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Leslie R. Groves

Keeping Life Simple Through Chocolate and Control

Abbi Ward

It was pretty awesome. I was told to use the shield in which I had placed that little piece of welder's glass. We were told to lie down and face the ground zero, but I didn't want to lie down because it was wet and clammy, so I sat on a stump. And when the bomb went off, the heat on the back of my hands holding my little shield was so intense and the light all around me was so bright that I got terribly shocked and I hit the dirt. The awe of seeing that thing and seeing the cloud and then realizing there would be people next time under that.1

The atomic age began at 5:30 A.M., June 16, 1945 in Alamogordo, New Mexico with the Trinity

Test, marking the first atomic bomb explosion and denoting a great technological advance of the

time. The leader of this initiative, commonly known as the Manhattan Project, was General Leslie

Richard Groves. This project was an undercover government operation to create the atomic bomb.

Although Groves served as the head administrator and was headquartered in Washington D.C., the

bomb was created through the research and engineering which occurred at over 30 sites across the

United States, Canada, and England. The three major American sites were Los Alamos, New

Mexico; Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and Hanford in Richland, Washington, although two other

important sites involving the theoretical aspects were the Radiation Lab in Berkeley, California

and the Metallurgical Lab in Chicago.

General Groves was a tall man with broad shoulders and a presence that demanded

attention and obeisance. After meeting him as a teenager, his future wife described him through

this rhyme: “This is Dick and this is fudge, from it little Dick won’t budge.”2 Through this, Grace

explained two of Groves’s main characteristics: his stubbornness and his predilection for sweets.

1 Hans W. Courant in interview with Nicole Bengiveno et al. “Voice of the Manhattan Project.” in New York Times, (New York, 2008), 1. 2 Richard Hulbert Groves, DNO Chronology, (Unpublished manuscript), 126 as quoted in Robert Norris, Racing for the Bomb. (South Royalton: Steerforth, 2002), 53.

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A scientist at the Chicago site, Libby Leona Marshall characterized him as “a tall, fat man who

weighted perhaps as much as 300 pounds. He bulged out of his khakis above and below his belt,

straining to perfect sphericity. His aides said that he was addicted to chocolate turtles and ice

cream sundaes.”3 He was certainly tall and portly with penetrating, crisp blue eyes, and he donned

a small, carefully trimmed mustache, and by the time of the Manhattan Project, his dark brown

hair began to morph to an iron gray.

Groves’s intense, military-oriented childhood and his forceful personality formed him into

a successful leader. His unorthodox leadership methods and administrative skill were imperative

to the rapid development of this incredibly powerful military weapon. His leadership style is rare

today, and would be frequently frowned upon in today’s modern society, but, in a time of the

country’s urgent need, this style proved more, if not most, efficient and accomplished the job

efficiently.

Leslie Richard Groves, Jr. became the third child of this eighth generation American

family on August 17, 1896 in Albany, New York.4 He joined a mother, a father, and two brothers,

and, six years later, in 1902, his sister Gwen was born. As an army chaplain, his father, Leslie

Richard Groves, Sr., moved his family frequently. Between his return to the United States in 1901

and 1913, the family moved 6 times.5 Though not always present in his son’s life, as Groves’s first

memory of his father was at age 5 or 6,6 the Chaplain had a profound influence on his son’s

morals and life. According to Richard Groves, grandson of the Chaplain, competition was an

innate part of the Groves’ household. Expected to compete within the family and the community,

3 Libby Leona Marshall, The Uranium People, (New York: Crane Russak, 1979), 92-93. 4 William Taylor Groves, A History and Geneology of the Groves Family in America Descendents of Nicholas La Groves of Beverly, Mass. (Ann Arbor, 1915). 5 Norris, 5. 6 Joseph Ermenc, ed. Atomic Bomb Scientists: Memoirs, 1939-1945 (Westport: Meckler Corporation, 1989), 205.

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the children were taught that “if it is a game, you win it. If there is a class you stand number one.”7

While supporting her children , his mother Gwen Griffith Groves also fostered this competitive

spirit, continuously urging her sons to success. For example, she urged competition in this letter to

son Owen at Hamilton College,

I am very glad indeed that you have second, if the judge wouldn't give your first. Second best in class is good. Next year we will try hard for first...Richard should be trimmed in tennis, in mind, manners and in everything. And A[llen] isn't going to be equal to the job…Are you going to write for prize this year and on what subject? Do your best, I expect you to win. You must practice your signature. Make it larger, as a man of your importance in the world ought to.8

Leslie Groves’ oldest brother, Allen, evinced from an early age signs of genius. In college,

he was remembered not only for his incredible mastery of language but also for his amazing

memorization capabilities, such as the ability recite all the names and batting averages of every

major league player or the census figures for all American cities.9 According to biographer Robert

Norris, “[Allen] was not just smart, he was brilliant. He remembered everything he read, was

versatile, and was able to master whatever challenge was put before him.”10 The family also

participated in sports, as a part of the competitive nature; Groves played tennis and enjoyed

horseback riding. As the youngest by three years, Leslie Groves, Jr. always had to push ahead, not

only to meet his two brothers’ achievements, but to push beyond. This constant pushing and

catching up led to his philosophy in which he treasured speed over quality, a belief which

manifested itself in his high school career, and may have in the Manhattan Project had it not been

for his almost unlimited resources. The philosophy gave him a competitive spirit and drive, so he

was willing to work as hard he could for a long duration to achieve his goals.

7 Interview with Richard Hulbert Groves by Robert S. Norris, January 25, 1999 as quoted in Norris, 41. 8 Letter, Gwen Griffith Groves to Owen Griffith Groves, June 24, 1912 as quoted in Norris, 49. 9 Homer Davis, ed, Allen Morton Groves: An Appreciation Together with Selections from His Orations and Essays, 8- 9 as quoted in Norris, 48. 10 Norris, 42.

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Chaplain Groves influenced his children in other ways as well. Grandson Richard Groves

explained,

Chaplain Groves believed in one-on-one contact with children during their formative years. In the spring of 1937, I became the object of his close scrutiny when… he spent a week with me, probing all the time my beliefs and my manners -- an awesome experience for a thirteen year old, which I shall never forget. In like manner, in mid-1911, Chaplain Groves seems to have decided that his third son [Leslie R. Groves] needed his personal attention. Until this time, whatever interaction they had was always in the presence of others. Now they would be alone together for several months. And, like me, [Leslie R. Groves] came away deeply impressed. He had always respected his father from afar; after this encounter, they really knew each other -- and they developed a mutual admiration, which endured through their lives.11

From this experience, Groves found new admiration for his father and his father’s views

and learned the value of direct personal attention. A classic characteristic of Groves’s

administrative style, his bluntness, was partially developed through his positive experience of this

direct style of discovery. The one-on-one, personal contact of these few months taught him much

about the values and beliefs of his father quickly and directly, as in the same manner in which

Groves preferred to deal with his problems. In gaining respect for his father, Groves also gained

respect for the army life. His father, who taught him many of his beliefs, is partially responsible

for his impeccable integrity later on in life.

His father’s piety also helped cultivate Groves’s strength of character. Between the

Christian and military morals drilled into him in childhood, Groves developed a strong moral

compass and high standards to which he held everyone. Though Groves later chose not to attend

church as frequently, opting to work or to spend time with his family, he never lost his veracity.

This intense adherence to moral standards also contributed to his bluntness, which functioned as a

sign of his integrity. Although he understood the bounds of social propriety and the extent of army

11 Richard Hulbert Groves, unpublished manuscript, 103 as quoted in Norris, 47.

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security, Groves was always frank about any problems; he did not try to make himself more than

he was nor allow himself to be considered less.

While his father helped foster many strong, positive qualities, he also passed on many

views of the world that hampered Groves’s ability to work with others. Although the close-knit

family yielded a sense of intimacy, it also produced exclusiveness, and because the family was

eighth-generation American, white, and Protestant, it was easy to adopt the standard racist and

anti-Semitic views of the time. Additionally, although they were of original English descent, the

Chaplain epitomized his Anglophobic views in writing to his sister-in-law, “If there is anything

that fills me with shame, it is my English blood.”12 Groves adopted these views to a lesser extent

and thus had difficulty in working with the scientists of varying backgrounds in the Manhattan

Project and found the foreign alliances objectionable.

From an early age, Groves learned and exhibited a sense of discipline and obedience

towards his superiors. As he explained, at school,

It was customary for misbehaving children to receive a rather sharp whipping, either with a wooden switch, or with a ruler laid across the palm of their hands. It was also customary never to tell anyone at home that we had been punished for that merely meant that we would be reproved, and if it was bad enough, we might be punished again.13

This environment not only taught him obedience but also illustrated an effective method of

control; threat of physical punishment. One time, after misbehaving at home, his mother sent him

to sit in the closet as punishment, instructing him not to say another word until she said he could

come out. By lunch time, when the Chaplain arrived home and called for his son, he was nowhere

to be found. Search parties were sent out until “at long last, the frantic mother remembered the

closet and the small prisoner. The door was flung open. There he sat, in the dark, obeying orders

12 Chaplain Groves, personal letter to Jane Griffith (Gwen’s sister) 17 November 1900 from Chaplain Groves, Papers, vol. 2, 741 as quoted in Norris, 570. 13 Leslie R. Groves, For My Grandchildren, (NARA), 29 as quoted in Norris, 44.

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to the end. It had been many hours.”14 Ultimately, his childhood environment, one of intense

competition, obedience, and hierarchy, conditioned Groves for the army life, where he eventually

flourished at West Point and throughout his career.

Desiring to push ahead of his classmates and learn more, Leslie Groves began college

while still a senior in high school at Washington State University. He took on two full course

loads, one at the University, the other at Queen Anne High School. However, lacking sufficient

time for his studies, he earned a combination of B’s and C’s at Washington University and slightly

better than average grades Queen Anne.15,16 Although he took the Presidential Competitive

Examinations to win one of twelve West Point nominations from the President of the United

States, his scores were not high enough to gain him one. Thus, Groves went to the Massachusetts

Institute of Technology, to become an engineer, but still remained set on going to the Military

Academy. His frustration only mounted upon discovering he would still be set for a four year

graduation plan because he had insufficient math credits. However, in his 1967 interview with

Joseph Ermenc, a professor from Dartmouth College, Groves confessed he felt frustrated because

in his Calculus course at MIT, he used the same book he had used at Washington University, a

book in which he had done every problem. According to him, “They would not give me credit for

the calculus course because the senior professor said that I couldn’t have done this much work in

so short a time.”17 Additionally, MIT lacked the competitive, fraternal, patriotic spirit he had

grown up with. This school’s message emphasized free thinking and cooperation rather than the

military achievement and competition Groves desired. Then, in January of 1916, his 25-year-old

brother Allen suddenly died of heart problems and Groves was brought to Washington D.C. He

seized the opportunity to change schools, more driven than ever to get into West Point, and left 14 Ibid, 32-33, as quoted in Norris, 45. 15 Richard Hulbert Groves, DNO Chronology, (unpublished manuscript) as quoted in Norris, 63. 16 Leslie Richard Groves, Permanent Record, Queen Anne High School as quoted in Norris, 63. 17 Ermenc, 207.

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MIT partway through his junior year in 1916, at the age of 20 to attend the Columbia Preparatory

School to prepare to take for the Presidential Competitive Examinations again, tests in which 250

candidates competed for the 12 appointment slots, one of which soon belonged to Groves. Upon

entering the Academy, he remarked,

Entering West Point fulfilled my greatest ambition. I had been brought up in the army, and in the main had lived on army posts all my life. I was deeply impressed with the character and outstanding devotion of the officers I knew... I was imbued with the idea that the West Point graduates were normally the best officers and on the world enjoyed higher respect from the enlisted men.18

By gaining admission, Groves had achieved a major goal. In the West Point environment,

Groves essentially returned to his orderly childhood environment. Having had to survive high

school and college with his brothers too far away to compete with, Groves now entered an

academy which treasured order, patriotism, and competition. West Point also provided the

fraternity similar to his childhood, and with his brother’s recent sudden death in right before he

left for cram school in 1916, the academy provided a fraternity he perhaps needed. According to

historian Stephen Ambrose about the Academy,

At West Point, graduates had all taken the same classes, undergone the same hazing, marched in the same formations. This common experience gave them a sense of community, of fraternity, that they could not bear to see destroyed… To tamper with West Point would be to tamper with the cement that held the army officer corps together.19

Through the army, Groves could stay connected to his childhood and aspire to something greater.

He could make individual achievements while still remaining within a tight group, like family.

18 Groves, Grandchildren, 103 as quoted in Norris, 71. 19 Stephen E. Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country: A History of West Point. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1916), 207.

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Thus, he flourished, graduating fourth in his class of over 200.20 Because of the need for

soldiers in World War I, the class graduated early, in 1918, but the war ended shortly after. By the

time he completed his graduate studies in engineering, Groves had acquired quite an eclectic

educational background. He had studied languages and mathematics at a state university, then

engineering at a technical institute, then undergraduate and graduate engineering at a military

academy.

After graduating from West Point in 1918, Groves completed his engineering education at

Fort Humphreys, the home of the military engineering school, in Virginia until June of 1920, but

his real engineering work did not begin until 1925, as assistant to the Galveston District Engineer.

In this position, he assisted with the administration in the re-opening of the harbor in Port Isabel,

Texas, where they had to open the channel to the sea, build jetties, and deepen the channel.21 This

job formed a foundation for his administrative experience, utilizing both his natural management

talents and his engineering skills. In 1929, he voyaged to southern Nicaragua where he

investigated the possibility of an inter-oceanic canal. There he honed his engineering skills,

working intensively on the hydrology aspects and determined the feasibility of a canal.22

Additionally, because he then had to complete the project in Washington, he increased his

connections to politicians and proved his reputation as a blunt, driven man. By the end of that

project, his reputation as a budding leader had spread and he was appointed to the Supply

Division, and was even made chief as a First Lieutenant in a position usually reserved for

brigadier generals. His commanding officers over the first 25 years of his career described him in

Efficiency Reports as

20 "West Point Breaks Graduation Record; Classes of 1920 and 1921, Numbering 511, Win Diplomas and Commissions." New York Times, 2 November 1918. 21 Ermenc, 211. 22 Ibid.

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‘A hard driving officer who gets things done.’ ‘Very energetic, very capable and reliable.’ ‘A superior officer, forceful, intelligent, resourceful, loyal, not afraid to assume responsibility and possessing both initiative and a large capacity for work under trying conditions.’… ‘[Having] the ability to turn out a tremendous amount of work and to see that undertakings are brought to a successful conclusion.’ ‘[A] good organizer, executive and administrator.’ ‘[N]ot easily diverted from his purpose.’ ‘[E]xcellent command of the English language.’ ‘Takes a definite stand, determined, holds to his convictions, sure of himself.’ ‘[A]mbitious’... ‘good judgement’...’cool even-tempered disposition’... ‘conscientious’…’keen mind’...’industrious’...’very resourceful in meeting new problems’23

During this time, he urged upgrading and mechanization of tools, and, ultimately, his insistence

acclimated the troops to power-tools and effectively prepared them for the war. This decision only

increased his reputation as a driven lieutenant ready to take initiative. He pressed development of

infra-red technology and, according to Groves, “Someone at General Electric… said he felt that

the fact that I had pushed infra-red along before, probably saved five years in this recent [1967]

infra-red development.”24 His persistence in using technology demonstrated not only his

forcefulness but also his forward thinking.

While developing such equipment, he made contact with larger engineering firms, such as

DuPont, and this contact that later aided him in the Manhattan Project. This experience also

contributed to his predilection for small staffs, as he enjoyed knowing more, relying less on others

and making the technical decisions on his own.25 He even audited experiments by General Electric

to oversee fiscal needs as well as the experiments.26 Through this method, he was able to provide

an accurate amount of money rather than set a budget which could be too much or not enough.

This supervision was highly unusual yet Groves felt it was necessary because he could see that the

company was paid a correct amount of money depending on what needs arose during the project.

In taking over the project, Groves again used a small staff and his headquarters, at their maximum,

23 Richard Hulbert Groves, Official Records (Unpublished) as quoted in Norris, 8-9. 24 Ermenc, 214. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid, 215.

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consisted of only five rooms, surprising given the massive size of the project. Groves depicted

them as

undoubtedly one of the smallest headquarters seen in modern Washington...Our internal organization was simple and direct, and enabled me to make fast, positive decisions. I am, and always have been, strongly opposed to large staffs, for they are conducive to inaction and delay. Too often they bury the leaders' capacity to make prompt and intelligent decisions under a mass of indecisive, long-winded staff studies.27

Another unusual aspect of Groves’s career was his move from the General Staff to the

Quartermaster Corps. With a huge construction expansion of the army at the time, Groves was

personally invited to be the Quartermaster General’s assistant. He inspected their work and camp

construction around the country yet was received as any outsider who enters a closely-knit

organization: hostilely. But Groves continued to execute his duties, not caring about popularity,

and he was soon appreciated for his talent. He discovered the inefficiency of their camp designs,

formed by professionals with no military experience or knowledge. In addition to correcting these

deficiencies, at his visits to each camp, he would check for safety and stability. On multiple

occasions, Groves pointed out errors or problems and simple solutions, such as, suggesting ways

to use the smaller studdings when there were no larger ones. He even gladly overstepped his job

title in pointing out flaws in a dam in California, that was overseen the Engineering Division. As

Groves reported, “It had been designed by a very prominent engineer in New York. This created a

terrific stir about my interfering when it was reported back to Washington. A day later there was a

big damn washout in California; not one more word was said about my interfering after that.”28

Groves had a natural ability to see problems and future consequences and then to devise simple

27 Groves, Now, 28. 28 Ermenc, 225.

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solutions. This ability aided him throughout his career, as he developed safety standards for

radiation in the Manhattan Project, and could solve big problems with simple solutions.

He was posted to the General Staff in Washington in 1940 as deputy to Chief of

Construction. There, he oversaw a variety of major projects, including the construction of the

Pentagon. Managing these projects involved massive financial transactions and this experience

with money helped him later in handling the two-billion-dollar project.

Leslie R. Groves officially took over the Manhattan Project from Colonel James Marshall

on September 17, 1942, transferring from the Construction Division for this special assignment.

Part of the outline of his duties in the official transfer order was simply to take “the necessary

steps” to achieve the goal.29 This vague and generally open description gave Groves all the

flexibility he needed and could have possibly wanted. With personal approval of the president,

Groves was granted all the political leverage necessary to instill the sense of urgency in those he

had to work with. Groves was always focused on executing his duties, and nowhere did the orders

dictate that he had to make friends. As, after the project, many complained that he was intolerant

and unlikable, Groves simply responded “I think the answer to that is: who cares whether they

liked you or not? That wasn't the objective; it was to have things running well.”30 Before

September 17, he entered the Manhattan Project as assistant to Colonel Marshall and thus saw the

project’s current state. By waiting for his promotion to general, he hoped to gain more respect than

if he were viewed as a promoted colonel.31 As his priorities changed from assisting Col. Marshall

with construction details to understanding scientific aspects, which he had not previously needed

to know, Groves was appalled because the project was based purely on possibility rather than

practical application. According to Groves, “Even if the theories were correct, engineering 29 Brehon Somervell, Memorandum for the Chief of Engineers. 17 Sept 1942. as quoted in Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962.), 417. 30 Ermenc, 248 31 Groves, Now, 5.

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difficulties would be unprecedented.”32 Additionally, he immediately had the priority level raised,

not only to facilitate his ability to get supplies but also instill urgency in the participants.

With him, Groves brought his secretary from the Construction Division, Mrs. Jean

O’Leary. Groves continually employed those he knew, such as his right-wing man, Kenneth

Nichols, not only because of familiarity with them, but because of their familiarity with him

and his methods. It was more efficient for him not to have to have people adjust to his quirks

when he could just hire someone who knew him. Furthermore, he already knew the merits of

Nichols, from previous army experience, and so hiring him would lead to minimal distractions

from his duty.

As he took over, Groves realized the need to increase efficiency and dissolve the stigma of

government as slow. Therefore, upon observing that five engineers shared only one phone and that

no one was doing anything about it, within hours, he had several phones installed. According to

Groves, “The morale of that place suddenly went up. For the first time they realized that there was

somebody who could do something for them instead of hiding behind this sort of answer – ‘We’ve

applied for telephones but you know the government. It takes time.”33 Groves immediately

established a new regime in which he supported action and instituted new attitudes about

accomplishing the project. He also put supervisors in the steel mills to oversee any forthcoming

troubles. He explained,

I think the unusual thing was that we had given authority to our people in the field to do something. They weren't supposed to just sit there and let things go from bad to worse. We used expediters and watchers. It was very easy for us to do this because we said we wanted somebody there so that if they ran into a hitch on supplies of any kind we could do something for them right away. That was the basis on which those

32 Ibid, 19-20. 33 Ermenc, 231.

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people were put in... The idea was always to remove all possible excuses for delay for anybody.34

With the essentially limitless resources of the United State government, Groves took any and

every possibly necessary step to maximize effectiveness and keep production moving.

Although Groves ultimately improved efficiency of the project, in the beginning there were

doubts about his ability to interact with scientists. He first met with Dr. Vanneuver Bush, an

American engineer and science administrator. In a letter to Mr. Bundy after the meeting, Dr. Bush

explained his sentiments regarding Groves’s appointment,

I visited General Styer [Chief of Staff of Army’s Services of Supply] since I feared that comments would be made before you returned. I told him (1) that I still felt, as I had told him and General Somervell [commander of the Army Service Forces] previously, that the best move was to get the military commission first, and then the man to carry out their policies second; (2) that having seen General Groves briefly, I doubted whether he had sufficient tact for such a job.

… On (2) he agreed the man is blunt, etc., but thought his other qualities would overbalance.

Apparently Somervell saw General Marshall today regarding Groves. I fear we are in the soup.35

Although their relations improved in the future, as Groves and Bush served on the Military Policy

Committee later on, Groves rarely made good first impressions among the scientists.

Many scientists opposed Groves’s methods and there were many misunderstanding

between the military and the scientists. In her memoir detailing her endeavors as the youngest

scientist in the Manhattan Project, Libby Leona Marshall highlights many of these

misunderstandings. Discussing Groves’s compartmentalization, she remarked,

After his appointment as czar... Groves now designated that the fast neutron bomb physics would be carried on at a separate laboratory … Until then, all members of the Metallurgical Project had been able to read all reports and know everything that was going on... [One scientist’s] insistence that all scientists were equal in this respect did a

34 Ibid, 240. 35 Groves, Now, 20.

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great deal to develop enthusiasm and devotion to immense effort among the younger scientists. Groves, however, set up the secrecy regulations so that information was not exchanged between the various sites.36

Many scientists felt that his strict regulations hurt the reputation of science, hurt morale and would

hurt the project by detracting the future scientists. She, and other scientists, saw Groves as an

authoritarian military general who was incapable of possibly understanding their physics and the

scientific world. She even believed that “his superiority complex was fed by the fact that he ruled

by fiat over five Nobel laureates.”37 However, in reality, although Groves did admire their

academic talent, he viewed them as an inconvenience in trying to plan the project, even once

calling them “the greatest collection of crackpots ever assembled in one place.”38 His methods

demanded complete obedience from people who studied a subject which trained them to question,

and thus he had difficulty reigning control. Though perhaps seemingly unreasonable, if Groves

had demanded anything less, security may have been even looser. In terms of the political

atmosphere, there was the continuance of the Red Scare attitudes which formed a severe divide

between Communists and others and the xenophobic attitudes which hurt relations with the often

foreign-born or foreign-connected scientists. In the end and in hindsight, even Marshall notes that

Groves’s actions were understandable, given the political circumstances of the time period.

On the subject of security, it seems impossible to fault Groves. He knew that people within the project were protesting his "Gestapo" methods. However, he knew that among the academic, most, if not all, scientists during the Depression years had been exposed to meetings of the local Communist clubs and some had sympathy for Communist doctrine. Some even had friends who were secret or overt Communists... Groves felt that the project needed all the scientists it could get, and so none of these could be shut out preemptively; however, those who where as yet not properly cleared must be looked into, with weight given to how closely a person might have followed Communist party line and for how long.39

36 Marshall, 94. 37 Ibid, 95. 38 Ermenc, x. 39 Marshall, 114.

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His obstinacy that the military would control the bomb’s use and that the scientists were just there

to perform the experiments frustrated scientists. Having been raised in a military family, for him,

the leader was always right. Now as leader, he expected the same from his subordinates. However,

these scientists who naturally questioned authority felt that his demands infringed upon their rights

as academics and violated their ethical support of cooperation. As Marshall put it,

Groves found scientists completely inflexible because they, in turn, would not see his viewpoint. But he was now in the driver's seat and that seat was the Army. He had complete control. He expected friction between the scientists and military, he expected them to dislike his supervision, but he was not engaged in a popularity contest and he was the boss.40

Ironically, the scientists’ personal dislike of him was one of the things the collective scientists and

Groves agreed existed. There was always respect and appreciation between both, but few came to

know or like Groves. Although there were conflicts about the creation and use of the bomb and

other scientific aspects permeated throughout the project and afterwards, they managed to work

together as professionals to get the job done.

In constructing Los Alamos, a new challenge with lots of complications, more than any

previous site, Groves saw the issues of the scientists as an inconvenience and obstacle to navigate.

In deciding on a location for Los Alamos, he noted,

As before, we sought an isolated area so that near-by communities would not be adversely affected by any unforeseen results from our activities. Yet this installation would be different, because here we were faced with the necessity of importing a group of highly talented specialists, some of whom would be prima donnas, and of keeping them satisfied with their working and living conditions.41

This statement typifies not only the problems Groves faced but also how he approached them. He

did not believe in allusion. He would bluntly state life’s dilemmas as he saw it, no matter how

40 Marshall, 95. 41 Groves, Now, 64.

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tactless that might be. An additional problem was finding a suitable administrator for the Los

Alamos site. Unfortunately, many of the obvious choices were unavailable, because they were

already involved in other parts of the project or other essential research. Though there were

perhaps other qualified people outside of the project, Groves felt that Robert Oppenheimer was

still better. Having studied under Arthur Compton, leader of the Chicago site, he was intimately

acquainted with the theoretical aspects of atomic theory. However, although brilliant, he lacked

any administrative experience, had not previously dealt with the experimental aspects, had had

some questionable associations and did not have a Nobel Prize. However, as Groves did not care

about the difference between brilliant minds with Nobel Prizes and ones without, he still supported

Oppenheimer. Additionally, Oppenheimer had ties to the Communist party, as in addition to

investigating the philosophies on his own, as many young scientists did in those days, many of his

relatives were advocates of the Communist Party. In this case, Groves went with his instinct: “I

felt that his potential value outweighed any security risk,” and thus Groves used his authority to

get him necessary security clearance.42 Isidor Isaac Rabi, a scientist at Los Alamos, considered his

appointment, “‘a real stroke of genius on the part of General Groves, who was not generally

considered to be a genius, to have appointed him,’ but at the time it seemed ‘a most improbable

appointment. I was astonished.’”43 Oppenheimer, because of his very successful work, was later

considered not only an academic genius, but also an indispensable part of the project.

With the development of the Military Policy Committee, Groves’s penchant for fewer people

again shone through. He vigorously objected to the original seven-person plan proposed by Henry

L. Stimson, leader above Groves. Groves won the debate by explaining that

such a large committee would be unwieldy; it would cause delays in taking action; and some, if not the majority of its members would tend to treat it as a secondary

42 Groves, Now, 63. 43 Isidor Isaac Rabi as quoted in Richard Rhodes. The Making of the Atomic Bomb. (New York: Simon, 1986), 449.

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responsibility, to the detriment of [the] progress. [He] felt that a committee of three was ideal and that any more members would be a hindrance rather than a benefit. [He] pointed out that [he] could keep three people reasonably well informed on major problems, and, furthermore, that [he] would be able to obtain advice from them much more readily that [he] could from a larger group.44

Ultimately, Groves gained his power not only through his hard work but also through logic,

knowledge, and experience. In the future, for the most part, the Committee was generally in

consensus on plans of action. However, the one issue Groves truly pushed was the hiring of

Oppenheimer. As he explained,

They weren't willing but went along… That was not on account of loyalty. They had the feeling that he didn't have the desired administrative experience and he didn't have the scientific reputation that was essential for the job. On both these criticisms they finally gave in when I asked them, ‘Do you know a better man?”45

Groves had a very simple security philosophy. To him “compartmentalization of knowledge…

was the very heart of security… each man should know everything he needs to know to do his job

and nothing else.”46 He felt that through this method, the scientists would stay focused and

remember the goal of stopping war, not increasing scientific knowledge. Groves himself followed

this philosophy always. In his introduction to the Manhattan Project, he had not inquired about any

scientific aspects until he had officially taken over the project. When he was assigned, all he told

his family was the he had a new job and that “The answer to be given if they were asked what [he]

was doing was, ‘I don’t know, I never know what he’s doing.’ To [his] son, [he] added, ‘If it is an

officer who knows me well, and he is persistent, you can add, ‘I think it is something secret.’”47

Groves loved his family, and took their protection very seriously, but always tried not to weigh

down his children with the burden of his work life. Thus, he always told them very directly that he

couldn’t discuss his work and kept his personal life away from his professional life. They found 44 Groves, Now, 24. 45 Ermenc, 257. 46 Groves, Now, 140. 47 Ibid, 21.

18

out about the atomic bomb the same day everyone else did, with the famous announcement of

President Truman.48 In fact, in his memoir Now It Can Be Told, the only mentions of his family

are his discussions regarding that they would not ever ask him about work and then their reaction.

He also strongly believed everyone should follow this philosophy, his family, his coworkers, and

himself.

In foreign affairs, although Groves desired to keep the project only within America, he

eventually made agreements with England for collaboration on the atomic energy project. As

always, he was cautious about the transfer of information and the people who were allowed to

receive. However, there were problems with French scientists. As he explained in his memoir,

At the long conference Secretary Stimson and I had with the President on December 31, 1944, we discussed the French problem in detail Mr. Roosevelt remarked that obviously Ambassador Winant had been deceived, and stated categorically that he himself had no knowledge of any British-French agreement involving atomic energy... At about the same time [that they got a copy of the 1942 English agreement with von Halban] we learned that the British considered most of the French scientists in Canada to be representatives of the French Committee for the National Liberation. They were not primarily British Civil Servants, as we had understood, but had been employed under an agreement that could be terminated whenever "their scientific position in the French Government Service" made it desirable. We discovered, in fact that one of them… had been on the French Government's payroll throughout his service in Montreal.

It should be re-emphasized that the American Government had no knowledge of the British obligation prior to this time.49

In re-emphasizing that point, Groves tries to absolve himself and his country, and reveals his

patriotism through his complete disbelief of American involvement. Groves remarked,

I cannot help but feel that the British should have disclosed to us prior to the Quebec Agreement, any arrangements that they had previously entered into with third parties... Had this been done, our difficulties at the end of 1944 would have been avoided.

48 Groves, Now, 21. 49 Ibid, 227.

19

Having effected a breach in the Quebec Agreement, Joliot proceeded to exploit it... if [France] were not eventually admitted to full collaboration with the United States and Britain in the project, she would have to turn to Russia. Thus, France acquired a bargaining power out of all proportion to anything to which her early parents entitled her... My sole source of satisfaction in this affair came from a remark made by Joliot to an employee of the United States Embassy in Paris: while the British had always been most cordial to him and had given him much information, he said, he got virtually nothing from the Americans he encountered.50

Groves felt betrayed by the British and burdened by their mistakes. As an intense patriot and

somewhat of a xenophobe, he clearly preferred Americans to foreigners, as seen through his

cynical treatment of alliances, as he was strongly opposed to British collaboration, and his

questioning of many scientists’ integrity.

The dubious allegiances of many of the American scientists were another security issue. In

the notes from an Interim Committee meeting, a committee comprised of the politicians above

Groves in the U.S. government and Bush, Conant, and Compton,

General Groves stated that the program has been plagued since its inception by the presence of certain scientists of doubtful discretion and uncertain loyalty. It was agreed that nothing could be done about dismissing these men until after the bomb has actually been used or, at best, until after the test has been made. After some publicity concerning the weapon was out, steps should be taken to sever these scientists from the program and to proceed with a general weeding out of personnel no longer needed.51

Originally, because of this compromised security, Groves installed security measures that

essentially prohibited communication between departments. Throughout the project he remained

skeptical of foreign scientists and as it turned out, rightfully so. Many scientists believed his

questioning as needless as they grew frustrated with the almost inhibitive security measures, yet,

Groves’s job was to be skeptical and protect national security.

50 Ibid, 228-229. 51 Notes of the Interim Committee Meeting. 31 May 1945, in The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II: A Collection of Primary Sources. Ed. William Burr.

20

Even before the bombing of Hiroshima, Groves, ever aware of consequences, was very

conscious of the fact that the public would want to know the details of the atomic project. Thus, in

1944, he began to discern the preparatory work needed to create an accurate report including

scientific and administrative work with proper credits, and hired Dr. Henry D. Smyth of Princeton

University.52 In its creation, Groves applied his security measures, as expected of the meticulous

general, and ensured, through having the scientists revise pertinent sections, that credit was given

where it was due. They felt this would satisfy the scientists and help ensure security.53 This

attention to detail again demonstrates Groves’s hyper-awareness of future consequences. With

each step he took, he did what he could to stop future problems and errors. Even before the

bombing at Hiroshima, Groves had a thousand copies of the report securely stowed in his office.54

Groves’s most important role was during the years leading up to the final event, the

bombing. He always knew that two bombs would be dropped and had no qualms about it. His job

was to save American lives, and he did. Coming into the project, he had to manage very intelligent

and often arrogant scientists who, as Oak Ridge worker Bill Wilcox put it, couldn’t “talk without

going to a blackboard and starting to write differential equations on the board and explaining how

you integrate them.”55 Groves entered the project without any knowledge of nuclear physics, yet

nevertheless had to try to understand what the problems and possible solutions were. He also had

to uphold his own duty and beliefs about the bomb during times of serious controversy among the

scientists. Even among the differing opinions of Groves’s likeability, there were never doubts

about his integrity. Scientist Emilio Segrè of Los Alamos, who had worked closely with Groves,

believed that,

52 Groves, Now, 248. 53 Ibid, 349. 54 Ibid. 55 Bill Wilcox as quoted in “Veterans Recollections: General Groves” from Atomic Heritage Foundation <www.atomicheritage.org>

21

Although no intellectual, Groves was endowed with integrity, courage, and a willingness to assume responsibilities and was able to recognize his own limitations. He recalls that although Groves had had no previous experience in dealing with scientists, Groves was not fascinated by the new vistas that continually opened and could keep his eye on the final goal; thus he obtained a decisive weapon at the earliest possible date.56

Even Sir James Chadwick, an English physicist, surprised Edward Teller, a theoretical physicist

who generally disliked Groves when,

He insisted that Groves was most conscientious, that in high councils it was Groves rather than scientists who pressed for development of the atomic bomb, that it was Groves who had obviated unnecessary delays, that [the] strong [American] international position was due to the efforts of Groves more than those of any other man, that he had given the United States a tremendous advantage… He was a man of his word. He could be trusted. When he said he would do something, it was done.57

Even though Groves had been against collaboration with Chadwick’s homeland, he still esteemed

Groves. Most agreed that Groves was, as one worker from Hanford pointed out, “very

understanding, and at all times a gentleman. He was stern, he was demanding, and like many other

great leaders, he was egotistical, to the point of being overbearing to some people.”58 However, he

was a military man first, as one wife reported that even in social settings, “He was strictly Army.

He had little regard for civilians.”59 Groves considered life simple. He was not there to chat and

maneuver the social and political scenes, but he simply wanted to complete the task he was

assigned.

Even his family was not an exception to this rule. Groves completely separated his home

and work lives, although his treatment of each differed little. He enjoyed more leisurely activities

at home, as he frequently played tennis with his daughter, yet demanded the same high standards.

Praise was rare, yet well-earned. For example, Richard Hulbert Groves had difficulty his first year 56 Marshall, 116. 57 Edward Teller. The Legacy of Hiroshima. (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1962), 32-33. 58 Robert W. Fulling as quoted in Sanger, S. L. Working on the Bomb: An Oral History of WWII Hanford. (Portland: Continuing Education, 1995), 85. 59 Betsy Stuart as quoted in Ibid, 170.

22

at Deerfield Academy because of poor preparation, as he had also moved around with his father

throughout childhood. When in his second year his grades finally began to improve, Groves,

according to his son, “smiled and told [him] that [he] had done well – one of the very few times

[he could] recall his saying so.”60

In the dropping of the bombs, Groves played a crucial role in determining locations as

leader of the Target Committee. He was in charge of making sure there were proper locations and

that the bombs would be effective, thus he had to determine at what height they needed to explode

and in what weather conditions. This part of the job was simply trying to orchestrate a successful

operation while appeasing the higher political figures and ending the war. The hardest parts were

already over.

Groves was also the main advocate of dropping two bombs versus one. He felt that the first

was to demonstrate power and the second would show that the United States could produce them

in quantity. His goal, through dropping both in quick successions, was to force an end to the war

without any hesitance to surrender on the part of the Japanese. However, Groves was not viewing

the issue from a humanitarian perspective, but rather a militaristic one; his goal was to end the war

as quickly as possible, with minimal loss of American lives. Although many scientists disagreed

with the use of the bomb, let alone two, many political figures sided with Groves.

Once the war ended, Groves helped transition the project to peacetime settings and

released many workers and scientists from their duty. There was also the issue of what to do with

atomic energy research. The Atomic Energy Commission took form but there was much debate

over how it would be run and especially by whom. Groves, characteristically, was in favor of

military rule but the scientists wanted civilian rule. Ultimately the commission was designated to

the charge of civilians.

60 Richard Hulbert Groves, War Stories, 215-216 as quoted in Norris, 349.

23

After the dropping of bombs and the transition of the project, Groves was not as needed

and his demanding leadership style was overall, incompatible with the atomic project.

Furthermore, due to the conflict of the Atomic Energy Commission, resentment among scientists

towards him had reached its peak, and even as he continued to be a part of the project, even

political figures began to view him as an obstacle to action rather than a catalyst for

accomplishment. Thus, Groves left to be vice president of research at Remington Rand, a

machines manufacturer, in Connecticut.

General Groves officially retired in 1961 at the age of 65. His memoir of the project was

published in 1962 and he continued to be involved with the press in the aftermath. He did an

interview with Joseph Ermenc, detailing his work before the Manhattan Project and some of his

work in it, and received one of three Atomic Pioneers Awards in 1970, along with Bush and

Conant, from President Nixon

For his exceptional contributions to the national security as Commanding General of the Manhattan Engineer District, United States Army, in developing the world's first nuclear weapons during World War II and for his pioneering efforts in establishing administrative patterns adopted by the Atomic Energy Commission in effecting the use of atomic energy for military and peaceful purposes.61

Leslie Groves died of a heart attack on July 13, 1970 at the age of 73. He left behind his

wife, Grace Wilson Groves, his son, Brigadier General Richard Groves, his daughter Gwen, then

Mrs. John A. Robinson, his brother Dr. Owen Groves, and seven grandchildren.

In reflecting on the Manhattan Project, Groves strongly believed in will and confidence, even

when chances were slim.

If you want victory there is no substitute for a will to win. Once it gets beyond a hand to hand operation there is no substitute for brains and experience. You need judgment and wisdom but those are developed

61 Seaborg, Glenn T, et al. "Remarks on Presenting the Atomic Pioneers Award." White House, Washington D.C. 27 Feb. 1970. The American Presidency Project. U of California Santa Barbara. 5 Apr. 2009

24

from these other things. But I think the most important is the will to win and confidence - you might say almost deliberately deceiving yourself as to the prospects for success.

I knew that immediately after I got into [the project], my chances for success were about 60 percent...Some...thought I'd been extremely optimistic. At no time from the time that I was designated and took over did I ever permit anyone in the organization to think that we weren't going to succeed. I never permitted myself to think so either.62

Groves applied this philosophy to the project and to his life. He also considered the

success was because of five aspects:

First, we had a clearly defined, unmistakable, specific objective...Second, each part of the project had a specific task. These tasks were carefully allocated and supervised so that the sum of their parts would result in the accomplishment of our over-all mission...Third, there was positive, clear-cut, unquestioned direction of the project at all levels. Authority was invariably delegated with responsibility.... Fourth, the project made a maximum use of already existing agencies, facilities, and services--governmental, industrial and academic... Fifth, and finally, we had the full backing of our government, combined with the nearly infinite potential of American science, engineering and industry, and an almost unlimited supply of people endowed with ingenuity and determination.63

In the scrutiny of Groves’s leadership successes and failures, as he fostered so much

dislike, it is important to remember that he was dealing with extraordinary circumstances and

unprecedented problems all during a war but with unlimited resources as well. He had to deal with

scientists. He had to try to establish security measures where there had previously been none while

tailoring them to the project because of its new, unique aspects. He had to establish new

administrative standards for such a large scale project and for handling atomic knowledge. Groves

was the bridge between the scientists and the military, the theory and the engineering, and the

possibility and the reality.

Today, General Leslie R. Groves’s style can be adopted for daily life and for large scale

projects. In everyday life, his philosophy on needing the will and confidence for success can be

62 Ermenc, 260. 63 Groves, Now, 414-415.

25

appreciated in high school up through the highest level of business. As for larger projects, his style

can be employed for military uses, but also for finding the necessary scientific solutions in today’s

world. Global warming, a concern facing industries and theoretical science, could benefit from this

sort of leadership. An initiative for greener technology using scientists from around the globe

would benefit from the same urgency that Groves instilled into the project. In addition, Groves’s

unique style, ideal for the Manhattan Project, within a repertoire of the great world leaders’ styles

can lead to a better understanding of what manner of management is needed for a particular

situation. Understanding his style will lead to better decisions about who to appoint as leaders in

politics, corporations, and organizations. Also, understanding what events in his life, the

circumstances of his childhood, and his personality, can lead to a better understanding of

leadership as a quality and better recruitment of leaders in the future. General Groves was a

critical member of the Manhattan Project who is often overlooked in literature on the time period

in favor of examining the science. Most of the scientists’ memoirs depict him as an intolerant and

inhibitive military officer and other accounts consider him just another military general who was a

part of the project. Though many of these books do recognize his achievements they also

emphasize the distaste of the scientists rather than looking at the reasoning behind it. Yet, without

his fervor and perseverance, without his essential leadership skills, World War II would have

lasted significantly longer and ended much differently.

26

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