

NPC is an attempt to come up with a new explanation of political sympathies. In spite

of this, previous findings (Aardal 1999) have shown that, in the case of Norway, the

parties that are the most negative and the most positive toward post‐materialist

values are found, respectively, on the left and right side of the traditional left‐right

party cleavage. These results are, again, based on the attitudes in the electorate. His

analysis does not contain data on the parties’ representatives’ attitudes toward post‐


materialist and NPC values, which is what this thesis is concerned with. Aardal’s

analysis does, regardless of this, give an indication on how the respondents will

group themselves on the cultural index. The hypothesis is that:

H5: Political preference will influence the respondents’ attitude toward


This hypothesis is rather general, and it is hard to falsify. Thus, it is not a good point

of departure for drawing high‐quality inferences (King, Keohane & Verba 1994). The

hypothesis should therefore be extended. Again, Aardal’s analysis is helpful. His

results point toward some extreme parties on both ends of the political spectrum.

FrP’s electorate was the group most negative towards post‐materialism. Sosialistisk

Venstreparti (SV) came out as the most positive, while Venstre’s (V) voters displayed

a high degree of awareness of what is often seen as the core of the NPC and post‐

materialist values, namely the environment. Three sub‐hypotheses are therefore

deduced. It should be noted that these sub‐hypotheses give the impression of the

traditional left‐right continuum. This corresponds with Inglehart (1990:383); the

center‐right voters are somewhat less concerned with PM values than the center‐left

voters.

H5a: The respondents representing FrP have the most negative attitude

toward cultural strategies.

H5b: The respondents representing SV have the most positive attitude

cultural strategies. toward

Alternatively:

H5c: The respondents representing V are the most positive toward


A last question must be answered before moving on to the next group of IVs. Does

the political position of the respondent influence the score on the culture index? Is a

mayor more positive toward new strategies than respondents who do not hold any

specific positions? Or are mayors more afraid of venturing into uncharted territory?


The hypothesis relies on two assumptions; first, if political preferences do influence

the dependent variable, then mayors from different parties should prioritize

differently. Second, if the first assumption is confirmed, and if a mayor has power to

influence decisions, then position should influence the dependent variable. The sixth

hypothesis is:

H6: The respondent’s position in the city council influences his or her

score on the cultural index.

The second group of IVs concerns structural relations and does not concern NPC. As

mentioned in the theoretical discussion above, increasing global competition is the

foundation of this theory. The argument of Clarke and Gaile (1998) is that the more a

region is exposed to this competition, the more willing it is to try new strategies.

According to Clarke and Gaile (1998:11), cities that have been hit hard by economic

restructuring are more likely to innovate and try experimental strategies. From this

the next hypothesis is derived:

H7: A sense of economic crisis in the respondent’s fylke or kommune will

enhance positive attitudes toward the use of culture strategies.

The seventh IV relates to the expected variation between regions and cities.

According to Clark & Hoffmann‐Martinot (1998) and Clark & Inglehart (1998),

citizen responsiveness is a hallmark for the NPC politician. City politicians have a

shorter “distance” to their inhabitants than regional politicians. This could mean that

they can pick up new signals from their citizens and, hence, have the opportunity to

be more responsive to the wants and needs of citizens and local firms. Moreover, the

kommuner in this sample are the biggest cities in their regions. City politicians have

been found to be more supportive of NPC strategies (Gabriel et. al. 1998). Therefore,

the local politicians in this survey can be expected to support cultural strategies. On

the other hand, fylkeskommunen has lost central responsibilities over the last years

and, in return, they have been promised resources to increase their development

capacities. From this point, they have been searching for new roles, and may

therefore be more open to experimenting with new strategies. As the fylkeskommune


is responsible for less sectors and service areas than the kommune, this might make it

easier to prioritize new strategies. As my arguments work both ways, I have chosen

to deduce two hypotheses:

H8a: Regional politicians will prioritize cultural strategies higher than

city politicians because they are searching for new roles.

H8b: City Politicians will prioritize cultural strategies higher than

regional politicians because of their proximity to the citizens.

Clark (2004a:111pp) argues that geographical conditions have a significant influence

on the possibilities for economic growth. Traditionally, this has been understood as

natural resources and access to water; however, this conception of geography is

changing. Today, an unfriendly climate with low temperatures is considered a

drawback for areas trying to attract new knowledge‐based workers because people

tend to move toward the Sun Belt (Clark 2004a). This certainly puts Norway, and

especially the northern parts of the country, in a rough spot. Not only does northern

Norway suffer from a cold climate, but the distance to central markets is large and

transportation costs are higher than in the south. Also, the knowledge‐based workers

are further away from the main airports of Norway. Together, these disadvantages

render the peripheral parts of Norway more exposed to the increasing economic

competition. In other words, the argument consists of a center‐periphery dimension

in which the more disadvantaged areas must fight harder to win in the global

competition (Clarke & Gaile 1998). The rational consequences of this are that the

politicians would react by compensating for these disadvantages. As climate and

geography are fixed factors, the politicians must turn to policies that attract people

and capital despite the climate. The implication of this argument is that:

H9: The respondent’s score on the culture index is influenced by whether

they live in a central or a peripheral region.

This variable will, however, only be tested against the regional politicians. This issue

will be dealt with closer in the next chapter which concerns the operationalization of

these hypotheses.


CHAPTER 3

Data, Methodology, Design and Operationalizing the Variables.

This chapter deals with issues concerning the choice of data, methodology and

testing of hypotheses deduced in the former section. The dependent and independent

variables together make up a model of analysis that needs to be tested against data in

order to be falsified or confirmed. The first step toward testing the model is to

discuss what kind of data is necessary.

3.1 What Kind of Data Do I Need?

In order to test the hypotheses around which the analysis is structured, data is

required. I have chosen a quantitative approach to collect and analyze the data. The

units in this thesis are Norwegian regional and local politicians. The main data

source is a survey conducted as part of a project labeled “Norden i regionenes

Europa”. The survey data allows for an overview of the attitudes toward cultural

strategies in Norway by examining a large number of respondents. Survey data limits

the possibility to scrutinize the situation in one particular city or region. This thesis

paper does not seek to explain empirically why and how cultural strategies are

implemented, and a statistical analysis of survey data is sufficient. Moreover, it

allows for keeping the different IVs constant and identifying the variables that

influence the dependent variable. In addition to data on the choice of cultural

strategies, data showing how the politicians or respondents view other possible

strategies is needed. The survey in use draws on both, and the respondents’ attitudes

toward a series of alternative strategies for meeting the international competition

are examined.

Furthermore, the hypotheses deduced in the section above specified my IVs. They are

as follows: gender, age, education, party preference, sense of crisis in the region or

kommune, political position, local or regional status of the politician and center‐


periphery measured as the distance from Oslo. The survey provides information on

the respondent’s gender, age, education and party preference, as well as local versus

regional politicians. Age is measured as the respondents’ age in years. As for

education, the respondents are asked to self‐report their education; however they

have been grouped into six different education levels in the data file. Position is

reported under the headline “political responsibilities”. The local and regional

politicians received surveys either asking the questions from a local or regional

perspective, so whether the respondents’ are local or regional politicians is

registered according to type of questionnaire received. The respondents’ values on

contextual variables, center‐periphery and sense of crisis were gathered from other

sources.

3.1.1 Presentation of Data

The data was collected as a part of the project “Norden i regionenes Europa”. The

project team, of which I was a member, surveyed Norwegian regional and local

politicians. As there was little data on the pursuit of cultural strategies in Norway, I

got the opportunity to include some questions on the subject in the survey. The

project’s main objective was to collect information on Norwegian local and regional

politicians’ attitudes toward ongoing European regionalization processes, their

networks or social capital and their use of IT.

The total population was Norwegian local and regional politicians. However, to limit

the number of participants, a selection was made. All the 19 Norwegian

fylkeskommuner were selected, but only the members of the fylkesutvalget (FU)

(county council) and its equivalents were asked to take part. Of Norway’s 431

kommuner (municipalities), only the county capitals were selected. As Oslo is both a

council and a municipality, the sample consists of 18 regional capitals. The same

selection was made for the municipalities as for the counties; the politicians in the

formannskap (city board) represent the sample. The selection was inherited from a

former study; an almost identical survey was conducted in 1997‐98 (Baldersheim et.

al. 2001) with the same selection. However, the questions regarding cultural


strategies were not a part of the first survey. I, therefore, lack the opportunity to

compare data over time.

The surveys were mailed to the respondents’ addresses as registered by each

participant’s municipality or county. The participants had the opportunity to either

return the printed version of the survey by mail or by using a web application. The

data was registered using SPSS. The questionnaires were mailed on the 1st of August

2006. The respondents who did not return the questionnaires received new

questionnaires in two consecutive rounds. The data collection process was finished

in November 2006. This means that the units were politicians elected in the 2003

local and regional election. The survey’s final response rate was 52%, which gives an

N of 205.

Four questions3 in the survey make up my dependent variable. The questions

concern city beautification, attracting knowledge‐based workers, constructing

buildings in order to house cultural entities and establishing public “venture capital”

firms to help increase spending on culture. The data has been registered as four

separate variables; however, in order to have one dependent variable, an

operationalization process has to be carried out. The four variables are grouped

together to form a cultural index. Each individual respondent receives a score on this

index, based on the scores on the four initial variables. This score is their value on

the dependent variable.

In addition to this, data on the sense of economic crisis operationalized as

unemployment rate, and on the center‐periphery score, was collected from Statistics

Norway. This means that all respondents from the same city or region are ascribed

the same score.

3 Question number 16 u, v, w, and x.


3.1.2 Problems Related to the Data

My main data source is the postal survey. The response rate was 51, 6%; however,

the dispersion among the different parts of Norway varied. The northernmost parts

of Norway, Troms and Finmark, have especially low response rates, as does the city

of Bergen. On the other end of the scale, Hedmark, Hordaland and Møre og Romsdal

have good response rates. This need not be a problem, but, if the politicians in

Finmark do not answer because they are not interested in the subject, or because

their effort within regional policies are lower than in the rest of Norway, this can be a

problem (Skog 2003:89).

The dependent variable is a set of attitudes toward the potential use of cultural

strategies. Data on attitudes does not provide information on actions, or what would

actually happen in a real budget struggle. Although one respondent may answer that

he thinks that cultural strategies are important, there is no guarantee that he would

not prioritize the local kindergarten over cultural strategies. In the case of cultural

strategies, these strategies work through several layers, affecting first human capital

than strengthening the economic growth and increasing population growth.

Moreover, there will be a significant time lag from the implementation of certain

policies until the outcomes can be seen. On the other hand, granting funds to a

kindergarten might be more visible and hence easier to defend from a political point

of view. Tove Mordal (1989) argues that this type of data does not necessarily

predict future actions (Mordal 1989:39). However, as the respondents here are asked

to state which strategies they think can help their community in the international

competition; I will argue that the answers concerning their attitudes provide

valuable information.

Another issue concerns the validity of the dependent variable. Does it measure what

it is supposed to measure? A general issue is whether the respondents understand

the topic the same way or not. In this survey, the participants have the opportunity to

comment on the questionnaire if they choose. Most respondents chose not to

comment; however, some comments have revealed some minor problems among the

regional representatives.


Last but not least, I would like to discuss the reliability of the material. As the

questions are standardized and all respondents received the same questionnaire, the

data is mostly reliable; gender and age are hard to misunderstand, and the

respondents would give the same answer even if they were asked ten times. The

possible problem lies here mostly with the collection and registration of the data,

especially with the recording of the education level. The problem is that while some

respondents were extremely meticulous about their answers, others wrote “studies

at the University of Oslo” as their response. The problem arises when these answers

are grouped into categories ranging from having finished elementary/high school to

those having an academic degree. To make the data as reliable as possible, I chose to

categorize the above‐cited answers together with the category for those who had

once embarked on an academic degree without finishing it. Only those writing that

they had a degree from a university or college were awarded full score on this

variable.

3.1.3 Criteria For Linear Regression Analysis.

The first step of the analysis is to test the first hypothesis against the data. As I

assume that the IV’s effects on the dependent variable are linear, my statistical

analysis will be a multiple linear regression. This does mean that certain criteria

must be met. The first research question that must be answeredwhich strategies are

the most prioritized‐‐will, however, not be analyzed using regression analysis. The

respondents were asked in Question 17 to state which of the strategies mentioned

they believed were good strategies for their municipality or county to succeed in the

international competition between regions and municipalities. The question of

priority will be answered by sorting the 24 statements by their average score.

With this exception, the main analysis’ tool will be a linear regression analysis. In

order to use regression analysis, some basic criteria must be fulfilled (Skog 2003).

First of all, the data must be examined for outliers. As the parties FrP and H have in

their programs that the regional level should be abolished, I have reason to expect a

few outliers. A case‐wise diagnostics revealed that Unit Number 56 had standard


residuals that diverged more than three standard deviations from the average value.

As a consequence of this, the unit was excluded from further analysis.

Casewise Diagnostics

Case Number Std. Residual culture_index Predicted Value

Residual

56 -3,679 1,00 3,7863 -2,78629

The assumption on linearity must be fulfilled. Multicollinearity seems not be a

problem, with the exception of the center‐ periphery dimension, where VIF for

Sørlandet and ‘support for KrF’ both are rather high. As the two variables are

interesting from a theoretical perspective, they will be kept in the analysis with the

consequences this has for the standard error. An analysis of the residuals reveals that

the standardized residuals deviate somewhat from the normal distribution.

However, the deviation is moderate‐‐this interpretation is supported by the normal

probability plot. The standardized residuals are all grouped around a straight line,

which indicate that the predicted value corresponds with the observed values

(Christoffersen 2004:108). The scatter plot for the culture index reveals a grouping

around a horizontal line, which means that the values on the dependent variable are

linearly distributed. With the criteria for linear regression being met, I can move on

to the analysis.

3.1.4 Design and Structure

Bryman and Cramer (1990) state that there are two basic types of research designs,

experimental and survey/correlations design. Mehlbye et. al. (1993) differentiates

between three types of designs: survey, field experiment and case‐studies. This

thesis paper has a survey/correlation design. The design applied here deals with the

problem of inferring causal relationships through statistical control. This means that

the different variables’ effect on the dependent variable is isolated, thereby

controlling the effect of a third variable. The study is cross‐sectional, which means

that I have collected data on the population sample within the same time period

(Skog 2003:71). The data will be analyzed using SPSS. This way I get a “snapshot” of


within the cultural and kn

the population and their values on certain variables. A result of this is that I am not

able to say anything about changes in the population; what I can study is the variance

within the data. Moreover, establishing causal relationships with a survey design is

difficult (Mehlbye et. al. 1993).

To answer the second research question, I will compare the average value of the

respondent’s for the different strategies stated in question 16 (see Appendix 6). With

the exception of this first step, the main analysis will follow the structure set up by

the hypotheses developed in the previous chapter. Each hypothesis will be tested

against the data, using regression analysis. The “null‐hypothesis” will be rejected and

the alternative, that is my hypothesis, will be kept at a significance level of .90. This

means that there will be a 10 % chance of rejecting a true “null hypothesis”.

3.2 Operationalizing the Variables

3.2.1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the choice of cultural strategies. Based on the survey data

the dependent variable will be measured constructing a “culture index”. Before I can

construct this index, however, culture must be theoretically defined. This definition

builds on Clark’s constructed amenities in order to attract knowledge‐based workers

and, thus, influence the socio‐economic composition of the area (Clark 2004c:111).

My operational definition is given by the items in the questionnaire. The respondents

were asked to state on a five point scale whether they supported the following

strategies4: 1)5 try to attract knowledge‐based workers, 2) develop recreational and

entertainment opportunities, 3) establish arrangements to stimulate new businesses

owledge‐based sector and 4) develop infrastructure for

4 The headline of this question is (my translation): It’s alleged that increasing internationalizing is leading to a situation with competition between regions and cities in Europe. What do you think that your region/ kommune should do to s s competition? trengthen their stance in thi

5 Questions 16 u, v, w and x


cultural activities (examples are building a theatre, concert hall, opera etc.). The first

statement concerns attempts to attract knowledge‐based workers, and thus reveals a

commitment to the overall goal of these strategies. The second question covers

Clark’s constructed amenities, as does the fourth question. The third statement

relates to the organizational set‐up of these strategies, whether or not this is under

direct political control or whether this has been out‐sourced to specialized branches.

A factor analysis of the four indicators revealed one factor that fulfilled Kaiser’s

criterion with an eigenvalue higher than one (Christoffersen 2004:236). The four

items all had factor scores between 0,700 and 0,800. A missing value count was

carried out and disclosed one unit with one missing value, two units with two

missing values and 17 units with four missing values. In order to include cases with

missing values in the index, the missing values must be replaced with valid values

(Christoffersen 2004). This implies methodological and theoretical questions. The

methodological questions concern what happens when a value is assigned to a unit.

The theoretical question relates to which value the unit should be assigned on that

item. The problems regarding missing values imply that as few missing values as

possible should be included into the index. On the other side, leaving units out of the

analysis means losing information. With this in mind, I decided to include units with

one missing value into the analysis. On the basis of the factor analysis and the

theoretic assumptions, the four indicators were merged together in an additive

index. The missing values were replaced with the average score on the three other

indicators. The dependent variable now had possible values ranging from one to five.

The culture index has an N of 188 and the mean value is 3,932. The mean suggests

that the dependent variable is skewed toward the right.

Descriptive Statistics

N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation

culture_index 188 1,00 5,00 3,9322 ,87546

Valid N (list-wise) 188


3.2.2 Gender

The IV gender is a natural dichotomy and the politicians in the sample were asked in

question number one to state their gender. The answers were coded into score “zero”

for men and score “one” for women. No missing values.

3.2.3 Age

Age has been used as reported by the respondents. Age was reported as “years old”.

The youngest respondent is 26 and the oldest is 77. 4 respondents have missing

values.



Age 201 26 77 52,00 10,671


3.2.4 Education

The respondents were asked to report their education as their highest education or

exam. In other words, the question was open and the answers had to be recoded in

order to be used in a regression analysis. The type of answers varied from stating

degree, university, exams and topics, to brief statements such as “University of Oslo”

or “høgskole”. Simple statements of this type were interpreted as meaning having

studied at a university without receiving a degree. Only respondents that specifically

stated they had a degree were seen as having a higher education. Thus, the variable

was dichotomized into two categories “higher education” and “lower education.” The

idea behind the division was theoretical. Both Florida (2002) and Clark (2004) focus

on the importance of college degrees in determining the influence of the creative

class or the NPC. Furthermore, Clark and Hoffmann‐Martinot (1998) claim that

educated persons are more prone to support the NPC, and that NPC parties generally

are supported by younger people with university degrees (Clark and Hoffmann‐


Martinot 1998:198). I therefore want to treat only the politicians with a degree as

having a higher education. This category does, however, include a broad spectrum of

educations such as kindergarten teachers, teachers, accountants and doctors, as well

as people with PhD degrees. Likewise, the “lower education” category contains

respondents with 7 years of primary schooling, as well as respondents who have

studied at universities, but did not continue on to finish their degree. “Lower

education” was given the score “zero,” “higher education” the score “one.”



Education 205 ,00 1,00 ,4976 ,50122


3.2.5 Party Preference

The respondents were asked to report the name of the party to which they belonged.

The answers included ”Sosialistisk Venstreparti,” “Arbeiderpartiet,” “Senterpartiet,”

“Venstre,” “Kristelig Folkeparti,” “Høyre,” “Fremskrittspartiet,” ”By‐og bygdelista,”

”Demokratene,” ”Pensjonistpartiet” and ”Reformpartiet.” These answers were not

scaled, and hence could not be used in a regression analysis. The variable was

therefore recoded into dummy variables. A dummy variable is a variable with the

values one or zero and each value is represented by a dummy variable. One of the

categories is used as a reference group, thus measuring the change in the dependent

value when moving from the reference category to another category. Here I decided

to use “Fremskrittspartiet” as a reference category because they were predicted to be

the most negative to the use of cultural strategies. Given that the FrP politicians

would receive the lowest score on the culture index, using this party as a reference

category would increase the probability of getting significant results for the party

variable. The regression coefficients should be interpreted as the change in the score

on the culture index when you, for instance, compare an “SV” politician with an “FrP”

politician, all other things controlled. The “Reformpartiet,” “Pensjonistpartiet,” “By‐


og bygdelista,” “lokale lister” and “Demokratene” were recoded into an

“others”/”øvrige” category because the number of cases were so low that running an

analysis with these parties as separate variables would not provide any significant

information.

3.2.6 Position

The respondents’ position was recorded in the questionnaire in question 3 and 7 in

the questionnaire, where the respondents were asked to state their occupation and

their position within the party organization. The information was recoded into a

dichotomous variable where “one” meant mayor, “vice mayor” or member of the city

council (byråd) for the regions and municipalities with a parliamentarian structure.

Also, respondents that sat in parliament, but who were not mayors, were given that

value “one”. Those not holding a mayoral position or the like were given the value

“zero”.

3.2.7 Economic Crisis

The next hypothesis concerned the influence of an economic crisis. In order to

operationalize this variable, an adequate measurement had to be found. I decided to

use unemployment rates to measure the level of crisis. Information on

unemployment is easily available from Statistics Norway and data can be found and

used at both the regional and local level. A limitation does apply to the data; they

only indicate the number of registered unemployed. The real unemployment rate can

be higher than the data reveals; for instance, stay‐at‐home mothers are not counted,

although they might be at home involuntarily. However, I would argue that the

unemployment statistics reveal the relative difference in economic fortunes between

different kommuner and fylkeskommuner. The numbers used are the level of

2 0 unemployment in Norway at the end of November 0 6.

The overall level of unemployment in Norway is at an all‐time low level. This

constitutes another problem concerning the use of unemployment rates as an

indicator of crisis. When considering the unemployment level in Norway, none of the


respondents in the sample lives in areas ridden by economic crisis. In fact, in this

sample, in the fylke with the highest registered number of unemployed, Finmark,

only 3, 7% of the population between 16 and 74 years old are out of work. Compared

to the rest of Europe and the US this is a low number. In other words, unemployment

poses no great threat to the Norwegian economy. However, the areas with a higher

unemployment rate are expected to show a lower economic performance rate than

the areas with very little unemployment. This can be seen when checking for state

transfers; in Finmark, a major portion of the budget is financed by state transfers

(www.ssb.no/kommuner/region.cgi?nr=20). On the other hand, the difference in

economic performance between regions and municipalities might spur the

responsible politicians into acting. Politicians in an area with an unemployment rate

that is perceived as high, relative to other areas within Norway, would have an extra

incentive to act. I will therefore argue that the unemployment rate provides an

effective proxy variable for measuring a sense of economic crisis.



Unemployment 204 1,30 3,70 2,1176 ,50940


3.2.8 Center-Periphery

The question in need of an answer in order to operationalize this variable is “what is

a periphery?” Rokkan and Urwin (1983) answer this question by stating that the

relationship between the center and its periphery consists of three dimensions:

dependence, difference and distance. The first dimension, dependence, is economic.

The periphery relies on the center for economic support or transfers. The second

dimension, difference, concerns cultural differences. Lastly, distance reflects the

geographical distance from the center to the periphery. The trisection of the term

periphery does call for an index measuring the degree to which a city or county is

central or peripheral.


First, the economic dependence must be covered. The size of the general state

transfers, specifically block grants‐‐that is, state grants that have not been earmarked

for specific purposes‐‐in comparison to the size of the budget for each kommune or

fylkeskommune is an excellent measurement for economic dependence. In Oslo, only

9, 2% of the budget is state transfers of this kind, whereas in Finmark 40, 7% of the

budget is financed by block grants. It is worth noting that Finmark and the regions in

North‐Norway receive additional funding called “North‐Norway funds,” as well as a

“regional fund,” on the basis of their peripheral geography. These two extra sources

of income are not part of my data here. The data I have used is gathered by Statistics

Norway and is available from their web site (http://www.ssb.no/kommuner/). A

problem related to this data is that, as mentioned in the section on unemployment,

these data do to a certain degree correlate with the unemployment rate.

The second part of the periphery definition is difference in culture. Operationalizing

this term is challenging. In which respects does the periphery culturally differ from

the center? Vignaux (2003) builds on Rokkan when he examines the politically

cleavage structure in France and compares it with Norway in order to explain why

there is no Christian democratic party in France. She expresses a sense of wonder

regarding why a Christian Democratic party could be established in a country so far

from Rome. Rokkan (1987) provides an answer: the establishment of the Christians

People’s Party (KrF) was a result of mobilization along the religious cleavage in

Norway, a cleavage he argues is a part of the territorial cleavage in the Norwegian

political landscape. Vignaux (2003) goes on to claim that although KrF claims to

represent the views of Norwegian Christians, this is not the case. This can be

illustrated by scrutinizing KrF’s weak standing in Norwegian rural areas and the

northern parts of Norway (Viganux 2003; Rokkan 1987). KrF appeals mostly to

members of the Low Church in peripheral areas. The members of the High Church

always have represented the establishment in Oslo or in Copenhagen, and KrF has

fought against their views. This means, according to Vignaux, that the existence of

KrF can only be understood as an expression of a center‐periphery conflict. Indeed,

this conflict does have a cultural dimension built on the puritan culture of the Low

Church and Prohibition. The support for KrF can therefore be used as a measure for


questionnaires were collec

the periphery’s cultural difference from the center. The second dimension consists of

the support of KrF in the 2005 parliament election.

The third element is geographic distance. The five provinces (landsdel) were used to

group the regions on this variable. The five provinces are “Østlandet,”6 “Sørlandet,”

“Vestlandet,” “Midt‐Norge/Trøndelag” and ”Nord‐Norge.” ”Østlandet,” includes Oslo.

Five dummy variables were constructed on the basis of this information, and

“Østlandet” was used as a reference category, and thus, excluded from the analysis.

That means that all coefficients must be interpreted as the difference between

“Østlandet” and the respective provinces.

The grouping of the three dimensions in an index turned out to be difficult. The

Chronbach’s Alpha was ‐.055, which indicates a very low inner consistency. This

implied that the three items could not be grouped in an index. Instead, the three

dimensions were analyzed within the same block in the regression analysis, thus

indicating the level of periphery. The underlying assumption behind this variable is

that living in a central or peripheral fylke influences the politicians’ attitudes toward

the importance of cultural strategies. However, one element has yet to be covered.

The center‐periphery index only covers the fylkeskommune. The reason is that all the

communes in the sample are cities and by definition not peripheral. This means that I

can only test the regional politicians on this variable. A problem with these indicators

could be multicollinearity; this will be tested in the regression analysis.

3.2.9 Region Versus ommune

The final independent variable concerned whether the respondent lives in a

kommune or a fylkeskommune. The respondents received different questionnaires

modified to fit either local or regional politicians. This was registered as the

ted, and fylkeskommune received the value “one” and

K

6 Østlandet consists of Oslo, Akershus, Buskerud, Østfold, Vestfold, Telemark, Hedmark and Oppland. Sørlandet consists of Vest‐Agder and Aust‐Agder, Vestlandet of Rogaland, Hordaland, Sogn og Fjordane and Møre og Romsdal. Trøndelag consists of Sør‐Trøndelag and Nord‐Trøndelag, and Nord Norge of Nordland, Troms and Finmark.


kommune the value “two”. A commented must be made to this variable, because this

variable will be excluded from the analysis when the center‐periphery measures are

included. This follows from the face that only the regional respondents will be tested

on these variables. This will be dealt with in the following chapter which concerns

the analysis of data.


CHAPTER

Analysis

4

This section will analyze the data from the survey. The third chapter supported the

use of regression analysis on this data material, and thus regression analysis will be

my main analytical tool. However, I will also use other analytical tools in order to

reveal patterns in the data. The structure of this chapter is given by the structure of

the hypotheses presented in the previous chapter, the hypotheses will be analyzed

simultaneously, and however, the findings will be commented on one hypothesis at

the time.

4.1 Putting Cultural Strategies to the Test

The first hypothesis concerns the thesis’ overall research question: Do Norwegian

local and regional politicians prioritize culture at all? Question number 16 in the

questionnaire outlines 24 possible policy choices. The items cover a broad range of

strategies from the more traditional “providing better services”, via “better training

for the region’s/ municipalities’ personnel” to the more NPC related “construct

infrastructure within the culture sector”. The answers were reported on a five‐point‐

scale, one for each of the 24 statements. The respondents stated whether they, on the

one extreme, “totally agreed” or, on the other extreme, “totally disagreed” with each

statement. Four statements concerned cultural policy choices. To what extent do

respondents choose cultural strategies rather than other possible strategies?

To answer the question, the first step was to carry out a principal component

analysis. The analysis revealed six different components within the data (see

Appendix 2). Component number one consisted of the statements 16a), f, p, q, r, s, u,

v, w, and x. As the table shows, these statements concern culture as well as

knowledge and competence. The second component included 16b), g, h, i, j, k, and t,

statements linked to questions about the international competence in the region or

municipality and services providing. The third extracted component was made up of


16d) m, and n, all concerning regionalization. The fourth component comprised

regional restructuring and consisted of 16e) and l. One item alone scored on the fifth

component, 16c), restructuring of the municipality or the region. The sixth and last

component concerned the region or municipality’s orientation towards

concentrating development tasks within the region or municipality. 16o) loaded on

this component. The first component is the one that will be in focus in this thesis.

Consisting of both the cultural and competence/knowledge variables, it fits the thesis

overall objective perfectly. It reveals an inner correlation between support of

strategies concerning competence and strategies concerning culture, thereby cutting

straight into the theory behind this analysis: That culture attracts competent men

and women. The factor analysis shows that the correlation between culture and

knowledge is not purely a technical one; respondents who think competence and

knowledge are important also think that culture matters. Despite this, the dependent

variable is not made up of the entire first component; as this thesis’ main focus is on


The next analytic step was to test hypothesis one:

H1: Politicians prioritize cultural strategies over other strategies in

order to meet the increased competition among regions and cities

induced by globalization.

In order to do this, the score on the four culture indicators had to be compared to the

score of the 20 other statements in the questionnaire. The analysis revealed an

overall score of the policy choices in question, as well as how the different items

were appreciated among local and regional politicians. The results are listed in

scending order in a

Table 4. 1.


Strategies ranked in ascending order, mean. Results from 1997‐98 included in second column.

Rank Question number 20‐06

1997‐98

24 16 l) Transfer development tasks from region or municipality to region/municipality 2,70 2,94

23 16 k) Increase the ”travel budget” for international contacts for politicians and public servants

2,89 2,79

22 16 j) Establish an international committee 2,95 2,88

21 16 c) Reorganize the region/municipalities’ organization and leadership structure 2,96 (‐)

20 16 o) Concentrate the region/municipality on development tasks 2,97 3,27

19 16 t) Establish/ develop a regional EU‐office 3,37

18 16 h) Train the administrative staff in taking care of international contacts 3,47 3,61

17 16 g) Establish partnership alliances with regions in other states 3,53 3,71

16 16 w) Establish arrangements to stimulate new businesses within the cultural and knowledge‐based sector

3,54 (‐)

15 16 e) Bigger regions/municipalities /merge regions 3,55 2,64

14 16 x) Develop infrastructure for the cultural sector 3,70 (‐)

13 16 i) Market the region/municipality internationally 3,78 3,63

12 16 d) Take over tasks from the state 3,81 3,11

11 16 m) Improve cooperation between regions and municipalities 3,87 4,30

10 16 p) Stimulate the development of centers of technologic competence 3,92 4,00

9 16 n) Transfer more of the development functions from the state to region/local level 4,01 3,76

8 16 v) Develop recreational and entertainment opportunities 4,02 (‐)

7 16 f) Cooperate with other regions/ munici. in strategic alliances/partnerships 4,13 4,42

6 16 b) Become a better service provider 4,19 4,47

5 16 a) Prioritize regional tasks/ development of the private sector 4,24 4,23

4 16 q) Establish strategic partnerships with colleges/ universities/ private sector 4,39 4,36

3 16 u) Try to attract knowledge‐based workers 4,43 (‐)

2 16 s) Develop better communication (electronic) in the region 4,45 4,56

1 16 r) Develop opportunities for higher education. 4,64 4,67

Table 4. 1


The least popular strategy is 16 l, to transfer developmental/engineering tasks from

either the regional or the local level to respectively the local or regional level, with an

average score of 2, 70. The most popular strategy is 16 r, to increase the education

level, with an average score of 4, 64. The analysis so far has revealed some variation

between the different scores of the policy choices. The four items in the culture index

were ranked respectively as number 3, 8, 14 and 16. In other words, one item, “try to

attract knowledge‐based workers” received a high score; however the other three

received more mediocre scores. Now, what does this mean?

First, the overall objective for to the supporters of these strategies, to attract

knowledge‐based workers to their community, is the third most popular strategy in

the bundle. This item can also be seen in conjunction to the most popular strategy in

the analysis; “stimulate to increase education”. So, although none of the four items

top the list, there is a significant interest in developing an educated and knowledge‐

based workforce among the respondents. Second, also the next cultural strategy, 16v,

“develop recreational and entertainment opportunities” scored in the top third,

ranked as number 8. This confirms that Clark’s “entertainment machine” also have

some support in Norwegian regions and municipalities. This pattern is supported on

the national level as stated in the white paper (Stortingsmelding nr 21 2006‐2007)

on regional policy from 2006. Areas with a weak private sector and a decreasing

population receive support from the national level in order to develop and support

local initiatives to create attractive districts, new jobs, and provide good services and

a good cultural sector.

As for the two less popular items in the culture index they add some nuances to the

analysis. These two items have a more practical appeal; they are not so much

strategies as concrete measures. Basically, where the two former items are less

tangible, the last two items cry for action and economic spending. They are therefore

important indicators of the willingness to spend money on cultural strategies. And

the results here were less encouraging for the supporters of culture. However, none

of the policy choices fall in the least popular third of the ranked strategies. In other

words, there is some willingness to support the cultural sector financially. But as the

score of statement 16b) “become a better service provider”, which was ranked as


number six, implies, culture will lose the battle for money in a fight against dental

care or elderly in need of public health care. However, when comparing the results of

this analysis with the results from the corresponding analysis made in 1998‐99 the

picture is somewhat reversed. Table 4. 1 shows the average value on the same items

in 1998‐99. The cultural strategies were not a part of the survey then. Despite of this,

the results still give an indication on the score of the different items. The most

interesting outcome of the comparison is that statement 16b here is ranked as

number three. When removing the cultural strategies from the table, 16b is ranked

fifth in the former analysis. In other words, the relative support of this strategy has

been diminished. This could have been caused by the fact that the fylkeskommune has

lost the responsibility for important areas during this time period. However, as this

sample consists of not only regional but also local politicians, there is reason to

believe that there has been a change in attitudes. This is also supported by the

findings of Gabriel et. al (1998) in Germany, where traditional development

strategies have lost their foothold.

To sum up, there seems to be an overall agreement that improving the qualifications

of the local or regional workforce is important. The disagreement lies in how this

goal is to be attained. To develop the education level in the region is the number one

strategy, but also attracting new, more skilled inhabitants is essential. Item number

16w and 16 x) with their mid‐level score give a reasonable support to these

“attraction” strategies. Politicians do, to a certain degree, support cultural strategies.

But, as might be expected, the support for cultural strategies is reduced when

financial issues arise. Everybody wants a better workforce; they do however disagree

on how.

Does this support the hypothesis? It is clear that the empirical evidence does not give

an unconditional support of the hypothesis. Only one of the items on cultural

strategies is among the top three of the 24 strategies, and the others have lower

scores. On the other hand, the overall goal seems to be backed by the data, as “trying

to attract knowledge‐based workers” are highly appreciated among the respondents.

In other words, there is an awareness of the problems addressed by among others

Reich (1991), Castells (2000), Clark (2004) and Florida (2002). The data also


disclosed that issues within the culture and entertainment sectors are prioritized.

They are viewed as more important than ‘Regional offices in Brussels’, ‘training of

administrative staff’, ‘administrative reorganizing in the fylkeskommune or

kommune’ and ‘establishing partnership alliances with other regions’. To end this

section; several strategies were prioritized; however, cultural strategies are among

the favored strategies for regional and local politicians. This does not mean that

everybody is inclined to support them, as shown earlier and confirmed in the

analysis, these strategies are creating a debate. And hence, the choice of such

strategies is not self‐evident.

4.2 Looking for the New Political Culture

This section will first test the four hypotheses concerning the influence of the

respondents’ individual characteristics on the choice of cultural strategies. The

regression analysis was carried out through introducing one variable at a time. This

tactic makes it easier to reveal potential correlations between variables, as every

step demonstrated how the coefficients changed when new variables were added to

the analysis.

4.2.1 Female, Young, Educated, and Cultural?

The first independent variable or hypothesis to be tested against the data concerned

gender. The hypothesis postulated on this theme was:

H2: Women are more likely than men to support cultural strategies

because they have a less materialist orientation.

The results of the bivariate analysis with culture as dependent variable can be seen

in Table 4. 4, model 1, with the model summary in table 4.2. The R2 indicates that

gender alone accounts for 1, 4 % of the variance in the dependent variable whilst the

entire model made up of individual characteristics, is responsible for approximately


35 % of the variance7. Model 4 indicates that, with education, age, position and party

preferences controlled, the standardized coefficient is ‐.126. Women were ascribed

the value zero, and men the value one, hence this coefficient should be interpreted as

that women on average score .126 scale‐units higher than men on the dependent

variable, everything else controlled. The significance level of .061 means that with a

significance level of .90 the hypothesis is confirmed. However, the low R2 indicates

that gender explains only a minor part of the total change in the culture index.

The M/PM‐NPC was used to develop the next hypothesis. Individuals brought up in a

period of economic growth and stability tend to be more post‐materialist orientated

(Clarke & Inglehart 1998; Clarke 2004, Inglehart 1977; 1990). Thus younger

respondents were predicted to be more supportive of cultural strategies than older

respondents. On the basis of this assumption the following hypothesis was

developed:

H3: Young respondents are more likely to support cultural strategies

ones.than older

When confronted with the data this hypothesis did, however, not find support. In

fact, at a first glance, the data disclosed a conflicting effect. Model 2 and 3, in which

gender and education are held constant, displayed a significant and positive

coefficient. In other words, model 2 and 3 demonstrated that the older the

respondents were, the more positive to culture they were! This picture is, however,

nuanced down in model 5, where political preferences and political position are

taken into account. With parties accounted for, the coefficient is reduced to a mere

.058 with a significance probability of .406. The fact that the results are changed as

an effect of introducing party preferences to the matrix indicates a correlation

between party preferences and age. The effect first visible was a spurious effect

caused by the age distribution in the different parties. A bivariate correlation

analysis between age and party preference backed this assumption, the FrP and SV

7 Adjusted Rsquare are respectively .044 and .265.


politicians are significant (.05‐level) younger than the average respondent, whereas

the members of the “others” category are significantly older than the average

respondent (see Appendix 1). An explanation to this unexpected finding is that

culture, the way it is defined in the questionnaire, does not appeal to young persons.

The statements do not separate “high culture” from “low culture” closely enough to

what Florida (2002) and Clarke (2004b) did. On the other hand, the statement

number 16v) “Develop recreational and entertainment opportunities” indicates a

more “street level type of culture” (Florida 2002) approach as described by Clarke

and Florida. To conclude this paragraph; the data does not support the third

hypothesis, and the claim that younger people are more positive to cultural

strategies than older respondents is rejected.

The fourth hypothesis concerned the educational level of the respondents. The

wording of the hypothesis was as follows:

H4: Respondents with a higher education are more likely to support

culture strategies than uneducated respondents.

Once again the hypothesis was deducted from the NPC scheme; respondents with a

college or university degree were supposed to be more positive to culture than

respondents with little or no higher education. Table 4.3 and model 3 prove that

when controlling for age and gender the standardized regression coefficient for

education is .207 (significant at a .05 level). Model 4 does once again wreck this

assumption, when holding party preference constant, the beta coefficient is reduced

to .102 and is no longer significant. Again, this hypothesis must be rejected on the

basis of the data material; education has no significant effect on the respondents’

score on the culture index. When scrutinizing Table 4. 4 it is obvious that party

preference and education are correlated. Appendix 3 maintains this conclusion, the

members of KrF (significant at a .01‐level) and SP (.10‐level) are more educated than

the average politicians in this sample, and the politicians stating that they belong to

FrP are significantly (.01‐level) less educated than the analysis’ average respondent.

This means that the beta coefficient for education could be hiding some of the effect

of party preferences because the “distribution” of education among the different

parties is uneven. This lack of effect can maybe be traced back into the data,


approximately 50 % of the respondents reported that they had an academic degree.

This is a much higher percentage than the percentage with a degree in the overall

Norwegian population. Statistics Norway

(http://www.ssb.no/emner/04/01/utniv/) reports that in 2005 25 % of the

population had a minimum of 2 years of academic training. In this sample, the

criteria for being ascribed the value “higher education” were that the respondent had

a college or university degree. In other words, stricter criteria were applied in this

analysis than what has been used by Statistics Norway. Hence, the disproportional

education ratio between the respondents and the Norwegian population is expected

to be even higher. As the politicians in this sample have a much higher average level

of education than the electorate, and the NPC data were based on the Norwegian

electorate’s attitudes towards M/PM‐NPC issues, the assumption that the hypothesis

was based on might not be true. And the lack of effect on education could perhaps be

ascribed to the fact that there is little variation in this variable compared to what has

been found in the electorate.

The next hypothesis to be put to the test regarded an element not that must be

included in a political science paper; party preferences. In the light of the above

testing of hypotheses it is not surprising that political preferences are supposed to

influence the score on the culture index.

H5: Political Preference influences the score on the culture index.

First thing first, when bringing the parties into the analysis the R2 soared. Gender, age

and education were together able to explain 8.1% of the variance in the dependent

variable. Party preferences made the R2 almost skyrocket to .270. In other words,

party preference alone has an explanatory power more than three times stronger

than the other three variables put together. This makes it the single most important

variable in the analysis. Party preference was not a scaled variable; dummy variables

were therefore constructed in order to be able to introduce party preferences to the

regression analysis. This meant that the coefficients must be interpreted as the

change in score on the culture index when comparing any party to the reference

group, in this case Venstre (V). V was selected as reference group because their

http://www.ssb.no/emner/04/01/utniv/


politicians were expected to receive the highest score on the culture index. This

implied that all the other party variables were predicted to have negative

coefficients, as they were expected to have a negative influence on the culture index

in comparison to V.

According to Aardal (1999:62‐63) FrP voters are the most negative to post‐

modernist values. On the basis of Aardal’s findings, their influence on the culture

index was expected to be the most negative in this sample. When using V as a

reference category, this assumption was supported. When everything else (age,

education, position and gender) was held constant, the beta coefficient for FrP

politicians was ‐.569 (significant at a .000‐level).

The biggest surprise in the bunch was SV’s low value on the dependent variable.

Research on voter behavior and attitudes in Norway (Aardal 1999) has unveiled a

post‐materialist attitude among SV’s voters. In fact, the voters have been the most

post‐materialist voter group in Norway, with positive attitudes towards immigration,

environmental issues as well as secularization and more classic leftist values. SV’s

politicians were therefore expected to be among those most positive towards

cultural strategies. This assumption was rejected by the findings in the analysis, the

evidence displayed an effect opposite of what was expected; the SV politicians

received on average a .258 (.05‐level) (Model 5) lower value on the culture index

than V. In fact, the only party with a more negative beta coefficient was FrP. This was

a surprise because it revealed a discrepancy between the voters and the politicians in

the party. It was tempting to test SV’s beta coefficient on the welfare strategy

statement “providing better services” (16b) because of their emphasis on providing

services such as childcare (Sosialistisk Venstreparti). A cross tabulation (see

Appendix 4) analysis between party preferences and 16b) revealed that

approximately 45 % of SV’s politicians in the survey had rated 16b) as very

important, i.e. given it a top score. FrP had the same rating. However, among the

Høyre (H) politicians the level was even higher, here 60 % of the respondents had

rated 16b) as very important. This indicated that SV’s low value on the culture index

could not be explained by the fact that they might have prioritized “better services”

over culture.


Senterpartiet (Sp) received a beta coefficient of ‐.195 (.05 level) in comparison to V’s

politicians. This was less surprising than SV’s low score, as Sp’s voters according to

Aardal (1999) tend to be more orientated towards traditional values. Moreover, it

was postulated in this thesis that being a local or a regional politician had an

influence on the score, especially since the local politicians were city politicians. Sp,

originally the Farmers’ party has had great support in the rural areas of Norway

(Rokkan 1987). A crosstabulation between party preference and regional/local

politician revealed that this pattern still was true for Sp, as can be seen in Table 4.2. If

city politicians were more positive than regional politicians, this factor might add to

why Sp was among those most negative towards cultural strategies. The

crosstabulation was extended to include SV, however, here the distribution between

cities and regions was more even, and hence this could not explain why SV scored so

low on the culture index.

Table 4.2

As expected V had one of the highest scores in

the sample, however, as the coefficients of H,

KrF, Ap and ‘Others’ were not significant, it

was not possible to confirm that V scored

higher on the dependent variable than the

other parties. The lack of variation within this

group of parties was interesting, especially since KrF‐voters have tended to be more

on the traditional side and less post‐materialist than the rest of the group (Aardal

1999:62‐63). Appendix 3 displayed the correlation between education and party

preference, and this might be an explanation to why KrF received such high scores.

KrF’s respondents had a higher education level than the other parties (Pearson’s r

.232), and this could help explain the NPC attitude of the KrF respondents. Although

education did not have a significant effect on its own when party preference was

introduced, it did point in the direction that educated respondents were more

Crosstabulation, SV and SP

SV SP

Region 14 43.8 % 10 71.4 %

Municipality 18 56.2 % 4 28.6%

positive.

In the section on age, there was a finding that the age distribution within the sample

was uneven. It was found that SV and FrP had significantly younger respondents,


while the “others” category had the oldest ones. It has now been shown that the SV

and FrP have the most negative respondents in the survey. The lack of significance

for age, and even the fact that age seemed to work in the opposite direction of what

was postulated in the hypothesis, might be attributed to the fact that the youngest

“parties” were the most negative towards cultural strategies. This indicates that

party politics, even on the regional and local political level, is more important for the

representative’s attitudes than their age.

It is clear that party preferences had a strong influence on the respondents’ score on

the culture index. The results have been most surprising, as SV, a party that was

predicted to be positive towards cultural strategies, in fact turned out to be one of

the most negative ones. The rank of the parties in the sample with respect to the

culture index is now, in ascending order, FrP, SV, Sp and H, Ap, V, KrF and “others” in

a joint top position. The headline’s assumption that there was a correlation between

female, young, educated, post‐materialist and cultural respondents does not hold

true. The female respondents confirmed that they were, as expected, more positive

towards cultural strategies than their male counterparts. However, neither age nor

education had the effects that were originally predicted. This means that most NPC

assumptions were rejected in the analysis. The conclusion to be drawn from this is

not that there are no elements of the NPC in Norway, however, the explanation

variables normally used to explain voter preferences, did not have the same

explanatory strength when applied to Norwegian politicians.

The data also contained information on the respondents’ political positions.

H6: The respondent’s position in the city council influences his or her

score on the cultural index.

The regression analysis revealed that whether a respondent held a mayor position

or other central political offices, such as Member of Parliament or member of the

regional or city board, or not, did not influence the dependent variable. This rejected

the argument that mayor tenure and leadership experience should improve the

willingness to support untraditional policy choices. In other words, H6 was rejected.


Model Summary Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate

1 .112 .012 .007 .84788 2 .196 .038 .028 .83893 3 .285 .081 .066 .82239 4 .520 .270 .229 .74716 5 .522 .272 .226 .74845

Table 4. 3

Coefficients

Model Unstandardized Coefficients

Standardized Coefficients

Sig. Collinearity Statistics

B Std. Error Beta VIF

1 (Constant)

4.256 .211 .000

Gender -.193 .126 -.112 .128 1.000 2 (Constant

) 3.626 .351 .000

Gender -.223 .126 -.129 .077 1.012 Age .013 .006 .162 .027 1.012

3 (Constant)

3.465 .348 .000

Gender -.258 .124 -.149 .038 1.021 Age .014 .006 .171 .017 1.014 Education .352 .121 .207 .004 1.010

4 (Constant)

4.496 .427 .000

Gender -.218 .115 -.126 .061 1.077 Age .004 .006 .055 .429 1.158 Education .173 .120 .102 .153 1.211 SV -.601 .276 -.260 .031 3.442 AP -.308 .260 -.163 .238 4.556 SP -.704 .329 -.195 .034 2.009 KrF -.431 .299 -.150 .151 2.600 H -.363 .270 -.163 .181 3.554 FrP -1.498 .297 -.569 .000 3.062 OTHERS -.212 .330 -.059 .522 2.018

5 (Constant)

4.474 .429 .000

Gender -.218 .116 -.126 .061 1.077 Age .005 .006 .058 .406 1.164 Education .173 .120 .102 .153 1.211 SV -.596 .277 -.258 .033 3.445 AP -.322 .262 -.170 .220 4.591 SP -.702 .330 -.195 .035 2.009 KrF -.451 .301 -.157 .135 2.629 H -.372 .271 -.167 .171 3.565 FrP -1.499 .297 -.569 .000 3.062


OTHERS -.212 .330 -.059 .521 2.018 Position .091 .145 .042 .531 1.062

Table 4. 4

4.2.2 Peripheral, Poor and Innovative?

The second chapter postulated that poor and peripheral regions would be more

prone to support cultural strategies. The idea behind these thoughts was found in

Clarke & Gaile (1998) where the authors argued that …distressed cities are now more

likely to innovate and try these experimental strategies… (Clarke & Gaile 1998:11).

The first structural hypothesis was constructed to test the effect of economic distress

on the respondents’ attitudes towards cultural strategies in the regions and

municipalities in the survey.

H6: A sense of economic crisis in the respondent’s fylke or kommune will

increase the use of culture strategies.

To operationalize this hypothesis, the unemployment rate in every region and

municipality was used as a sign of economic distress. The data did support this,

however, the change in the R2 (Table 4.5) implied that unemployment rate accounted

for only approximately 2.0% of the total variance. The sixth hypothesis stated that a

sense of crisis would increase the score on the culture index, the standardized

regression coefficient when age, gender, education, position, party preference and

‘type of unit’ are controlled is ‐.157. The interpretation of this coefficient is that when

the unemployment rate is raised, the average score on the dependent variable is

decreased. The evidence did not support Clarke and Gaile’s (1998) findings from the

US, where distresses cities tended to be more innovative. This could be a result of the

operationalization of the variable. In Norway the overall unemployment rate in

November 2005 was 3.0 % (Statistics Norway, table 04471). The variance in the data

material was only 2.4 percent points, with 3.7 % as the highest value and 1.3 %

percent points as the lowest value. The lack of variation in the unemployment rate

can reduce the explanatory power of this variable.

The ninth IV was developed into two hypotheses on the basis that different

arguments suggested different effects for local and regional politicians on the culture


index. The H8a argued that because of the diminished responsibility in health care

issues, the fylkeskommune would be in search of new roles. Hence, the regional

politicians would be more interested in applying innovative strategies such as

culture.

H8a: Regional politicians will prioritize culture strategies higher than


H8b argued that local politicians in cities were closer connected to their electorates

and therefore would be paying a closer attention to the performance of the city, and

thus, be more fascinated by new strategies such as culture.

H8b: City Politicians will prioritize culture strategies higher than


The regression analysis supported the second hypothesis. When region was coded

“one” and city was coded “two” the coefficient of .161 should be interpreted as when

everything else was equal, a local politician received a .161 higher score on the

culture index than a regional politician. The result is in agreement with the findings

by Gabriel et. al. (1998) on Germany. When examining determinants of mayors’

spending preferences, they found that when it came to “culture” and “parks and

recreation areas” the urban vs. rural dimension had the single most explanatory

power (ibid: 227). City mayors were more prone to spend money on these strategies

than mayors in more rural areas. Especially when thinking of the proposition 16x)

“construct infrastructure in the cultural sector” it was reasonable that cities scored

higher. Large theaters or cultural halls need a certain number of potential visitors

and this favors the cities in this sample. However, as the regional politicians were not

necessarily rural politicians but politicians for the entire fylkeskommune this

argument lost some of it potential. Regional politicians could also support their

.region by establishing houses of culture in the regions’ cities

The white paper (Stortingsmelding nr 29 1988‐1989) on regional policy in 1989

emphasized for the first time that the fylkeskommune should be given means to

develop their role as entrepreneurs and developers. This view has been upheld in the

white papers on regional policy that have followed since. The argument was that


with this political support, the regional politicians would be more positive towards

cultural strategies, as they were supposed to act as development agents. However,

the analysis disclosed that the regional politicians were in fact less positive than the

local respondents. Hypothesis H8b has thus been confirmed, while the H8a has been

rejected.

Model Summary Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate

1 .112 .012 .007 .84788 2 .196 .038 .028 .83893 3 .285 .081 .066 .82239 4 .520 .270 .229 .74716 5 .522 .272 .226 .74845 6 .543 .295 .246 .73881 7 .565 .320 .269 .72773

Table 4. 5

Hypothesis number nine took Clark’s (Clark 2004b:111) claim that an unfriendly

climate in combination with long distance to relevant markets, made peripheral

areas such as Northern‐Norway more exposed to international competition, as a

point of departure when developing the following hypothesis:

H9: Politicians in peripheral regions are more prone to support cultural

strategies.

The argument was that areas exposed to competition would actively try to make up

for their short‐comings and enhance their stance in the global economy and hence,

prioritize cultural strategies. The independent variable was operationalized along

Rokkan & Urwin’s (1983) ideas that a periphery is economically dependent,

geographically distant and culturally different. The three components of the variable

were treated as one block in the analysis. The analysis was limited to the regional

politicians which meant that the N was 102. This also meant that the other

coefficients might be changed in comparison to the coefficients in Table 4. 4 and

When introducing the three center‐peripheriality (CP) measures into the analysis,

three things happened. First, gender was no longer significant. Second, the

unemployment rate was not significant. Third, the explanatory power (R2) of the


model was heightened to .496. The model’s explanatory power (adjusted R2) was

approximately 37 % (Table 4.7). This meant that when controlling for the CP

dimension, gender could no longer explain the variation in the dependent variable.

This suggested a correlation between gender and the CP‐dimension. Moreover, the

effect of unemployment on the dependent variable was diminished by the

introduction of the C‐P dimension, and again, this suggested a correlation between

unemployment rate and the one or more of the items in the CP‐dimension. In

particular, the size of the state block grants and the level of unemployment rate

displayed a correlation (see Appendix 5).

Coefficients Model Unstandardized

Coefficients Standardized Coefficients



6 (Constant) 5.001 .479 .000 Gender -.193 .115 -.112 .094 1.087 Age .003 .006 .044 .529 1.173 Education .176 .119 .104 .140 1.211 SV -.533 .275 -.230 .054 3.478 AP -.262 .260 -.138 .315 4.636 SP -.735 .326 -.204 .025 2.013 KrF -.413 .297 -.143 .167 2.637 H -.319 .269 -.143 .237 3.591 FrP -1.481 .294 -.562 .000 3.064 OTHERS -.194 .326 -.054 .554 2.020 Position .119 .143 .055 .409 1.069 Unemployment -.260 .110 -.156 .019 1.073

7 (Constant) 4.584 .500 .000 Gender -.217 .113 -.126 .057 1.094 Age .005 .005 .056 .410 1.180 Education .141 .118 .083 .233 1.228 SV -.541 .270 -.234 .047 3.479 AP -.291 .256 -.153 .258 4.645 SP -.687 .321 -.190 .034 2.020 KrF -.367 .294 -.128 .213 2.647 H -.334 .265 -.150 .208 3.593 FrP -1.439 .290 -.546 .000 3.074 OTHERS -.295 .324 -.082 .364 2.051 Position .142 .141 .065 .318 1.074 Unemployment -.262 .108 -.157 .016 1.073 Regional vs.

local pol. .281 .111 .165 .013 1.096

Table 4. 6


Running the regression analysis revealed that only one of the three components in

the C‐P‐dimension had an influence on the culture index. Both financial support and

“support of KrF” did not have significant coefficients, province (landsdel), was the

only component with an effect on the dependent variable. Østlandet, Nord‐Norge,

Trøndelag and Vestlandet had approximately the same value on the dependent

variable. The respondents from Sørlandet, on the other hand, were more positive

towards cultural strategies than the politicians from the other four provinces. In

other words, the geographic component was the only part of the center‐periphery

analysis that had an effect on this issue. This should be taken into account when

interpreting the positive effect for KrF’s voters on the dependent variable, as

especially Kristiansand and Vest‐Agder and this province is known for its strong

support of this party8. A last comment must be added, two of the items in the CP‐

dimension are potential examples of collinearity, province, here understood as

Sørlandet, and support of KrF. The VIF for the two items is respectively 6.752 and

8.105, both rather high values. This indicates that both variables are correlated with

each other, and hence, that it is difficult to come up with their isolated effect on the

dependent variable (Skog 2003:274). A consequence of this could have been to

exclude one of the two indicators, however, that would mean a loss of information,

and as both the indicators were theoretically interesting, they were kept in the

analysis.

Model Summary Model R R Square Adjusted

R Square

Std. Error of the

Estimate 1 .622 .387 .292 .75970 2 .705 .496 .369 .71715

Table 4.7

8 In the Parliament election in 2005, KrF received 17,7 % of the votes in Kristiansand, and 18,9 % in Vest‐Agder, which in the case of Vest‐Agder, was the best result for KrF in the country.


Coefficients

Model Unstandardized Coefficients

Standardized Coefficients



6 (Constant) 4.768 .710 .000 Gender -.180 .182 -.100 .325 1.273 Age .009 .008 .102 .289 1.144 C .058 .189 .032 .760 1.376 SV -.691 .407 -.271 .093 3.187 AP -.282 .396 -.135 .478 4.518 SP -.483 .454 -.144 .291 2.308 KrF -.480 .411 -.175 .247 2.827 H -.319 .409 -.132 .438 3.625 FrP -1.616 .413 -.671 .000 3.699 OTHERS -.303 .655 -.050 .645 1.453 Position .260 .209 .118 .217 1.134 Unemployment -.321 .169 -.184 .062 1.180

7 (Constant) 4.769 .876 .000 Gender -.066 .176 -.037 .707 1.332 Age .003 .008 .034 .715 1.216 Education .102 .184 .057 .580 1.468 SV -.496 .408 -.194 .228 3.609 AP -.092 .398 -.044 .817 5.109 SP -.293 .450 -.087 .517 2.538 KrF -.490 .397 -.179 .222 2.963 H -.132 .401 -.055 .743 3.906 FrP -1.588 .400 -.660 .000 3.892 OTHERS -.092 .629 -.015 .884 1.505 Position .233 .209 .106 .268 1.268 Unemployment -.484 .242 -.278 .049 2.708 Block grants in

% .012 .018 .086 .513 2.438

Support for KrF -.002 .051 -.011 .964 8.105 Sørlandet .929 .625 .325 .142 6.752 Vestlandet -.008 .325 -.004 .981 3.526 Trøndelag -.340 .305 -.108 .270 1.322 Nord-Norge -.007 .383 -.003 .985 2.970

Table 4.8

4.3 Summary

To end this chapter I will give a short summary of the analysis. The first section of the

chapter put the cultural hypothesis to the test: Did the politicians support cultural

strategies? The test disclosed that the hypothesis was somewhat supported. When


applying the six components extracted in the factor analysis, the knowledge,

competence and cultural strategies were the most supported strategies. The cultural

items alone were also on the popular end of the scale, all in all, the first hypothesis

found partial support.

The second hypothesis stated that women were more likely to support cultural

strategies than men. When controlling age, party preference, political position and

education, gender was significant and the negative coefficient confirmed the

hypothesis. However, when unemployment rate and the CP‐dimension were

introduced into the analysis, gender was no longer significant. Hence, province as an

expression of CP was more important to the value on the dependent variable than

gender.

Young respondents were predicted to be more positive toward culture than older

respondents. The regression analysis revealed that, when controlling age and

education, the older politicians were more positive than the younger ones. However,

when party preference was introduced, the coefficient was no longer significant. This

implies that the positive effect was partly spurious and caused by the uneven age

distribution within the parties. Consequently, the third hypothesis was rejected.

The fourth hypothesis concerned education. As the literature on this subject

predicted that the persons with higher education were more positive to NPC

strategies than persons with little education, the hypothesis stated that high

education would give a high score on the culture index. When first analyzing the data,

education showed a significant influence on the dependent variable. When

controlling for age and gender, education still had a significant influence on the

dependent variable. When party preference, unemployment rate and center‐

periphery were added, the significance level was reduced, and education did no more

e have an effect on the culture index. Hence, the hypothesis was reject d.

The fifth hypothesis stated that political preference would have an effect on the

dependent variable. This was supported. V, H, KrF and Ap proved to be the most

positive parties with respect to the culture index. Most surprisingly, SV turned out to

be among the most negative parties, contrary to earlier predictions. As predicted, FrP


turned out to be the most negative, while SP was able to sneak in between SV and V,

H, KrF and AP. However, the most unexpected part of this analysis was that party

preferences seemed to outmaneuver the other independent variables. Only gender so

far survived the inclusion of party preference, and even the strength of gender was

significantly reduced when party preference was accounted for. This finding was a

surprise, although the literature and theory in this field has shown that party

preference among other variables explain the attitude towards NPC variables, the

strength of party preference was unexpected.

Political position does not matter for the choice of policy response. The sixth

hypothesis stated that there would be a difference in score on the culture index

between mayors and ordinary city or county board members. This assumption was

rejected in the analysis.

The next hypothesis declared that a sense of economic crisis would increase the

choice of cultural strategies. The empirical evidence proved this assumption to be

wrong. Holding age, gender, education, party preference and type of answer

constant, a higher unemployment rate did not support a higher use of culture

strategies. In fact, the higher the unemployment rate, the lower was culture

prioritized. In the analysis of the regional politicians, this effect was reduced when

the center‐periphery variables were introduced. Then economic crisis turned out to

have no effect on the dependent variable.

The eighth hypothesis was divided into two. As the arguments concerned “type of

unit” or whether regional or local politicians would be more positive towards

culture, pulled in different directions, the two following hypotheses were developed:

H8a: Regional politicians will prioritize cultural strategies higher than


H8b: City Politicians will prioritize cultural strategies higher than


The empirical evidence was clear that H8b was to be kept and H8a rejected. With a

positive coefficient of .165, the city politicians turned out to be more positive than

the regional politicians.


The last hypothesis concerned the center‐periphery dimension. The theory predicted

that the more peripheral a region was, the more prone its politicians would be to

support new strategies such as culture. This variable was only tested on the data for

the regional politicians as the local respondents were city politicians and thus not

situated on a peripheral area. Although only one of the items turned out to be

significant, province (landsdel), the evidence showed that the regional politicians

from Sørlandet tended to be more supportive of cultural strategies. It is also worth

noting that the center‐periphery variables removed the effect of unemployment rate

in the data material. This is not surprising, financial support and unemployment was

expected to correlate.

The results from the analysis have been summed up in table 4.9. These findings will

be discussed further in the concluding part of the thesis.

Hypothesis Theme

Supported

H1 Cultural strategies vs. other strategies. Partial

H2 Women more positive than men. Yes

H3 Younger more positive than older. No

H4 Educated more positive than less educated No

H5a

FrP the most negative. Yes

H5b SV the most positive. No

H5c V the most positive. Yes

H6 Position matters. No

H7 Economic crisis increases the score on the culture index. Yes

H8a Regional politicians more positive. No

H8b. City politicians more positive. Yes

H9 Peripheral regions are more positive. Partial

Table 4. 9


CHAPTER 5

Conclusion

5.1 Main Findings

Three research questions were asked in the first chapter. Question number one

concerned the theoretical argument: Why is culture becoming an increasingly popular

strategy for regional economical development? In chapter two theories were

presented arguing that the modes of production had changed as the economic

structures shifted from a fordist to a post‐fordist arrangement. This shift produced

yet another change, this time towards a more specialized division of work. Due to the

specialization of production, a new social class of workers, be it creatives or symbolic

analysts, emerged. The members of the new social class were educated, mobile and,

drawn towards other members of the same class. This, in turn, led to a clustering of

young, talented workers in zones rich in creativity and knowledge‐intensive

businesses. Analysts, such as Clark (2004) and Florida (2004) found an interest in

these zones, and discovered that in addition to creative and competent inhabitants,

these regions were also rich in amenities and culture. Clark found that, contrary to

what has normally been assumed, the cultural diversity was not a mere bi‐product of

the economic success these zones had experienced. In fact, his findings pointed in the

opposite direction. The creative class members moved around the world in search of

culture and amenities. This led him to conclude that what an opera has to offer in

terms of cultural amenities, products and services, drives urban growth.

Florida (2002) argued that culture is important because it works as a magnet on

talented workers. As the theoretical discussion revealed, culture, understood in a

broad sense as amenities and entertainment, have an effect on where people settle to

live and work. Thus, culture contributes to economic growth. This growth generated

from culture, is a result of two different processes. First, culture is an attractor.

Members of the creative class, with education and specialized skills, are attracted to


areas with a broad range of leisure activities in addition to job options. This

attraction results in population growth, and an educated and competent workforce.

This results in a comparative advantage to the region. The second process works in a

more traditional way. The cultural sector has become a large employer, thus there is

a direct effect on economic growth from this sector. The two processes are

intercorrelated. The population growth that the first process caused boosts the need

for new workers in the cultural and the service sector. Thus, the two processes

interfere with each other, thus creating a strong growth mechanism.

This thesis tried to apply this causal chain to the case of Norway, through research

question number two: How positive are Norwegian politicians towards cultural

strategies for urban and regional growth? When comparing cultural strategies to

other strategies, the empirical evidence showed that the respondents’ attitudes

towards cultural strategies represented through the mean attitude, were highly

positive. Especially the item “trying to attract knowledge‐based workers” was a much

valued strategy. However, the respondents’ scores on the dependent variable

revealed substantial variation. The politicians’ answers varied from completely

uninterested in choosing cultural strategies, to giving them a perfect score. In other

words, there is disagreement between Norwegian city and regional politicians on

th p c n t. whe er to rioritize ulture or o

The third research question: Which politicians are positive towards cultural

strategies? dealt with this conflict. Through answering the question an attempt was

made to explain what determined on which side of the conflict a respondent would

end up. Education, age, and political position could not explain the variance in the

dependent variable. Two individual characteristics did have an influence on the

dependent variable, respectively gender and political preference. Women were

significantly more prone to support cultural strategies than men. The influence of

party preference was unexpectedly strong. The hypothesis postulated that SV’s

respondents would be among the most positive towards the strategies in question.

However, the regression analysis disconfirmed this hypothesis, based on Aardal’s

(1999) findings SV has had the most positive voters with respect to strategies and

values often referred to as post‐materialist or part of the new political culture. This


result could mean that SV has had a change of heart concerning these issues. If that is

not the case, then SV’s politicians are surprisingly unresponsive towards the values

and opinions of their voters.

As the hypothesis predicted, FrP’s politicians turned out to be those most negative

towards cultural strategies. The average FrP politician’s value on the dependent

variable was .546 units lower than the value of the politicians in V, SV, FrP and SP

clustered on the negative side of the continuum, while AP, H, KrF and V grouped

themselves on the opposite side. This finding contradicts the results of Inglehart

(1990). Inglehart found that center‐left parties are slightly more likely to be post‐

materialist than center‐right parties, whereas in Norway, the parties that form a

center of the political spectrum, are grouped against the left and right wings together

with SP. In addition to this unexpected grouping of parties, the strength of the party

variable itself was surprising. Party preference was clearly the set of variables that

had the highest explanatory power in the model. In fact, of the variables in the

original model of analysis, only the assumptions on the influence of gender, party,

unemployment and regional vs. local politicians were fully confirmed in the analysis.

The analysis of the variable regional vs. local politicians also provided important

findings. When trying to develop a hypothesis, it became obvious that the arguments

pointed in different directions. The solution was to add two hypotheses, one that

assumed that the regional politicians would be the most positive, and one that

assumed that local politicians would prioritize culture more than regional politicians

would do. The analysis revealed a clear pattern; the politicians in the municipalities

were clearly more supportive of culture than the regional representatives were. The

results disclosed a more traditional attitude to the region’s role as a development

agent than what was found in the cities. Regions are slower or more reluctant to

prioritize cultural strategies. Does this indicate lack of capacity for policy innovation

in regions, or that the theory is inadequate in the Norwegian context? This issue will

be picked up in the last section of this chapter.

An additional analysis was carried out, including only regional politicians in order to

test the centre‐periphery (CP) hypothesis. The CP dimension consisted of three


items: province (landsdel), size of block grants from the state, and the level of

support for the Christian People’s Party (KrF). These measures provided little

support for the hypothesis that peripheral regions would be more supportive of

cultural strategies. The other two indicators of peripheriality do not seem to have

any influence. One peripheral county, Finmark, seems to stand out with a particularly

high level of polarization in the attitudes toward cultural strategies. The impression

from the data in Finmark is that there is heavy polarization in this county, with the

respondents distributed at the two extremes of the scale9. The results are surprising,

as Finmark, maybe the most disadvantaged area in Norway, does not seem more

eager than other counties to try alternative strategies to increase its attractiveness.

5.2 Two Norwegian Trends

When analyzing the data, two possible trends became evident. First, are we

witnessing the emergence of a new political cleavage? Second, does the popularity of

cultural strategies accelerate the ongoing process of centralization, thus under

cutting the overall goal of Norwegian regional policy?

My presentation of Norwegian examples of cultural strategies pointed at an ongoing

debate between supporters and opponents of cultural growth strategies. Opponents

claimed that the level of spending on culture was too high and that it had led to a

worsening of the situation for the elderly in Kristiansand. The fight was over whether

to choose a traditional or a new approach to enhancing their city’s position in a

competitive economy. FrP and D stood on the same side condemning spending on

culture. On its own, that is not a surprise, as FrP have often belittled culture,

especially high culture (Skjævesland 2007, Gjerde 2007). However, seen in

conjunction with the attitude of SV’s politicians in this study, it is obvious that we

have an unusual composition of parties on the anti‐cultural side. Cultural strategies

9 It must be stresses that thi conclusion is drawn from data consisting of only a few respondents.


are policy choices that do not fit with the traditional left‐right political scheme. Could

this be a sign of an emerging political cleavage?

According to the theory of new political culture, championships of social issues and

conservative fiscal policy have been found to go together (Clark & Inglehart

1998:11). This study reveals some of the same tendencies. The center‐left and –right

parties support new strategies and the populist left and right are in favor of

strategies that increase the overall spending on traditional welfare issues. SV and

FrP, as well as AP, and Sp, have joined forces before in a display of ‘fiscal liberalism’,

understood as an inclination to increase the public expenditures, in an attempt to

provide cheaper child care (Stortingets instilling nr 250, 2002‐2003). These issues

divide the political systems along new lines. The level of spending on service

provision is still a political issue, but, overall, the welfare state has strong support

from parties of all colors. This lack of political disagreement opens up for other

conflicts, and thus a new political cleavage.

The second trend in the data concerns the ongoing centralization of population and

economic activity in Norway. At the heart of the Norwegian debate on regional policy

is the position of the rural areas of Norway. The long‐established aim of Norwegian

regional policy has been to secure the living standards of these areas through

subsidies and development of infrastructure. The 1990’s brought on a shift in this

policy area. Cities were given a role in regional policy more than before. However, it

is still claimed that regional policy under the label “balanced development” aims at

stabilizing the economic situation of the rural parts of Norway. In the light of Clarke

& Gaile’s (1998) findings, that peripheral areas are more exposed to competition, it

could be expected that politicians from these areas were more willing to think

alternatively. The analysis discourages this idea. The cities are more innovative than

the regional level when it comes to implementing new strategies, and with the

exception of Sørlandet as a cultural periphery, peripheral regions are no more

innovative than central regions.

The objective of cultural strategies is to attract creative and knowledge‐based

workers to an area or a region in order to generate a population growth. When these


strategies have more support in the cities, and probably more often applied, the

result is that these areas gain yet an advantage. And cities already have an advantage

by being cities. According to the pattern found in my, there is little evidence that this

policy will help the rural regions close the gap between themselves and the cities.

When analyzing the data along a geographic dimension, the southern part of Norway

is the most innovative in the sense that it is the regions that are the most positive to

cultural strategies. It is also a region where large amounts of money are spent on a

wide range of cultural activities. However, in the Greater Kristiansand region as well

as in the rest of Norway, people are moving from the countryside and into more

urbanized regions. Hence, if amenities do drive urban growth, the cities are the

winners.

5.3 Is this Theory too American to Fit the Case of Norway?

Some patterns found in the data diverged from the model of analysis that was set up

in the theory section. Variables that belong in the core of the NPC/PM theory like

gender, education and especially age had little or no explanatory power. Instead, the

difference between regional and city politicians and party preferences were the main

predictors of support for cultural strategies. Does this mean that the NPC have little

support in Norway? The answer seems to be two‐faced. On one hand, the pattern in

Norway matched the pattern found elsewhere (Gabriel et. al. 1998); cities are

important providers of culture. On the other hand, the explanatory power of the

political preferences points in the opposite direction. As the parties did not group

according to the left‐right scheme of class politics, the explanatory power of parties

does not necessarily mean a step away from the NPC‐theory. The division between

on the one hand the populist right, the populist left and the center‐party (SP) and on

the other hand AP, H, KrF and V demands other explanations than class politics can

supply. And the NPC does provide such an explanation.

The NPC theory has its backdrop in developments of the American economy and the

value changes of American citizens. These value changes have happened in both

political parties and the electorate. American politics is, however, not Norwegian


politics, and the political culture in a state with proportional elections may be

different from the American political culture. In spite of this, traces of these value

changes have also been found in Norway, although the Norwegian people do not fit

Inglehart’s theory10 (Hellevik 2001). I nevertheless want to suggest that the patterns

visible in this thesis might be a NPC compatible pattern emerging in the Norwegian

context. The fact that FrP, SV and SP are demonstrating the same inclinations

concerning cultural strategies, underlines the problems of the party systems to adapt

to new political conflicts of a less materialist or economic character. It is too early to

conclude as to the fate of NPC in Norway. However, the increased volatility of

Norwegian, and Western voters may indicate that the political culture is changing.

10 With the exception of the years 1985‐1987, in which the Norwegian population form a perfect fit to Inglehart’s model (Hellevik 2001).


Appendix

Appendix 1

Age Age Pearson

Correlation 1

Sig. (2-tailed) N 201

SV Pearson Correlation

-, 142(*)

Sig. (2-tailed) ,045 N 201

AP Pearson Correlation

,020

Sig. (2-tailed) ,776 N 201

SP Pearson Correlation

-, 040

Sig. (2-tailed) ,570 N 201

V Pearson Correlation

,068

Sig. (2-tailed) ,338 N 201

KrF Pearson Correlation

-, 033

Sig. (2-tailed) ,646 N 201

H Pearson Correlation

,076

Sig. (2-tailed) ,285 N 201

FrP Pearson Correlation

-, 144(*)

Sig. (2-tailed) ,042 N 201

OTHERS

Pearson Correlation

,257(**)

Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 N 201

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)


Appendix 2

Component Matrix Component

1 2 3 4 5 6 16a) satse på

regionalpolitiske/næringspolitiske oppgaver

.657 .224 .169 .196 -.083 .052

16b) bedre tjenesteyter .245 .365 -.036 -.324 .457 .115 16c) Omorganisering .087 -.064 .422 .178 .192 .556

16d) overta oppgaver fra staten .501 -.130 .438 .373 -.031 -.350 16e) kommune/

fylkessammenslaåing .356 .207 .081 .584 .373 .088

16f) samarbeide med andre komm/strategiske allisanser

.715 -.030 -.025 -.055 .006 -.130

16g) allianser med regioner i andre land

.645 -.488 .018 .001 .076 -.108

16h) skolering -håndtering av internasjonale kontakter

.632 -.415 -.271 -.056 .121 .046

16i) markedsføre fylket/kommune .669 -.335 -.261 .004 -.010 .179

16j) eget internasjonalt utvalg .566 -.540 -.091 .016 .150 .079 16k) styrke reisebudsjettene .642 -.405 -.364 .088 .151 .025

16l) overføre oppg. fra kommune til fylket/ fra fylket til kommune

.189 .431 -.404 .457 .198 .079

16m) forbedre samspill fylke-kommune

.358 -.229 .543 -.297 -.194 -.012

16n) overføre utviklingspol arb fra stat til region/kommune

.584 -.064 .453 .323 -.019 -.359

16o) konsentrere kommune/fylke om utviklingspol oppg

.292 -.198 -.067 .099 -.549 .384

16p) utvikling av teknologiske kompetansesentra

.629 .250 -.043 .121 -.305 .193

16q) strategiske allianser med uni/høgskole/næringsliv

.763 .286 .149 -.194 -.145 -.021

16r) satsing på høyere utdannelse .616 .331 .297 -.204 .025 .060

16s) bedre kommunikasjon i regionen

.652 .205 .237 -.064 .035 .288

16t) regionalt europakontor .237 -.211 .181 -.278 .472 .049 16u) tiltrekke kunnskapsbasert

arbeidskraft .688 .318 .027 -.292 .024 -.028

16v) by-/kommuneutvikling - rekreasjon, underholdning

.699 .231 -.293 -.207 .061 -.178

16w) etablere stiftelser - nyetablering i kultur/kunnskap

.622 .135 -.345 .026 -.256 .044

16x) utbygginger innenfor kultursektoren

.558 .209 -.320 -.030 -.074 -.275

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 6 components extracted.

84 Let Us Entertain You!

Appendix 3

Pearons’s correlation between party preference and education.

Education

Education Pearson Correlation

1

Sig. (2-tailed) N 205

SV Pearson Correlation

,110

Sig. (2-tailed) ,118 N 205

AP Pearson Correlation

-, 074

Sig. (2-tailed) ,291 N 205

SP Pearson Correlation

,117

Sig. (2-tailed) ,094 N 205

KrF Pearson Correlation

,232(**)

Sig. (2-tailed) ,001 N 205

H Pearson Correlation

,028

Sig. (2-tailed) ,691 N 205

FrP Pearson Correlation

-, 292(**)

Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 N 205

OTHERS Pearson Correlation

-, 064

Sig. (2-tailed) ,364 N 205

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).


Appendix 4 Better service provider * party preferences Crosstabulation

SV AP SP V KrF H FrP Better service

prov. 1 Coun

t 0 0 0 0 0 1 2

0 % .0% .0% .0% .0% 3.1% 9.1% 2 Coun

t 2 3 1 0 0 0 1

6.5 % 5.8% 9.1% .0% .0% .0% 4.5% 3 Coun

t 1 4 1 1 4 7 0

3.2 % 7.7% 9.1% 11.1% 22.2% 21.9% .0% 4 Coun

t 14 27 8 3 7 5 9

45.2 % 51.9% 72.7% 33.3% 38.9% 15.6% 40.9% 5 Coun

t 14 18 1 5 7 19 10

45.2 % 34.6% 9.1% 55.6% 38.9% 59.4% 45.5% Total Coun

t 31 52 11 9 18 32 22

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Appendix 5 Correlations

Unemp. Block Grants

Pearson Correlation

1 .288(**)

Sig. (2-tailed) .000

Uneom-ploy-ment

N 203 203 Pearson

Correlation .288(**) 1

Sig. (2-tailed) .000

Block grants

N 203 203 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).


Appendix 6

1Det hevdes at internasjonaliseringen fører til en situasjon med økende konkurranse mellom regioner og kommuner i Europa. Hva bør etter ditt syn din fylkeskommune gjøre for å hevde seg i denne konkurransen?

Kryss av for om du er enig eller uenig i følgende satsinger.

Helt uenig

1

2

Vanskelig å si

3

4

Helt enig

5

a) Satse mer på regionpolitiske oppgaver/ næringsutvikling

b) Bli en bedre tjenestyter (helsetjenester, utdanning, osv.)

c) Omorganisere regionens organisasjon, ledelse og styringsstruktur

d) Overta oppgaver som i dag utføres av staten

e) Større fylkeskommuner/ slå sammen med andre

f) Samarbeide med andre fylkeskommuner/ strategiske allianser

g) Etablere allianser med regioner i andre land/grenseregionalt samarbeid

h) Skolere administrasjonen til å håndtere internasjonale kontakter bedre

i) Markedsføre fylket internasjonalt

j) Sette ned et eget internasjonalt utvalg i fylkestinget

k) Styrke reisebudsjettene for internasjonale kontakter for politikere og tjenestemenn

l) Overføre utviklingsoppgaver som i dag ivaretas av kommunen til fylkeskommunen

m) Forbedre fylkeskommunens samspill

16

1 A translation of this questionnaire can be found in table 4.1.


med kommunen n) Overføre mer av det

utviklingspolitiske arbeidet fra staten til regionene

o) Konsentrere fylkeskommunen om utviklingsoppgaver

p) Delta i utviklingen av teknologiske kompetansesentra

q) Inngå strategiske allianser/partnerskap med universiteter/ høgskoler/næringsliv

r) Stimulere til satsing på høyere utdannelse i regionen

s) Utvikle bedre kommunikasjoner (elektronisk infrastruktur) i regionen

t) Etablere/ videreutvikle regionalt Europa-/EU-kontor

u) Satse på å tiltrekke seg kunnskapsbasert arbeidskraft.

v) Satse på by-/ kommuneutvikling med hensyn til rekreasjons- og underholdnings-muligheter.

w) Etablere stiftelser eller andre ordninger for å stimulere til nyetablering innenfor kultur- og kunnskapssektoren.

x) Foreta utbygginger innenfor kultursektoren (teaterhus, kulturhus eller lignende).


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