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Crystal River Unit tree uses a system of incore neutron detectors ard acorpuNr to monitor Quadrant Ptwer Tilt aM other core parameters. TechnicalSpecifications require demonstration of incore detector system operability onceper week.

Plant personnel gathered data for demonstration of incore detector systemoperability on January 28, 1988. Se data was not evaluated until February 1,two days beyond the 'Ibchnical Specification surveillance wiMcu. We plant wasoperating at 98% of Pated Berml Power when the surveillance period wasexceeded.

Based on the evaluation of additional data gathertd on February 2, the incoredetector system was declared inoperable for Quadrant Ptwer Tilt calculations.Durirg further evaluation on February 4, engineers realized that inoperabilityshould have ocen declared January 28.

We delay in ccrpleting surveillance resulted frm procedural imdequacy Winadcquate implementation of Technical Specification surveillance requirements.Late ccupletion of the surveillance prevented timely declaration of incoresystem inoperability. ,7 9

1fA^'Plant procedures will be revised to clarify 'Ibchnical Specificationsurveillance requirenents regarding the ircore detector system. I

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Crystal River Unit %ree was operatire at 99% of Rated 'Ihermal Ibwer on January29, 1988. Instrumentation and Control technicians had calibrated the datarecorders (IG,XR) for the incore neutron detectors (IG,DUT) using plantprocedure SP-433, "In-core Neutron Detectors Channel Check."

In acklition to the instructions for data recorder calibration, SP-433 includesinstructions by which reactor ergineers determine ard document operability ofthe incore detector system. Determimtion of cperability is a 'IbchnicalSpecification surveillance requirenent. We surveillance requirement issatisfied by the portion of SP-433 performed by reactor engineers. Seprocedure is performed on a weekly basis.

Procedure SP-433 is written such that technicians are allowed to calibrate theincore detector data recorders independently of the determination of incoredetector system cperability. On many occasions technicians signed off SP-433as boirg satisfactorily ccupleted ard forwardcd the procedure to theSurveillance Pmgara Clerk before the reactor engineers detemintxi inwredetector system operability. On these occasions, reactor enginents obtaincdthe partially completed copy of SP-433 ard perfomed the operabilitydetemination before the proccdure was transmitted to files.

Procedure SP-433 was due to be ccupleted on January 29, 1988. Plant 'IbchnicalSpecifications allcw a one day grace period for ccepletion of SP-433. Sus,the promdure should have been ccepleted no later than January 30. Plantpersonnel gathered data r=wy for ccepletion of SP-433 on January 28.However, reactor cryineers did not evaluate the data until February 1. 'Iheplant was operating at 98% of Rated 'Ihermal Ptser khen the surveillance periodfor SP-433 was exceeded.

'Ihe incore neutron detector system at Crystal River Unit 'Ihree uses fifty twodetector strirgs. Each string contains seven self powered neutron detectors(SWD's) , one therromuple, and a background detector, Detector stringlocations are arranged in a spiral pattem that allows monitoring of every fuelassembly, w=hy symmetric flux distrihition between each core [AC) octant.'Ihe incore neutron detectors ard plant cceputer (ID,CW) are used to nonitorradial and axial flux distributions, Quadrant Power Tilt, pcher peakingfactors, ard core themal hydraulf c parameters.

Sixteen of the fifty two detector strings are arrarged in a pattern thatapproximates two concentric circles, containing eight detectors each, centeredabout the center fuel assembly. 'Ihe strirgs in each circle are spaced fortyfive degrees apart, in a radially symetric pattem. 'Ihese detectors, ccomonlycalled the "symetric detectors," are nomally used to monitor Quadrant PowerTilt. Plant Technical Specifications require that at least 75% of thesymnetric SWD's in each core quadrant be cperable in order to declare thesynnetric incore detector system operable for Quadrant Pther Tilt measurement.

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If the synrnetric incere detectors are declarcd inoperable for Quadrant PowrTilt ncasurement, tilt nust be measured usirg a different group of incoreinstruments, or ex-core nuclear instrunentation (IG,DE?r).

Se plant ocruputer program selects appropriate substitute detector inputsignals for inoperable SFND's. Signals khich fail lcw are removed frcracmputer scan, and substitute signals are selected fran other incore detectorstrirgs. he substitution scheme provides sufficiently accurate informationfor monitoring core parameters despite inoperability of scrne detectors. Due toerrors introduced by substitution of incore detector signals, limits areimposed on the allcwable numbers ard ccanbinations of inoperable SHID's.Different limits are established for different core parameters.

Upon initial data review on February 1, reactor engineers discovered eightinoperable symmetric incore detectors in one core quadrant. Sus, the systemdid not meet the requirement to have at least 75% of the symmetric detectorsoperable in each core quadrant. me inputs frcan one symetric string had beenautmatically removed and replaced by the plant ccrputer due to failcddetectors in the strirg. Initially, reactor engineers believed that the eighthSHID had been rtmoved frcan scan due to another surveillance test which was inprogress at the time. Since it is current plant practice not to declare asystem inoperable solely for surveillance testing, the incore detector systemwas not declared inoperable on February 1.

Reactor engineers obtained an additional set of incore detector data onFebruary 2. hhile reviewirg this data, reactor ergineers detemined that theeighth inoperable detector in the quadrant in question was renovcd fran scanfor reasons other than surveillance testing. E erefore, the symmetric inceredetectors were declared inoperable for Quadrant Power Tilt neasurenent.

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| Reactor engineers perfomed further review of the January 28 data on; February 4. Durirg this review, ergineers determined that the incore neutron

detector system shculd have been declared inoperable for Quadrant Power Tilt'

measurements on January 28, 1988.

A Nonconfomirg Operating Reporc documenting incore system inoperability wasi ccarpleted on February 11. Ehsed on review of the report, this event was

( detemined to be reportable por the requirements of 10CFR50.73 on February 12.he due date for this IER was based on the date the event was detemincd to be'

reportable.

CNEE OF EVENTl

Reactor ergineers were called upon by SP-433 to perfom the section of the'

pro dure which satisfies 'Ibchnical Specification surveillance requirements.Hcwever, the reactor ergineers ard 'Ibchnical Specification Coortlinator did notrealize the section of SP-433 perfomed by reactor engineers was the sectionkhich implemented 'Ibchnical Specification surveillance requirements.

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Additionally, the mster Surveillance Plan, which governs scheduling ofsurveillance procedures, did not notify the reactor ergineers when SP-433 wasdue to be perfonned. Instead, the plan notified only I&C perr m el. Iack ofnotification, cmbined with the practice of signing off SP-433 assatisfactorily cmpleted before determination of incore system operability,caused confusion concerning the inplementation of 'Ibchnical Specificationsurveillance requirements. 'Ihis cxanfusion prevented capletion of SP-433 byJanuary 30.

Iate cmpletion of SP-433 and the belief that sme SmD's were removed frmcxrputer scan due to surveillance testirg caused the delay in declaring theincore neutron detector system incperable for Quadrant Power Tilt mea trement.

. SAITIY CUSIIERATIONS(.

Plant operators used the symetric incore detectors for tilt irxiication for,

four days when the system should have been declared incperable. However,I

Quadrant Rw, r Tilt measured by ex-core instrumerts was also available to theoperators during the period when the symetric incere detectors should havebeen declared incperable. Tilt measurements frm incore and ex-coreinstruments were displayed next to one arother on a cap 2ter monitor in thecontrol roca. Quadrant Power Tilt, as measured by ex-core instruments did not

| exceed Technical Specification limits. 'Iherefore, this event did not raise anyI safety c:)ncerns,

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| As a result of this incident, plant personnel halted the practice of signingI off SP-433 as satisfactorily capleted before determination of incore detector

system operability. A forthowting revision of the Master Surveillance Planwill include notification of the reactor engineers khen SP-433 is due to beperformed. 'Ihe Surveillance Program Clerk has initiatcd a program to providethe reactor engineers written notification.

Procedure SP-433 will be revised to prevent recurrence of this event. 'Iheinstructions for determining and documenting operability of the incere detectorsystem will be removed frm SP-433 and incorporated into a new procedure.Responsibility for the new procedure will be assigned to the reactor engineersor to their imediate supervisor. Separation of reactor engineer ardtechnician responsibilities will eliminate confusion concerning implementationof the surveillan requirements for the inwre detector system.

WEVIOUS STMIIAR OCIURRENCES

Crystal River Unit 'Ihree has subnitted six previcus Licensee Event Reportsconcerning surveillance procedures that were not cmpleted within the timerequired by 'Ibchnical Specifications. (IER numbers 86-20, 86-12, 87-8, 87-12,87-14, and 87-29.)

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lbrch 14, 19883F0388-09

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory OcmnissionAttention: Document Cbntrol DeskWashiIqton, D. C. 20555

Subject: Crystal River Unit 3Docket No. 50-302Operating License No. DPR-72Licensee Event RepcIt No. 88-004-00

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (IIR) 88-004-00 which issubnitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73.

Should there be any questions, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

K. R. WilsonFunager, Nuclear LicensiIg

WLR:Inag

Enclosure

xc: Dr. J. Nelson GraceRegional Administrator, Region II

Mr. T. F. StetkaSenior Resident Inspector

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