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    Lectures Evaluating Democratic Governance in Europe

    Lecture 2: assignmentsJames Maddison

    Denmark: the structural reform

    -normative standards employed (ought)--> vision of outcomes/achievements:-strengthened democracy; -improved task solution.

    -empirical propositions (what are the assumptions underlying the research agenda/claims) -increasing size municipalities will helpimproving task solution (+); -plus will strengthen democracy at locallevel (+). (statistical positive + normative positive)

    Aristotle-normative standards employed--> -self-sufficient; -incapable of consitutional government.-empirical propositions--> -municipal size (key instrumental value); -task solution (+); -democratic strenght (-).normative standards look similar, but they differ in empirical propositions.(standards which need to be achieved)

    ES assignment-RPM (normative theory model);-confrontation with empirical evidence (requirements);-proposal.(Madison + Mach.)

    Responsible Party Model (as a normative model)(first chapter book, on BB)--> if you want electoral democracy--> several conditions

    Arnold Brecht (Jumping the Gulf)

    = conditional becommendations

    Example: what if Aristotle were right?municipal size--> (+) task solution (-) democratic strenghtpolicy recommendation to be given--> conflict of values, political job not a scientifical one--> be conditional,(in assignment, respect the conditionality in the formulation in the proposals)don't use Google Scholar!!

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    Lecture 3: classical democracy and its critics

    -basic principles of Greek democracy-critics; Plato and Aristotle

    city states could decide everything within the municipality, sovereign powers

    polishuge differences between population size and the citizenship number (1/7 of totalpopulation)--> many were thus excluded from citizenship

    normative standards of democracy--> polis as social and political ideal(s)-harmonious common life(s)-capacity of its members found natural and spontaneous outlet(p)-as many citizens as possible to take active part, no discriminationon the basis of talent, would have a function in society and in harmony with others (s)each citizen would fulfill a role (but not all are citizens)

    peruckes: isokratia and isonomia-administration in hands of whole people;-equality before the law;-no man be rejected to be of service of the state (also military).

    principle of equality

    exclusion of slaves and women

    civic freedom is not individualistic freedom-free and tolerant in our private life (but citizens ought to participate);-"useless character"

    major Athenian institutions-Ecclesia (role for the assembled people); -isogoria (right to speak and make proposals) -at least 6000 would be needed to make valid decisions -40 sessions per year-elections for office that require particular competences;-lottery of executive offices and the courts.

    lottery--> in NL, it is easier to become a member of parliament thanks to political friendsthan because of competences

    ancient democracy-two basic values;-basic assumption of the principle of essentially equal qualification;-three democratic institutions.

    Plato and Aristoteles-both share Athenian ideal of " harmonious life in the city"

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    Plato is the moral of the two-whole ideal of equal qualification is crap, nonsens;-true knowledge can only be acquired by philosophers;-knowledge of what is good/how it should be developed--> the "idea of the good" is a formof knowledge, where if people differ about what a good life would look like, either one mustbe wrong (objective knowledge is possible).

    -->we should give power to the people who are supposed to know (allegory of the cave).ordinary citizens are comparable to people who are put in a cage, who only see the realityoutside the cave in the form of a shadowplay to the wall they are forced to look at. Don'thave real knowledge of real shape of things, just bad assumptions. Only the philosophersknow what the good life is, they are not in the cave.

    Greece--> let the economists do the work (ECB for Europe)-Mario Draghi (ECB);-Lucas Papademos (Greece).They are not dependent on popular decisions/elections.

    Aristoteles: wisdom of crowds-agrees with Plato on not liking democracy as well -puts too much power in hands of ignorance -not as far as early Plato-believes in wisdom of crowds -if we ask a large enough group of people to think about things, the common

    opinion may be more right than even the best opinion of an expert.-jury theorem (de Condorcet)-goodness and intelligence of many people are brought together

    Aristoteles-habits and laws result of public opinion;-democracy is lack of decisiveness and demagegues;-polity is virtuous: -aristocracy (small group and knowledgeable); -laws (based on sober public opinion).

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    Lecture 4: republicanism

    -Marilius of Padua-Machiavelli

    The Rise of the Roman Empire

    -rise of Christianity-Constantine became a Christian: move capital from Rome to New Rome/Constantinople

    Fall of the Roman Empire-two Roman Empires--> both were under external pressure (invading Germans/Saxionsand Muslims trying to invade)

    Gelasius II: two swords doctrine-constant conflict between the pope, church-leader, and the emperor, worldy-leader.-pope and followers claimed supreme power (explicitly done in work of Gelasius II; pope)-pope was vicar of God (vicar-->vice-->representative) on earth (thus the replacement ofGod on earth, in the supreme position of saying what is good for everyone, including kingsand emperors)-Church was the most important of the two swords-->source of number of conflicts between pope and kings/emperors

    Marsilius of Padua: defesor pacis-people who don't listen to God will be doomed to hell-no earthly sanctions following from the law of Good-any pope saying that he knows the laws of God etc., are denied by Marsilius-pope should not have any wordly powers

    -second part--> laws of God play role in Church, Church can have own powers withinChurch, but Council of Bishops is better for seeing the will of God (not one mortal)-collective wisdom of groups, not individual citizens

    Basic normative and empirical propositions(n)-state exists for the sake of living well -good life comes close to the Greek's-living well is living in a community (citizen can find its natural place)-function of state is the maintenance of community, that they can live in peace(e)

    -without state, community would disintegrate

    institutions 2: unified rule based on laws made by the citizen body-"body of citizens or the more dominant part of them"-pope should not have wordly power, but it should go elsewhere--> citizen body-one source of power in society should be at organ that makes the laws--> citizen body(1) "it would be insecure to entrust the making of the law to the discretion of the few"one powerful person would be risky, temped to misuse it(2) " the common utility of a law is better noted by the entire multitude, because no oneknowingly harms himself"

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    The dominant part?-no women-all adult men capable: have the time (mechanics as human beings) -so those who do the work would be excluded, because they don't have the time forreflection--> old Greek distinction between citizens and slaves, more or less the same-no modern political sovereignty based on full equality

    assembly or representation?-primary legislator are the people as a whole-representatives are there with limited time with specific instructions-political representation based on idea of strict delegation, heavy control of citizens-merely voice of people-representatives are delegates: should follow preferences of their constituents

    absolute sovereignty-acknowledges that it may be efficient to let the execution of laws in the hand of an electedking, for practical matters-legislator is absolutely sovereign

    Form strong stable state-if we want to establish a strong state in Italy, there should be a strong visionary leader inthe state formation process-based on empirical proposition

    sustaining a strong stable state-more groups at power would help-discord between the plebs (people) and the senate made Rome both free and powerful

    -through competition you get three effects

    conditions republican government-respect for custom and tradition-large middle class and inhabitants of towns should dominate-popular power institutionalized-civic virtue has not decayed-knowledge of these factors-->if prevail--> republican government is possible and should be triedCreating a stable repulic in the absence requires immortal effort

    testable theory of republican or mixed governancemixed government-->political competition --> three effects, provided that five conditions(above) are met

    protective

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    Lecture 5: the developental tradition and political participation

    two republican traditions-developmental-protective

    17th and 18th century--> dominance of absolute monarchism (Louie 14)Roussearu"empirical" theoretical modelhuman nature:-is not a given, but malleable, depending on the circumstances-not inherently bad, though he may be corrupted -assuming that human are bad, so ruler has to be hard to subjects (Machiavelli)three stages of "historical" development of human kind-state of nature: human innocence and equality, citizens isolated, equal in strenght andcapacities, cope with their environment on their own, with small family, recognize that lifewould be better if there would be cooperation--> start thinking of collaboration-->buildingcommunities/societies/states-corrupt existing society and tyrannical government, absolute monarchies-reformed society, based on proper institutions, that do not corrupt the citizens and do notlead to corrupt governing, if we reform them, things might go better--> tasks for himself

    normative standards-equality-common good-->freedom to contribute on basis of equality to the common good (notnegative freedom) -->positive freedom

    social contract: basis civil freedom-answer Rousseau -->obeys no one but himself-all authority to cengtral authority--> alienating public authority--> still feel citizens as jointauthority as if the person self would act-unsolved question--> obey no one but himself to transfer of authority to general will?

    general will = common good-distinction general will and individual will-will of all concerns private interest, general will is common interests

    absolute sovereignty: forced to be free!-general will in the common interests-in each individual's well conceived self-interest-temptation "to enjoy the rights of a citizen without doing the duties of a subject" -citizens should have fair share of community life, obedience to rules--> if not,

    community would disintegrate -force people to be free--> commitment to social contract implies that whoever doesnot obey, will be forced

    weathar or not!!! (Atzeni, 2011)

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    self government in assembly-"the assembled people should have determined the constitution of the state by givingsanction to a body of laws" -constitution if set of rules, important for substantive rules-role of assembly goes further, in the consitution if of prime importance, importantsubstantive decisions

    -all major decisions should be made by assemblies, thus should meet regularly-fixed date-->sure to take place, no one can postpone them -if you would make executive office responsible for setting the dates for assemblymeetings, they won't be held as regurlarly, gives executives too much freedom

    -allow all citizens to participate (no women!, don't qualify the criteria)

    no representation nor divided powers-should not be democratic-no representation, but agents, no free mandates-cannot decide finally-->can be retaken by Assembly-no genuine division power away from government, united in Assembly

    public service a duty-citizen rights prime importance-all citizens in republics should serve common cause-pay representatives and stay at home--> country is in trouble

    civic duties instead of civic rights-should common good prevail over individual interests

    tabula rasa

    -through proper education you can install virtues of democratic citzenship in citizens

    developmental republicanism-citizens participation in law-making is essential for good life in a community(developmental view)-should participate within community-based on idea of equality (not women)-absolute popular sovereignty (based on duties, rather than rights)

    John Stuart Mill-liberal democrat in many respects

    -pro representation (unlike Rousseau) -pro separation of legislative power and executive powers--> separated, you cansingle out experts that make up executive branch, counterbalances lamens power(?), secure balance where one cannot override the other-importance of civil rights (no absolute sovereignty)

    inclusiveness-first advocates of general universal voting rights for all citizens

    -all citizens over a certain aige -not completely equal--> lower class only 1 vote, higher more votes (plural votes,weight in proportion with expertise and property) -non tax payers cannot decide on something they do not pay for-free basic education, for making something of their life and having good citizenship(more general than Rousseau)-->free is revolutionary

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    participation: individual development-it not only means to voice preferences and protect own interests-also way for personal development of the citizen -skills--> only through active participation

    -"we can't let ignorant participate"--> no, if you don't let them do it, they can't becapable, give them the opportunity

    Mill introduced by de Tocqueville

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    Lecture 8

    James Mill, Weber, Wilson (monocentrism): today

    James Mill-politician

    -utilitarianism -individuals try to maximize own pleasure -state should help them--> make sure that society is as happy as possible-state: goal to prevent individuals harm each other-problem: how to prevent the state from doing individuals harm?citizens are best judges of what is in their own interests and have freedom to do so.

    prescription 1: no divisions of power(like Hobbes)-balance of power does not work-theory of balance is just a fairytale-the citizens/representatives in Assembly, are likely to be dominant over by representativesof Monarchy/Aristocracy who are in charge of executive power--> dominate legislativebranch-make sure that people's representatives/Assembly--> have dominance of power--> so nodivision of power, but a state where it is guaranteed that representative Assembly will bedominant in the political system

    what else?-direct democracy: too costly (on a large scale)-representation as a vehicle for democracy: "the grand discovery of modern times"

    -major instrument that makes sure that will of people will dominate in political system-elections: all married males over 40 (his definition of 'citizens')

    elections-guarantee against exploitation by elected members?-no division of power due to abuse of powers against will of people, how can we assurethat that won't happen with representatives of the people, that they won't enlarge theirinterests at the cost of the people?-two prescriptions: -periodic elections: control + throw out representatives

    -"identity of interests" --> 1 year, no re-election (not only professionals (own

    interests), also regular people, who they indeed represent)

    no counterpart!

    new challenges: mass democracy and bureaucracy-labor unions-socialist parties

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    John Stewart Mill-son of previous Mill-utilitarian and liberal democrat--> elections and representation for democracy-importance of participation (as one of few liberals): developmental effects-questions -how to combine democracy with need for skilled administration with influence of

    laymen? -how to control expanding state bureaucracies?his solutions-provide all citizens with opportunities for learning by doing -include citizens in system + give them skills needed-plural vote: wisest citizens more influence (despite of former) -classical liberal citizens extra votes-system of representation for legislature: wisest and ablest(although broad participation, still elitist!!) -not in favor of direct democracy, but representatives--> guarantee of the ablest -deliberation would prevent unwise decisions from being passed-doing administration: trained professionals-control of administration: in hand of legislature

    Max Weber-sociologist-influences in theory of democracy (!!!)-analyzes social trends in economy and society-social trends -rationalization: increasing role for expertise (bureaucracy)

    -modernization, increasing fragmentation, variety of group identities; factions -all sorts of special organizations, social groups--> social fragmentationimplications for liberal democracy?-2 dilemmas -popular sovereignty or expert government -how can that be brought together?

    -right (law) or might (power)-how can we ensure that the power given to the government will be used insuch a way that follows the law

    prescription: fuhrerdemokratie-directly elected president--> important place in the democratic system -central power in political system -in relation of president to executive brand of government (bureaucracy), with

    regard to bureaucracy he is chef der exekutive, head of civil servents -important powers in relation to parliament: eines aufschiebenden vetos und derbefugnis der parlementsauflosung und volksbefragung --> power to veto legislationby parliament + dessolve parliament when it doesn't conform to the idea of chefexekutive + call for referendums

    -centrum of power clearly in hands of president -danger of factions will be prevented because he said this one president will prevent"ohnmachtige preisgabe an klungel"

    -dominance of executive: rather than dominance of legislature

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    -wants to ensure that there is dominance of particular center of power--> directlyelected power, on unitary basis -different to Mill--> locus center of power is different--> legislative branch dominant

    Schumpeter: democractic elitism-Weber--> directly elected president + role of people (however the parliament is not that

    important)-Schumpeter: "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving atpolitical decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of acompetitive struggle for the people's vote" -only realistic way in which democracy can operate, because he is convinced of the

    necessity of participatory democracy--> citizens are not interested (?) -leave it to the leaders--> ignorants should not intervene-indirect influence: elections to provide mandate to political elite, who will govern -competition as way to express preferences and to control elites -to select citizens the leader that they want + what they do with power

    Schumpeter democracy: less knowledge required-elections-->competition-->democratic control-citizens are not able to understand the complexity

    __

    additional provision: expertise through bureaucracy(Weber)1. vertical differntiation: hierarchy2. horizontal differentiation (between sectors) and clear distribution of responsibilities3. expertise and professionalism: basis for appointmentdilemma 2: control over power-there is room for parliamentary control: will provide legislation (although if president doesnot agree: referendum/veto)-major principle of his theory of political democracy is that the basis for government shouldbe provided by laws-parliament has powers of control over the president, but the power lies with the presidentas head of administration

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    Lecture 9: political representation

    flaw of David Held book: doesn't say much on process of political representation

    approach to representation-democratic representatives--> do they look like those who they represent?

    -acting for--> who the representative is does not matter, but what they do is important -trustee theory -party modelJames Mill-the notion of political representation as one of the most important discoveries of moderndemocracies-because he thinks that the institutional representation is important because it guaranteesan identity between the people that represent and those that are represented-all is lost if the interests of the choosing body are not the same with those of thecommunity-all citizens same chance of getting representation in assembly that represents the people

    Jeremy Bentham(worked with Mill)-composition of legislative assembly should be in proportion with the interests of thecommunity-important that in the public debate all shapes of preferences amongs the population are inthe public debate, so they can play a role in the decisions at the end-in favor of system of representation where all sorts of groups are able to enter theparliament--> proportionate representation system (all people are thus represented)

    they should look like the people they represent

    Burke (trustee model)-parliament should not be considered as a congrss of ambassadors or agent/advocates;-but should be someone who is part of a deliberative assembly of one nation (no particularinterest, but nation as a whole)-general good-this interpretation of role of representatives is based on: -focus of representation--> should be representing interests nation as a whole, not

    only his party/region

    -should not be a delegate/agent but should have freedom to listen to otherarguments and then decide in terms of national interest

    Burke: two dimensions-style --> how much freedom should the representatives take in the desire from those whochose them?-focus--> whose interestBurke--> trustee/general interest

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    acting for: reponsiviness-representation in essence is about representing the interests of the people-this does not always imply that a MP should act precisely in accordance to the wishes-->can follow own ideas--> always ask himself if you take a different position, can I explainit/is it in the interests of the people I am representing?-people's interests always in back of his mind--> can you explain it to your voters/always

    do the act of explaining, why he/she is not following their precise line of thought= notion of responsiviness representationrepresentative tries to act with idea of voters in his mind

    Schumpeter: competition-acknowledging the rise of party competition in western democracies-associated with notion of democracy formulated by Burke/Weber: democracy" ...." (lecture slide)

    Schumpeter-no high regard of competences of voters-he made the comparison with the bakery/stero--> it asks a limited amount of rationality,but even that degree is up for debate whether or not it is there

    Anthony Downs: competition-voters: b*p-c -b is policy preferences (benefits) -p is chance to affect result (probability) -c is voting costs-parties: vote maximization platform/ideology instrument-smallest distance maxim: voters vote for parties that are closest to their preferences-->voters vote rationality, on the above motions-->spend little effort to gather information because the costs, what you loose in terms ofbenefits, is rather small if you don't cast your vote correctly-->party representatives are carreer-oriented-->parties are interested in vote maximization and they make a set of promises to citizens(will vote on that basis)--> party platform/attractive ideology that summarizes their mainpoints--> voters vote without high information costs--> voting on basis on superficialformulated party idelogy, no detailed knowledge

    R wins (closer to M)

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    Lecture 10: 1/3 lectures book Lijphart

    previous lectures (within liberal democracies)-monocentric tradition -polycentric tradition-responsible government -representative governmentpolycentric--> all public offices should be directly elected (/indirected controlled),separation of powers to prevent different offices from misuse

    importance of responsible government where elections are contested between two partiesthat then, if conditions are filled, offer citizens choice of party platforms and party that winsthe elections will be able to implement programmes and the government is closest tomajority of citizens in terms of party platform

    not all systems fulfill the conditions for such responsible party government

    multi-party systems--> citizens have diversity choice options, disadvantage that the vote ofgovernment is not always in line with voters' casts, by voting the parliament can representtheir opinon but not the government with the majority (representative government)--> no control over composition of government that will be in office after elections

    Arend Lijphart"Patterns of Democracy"

    Bently, Truman: pluraslism-stable democracies are only possible in societies that have cross-cutting cleavages.Society where there are groups, but those groups are not homogeneous in terms of social

    composition;"when individuals.."--> psychological cross-pressuresif members of society are members of organization where they meet people of differentbackgrounds, they get different perceptions and learn to understand that people can in factbe kind--> acceptance of differences, where there is cross-pressure: climate in which thereis at least less feeding grounds for annomosity between the different religions"morover, leaders.."--> political cross-pressuresif the leaders of organizations are working in such a climate, they are not in pressure tocreate stereotype of "they vs us", because they are in the same group, tendency ofmoderation because of the leaders where they deal with a variety of opinions within thegroup--> climate of moderation (essential for political stability)

    pillarization: plural society-no cross-cutting, but mutually reinforcing cleavages -all memberships were in 1 line, alined along the pillars, segmented society which

    was wrong, according to pluralistic theory--> rise of concerns of stability of thesetypes of democracies

    -worries about stability democratic systems -pluralistic theory -weimar republic-Lijphart: how it is possible that Nl is a stable democracy -knowing the worries of divided society, Nl still stable democracy-Nl may not be unique: other plural societies

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    definition of plural society-social divisions (etnic/religious/cultural/etc.)-institutionialized in state and society (so not alone the social divisions) -organized in other social divisions -mutually reinforcing one another-result intensive cleavages

    -distinction between two religionsgeneral argument-for survival of plural societies it is essential that there is a wise elite that recognises thedangers of plural society, well aware of the inherent danger of desintegration/instability ofsuch a society-->democracy in such a society cannot survive (pluralism/s prophecy)-prudent elite--> people from politics, are ware of dangers, strive for compromises that willcontain the dangers/allow conditions for stable democracy-what they should do in such a situation is a form of constitutional engineering: resulted inpacification of dangers of plural society, because the elite was aware of the prophecy ofpluralism and tried to prevent collapse by taking measures that would invalidate thehypothesis--> self-denying prophecy--> because they knew the prophecy/instability, tookmeasures to make this prophecy not come true

    what to do?-subsidiarity (!!) -pillars were allowed a lot on internal autonomy, state powers were decentralized to

    organizations within the pillars (housing-->catholic associations, not one national)-positions in politics and administration: distributed on the basis of proportionality -distribution on this basis to different nominations in society (top position: equal

    distribution for people from different backgrounds in fair manner)

    -cooperation at the top (broad coalitions) -between representatives of elites: provide leadership, compromises, because theyare aware that if they don't cooperate there will be civil war/disintegration stabledemocracy

    -politics behind closed doors, business like-passive citizens: elections as census -not too much mass political participation--> if they would, divisions would prevail,

    difficult for prudent leadership at the top -this attitude of citizens will help -only participation in elections--> pillarized phenomenon of elections, often times"volkstelling", because (next slide)

    -very stable over time--> these elections are thus merely census -know the size of pillars, outcome is to be predictedstable, but democratic?-criticism -no transparency; grand coalitions; no choice for voters (mere census) -no opportunities for citizen participation beyond elections -no referendum, only elections-defense -"Is it fair to judge the Dutch system with the criteria of an ideal typical model of a

    democratic society?" -in a plural society the most danting task is trying to secure stability and dothat in a most democratic way--> so not a fair comparison

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    -heterogeneity: peaceful coexistence is priority. Take deviations from puredemocratic ideals for granted

    from consociationalism to consensus democracy-if I think more about this, I'm becoming convinced that this kind of Dutch type of

    democracy is not a second-best as compared to US-model, but it may perform better(Lijphart)-provides secure for instabilty, and ingredients for healthy kind of democracy

    one question: two answers"government of the people, by the people and for the people"-in that sens, a fundamental question is: "who will do the governing and whose interestsshould they answer to?" -two basic types of democracies (two answers) -majority democracy type-->majority should do the governing and be source

    of inspiration for those that govern (Anglo-Saxon)

    -more polycentric, based on representative government--> as many peopleas possible should be included in government and should be kept in mindwhen government is making its policies (Dutch)

    models: ten key variablesbetween minimum (majority) and maximum (consensus)(electoral system, party system, cabinet, executive, interest groups, federalism,parliament, constitution, judicial review and central bank)

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    Lecture 12: Institutions of liberal democratic systems III

    -patterns or random choice?-how can we explain variatios in the institutional choices in democracies?-what are the consequences of variations in institutional design for the quality ofgovernance?

    ten variables: two models?(first 4 in lecture 11)Lijphart expects that institutional choices are not random, but corehence between them.Correlations, associations between differenct characteristics along the lines (exp.correlations 1, 2-4)

    relation: electoral and party system-line: slope is downwards-> the larger the dispr., the lower the parties;

    relation: electoral system and type of coalition-the more dispr., the less likely there are to be greater parties, small coalitions;-slope up--> plus correlation, as strong as previous one

    relation ten variablesLijphart does not expect random combinationsbut two together:-all the characteristics are associated/highly correlatedwhat you see: to certain extent it is the case-->there are thus two sets of variables: party-executive + federalismrather than all correlated, 5 and 5 are correlated amongst themselves, and weakly

    correlated between the 2 sets

    md = majoritarinism dimensiontake scores on ten variables, compute scores based on characteristics, computedfederalism and executive-party on dimensions

    question 2

    2 dimensions of democracy, why do countries make a choice on the party-executivedimension/more to right or to leftIsrael, PnG, India were part of British Colonies as well--> although they are sharing history,

    plural societes suggests that pluralism also playes a roleexplain differences in countries in have more/less executive score--> two main variablesexplaining it: being part of common wealth (cw) is important and high scores are negativelyassociated with degree of pluralismcountries with plural societies have chosen to change their constitutions to cope withchallenges of plural societies (indicated in first lecture)

    why do countries make a choice on the federalism dimensionNZ and UK high degree, GER and US low degree-up high--> smaller than low (territorial and population terms);-again pluralism (SWI has high degree cultural segmentation and large degree ofautonomy for different cultures)size (small countries up) matters + pluralism plays role (many in green circle are pluralist)

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    question 3

    what is quality of governance-->input/throughput vs output-democratic quality vs exconomic management order and safety welfareInglehart: quality of outputsrelation democracy and aspects of performance political systems, it is important to beaware of the possiblity that if we find the correlation, it may not be the result of a causalrelation between them (correlation storks and birth rates--> spuriousness)looks for supriousness--> checks economic development (democracy may be morepresent in certain types of economies) pluralism (characterized by particular types ofdemocracy) and size

    Lowell's axiom in politics (Lijphart)one party majority cabinets are needed for effective policy makingobjectives:-fast decissions are not necessarily wise;-regular cabinet changes lead to high policy instability over time; -the next cabinet may undo the work the former did--> society does not know where

    to go, policies tend to change all the time, may not necessarily be good foreconomic and social problems

    -broad support: no veto powers in implementation; -slow decision making process, but stronger-broad support: less social unrest.

    -social unrest after having made the decisions -unlinke consensus democracieschoice political system tends to affect types of outcomes you havce (conclusion 2)

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    Lecture 13: the institutions of EU democracy

    how can we characterize EU democracy-Lijphart--> 2 decisions of constitutions--> shape party-system + desireble degreedecentralization

    where would we put the EU?-in 1--> highly consensual (EXAMM for why that is the case)(question on "describe choices of EU that is in fact in 1" --> know the 10 variables!!)EU: consensus democracy par excellence (!!!)-typical is cabinet (commission)-legislative in EU is bicameral (EP + Council) --> both powerful and thus (Lijphart)considered to be symmetric in their power + incongruent in their composition -->so strong bicameralism (strong element consensualism in the EU)(could you show for 2/3 variables having to do with the party executive dimension why wecan consider EU to be strong case of consensual democracy and illustrate on 2/5characteristics on federalist dimension (!!!!))

    explaining variations: corrobartion Lijphart's thesis"why do constitions makers op for a more or less consuensual type of democracy overmajoritarian?"the reason why they do so is because thy want to deal with the problems of a pluralsociety (not only substantive degree of social division + sharp divisions between thegroups in society (mutually re-inforcing cleavages)--> conflict, unstable)

    the EU society is very different, languages traditions religions, different countries, etc-->highly polarizedplural society is the main reason for consensual institutions + size!(second question)

    Hix: EU remarkable accomplishment Small Large&not plural society Large&plural societyNo democracy China, RussiaDemocracy Nl, Ger USA EU(first explain why the EU is indeed an accomplishment!!)

    Hix--> the EU makes an ever bigger accomplishment, because the US is not plural and isa large state (cross-cutting cleavages) so no plural society--> moderate challengelarge and plural society--> only example where you can find democratic institutions (sovery content over EU)

    Hix: could be even better3 major flaws-policy gridlock: lack of decisiveness (now)-lack of legitimacy (next)-democratic deficit (next)

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    The calculus of consent-->understand basis of gridlock--> founders of EU/current leaders are confronting dilemmaimage that you would have to write the constition for new EU and you don't know yourposition after the implementationlegitimacy of having been draft on non-partisan basis, mutual person

    dilemma: two costs, two values-external costs: undesirable decision--> value of national autonomyhow do the costs of the und. decisions vary with different types of decison rules?near unanimity would be greater for more important than for less important-decision-making costsmaking decisions + implementingvalue of effectiveness and efficiencysome of the costs are for different types of decisions/life and death-->speedy decisionmaking-->costs will increase very much

    what is the best rule?-NOT the intersection-rational person--> minimize sum of both costs (C+D)-where minimum lies depends on the type of decision being made--> crisis vs crucial-any decision is better than no decision/endless meetings-matter of life and death--> someone just needs to act, no matter who

    conclusions1) majority rule not self-evident, nor optimal2) trade-off autonomy - effectiveness -getting it the national way vs effectiveness3) optimum differs between type of decision-point K -varies with homogeneity of a group (totally homogenious on type of decision-->

    one-man-rule is not that bad, everybody agrees (external costs zero)

    Buchanan & Tullock: other institutional provisions alternative for unanimity-bicameralism: consent of two symmetric and incongruent chambers: lowers external costswithout using very unclusive decision-rules, (near) unanimity -institutional choice (strong bicameral system) may be good for external costs

    without raising high decision making costs-decentralization (subsidiarity)

    -leaving decision powers to more homogeneous, smaller communities (national andsubnational) -"best of both worlds"; low external and decision costs

    implications for EU decision-making-highly consensual decision arrangements (no simply majority on major issues) -inclusive decision rules -other CD institutions-Hix: less consensual than in the past -e.g. from unanimity to QMV -this system in the EU also has advantages of course!Hix: policy gridlock not due to institutional make-up -changes in the issue agenda: more redistributive issues (rather than efficiency

    policies)

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    -issue agenda--> in the past EU decision making was about issues thatimplied efficiency gains, currently it is more about re-distributive policies -efficient here

    redistributive policies-issues are on chaning policies to new policies--> from x to a new situation, adopt new

    policies-assume that all alternatives are allocated on line AY--> change from x to new mightinvolve very beneficiary situation A and where B looses everything-other extreme is vice versa-there are situations where A + B win--> so all policies there would be efficiency-winsituations (only if alternative lie on different lie, under the lowest schuine line)

    gridlock?-relatively optimistic -already less consensual than before (can be better) -for instance: adoption QMV -institutions provide rules of the game: do not completely determine the run of a

    game!!!--> types of issue are more important, if the game would be played moreproperly, no need for institutional change

    -before financial crisis -requires new balance national and EU competences (budgetary discipline Eurocountries) -requires stronger provisions for crisis decision making

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    Lecture 14: the institution of EU Democracy II

    question 3 and 4What are the consequences of variations in institutional design for the quality ofgovernance in EU?-policy gridlock (national interests stand in the way)

    How can we improve the quality of governance in the EU?

    quality: output or processoutput; policy gridlockprocess; popular legitimacy, democratic deficit (procedural/institutional legitimacy)

    -->many citizens do not support EU, lacks legitimacy-->democratic quality of democratic procedures

    Weber--> not only look at procedures, but also see what people think on it (what Hix saysin chapter 4)

    why decline?-(Hix) utilitarian considerations: "what do I get out of this?"

    -->currently, the importance of these considerations are much more important thanpeople's support for EU; the EU has difficulties in performing in breaking through the policygridlock, implementing policies and responding quickly to problems in MS

    -Ireland and England were against the EU in the beginning; in Ireland thesupport has risen (one of highest), England has remain stable (lack ofsupport in UK)--> Hix: result that Irish have benefit a lot, huge subsidies, thusthey were convinced that they got a lot out of the EU, the British did not -Dutch--> supported the EU for years, declined when the Dutch were payingmore than receivingutilitarian support as explanation for MS, and explain support at individual levels, groups

    (graph)

    skilled workers & manual workers-level of support higher for skilled; higher pay (more they earn, more support) --> benefit more from openness of the EU, opportunities-manual workers have increase up to a certain level, after that it decreases

    -->(Hix); level of pay to a certain extent also reflects level of skills + (in some MS)the high salaries can be result of labour unions has better deals--> EU rather athreat with its liberalization, less opportunities of mobilization

    democratic deficit: four refuted claims Iclaim:-national parliaments are key democratic institutions in national politics, and they play onlya marginal role in EU-EU falls short in this senseHix--> 4/5 claims on the EU are falseHix:-national elections are about government performance (parliament is not that central); notas crucial, elections on their future plans, limited, it is about governance (Council in EU)-national parliaments: relatively powerless domestically compared to government

    -governments most prominent actors-EU more supranational: the lesser importance of national parliaments is even proper

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    democratic deficitclaim:-EU parliament is powerlessHix:-increased powers of EP; -right to amend and veto legislation -right to veto selection of Commission-more independent (stronger) than national parliaments than governmentsthirdclaim:-EU politics is too distant and opaqueHix:-the EU decision-making process is in essence most transparent -more than national -for people that are interested, it is out in the open--> as long as a proportion of the

    people is in fact interested

    fourthclaim:-EU politics are not what citizens want. They have a neo-liberal bias and learn towardsinterests of business/multinationalsHix:-because of checks and balances EU policies are typically rather centrist: broad coalitionsrequired: because support of all major parties is required dominance by special interests isunlikely

    democratic deficit: one legitimate claimclaim:in the EU there is too little political competition for political power-there are EP elections, but are far less important than they should/could be

    proposals Hix: winner takes more-elect president of EP for 5 years;-replace pure PR system for commitee chairs-open contest for Commission Chairmanship -rival candidates before EP elections -program and debate -winning program guiding work of Commission and winner selecting the membersHELD AND LIJPHART MOST IMPORTANT

    example 1(Held)