LEGSL PROFESSION CASE DIGEST

8/3/2019 LEGSL PROFESSION CASE DIGEST

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RENATO L. CAYETANO, petitioner , vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R.SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE

in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.

PARTIES:Respondent Christian Monsod, was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the

position of Chairman of theCOMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commissionon Appointments on April 25, 1991. Cayetano, petitioner, opposed the nomination because

allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engagedin thepractice of law for at least ten years.

ISSUE:

Whether the appointment of Chairman Monsod of Comelec violates Section 1

(1), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution?

Whether respondent Christian Monsod has the qualification of having engaged in thepractice of law for ten years qualifying him to be the Chairman of Commission on Elections.

DECISION:

The petition is dismissed. Atty. Monsod possesses the qualification of having engaged inthe practice of law for at least ten years. Atty.Monsod’s past work experience includes being a

lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor. These are included as being in the

practice of law.

LEGAL PROVISIONS:

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, thatthe Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should eitherbe certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, ormembers of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at leastten years.



PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner , vs. CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in hiscapacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent .

PARTIES:

Philippine Lawyer's Association petitioner, filed a case for prohibition andinjunction against Celedonio Agrava,respondent, in his capacity as Director of thePhilippines Patent Office.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent may require the members of the Philippine Bar to submit to

an examination and pass the same before being permitted to appear and practice before thepatent office.

DECISION:

Respondent may not conduct and require members of the Philippine Bar to take andpass such examination to be able to practice before the patent office. Under the present law,members by the Philippine Bar authorized to practice law, in good standing, may practice theirprofession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said officeinvolves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law,

which lawyers are qualified to practice.

LEGAL PROVISION:

SEC. 78.Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the approval of theSecretary of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistentwith law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.



THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SIMPLICIOVILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant .

PARTIES:

the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva, defendant withthe Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Saidaccused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte.

ISSUE:

Whether Atty. Fule violated Section. 32 of Rule 127 now Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the RevisedRules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.

DECISION:

Fule was not actually engaged in private law practice. The word private practice of lawimplies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of thelegal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for acompensation, as a source of his livelihood or in the consideration of his said services. Theappearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in theprivate practice of law.

LEGAL PROVISIONS:

Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peacea party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by himfor that purpose, or with the aid of an Attorney.

Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the SolicitorGeneral, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice toclients.



JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant,ROMULO CUI, intervenor – appellant

PARTIES:

The office in contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili .Judgment was rendered on 27 April 1961 in favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealedto us by the defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui.

ISSUE:

Whether or not plaintiff is entitled to the office of the administrator against thedefendant.

DECISION:

No. Defendant is the rightful holder as administrator of Hospicio as he holds thequalification of being lawyer which is penned by the original owners of the Hospicio in theirdeed of donation. Even if defendant Antonio Cui was disbarred before, he was reinstated twoweeks before he assumed the position of administrator the Hospicio de Barili. “Titulo de

abogado” means a full fledged lawyer. It means not the mere possession of the academic

degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership of the bar after due admission thereto, qualifyingone for the practice of law. A bacherlor’s degree alone does not entitle its holder to exercise

the legal profession. When the defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions

and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.

LEGAL PROVISION:

Rule 138, such admission requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer’s

oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of court being his license to practice theprofession.



IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDING FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN

PARTIES:

The case at bar is a petition made by Attorney Almacen in his motion toSureender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title, in protest on his assertion that the Supreme

Court committed great injustice against his client.

ISSUE:

Whether Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen must surrender his Lawyer’s Certificate of Title.

DECISION:

Atty. Almacen is suspended from the practice of law until further orders. The suspension

is to take effect immediately.

LEGAL PROVISION:

The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general byRule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall statethe time and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the parties concerned at leastthree days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall beacted upon by the court without proof of such notice.



IN RE: ATTY. FELIZARDO M. DE GUZMAN, respondent .

PARTIES:

Lagrimas Lapatha, petitioner, filed a petition for relief of judgment against DeGuzman, respondent, by making it seem she confessed judgment where in fact shesought the aid of De Guzman as counsel for the postponement of that first hearing.

ISSUE:

Whether the petition for relief against respondent be approved.

DECISION:

This court said that it is quite elementary that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. To be made the basis suspension or disbarment of a lawyer,the charge against him must be established by convincing proof. The record must disclose asfree from doubt a case which compels exercise by this Court of its disciplinary powers. Thedubious character of the act done as well as of the motivation thereof must be clearlydemonstrated. Wherefore, this administrative complaint is dismissed and respondent, Atty.Felizardo M. de Guzman, is exonerated of the charge.

LEGAL PROVISION:

"An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of thecharges preferred against him until the contrary is proved, and as an officer of the court, that he has performed his duty in accordance with his oath. Thus,

the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow onlywhere there is a clear preponderance of evidence against a respondentattorney." (Moran, Revised Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., vol. 6, p. 243, citing In

re Tionko, 43 Phil. 191)



IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A.DIAO, vs. SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner .

PARTIES:

Telesforo A. Diao took the law examinations in 1953 and was admitted to the Bar.

Two years later, Severino Martinez charged Diao of falsifying the information in his applicationfor such Bar Examination. Upon further investigation, it was found that Diao did not finish his

high school training, and neither did he obtain his Associate in Arts (AA) degree fromQuisumbing College in 1941.

ISSUE:

Whether there is a ground to disbar Attorney Telesforo Diao.

DECISION:

It was held that Telesforo Diao’s name is removed from the roll of attorneys as he was

not qualified to take the Bar examinations and falsified information regarding his pre legaleducation for him to be able to take the examinations thus giving grounds to revoke his license.Passing the bar exams is not the only requirement to become an attorney at law; taking theprescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.

LEGAL PROVISION:

ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; ADMISSION TO BAR OBTAINED UNDER FALSE PRETENSES.— Admission to the Bar obtained under false pretenses must be revoked.



ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, PublicInformation Office, complainant , vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, respondent .

PARTIES:

Simbillo was charged for improper advertising and solicitation of legal services, filed byAssistant Court Administrator and Chief of Public Information Office, Atty. Ismael G, Khan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not AttySimbillo violated rule 2.03 and 3.01 of the code f of Professionalresponsibility and Rule 138 Sec. 27 of the Rules of Court.

DECISION:

Respondent Simbillo is guilty of violating rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility and Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of Court. He is suspended of the practice of law for one year. Respondent committed the acts complained of. A lawyer may not properlypublish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal orsociety program. Respondent did in this case thus the suspension.

LEGAL PROVISION:

Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designedprimarily to solicit legal business.

Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding hisqualifications or legal services.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27.Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. –

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the

Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moralturpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before theadmission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a partywithout authority to do so.



ELMER CANOY, complainant , vs. ATTY. JOSE MAX ORTIZ, respondent .

PARTIES:

Elmer Canoy, petitioner, filed a complaint with the Office of the Bar Confidant byaccusing Atty. Jose Max Ortiz of misconduct and malpractice. It was alleged that Canoy

filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against his former employer, Coca Cola BottlersPhilippines.

ISSUE:

Whether Atty. Ortiz is guilty of an extent of incompetence and being not diligent asrequired of him in catering for the legal needs of his client.

DECISION:

In the case at bar it was sustained that Respondent Atty. Ortiz is suspended fromthe practice of law for one month from notice with the warning of the same negligencewill be dealt with more severely. There are no good reasons that would justify a lawyervirtually abandoning the cause of the client in the midst of litigation without eveninforming the client of the fact or cause of desertion. That the lawyer forsook his legalpractice on account of what might be perceived as a higher calling, election to publicoffice, does not mitigate the dereliction of professional duty. Suspension from thepractice is the usual penalty, and there is no reason to deviate from the norm in thiscase.

LEGAL PROVISION:

CANON 18 –A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 –A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and hisnegligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 –A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shallrespond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.

CANON 22 –A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE ANDUPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Rule 22.02 – A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien,immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shallcooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including allinformation necessary for the proper handling of the matter.



BASILIO BORJA, SR.,petitioner, vs. SULYAP, INC. and the COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.

PARTIES:

The antecedent facts reveal that petitioner Basilio Borja, Sr., as lessor, andprivate respondent Sulyap Inc., as lessee, entered into a contract of lease involving aone-storey office building owned by the petitioner and located at 12th Street, NewManila, Quezon City. Pursuant to the lease, private respondent paid, among others,advance rentals, association dues and deposit for electrical and telephone expenses.Upon the expiration of their lease contract, private respondent demanded the return of the said advance rentals, dues and deposit but the petitioner refused to do so. Thus, onOctober 5, 1995, the former filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch80, a complaint for sum of money against the petitioner. Hence, private respondentfiled a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. The trial court, in its February 7,1996 order,8 granted the motion over the opposition9 of the petitioner. On February 20,1997, petitioner filed another motion praying for the quashal of the writ of executionand modification of the decision.11 This time, he contended that there was fraud in theexecution of the compromise agreement. He alleged that his former counsel, Atty.

Leonardo Cruz, who assisted him in entering into the said agreement, removed the pageof the genuine compromise agreement where he affixed his signature and fraudulentlyattached the same to the compromise agreement submitted to the court in order tomake it appear that he agreed to the penalty clause embodied therein. On appeal by thepetitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed the challenged order of the trialcourt.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner bound by the penalty clause in the compromiseagreement.

DECISION:

While a judicial compromise may be annulled or modified on the ground of vitiated consent or forgery,14 we find that the testimony of the petitioner failed toestablish the attendance of fraud in the instant case. Indeed, the testimony of Atty.Leonardo Cruz is worthy of belief and credence. We are inclined to believe that thepetitioner had knowledge of and consented to the penalty clause embodied in theagreement considering that the same is less burdensome than the automatic impositionof the penalty of P250,000.00 and attorney’s fees of P50,000.00 in case of violation of the terms of the agreement or default in payment. Moreover, we see nothing irregularin the compromise agreement approved by the trial court. No evidence was presented

by petitioner other than his bare allegation that his former counsel fraudulentlyattached the page of the genuine compromise agreement where he affixed his signature



to the compromise agreement submitted to the court. In effect, therefore, petitioneracknowledged the validity of the penalty clause.

Evidently, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the penaltyclause in the compromise agreement approved by the court. Even assuming that Atty.

Leonardo Cruz exceeded his authority in inserting the penalty clause, the status of thesaid clause is not void but merely voidable, i.e., capable of being ratified.17 Indeed,petitioner’s failure to question the inclusion of the 2% monthly interest and 25%

attorney’s fees in the judicial compromise despite several opportunities to do so was

tantamount to ratification. Hence, he is estopped from assailing the validity thereof.18

Finally, we find no merit in petitioner’s contention that the compromise

agreement should be annulled because Atty. Leonardo Cruz, who assisted him inentering into such agreement, was then an employee of the Quezon City government,

and is thus prohibited from engaging in the private practice of his profession. Suffice itto state that the isolated assistance provided by Atty. Cruz to the petitioner in entering

into a compromise agreement does not constitute a prohibited "private practice" of lawby a public official.

LEGAL PROVISIONS:

"Private practice" of a profession, specifically the law profession does not pertainto an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the samenature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.

19 Such wasnever established in the instant case.



LOTHAR SCHULZ, complainant , vs. ATTY. MARCELO G. FLORES, respondent .

PARTIES:

Lothar Schulz, a German national filed a verified complaint for disbarment

against Atty. Marcelo G. Flores of Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental.

ISSUE:

Whether Atty. Marcelo G. Flores violated Canons 17 and 18 by not not proecting

the interest of his client.

DECISION:

In lieu to the foregoing Provision, Atty. MARCELO G. FLORES is found guilty of

negligence and incompetence, and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a periodof six (6) months effective immediately. He is ordered to RETURN to complainant LotharSchulz the amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) with legal interest from thedate of promulgation of this Resolution, and all papers which came into his custody as aresult of having served as counsel for said complainant. Respondent is further sternlywarned that a commission of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt withmore severely.Respondent has fallen short of the competence and diligence required of every member of the Bar and his failure to uphold his duty to be competent and diligent

towards his client.

LEGAL PROVISIONS:

CANON 17. — A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HESHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18. — A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE

Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and hisnegligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

CANON 15. — A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND LOYALTY IN ALL HISDEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.

Rule 16.03. — A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of client when due or upondemand.



ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner , vs. HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, PresidingJudge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay

City, respondent .

PARTIES:Judge Rafael C. Climaco as respondent, denying the petition of Adelino H.

Ledesma to withdraw as counsel de oficio, on the grounds that with his apoointment asElection Registrar by the Commission on Elections, making him unable to be in a

position to devte full time to be the defense of the accused.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the order of the respondent judged in denying the motion of thepetitioner is a grave abuse of discretion.

DECISION:

It was held that Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty required of the legal profession. He ought to have known thatmembership in the bar is burdened with conditions. The legal profession is dedicated tothe ideal of service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be required to act as counselde oficio to aid in the performance of the administration of justice. The fact that such

services are rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal.Thus is mademanifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused.

Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw ascounsel de oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the taskentrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility as anelection registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be availed now. Thereis not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time.It may likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forth above, that petitionerwould exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel withcompetence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain amember of the profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for thoseenrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them,when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self -interest.

LEGAL PROVISIONS:

Section 32 Rule 127 of the Rules of Court [Section 35 of Rule 138 of the RevisedRules of Court - The only attorneys who cannot practice law by reason of their office areJudges, or other officials or employees of the superior courts or the office of theSolicitor General.



CARLOS B. REYES, complainant , vs. ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN, respondent .

PARTIES:

Carlos B. Reyes filed a case against Attorney Jeremias R. Vitan, Respondent, for taking

no action to the Complainant’s case after being sought and paid for Counsel.

ISSUE:

Whether Attorney Jeremias R. Vitan violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by

gross negligence.

DECISION:

It was held that Respondent Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan is guilty of violation of Canon

18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility wherein he was unable to uphold his task as alawyer and not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connectiontherewith shall render him liable. For it, he is suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective upon notice of this Decision. He is ordered to return to complainantwithin five (5) days from notice the sum of P17,000.00 with interest of 12% per annum from thedate of the promulgation of this Decision until the full amount shall have been returned.

LEGAL PROVISION:

Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall

serve his client with competence and diligence. More specifically, Rule 18.03 states:

Rule 18.03.A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligencein connection therewith shall render him liable.

A member of the legal profession owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest,warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights. An attorney is expected to exert hisbest efforts and ability to preserve his client's cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to hisclient likewise serves the ends of justice. Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law carrieswith it the corresponding duties, not only to the client, but also to the court, to the bar and tothe public.



Spouses FRANKLIN and LOURDES OLBES, complainants, vs. Atty. VICTOR V.DECIEMBRE,respondent .

PARTIES:

Respondent, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre was given five blank checks by SpousesOlbes for security of a loan. After the loan was paid and a receipt issued, Atty.

Deciembre filled up four of the five checks for P50, 000 with different maturity date. Allchecks were dishonored. Hence, prompting Atty. Deciembre to petition a case for estafaagainst the spouses Olbes. Thus, the spouses Olbes opted to file a disbarment caseagainst Atty. Deciembre with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court.

ISSUES:

Whether Attorney Victor V. Deciembre’s suspension was in accordance to theProvision of the Law.

DECISION:

In the case at bar, it is evident that membership in the legal profession is aspecial privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed upon individuals who are notonly learned in the law, but also known to possess good moral character. “A lawyer is an

oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexiblenorms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest fortruth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader.” By taking the

lawyer’s oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an

indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice. Lawyersshould act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyondreproach, in order to promote the public’s faith in the legal profession. It is also glaringly

clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously transgressed by hismalevolent act of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts that had not beenagreed upon at all and despite respondent’s full knowledge that the loan supposed to

be secured by the checks had already been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a

commercial document, resorted to for his material gain.

Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices thatare disgraceful and dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of thelegal profession are not satisfied by conduct that merely enables one to escape thepenalties of criminal laws. Considering the depravity of the offense committed byrespondent, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP of suspension for two yearsfrom the practice of law to be too mild. His propensity for employing deceit and



misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to thedetention of one petitioner is loathsome. Thus, he is sentenced suspended indefinitelyfrom the practice of law effective immediately.

LEGAL PROVISION:The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates the following:

"Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promoterespect for law and legal processes.

"Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession andsupport the activities of the Integrated Bar.

"Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practicelaw, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to thediscredit of the legal profession."



MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ, petitioners, vs.HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents.

PARTIES:The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels for the

petitioners, while submitting to the judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration of thedecision in so far as it reflects adversely upon their "professional conduct" and condemns them

to pay the treble costs adjudged against their clients.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A.N. Bolinao, Jr. shall pay jointly and

severally the treble costs assessed against the petitioners, which shall be paid by their counsel.

DECISION:

A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause mustbe encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer'sinsistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.

It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagariesof the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause isdefenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, ratherthan traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client,and temper his client's propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is

superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.

The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several counsel in this case but theparticipation of each counsel was rather limited implying that the decision of this Courtordering that "treble costs are assessed against the petitioners, which shall be paid by theircounsel" is not clear. The word "counsel" may be either singular or plural in construction, sothat when we said "counsel" we meant the counsels on record of the petitioners who wereresponsible for the inordinate delay in the execution of the final judgment in the basic civil case39407, after the Court of Appeals had rendered its aforementioned decision of November 15,1962. And it is on record that the movants are such counsels. Atty. Bolinas, upon his ownadmission, "entered his appearance in the case at bar about the time the Court of First Instanceof Manila dismissed the petitioners' Petition for Relief in Civil Case No. 39407," or about August3, 1961 and even prior to the Court of Appeals decision above-mentioned. Atty. Baizas claimsthat he "became petitioners' counsel only in October, 1963 when he filed, with Atty. A.N.Bolinao, Jr. Civil Case No. 55292 before the Court of First Instance of Manila presided by the

Hon. Judge Alikpala although it appears on record that the urgent motion to recall writ of execution filed by Mrs. Perez in the basic civil case 39407 on September 3, 1963, was over the



signature of one Ruby Zaida of the law firm of "Crispin Baizas & Associates" as counsel for Mrs.Perez. It is to be recalled that the said urgent motion is the same motion discussed above,which, curiously enough, antedated by at least one month the lifting of the writ of preliminaryinjunction issued in civil case 7532.

ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration is denied. Our decision of May 22,1968 is hereby modified in the sense that Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A.N. Bolinao, Jr. shall pay jointly and severally the treble costs assessed against the petitioners.

LEGAL PROVISIONS:

A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause mustbe encouraged and is to be commended.

It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies andvagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is

defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, ratherthan traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client,and temper his client's propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice issuperior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.



THE PFOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellant,vs.

EUSTACIO DE LUNA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

PARTIES:

Defendants Eustacio de Luna, Jaime P. Marco, Santos L. Parina, Estela R. Gordo, AngeloT. Lopez, Generosa H. Hubilla Oreste Arellano y Rodriguez, Abraham C. Calaguas, Roque J.Briones, Alawadin T. Bandon, Balbino P. Fajardo, Maria Velez y Estrellas and Emilio P. Jardinico,

Jr., are charged. It is alleged in said amended informations that, on or about the 22nd day of December, 1954, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the person accused in each one Of thesecases well knowing that he has not passed the bar examination and was not in any wayauthorized to take his oath as a lawyer and after haing been duly informed and notified thatcertain portions of Republic Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, areunconstitutional and therefore void and without force and effect, and that all the petitions of the candidates including the accused who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952, inclusive,for admission to the bar were refused and denied by the Resolution of the Honorable, theSupreme Court, promulgated on March 18, 1954, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully andcontemptously disobey and resist in an insolent and defiant manner the said Resolution of theSupreme Court directed to him and each and everyone of the petitioners, and perform actsconstituting improper conduct and manifestations that tend directly or indirectly to impede,obstruct or degrade the administration of justice in all courts of the Philippines and impair therespect to and attack the authority and dignity of the Honorable, the Supreme Court and all

other inferior courts by then and there, without being lawfully authorized to do so, taking anoath as a lawyer before a notary public and making manifestations to that effect before theHonorable, the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not each and everyone of the petitioners performed acts constitutingimproper conduct and manifestations that tend directly and indirectly to impede, obstruct ordegrade the administration of justice

DECISION:

It appearing that the persons mentioned, except Capitulo, Gefredo, and Sugarol, havenot passed the examinations, it was resolved:

A. To refer the matter to the Fiscal, City of Manila for investigation and appropriate action inconnection with Section 3 (e), Rule 64;



B. As Pedro Ayuda has assumed to be an attorney without authority, he is given 10 days fromnotice thereof, within which to explain why he should not be dealt with for contempt of theCourt;

C. The notary public Anatolio A. Alcoba, member of the Bar, who has illegally administered theoath to the said persons in disregard of this Court's resolution denying them admission to theBar (except Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol), is hereby given ten days to show cause why heshould not be disbarred or suspended from the pratice of law;

D. The clerk of Court is directed to furnish copy of this resolution to the Court of Appeals and to

all courts of first instance, the Court of Industrial Relations, the Public Service Commission, andthe Department of Justice;

E. As to Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol, proper action will be taken later in their respectivecases. (pp. 36-37, rec., G.R. No. L-10245.)

It is clear, from the foregoing resolution, that this Court did not intend to exercise itsconcurrent jurisdiction over the acts of alleged contempt committed by appellees herein and

that we preferred that the corresponding action be taken by the City Fiscal of Manila in theCourt of First Instance of Manila. In fine, the latter had no jurisdiction over the cases at the bar.

LEGAL PROVISIONS:

Section 3, subdivision (b), Rule 64, of the Rules of Court: A criminal action is one bywhich the State prosecutes a person for an act or omission punishable by law.



LESLIE UI, complainant , vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent .

PARTIES:

Leslie Ui, petioner, filed a case for the disbarment of Attorney Iris Bonifacio,

respondent on the ground that the latter is having an immoral relationship with theformer’s husband.

ISSUE:

Whether Attorney Iris Bonifacio is culpable of misconduct through grossimmorality as a ground for disbarment.

DECISION:

In summary, this leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent wasimprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that herrelationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a validmarriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that showsindifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectablemembers of the community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action,the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as toconstitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.

We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not onlyrequired to refrain from adulterous relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as

to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moralstandards." Respondent's act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upondiscovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and provesthat she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legalprofession. Complainant's bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all,the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise itsdisciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactoryevidence. This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.

On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent toher Answer, we find improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely

relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui.For an event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recallthe date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially alawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it

is contrary to human experience and highly improbable.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the higheststandards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less.



Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds andacts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demandno less than the highest degree of morality. LexLib

The complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for allegedimmorality, is deemed without merit and was dismissed.

LEGAL PROVISIONS:

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; PRACTICE OF LAW; A PRIVILEGE. — The practice of law is aprivilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal professionsimply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to themandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics.

REQUISITES FOR ADMISSION. — The requisites for admission to the practice of law are:a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines; b. a resident thereof; c. at least twenty-one (21) years

of age; d. a person of good moral character ; e. he must show that no charges against himinvolving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in court; f. possess the required educationalqualifications; and g. pass the bar examinations. AEDCHc

POSSESSION OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER MUST BE CONTINUOUS. — Clear from theforegoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant mustpossess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral character must becontinuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, theloss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has been held — "If good moralcharacter is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good

moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession.

Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character.(Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865). A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, orby reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude." A member of the bar shouldhave moral integrity in addition to professional probity. It is difficult to state with precision andto fix an inflexible standard as what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moraldelinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of thebar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-lacedmay not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been definedas "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows moral indifference tothe opinion of the good and respectable members of the community."

LAWYERS MUST HANDLE THEIR PERSONAL AFFAIRS WITH GREAT CAUTION. — Perhapsmorality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be before. Thispermissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher

degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution.



FLORA NARIDO, Complainant, vs. ATTORNEY JAIME S. LINSANGAN, Respondent.

PARTIES:

The case involves two administrative cases wherein respondents Jaime S.

Linsangan and Rufino B. Risma, who represented adverse parties in a workmen'scompensation case, did mutually hurl accusation at each other. The charge againstrespondent Linsangan filed by a certain Flora Narido is that he violated the attorney'soath by submitting a perjured statement. When required to answer, not only did he

deny the complaint but he would also hold respondent Risma accountable for havinginstigated his client, the complainant, Flora Narido, to file a false and maliciouscomplaint resulting in what respondent Linsangan called "embarrassment, humiliationand defamation" of a brother in a profession.

ISSUE:Whether or not Narido violated the lawyer’s oath by allegedly submitting to the

Court a perjures statement.

DECISION:

There was no showing of respondent having violated his attorney's oath forsubmitting a perjured affidavit. Thus the report continues: "With respect to the other

allegations in the affidavit, suffice it to say that there is no evidence showing Atty.Linsangan's awareness of the falsity thereof, assuming arguendo that they are indeed

false. As testified by Atty. Linsangan he has no intention whatsoever of misleading anycourt or judicial body, or of violating his attorney's oath." The two respondents wouldbe well-advised to heed these words from Justice Laurel, announced in Javier v. Cornejo:4 "It should be observed, in this connection, that mutual bickering and unjustifiablerecriminations, between brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the legalprofession and will not receive any sympathy from this court." , the complaint inAdministrative Case No. 944 against respondent Jaime S. Linsangan is dismissed for lackof merit. Respondent Rufino B. Risma in Administrative Case No. 1025 is exculpatedfrom the charge of having instigated the filing of an unfounded suit. He is, however,admonished to exercise greater care in ascertaining how much under our law he couldrecover by way of attorney's fees. The contract entered into between him and his clientas to his being entitled to fifteen per cent of the award granted her in a workmen'scompensation suit is declared to be of no force and effect, the penalty imposed beingthat of admonition merely only because he had made no effort to collect on the same

and had even advanced expenses for a poor client. Let a copy of this resolution bespread on the records of both respondents.



CASIANO U. LAPUT, complainant , vs. FRANCISCO E.F. REMOTIGUE, respondent .

PARTIES:

Laput, complainant filed a case against Attorney Remotigue for malice, bad faith

and misrepresentation when the latter allegedly filed motions in court without notice tocomplainant, thereby committing unfair and unethical practices bordering ondishonesty, all to the prejudice of said complainant.

ISSUE:

Whether Attorney Francisco Remotigue and Attorney Attorney Patalinghug areliable to unethical and unprofessional conduct in soliciting cases.

DECISION:It was held that from the foregoing provision that respondent did not act with malice or badfaith. Hence, the recommendation of the Solicitor General for respondent's completeexoneration should be, as it hereby, is approved. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found noirregularity in the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug as counselor Mrs. Barrera; and there was noactual grabbing of a case from petitioner becauseAtty.Patalinghug's professional services were contracted by the widow. Besides, thepetitioner'svoluntary withdrawal on 5 Feb. 1955, and his filing almost simultaneously of a

motion for thepayment of his attorney's fees, amounted to consent to the appearance of Atty.Patalinghug ascounsel for the widow. It was likewise

held that respondent Atty. Remotigue was also not guilty of unprofessionalconduct in as muchas he entered his appearance, dated 5 Feb. 1955, only on 7 February 1955,after Mrs. Barrerahad dispensed with petitioner's professional services, and after petitioner had voluntarilywithdrawn his appearance. As to Atty. Patalinghug’s preparation of documents revoking the

petitioner’s power of Attorney, the Solicitor General found that the same does not appear to beprompted by malice or intended to hurt petitioner's feelings, but purely to safeguardthe interest of the administrator. The case was demmed dismissed and closed for nosufficient evidence submitted to sustain the charges.

LEGAL PROVISION:

LEGSL PROFESSION CASE DIGEST

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