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AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

LESSONS LEARNED FROM OPERA FTOW MARKET GARDEN

by

Jennifer B. FoxLieutenant Colonel

SA RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM

REQUIREMENT

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DISCLAIMER

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ABSTRACT

TITLE Lessons Learned From Operation Market Garden

AUTHORt Jennifer B. Fox, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Operation Market Garden was the largest paratroop drop of the Second

World War; It was also one of the worst operational failures. What strategy

could have led the Allies to such an incredulous failure and what lessons can

be learned for future military operations? Several timeless lessons are

apparent from an analysis of the operation: (1) at the strategic level,

military planners must never lose sight of the political reasons which

fostered the initial conflict; (2) at the operational level, total coordination and

planning with all elements of an operation remain critical to the successful

execution of any plan: (3) logistics shortages caused the troops to be ill

prepared; (4) most importantly, at the tactical level, commanders must learn

to "read the troops," watch their collective behavior and be ready to step in

to keep them focused on the ultimate goal, the satisfactory completion of the

mission; (5) from a leadership perspective, we learn that truly great leaders

sacrifice their personal ambitions for the good of the unit effort and the

successful execution of the mission.

• . " •: ."

9

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Jennifer B. Fox (AA, Hartford College for Women: BA.

University of New Hampshire; MA, Webster University) is a student at the

Air War College in the Class of 1994. She is the former Logistics Commander

and Deputy Commander for Maintenance, 32d Fighter Group, Soesterberg Air

Base, the Netherlands. Lt Col Fox is a career aircraft maintenance officer who

commanded the 50th Aircraft Generation and 50th Equipment Maintenance

Squadrons, Hahn Air Base, Germany. from 1988 to 1991. Previously, she

served as an aircraft maintenance assignments officer, Headquarters Air

Force Military Personnel Center, Randolph Air Force Base. Texas, and also

discharged duties as an Air Staff Training Officer, Deputy Chief of Staff for

Logistics and Engineering, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington,

DC. Lieutenant Colonel Fox is currently assigned to the Oklahoma Air

Logistics Center, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma.

TABLE OF CONTEITS

DISCLAIMER ..............................L ii

ABSTRACT .............................. 111

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ....................... iv

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ........................ vi

Chapter

1. INTRODUCTION ............................ I

II. PRELUDE TO MARTGARDE ....................... 2

III. D DAY M INUS 17 ........................... 5

IV. THE OPERATION, SEPTEMBER 17, 1944 ................ 13

V. THE QUEST FOR THE RUHR: THE ILL-FATED MA Rif GARDAV . .15

VI. THE FINAL ANALYSIS ........................ 17

VII. LESSONS ............................... 23

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................ 27

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure Page

1. Allied Broad Front Strategy ...................... 3

2. Montgomery:s Narrow Thrust Strategy ................ 7

3. Port Situation. 8 September 1944 ................... 10

4. Second Army's Advance To Arnhem ................. 13

5. Opera'aonMarket Garden ...................... 14

Introduction

On September 17, 1944. from airfields across southern England, the Allied

forces launched a massive airborne operation, code named Market Garden,

consisting of 1,545 troop carriers. 478 gliders, 3,500 glider men, and 16,500

paratroopers from the I st Allied Airborne Corps, consisting of the I st British

(Airborne), the US 82nd and the US 101st Airborne Divisions.1 The objective

was to take and hold several key bridges over the Rhine River in Holland,

while General Dempsey's 2nd British Army, specifically, General Sir Brian

Horrock's XXX Corps, reached the airborne units by road. They intended to

create a "corridor" through which the Allied armies would advance and drive

the Wehrmacht from Holland. The Allies would then. move further into

Germany in pursuit of Hitler's army.2 For nine days the Allied forces

engaged in this operation fought the remnants of the retreating German

army in and around the cities of Eindhoven, Nijmegen, and Arnhem, the

Netherlands. But Horrock's XXX Corps proved unable to advance to reinforce

the airborne elements and the Germans decisively defeated the paratroopers

in Arnhem. Finally, on September 26, 1944, the Allies withdrew the

remaining troops, having suffered almost i /,00 casualties and 7,000 plus

Allied prisoners of war, of which 1,500 were wounded.3

Wesley Frank Craven and James Lee Caes, ad. The Army Air Forces in World War II.Volume III. Europe: Arnument to V-E Dav. lanuary 1944 to Ma 1945. (Washington, DC:Office of Air Force History. 1963). pp. 604. 610.2 LDLdd p.600.

3 John North. North-etl Fjurop. The Achieeent of 21st Arml 6=0n. (London: HerMajesty's Stationery Office, 1953), pp. 99-100; Charles Whiting (ed.), '44: In Combat fromNorsut to the Ardonnes (New York: Stein and Day. 1964), p. 149.

I!I

What possible strategy could have led the Allies into such an adventure

which resulted in the incredulous waste of human life and the extension of

the Second World War into 1945? Using the resource-strategy-objective

model, this paper will analyze OperatAin Market Garden in an effort to

explain why the Allies failed and what lessons there are for future military

operations.

PRELUDE TO Market Garden

Before attempting formal analysis, it will be helpful to review the

positions of the Allies and the Germans in the late summer of 1944. That

previous June, Overlord identified itself as the hugely successful landing of

the Allies on the beaches of Normandy. Until July 25th, Allied progress was

unexpectedhIy sluggish, resulting primarily from stiff German resistance

aided by the unfriendly topography of northern France. The "hedge rows"--

combinations of shrubs, hedges, and trees which serve as fencing and

delineate farming plots--substantially hindered offensive mechanized

operations. The time delay from D-Day to breakout, however, allowed the

Allies to replace equipment, vehicles, and personnel lost in the Over/Ard

landings. By late July, the Allies' logistics preponderance placed them in

good condition. When the breakout finally occurred, it employed 25

divisions under the leadership of British Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery

and US Army General Omar Bradley. General Dwight Eisenhower was the

Supreme Allied Commander.

The breakout plan directed Montgomery and the 21 st British Army Group

to move eastward to recapture Belgium and to advance into the industrial

heartland of Nazi Germany: the Ruhr Valley. Bradley and the US 12th Army

2

Group was to head south and then turn east through the Belgian Ardennes

into Luxembourg and end up at the Saw River Valley, Germany's second

most important industrial area. General George Patton was to advance

through the southern flank and join Bradley. This plan became known as

Eisenhower's famous broad front attack (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Allied Brovl Front Strategy

During this time, the Fubrer hiaseS itnreasingly oversaw and controlled

German operations. After an abortive assassination attempt in mid-july,

Adolf Hitler purged the armed forces of much of' their senior leadershipill talent and experience.4 Carl von Rundstedt and Erwin Rommel were

Si 4 M Basing. Victory in Furone: D)-hv to V-E Nyv-Basion: (Little. Br'own and Co..I I1965). pp. 874-8: DavId Ftrsor. Aqnd V.Shall Shoclk Thea The Britis Armyvin theI I •€oSmadior~ld.ar (JLondon: Soddsr and Stoughton, 1963). p. 348: Richard Lamb,

Mdontanmer, in Krooes. 194_-1940. Succeus orFailnre. C Nov York: Franklin Waifs,

N 4le-1,3

replaced by the Fuhrer for suggesting that huge losses dictated a German

retreat. Similarly, Rommel's replacement, Hans Gunther von Kluge, was

removed for the German defeat at St. Lo. SS General Walter Model, Kluge's

successor, moved forces to strengthen the Falais Gap but sustained 50,000

prisoners and 10,000 casualties before eventually retreating under heavy

Allied ground and air attacks. By mid August. the German 7th and 15th SS

Panzer Divisions were shattered and Hodges held 25,000 prisoners at Mons.

The German army withdrew to their southern border and held tenaciously to

Northern Belgium and Holland.

On the Eastern front, the Russians seized territory at a phenomenal rate:

250 miles from 22 June until mid August. In fact, the Red Army had

marched to within 50 miles of the German border with East Prussia by

August 10.5 Although it did not appear at the time that lthe Nazi war

machine was in immediate danger of collapse, the combined Allied effort

convinced the senior German military leaders that defeat was forthcoming.

The unexpected and rapid Allied advances, especially along the coast of

Northern France, cost Hitler the French ports from which U-boat attacks

against US and British shipping proved so effective. Finally, the advance

denied the Reich vital raw materials and manufactured goods as well as

Hitler's V I and V2 launch areas in Holland. 6 According to Max Hastings, the

Russians had also taken Bulgaria and Rumania by mid-September, including

the oil rich port of PloestL7 Oil and petroleum were becoming scarce and

critical. Yet, it is crucial to note that German industry continued to produce

1984). p. 212: Field Marshall Sir Berahmrd Montgomery. 1a rMandy To Thl_ PIe(Germay: Printing and Stationery Services. British Army of the Rhine, 1946). p. 170.5 Hastings. 2g. i pp. 6344.6 jkiL p. s4.7 il p. SO.

4

ammunition, tanks, guns, and armaments, sometimes under terrible working

conditions and with no apparent drop in productivityl t

D DAY MINUS 17

By the first of September. General "Ike" Eisenhower. who took personal

command of the ground forces from Montgomery, faced three problems:

one, conflicting strategies surfaced on how best to pursue the German army;

two, the Allied logistics lines of communication were overextended as a

result of the rapid advances, and the Allies maintained supplies, especially

fuel, at critically low levels; and three, constant bickering and rivalry over

strategy and resources marked the relations of his commanding generals.9

Although the coalition force leaders previously discussed a general

strategy for pursuing the Germans. the successful executioh of Overelrd

uncovered an inadequate follow-on strategy. Consequently, after the

victories in France had accelerated the campaign, the actual speed of the

Allied advances had not allowed time for the strategy to develop.' 0 By mid-

August, Montgomery, who had been "considering how best the Allies should

be handled after breakout had occurred," approached Eisenhower with a

strategy to defeat Hitler.I t The plan involved a huge, single thrust through

Belgium and Holland, eventually ending at the Ruhr Valley. With

augmentation and redistribution of supplies from Bradley and Patton.

Montgomery proposed that his plan should be done by his 21st Army

TIJL V. 94.9 Charles B. ac Donald, The Mightv Epfdsvr: The American Jar in Euroe. ( NewYork: De N Pres, 1992). p. 361.10 Stephen L Ambrose. The 5upeaLQ==der. The ft Jun ofieneni &"tDavid Elianhomer, (New York: Houglhton Mifflin Company, 1970). p. 531.1 Major General Sir Francis Do Guingand, tnon Vicor (Nev York: CharlesScribner and Sons, 1947). p. 411.

5

Group.12 In addition, "Monty" wanted three divisions of highly trained

paratroopers from Eisenhower's reserve, at the time sitting idly in the United

Kingdom, to carpet several cities in Holland. The paratroopers would take

key bridgeheads over the Rhine and form a "corridor" through which the

British army could march. Montgomery reasoned that once the Ruhr was

open then the rest of Germany would fall quickly because the majority of

German industry would be in the hands of the Allies. This idea became the

seed from which Operation Market Garden grew.' 3

General Eisenhower did not favor Montgomery's idea of a single thrust

but raiher preferred a broad front attack, employed successfully by Allied

armies during the Normandy breakout (Figure 2). On the 29th of August,

after a thorough review of his strategy and the post D Day plan, Ike

reiterated his broad front strategy in a memo to his commanders. He felt

strongly that one thrust such as suggested by Montgomery revealed Allied

plans. With two approaches, at least, the Germans would always be guessing

where the next attack would be (Figures I and 2).14

However, Eisenhower's second and perhaps more pressing logistical

problem--that of what to do about the long supply lines, lack of fuel and

inadequate transportation--had to be solved first. The Allies continued to

receive their supplies through the landing beaches of Normandy. The

problem worsened once supplies arrived, as there were not enough trucks

available to haul necessities to the armies. With the advance of cold weather

12 David Irving. The War Bletveen the Generals (Nov York: Congdon and Lattes. Inc..1961). p. 269; Craven. alL.iLt p. 599: MacDonald, gp j• p. 269; Do Guingand, ciLpp. 410-412.13 Fraser. og&itp. 342: Martin Van Creveld, Suonlin.ar Wa-Louaistic fromVlnstain to Piawnn ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1977). p. 217.14 MacDonald..nn,.jcL p. 360 and Craven, i p. 596-599; Major General Sir FrancisDe Guingand. The GeneraLs at War ( London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1964). p. 104,

6

4

C'C~

"is"

Figure 2. Montgomery's Narrow Thrust StrategyW

and winter, which made unloading supplies on the landing beaches difficult,

if not impossible, Ike desperately needed a deep water port from which toI transfer supplies to the front. Further, as the Germans retreated, they

mined the coastal harbors and destroyed much of' the shipping

infrastructure. Like the Reich, fuel became the logistic shortfall and this

S-- limitation halted the advance of the armies of both Hodges and Pattonl.t5

The constant bickering and rivalry amongst Ike's generals exacerbated

the situation. Other general officeers characterized Montgomery as difficult to

get along with; a loner, he remained focused on his own glory rather than the13 Mec Donald. U Lp 363; Irving. n p. 263: Ambrose. is p.425 RonaldLull. Mmr *Mma.h flilaiaasadr. (Nw York: Stei ad Day. 1971). p. 235:

Field Marshall Sfr DFreha2d Montgomery's Narrow f T iuhds •trhalThn aoniMma-t•V cOast.a (Cleveland: World Publishint Co.y m9). pp. 24. 251.

7

Allied effort.16 The Montgomery proposal for a single thrust operation

bolstered these feelings of animosity. Further, Montgomery complained

ceaselessly to Ike about the amount of supplies his army received and

constantly pressed for priority on fuel and ammunition. General Bedell

Smith, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, reportedly remarked that Montgomery

"...deserved the greatest censure for his intransigence and behind the scenes

conniving to enhance his own prestige and to obtain a major measure of

command."17 Montgomery looked upon Bradley and Patton as "Johnny-

come-latelys" who lacked experience and knowledge because the US entered

the war late.

When Ike took personal command of the European ground operation, the

situation worsened.18 As MGen Freddie De Guingand, Montgomery's Chief of

Staff, noted, "now, Montgomery, although he knew and apprved of these

preparations (for Eisenhower's assumption of command of the ground forces)

... (he) never thought that the day would come so soon."19

A divisive command issue arose out of Eisenhower's decision to take

control of the ground operations for Europe. Although renowned for his

military skill and leadership, not only in North Africa at El Alamein but also

in Overlord Montgomery could not, for political reasons, be named the

Supreme Allied Commander. As such, "Monty" lobbied "Ike" hard to be

named the ground forces commander. Electing to retain that duty for

16 Irving t..gjL p268; Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A GetrajlsLife (New York:Simon and Schuster, 1963). pp. 327-328.17 Irving, o p. 268.18 Martin Blumenson, ad., The Patton Paners. 1940-,1945. (Boston: Houghton MifflinCompany, 1974). pp. 547-548.19 Do Guigand. og. cit.l The Generals at War- p. 100; Nigel Hamilton, Matar.offthBattlefield. Montv's War Years. 1942-1944 (Nov York: McGraw Hill Book Company. 1983),p688.

8

himself. Eisenhower faced open and continual challenges from Montgomery

and a small number of his British colleagues. in combination with this issue

of command and control, Montgomery, who thought himself a more qualified

military commander, belligerently doubted Eisenhower on nearly every

strategic decision. This overt disrespect created further turmoil, distrust,

and tension among the generals. Yet Eisenhower, who was known for his

patience, did not act on Montgomery's behavior until after Market Garden

when he threatened to take the matter to Marshall and Churchill.

Montgomery's Chief of Staff finally settled the matter before Ike elevated it,

preventing Montgomery from being fired.

After having a few days to review Montgomery's proposal, General

Eisenhower agreed to the plan on 4 September. His approval came in part as

an effort to quiet and assuage the complaining Montgomery but more

importantly, Eisenhower recognized his opportunity to gain access to a deep

water port. The Maktel Garden plan, bold and risky, was out of character

for the normally conservative Montgomery.20 As a result of his approval,

Ike gave Montgomery temporary supply priority for fuel and ammunition,

and realigned the US First Army under General Hodges on the British

southern flank, until the Allies secured Antwerp. Ike wanted the ports of

Antwerp and Le Havre cleared of all remaining German resistance. This

would provide the Allies much needed deep water ports, significantly

reducing the delivery time of critical war reserve materiel to the front line

armies (Figure 3).

The sustainment required for the next phase of operations, that is, the

movement of the Allies into Germany and the taking of Berlin, had to be

20 Bradley. osp. P. 257.

9

insured and was contingent upon the successful occupation of a port facility,

capable of sustaining a fighting force of over two million men. Antwerp was

the only port in Europe with that capacity. "While the offensive towards the

Ruhr would always have priority, it was Ike's intention to occupy the Sear

and the Ruhr while clearing operations Le Havre znid Antwerp were

• ... ,.,. •,L no

Figure 3. Allied Port Situation, 15 September 1944

completed."21 Montgomery was furious at the idea of a combined thrust

which included the Saar valley ... and remarked, "if only Patton's transport

and petrol were diverted to 21st Army Group," then he could convince

21 Lamb, g-sip. 209; North, oj.csit p. 123.

10

Eisenhower of the merits of a single concentration of force into the industrial

heart of the Reich.22

Montgomery took the port of Antwerp on the 4th of September.

Eisenhower, over the objections of his staff, permitted Montgomery to

proceed into Belgium, without clearing the Schelde Estuary of German

resistance. Montgomery also persuaded Eisenhower to allow Market Garden

to continue as planned, rather than to delay to clear the port, as Bradley and

Patton desired. However, the day of execution would prove to be the only

aspect of the operation which changed and was moved by Montgomery to

facilitate more detailed planning. 23

The announcement of Eisenhower's decision to support Montgomery, and

the delivery of the subsequent execution order for Market Garden evoked a

variety of emotional and professional objections across the ALied spectrum.

According to David Irving, "Omar Bradley was nauseated by the decision ...

and immediately phoned Patton ... to assure him in person he would give

Third Army half of any supplies available to his army group."24 From an

operational perspective, Montgomery's own staff remained against the plan.

"Brigadier Belcham, Chief of Operations, disliked the narrowness of the

thrust, along low ground ... Brigadier Richardson, Chief of Plans, did not know

of the proposed drop until several days after the announcement."25 Instead,

Richardson favored an Allied advance through Aachen vice the

22 ]iL. p. 208; Lewan, o p.Ci..,35.23 JbL p. 207; Montgomery, admitted that the fatal flaw in Operation Market Gardenand even in the War, was the failure to clear the Schelde Estuary. Montgomery left thistask to the 1st Canadian Army, under General Crerar and after Market Garden failed,had to return to robust the operation with more troops to finally clear the port byNovember 7.24 Irving, ct.Lp. 271.25 Nigel Hamilton, Monty. Final Yars of the Field-Marhall. 1944-1976Ne6 York:McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1986), p. 72.

11

topographically difficult lowlands of Holland. Furthermore, intelligence

reports, via Ultra, revealed a disturbing reinforcement of troops and armor

in Arnhem, in the Albert Canal area, and along the border with

Luxembourg. 26 Dempsey, Commander of the British Second Army,

personally visited Montgomery to express his deep concern over both the

Ultra information and Dutch resistance reports of an unknown number of

tanks near Nijmegen and Arnhem. Extremely worr."ed about "increased

resistance in the Albert Canal area, Dempsey doubted his army's ability to

advance as quickly as the plan required and to join up with the airborne

who were to hold bridges for his arrival. 27 Finally, "Monty's" own Chief of

Staff, MGen Freddie De Guingand, telephoned from his hospital bed..."to warn

Monty that the combined efforts of increasing enemy resistance and

logistical dependence on the winning of more deep water portj, made such a

unilateral thrust a very doubtful position."28 Yet, Montgomery persisted in

his objective of opening up the Rhine and doing it before either Patton or

Bradley. 'The utmost drive and energy was centered on speeding up

preparations (for Market Gvrden); in deciding on the target date of 17

September ... time had been cut to an absolute minimum ... to plan an

operation of this scope.' 29 Andi so, on Sunday, the 17th of September, 1944,

the Allies launched the largest paratroop drop of the Second World War.

26 Diane T. Putney (ad.). ULTRA and the Army Air Forces in World War II: An Interviewwith Amsciuae ustice of the US Suoreme Court Levis F. oweli. Junior. (Washington D.C.: Office of AirForce History, 1967) p. 39 Footnote. 56. Lamb, jnsiL p215; Hamilton.QL-cit,, p. 72; Irving. nnslkp. 275.27 Lamb, gSitpp 214-216.28 Hmilton, op. cit.iontp- Final Years... 72.29 North, Q#sit p. 92.

12

The Operation, 17 September. 1944

A day aeronautically superb for an airdrop, as it progressed the weather

over the English airfields, and later the Dutch coast, worsened: the second

wave remained unable to drop for four more days.3 0 However, the initial

gains of the 82nd and 10 1st Airborne at Grave and Nljmegen secured their

bridgeheads with minimal losses (Figure 4). The First Airborne Division

(British) was not as lucky. Dropped short of their landing zone, they

encountered General Model's 9th and 10th Panzer (SS) Divisions as well as

some very strongly armed units of the German 15th Army. Despite

warnings from his staff and ignoring the intelligence reports from Ultra and

the Dutch resistance, Montgomery put the First Airborne Division literally in

I AIRSJORM

Figure 4. Second Army's Advance To Arnhem

3- 0 Frasr. usip,346; Craven, stl p. 610.

13IV

the middle of the SS hornet's nest.31 Meanwhile, at Eindhoven, Dempsey

with the 2nd British Army encountered unexpectedly tough German

resistance and his forward progress slowed because of the exact same

concerns previously voiced to Montgomery. In fact, the Germans blocked the

highway and smaller roads leading to Arnhem, as the newly reinforced

German 15th Army halted Dempsey's advance with massive shelling and

artillery barrages (Figure 5). By the 23rd, the British reached the lower

- ,j 101 st0US.st

Figure 5. Operation Mattel Qrrden

3' lamb, naAL p. 226; Mac Donald. oai• . 375.

14

Rhine but could not join with elements of the First Airborne Division.

Finally, after nine days of the fiercest fighting since Operatian Overlorc( the

Allies withdrew. Unable to rescue all of their personnel, a huge number of

casualties and prisoners of war had to be abandoned. Sadly, this defeat may

have caused the war to extend into 1945.

The Quest for the Ruhr: the Ill-fated MVrket Garden

After reading the chronology of Alarket ir~rden or having at least seen

the film A Bridge Too Fao, one still must wonder, if the objective was

achievable? Was the strategy flawed and doomed from the start? What

about Allied resources, were they adequate considering Eisenhower's logistic

problems? Through an analysis of the objective, the stu ategy employed, and

the resources available to execute the plan, there may be cluesas to why the

operation failed and lessons to be utilized for future operations.

To take and hold the bridges over the Rhine, Meuse, and Waal Rivers was

Montgomery's idea and was formulated within the larger framework of the

Eisenhower goal of taking the Ruhr Valley. Montgomery developed the

strategy entirely by himself and in it, he advocated one major offensive

effort. This thrust should across the Rhine, north of the Ruhr into the

heartland of Germany. By so doing, Montgomery hoped to see the enemy

brought to its knees (by denying them this great industrial region). This,

Montgomery felt, would lead to the early collapse of the Reichl 32

Montgomery deliberately picked Arnhem rather than Wesel because there

were fewer anti-aircraft defenses and there was the added plus that, if

32 Brian Montgomery. A Field Marshall In The Family. (New York: TaplinjerPublishing Company, 1974). pp. 315-316.

15

successful, he would simultaneously destroy the V I and V2 launch sites

which had been so deadly to the city of London.33

The resources available for Market arden proved, in retrospect, talented

yet limited, as was the case with the paratroopers designated for the

operation. Although rested and ready to get into action because some had

not jumped since Normandy, they had been activated several times only to

be cancelled at the last minute because of the rapid ground gains. These

units were elements of the US 82nd Airborne under MGen James Gavin; the

US 101st Airborne under MGen Maxwell Taylor; and finally, the Ist

Airborne Division. comprised of British, Canadian, and Polish soldiers, under

British Army MGen Roy Urquhart.34 A second resource was Ultra, the

successful decoding of German messages and operational orders. Ultra

enabled the Allies to know in advance many of the moves made by Hitler.3S

Ultra, in combination with human intelligence sources from the Dutch

underground, identified the equipment and tank build-up operations in the

Nijmegen and Arnhem areas ten days before D-Day. Ultra estimates of

residual German forces from 15th Army proved fairly accurate, especially in

the Antwerp area. The port of Antwerp with its access to the ocean through

the Scheldt Estuary, proved to be a third resource. Antwerp offered the

solution to the supply and fuel delivery problems. Further, Antwerp was

captured virtually intact and would require little work to restore to

operational condition. 36 This was a distinct advantage because other

33 Irving. R.L p. 280; Lamb, oL. ,iL PP. 213-214.227.34 Montgomery. 2n2 CiLMmmoi p. 246.35 Putney. olsi p. 39.36 Irving. ciL. p. 269; Montgomery, 2D, ci., Memir p. 266.

16

captured ports, such as Dieppe and Cherbourg, had been heavily damaged by

the retreating Germans and required months of extensive labor to restore.

The momentum of advancing Allied troops coupled with the alleged

exhaustion, frustration, and rapid retreat of the Germans presented

opportunities the Allies could easily exploit. Again, Ultra provided a late

August assessment of the German army in the West as "having been

irretrievably broken."37 The long and hasty retreat supposedly left the

Germans disorganized and ill equipped. 38

A final advantage and resource for the Allies was the operation itself

which called for surprize, initiative, and a lightning attack through a route of

travel thought to be easier than through the Ardennes. There were no hills

or heavily forested areas to make maneuver difficult. Timing, weat3.,kr, and

initiative would be the resou: ces which would lead to a succesoful operation.

The Final Analysis

Judging from the outcome, Markelt Garda was found to be not a feasible,

"do-able" operation. To begin with, the objective ended up a difficult one.

The plan assumed the bridges would be as easy to recapture as bridges in

France had been; however, Montgomery and the Alliet unlerestimated the

tremendous resolve of Hitler and the German army. dltra reports indicating

that Hitler had rearmed along the Siegfried Line, the Alhert Canal in Belgium,

and in Arnhem were acknowledged but discounted by Montgomery himself.

Eisenhower, told about the German reinforcement euforts. but, because his

difficulty in communicating with Montgomery, did noL personally challenge

the plan based on the intelligence reports. Instead, he sent Bedell Smith to

37 Hastings. 2L. iL- p. 87.38 Mac )onald, up.cL.p. 370; Montgomery. gg...s Memoir pp 243-244.

17

see Montgomery "who ridiculed the idea (that the objective was difficult),

merely because of reports of German tank strength at Arnhem...and would

not revise Market Garde'~39

Montgomery also failed to appreciate the difference in terrain and

topography between the lower Rhine and France, which made achieving the

objective difficult and challenging. Roads were very narrow, usually built on

top of dikes, while the lower roads flooded frequently resulting in heavy

clay mud. Travel would be slower than it had been in other parts of Europe.

Further, the boggy, marshy land prevented maneuver of the heavy

equipment which often sank up to the axles once the vehicle left the road.

Again, ignoring the advice of his staff and disregarding Dempsey's concerns

for a timely convergence with the airborne, Montgomery tenaciously pressed

ahead. V

Even if the objective was achievable, the strategy remained riddled with

flaws. Again, had the Ultra reports been heeded, the entire operation could

have been stopped or at least delayed. The narrowness of the corridor gave

Dempsey little maneuver room and severely limited his flexibility and

exercise of surprise. Further, the strategy did not include any air component

tasking other than fighter escort of transports and gliders. Some deep

interdiction missions were run against railroad junctions and were designed

to interrupt German transportation of reinforcing supplies and personnel but

these remained south along the Siegfried line.4e

It also appears that very little coalition coordination in the planning of

Markte Garde was exercised. Montgomery merely handed the plan to his

staff for execution. In fact, MGen Maxwell Taylor phoned Montgomery to

39 L•b. en iL. p26.49 Cmven, g Lp. 600.

18

personally voice his objections to the landing zone for his personnel and was

told that it was too late to change the plan.4t MGen Roy Urquhart

encountered the same lack of cooperation when he tried to talk to

Montgomery.42 The strategy also presupposed the availability of adequate

amounts of petroleum and ammunition to execute the plan: Montgomery

wanted Bradley and Patton's fuel rather than to stop long enough to clear

the Germans from the Scheldt Estuary. Possession of the Scheldt would have

opened Antwerp to supplies for all Allied armies. In addition, Bradley and

Patton's activities to the south served to further divert German personnel

and resources, thus supporting Ike's broad front strategy.

Not only was the objective questionable and the strategy flawed, but the

resources were limited. To begin with, it was a strategic and logistical error

to continue through Antwerp without first clearing pockitts of German

resistance. The resistance proved especially heavy in the Scheldt Estuary,

the key access to the North Sea. This chokepoint was not eliminated until

November 1944143 Thus, this failure denied the Allies the desperately

needed deep water port and shortened logistics lines, critical to any further

operations in the interior of Germany. The failure to eliminate resistance

also hampered Dempsey's progress because he had to divert fighting troups

41 Lamb,. dlLL.2ZO.1 2 M n•1 4, CmC i- Evill FmArgMn TheaeL of _Opeaions. (New York: ArborHouws, 193), p. 382-384.432nrnar, io.s&p. 30; Lamb go-aaL p216. Mongoiiery sold the idea of aoinm backto Aniwer, and clewing out the resistace after Market Garden vas executed andsuccesl Ike agreed. So in this regard. Montgomery was not operating unilaterally._ mr, several sources pint out that Eisenhower had not poid enough attention tothe Ultra reports and to his staff regarding the strength of remistnce. Had he done so,perhaps Montgomery would have been hrcS to cler the estuary frs before MurkGarden, and the complexion and direction of the war vould hm changed. It shouldalso be noted that Montgomery. years later, admitted that not clearing the Scheldeestnary was a mnistake.

19Ii ow'-

to protect his flank. In fact, his line of march was twice cut by the German

army, forcing him to stop, regroup, and secure his avenue.

The cardrop was hindered logistically because there were not enough

transport and glider aircraft to make one single drop as called for in

Montgomery's plan.44 Further, when the second wave did finally arrive, it

was poorly equipped to meet the Panzer SS armored threat. The First

Airborne did not even have adequate radios to communicate within their

units145 Senior paratroop leaders worried about the drop zones and

armament for their troops but their concerns were ignored, as noted earlier.

Adverse weather contributed to the delay of the second wave when clouds

and rain prevented them from arriving on D-Day. The weather was a

favorable resource for the first drop but turned against the Allies for the

second drop, delaying resupply and reinforcements for the Arnhem troops.

The Germans, however, successfully capitalized on the poor weather utilizing

the time to strengthen their forces to counter the Allies. As such, an aspect

of the operation thought to be a premier resou-ce, the crack paratroopers,

proved to be a severe limitation to Allied success.

Montgomery's cavalier attitude toward the Ultra and Dutch resistance

reports shows he failed to use one of the most valuable tools available to

Operation Market Garden What is more difficult to comprehend, however, is

why he chose to ignore his talented and experienced staff. Legitimate

concerns raised by seasoned infantry and airborne officers were dismissed

out-of-hand by Montgomery. He also paid no heed to other concerned Allied

officers. MGen Stanislaw Sosabowski of the Polish Independent Paratroop

Brigade told Montgomery that the "plan for his troops to land near Arnhem

44 Ceven, SiL, p. 601.43 autings. 2L i. p. 90.

20

=

... was disastrous and that senior planners were guilty of reckless

overconfidence."4 6 Staff members could do nothing but sit in silent

frustration and do as they were told. Bedell Smith, worried over the plan,

admitted, "I can not change his mind."47 MGen Freddie De Guingand, the

only person who was reputed to have any influence on Montgomery, was not

physically present on the Continent.48

If Montgomery was thought to be arrogant and self-confident, it may

have been with good reason, since he had been the ground forces

commander during the highly successful North African campaign, as well as

Operation Overlord. In fact, the Allies as a group suffered from this same

sense of overconfidence. They had been lulled into a collective sense of

cockiness and arrogance because of the rapidity with which their victories

came. As Max Hastings says, "the exhilaration of pursuit caused men to

fatally relax."49 Tired, they began to lose focus on the mission, as was

evidenced by some of the preparation activities and ensuing logistical

shortfalls of Market Garden The intelligence was also misleading and gave

airborne units the idea that the "Germans were on their last gasp."30 Hence,

with no sense of urgency, extreme exhaustion, and the subsequent loss of

focus, situations developed wherein troops maneuvered with inadequate

resources: the deployment of the First Allied with no radios and inadequate

antitank munitions serve as two examples. The momentum and "heady

optimism" brought on by the Allied victories turned the army from what

should have been a successful application of Allied force, into an pretentious

46 Lamb. ~jit p. 220.4 7 lJLp. 224.48 Hmilton, on. cit.. Hontv: Final Years. p. 72.49 agstings. n, SiLt. .87,30 jbjL p2 90.

21

41

and unfocused group who sustained major and unnecessary losses of

equipment and personnel.

The plan itself demanded forces to seize the initiative and strike with

speed to surprise the exhausted and poorly equipped Germans. Uncannily,

Hitler had suspected that Montgomery would head north to the Zuider Zee

and reacted by placing one of his strongest generals, Field Marshall Walter

Model, in that area. Model immediately marshalled troops and began

rearmament efforts for the Wehrmacht units in Holland. "Regimental and

division commanders were empowered to form battle groups with such

troops as they could muster locally from stragglers, reinforcements and lines

of communication units."'5 He orchestrated the blocking of strategic

highways and canals, while taking advantage of the weather and the Allies'

inability to resupply and reinforce themselves. He managed tg hold not only

the Arnhem bridge, but also the entire city. His energy, personal effort, and

organizational skills served as three key reasons for the German repulse of

Maret: GardA To summarize, the timing needed to orchestrate a rapid

thrust remained "out of sync" because of a number of factors: the

unexpected resistance by dedicated German soldiers; the inability to drop

the second wave of paratroopers due to weather; the disregard for

intelligence reports which dennnded the robusting of armament for the

paratroopers; and the lack of communication capability.32 These factors

combined to create one of the worst Allied defeats of the entire war.

51 Montgomery, optit., Normandy. p. 169; Putney, p.sit.L P. 39; Lamb, nasL p. 220.52 Congdon, on. cit.. p. 603.

22

Lessons Learned

Several timeless lessons can be learned from the Allied failure at Market

Garden At the strategic level, Market Garden teaches us that military

planners must never lose sight of the political reasons which fostered the

initial conflict. National political will and national interests play a

tremendous role in the development of coalition strategy. Since the US in

1944 contributed the majority of manpower, materiel, and money to the

Allied war effort, Eisenhower's selection over Montgomery as the Supreme

Allied Commander was reasonable. Ever sensitive to political and senior

military bosses, primarily Roosevelt, Churchill, and Marshall, Ike remained

focused on the coalition goal of "unconditional surrender." A consumate

professional, he did not let the egoistical and personal ambitio•s of any of his

generals distract him from attempting to achieve that goal. Ike listened and

considered Montgomery's opinions and ideas, yet remained the architect of

the multiple-pronged attack strategy. This, he knew, would lead the way to

a Nazi defeat.

Two operational level lessons should he remembered from the Market

Garden defeat. First, total coordination and planning with all elements of an

operation, whether ground or air, remain critical to the successful execution

of any plan. Planners gave no consideration, for example, to fighter or

bomber cover or carpet bombing to soften the target area before the airdrop.

Nor did anyone review the plan again when Montgomery was told that

there were not enough transport aircraft to complete the drop on the first

day. Certainly the plan would have taken a different form, had fighter and

transport planning expertise been included in initial and follow-on planning.

Secondly, logistics shortages caused both paratroopers and ground forces to

23

be inadequately prepared. A few days delay or the opening of the port of

Antwerp may have prevented such disasters as the delivery of the wrong

ammunition and the lack of radios. The combination of a fully coordinated

plan and better logistical support, may have produced a different outcome.

However, the most important lesson of Market Garden emerges at the

tactical level. Commanders and senior leaders must learn to "read the

troops," watch their collective behavior, and understand their fears and

concerns. Without a break, Dempsey's personnel had marched since

Overlord and traversed through Northwestern France while fighting against

some very strong opposition. Logistics and supply lines could hardly keep

up, resulting in severe shortages of food, shelter, and munitions. A negative

result of the rapidity with which the Allies pushed the Nazis back surfaced

as a sense of self-confidence and arrogance in the troops. As k.result, people

lost focus of their primary mission, the results of which proved disastrous.

Even more relevant today, reading the troops is a skill which goes hand-in-

hand with solid leadership.

There is much to learn from analysis of the leadership during Market

Garden Eisenhower and Montgomery, both accomplished military leaders in

their own right, could not have been further apart in style or personality.

Eisenhower, as the Supreme Allied Commander, understood the sensitivities

and political ramifications of the Allied coalition. Montgomery, on the other

hand, as the famed leader of Overkrd and £1AlameM saw only the British

perspective and faied to understand that the United States, as the major

provider in 1944 of manpower, materiel, and money, remained unwilling to

allow the British to take the entire glory of an Allied push into Berlin. As De

Guingand politely reminded Montgomery, "What would the people of

24

America have said if (he) had been given all those resources and yet failed?

It might well have led to a crisis amongst the Allies."'3

Turmoil and dissention among the Allied senior leaders created problems

as well, a situation perpetuated by Montgomery's open disagreement with

Ike on such issues as whether there should be a ground forces commander

and on the merits of a single thrust vice broad front strategy. As Omar

Bradley remembers, 'Mtntgomery began denouncing Ike's strategic

decisions and directives in the s'.rongest possible terms. His language was so

insubordinate that Ike was compelled to interrupt."5 4 Once Eisenhower

announced his decision, the arguing continued and many Allied subordinate

commanders felt that Montgomery's actions warranted removal. Eisenhower

did not, however, because he realized he was obliged to listen to his British

allies and he 'believed that he had to give Montgomery tle right to full

expression of his views.°55 This, indeed, typifies Eisenhower's sensitivities to

the Allied coalition, but created frustration for the other Allied generals.

Montgomery's failure to utilize the talents of his staff and to consult with

his peers on the planning of Market lGarden further illustrates that not only

was he a solitary thinker but also that he tended to develop operational

plans without assistance from his staff, forcing subordinate commander

execution. Ike, conversely, used his staff and very frequently conferred

with his field commanders on the operational implications of various plans.

Solutions to problems were worked in concert with his staff and outlined to,

quite frequently, General George Marshall and Prime Minister Winston

33 Do Guingand. on. cit.. Oneration Victory. p. 413.M4 Bradley. njL.ijLp 330.53 Hamilton, oau. ciL. Master of the att.lefield. p. 533.

25

Churchill bef,)xe their implementation.56 It is difficult to understand why

Montgomery chose not to coordinate with his airborne commanders or

request fighter support other than escort for the transports. Had he

ccordinated his plan with his contemporaries, it would have been massaged

to accommodate the logistical shortfalls or to realign transport and fighter

resources so that adequate numbers remained available to accomplish the

mission. There is no doubt that leadership styles and personalities played a

significant role in the failure of Market Garden and that national interests

and pride, as well as military considerations, impact tuccess or failure of any

campaign.

In summary, the lessons of Operation Market Garden are timeless and

universal and will serve as examples to future leaders at any level of an

organization. Whether a contingency operation or full blqtwn conflict, a

urdlateral action or coalition effort, these lessons form the basis from which

we must develop not only the men and women who will lead our forces but

also the "Winning" strategy, if we are to prevent the tragedy of huge

personnel and materiel losses.

56 Dwight D. Eisenhower. At fse: Storrin I Tell To Friends (New York: Doubleday and

Compmay. Inc.. 1967). p275.

26

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