Topic 1.Issues of reality conceptualization in linguistic world-image development.Lecture 1.Cognitive Linguistics as a science.Aims: Study the background of Cognitive linguistics science and stages of its development. Specify the central problem, the main aims, and the subject of Cognitive linguistics. Trace the relations of Cognitive linguistics to other scientific fields.1.1 Cognitive linguistics becoming a science.Cognitive Linguistics as represented in this Handbook is an approach to the analysis of natural language that originated in the late seventies and early eighties in the work of George Lakoff, Ron Langacker, and Len Talmy, and that focuses on language as an instrument for organizing, processing, and conveying information. Given this perspective, the analysis of the conceptual and experiential basis of linguistic categories is of primary importance within Cognitive Linguistics: the formal structures of language are studied not as if they were autonomous, but as reflections of genera conceptual organization, categorization principles, processing mechanisms, and experiential and environmental influences.Because Cognitive Linguistics sees language as embedded in the overall cognitive capacities of man, topics of special interest for Cognitive Linguistics include: the structural characteristics of natural language categorization (such as prototypicality, systematic polysemy, cognitive models, mental imagery, and metaphor); the functional principles of linguistic organization (such as iconicity and naturalness); the conceptual interface between syntax and semantics (as explored by Cognitive Grammar and Construction Grammar); the experiential and pragmatic background of language-in-use; and the relationship between language and thought, including questions about relativism and conceptual universals.Crucially, there is no single, uniform doctrine according to which these research topics) are pursued by Cognitive Linguistics. In this sense, Cognitive Linguistics is a flexible framework rather than a single theory of language. In terms of category structure (one of the standard topics for analysis in Cognitive Linguistics), we might say that Cognitive Linguistics itself, when viewed as a category, has a family resemblance structure: it constitutes a cluster of many partially overlapping approaches rather than a single welldefined theory.Even so, the recognition that Cognitive Linguistics has not yet stabilized into a single uniform theory should not prevent us from looking for fundamental common features and shared perspectives among the many forms of research that come together under the label of Cognitive Linguistics. An obvious question to start from relates to the cognitive aspect of Cognitive Linguistics: in what sense exactly is Cognitive Linguistics a cognitive approach to the study of language?Against the background of the basic characteristics of the cognitive paradigm in cognitive psychology, the philosophy of science, and related disciplines, the viewpoint adopted by Cognitive Linguistics can be defined more precisely.Cognitive Linguistics is the study of language in its cognitive function, where cognitive refers to the crucial role of intermediate informational structures in our encounters with the world. Cognitive Linguistics is cognitive in the same way that cognitive psychology is: by assuming that our interaction with the world is mediated through informational structures in the mind. It is more specific than cognitive psychology, however, by focusing on natural language as a means for organizing, processing, and conveying that information. Language, then, is seen as a repository of world knowledge, a structured collection of meaningful categories that help us deal with new experiences and store information about old ones.From this overall characterization, three fundamental characteristics of Cognitive Linguistics can be derived: the primacy of semantics in linguistic analysis, the encyclopedic nature of linguistic meaning, and the perspectival nature of linguistic meaning. The first characteristic merely states that the basic function of language involves meaning; the other two characteristics specify the nature of the semantic phenomena in question. The primacy of semantics in linguistic analysis follows in a straightforward fashion from the cognitive perspective itself: if the primary function of language is categorization, then meaning must be the primary linguistic phenomenon. The encyclopedic nature of linguistic meaning follows from the categorical function of language: if language is a system for the categorization of the world, there is no need to postulate a systemic or structural level of linguistic meaning that is different from the level where world knowledge is associated with linguistic forms. The perspectival nature of linguistic meaning implies that the world is not objectively reflected in the language: the categorization function of the language imposes a structure on the world rather than just mirroring objective reality.Specifically, language is a way of organizing knowledge that reflects the needs, interests, and experiences of individuals and cultures. The idea that linguistic meaning has a perspectivizing function is theoretically elaborated in the philosophical, epistemological position taken by Cognitive Linguistics.The experientialist position of Cognitive Linguistics vis-a`-vis human knowledge emphasizes the view that human reason is determined by our organic embodiment and by our individual and collective experiences.To conclude, if we can agree that contemporary linguistics embodies a tendency (a cluster of tendencies, to be more precise) toward the recontextualization of linguistic enquiry, we may also agree that Cognitive Linguistics embodies this trend to an extent that probably no other theoretical movement does. It embodies the resemanticization of grammar by focusing on the interplay between language and conceptualization. It embodies the recovery of the lexicon as a relevant structural level by developing network models of grammatical structure, like Construction Grammar. And it embodies the discursive turn of contemporary linguistics by insisting explicitly on the usage-based nature of linguistics. Other approaches may develop each of these tendencies separately in more detail than Cognitive Linguistics does, but it is the latter movement that combines them most explicitly and so epitomizes the characteristic underlying drift and drive of present-day linguistics. The two primary commitments of cognitive linguistics:Cognitive linguistics is distinct from other movements in linguistics, both formalist and functionalist, in two respects. First, it takes seriously the cognitive underpinnings of language, the so-called Cognitive Commitment. Cognitive linguists attempt to describe and model language in the light of convergent evidence from other cognitive and brain sciences. Second, cognitive linguists subscribe to a generalization commitment: a commitment to describing the nature and principles that constitute linguistic knowledge as an outcome of general cognitive abilitiesrather than viewing language as constituting, for instance, a wholly distinct encapsulated module of mind. In this section I briefly elaborate on these two commitments which lie at the heart of the cognitive linguistics enterprise.The Cognitive Commitment represents the view that principles of linguistic structure should reflect what is known about human cognition from the other cognitive and brain sciences, particularly psychology, artificial intelligence, cognitive neuroscience, and philosophy. In other words, the Cognitive Commitment asserts that the models of language and linguistic organization proposed should reflect what is known about the human mind, rather than purely aesthetic dictates such as the use of particular kinds of formalisms or economy of representation.The generalization commitment represents a dedication to characterising general principles that apply to all aspects of human language. This goal reflects the standard commitment in science to seek the broadest generalizations possible. In contrast, some approaches to the study of language often separate what is sometimes termed the language faculty into distinct areas such as phonology (sound), semantics (word and sentence meaning), pragmatics (meaning in discourse context), morphology (word structure), syntax (sentence structure), and so on. As a consequence, there is often little basis for generalization across these aspects of language, or for study of their interrelations.While cognitive linguists acknowledge that it may often be useful to treat areas such as syntax, semantics, and phonology as being notionally distinct, cognitive linguists do not start with the assumption that the subsystems of language are organized in significantly divergent ways.Hence, the generalization commitment represents a commitment to openly investigating how the various aspects of linguistic knowledge emergefrom a common set of human cognitive abilities upon which they draw, rather than assuming that they are produced in an encapsulated module of the mind, consisting of distinct knowledge types, or subsystems.1.2The five postulates of cognitive linguistics.1 the thesis of embodied cognition,2 the thesis of encyclopedic semantics,3 the symbolic thesis,4 the thesis that meaning is conceptualization, and5 the usage-based thesis.Together with the two primary commitments, these theses give rise to a distinctive worldview.The thesis of embodied cognitionThe thesis consists of two related parts. The first part holds that the nature of reality is not objectively given, but is a function of our species-specific and individual embodimentthis is the sub-thesis of embodied experience. Second, our mental representation of reality is grounded in our embodied mental states: mental states captured from our embodied experiencethis is the sub-thesis of grounded cognition.The sub-thesis of embodied experience maintains that due to the nature of our bodies, including our neuro-anatomical architecture, we have aspecies-specific view of the world. In other words, our construal of reality is mediated, in large measure, by the nature of our embodiment.A further consequence of the sub-thesis of embodied experience is that as individual embodiment within a species varies, so too will embodied experience across individual members of the same species. There is now empirical support for the position that humans have distinctive embodied experience due to individual variables such as handedness. That is, whether one is left- or right-handed influences the way in which one experiences reality.The fact that our experience is embodiedthat is, structured in part by the nature of the bodies we have and by our neurological organization has consequences for cognition: the sub-thesis of grounded cognition. In other words, the concepts we have access to, and the nature of the reality we think and talk about, are grounded in the multimodal representations that emerge from our embodied experience. The thesis of encyclopedic semanticsThe thesis of encyclopedic semantics is also made up of two parts. First, it holds that semantic representations in the linguistic system, what is often referred to as semantic structure, relate toor interface with representations in the conceptual system.The second part of the thesis relates to the view that conceptual structure, to which semantic structure relates, constitutes a vast network of structured knowledge, a semantic potential (Evans, 2009) which is hence encyclopedia-like in nature and in scope.The symbolic thesis holds that the fundamental unit of grammar is a formmeaning pairing, or symbolic unit. The symbolic unit is variously termed a symbolic assembly in Langackers cognitive grammar, or a construction in construction grammar approaches (e.g., Goldbergs cognitive construction grammar, 1995, 2006). Symbolic units run the full gamut from the fully lexical to the wholly schematic. For instance, examples of symbolic units include morphemes (for example, dis- as in distasteful), whole words (for example, cat, run, tomorrow), idiomatic expressions such as He kicked the bucket, and sentence-level constructions such as the ditransitive (or double object) construction, as exemplified by the expression: John baked Sally a cake. More precisely, the symbolic thesis holds that the mental grammar consistsof a form, a semantic unit, and symbolic correspondence that relatesthe two.Constituency structureand hence the combinatorial nature oflanguageis a function of symbolic units becoming integrated or fused in order to create larger grammatical units, with different theorists proposing slightly different mechanisms for how this arises. The thesis that meaning is conceptualizationLanguage understanding involves the interaction between semantic structure and conceptual structure, as mediated by various linguistic and conceptual mechanisms and processes. In other words, linguistically mediated meaning construction doesnt simply involve compositionality, in the Fregean sense, whereby words encode meanings which are integrated in monotonic fashion such that the meaning of the whole arises from the sum of the parts. Cognitive linguists subscribe to the position that linguistically mediated meaning involves conceptualiizationwhich is to say, higher-order cognitive processing some, or much, of which is non-linguistic in nature. In other words, the thesis that meaning is conceptualization holds that the way in which symbolic units are combined during language understanding gives rise to a unit of meaning which is non-linguistic in naturethe notion of a simulation introduced above and relies, in part, on non-linguistic processes of integration.The usage-based thesis holds that the mental grammar of the language user is formed by the abstraction of symbolic units from situated instances of language use: utterances specific usage events involving symbolic units for purposes of signaling local and contextually relevant communicative intentions. An important consequence of adopting the usage-based thesis is that there is no principled distinction between knowledge of language, and use of language (competence and performance, in generative grammar terms), since knowledge emerges from use. From this perspective, knowledge of language is knowledge of how language is used.Problem Questions:What is the practical value of Cognitive Linguistics?What role can the findings of this science play in the development of language communication?

Lecture 2: Conceptualization and categorization in cognitive linguistics.Aims: Study the core sense of two notions conceptualization and categorization Study the main approaches to research of language phenomena

Categorization is the process in which ideas and objects are recognized, differentiated, and understood. Categorization implies that objects are grouped into categories, usually for some specific purpose. Ideally, a category illuminates a relationship between the subjects and objects of knowledge. Categorization is fundamental in language, prediction, inference, decision making and in all kinds of environmental interaction. It is indicated that categorization plays a major role in computer programming.categorizationis our ability to identify entities as members of groups. Of course, the words we use to refer to entities rest upon categorization: there are good reasons why we call a cat cat and not, say, fish. One of the reasons behind the interest in this area stems from the Cognitive Commitment: the position adopted by cognitive linguists that language is a function of generalized cognition. The ability to categorize is central to human cognition; given the Cognitive Commitment, we expect this ability to be reflected in linguistic organization. The other reason behindIn the 1970s, pioneering research by cognitive psychologist Eleanor Roschand her colleagues presented a serious challenge to the classical view of categorization that had dominated Western thought since the time of Aristotle.According to this classical model, category membership is defined according to a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, which entails that category membership is an all-or-nothing affair. The findings of Eleanor Rosch and her team revealed that categorization is not an all or nothing affair, but that many categorizationjudgments seemed to exhibit prototype or typicality effects. For example, when we categorizebirds, certain types of bird (like robins or sparrows) are judged as better examples of the category than others (like penguins).In his famous book Women, Fire and Dangerous Things, George Lakoff (1987) explored some of the consequences of the observations made by Rosch and her colleagues for a theory of conceptual structure as manifested in language. An important idea that emerged from Lakoffs study is the theory of idealized cognitive models (ICMs), which are highly abstract frames. These can account for certain kinds of typicality effects in categorization.For example, lets consider once more the concept BACHELOR. This is understood with respect to a relatively schematic ICM MARRIAGE. The MARRIAGEICM includes the knowledge that bachelors are unmarried adult males. As we have observed, the category BACHELOR exhibits typicality effects. In otherwords, some members of the category BACHELOR (like eligible young men) are better or more typical examples than others (like the Pope). The knowledge associated with the MARRIAGE ICM stipulates that bachelors can marry.However, our knowledge relating to CATHOLICISM stipulates that the Pope cannot marry. It is because of this mismatch between the MARRIAGE ICM (with respect to which BACHELOR is understood) and the CATHOLICISM ICM (with respect to which the Pope is understood) that this particular typicality effect arises.The position adopted in cognitive linguistics is that there are commonalities in the ways humans experience and perceive the world and in the ways human think and use language. This means that all humans share a common conceptualizing capacity. However, these commonalities are no more than constraints, delimiting a range of possibilities. As we have seen, there is striking diversity in the two domains we have surveyed, which shows that the way English speakers think and speak about space and time by no means represents the only way of thinking and speaking about space and time. According to cognitive linguists, language not only reflects conceptual structure, but can also give rise to conceptualization. It appears that the ways in which different languages cut up and label the world can differentially influence non-linguistic thought and action. It follows that the basic commitments of cognitive linguistics are consonant with a weak version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, a position that some linguists argue is gathering increasing empirical support.There are two notable approaches to meaning construction that have been developed within cognitive linguistics. The first is concerned with the sorts of mechanisms central to meaning construction that are fundamentally non-linguistic in nature. Meaning construction processes of this kind have been referred to as backstage cognition (Fauconnier, 1985/ 1994, 1997). There are two distinct, but closely related, theories of backstage cognition: mental spaces theory, developed in two monographs by Gilles Fauconnier (1985/1994, 1997), and conceptual blending theory, developed by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner (2002). Mental spaces theory is concerned with the nature and creation of mental spaces, small packets of conceptual structure built as we think and talk. Conceptual blending theory is concerned with the integrative mechanisms and networks that operate over collections of mental spaces in order to produce emergent aspects of meaningBehind the idiosyncrasies of language, cognitive linguistics has repeatedly uncovered evidence for the operation of more general cognitive processes. Mappings between mental spaces are part of this general organization of thought. Although language provides considerable data for studying such mappings, they are not in themselves specifically linguistic. They show up generally in conceptualization. A striking case of a general cognitive operation on mental spaces, that is reflected universally in the way we think, is conceptual integration.Conceptual integration consists in setting up networks of mental spaces which map onto each other and blend into new mental spaces in various ways. In everyday thinking and talking, we use conceptual integration networks systematically in the on-line construction of meaning. Some of the integrations are novel, others are more entrenched, and we rarely pay conscious attention to the process, because it is so pervasive. In a conceptual integration network, partial structure from input mental mental spaces is projected to a new blended mental space which develops dynamic (imaginative) structure of its own.Most aspects of human life, not just language, bring in conceptual integration networks. This remarkable cognitive capacity has been studied in a variety of domains, such as mathematics, action and design, distributed cognition, magic and religion, anthropology and political science. It has been suggested that the capacity of conceptual integration evolved biologically to reach a threshold, double-scope creativity, that constitutes a necessary condition for the cognitively modern human singularities of art, creative toolmaking,religious thought, and grammar.Problem questions: To what extent do the personal experience and interests reflect the speech of communicants.How can the language influence the persons understanding and interpretation of the environment?

Lecture3Reality conceptualization and the worldview. Aims: Studythetermthe worldview Study the components of the linguistic worldview Look at the role of conceptualization in the worldview formationThe primary commitments and theses of cognitive linguistics give rise to a specific and distinctive worldview, which has a number of dimensions. Collectively, these give rise to a distinctive cognitive linguistic perspective on the nature of language, its interaction with non-linguistic aspects of cognition, and the nature of the human mind.Five dimensions of the cognitive linguistics worldview can be identified: Language reflects the embodied nature of conceptual organization. Language is a lens for studying conceptual organization. Language provides a mechanism for construal. Language can influence aspects of non-linguistic cognition. Humans have a common conceptualizing capacity.Language reflects conceptual organizationFollowing the thesis of embodied cognition, cognitive linguists view language as reflecting the embodied nature of conceptual structure and organization. Hence, cognitive linguists study language by taking seriously the way language manifests embodied conceptual structure.An outstanding example of this is the study of conceptual metaphor. For instance, we use language relating to more abstract domains such as time, in terms of space, as exemplified by the example in (1), or states in terms of locations exemplified in (2), precisely because at the level of conceptual structure time is systematically structured in terms of conceptual structure recruited from the domain of space, and states are structured in terms of locations in space. I consider the issue of conceptual metaphor in more detail later on.1) Christmas is approaching.2) She is in love.Language is a lens on the mindSecond, language serves as a lens for studying aspects of the mind. Itdoes so precisely because it reflects organizational principles of embodied cognition. For instance, by studying metaphorical patterns in language, the cognitive linguist is able to discern patterns in the nature and organization of conceptual structure. Conceptual metaphors, qua cross-domain mappingsmappings that relate distinct conceptual domainsare evidenced by virtue of examining distinctive and productive patterns in language in order to uncover their existence.Language provides a mechanism for construalThird, as language is constituted of a language-specific inventory of symbolic units, following the symbolic thesis, any given language provides a means of viewing the same state, situation, or event from the range of perspectives that are conventionally available to the language user, given the language-specific symbolic resources available. In other words, a language provides the language user with resources for viewing the same scene in multiple, and hence alternative, ways. This constitutes a mechanism for construal. Construal is a technical term for the facility whereby the same situation can be linguistically encoded in multiple ways. For example, someone who is not easily parted from his or her money could be either described as stingy or as thrifty. In keeping with the thesis of encyclopedic semantics, each of these words is understood with respect to a different background frame or cognitive model, which provides a distinct set of evaluations. While stingy represents a negative assessment against an evaluative frame of giving and sharing, thrifty relates to a frame of careful management of resources (husbandry), against which it represents a positive assessment. Hence, lexical choice provides a different way of framing ostensibly the same situation, giving rise to a different construal. Indeed, any given language, by virtue of containing a language-specific set of symbolic units, thereby provides a ready-made language-specific repertoire for construing human experience and the world in, necessarily, different ways. One reason for this is because different languages often encode culture-specific ideas and hence perspectives. For instance, the Korean word nunchi, which might be translated as eye-measure in English, provides a conventionalized means of encoding the idea that a host evaluates whether a guest requires further food or drink in order to avoid the guest being embarrassed by having to request it. Of course, languages provide conventional means of alternate construalseven when two similar ideas are both conveyed in two different languages.For instance, both English and Frenchrelated genetically and by area have conventional means of expressing the notion of containment: the preposition in for English and dans for French. Yet the scene depicted by examples, involving a woman walking in the rain, is conventionally construed, in English, as exhibiting a containment relationship as evidenced by (1), but in French as exhibiting an under relationship, as encoded by the French preposition sous, evidenced in (2).(1) The woman is walking in the rain.(2) La femme marche sous la pluie.The woman walks under the rain.The woman is walking in the rain.Language influences non-linguistic cognitionThe discussion of the English and French utterances in (1) and (2) also helps illustrate the fourth dimension of the cognitive linguistics worldview. As language provides a means of construing reality in alternate ways, and moreover remains connected to conceptual representation, it has a transformative function: It can influence aspects of non-linguistic cognition. That is, language doesnt merely reflect conceptual representation; it can influence and affect it. For instance, as French and English each have conventionalized alternative ways of encoding a particular spatial scene, this leads to what Slobin has labeled differences in thinking for speaking: Users of any given language must pay attention to particular aspects of their experienced reality, at the expense of others, in order to package their thoughts for purposes of linguistic communication. Cognitive linguists hold that this language-specific packaging has profound consequences on non-linguistic cognition. That is, language influences how we categorize aspects of our socio-physical environment, and how we think about reality, independently of language.Thus, different choices of language for representing concepts can indeed affect non-linguistic thought, such as reasoning and problem solving.A common human conceptualizing capacityOf course, one of the charges that has been leveled at those who subscribe to a (neo) Whorfian perspective is that this entails that language determines how the world is viewed and categorized. If this view were correct, language would effectively provide a straitjacket, resulting in wholly distinct ways of conceptualization across languages and language users, which would be insurmountable.However, the cognitive linguistics worldview treats language as but one of the mechanisms whereby humans construct their perceptual, cognitive, and socio-cultural reality. Cognitively modern humans have a common conceptualizing capacity: we share with our conspecifics a similar range of cognitive mechanisms and processes that provide us with multiple ways of construing reality. Language is but one modality, and hence but one way in which we interact with and learn about our environment, our socio-cultural reality, others around us, and ourselves. Cognitive linguists fully recognize that there are myriad ways in which humans experience their environment, including sense-perceptory experience, proprioception, and subjective experiences including affect, the visceral sense, and diverse cognitive evaluations and states. All of these experiences provide a rich basis for a multiplicity of mental representations, providing often complementary and even competing views of reality. From the perspective of cognitive linguistics, semantic structure encoded by language can influence our conceptualizations, and other outputs of cognitive function, such as categorization, for instance. However, languagedoesnotdeterminethem.Problemquestions: Can it be assumed that native speakers of different languages see the world differently, why (not)? Why hasntthetheoryoflinguisticrelativitystill found its complete acceptance?

Topic 2. The main trends of modern cognitive linguistics Lecture 1.Stages of cognitive linguistics developmentAims: To distinguish the main stages of cognitive linguistics formation as a science To define the role of a language in world acquisition

Cognitive linguistics is a modern school of linguistic thought and practice. It is concerned with investigating the relationship between human language, the mind and socio-physical experience. It originally emerged in the 1970s (Fillmore 1975, Lakoff& Thompson 1975, Rosch 1975) and arose out of dissatisfaction with formal approaches to language which were dominant, at that time, in the disciplines of linguistics and philosophy. While its origins were, in part, philosophical in nature, cognitive linguistics has always been strongly influenced by theories and findings from the other cognitive sciences as they emerged during the 1960s and 1970s, particularly cognitive psychology. Nowhere is this clearer than in work relating to human categorization, particularly as adopted by Charles Fillmore in the 1970s (e.g., Fillmore 1975) and George Lakoff in the 1980s (e.g., Lakoff 1987). Also of importance have been earlier traditions such as Gestalt psychology, as applied notably by Leonard Talmy (e.g., 2000) and Ronald Langacker (e.g., 1987). Finally, the neural underpinnings of language and cognition have had longstanding influence on the character and content of cognitive linguistic theories, from early work on how visual biology constrains colour terms systems (Kay and McDaniel 1978) to more recent work under the rubric of the Neural Theory of Language (Gallese and Lakoff 2005).In recent years, cognitive linguistic theories have become sufficiently sophisticated and detailed to begin making predictions that are testable using the broad range of converging methods from the cognitive sciences. Early research was dominated in the 1970s and early 1980s by a relatively small number of scholars, primarily (although not exclusively) situated on the western seaboard of the United States. During the 1980s, cognitive linguistic research began to take root in northern continental Europe, particularly in Belgium, Holland and Germany. By the early 1990s, there was a growing proliferation of research in cognitive linguistics throughout Europe and North America, and a relatively large internationally-distributed group of researchers who identified themselves as cognitive linguists. This led, in 1989, with a major conference held at Duisburg, Germany, to the formation of the International Cognitive Linguistics Association, together with, a year later, the foundation of the journal Cognitive Linguistics. In the words of one of the earliest pioneers in cognitive linguistics, Ronald Langacker (1991b, p. xv), this event marked the birth of cognitive linguistics as a broadly grounded, self-conscious intellectual movement. Cognitive linguistics is best described as a 'movement' or an enterprise, precisely because it does not constitute a single closely-articulated theory. Instead, it is an approach that has adopted a common set of core commitments and guiding principles, which have led to a diverse range of complementary, overlapping (and sometimes competing) theories. The purpose of this article is to trace some of the major assumptions and commitments that make cognitive linguistics a distinct and worthwhile enterprise.The new insights into the system of conceptual structuring in language that have been coming from the relatively recent tradition of cognitive linguistics haverested mainly on the methodologies already standard in the field of linguistics overall: introspection in conjunction with theoretical analysis. The aim of the workshop that the present volume arises from was to help foster the application of additional methodologies to this emerging body of understanding. The spirit of the workshop and the papers here has been to value all of the applicable methodologies for their distinctive contribution to the total picture. Each methodology can be seen as having certain capacities and limitations that accord it a particular perspective on the nature of conceptual organization in language. In this respect, no single methodology is privileged over others or considered the gold standard of investigation. Though not all of them were represented at the workshop or are in this volume, the range of methodologies that apply to conceptual structure in language includes the following: introspection into the meanings and structures of linguistic forms and expressions, whether in isolation or in context, as well as the comparison of ones own introspections with those reported by others (the more recent notion of "metacognition" largely overlaps with that of introspection); the comparison of linguistic characteristics across typologically distinct languages and modalities (e.g., spoken and signed language); the examination of how speech events interact with context, such as with the physical surroundings, the participants background knowledge, or the cultural pattern; the analysis of audiovisual recordings of naturally occurring communication events, including their text, vocal dynamics, gesture, and body language; the (computer-aided) examination of collated corpora, often annotated; the examination of cumulatively recorded observations of linguistic behavior, as by children acquiring language; the experimental techniques of psycholinguistics; the instrumental probes of the brains linguistic functioning in neuroscience; and the simulations of human linguistic behavior in artificial intelligence. Used in conjunction with all of these is the methodology of analytic thought, which includes the systematic manipulation of ideas, abstraction, comparison, and reasoning, and which is itself introspective in character, though with its object of attention not limited to language, as in the case of the linguistic introspection otherwise treated here. A selection of these methodologies is considered next for their respective capacities and limitations, so as to demonstrate their complementary character.Because Cognitive Linguistics sees language as embedded in the overall cognitive capacities of man, topics of special interest for Cognitive Linguistics include: the structural characteristics of natural language categorization (such as prototypicality, systematic polysemy, cognitive models, mental imagery, and metaphor); the functional principles of linguistic organization (such as iconicity and naturalness); the conceptual interface between syntax and semantics (as explored by Cognitive Grammar and Construction Grammar); the experiential and pragmatic background of language-in-use; and the relationship between language and thought, including questions about relativism and conceptual universals. Crucially, there is no single, uniform doctrine according to which these research topics are pursued by Cognitive Linguistics. In this sense, Cognitive Linguistics is a flexible framework rather than a single theory of language. In terms of category structure (one of the standard topics for analysis in Cognitive Linguistics), we might say that Cognitive Linguistics itself, when viewed as a category, has a family resemblance structure: it constitutes a cluster of many partially overlapping approaches rather than a single welled-fined theory.Even so, the recognition that Cognitive Linguistics has not yet stabilized into a single uniform theory should not prevent us from looking for fundamental common features and shared perspectives among the many forms of research that come together under the label of Cognitive Linguistics. An obvious question to start from relates to the cognitive aspect of Cognitive Linguistics: in what sense exactly is Cognitive Linguistics a cognitive approach to the study of language?Terminologically, a distinction imposes itself between Cognitive Linguistics, and (uncapitalized) cognitive linguistics (all approaches in which natural language is studied as a mental phenomenon). Cognitive Linguistics is but one form of cognitive linguistics, to be distinguished from, for instance, Generative Grammar and many forms of linguistic research within the field of Artificial Intelligence. What, then, determines the specificity of Cognitive Linguistics within cognitive science? The question may be broken down in two more specific ones: what is the precise meaning of cognitive in Cognitive Linguistics, and how does this meaning differ from the way in which other forms of linguistics conceive of themselves as being a cognitive discipline? Against the background of the basic characteristics of the cognitive paradigm in cognitive psychology, the philosophy of science, and related disciplines (see De Mey 1992), the viewpoint adopted by Cognitive Linguistics can be defined more precisely.Cognitive Linguistics is the study of language in its cognitive function, where cognitive refers to the crucial role of intermediate informational structures in our encounters with the world. Cognitive Linguistics is cognitive in the same way that cognitive psychology is: by assuming that our interaction with the world is mediated through informational structures in the mind. It is more specific than cognitive psychology, however, by focusing on natural language as a means for organizing, processing, and conveying that information. Language, then, is seen as a repository of world knowledge, a structured collection of meaningful categoriesthat help us deal with new experiences and store information about old ones. From this overall characterization, three fundamental characteristics of Cognitive Linguistics can be derived: the primacy of semantics in linguistic analysis, the encyclopedic nature of linguistic meaning, and the perspectival nature of linguistic meaning. The first characteristic merely states that the basic function of language involves meaning; the other two characteristics specify the nature of the semantic phenomena in question. The primacy of semantics in linguistic analysis follows in a straightforward fashion from the cognitive perspective itself: if the primary function of language is categorization, then meaning must be the primary linguistic phenomenon. The encyclopedic nature of linguistic meaning follows from the categorical function of language: if language is a system for the categorization of the world, there is no need to postulate a systemic or structural level of linguistic meaning that is different from the level where world knowledge is associated with linguistic forms. The perspectival nature of linguistic meaning implies that the world is not objectively reflected in the language: the categorization function of the language imposes a structure on the world rather than just mirroring objective reality. Specifically, language is a way of organizing knowledge that reflects the needs, interests, and experiences of individuals and cultures. The idea that linguistic meaning has a perspectivizing function is theoretically elaborated in the philosophical, epistemological position taken by Cognitive Linguistics (see Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987; Geeraerts 1993). The experientialist position of Cognitive Linguistics vis-a`-vis human knowledge emphasizes the view that human reason is determined by our organic embodiment and by our individual and collective experiences.Cognitive linguistics is described as a movement or an enterprise because it is not a specific theory. Instead, it is an approach that has adopted a common set of guiding principles, assumptions and perspectives which have led to a diverse range of complementary, overlapping (and sometimes competing) theories.Cognitive linguists, like other linguists, study language for its own sake; they attempt to describe and account for its systematicity, its structure, the functions it serves and how these functions are realized by the language system. However, an important reason behind why cognitive linguists study language stems from the assumption that language reflects patterns of thought. Therefore, to study language from this perspective is to study patterns of conceptualization. Language offers a window into cognitive function, providing insights into the nature, structure and organization of thoughts and ideas. The most important way in which cognitive linguistics differs from other approaches to the study of language, then, is that language is assumed to reflect certain fundamental properties and design features of the human mind. As we will see throughout this book, this assumption has far-reaching implications for the scope, methodology and models developed within the cognitive linguistic enterprise. Not least, an important criterion for judging a model of language is whether the model is psychologically plausible.Cognitive linguistics is a relatively new school of linguistics, and one of the most innovative and exciting approaches to the study of language and thought that has emerged within the modern field of interdisciplinary study known as cognitive science. In this chapter we will begin to get a feel for the issues and concerns of practicing cognitive linguists. We will do so by attempting to answer the following question: what does it mean to know a language? The way we approach the question and the answer we come up with will reveal a lot about the approach, perspective and assumptions of cognitive linguists. Moreover, the view of language that we will finish with is quite different from the view suggested by other linguistic frameworks.Cognitive linguistics took its plays in the paradigm of modern world linguistic concepts. Its appearance and rapid development today is a typical feature of language study of century boarder. In cognitive linguistics we see new stage of study of difficult relationships between language and thinking, problems, which are typical particularly for national language study. The beginning of the research was laid by neurophysiologists, doctors, psychologists (P. Broka, K.Vernike, I. Sechenov, V.Bechterev, I.Pavlovandn others). Neurolinguistics was formed on the basis of neurophysiology (L.Vigotsky, A. Luriya). It became clear that language activity is processing in peoples brains, and that different kinds of language activities (language acquisition, listening, speaking, reading, writing etc.) are connected with different parts of the brain.The following stage of development of the problem of collocation of language and thinking was psycholinguistics, in the framework of which the processes of speech making and perception, processes of studying the language as a system of symbols saved in peoples mind, balance between the system of language and its usage and function were studied. (American psycholinguists are Ch. Osgud, T. Sebeok, J. Greenberg, J.Carrol and others, Russian linguists are A. Leontiev, I. Gorelov, A. Zalevskaya, U. Karaulov and others)Cognitive linguistics has been forming for the last two decades of the 20th century, but its subject- peculiarities of assimilation and working with information, ways of mental representation of knowledge through the language was noticed even in the first theoretical works on language study in 19th century. Thus, considering the theory of B. Humbold about national spirit, A. Potebnya admits the question about language foundation to be a question about phenomenon of spiritual life, going before the language, about rules of its formation and development, about its effect on the following spiritual activity, in this way to be only a psychological question.A. Potebnya believes that there are the strongest notions moving forward and the notions staying behind in spiritual activity. Exactly the strongest believes take part in the development of new thoughts (Herbarts law of apperception). A. Potebnya sees the role of association and the combination of associations in the development of images line very well.Problem questions: What did the development of cognitive linguistics as a science start from? What play does a language take in cognitive science? What are the main problems which are placed before cognitive linguistics at every stage of its development?

Lecture 2. The main trends of Cognitive Linguistics in works of native authorsAims: To study the main stages of Cognitive Linguistics development in works of native. To give characteristic to the main approaches distinguished by the authors

Modern cognitive linguistics is rapidly developing in various scientific centers all over the world, which leads to particular differences in approaches, categorical and terminological apparatus, understanding of the main aims of cognitive linguistics and applied methods. In the dissertation research and review papers, scientists are increasingly attempting to classify trends in modern cognitive linguistics. Recognizing the relativity of these classifications, however, we note that they have a sense, as different areas primarily use different methodological approaches the study of concepts.EY Balashova, describing prevailing in the domestic cognitive linguistics research areas, distinguishes two basic approaches: Cognitive and Lingvocultural.Lingvocultural approach would address the specifics of the national concept sphere of culture to consciousness. For researchers working within Lingvocultural approach, EY S. Balashova refers Stepanov, VI Karasik, VV Red, VA Maslov, NF Alefirenko etc. This approach defines concept as the basic unit of culture that has the figurative, conceptual and value components, with a predominance of the latter one (VI Karasik). Cognitive approach according to EY Balashova refers researchers who come from the fact that the basis of knowledge of the world is a unit of mental information, as a concept, which provides "access to the concept sphere of society." From the standpoint of Cognitive approach to the study of the concept was designed by the field model presented in terms of the core and the periphery. Representatives of this approach are ES Cubreacov, D. Popov, IA Sternin, VN Teliyu etc. EY Balashova, except the two mentioned approaches in cognitive linguistics, also allocates more psychological, psycholinguistic, neuro-psycholinguistic, semantic, logical and conceptual, logical analysis of cultural concepts and approach of the traditional linguistics, identifying the terms "concept" and "concept". A. Kostin described lingu-ocultural direction in cognitive linguistics. By his definition, linguo-cultural approach is based on the idea of cumulative (cumulative) of the language by which it is impressed, stored and transmitted experience of the people of his world view and attitude. Language, according to this view, is a universal form of initial conceptualization of the world and the rationalization of human experience, the exponent and guardian of the unconscious knowledge of the natural world, the historical memory of socially significant events in human life.By lingvokultural direction A. Kostin considers works of SG Vorkacheva, V. Vorobiev, VN Telii, G. Tokarev, F. Farkhutdinova, AT Hro-lenco, V. M. Shakleina etc. This may also include investigations of Kostomarov and EM Vereshchagin, VA Maslova, Vladimir Vorobiev.A. Kostin highlights a number of approaches in contemporary cognitive linguistics, "mentally-activational approach of SA Askold, the approach of individual speech by Likhachev, semantic approach (NF Alefirenko, A. Vezh-bitskaya, V. V. Kolesov, IP Mikhalchuk VP Neroznak), cultural studies (S. Stepanov, VI Karasik), logical approach (ND Arutyunov, TV Bulygin, AD Shmelev GV Makowicz, RI Pavilionis, MR ProskuryakovProskurjakova IG), cognitive approach (AP Grandmother, ES Cubreacov, D. Popov, IA Sternin , G. Tokarev, JF Richard, S. X. Lyapin, AV Kravchenko, GA Volokhina, GV Bykov), linguo-cultul approach (SG Vorkachev, VN Telia, FF Farkhutdinova). "V. Kolesov distinguishes cognitive linguistics (the connection between the word and the thing) cognitive linguistics (which studies the semantic "prototypes" - modality, mortgage, temporality and etc.) and conceptual linguistics that studies the actual concepts.C. Kuzlyakin differentiates psychological approach (Likhachev), logical (N Arutyunov and the school, "Logical Analysis of Language"), philosophical approach (V Kolesov), cultural approach (S. Stepanov) , integrative approach ( X. Lyapin, G Slyshkin) in cognitive linguistics. E Kubreacova separates classical cognitivism - research of knowledges structures and types predominantly by means of logical methods - and cognitive-discursive trend that is a logical development of the entire modern linguistics in general: "every linguistic phenomenon can be adequately described and clarified only in cases if it is considered at the intersection of cognition and communication ", the purpose of cognitive linguistics is not only to be associated with each language form its cognitive counterpart, its conceptual or cognitive structures (thus explaining the meaning or content of a particular form of cognitive structure, the structure of opinion or knowledge) but also to explain the reasons for the selection or creation of this "package" for the content. "N. Boldyrev fairly notes that it is possible speak of two stages in the development of cognitivism "early - logical, or objectivist, and modern experimental, based on experience." Thus, we can say, at least, that the following directions in cognitive linguistics, which are defined to date (refer to typical representatives of these areas): cultural - research of concepts as elements of culture by relying on data from different sciences (S. Stepanov) . Such studies are usually interdisciplinary, not exclusively related to linguistics, though they can run linguists (which allows us to consider this approach in the framework of cognitive linguistics), language in this case is the only one of the sources of knowledge of concepts (for example, to describe the concept of using data on the etymology of the word, the name of this concept); lingvo-cultural - study these language units concepts as elements of national lingvo-cultural study in their relationship with national values and national characteristics of the culture: the direction of "the language of the culture" (VI Karasik, SG Vorkachev, GG Slyshkin, Mr. Tokarev); logical - analysis of concepts by means of logical methods is directly related to their linguistic form (ND Arutyunov, RI Pavilionis); semantic and cognitive study of lexical and grammatical semantics of the language as a means of access to the content of the concept as a means of modeling the semantics of the language to the conceptual sphere (E Cubreacov, N. Boldyrev, Rachel's , E Lukashevich , A Grandmother, D. Popov, I Sternin, G Bykov); philosophical and semiotic study of cognitive foundations of semiotics (AV Kravchenko).Each of these can be considered as an already taken shape in modern linguistics, they all have their methodological principles (they are all primarily united by a theoretical understanding of the concept of consciousness as a unit) and they all have their supporters among linguists, cognitive science, they are quite well-known scientific schools. Of course, the proposed division of approaches as the reference of individual scientists to the different areas, are rather relative (many scientists at different stages of their scientific career are working within the framework of different concepts), but, nevertheless, such a classification reflects the key linguistic trends, which take place in the modern domestic cognitive.In addition, there are quite a number of works that share the actual identification of the concepts and the concept of the word: the traditional analysis of the semantics of speech called for an analysis of this concept, a semantic study cognitive linguistics. For example, V Myrkinsvery interesting and informative article on the types of the word begins with a phrase: "The concept, adopting a particular word is a (lexical) meaning of the word."Such identification is barren; it simply reflects the tendency to use a fashionable term concept, cognitive. The existence of such work once again explains the need for a system of presentation of the postulates of cognitive linguistics with a clear definition of its categories and the establishment of a relationship with the categories of traditional semasiology.Problem questions:What reflects the difference in approaches to the study of cognitive linguistics? What are the main approaches which can be identified in the works of authors? What trends in contemporary cognitive linguistics does the presented classification highlight?

Lecture 3.The main trends of Cognitive Linguistics in works of foreign scientists.Aims: To view the main approaches to Cognitive Linguistics in works of foreign authors To trace the similarities and differences of foreign and native approaches.

The cognitive linguistics enterprise is characterized by two fundamental commitments (Lakoff 1990). These underlie both the orientation and approach adopted by practicing cognitive linguists, and the assumptions and methodologies employed in the two main branches of the cognitive linguistics enterprise: cognitive semantics, and cognitive approaches to grammar, discussed in further detail in later sections.The first key commitment is the Generalization Commitment (Lakoff 1990). It represents a dedication to characterizing general principles that apply to all aspects of human language. This goal is just a special subcase of the standard commitment in science to seek the broadest generalizations possible. In contrast to the cognitive linguistics approach, other approaches to the study of language often separate the language faculty into distinct areas such as phonology (sound), semantics (word and sentence meaning), pragmatics (meaning in discourse context), morphology (word structure), syntax (sentence structure), and so on. As a consequence, there is often little basis for generalization across these aspects of language, or for study of their interrelations. This is particularly true of formal linguistics.Formal linguistics attempts to model language by positing explicit mechanical devices or procedures operating on theoretical primitives in order to produce all the possible grammatical sentences of a given language. Such approaches typically attempt precise formulations by adopting formalisms inspired by computer science, mathematics and logic. Formal linguistics is embodied most notably by the work of Noam Chomsky and the paradigm of Generative Grammar, as well as the tradition known as Formal Semantics, inspired by philosopher of language Richard Montague.Within formal linguistics it is usually argued that areas such as phonology, semantics and syntax concern significantly different kinds of structuring principlesoperating over different kinds of primitives. For instance, a syntax module is an area in the mind concerned with structuring words into sentences, whereas a phonology module is concerned with structuring sounds into patterns permitted by the rules of any given language, and by human language in general. This modular view of mind reinforces the idea that modern linguistics is justified in separating the study of language into distinct sub-disciplines, not only on grounds of practicality, but because the components of language are wholly distinct, and, in terms of organization, incommensurable.Cognitive linguists acknowledge that it may often be useful to treat areas such as syntax, semantics and phonology as being notionally distinct. However, given the Generalization Commitment, cognitive linguists do not start with the assumption that the modules or subsystems of language are organized in significantly divergent ways, or indeed that wholly distinct modules even exist. Thus, the Generalization Commitment represents a commitment to openly investigating how the various aspects of linguistic knowledge emerge from a common set of human cognitive abilities upon which they draw, rather than assuming that they are produced in encapsulated modules of the mind.The Generalization Commitment has concrete consequences for studies oflanguage. First, cognitive linguistic studies focus on what is common among aspects of language, seeking to re-use successful methods and explanations across these aspects. For instance, just as word meaning displays prototype effects there are better and worse examples of referents of given words, related in particular ways so various studies have applied the same principles to the organization of morphology (e.g., Taylor, 2003), syntax (e.g., Goldberg, 1995), and phonology (e.g., Jaeger &Ohala, 1984). Generalizing successful explanations across domains of language isn't just a good scientific practice it is also the way biology works; reusing existing structures for new purposes, both on evolutionary and developmental timescales. Second, cognitive linguistic approaches often take a 'vertical', rather than a 'horizontal' strategy to the study of language. Language can be seen as composed of a set of distinct layers of organisation the sound structure, the set of words composed by these sounds, the syntactic structures these words are constitutive of, and so on. If we array these layers one on top of the next as they unroll over time (like layers of a cake), then modular approaches are horizontal, in the sense that they take one layer and study it internally just as a horizontal slice of cake. Vertical approaches get a richer view of language by taking a vertical slice of language, which includes phonology, morphology, syntax, and of course a healthy dollop of semantics on top. A vertical slice of language is necessarily more complex in some ways than a horizontal one it is more varied and textured but at the same time it affords possible explanations that are simply unavailable from a horizontal, modular perspective.The second commitment is termed the Cognitive Commitment (Lakoff 1990). It represents a commitment to providing a characterization of the general principles for language that accord with what is known about the mind and brain from other disciplines. It is this commitment that makes cognitive linguistics cognitive, and thus an approach which is fundamentally interdisciplinary in nature.Just as the Generalization Commitment leads to the search for principles of language structure that hold across all aspects of language, in a related manner, theCognitive Commitment represents the view that principles of linguistic structureshould reflect what is known about human cognition from the other cognitive andbrain sciences, particularly psychology, artificial intelligence, cognitive neuroscience, and philosophy. In other words, the Cognitive Commitment asserts that models of language and linguistic organization proposed should reflect what is known about the human mind, rather than purely aesthetic dictates such as the use of particular kinds of formalisms or economy of representation (see Croft 1998 for discussion of this last point).The Cognitive Commitment has a number of concrete ramifications. First,linguistic theories cannot include structures or processes that violate known properties of the human cognitive system. For instance, if sequential derivation of syntactic structures violates time constraints provided by actual human language processing, then it must be jettisoned. Second, models that use known, existing properties of human cognition to explain language phenomena are more parsimonious than those that are built from a priori simplicity metrics. For example, quite a lot is known about human categorization, and a theory that reduces word meaning to the same mechanisms responsible for categorization in other cognitive domains is simpler than one that hypothesizes a separate system for capturing lexical semantics. Finally, it is incumbent upon the cognitive linguistic researcher to find convergent evidence for the cognitive reality of components of any proffered model or explanation.Having briefly set out the two key commitments of the cognitive linguistics enterprise, we now briefly map out the two, hitherto, best developed areas of the field. Cognitive linguistics practice can be roughly divided into two main areas o research: cognitive semantics and cognitive (approaches to) grammar. The area of study known as cognitive semantics is concerned with investigating the relationship between experience, the conceptual system, and the semantic structure encoded by language. In specific terms, scholars working in cognitive semantics investigate knowledge representation (conceptual structure), and meaning construction (conceptualization). Cognitive semanticists have employed language as the lens through which these cognitive phenomena can be investigated. Consequently, research in cognitive semantics tends to be interested in modelling the human mind as much as it is concerned with investigating linguistic semantics. A cognitive approach to grammar is concerned with modelling the language system (the mental grammar), than the nature of mind per se. However, it does so by taking as its starting points the conclusions of work in cognitive semantics. This follows as meaning is central to cognitive approaches to grammar.4 It is critical to note that although the study of cognitive semantics and cognitive approaches to grammar are occasionally separate in practice, this by no means implies that their domains of inquiry are anything but tightly linked most work in cognitive linguistics finds it necessary to investigate both lexical semantics and grammatical organization jointly.As with research in cognitive semantics, cognitive approaches to grammar have also typically adopted one of two foci. Scholars such as Ronald Langacker have emphasized the study of the cognitive principles that give rise to linguistic organization. In his theory of Cognitive Grammar, Langacker has attempted to delineate the principles that structure a grammar, and to relate these to aspects of general cognition.The second avenue of investigation, pursued by researchers including Fillmore and Kay, Lakoff),Goldberg and more recently Bergen and Chang (2005) and Croft (2002), aims to provide a more descriptively and formally detailed account of the linguistic units that comprise a particular language. These researchers attempt to provide a broad-ranging inventory of the units of language, from morphemes to words, idioms, and phrasal patterns, and seek accounts of their structure, compositional possibilities, and relations. Researchers who have pursued this line of investigation are developing a set of theories that are collectively known as construction grammars. This general approach takes its name from the view in cognitive linguistics that the basic unit of language is a form-meaning pairing known as a symbolic assembly, or a construction.Cognitive semantics, like the larger enterprise of which it is a part, is not a unified framework. Those researchers who identify themselves as cognitive semanticists typically have a diverse set of foci and interests. However, there are a number of guiding principles that collectively characterize a cognitive approach to semantics. In this section we identify these guiding principles (as we see them). In section 5 we explore some of the major theories and research areas which have emerged under the banner of cognitive semantics. The four guiding principles of cognitive semantics are as follows:i) Conceptual structure is embodied (the embodied cognition thesis)ii) Semantic structure is conceptual structureiii) Meaning representation is encyclopaediciv) Meaning construction is conceptualizationConceptual structure is embodiedDue to the nature of our bodies, including our neuro-anatomical architecture, we have a species-specific view of the world. In other words, our construal of reality is mediated, in large measure, by the nature of our embodiment. One example of the way in which embodiment affects the nature of experience is in the realm of color. While the human visual system has three kinds of photoreceptors (i.e., color channels), other organisms often have a different number. For instance, the visual system of squirrels, rabbits and possibly cats, makes use of two color channels, while other organisms, including goldfish and pigeons, have four color channels. Having a different range of color channels affects our experience of color in terms of the range of colors accessible to us along the color spectrum. Some organisms can see in the infrared range, such as rattlesnakes, which hunt prey at night and can visually detect the heat given off by other organisms. Humans are unable to see in this range. The nature of our visual apparatus one aspect of our embodiment determines the nature and range of our visual experience. The nature of the relation between embodied cognition and linguistic meaning is contentious. It is evident that embodiment underspecifies which color terms a particular language will have, and whether the speakers of a given language will be interested in color in the first place (Saunders, 1995; Wierzbicka, 1996). However, the interest in understanding this relation is an important aspect of the view in cognitive linguistics that the study of linguistic meaning construction needs to be reintegrated with the contemporary study of human nature. The fact that our experience is embodied that is, structured in part by the nature of the bodies we have and by our neurological organization has consequences for cognition. In other words, the concepts we have access to and the nature of the reality we think and talk about are a function of our embodiment. We can only talk about what we can perceive and conceive, and the things that we can perceive and conceive derive from embodied experience. From this point of view, the human mind must bear the imprint of embodied experience. This thesis, central to cognitive semantics, is known as the thesis of embodied cognition. This position holds that conceptual structure (the nature of human concepts) is a consequence of the nature of our embodiment and thus is embodied.Semantic structure is conceptual structureThe second guiding principle asserts that language refers to concepts in the mind of the speaker rather than, directly, to entities which inhere in an objectively real external world. In other words, semantic structure (the meanings conventionally associated with words and other linguistic units) can be equated with conceptual structure (i.e., concepts). This representational view is directly at odds with the denotational perspective of what cognitive semanticists sometimes refer to as objectivist semantics, as exemplified by some formal approaches to semantics. However, the claim that semantic structure can be equated with conceptual structure does not mean that the two are identical. Instead, cognitive semanticists claim that the meanings associated with linguistic units such as words, for example, form only a subset of possible concepts. After all, we have many more thoughts, ideas and feelings than we can conventionally encode in language. For example, as Langacker (1987) observes, we have a concept for the place on our faces below our nose and above our mouth where moustaches go. We must have a concept for this part of the face in order to understand that the hair that grows there is called a moustache. However, there is no English word that conventionally encodes this concept (at least not in the non-specialist vocabulary of everyday language). It follows that the set of lexical concepts, the semantic units conventionally associated with linguistic units such as words is only a subset of the full set of concepts in the minds of speaker-hearers.Meaning representation is encyclopedic The third guiding principle holds that semantic structure is encyclopedic in nature. This means that lexical concepts do not represent neatly packaged bundles of meaning. Rather, they serve as points of access to vast repositories of knowledge relating to a particular concept or conceptual domain (e.g., Langacker 1987). Of course, to claim that lexical concepts are points of access to encyclopedic meaning is not to deny that words have conventional meanings associated with them. Meaning construction is conceptualization. The fourth guiding principle is that language itself does not encode meaning. Instead, as we have seen, words (and other linguistic units) are only prompts for the construction of meaning. Accordingly, meaning is constructed at the conceptual level. Meaning construction is equated with conceptualization, a process whereby linguistic units serve as prompts for an array of conceptual operations and the recruitment of background knowledge. Meaning is a process rather than a discrete thing that can be packaged by language.Problem questions: What has the main role in performing thinking activity according to one of the approaches of 90s? Works of which scientists did influence Cognitive Linguistics as a science? What contribution did Lakoff make for cognitive science?Topic 3.The main categories of cognitive linguisticsLecture 1.ConceptAims: Give the definition to the notion of concept View the structure of the concept1.1 The notion of the conceptConceptsare the constituents of thoughts. Consequently, they are crucial to such psychological processes as categorization, inference, memory, learning, and decision-making. This much is relatively uncontroversial. But the nature of conceptsthe kind of things concepts areand the constraints that govern a theory of concepts have been the subject of much debate. This is due, at least in part, to the fact that disputes about concepts often reflect deeply opposing approaches to the study of the mind, to language, and even to philosophy itself.oncepts are psychological entities, taking as its starting point the representational theory of the mind (RTM). According to RTM, thinking occurs in an internal system of representation. Beliefs and desires and other propositional attitudes enter into mental processes as internal symbols. For example, Sue might believe that Dave is taller than Cathy, and also believe that Cathy is taller than Ben, and together these may cause Sue to believe that Dave is taller than Ben. Her beliefs would be constituted by mental representations that are about Dave, Cathy and Ben and their relative heights. What makes these beliefs, as opposed to desires or other psychological states, is that the symbols have the characteristic causal-functional role of beliefs. (RTM is usually presented as taking beliefs and other propositional attitudes to be relations between an agent and a mental representation (e.g., Fodor 1987). But given that the relation in question is a matter of having a representation with a particular type of functional role tokened in one's mind, it is simpler to say that occurrent beliefs just are mental representations with a characteristic type of functional role.)Many advocates of RTM take the mental representations involved in beliefs and other propositional attitudes to have internal structure. Accordingly, the representations that figure in Sue's beliefs would be composed of more basic representations. For theorists who adopt the mental representation view of concepts, concepts are identified with these more basic representations.Early advocates of RTM (e.g., Locke (1690/1975) and Hume (1739/1978)) called these more basic representations ideas, and took them to be mental images. But modern versions of RTM assume that much thought is not grounded in mental images. The classic contemporary treatment maintains, instead, that the internal system of representation has a language-like syntax and a compositional semantics. According to this view, much of thought is grounded in word-like mental representations. This view is often referred to as the language of thought hypothesis (Fodor 1975).Some philosophers maintain that possession of natural language is necessary for having any concepts (Brandom 1994, Davidson 1975, Dummett 1993) and that the tight connection between the two can be established on a priori grounds. In a well known passage, Donald Davidson summarizes his position as follows:

We have the idea of belief only from the role of belief in the interpretation of language, for as a private attitude it is not intelligible except as an adjustment to the public norm provided by language. It follows that a creature must be a member of a speech community if it is to have the concept of belief. And given the dependence of other attitudes on belief, we can say more generally that only a creature that can interpret speech can have the concept of a thought. Can a creature have a belief if it does not have the concept of belief? It seems to me it cannot, and for this reason. Someone cannot have a belief unless he understands the possibility of being mistaken, and this requires grasping the contrast between truth and errortrue belief and false belief. But this contrast, I have argued, can emerge only in the context of interpretation, which alone forces us to the idea of an objective, public truth.(Davidson 1975, p. 170).

The argument links having beliefs and concepts with having the concept of belief. Since Davidson thinks that non-linguistic creatures can't have the concept of belief, they can't have other concepts as well. Why the concept of belief is needed to have other concepts is somewhat obscure in Davidson's writings (Carruthers 1992). And whether language is necessary for this particular concept is not obvious.1.2 The structure of conceptsJust as thoughts are composed of more basic, word-sized concepts, so these word-sized conceptsknown as lexical conceptsare generally thought to be composed of even more basic concepts.The classical theoryIn one way or another, all theories regarding the structure of concepts are developments of, or reactions to, the classical theory of concepts. According to the classical theory, a lexical concept C has definitional structure in that it is composed of simpler concepts that express necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under C. The stock example is the concept BACHELOR, which is traditionally said to have the constituents UNMARRIED and MAN. If the example is taken at face value, the idea is that something falls under BACHELOR if it is an unmarried man and only if it is an unmarried man. According to the classical theory, lexical concepts generally will exhibit this same sort of definitional structure. This includes such philosophically interesting concepts as TRUTH, GOODNESS, FREEDOM, and JUSTICE.Before turning to other theories of conceptual structure, it's worth pausing to see what's so appealing about classical or definitional structure. Much of its appeal comes from the way it offers unified treatments of concept acquisition, categorization, and reference determination. In each case, the crucial work is being done by the very same components. Concept acquisition can be understood as a process in which new complex concepts are created by assembling their definitional constituents. Categorization can be understood as a psychological process in which a complex concept is matched to a target item by checking to see if each and every one of its definitional constituents applies to the target. And reference determination, we've already seen, is a matter of whether the definitional constituents do apply to the target.The classical theory has come under considerable pressure in the last thirty years or so, not just in philosophy but in psychology and other fields as well. For psychologists, the main problem has been that the classical theory has difficulty explaining a robust set of empirical findings. At the center of this work is the discovery that certain categories are taken to be more representative or typical and that typicality scores correlate with a wide variety of psychological data (for reviews, see Smith &Medin 1981, Murphy 2002). For instance, apples are judged to be more typical than plums with respect to the category of fruit, and correspondingly apples are judged to have more features in common with fruit. There are many other findings of this kind. One other is that more typical items are categorized more efficiently. For example, subjects are quicker to judge that apples are a kind of fruit than to judge that plums are.What other type of structure could they have? A non-classical alternative that emerged in the 1970s is the prototype theory. According to this theory, a lexical concept C doesn't have definitional structure but has probabilistic structure in that something falls under C just in case it satisfies a sufficient number of properties encoded by C's constituents. The prototype theory has its philosophical roots in Wittgenstein's (1953/1958) famous remark that the things covered by a term often share a family resemblance, and it has its psychological roots in Eleanor Rosch's experimental treatment of much the same idea (Rosch&Mervis 1975, Rosch 1978). The prototype theory is especially at home in dealing with the typicality effects that were left unexplained by the classical theory. One standard strategy is to maintain that, on the prototype theory, categorization is to be understood as a similarity comparison process, where similarity is computed as a function of the number of constituents that two concepts hold in common. On this model, the reason apples are judged to be more typical than plums is that the concept APPLE shares more of its constituents with FRUIT. Likewise, this is why apples are judged to be a kind of fruit faster than plums are.The prototype theory does well in accounting for a variety of psychological phenomena and it helps to explain why definitions may be so hard to produce. But the prototype theory has its own problems and limitations. One is that its treatment of categorization works best for quick and unreflective judgments. Yet when it comes to more reflective judgments, people go beyond the outcome of a similarity comparison. If asked whether a dog that is surgically altered to look like a raccoon is a dog or a raccoon, the answer for most of us, and even for children, is that it is remains a dog (see Keil 1989, Gelman 2003 for discussion). Another criticism that has been raised against taking concepts to have prototype structure concerns compositionality. When a patently complex concept has a prototype structure, it often has emergent properties, ones that don't derive from the prototypes of its constituents (e.g., PET FISH encodes properties such as brightly colored, which have no basis in the prototype structure for either PET or FISH). Further, many patently complex concepts don't even have a prototype structure (e.g., CHAIRS THAT WERE PURCHASED ON A WEDNESDAY) (Fodor &Lepore 1996, Fodor 1998; for responses to the arguments from compositionality, see Prinz 2002, Robbins 2002, Hampton &Jnsson 2011).One general solution that addresses all of these problems is to hold that a prototype constitutes just part of the structure of a concept. In addition, concepts have conceptual cores, which specify the information relevant to more considered judgments and which underwrite compositional processes. Of course, this just raises the question of what sort of structure conceptual cores have.The theory theoryAnother and currently more popular suggestion is that cores are best understood in terms of the theory theory of concepts. This is the view that concepts stand in relation to one another in the same way as the terms of a scientific theory and that categorization is a process that strongly resembles scientific theorizing (see, e.g., Carey 1985, 2009, Gopnik&Meltzoff 1997, Keil 1989). It's generally assumed, as well, that the terms of a scientific theory are interdefined so that a theoretical term's content is determined by its unique role in the theory in which it occurs.The theory theory is especially well-suited to explaining the sorts of reflective categorization judgments that proved to be difficult for the prototype theory. For example, theory theorists maintain that children override perceptual similarity in assessing the situation where the dog is made to look like a raccoon, claiming that even children are in possession of a rudimentary biological theory. This theory, an early form of folk biology, tells them that being a dog isn't just a matter of looking like a dog. More important is having the appropriate hidden properties of dogsthe dog essence (see Atran&Medin 2008 on folkbiology). Another advantage of the theory theory is that is supposed to help to explain important aspects of conceptual development. Conceptual change in childhood is said to follow the same pattern as theory change in science.One problem that has been raised against the theory theory is that it has difficulty in allowing for different people to possess the same concepts (or even for the same person to have the same concept over time). The reason is that the theory theory is holistic. A concept's content is determined by its role in a theory, not by its being composed of just a handful of constituents. Since beliefs that enter people's mental theories are likely to be different from one another (and are likely to change), there may be no principled basis for comparison (Fodor &Lepore 1992). Another problem with the theory theory concerns the analogy to theory change in science. The analogy suggests that children undergo radical conceptual reorganization in development, but many of the central case studies have proved to be controversial on empirical grounds, with evidence that the relevant concepts are implicated in core knowledge systems that are enriched in development but not fundamentally altered (see Spelke 1994 on core knowledge).Conceptual atomismA radical alternative to all of the theories we've mentioned so far is conceptual atomism, the view that lexical concepts have no semantic structure (Fodor 1998, Millikan 2000). According to conceptual atomism, the content of a concept isn't determined by its relation to other concepts but by its relation to the world.Conceptual atomism follows in the anti-descriptivist tradition that traces back to Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, and others working in the philosophy of language (see Kripke 1972/80, Putnam 1975, Devitt 1981). Kripke, for example, argues that proper names function like mere tags in that they have no descriptive content (Kripke 1972/80). On a description theory one might suppose that Gdel means something like the discoverer of the incompleteness of arithmetic. But Kripke points out we could discover that Schmitt really discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic and that Gdel could have killed Schmitt and passed the work off as his own. The point is that if the description theory were correct, we would be referring to Schmitt when we say Gdel. But intuitively that's not the case at all. In the imagined scenario, the sentence Gdel discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic is saying something false about Gdel, not something trivially true about the discoverer of the incompleteness of arithmetic, whoever that might be (though see Machery et al. 2004 on whether this intuition is universal).Kripke's alternative account of names is that they achieve their reference by standing in a causal relation to their referents. Conceptual atomism employs a similar strategy while extending the model to all sorts of concepts, not just ones for proper names.At present, the nature of conceptual structure remains unsettled. Perhaps part of the problem is that more attention needs to be given to the question of what explanatory work conceptual structure is supposed to do and the possibility that there are different types of structure associated with different explanatory functions. We've seen that conceptual structure is invoked to explain, among other things, typicality effects, reflective categorization, cognitive development, reference determination, and compositionality. But there is no reason to assume that a single type of structure can explain all of these things. As a result, there is no reason why philosophers shouldn't maintain that concepts have different types of structure. For example, notice that atomism is largely motivated by anti-descriptivism. In effect, the atomist maintains that considerable psychological variability is consistent with concepts entering into the same mind-world causal relations, and that it's the latter that determines a concept's reference. But just because the mechanisms of reference determination permit considerable psychological variability doesn't mean that there aren't, in fact, significant patterns for psychologists to uncover. On the contrary, the evidence for typicality effects is impressive by any measure. For this reason, it isn't unreasonable to claim that concepts do have prototype structure even if that structure has nothing to do with the determination of a concept's referent. Similar considerations suggest that concepts may have theory-structure and perhaps other types of structure as well.One way of responding to the plurality of conceptual structures is to suppose that concepts have multiple types of structure. This is the central idea behind conceptual pluralism. According to one version of conceptual pluralism, suggested by Laurence & Margolis (1999), a given concept will have a variety of different types of structure associated with it as components of the concept in question. For example, concepts may have atomic cores that are linked to prototypes, internalized theories, and so on. On this approach, the different types of structure that are components of a given concept play different explanatory roles. Reference determination and compositionality have more to do with the atomic cores themselves and how they are causally related to things outside of the mind, while rapid categorization and certain inferences depend on prototype structure, and more considered inferences and reasoning depend upon theory structure. Many variants on this general proposal are possible, but the basic idea is that, while concepts have a plurality of different types of structure with different explanatory roles, this differing structure remains unified through the links to an atomic representation that provides a concept's reference. One challenge for this type of account is to delineate which of the cognitive resources thich are associated with a concept should be counted as part of its structure and which should not. As a general framework, the account is neutral regarding this question, but as the framework is filled in, clarification will be needed regarding the status of potential types of structure.Problemquestions:Do the concepts and their components differ in various languages? Why? Arethereanyuniversalconceptswhichareappropriatetomostlanguages of the world?

Lecture 2. Sphere of concepts (Conceptual system of a language)Aims: Give the definition to the sphere of concepts Consider the relation between a concept and the sphere of concepts Study how is the sphere of concepts organizedThe human conceptual system is not open to direct investigation. Nevertheless, cognitive linguists maintain that the properties of language allow us to reconstruct the properties of the conceptual system, and to build a model of that system. The logic of this claim is as follows. As language structure and organization, a