Legacy-Compliant Data Authentication for Industrial ... · Real Scenario on SWaT Testbed Verifies...

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Legacy-CompliantDataAuthenticationfor

IndustrialControlSystemTraffic

JohnHenryCastellanos,DanieleAntonioli,NilsOleTippenhauerandMartínOchoaSingaporeUniversityofTechnologyandDesign

15th InternationalConferenceonAppliedCryptographyandNetworkSecurityJapan,Kanazawa,July11,2017.

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Source:urvil.wordpress.com

AutomaticcontrolofIndustrialProcesses:

Manufacturingplants

Powerplants

Publictransportationinfrastructure

Utilityinfrastructure(watertreatment,gas/oil,powergeneration)

IndustrialControlSystemsWhatareICSs?

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Source:http://bcmpublicrelations.com/

IndustrialControlSystemsIndustryEvolution

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InformationTechnology:

ServersandClientPCs

Source:https://pgjonline.com/

OperationalTechnology:

Servers,PLCs,SCADA,HMIDevices,ActuatorsandSensors

IntegrityAttackscauseOperationalChanges

IndustrialControlSystemsITmeetsOT(PurdueModel)

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Cyber-securityinICSMotivation:IntegrityAttacks

PLC

ControlCenter

AttackerAttacker

TankLevelMonitor

ValveController

ChemicalDispenser

PLC

666

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PLC

ControlCenter

AttackerAttacker

TankLevelMonitor

ValveController

ChemicalDispenser

PLC Highlevel

!!Highlevel

777

ACNS2017


PLC

ControlCenter

AttackerAttacker

TankLevelMonitor

ValveController

ChemicalDispenser

PLC

Highlevel

Normallevel

!!Highlevel

888

ACNS2017


PLC

ControlCenter

AttackerAttacker

TankLevelMonitor

ValveController

ChemicalDispenser

PLC

Turnoffvalve

ReduceChemical

999

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PLC

ControlCenter

AttackerAttacker

TankLevelMonitor

ValveController

ChemicalDispenser

PLC

TurnonvalveIncrease

ChemicalTurnoffvalve

ReduceChemical

101010

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PLC

ControlCenter

AttackerAttacker

TankLevelMonitor

ValveController

ChemicalDispenser

PLC

111111

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ControlCenter

Highlevel

!!Highlevel

TankLevelMonitor

CountermeasuresAuthenticity&Integritychecks

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ControlCenter

!!Highlevel

TankLevelMonitor


Highlevel

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ControlCenter

!!Highlevel

TankLevelMonitor


Highlevel

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ControlCenter

!!Highlevel

TankLevelMonitor


Highlevel

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ControlCenter

!!Highlevel

TankLevelMonitor


Attacker

Highlevel

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ControlCenter

!!Highlevel

TankLevelMonitor


Attacker

Highlevel

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ControlCenter

!!Highlevel

TankLevelMonitor


Attacker

Highlevel

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ControlCenter

!!Highlevel

TankLevelMonitor


Attacker

Lowlevel

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ControlCenter

!!Highlevel

TankLevelMonitor


Attacker

Lowlevel

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Attribute InformationTechnologySystems(IT)

IndustrialControlSystems(OT)

ComponentLifetime

3to5years 10to15years

Connectivity Corporate network,IP-based,standardprotocols

ControlNetwork,proprietaryprotocols

PerformanceRequirements

Non-real-time Real-time

Sources:NIST:GuidetoIndustrialControlSystemsSecurity.800-82Rev2http://www.wbdg.org/

IndustrialControlSystemsIT/OTRequirements

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SecureWaterTreatment(SWaT)isatestbedforresearchintheareaofcybersecurity.

DatafromarealICSSWaTTestbed

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DatafromarealICSReal-timerequirements

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DatafromarealICSUnderstandingICSData

ByselectingCIPserviceswithcriticaldataourproposalavoidsadditionalprocessingandbandwidthoverheadsincomparisonwithsigningallCIPtraffic.

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DatafromarealICSUnderstandingICSData

ByselectingCIPserviceswithcriticaldataourproposalavoidsadditionalprocessingandbandwidthoverheadsincomparisonwithsigningallCIPtraffic.

CIPServices(CriticalData):Read_Tag

Write_Tag

Read_Tag_Fragmented

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ControlCenterPLC

Crypto-featuredHardware

BridgingNon-CriticalData

SigningCriticalData


VerifyingCriticalData


SPAProtocolSelectivePacketAuthentication

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AsSPAonlysigns/verifiesselectedcriticalpackets,itimprovestheoverallhardenedcommunicationrateofthesystemcomparedwithTLS.

ComparisonwithTLSSPAEvaluation

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ControlCenterPLC



Marking&BridgingCritical

Data

SigningMarkedChunk



Marking&BridgingCritical

Data

VerifyingMarkedChunk

ASPAProtocolAggregatedSelectivePacket

Authentication

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UsingAggregated-SPAthesystemwouldachievehighertolerancecommunicationlevelsprocessingdifferentpercentagesofcriticaldata.x-axisrepresentschunkofpacketstobesigned.

y-axisrepresentstoleranceatcommunicationlevelreachedbythesystem.

ComparisonwithTLSASPAEvaluation

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ControlCenter

PLC1

TCP/IPSwitch

PLC3

ImplementationRealScenarioonSWaTTestbed

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ControlCenter

PLC1

TCP/IPSwitch

PLC3


Signs Verifies

CriticalData

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ControlCenter

PLC1

TCP/IPSwitch

PLC3


SignsVerifies

CriticalData

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ControlCenter

PLC1

TCP/IPSwitch

PLC3


Updatesstats

Updatesstats

333333

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ControlCenter

PLC1

TCP/IPSwitch

PLC3


Monitorssystem

performance

MonitorsSystem

Performance

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*VM:VirtualMachine

Hardware Processor CPU Memory

Controllino ATmega2560Microcontroller

16MHz 256KB

ARM(VM*) ARM926EJ-S 540MHz 256MB

RaspberryPI2 Quad-core ARMCortex-A7

900MHz 1GB

RaspberryPI3 Quad-coreARMCortex-A53

1200MHz 1GB

PC(VM*) IntelCorei5-5300U 2300MHz 2GB

BenchmarkHardwareSelection

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DataSize(Bytes)

Controllino ARM RaspberryPI2

RaspberryPI3

PC

64 2.2x104 76 53 15 2

128 3.3x104 78 58 16 2

256 5.5x104 84 69 18 3

512 1x105 117 89 32 4

1K 1.8x105 171 130 35 6

2K 3.6x105 252 211 58 10

4K 7x105 474 374 104 18

ECDSA N/A 1.5x105 1x105 3.2x104 3.1x103

AlldatainμsCryptographicAlgorithms:• Symmetric:HMAC-SHA256• Asymmetric:ECDSA

BenchmarkHardwarePerformance

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ASPAProtocolPerformanceEvaluation(Speed)

Pk/s

AggregatedSignature(Pksinachunk)20 40 60 80 100 120

107

106

105

104

103

102

101

MinPk/srequiredinSWaT

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FeaturesProtocols• Ourprotocolsarebackwardcompatible,astheytransmit

authenticationdataaspayloadinlegacyindustrialprotocols.

• Withinexpensiveandfasthardware(RaspberryPI),itisfeasibletoenhancelegacyplantswithauthenticchannelsforstrongsignaturealgorithmswithsimpleprotocols.

• ItisfeasibletosignificantlyraisethebaragainstattackersofICSbyincludingauthenticationbasedonmoderncryptographywithoutcompromisingefficiencyorcost.

• Weplantocomparethereal-timeconstraintsofSWaTwithconstraintsinotherICSTestbeds(SmartGrid).

Conclusions

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Thankyou

Q&A

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BackupSlides

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Attribute InformationTechnologySystems(IT) IndustrialControlSystems(OT)

Purpose Process transaction,provideinformation Controls andmonitorphysicalprocesses

Role Supportpeople Controlmachines

Architecture Enterprisewideinfrastructureandapplications Event-driven,real-time,embeddedhardwareandcustomizedsoftware

ComponentLifetime

3to5years 10to15years

Interfaces GUI,Webbrowser,terminalandkeyboard Electromechanical, sensors,actuators,codeddisplays

Connectivity Corporate network,IP-based,standardprotocols ControlNetwork,proprietaryprotocols

PerformanceRequirements

Non-real-time Real-time

Majorriskimpacts Delayofbusinessoperations Environmentalimpacts,lossoflife,equipment, orproduction

Sources:NIST:GuidetoIndustrialControlSystemsSecurity.800-82Rev2http://www.wbdg.org/

IndustrialControlSystemsIT/OTRequirements

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InjectingdataintoEthernetIPProtocol

EthernetFrameEthernetHeader

IPHeader

14Bytes 20Bytes

TCP/UDPHeader20Bytes

EncapsulationHeader

EncapsulationData CRC

EncapsulationPacket

Command Length

2Bytes 2Bytes

SessionHandle

4Bytes

Status SenderContext Options

8Bytes4Bytes 4Bytes

EncapsulationHeader

ItemCount(Usual=2) TypeID

2Bytes 2Bytes

Length(l1)

2Bytes

Data(ConnectionID)

l1 Bytes

TypeID

2Bytes

Length(l2)

2Bytes

Data(CIPData)l2 Bytes

AddressItem DataItemEncapsulationData(CommonPacketFormat)

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InjectingdataintoEthernetIPProtocol

EthernetFrameEthernetHeader

IPHeader

14Bytes 20Bytes

TCP/UDPHeader20Bytes

EncapsulationHeader

EncapsulationData CRC

EncapsulationPacket

Command Length

2Bytes 2Bytes

SessionHandle

4Bytes

Status SenderContext Options

8Bytes4Bytes 4Bytes

EncapsulationHeader

ItemCount(Usual=2) TypeID

2Bytes 2Bytes

Length(l1)

2Bytes

Data(ConnectionID)

l1 Bytes

TypeID

2Bytes

Length(l2)

2Bytes

Data(CIPData)l2 Bytes

AddressItem DataItem

TypeID

2Bytes

Length(l3)

2Bytes

Data(Signature)

l3 Bytes

SignatureItemEncapsulationData(CommonPacketFormat)

3X

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AuthenticationProtocolsImplementation:RealScenarioonSWaTTestbed

• SCADA’s supervisory reads PLCvariables of signing-verificationprocess.

• Statistics about integrity checks mightbe summarize.

• In case of integrity violations happenan alarm will trigger.

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ARaspberryPIisdirectlyconnectedbetweenthehardenedPLCanditsclosestswitch.ItbridgescommunicationbetweenthePLCandtherestofthesystem.


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Different tags were configured atPLC program to store statisticsabout signing/verification process.It allows to monitor the processand debug it.


Legacy-Compliant Data Authentication for Industrial ... · Real Scenario on SWaT Testbed Verifies...

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