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Rebuilding Lego, Brick by Brick by Keith Oliver, Edouard Samakh, and Peter Heckmann from strategy+business issue 48, Autumn 2007 reprint number 07306 © 2007 Booz Allen Hamilton Inc. All rights reserved. strategy +business Reprint

Transcript of Lego Brick by Brick

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Rebuilding Lego, Brick by Brickby Keith Oliver, Edouard Samakh, and Peter Heckmann

from strategy+business issue48, Autumn 2007 reprint number 07306

© 2007 Booz Allen Hamilton Inc. All rights reserved.

strategy+business

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Lego

artby

SeanKen

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tographs

byMatthew

Septimus

by Keith Oliver, Edouard Samakh,and Peter Heckmann

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How a supply chain transformationhelped put the beloved toymaker

back together again.

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n the surface, the LegoGroup didn’t look as if it was introuble. The fourth-largest toy-maker in the world at the time(today it is fifth-largest), theLego Group sold €1 billion(US$1.35 billion) worth of toys

in 2004, ranging from its snap-together bricks for youngchildren to Mindstorms, a line of do-it-yourself robotkits for older kids. Even in the digital age, its toys main-tained a surprisingly firm grip on the market andseemed to adapt well to changing tastes. The company’ssteady stream of new products routinely generatedthree-quarters of its yearly sales. Popular enthusiasm wasso great that in 2000, the British Association of ToyRetailers joined Fortune magazine in naming the com-pany’s classic bricks “the toy of the century.”

But the Lego Group’s financial performance toldanother story. Despite its extraordinary hold on theimagination of children around the world, the Billund,Denmark, company was in trouble. The Lego Grouphad lost money four out of the seven years from 1998through 2004. Sales dropped 30 percent in 2003 and 10percent more in 2004, when profit margins stood at –30percent. Lego Group executives estimated that the com-pany was destroying €250,000 ($337,000) in valueevery day.

How could such a seemingly successful toymakerlose that much money? Some observers speculated thatthe Lego Group had overdiversified its product line withmoves into such areas as apparel and theme parks.Others blamed the exploding popularity of video gamesor pressure from low-cost producers in China.

Although there was some truth in these hypotheses,

Keith Oliver([email protected]) is asenior vice president in BoozAllen Hamilton’s Londonoffice. He previously headedthe firm’s work in globaloperations and has specializedin supply chain managementfor more than 40 years.

Edouard Samakh([email protected])is a principal in Booz Allen’sLondon office. His workfocuses on operationsstrategy, restructuring, andsupply chain management.

Peter Heckmann([email protected])is a vice president in BoozAllen’s Düsseldorf office. Heleads the firm’s Europeanoperations and specializes inprocurement and supply chainmanagement.

Editor’s Note:The LEGO Group spells itstrademarked brand nameand its company name inuppercase letters. We havefollowed standard editorialstyle for company names thatare not acronyms, and capital-ized only the first letter.

Also contributing to this articlewas Booz Allen HamiltonSenior Associate GeorginaGrenon.

many other factors impeded the success of the iconicglobal brand, including its innovation capabilities andits supply chain. The company leadership knew it had toaddress those problems, and that the supply chain posedthe most immediate opportunity for improvement. TheLego Group’s supply chain was at least 10 years out ofdate. Poor customer service and spotty availability ofproducts were eroding the company’s franchise in keymarkets. Speedy attention to the supply chain, the lead-ers reasoned, would not only buy them time to deal withthe other challenges, but could help set in motion a vir-tuous circle of improvements that would support subse-quent changes in the rest of the company.

And it would address head-on one of the company’smost pressing challenges. Having established itself in anera when supply chain management was a matter ofmoving boxes from here to there, the Lego Group hadmissed a sea change as retail giants like Wal-Mart andCarrefour gained dominance. The company’s supplychain was geared for custom delivery to the smallerretailers that had owned the toy market in the 1950swhen its bricks first became popular. For nearly sixdecades, this way of doing business had served the com-pany very well — and then the system started to fail. Inthe 1990s, as competitors focused on regearing for thebig-box stores, the Lego Group considered its primarychallenge to be brand building — despite the fact thatits bricks were already among the most recognized toysin the world. By the end of that decade, most of theLego Group had lost ground to companies that operat-ed with much greater sophistication, companies thatanalyzed and optimized every cost driver to provide just-in-time service to the behemoths. (U.S. operations werea notable exception to this problem.)

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To rebuild profitability, the company had to refash-ion every aspect of its supply chain. That meant elimi-nating inefficiencies, aligning its innovation capacitywith the market, and re-gearing to compete in the newbig-box world. This was no small matter for the LegoGroup, which by the time CEO Jorgen Vig Knudstorptook the helm in 2004, had grown to roughly 7,300employees, working mostly in two factories and threepackaging centers — each in a different country —turning out more than 10,000 permutations of its prod-ucts packaged in hundreds of configurations.

The company’s leadership team recognized thateven though transformation would be painful, it wasimperative. “From my perspective, the supply chain isa company’s circulation system,” says Knudstorp. “Youhave to fix it to keep the blood flowing.”

Diagnosing the ProblemThe symptoms of a dangerously misaligned supplychain can be deceptive. At the Lego Group, for instance,it took many years of underperformance before thecompany realized that the supply chain was a majorsource of its difficulties. What made those problemsespecially hard to identify was that they grew out of thecompany’s core strengths: its capacity for innovation andits commitment to quality. Those were the very advan-tages that the company’s leaders had relied on at first toreverse the profitless streak, hoping the company couldinnovate its way out of trouble. From the mid-1990sthrough 2004, the Lego Group moved into videogames, TV programs, and retail stores. But the diversifi-cation added layers of complexity, and the red ink con-tinued to flow.

In 2004, the family that had founded and run the

Lego Group knew they had to change direction. Thethen CEO Kjeld Kirk Kristiansen, grandson of the car-penter who had launched the company in 1932 and cre-ated the first snap-together Lego bricks in 1949, con-vened the leadership team to chart a new course. Themeasures they considered were radical, and to executethem, the Kristiansen family turned to an outsider.Kristiansen had been CEO for 25 years when he steppedaside in October 2004 for Knudstorp, then 34, a one-time management consultant who had joined the com-pany in 2001 as a director of strategic development.

With the mandate for change clear, Knudstorpspent his first weeks as CEO working closely withKristiansen and the other members of the board and theleadership team to pinpoint the source of the company’sproblems. Was the Lego Group too diversified? Yes, butfocus alone was unlikely to be the silver bullet. Werecosts an issue? Absolutely, but they were just one aspectof an array of challenges, including service, so a stand-alone cost play was unlikely to succeed. Had the com-pany lost touch with the video game–obsessed consumermarket? That hypothesis withered in the face of a simplefact: Three-quarters of the Lego Group’s sales every yearwere from new, mostly nonelectronic products. “Ibelieve that the focus on electronic competition wasreally a blame game,” Knudstorp says.

Instead, as Knudstorp and his team examined everyfacet of the company’s operations, they came to focus onthe supply chain. They approached it holistically, ana-lyzing every aspect of the company’s product develop-ment, sourcing, manufacturing, and distribution.

Product Development.Given the success of the LegoGroup’s steady stream of innovative new offerings overthe years, the “Kitchen,” the company’s product devel-

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opment lab, was a point of corporate pride. But the lead-ership team found that new products were deliveringless and less profit. Each successive generation of offer-ings added more complexity. Plastic bricks and otherelements that were once available only in primary colors,plus black and white, now came in more than 100 hues.A far cry from the simple box of bricks that babyboomers grew up with, Lego sets had grown much moreelaborate: A pirate kit included eight pirates with 10types of legs in different attire and positions.

Such intricacy and attention to detail reflected thefirm’s culture of craftsmanship, but also its disregard forthe costs of innovation. The company designers weredreaming up new toys without factoring in the price ofmaterials or the costs of production. That kind of care-free creativity is unsustainable in the current global toymarket, where cost pressures are a constant concern.

Furthermore, introducing new products every yearis not necessarily a bad thing, but the Lego Group didnot align its supply chain with that business strategy.Just 30 products generated 80 percent of sales, whiletwo-thirds of the company’s 1,500-plus stock keepingunits (SKUs) were items that it no longer manufactured.And the number of SKUs multiplied every year, increas-ing that backlog.

Sourcing. The Lego Group dealt with an astonish-ing array of suppliers, more than 11,000 in all. That’snearly twice as many suppliers as Boeing uses to build itsairplanes. The numbers had crept up gradually over theyears, as product developers sought new materials. Eachengineer had his or her own favorite vendors, and thecompany’s lack of procurement compliance proceduresallowed the engineers to form ad hoc relationships withsuppliers — a practice that grew more problematic as

the group expanded into new businesses.These sourcing practices led to incredible waste. A

new design might call for a unique material, such as aspecially colored resin, that sold in three-ton lots. Itmight take just a few kilos of the substance to producethe new toy, but the company would be stuck with€10,000 ($13,500) worth of resin it would never need.Ordering so many specialized products at irregular inter-vals from a large number of vendors left the LegoGroup’s procurement staff powerless to leverage thecompany’s scale in dealing with suppliers.

Manufacturing. As was the case with sourcing, theLego Group gained limited advantage from its scale inthe way it organized its production facilities. The com-pany ran one of the largest injection-molding operationsin the world, with more than 800 machines, in itsDanish factory, yet the production teams operated ashundreds of independent toy shops. The teams placedtheir orders haphazardly and changed them frequently,preventing operations from piecing together a reliablepicture of demand needs, supply capabilities, and inven-tory levels. This murkiness led to overall capacity uti-lization of just 70 percent.

In such a fragmented system, long-term planningcan be exceptionally difficult. Day-to-day operationswere often chaotic. Operators routinely responded tolast-minute demands, readily implementing costlychangeovers. That the Lego Group’s production siteswere located in such high-cost countries as Denmark,Switzerland, and the United States put the company ata further disadvantage.

Distribution. The Lego Group paid as much atten-tion to the thousands of stores that together generatedonly one-third of its revenue as it did the 200 larger

The number of suppliers had graduallycrept up to 11,000 — nearly twice as many as

Boeing uses to build its airplanes.

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chains that accounted for the other two-thirds. Withoutclearly defined service policies, the company spent a dis-proportionate amount of time and effort serving smallshops, which drove up the costs of fulfillment substan-tially. Sixty-seven percent of all orders consisted of lessthan a full carton — an incredibly costly propositionthat demands labor-intensive “pick-packing” at the dis-tribution center. In addition, to serve its many small cus-tomers, the Lego Group had developed a multiple-tierinventory system with local centers; it was very difficultto position the right product in the right distributioncenter, a challenge that contributed to missed sales andhigh inventory levels.

Making Change ClickTo drive the transformation, Knudstorp gathered adiverse group of senior executives and managers to takea two-track approach. The leadership team developedthe strategy, while the larger group of planners and rep-resentatives from sales, logistics, IT, and manufacturingcoordinated change at the operational level.

The leadership set up a war room where the opera-tional team gathered every day to work out such nitty-gritty decisions as what toys to make, how tasks shouldbe prioritized, and how to deal with obstacles. Teammembers tracked the progress of key initiatives, resolvedbottlenecks as they arose, and settled a variety of issues.Assigning clear responsibility in this way avoided the all-too-human tendency in organizations to point fingersrather than solve problems.

The team drew up hundreds of lists tracking back-logged items, delivery glitches, and inventory levels,among other concerns, on white boards around theroom, and at any given time over the next year, 30 to 40

people gathered to hash out plans. Knudstorp wouldoften visit the war room, quizzing managers when hesaw that an item had not been resolved since his lastvisit. “This is still here?” he would ask. The magnitudeof the work was so daunting and the pressure to finishby year’s end so intense that at one point someone jokedthat everything would work out just fine, provided theymove Christmas to the second week of January.

espite the urgency, executives paidreal attention to detail. They tookcare to set clear priorities, limitthe scope of individual projects,and monitor progress closely.Each team worked out its cross-functional plans through lengthy

workshops. The process started with an examination ofone aspect of the company’s supply chain complexityand an analysis of its impact on productivity, planning,and control. These analytics were particularly useful inframing the case for transformation in the face of expect-ed resistance. Using a hypothesis-driven approach, theteam would debate how to change and improve process-es. Once they’d agreed on a plan of attack, the teamswould change direction only if the original hypothesisproved faulty— a tactic that teammembers say kept thewhole process on track.

The leadership team also allotted time to consensusbuilding. They knew that management by decree wouldnever work well in a close-knit, family-owned company.The executives understood that, for the initiatives tostand any chance of success, the Lego Group needed topreserve the loyalty of its workforce, even as the moveto a more global supply chain did away with many jobs.

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The most respectful way to navigate through this transi-tion, they reasoned, was to adopt a strategy of completetransparency. The team shared and debated the realitiesof the situation with the total workforce early in theprocess and consulted with them throughout in puttingtogether the painful plans to address redundancy. (TheLego Group has also moved its U.S. plants to Mexico insearch of labor cost savings and market proximity.) Yetas slow-footed as that process sometimes seemed at thetime, working through it had an important benefit:When the teams finally reached a consensus, the deci-sion stuck.

In tandem with the planning and consultativeprocesses, the leadership ordered a pilot programdesigned to make sourcing more strategic. At its helmthey placed Chief Financial Officer Jesper Ovesen —a clear signal that this initiative was of the utmostimportance. Ovesen’s team believed that rationalizingthe cost of the company’s materials would be one of theeasier parts of the transformation and would yield sav-ings immediately. Not coincidentally, the initiative wentright to the heart of the Lego Group’s innovation capa-bility: the resins that gave the bricks their distinctivecolors. If it succeeded, the pilot would do more thansave money. It would demonstrate that the Lego Groupreally could change.

The price of colored resins, always a major expendi-ture for the company, was highly volatile. The sourcingteam analyzed the prices of the raw materials andworked with a narrowed roster of suppliers to stabilizepricing. The resulting contracts made production mucheasier to plan. More importantly, the success of thesourcing project created a sense of optimism and themomentum to move ahead with other changes. At

each cost center along the supply chain, the transitionteam applied its new insight: Constraints don’t destroycreativity or product excellence, and they can evenenhance them.

Indeed, the idea of implementing new constraintscould now help the company build on its establishedstrengths. The Lego Group motto is “Only the best isgood enough,” and the company name derives from theDanish words Leg godt, meaning “play well.” The driveto innovate was deeply embedded in the corporate cul-ture. In the early years, this idea had helped the com-pany develop its brand and instill pride in its employees.But after a time, it had come to be seen as a mandate tocreate new toys at any cost. In Knudstorp’s view, the per-ceived mandate had evolved into a crutch. “This ideahad become an emotional concept and an excuse tooppose new cost-saving initiatives,” he says. “Anytimethere was something someone didn’t want to do, theywould say, ‘You cannot do that because of quality.’”

ut Mads Nipper, the company’schief of product innovation, workedclosely with Bali Padda, who over-sees the supply chain, to devise aseries of day-to-day solutions to theparadox of constraints. Nipper andPadda recommended slicing the

palette of roughly 100 colors in half. They also recom-mended cutting back on the thousands of differentpolice officers, pirates, and other figures in production.The team took a deliberate approach, building on theresin-sourcing work to analyze the true costs of each ele-ment and identify those whose costs were out of linewith the rest of the stock. This initiative, coupled with

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the resin pilot, helped the Lego Group cut its resin costsin half and shrink its supplier roster by 80 percent.

At the same time, the operational team put aprocess in place to help designers make more cost-effective choices. Team members devised basic rulesregarding the creation of new colors and shapes andspelled out the requirements for ordering new materials.They also created a cost matrix, clearly showing the priceassociated with each change. Once the costs of innova-tion were clear, designers were urged to use existing ele-ments in new ways, rather than devise new elementsrequiring new molds and colors. The initiative encour-aged the designers to think in terms of price trade-offswhen they were developing a new item: Yes, you can givesparkling amber eyes to your new Bionicle space alienaction figure, but it may limit your choices on its claws.

Cost transparency gave developers a new way todefine their achievement. “The best cooks are not theones who have all the ingredients in front of them.They’re the ones who go into whatever kitchen andwork with whatever they have,” wrote a senior managerin a memo to the Lego Group’s own Kitchen. Thedesigners seemed to take those words to heart. Theproduct development group “initially saw reducingcomplexity as pure pain,” says Knudstorp, “but gradual-ly they realized that what they had seen at first as a newset of constraints could in fact enable them to becomeeven more creative.”

The evolution of the design team’s thinking re-affirmed for Knudstorp an idea he has long held aboutthe importance of looking at business issues holistically.“I think one of the big mistakes companies often makein this kind of initiative is approaching the supply chainas one topic, innovation as another, product quality as

a third. The better way to think about it is that allthese issues are connected,” he says. “Innovation is alsoa supply chain issue, and sometimes the supply chaincan provide ideas for consumer- or customer-driveninnovation.”

Approaching the Value Chain HolisticallyCutting the number of elements and colors in produc-tion made it easier to take the next step — rationalizingproduction cycles. The team started by halting the time-honored practice of making every machine available toproduce any element, an approach that necessitatedconstant, costly retooling. Instead, the team assignedspecific molds to specific machines, and set up regularfour- to 12-week production cycles. The group thendeemed that sales and operations would set orders at aregular monthly meeting, reducing the need for con-stant changeovers.

The leadership team also clarified decision rights toensure that schedules made sense for the enterprise as awhole. For instance, it would no longer be acceptable tomake manual changes in a molding machine withoutinforming the finished-goods packing team, an impor-tant consideration since different kits are packaged indifferent boxes. Clearer descriptions of rights andresponsibilities made it more difficult to dodge toughdecisions, or to make them without considering theirimpact on other departments. As a result, the companywas able to sidestep many potential production glitches.

The team also considered the manufacturing foot-print. The Lego Group had already outsourced 10percent of its production to Chinese contract manufac-turers, but the team decided against sending more workto Asia. Instead, building on its successful experience

The drive to innovate, which was deeplyembedded in Lego’s corporate culture,

“had become an emotional concept and anexcuse to oppose cost-saving initiatives.”

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moving some production to Kladno, Czech Republic,the company concluded that it could actually boost effi-ciency by locating its factories near its most importantmarkets. A plant in Eastern Europe would get productsto European store shelves in three to four days — animportant consideration given that Europe accounts for60 percent of the company’s sales and that 40 percent ofsales take place during the Christmas season.

In 2005, the Lego Group began outsourcing themanufacture of its simpler products to a Hungarianfacility belonging to Flextronics, a Singapore-based elec-tronics manufacturer. That year the company alsoexpanded its operations in Kladno. Arriving at thispoint, however, was difficult in two ways: The negotia-tions were long and difficult, and the impact on thecompany’s workforce had to be managed with great care.Chief Purchasing Officer Niels Duedahl was tasked withoverseeing the process, supported by a team of analystswho built detailed cost models. Their philosophy was tounderstand their suppliers’ costs better than the suppli-ers themselves did. This approach would enable theLego Group’s leaders not just to evaluate the options butalso to approach subcontractor proposals armed fornegotiation.

The Lego Group also needed to move its distribu-tion channels closer to the customer — and to lower itsbloated distribution costs. First, the number of its logis-tics providers was cut from 26 to three or four —enough to ensure resilience and gain greater economiesof scale while still encouraging competition among thesuppliers. This step alone saved more than 10 percentin transportation costs. But consolidating logisticsproviders really just brought the Lego Group in linewith what many of its competitors had done years ago.

However, the company was able to leapfrog the compe-tition by redesigning its entire distribution system.

Although many companies have taken manufactur-ing to lower-cost markets and to contract providers, sur-prisingly few have done the same with distribution,although identical advantages exist. The Lego Groupphased out five centers in Denmark, Germany, andFrance and created a single new center in the CzechRepublic, to be operated by DHL. “Putting all your eggsin one basket” might sound like a poor strategy toreduce risk, but consolidated distribution made inven-tory easier to track and made stock shortages far lesslikely. It also brought the Lego Group closer to Europe’slargest population centers, decreasing the average dis-tance to market.

With a new value chain in place, the Lego Groupcould act with the understanding that customers haddifferentiated needs. The company’s marketing team fol-lowed the examples of other consumer packaged-goodsmanufacturers, working more closely with the largestretailers to conduct joint forecasting, inventory manage-ment, and product customization. Those big-box andchain stores that made up the bulk of the Lego Group’smarket would receive marketing support as well. Thecompany would continue to deal with smaller sellers,but on more regular and standardized terms. The com-pany further minimized the cost of serving each accountby providing discounts for early orders and refusing toship less-than-full cartons.

The largest Lego Group customers were also invitedto participate in product development. Not only wouldthis presumably make the big clients happier, but theretailers’ strong forecasting and replenishment technol-ogy would give the company marketers access to a

Getting the right product to the rightplace at the right time at the right cost was an

important early step in grapplingwith an array of strategic challenges.

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greater level of insight into buyer behavior than thecompany had on its own. The Lego Group would alsolet these large retailers help make assortment decisions,and sweeten the relationship further by providing someSKUs on an exclusive basis.

Profitable Once MoreThanks in part to its supply chain transformation, theLego Group is profitable once more. It has savedapproximately €50 million ($67 million) since 2004,and forecasts savings in excess of €100 million ($135million) over the next two years. The tremendous gainsin efficiency meant that despite the impact of rising oilprices on materials and transportation, stock turnoverincreased by 12 percent in 2005, and the same year, theLego Group recorded its first profits — €61 million($72 million) — since 2002. This positive trend furthercontinued in 2006, with the Lego Group turnover upby 11 percent over 2005, and profits up by a staggering240 percent. The Lego Group supply chain is nowso advanced that the company is actually “slightly get-ting ahead of the competition in some parameters,”says Knudstorp.

The gains are more than operational. Knudstorpargues that the supply chain restructuring has had atransformational impact on the company as a whole.Getting the right product to the right place at the righttime at the right cost was an important early step ingrappling with an array of strategic challenges. “It hasallowed us to again focus on developing the business, oninnovation, and on developing our organization tobecome a much more creative place to work,” saysKnudstorp. “Those are luxuries we didn’t have when wedidn’t make money and we had a supply chain that was

10 to 15 years behind the times.” Now that the LegoGroup has rationalized and streamlined its productdevelopment, sourcing, manufacturing, and distribu-tion, it can pour its resources into what it does best:making wonderful toys. +

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Resources

Allan Bedford, The Unofficial LEGO Builder’s Guide (No Starch Press,2005): Erudite consumer’s-eye view of the blocks, techniques for assem-bling them, the world view that makes them appealing, and the company.

Kevin Dehoff and Vikas Sehgal, “Innovators without Borders,” s+b,Autumn 2006, www.strategy-business.com/press/article/06305: A studyby Booz Allen Hamilton and India’s National Association of Software andService Companies (NASSCOM) on the expanding geographic footprintof innovation sourcing.

Jeff Ferry, “Flextronics: Staying Real in a Virtual World,” s+b, Winter2004, www.strategy-business.com/press/article/04408: Case study of theSingaporean contract manufacturer helps explain why the Lego Groupfound them a congenial partner.

Kaj Grichnik, Christian Basedow, John Hedgcock, and John Potter,“Brownfield Transformation: 25 Years On, Fulfilling the Promise of LeanManufacturing,” s+b Leading Idea, 3/20/07, www.strategy-business.com/li/leadingideas/li00018: Under intensifying pressure to relocate manufac-turing to areas of cheaper labor, traditional manufacturers can survive asLego did, by changing their practices.

Kaj Grichnik, Conrad Winkler, and Peter von Hochberg, “ManufacturingMyopia,” s+b, Spring 2006, www.strategy-business.com/press/article/06105: How manufacturers can avoid decline and irrelevance.

Alexander Kandybin and Martin Kihn, “The Innovator’s Prescription,”s+b, Summer 2004, www.strategy-business.com/press/article/04205: Waysto improve a company’s intrinsic innovation effectiveness curve.

Hans-Jörg Kutschera, Peter Obdeijn, Michael Ilgner, and Peter vonHochberg, “Relocate? Transform? Which Option Is Right?” s+b ResilienceReport, 10/17/06, www.strategy-business.com/resiliencereport/resilience/rr00037: A guide to maximizing manufacturing efficiency.

C.K. Prahalad, “The Innovation Sandbox,” s+b, Autumn 2006,www.strategy-business.com/press/article/06306: To create an impossiblylow-cost, high-quality new business model, start by cultivating constraints.

Jeffrey Rothfeder and Georgina Grenon, eds., Manufacturing Realities:Breaking the Boundaries of Conventional Practice (strategy+business Books,2006), www.strategy-business.com/manureader: This book offers solutionsfor the crisis facing manufacturing today.

LEGO.com, the Official Web Site of Lego Products, www.lego.com/:Official source of “cool creations” and product information from theDanish company.

Manufacturing Realities Web site, www.manufacturing-realities.com:Alternatives to conventional manufacturing practice.

My Own Creation pages, www.mocpages.com: Independent showcase forLego artists run by Sean Kenney (whose work is featured on these pages).

For more articles on supply chains, sign up for s+b’s RSS feed atwww.strategy-business.com/rss.

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