Lessons of Dien Bien Phu

11
TheLcssms of DEN BIEIN PM) Howard R. Simpson Copyright 1992 The study ofpast battles o~n provides vahuble lkssons to those who may jight in the f~re. The author oflens seveml vald insights into the faukty pbnning and execution of the French stind at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 in Indochina T 2400ON 7 MAY 1954, tier 55 days of continual combat, General Vo Nguyen Giap’s red battle flag, bearing the gold–le~ered slogan, “Fight and Win,” flew from the captured command post of the French mountain strong- hold of Dien Bien Phu. The fall of Dien Bien Phu signaled the end of French rule in Indochina, the establishment of the North Vietnamese Army as a recognized professional fighting force in Asia and the opening of a new phase in the struggle for Vietnam-a struggle that would eventually lead to direct US military involvement. The battle of Dien Bien Phu also revealed a number of important truths about revolutionary warfare and counterinsurgency. Unfortunately for the West, particularly the United States, these lessons were largely ignored. Given the choice between studying defeats and victories, most military professionals will ofien opt for the latter, unless the defeat in question was that of a real or potential enemy. At the time of Dien Bien Phu, there was a tendency in the Pentagon to view the defeat as one more French military disaster, another debacle linked in American minds with France’s collapse in World War II. Tiue, the outcome of Dien Bien Phu stemmed from a host of errors in planning, intelligence and tactics, but the whys and wherefores were generally forgotten following the French with- drawal from Indochina. A study of Dien Bien Phu can be as impor- tant today as it was more than 37 years ago. Certain aspects of the campaign have a direct application to contemporary limited–intensity conflict and provide a number of lessons for the professional soldie~ The battle was a clear demonstration of the flexibility of a guerrilla foe and his ability to change procedures to fit a specific tactical situation. The taint of colonial paternalism or too much Western influence can be fatal to a “na- tional” army in the Third World, exerting nega- tive psychological pressures that weaken morale and degrade battlefield petiormance. . Underestimation of a guerrilla enemy by regular forces is a cardinal milita~ sin. . An overdependence on air support and supply can lead to disaster during a guerrilla- type campaign in diflcult terrain or adverse weather conditions. To better understand the battle of Dien Bien Phu, the issues and those involved, it is usefd to review the situation in Indochina during the early 1950s. General Henri Navarre, the newly appointed commander of the French Expeditionary Corps had arrived in Saigon on 19 May 1953. A cold and effete man, the 55–year-old Navarre knew little of Asia or Indochina. He had come to Vlet-

Transcript of Lessons of Dien Bien Phu

Page 1: Lessons of Dien Bien Phu

TheLcssms

ofDEN BIEIN PM)

Howard R. Simpson Copyright 1992

The study ofpast battles o~n provides vahuble lkssons to thosewho may jight in the f~re. The author oflens seveml valdinsights into the faukty pbnning and execution of the Frenchstind at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 in Indochina

T 2400ON 7 MAY 1954, tier 55 days ofcontinual combat, General Vo Nguyen

Giap’s red battle flag, bearing the gold–le~eredslogan, “Fight and Win,” flew from the capturedcommand post of the French mountain strong-hold of Dien Bien Phu. The fall of Dien Bien Phusignaled the end of French rule in Indochina, theestablishment of the North Vietnamese Army asa recognized professional fighting force in Asiaand the opening of a new phase in the strugglefor Vietnam-a struggle that would eventuallylead to direct US military involvement.

The battle of Dien Bien Phu also revealed anumber of important truths about revolutionarywarfare and counterinsurgency. Unfortunatelyfor the West, particularly the United States,these lessons were largely ignored. Given thechoice between studying defeats and victories,most military professionals will ofien opt for thelatter, unless the defeat in question was that of areal or potential enemy. At the time of DienBien Phu, there was a tendency in the Pentagonto view the defeat as one more French militarydisaster, another debacle linked in Americanminds with France’s collapse in World War II.Tiue, the outcome of Dien Bien Phu stemmedfrom a host of errors in planning, intelligenceand tactics, but the whys and wherefores weregenerally forgotten following the French with-drawal from Indochina.

A study of Dien Bien Phu can be as impor-tant today as it was more than 37 yearsago.Certain aspects of the campaign have a directapplication to contemporary limited–intensityconflict and provide a number of lessons for theprofessional soldie~

● The battle was a clear demonstration ofthe flexibility of a guerrilla foe and his abilityto change procedures to fit a specific tacticalsituation.

● The taint of colonial paternalism or toomuch Western influence can be fatal to a “na-tional” army in the Third World, exerting nega-tive psychological pressures that weaken moraleand degrade battlefield petiormance.

. Underestimation of a guerrilla enemy byregular forces is a cardinal milita~ sin.

. An overdependence on air support andsupply can lead to disaster during a guerrilla-type campaign in diflcult terrain or adverseweather conditions.

To better understand the battle of Dien BienPhu, the issues and those involved, it is usefd toreview the situation in Indochina during theearly 1950s.

General Henri Navarre, the newly appointedcommander of the French Expeditionary Corpshad arrived in Saigon on 19 May 1953. A coldand effete man, the 55–year-old Navarre knewlittle of Asia or Indochina. He had come to Vlet-

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nam with the outlines of a special “NavarrePlan” designed to restore the confidence of histroops and shifi the French war effort out of neu-tral through offensive action. With US militaryand economic aid supporting the bulk of the wareffort (to keep the French “fighting the goodfight” in Asia while guaranteeing their contin-ued membership in NATO), Navarre wm underpressure to come up with some impressive suc-cesses.

Shortly after his arrival, Navarre turned his at-tention to the background material and recom-mendations dr&ed by his predecessor, GeneralRaoul Salan, an old Indochina hand nicknamed“Le Chinois.” One of Salan’s recommendationsinvolved the occupation of Dien Bien Phu, asmall administrative hamlet in a strategic valleyin Northwest Vietnam that had been aban-doned to the Vietminh in 1952. Salan had seenDien Bien Phu, together with the already estab-lished position at nearby Na-san, about 60 milesto the east, as mutually supporting strongpointsblocking further enemy moves on Laos, 1 Its lo-cation would also bolster the tribal capital of LaiChau, not far fi-om the Chinese border, and pro-vide operational support to the Grou~ments deCommurukx Mixes A&o~ort& (GCMA), theFrench–led, anti–Vietminh tribal guerrillas ofthe region, primarily the Black Thai and theMeo. Dominance of the confluence of the NamYum and Nam Ou rivers at Dien Bien Phu wouldalso deny a precious transport asset to the enemy.

As Navarre’s immediate staff secretly weighedthe advantages and disadvantages of seizingDien Bien Phu, they were influenced by the re-current, hopeful vision of a major, set–piecebattle. Such a dream sequence had become partof the folklore of the French ExpeditionaryCorps. This “best of all possible worlds” scenariohad Giap’s divisions pouring from the forestedhills onto the valley floor of Dien Bien Phu,where they would be blocked by the Frenchbarbed wire, decimated by artillery and airstrikes, and mopped up by tanks.

In August 1953, while the @ns for a Frenchattack on Dien Bien F’hu were progressing, Na-varre ordered the evacuation of Na–san. This

GeneraJ iVavarre [pkwned]. . .to restore the conjiience of his troopsand shift the French war effort out ofneutral through offensive action. WithUS milillzry and economic aid suppoti”ng

the bulk of the war effort (to keep theFrench /Jighting] while guaranteeing

their continued membership in NATO),Navarre was under pressure to come up

with some impressive successes.

strongpoint had been sitting in stagnant suspen-sion since the heavy Vietminh attacks of De-cember 1952. In reality, it was an empty symbolof power, ignored or bypassed by the enemy andrequiring constant resupply by airlift from Ha-noi. To Navarre, who needed every combat unitand aircraft he could muster, the evacuationmade practical sense. But it removed a stan-chion of Salan’s recommendation that projectedNa–san, Dien Bien Phu and Lai Chau as mutual-ly supporting bases.

The valley of Dien Bien Phu, 16 kilometerslong and 9 kilometers wide at its broadest pointand dominated by jungle mountains, was nostranger to the clash of arms. It had long beena stopping point fhr invaders from the northseeking access to the upper Mekong. In 1888, aFrench column had camped at Dien Bien Phuduring operations against the Siamese. It laterbecame an administrative post manned by asmall detachment of troops under French com-mand. In 1939, a small emergency airstrip wasbuilt to support the garison at Lai Chau. From1940 to 1945, the Japanese occupation forceslargely avoided Dien Bien Phu, and the Frenchused the strip occasionally for the clandestinelandings of agents and members of Force 136, ananti-Japanese resistance unit. z

When Japanese forces reversed their live–and–let–live policy toward French authorities inIn&china in 1945 and attacked French gmri-sons throughout Vietnam, Dien Bien Phu wasused to evacuate French wounded to the relativesafeq of China. A heavy fire fight during this pe-

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riod found a French Foreign Legion companycharging with fixed bayonets to retake the air-strip from the Japanese. The company com-mander, a certain Captain Jules Gaucher, wasfated to be one of the first fatalities at Dien BienPhu in 1954, when Vletminh artillery made a di-

The valley of Dien Bien Phu, 16 kib-meters lon~ a-rid9 kilometers wide at itsbroadest p~int and domin~ed by junglk

mountains, was no stranger to the clashof arms. It had long been a stopping

point for invademfiom the north seekingaccess to the upper Mekong.

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rect hit on the command post (CP) where Lieu-tenant Colonel Gaucher was commanding the13th Half–Brigade of the Foreign Legion. DienBien Phu was also famous for the quality of thelocal opium crop. The French, the Japanese,Chinese Nationalist war lords and the Vietminhhad clashed over this rich harvest in the past.

There were outspoken objections to Navarre’sdecision to proceed with the seizure of Dien BienPhu. His air force commanders had grave doubtsabout maintaining a constant air bridge fromHanoi, some 280 kilometers distant. They wereparticularly concerned about the vagaries ofweather in North Vietnam’s mountain country. 3

The same misgivings were expressed by air force

officers responsible for ground support. BrigadierGeneral Jean Gilles, the tough, one-eyed com-mander of French airborne troops in Indochinawas definitely unenthusiastic. He had comman-ded the strongpoint of Na-san, where his menhad had to fight hard to retake a hill positionoverrun by the enemy in a night attack. As a“para,” he was basically against static positions,particularly in a guerrilla war of movement. Ap-pointed by Navarre to lead the airborne assaulton Dien Bien Phu, his prime concern was to turnthe seized airstrip over to its new garrison forceand get his paras out of the “chamber pot” valleyhe saw as a potential trap.

Ccmsidetible time w& spent discussing thepossibility that the V~etminh might move artil-lery to Dien Bien Phu. It was finally decided thatthe lack of roads and truck transport made this-an impossibility. If, by any chance, the enemymanaged to sneak some light pieces that far, theHigh Command was confident they could bedealt with easily by air strikes and Dien BienPhu–based artillery. Warnings not to underesti-mate enemy capabilities from parachute andcommando officers with long experience in In-dochina were ignored by staff officers, whoseprime experience had been limited to the cam-paigns of World War 11in North Africa and Eu-rope. A fatal symptom of this mentality was Na-varre’s decision to name Colonel ChristianMarie Ferdinand de la Croix de Castries asGilles’ successor at Dien Bien Phu once the

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cal tribesmen on Vietminh movements, andmiles of field telephone wire was strung con-necting the CP to the scattered battalions.

The sky was filled with aircrafi. Flying Boxcars(C-1 19s), piloted by American contract pilots

As Navame’s immediute stiffsecretly weighed the advantages and

disadvantages of seizing Dien Bien Phu,they were influenced by the recurrent,

hopeful vision of a majoq set-piecebattle. . . . This “best of all possible

worlds’) scenam”ohad Giup% divisionspouringfiom the forested hills onto the

valley @or of Dien Bien Phu, wherethey would be. . . dkcimated

Consi&vwble time was spentdiscussing the possibility that the Viet-

minh might move a~”llery to Dien BienPhu. It wafinally decided that the hck

of roads and truck transpoti mudk thtian impossibility. If. . . the enemy mun-aged to sneak some light pieces that fw,the High Command was conftient theycouili be dealt with easily by air sti”kes

and Dien Bien Phu+ased artillery.

of the “Flying Tigers,” droned over the valleydropping metal grillwork sections of the airstripand free-falling rolls of barbed wire. Dakotas(C+7S), in well+paced flights, launched sway-ing chutes loaded with everything from mortarammunition to electric generators, from emptysandbags to gasoline stoves. Cases of wine, beerand pastries thudding to the ground-with con-siderable breakage—brought cheers from thesweat ing garrison.

On 25 November, the first Dakota landed onthe strip. Infantry and artilleq reinforcementswere brought into man the strongpoints. Thesereitiorcements grew to a total of 12 battalions bythe time the siege started in early March, includ-ing two Foreign Legion parachute battalions,four other Legion battalions, two battalions of

North Africans and two “tribal” battalions ofmore doubtfid quality. 5

The Vietminh propaganda apparatus hadlaunched a major effort to shake the loyalty ofthese colonial troops and was making good useof captured, indoctrinated North Africans andWest Africans to pass the message of “friendship”to those still in French ranks. Vietnamese troopsof the newly formed national army were underparticular pressure. Communist cadres in-fluenced their families with tales of French atro-cities and slipped pamphlets describing EmperorBao Dai’s dissolute, playboy life into their ranks.Even the stolid legionnaires were targeted in thecampaign. Some legion deserters were alreadyserving with the Vletminh. Members of theThai battalion—adapted to small actions andcounterguerrilla operations-were unpreparedfor the sustained battle they were about to face.

By the end of November, there were morethan 5,000 French Union troops at Dien BienPhu. By 25 December, there were 10,910, in-cluding 10 inkmtry battalions, plus artille~, ar-mor and service troops. On 18 December, thefirst 20-ton Chtiee tank arrived.G It was deliv-ered by air in detached sections and reassembledlaboriously with a block and tackle rig. By 15January 1954, there were 10 Chfiees ready foract ion.

On 25 January, Colonel Charles Piroth, theartillery commander, could count 25 105mmhowitzers, four 155mm howitzers and16120mmmortars at his disposal.7 Still convinced that theVletminh could never move their artille~ with-in range of Dien Bien Phu, Piroth had installedhis artillery in exposed battery firing positionswithin uncamouflaged, sandbag revetments thatoffered minimum protection. He counted on us-ing his firepower to smash advancing enemy in-fantry or to support French offensive action out-side the defense perimeter. Planning forcounterbattery fire was sorely neglected.

During this period, the Vietminh CentralCommittee, at the urging of Giap, had made thedecision to attack Dien Bien Phu to, in Giap’swords, “obtain a strategic decision.”8 The Viet -minh commander saw the French presence in

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the valley as a windfall, a chance not to bemissed. There, in an isolated pm it ion sur-rounded by mountains and difficult jungle ter-rain, were some of Navarre’s best troops, whollydependent on air resupply. Considering theFrench seizure of Dien Bien Phu as “a fundamen-tally favorable occasion,” Giap ordered four ofhis divisions to seize Lai Chau and encircle DienBien Phu. g By late December, battalion-strength patrols of French paras had already be-gun to run into stiff resistance 10 kilometers fromthe outer defenses.

Giap came prepared. The 75mm recoillessrifles and the old Japanese 75mm mountain gunsof his divisions had been supplemented with new120mm mortars and 105mm howitzers. Signifi-cantly, a special effort had been made to attachan antiaircraft battalion armed with Soviet37mm guns to each division. Tmsport troopsand the Dan Cang (labor units) worked day andnight under the hi~h jungle cover to cut trailsand new roads through the rough mountains.Footpaths were slashe~, leveled =cI widened toaccommodate Molotova trucks. Hundreds of bi-cycles, later described by Giap as “our taxis of theMame,” were adapted to carry heavy loads. 1°Shallow underwater for&, reinforced with logsand practically invisible from the air, facilitatedthe Vietminh advance. Small (advance) patrols,led by artillery officers trained in China, sur-veyed the ridges and mountains dominating the—valley to select sites for masked gun positions.

Within the fortress, defenses were improved.The air bridge continued as supplies were deliv-ered daily and wounded from the patrol act ionswere evacuated to Hanoi. Gmflicting intelli-gence reports spoke of enemy movement nearDien Bien Phu (from on the ground GCMA pa-trols) and of silent, empty trails (fi-om air recon-

11 An aura o orenaissance ). f f boding hung overthe valley. “They are out there,” a legion officermurmured, sweeping the high ground with hisbinoculars, “They are waiting. This time it willbe a true battle.”lz

It was. The bloody fighting began in earnestduring early March, turning the valley into anightmare landscape tom by heavy explosives

Still convinced thul theVietminh could never move their

a~”llery within range of Dien Bi4n Phu,Piroth had installed his ati”llery in

exposed battery firi”ng positions withinuncamoufluged, sandbag revetments that

offered minimum protection. . . .Planning for counterbatte~fire was

sorely neglected.

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and littered with the debris of smashed equip-ment and aircrafi. The hidden Vletminh batter-ies quickly made the airstrip untenable. A com-mando patrol of Vietminh sappers tilltrated the

The V&minh pmpagandh apparatus hadluunched a major effort to shake the loy-

dy of these colonkd troops and wasmaking good use of captured, indoctn”-

nated North Aftians and West Africansto pass the message of ‘~tindship” to

those stiU in French ranks. Vietnamesetroops of the newly formed national army

were under pwticuku pressure.

strongpoint during the night of 12 March to setcharges under the metal stripping, scatter propa-ganda leaflets and demonstrate the vulnerabilityof the “impregnable” position. 13

The initial assaults proved costly. OfficialFrench estimates put Vietminh dead during the14 March attack on Gabrielle at more than1,000, and Giap soon switched to a constant,steady pressure, nibbling at the French positions.Supplies and reinforcements for the garrisonwere parachuted at night to avoid antiaircraftfire. Some of the reinforcements were volun-teers: cooks, mechanics and service troops whohad never used a parachute before. As the pe-rimeter narrowed, the drop zone became smaller,and men and supplies dropped too soon or toolate fell directly into enemy units.

The parachute battalions and the Foreign Le-gion formed the backbone of the defense, fight-ing and counterattacking around the clock in astrange rebirth of trench warfare. Piroth, deeplyaffected by his inability to locate and neutralizethe Vietminh artillery, committed suicide byholding a grenade to his chest. De Castries,shaken and drawn, retired to his dugout and hisown dreamworld, leaving tactical decisions tohis parachute commandem 14 Tireless Vletminhsappers, working in relays under heavy fire,pushed their trenches within yards of the Frenchpositions, and Vletminh assault groups attacked

again and again. Hundreds of dead lay aroundthe outer defense perimeter and sprawled overthe redoubts of captured strongpoints. With noevacuation possible, the French wounded lay onlitters in the damp trench outside the surgicaldugout. Those beyond help were piled in aban-doned trenches or lefi where they had fallen ina sea of mud.

One by one, the strongpoints fell. A messagefrom a para officer to his commander reveals thedrama of defeat. “Bruno from Thomas, we’reholding but we’re down to ten. No more gre-nades, no more mortar shells. . . things are fallingapart. ” De Castries’ last message to Hanoisummed up the disaster. “We’re submerged.The three strongpoints to the East of the NamYum [River] have now fallen. I no lon~er knowwhere my wounded are. We’re under the fire ofStalin organs [multiple rocket launchers]. Theradio will be destroyed at 1730. We’ll fight tillthe end . . . .“15

High above the valley the last transport para-chuted its cargo of fbod and medicine in thehope it would be of some use to the survivors ofthe battle. Death marches, privation, illness andcontinuous communist “reeducation” sessionslay ahead for the thousands of prisoners taken atDien Bien Phu, many of whom would never re-turn alive from the Vietminh camps.

On 13 May 1954, Giap issued his “order of theday on the victory of Dien Bien Phu.” It in-cluded a prophetic phrase: “With the campaignof Dien Bien Phu our army has taken a step for-ward . . . this [new] maturity constitutes a’solidbase permitting us to envisage the destruction ofmuch larger enemy forces.” lb Not too manyyears later, the United States, having replacedFrance in the conflict with communist forces inIndochina, would come dangerously close to ex-periencing a Dien Bien Phu of its own at KheSanh, and Giap’s prophecy would remain perti-nent.

In reviewing the lessons already mentioned, itis important to realize that many of the Frenchheadquarters officers responsible for the plan-ning of Dien Bien Phu saw the Vletminh as basi-cally a guerrilla force, a “peasant” army. Even the

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experiences of some combat oflcers in counter-ing limited~trength Vietminh attacks, followedby quick withdrawals, made it difficult for themto imagine facing enemy divisions willing tostand and fight. Giap himself has admitted tosome trepidation about the defensive strength ofDien Bien Phu and the difficulties of supplyinghis forces for an extended campaign in the diffi-cult terrain of northwest Viemam. But once thedecision was made to attack, the resources of a“People’s War,” including a fdl mobilization ofthe peasantry as a labor force, were brought tobear on the objective.

Giap, although prone to divide his actionsinto “phases,” did not allow his procedures to beset in concrete. While preparing to attack thefortified camp in a basically classic manner withmassed forces, he ordered his troops in the Ton-kin Delta—regulars, regionals and militia—tostep up small, deadly assaults on positions where“the adversary is relativelyweak.”17 These con-stituted an intensification of guerrilla actionsbest fitted to the local terrain and tactical reali-ties. At the same time, he sent specially trained“hunter-killer” units into the jungled mountainsaround Dien Bien Phu to track the GCMAcommandos posing a threat to what was soon tobecome his “rear” in the coming battle. It was es-sential to the Vietminh to eliminate the GCMAas the beyond-the-perimeter eyes and ears ofthe Dien Bien Phu garrison. Giap thus demon-strated his ability to launch different operations,using different procedures in support of a majorobjective. Once the battle was joined, he main-tained flexibility and did not hesitate to changetactics when direct, massed assaults proved toocostly.

In a more distant epoch, the French Expedi-tionary Corps of the 1950s might have been anefficient, professional fighting machine. But, by1953, it had already become an anachronism.As one of the last existing colonial armies, it wasshowing the strains and cracks caused by new di-rections in the postwar world. The winds of po-litical change were already buffeting the sourcesof its recruitment, and the old military paterna-lismthat had held its famous regiments together

Transpoti troops and the I)anCang(labor units) worked dhy and nightunder the high jungle cover to cut trm”ls

and new roads through the roughmountains. Footpaths were slashed,leveled and widened to accommodate

Molotova trucks. Hundreds of bicycles.. . . were adapted to carry heavy loads.

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was becoming outmoded. The normally de-pendable North African and West Africantroops who had fought “like lions” in World WarII were still petiorming well in Indochina, de-pending on the quality of their French officersand the veteran noncommissioned officers oftheir own race. But the seemingly never+xtdingwar in a far-& land and exposure to V~etminhpropaganda was taking its toll. Leaflets, loud-speaker lectures to cut off units, and word-of–mouth campaigns in the dingy bars near militarycamps often posed the questions, “What are youdoing here? Why did you come here to die?”Many colonial trcmpershad begun to ponder theanswers, particularly when rumors of unrest andopposition to continued French rule at homereached them in Indochina. Not too long before

the fall of Dien Bien Phu, some colonial units,battered hy artillery and suffering heavy losses,including their o~lcets, left the battle to seekshelter in the muddy caves along the banks of theNam Yum River. Ironically, among those Alge-rian noncommissioned oflcers who fought tothe end and lived throu,gh captivity were somewho would become the professional cadre of theNational Liberation Front (FLN ) in the war forAlgerian independence against France.

Although colonial armies are now part of thehistorical past, their spectre lingers on. TheARVN was never able to shed its origins as aEuropean-trained colonial force. When USadvisers took over the role of the French, thetinge of colonialism remained, providing a con-tinuing theme for Vietcong propagandists who

COMBAT CUISINE7he cooks of the French Expeditionary Corps

were the unsung hems of the Indochina War.France has always made an effort to see that its men–at–arms eat adequately, if not well, and French sol-diers-much to the chagrin of field surgeons-havelong preferred to go into battle with a fill stomach.The Indochina campaign presented special problemsto quartermasters and cooks alike. The racial and re-ligious diversity of the French Union Forces calledfor special menus. This, in turn, called for specialprocurement and delivety.

North African riflemen required lamb in abun-dance, harissa hot sauce for their COUS-COUS,datesand mint for their tea. Troops from French WestAfrica had a taste for yams, coconuts and hot pep-pers. The Vietnamese of the national army andthose serving with French units (more than 50 per-cent of some parachute battalions) required pork,plentifil rice, noodles and now mum, the fermentedfish sauce. The French Legion was partial to Wnnoir, a rich blood sausage, required for the yearlycelebration of Camerone, a famous battle in Mexicowhere a legion detachment fought to the deathagainst overwhelming odds.

Wine, beer, pastis and brandy were plentifd inmost French messes and a special effort was madeto see that no one went thirsty in the field. Theholiday period saw truck convoys risking ambushesand mines to deliver Christmas cheer to isolatedoutposts. Transport aircraft parachuted cased bot-

bottles, along with ammunition and medical sup-plies, to long–range patrols deep in the jungle. Vi-noge[, a horrendous concoction of concentratedwine packed in cans, was sometimes substitutedwhen the real thing was not a~’ailablc. Mixed withwater, it produced an alcoholized grape juice of pur-ple hue that only a besieged garrison might savor.

The chefs of the legion were noted for theiradaptability and imagination. War correspondentsin the field soon learned that a hazardous jeep rideto a nearby legion unit w= ofien “worth a detour.”One shaven-headed legion cook conjured thinlysliced water buffalo, chopped Chinese mushroomsand the remains of a bottle of port into a passableIweuf @gordine. Bare chested Vietnamese “beps”could do wonders with a few scrawny chickens,some green onions, rice noodles and coriander. Aninvitation to a Spahi (Algerian cavalry) unit’s me-choui feast following the end of the ?&dim Rama-dam fast meant helping yourself with your fingers toa whole, spitted lamb roasted over hot coals.

But, once the battle began at Dien Bien Phu andthe airstrip became unuseable, the defenders had notime for culinary indulgence. They survived on air–dropped combat rations and tightened their belts asthe enemy inched closer. By the time the fortressfell, they had little weight to spare, a condition thatwould prove fatal to many prisoners attempting tosurvive on the meager rice gruel and bits of fishsupplied by their Cap;ors.= ‘

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never failed to refer to the ARVN as a “puppet”army. Tday, as we take a more active militaryrole in the drug wars of Central America, USadvisen should bear in mind that overeagernessto push US methods on their local militarycounterparts could be counterproductive. Tous, “colonialism” is now a historical label. Tomany in the Third World, it remains a valid,negative symbol.

me one easily identifiable shortcoming ofWestern military forces in post-World War IIclashes with guerrillas has been the underestima-tion of the foe’s capabilities, motivation and de-terrninat ion. Nowhere was this more obvious-and fatal—than in the French planning andimplemental ion of the Dien Bien Phu Cam-paign. French staff o~lcers m,d commanders,graduates of Saint Cyr and the Ecole de Guerre,veterans of Italy, the landings in SouthernFrance and the Rhineland Campaign, found itdifficult, if not impossible, to accept Ho ChiMinh’s guerrillas as military equals. Those whodid—because of harrowing firsthand exper-ience—found it hard m convince their fellow of-ficers that the skinny Vietminh with his rice rolland individual weapon could be a dangerous andclever adversary. When a seasoned para com-mander such as Lieutenant Colonel Marcel Bi -geard referred to the “Viet,” there was a note ofgrudging respect in his voice. Map-marking offi-cers in Saigon headquarters used the same wordwith marked contempt.

Underestimation of an irregular enemy or allyis nothing new. Major Robert Rogers, the com-mander of the unorthodox Roger’s Rangers dur-ing the French and Indian War, tried to warn hisBritish superiors about the worth of the enemy’sunconventional tactics to no avail. Some card–punching US senior officers were guilty-dento their regret-of treating the Vietcong withdisdain. At no time during the Dien Bien PhuCampaign could Giap be accused of the samemistake. In no less than seven messages, ordersof the day and congratulations to his troops, hereturned again and again to the danger of under-estimating the enemy. For example, on 20March 1954, he warned, “His [enemy] morale is

The parachute b~lwnsand the Foreign Legion formed the

backbone of the defense, jlghting andcounterattacking around the clock in a

strange rebirth of trench warfare. . . .With no evaaudidn possible, the French

wounded lay on litters in the damptrench outside the surgtial dugout.

MILITARY REVIEW . January 1992 71

Page 11: Lessons of Dien Bien Phu

tiected, his difficulties are numerous. But don’tunderestimate him. If we underestimate himwe’ll lose the battle.” Even in his victory messagetier the battle had ended, Giap cautioned hismen to “guard against the subjectivity that leadsto complaisance and the underestimation of theenemy.”18 In the contemporary internationalenvironment of limited-intensity conflict, guer-rilla warfare and terrorism, we would do well toadapt even a paraphrase of Giap’s warnings toour own use.

Few hard–pressed combat officen will willing-ly forgo the asset of efficient air support, but anoverreliance and dependence on such supportcan prove dangerous. Notwithstanding the factthat some of Giap’s early defeats can be creditedto the prompt application of air power in theform of fighter–bombers loaded with napalm, itis also true that the French High Command’sfaith in the effectiveness of air supply and sup-port contributed to the loss of the battle. The gi-gantic supply effort required for Dien Bien Phusiphoned off badly needed air as-setsfrom otherfronts. The typhoon-like storms and heavy rainsof North Vlemam made a hash of flight plans.When the Vietminh artillery shut down the air-strip, all supplies and munitions had to be para-chuted to the garrison, a procedure made dan-gerous and inaccurate by antiaircraft fire. Airstrikes against Vietminh supply lines were lim-ited in their effectiveness by the enemy’s use ofcamouflage and the quick repair teams located at

The one easily identi!bleshortcoming of Western milby forces

in post-World War II clhshes with guer-rilkw has been the underestimation of the

foe’s capabilities, motivation anddetermination. Nowhere was this more

obvious-and ftil-than in the Frenchplanning and implement@”on of the

Dien Bien Phu Campaign.

intervals along the jungle roads and trails (atechnique used later on the Ho Chi Minh Tmil).Repeated strikes directed at the approximate lo-cations of the enemy’s masked batteries, oftendug directly into the surrounding limestoneridges, were largely ineffective and costly. TheVietminh, while respecting French air power,had adapted their tactics and movements to sur-vive under its threat. They had learned to livewith it. The defenders of Dien Bien Phu couldnot have survived without it.

These are but a few lessons to be learned fromthe battle for “DBP Airport,” as it was called bythe paras. A more detailed study, including thepsychological and physical effects of jungle war-fare on both sides, would doubtless provide addi-tional insights. Military planners and serving of-ficers must look to the future, but a soundknowledge of the past is often the key to what liesahead. MR

NOTES

1 Dominique Wermer, Navarre CJULa Sohtude d’un Commandant en Chef 10 Ibid.(Pans. Revue Hlstona, 1971), 11 Author’s discus.suon With mtelhgence offcer, Dlen Blen Phu, December

2. Roger Fallgot and Pascal Krop, La P/scirr+Les service secrets 1953fran~als 1944-1984 (Pans. Edtons du .SeuIl, 1985). 12. Author’s discussion wrth Foreign LegIon ofhcer, Dlen Blen Phu, December

3 Jules Roy, La Bata///e de D/en Blerr Phu (Pans Julllard, 1963) 1953.4. Jullen Lebel, D/en B/en Phu (Pans: Revue Hlstona, 1971) 13 Roy5. Joo Keegan, D/en Bien Phu (New York Ballatrne Bock, 1974), 85 14. Author’s dscus.wn wth LTC Marcel Blgeard, Sagon. 1955

15 Lebel7 Ibid 16 G~ap8 Vo Nguyen Glap, Den B/en Phu (Hanoi: Edmons en Langues Etrangers, 17 Ibid

1964) 18 Ibid.9. Ibtd.

Howard R. Simpson, a formerUS ForeignSentie officer,isa novelist and writer(m military matters. He is a gradum of the Naval War College. He was at DimBen Phu prior to the IMtdeas u US lnfmtion Agencywar correspondentduringan assignment in Vietnam and UKNkr an adviser to Prime Minister GeneralNguyen Khanh.

72 January 1992 ● MILITARY REVIEW