Leaman - Does the Interpretation of Islamic Philosophy Rest on a Mistake163133

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Does the Interpretation of Islamic Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?Author(s): Oliver LeamanReviewed work(s):Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Dec., 1980), pp. 525-538Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/163133 .

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526 Oliver Leaman

understanding these devices and reading the text in accordance with an appre-ciation of their role. So the conclusion must be, on the standard interpretation,that we must examine such texts with suspicion and ask ourselves what the au-thor was really getting at; only then can we grasp what the author is about in hiswork. The standard interpretation provides, then, a methodological paradigmin terms of which samples of philosophy will be studied and analyzed. There isa great deal to be said for such a paradigm, since an important distinction canbe made between exoteric (zahir) and esoteric (bdtin) works.2 There are alsoworks that fall between such clear cases, works that are exoterically orthodoxbut that have features pointing to aspects of the argument that only those fit andproper to understand such philosophy would appreciate.3 In that case, the faithof the masses is not challenged while the wise elite are provided with an ac-count, albeit disguised, that discusses the philosophical aspects of a certainproblem. This strategy is apparently followed by God in his gift of the Qur'dn,which is itself a representation of two doctrines, one exoteric and to be ac-cepted by all believers, and one esoteric and available only to those capable ofrecognizing it. Ibn Rushd rather neatly categorized the different kinds of textsinvolved in terms of different sorts of reasoning, each type being appropriate toa different group in society. So demonstrative reasoning is appropriate to a dif-ferent group - philosophers - than dialectical reasoning, which is correct fortheologians. Rhetorical, sophistical, and poetic formulations of an argumentare designed for the masses. It is one of the excellences of Islam, according toIbn Rushd, that it provides the possibility of assent to its doctrines to anyone,regardless of intelligence or social position.4 Ibn Rushd severely criticized themixing up of such types of reasoning; he argued that it can result only in mysti-fication and disbelief. Certain representations of one's views are appropriatefor certain purposes; like tools they should be directed to an end rather thanemployed haphazardly. The trouble with writing a book is that it may end up inthe hands of those for whom it is not intended and actually do them damage, inthe sense of endangering their faith. It may, on the other hand, do the philoso-pher damage, in that its publication may lead to the popular, albeit erroneous,belief that he is advocating disbelief, or at the very least, heresy.5

It is worth noting, though, that this caution toward writing does not providegrounds for caution toward philosophy itself, since the philosopher can in con-versation distinguish between those to whom it is worthwhile or safe to talk andthose who should not be addressed on such issues. That is the problem withwriting: it is indiscriminate and so unsatisfactory - a fact that explains the ten-dency of faldsifa, like Maimonides, to address their controversial work to aspecific individual.6 A point that the standard interpretation makes is that the

faldsifa try in their written works to duplicate the sorts of controls and safe-guards they could apply to their oral teaching. Thefaldsifa tried to write in sucha way that whoever read them would find only what it was in his capacity tounderstand. An ordinary person would not find his faith threatened by readingeven a specifically philosophical work, since the way in which it is writtenwould put him off from continuing with it, while a philosopher would put upwith the contradictions, repetitions, and dryness of the text.7 But this strategy

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Interpretation of Islamic Philosophy 527

with respect to the presentation of philosophical views to the public suggests aquestion: what really are the beliefs of the practitioners of this form of writing?Did the falasifa set out to deceive people with their apparent orthodoxy andhidden heterodoxy? Thefaldsifa themselves were very aware of this issue. Atthe beginning of his Hayy ibn Yaqzdn, Ibn Tufayl catalogued briefly the incon-sistencies between the opinions expressed by the same author in differentworks in the case of Ibn Sina, Farabi, and even Ghazali.8 He does this in such away as to suggest that such comparisons were commonly made at the time. Forexample, he makes this observation about Farabi:

In the Ideal Religion he affirms hat the souls of the wicked live on forever n infinitetorments after death. But in his Civil Politics he says plainly that they dissolve into

nothing and that only the perfected souls of the good achieve immortality. Finally n hiscommentary on Aristotle's Ethics, discussing human happiness, he says that it existsonly in this life, and on the heels of that has words to the effect that all other claims aresenseless ravings and old wives' tales. This makes mankind at large despair of God'smercy.9

Ibn Tufayl makes a good point here. There certainly does appear to be amarked distinction between the claims thefalasifa make in their popular worksand the claims they make in works unlikely to have been of much interest to thegeneral public. For example, Farabi's accounts of Plato and Aristotle in hismore

popular writings(like his

Agreementand The Virtuous

City) presenta dif-

ferent view of these thinkers, and one more in line with Islam, than those in themore specialized works on the Greeks like his Philosophy of Plato, Philosophyof Aristotle, and Attainment of Happiness. Strauss has also remarked upon thefact that Farabi's Summary of Plato's Laws is markedly different from its sup-posed source, Plato, and imports all kinds of religious expressions and con-cerns that are entirely absent not just from Plato (as Farabi knew him) but fromFarabi's own book Philosophy of Plato itself. Strauss has also emphasized thesignificance of the distinction between the Mishneh Torah and the Guide for thePerplexed, the former being a standard work offiqh and the latter a discussion

(accordingto

Strauss,forbidden

bythe

Law)of how to

explaindifficult

pas-sages in the Law to those confused by what they found in it. He spends a greatdeal of time in pointing to Maimonides's judicious and self-conscious use ofcontradiction to put off those not capable of appreciating his teaching.10 Whatall these contrasts are designed to show (and many more are available from theworks of the faldsifa) is that we must approach this type of thought in a veryspecial way, not just because it is concerned with problems that may be specifi-cally medieval, but because the way in which it is written is intended to ensure(insofar as this is possible in a writing) that it will be read by only a certain typeof reader. Unless we understand this basic fact about such writing, we shall notbe able to enter into it but will be condemned to have

onlya

superficial graspof

exactly what is happening when we confront such a text.The standard interpretation is in fact a reaction to an older type of interpreta-

tion, according to which the faldsifa managed, by and large, to reconcile reli-gion and philosophy, and their writings showed how this feat could be accom-



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528 Oliver Leaman

plished.1 This type of interpretation was itself a reaction to the earlier view(largely based on the nature of Averroism in medieval Christian Europe) thatthefalasifa were rationalists who rejected the values and beliefs of the commu-nity of Islam in favor of what they had learned from Aristotle and Greek logic.The standard interpretation rejects the position that the reconciliation was suc-cessfully carried out as a view that was, in fact, propagated by the Muslimphilosophers themselves in their effort to convince their fellow Muslims thatthe teachings of philosophy did not contradict the revealed teaching, and thatphilosophic activity, far from undermining religion, was undertaken in defenseof the faith.'12 It is significant that both the standard interpretation and previ-ous types of interpretation all share a certain assumption - that the conflict be-tween religion and philosophy, an aspect of the clash between belief and disbe-lief, is a constant theme and interest of thefialcsifa. They are merely taken todiffer in their answers to the question of how thefalasifa deal with this constanttheme, whether by dissimulating their genuine antireligious philosophical be-liefs or by bringing their religious and philosophical beliefs into genuine har-mony. Often when there is a dispute in philosophy between two alternatives,both of which seem capable of reasoned support and argument, it is impossibleto settle the dispute because it presupposes a common assumption that is itselffalse. The common assumption here is that the conflict between belief and dis-belief is a crucial theme of Islamic philosophy (all Islamic philosophy), and thiscommon and often tacit presupposition deserves some critical attention.

It will be suggested here that some aspects ofjalsafa are not touched by thispresupposition. We should reexamine the influence that Greek philosophy hadon the Islamic philosophers. What thefialdsifai learned from the Greeks was notlimited to a number of interesting doctrines that appear to be inconsistent withIslamic revelation, such as the eternity of the world or difficulties about corpo-real immortality, and so on, although the opposition to falsafa often centersupon such issues. What the falasi'f learned from the Greeks was an en-tirely new way of thinking, a system of constructive logical thought that pro-vided its users with great conceptual power. This capacity for logical thoughtwas largely, but certainly not entirely, represented by Aristotle; that is why hefascinated thefalasifa - not because he supported theories of the eternity of theworld or the impossibility of corporeal immortality. What made such awkwardtheories interesting was that Aristotle seemed to arrive at them using the princi-ples of valid demonstrative reasoning, and so they presented a problem insofaras they were examples of respectable logical thinking that are possibly opposedto aspects of Islamic teaching. The conflict between religion and philosophy inthe medieval world is often represented as being a conflict between orthodoxyin religion and such issues as the age of the world and the nature of immortality,and that indeed is how it is represented in many of the discussions that touch

directlyon these issues.13 But Aristotle's thinking in these areas was felt to be

problematical by thefalasifa because it was based on arguments they could ac-cept as formally valid and it appeared to oppose what they accepted on thebasis of revelation. What specifically interested thefalasifa was the form of theargument, not the conclusion or its premises. In works directed at other philos-



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ophers and not at the general public they did not go in much for discussing

Islam,not because

theywere not

reallydevout Muslims, but because

theywere

doing philosophy, and Islam is a religion, not a philosophy.14Of course, the obvious rejoinder in defense of previous interpretations offal-

safa will point out that thefalasifa spent much time apparently reconciling phi-losophy and religion. This does not show, though, that this conflict was of greatimportance to them as philosophers. To be sure, it was a problem they dealtwith, and the editing and translating offalsafa have often concentrated on suchworks, but it would be a mistake to conclude from this that such a theme wasthe major problem or interest for such thinkers. Rather, the religion-vs.-philos-ophy works are selected for attention because they are thought to be central,which leads to a

self-fulfilling prophecy.Such works,

however,are

completelyovershadowed in both size and importance by the expository commentariesand analyses of the Greek philosophers and logicians. The conflict between re-ligion and philosophy does not arise for the Greeks in the form of an oppositionbetween a revelation and a philosophy as it did for thefalasifa, and so there isnext to no mention of the subject in their discussion of the works of the Greeks.Adherents of the standard interpretation realize this and are obligated to ac-count for it. They account for it by relating what thefalasifa have to say in theirtechnical works about the conflict between religion and philosophy. They arguethat the apparently merely logical comments thefalasifa make have an extra-

logicalreference and that in

uncoveringthis reference we

maydiscover what

the work is really about. Let us take a relatively uncomplicated example ofthe standard interpretation being used with respect to the relationship betweendemonstrative and dialectical reasoning in the work of Ibn Rushd. In his ShortCommentary on Aristotle's Topics Ibn Rushd correctly represents Aristotle'sthesis on the distinction between two types of valid reasoning. One type iscalled demonstrative and is based on true premises, and the other type is calleddialectical and is based on merely probable premises. Now, on the standardinterpretation this discussion of Aristotle must be taken to conceal somethingbecause it fails to mention religion. In spite of this failure, Ibn Rushd is taken torefer to

religion indirectly.As Butterworth

saysin his account of the

text,The whole presentation appears very arid, and one cannot help but wonderwhy Averroes would have been content to insist upon all these technical con-siderations, in order to make such a minor point. The answer is relatively sim-ple: the tedious technical discussion is a screen for a more important substan-tive argument. 15 It may well be thought, though, that since Ibn Rushd wascommenting on Aristotle, a writer not noted for his exciting style, it is hardlysurprising that his discussion is rather dry.16 Of course, someone uninterestedin logic might find such an argument very arid, minor, and tedious, alldescriptions that are used by Butterworth. However, Ibn Rushd, like Aristotle,

thoughtthat

the distinction betweena demonstrative

reasoningand the

useof

dialectic is most important if we are to understand why and how different argu-ments work or fail to work. This, like any other logical distinction, is of greatinterest to the logician, and that in itself justifies the process of establishing log-ically the distinction.



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way than by refuting alternatives. As Ghazali points out, this does not providea great deal of backing for one's own position, since both it and its negationsmay be based upon a false premise.

Now, it is important to get the order of priority right here when discussingthe relationship between Ibn Rushd's logical arguments and their theologicalapplication. The attack upon the mutakallimun can be mounted because theyoften logically err in their applications of dialectic, and they often try to usedialectic to establish as true the premises of their arguments, something thatdialectic is just not capable of doing.23 There is no need to approach IbnRushd's commentaries with suspicion and ask what is the significance of whatis missing, or of what is implied as opposed to what is said. There is nothing tobe uncovered, no mysterious forms of representation that require interpreta-tion. Ibn Rushd is merely presenting a logical commentary on Aristotle, whichis by no means a slavish adaptation of the Greek text, but which is entirely un-enigmatic. It is written in a manner perfectly consistent with the standard formof philosophical logic of that period. The references to the mutakallimun (not, itis worth noting, in the commentary on the Topics, but in the commentary onthe Rhetoric) are merely contemporary illustrations of logical points that Aris-totle made. But the standard interpretation assumes that the conflict betweenreligion and philosophy must have been something uppermost in Ibn Rushd'smind even when he was apparently commenting upon Aristotle's logic; evena commentary on logic must, it is felt, be a reflection of an obsession with sucha conflict. Such a thesis is without foundation and seeks to find what is notthere and never was intended to be there.

It might be admitted in defense of the standard interpretation that it is not anappropriate method for dealing with logical works offalsafa. After all, there islittle cause for dissimulation concerning logic, since it is hardly likely to be reador understood by nonphilosophers, nor could it easily be thought to be antago-nistic to Islam or to any other religious doctrine. Butterworth's application ofthe standard interpretation to logic could then be seen as overenthusiastic.Logic deals with rules of reasoning and has nothing to do with religious doc-trines. But the falasifa did not restrict their interest in Greek philosophy tologic; they were interested in more sensitive areas insofar as religion is con-cerned, areas such as ethics, politics, and metaphysics. Perhaps the standardinterpretation is more successful in these areas in explaining what it is that thefalasifa are about and how they express themselves to their intended audience.This is of course to be expected; they were often careful not to appear to chal-lenge the accepted norms of Islam in their writings, and their works are oftenpresented in such a way as to put off or placate the ignorant and orthodox non-philosophers while at the same time stimulating the interest of the philosophi-cally minded.

Agood example

of how this issupposed

to work can be found in Strauss'saccount of Farabi, which is paradigmatic of the standard interpretation. Ac-cording to Farabi, Plato presents his teaching by means of allusive, ambigu-ous, misleading, and obscure speech 24 and was a master of dissimulation. Heis supposed to have criticized Aristotle for the relative simplicity and clarity of



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his style, which makes his meaning plain to anyone.25 According to the stan-dard interpretation, this discussion of dissimulation should cause interpretersof Farabi's writings to ponder about what he is really getting at. What strikes areader of Farabi's Summary of Plato's Laws is how different that summary isfrom what it is supposed to summarize. It almost seems to be a summary of adifferent book. It is even quite different from Farabi's own account of Plato andhis philosophy,26 which discusses Plato without any special regard for religionin general or Islam in particular. But the Summanr talks about God, Shari'a,the other life, and divine laws, managing not to mention the word philoso-phy once. Strauss suggests that Farabi disguised his real opinions about Platoin the Summary by the use of noncommittal expressions that signify neitheragreement nor disagreement. Strauss catalogues some of the different ways inwhich Farabi refers to Plato's doctrines and claims that the different expres-sions used sometimes can be seen to express different shades of agreement oropinion concerning their importance. A tentative conclusion is made byStrauss:

Farabi may have rewritten he Laws, as it were, with a view to the situation hat wascreated by the rise of Islam. ... He may have tried to preserve Plato's purpose byadapting he expression of that purpose o the new medium . . . he may have desired toascribe his revised version of Plato's teaching to the dead Plato in order to protect thatversion, or the sciences generally peaking, especially by leaving open the question as to

whether he agreed with everything his Plato taught and by failing to draw a precise linebetween his mere report and his independent exposition.27

Now, according to Strauss and the standard interpretation, Farabi must beup to something in his Summary; after all, Farabi agreed with Plato certainlyto the extent that he, too, presented what he regarded as the truth by means ofambiguous, allusive, misleading, and obscure speech.'28 Strauss himselfmakes many allusive and suggestive comments about what that truth is fromFarabi's point of view. The description Strauss provides of the Summary suc-ceeds in clouding it in the same sort of mystery and ambivalence that Straussclaims is

integralto the work. But there is insufficient

justificationfor such an

approach to Farabi. Thefalasifa were, it is true, often interested in dissimulat-ing their genuine views, but the sort of strategy that Strauss's Farabi demandsto be understood surely defies credibility. According to Strauss, to understandFarabi we must have not only the Summary with us but also the original Laws;yet the former is meant only to be a help to him who desires to know [theLaws] and to be sufficient to him who cannot bear the toil of study and medita-tion. 29 The procedure that Strauss demands of the discriminating reader in-volves a good deal of work, not to mention intelligence. Then the reader mustcompare and contrast chapter with chapter, noting what is added to the originaland what is omitted from the

original.Then he must

payclose attention to the

ways in which Farabi introduces his discussions of Plato - does he say, for ex-ample, that Plato mentioned a subject of exceeding usefulness,30 or does he saythat Plato mentioned a useful subject?31 Strauss mentions all sorts of apparentlyirrelevant points, such as that at the beginning of the eighth chapter mention-



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ing is referred to five times and is contrasted with Plato's intimating an-other aspect of the same subject in the beginning of the book.32 Strauss alsopoints out that Farabi does not discuss some Platonic themes, that the Sum-mary uses the personal pronoun unlike the Philosophy of Plato, and that thedistribution of thens in the Summary is uneven. The brilliance of Strauss'sanalysis is evident through the fact that he manages to take up all these points,and many more, and argue that Farabi was doing something very complicatedand devious when he wrote the Summary. Strauss does not feel able to come toany definite conclusion about what the Summary is about and asserts only thatalthough we would be foolish to claim that we are in a position to explainthese difficulties . . . on the other hand, it cannot be denied that in reflectingfor some time on writing like the Summary, one acquires a certain understand-ing of the manner in which such writings wish to be read. 33 Strauss is arguingthat to understand the text completely we should have to be in the position ofan original reader, and because our understanding of that point of view is nec-essarily limited, our comprehension of the text must also be limited.

But if the points Strauss makes about the difficulties are separately exam-ined, they can be seen not to be difficulties at all, but rather normal ways ofgoing about writing philosophy. The standard interpretation concentrates onthe distinction between the real opinion of the author and what is offeredmerely as a sop to public opinion and its prejudices. Yet it might be suggestedthat thefalasifa present theories that they argue are true, or at least interestingand relevant, and that the question of the precise authorship of such theories isnot really important.:4 Strauss is convinced that this question does and mustarise and that it demands an answer, and since thefailasuf is reluctant to pro-vide the answer, his teaching must be obscured and hidden by means of thetechniques we have already mentioned (and a good many more). This approachpresupposes that it is normal for Islamic philosophers to differentiate exactlytheir views from the views of others with whom they are not clearly in dispute,and that when they discuss the works of others they must make clear whichargument is original, which merely commentary, which application of the textis not to be found in the original, and so on. It will be urged here, though, thatthis presupposition fails and so there is no need to try to discover some subtleexplanation for possible confusion between thefaiilashf's views and the Greeksource.

If we think offalsafa as more like ordinary philosophy and less like esotericliterature, we can explain the techniques that Strauss thinks thefalcsifa em-ploy in more conventional and less exciting ways. For example, the differentways in which Farabi refers to points Plato makes may be stylistic variationsthat indicate his opinions of the differing relevance, importance, and truth ofPlato's thought at different stages, that they may not indicate a hidden meaningor constitute an obstacle to unsympathetic comprehension of the real point. Itis not important for Farabi as a philosopher to distinguish precisely where hediverges from Plato or what his opinions of Plato's various points are. The factthat the Summary and Plato's Laws (not to mention Farabi's Philosophy ofPlato) are different from one another in important details has a simple explana-



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tion, which Strauss himself provides: the Summary is not a representation ofPlato's views, but rather an account of his art of kalam,35 his technique of de-fending the laws or religion. Farabi is showing how Plato would defend lawwithin an Islamic context, hence the introduction of Islamic and religious topicsforeign to the original Laws and Philosophy of Plato. No dissimulation is re-quired here as an explanatory hypothesis. Farabi himself suggests that theSummary is more than just a commentary on Plato by his use of the personalpronoun and his use of specifically Islamic expressions like Shari'a; it is clearthat he did not wish to represent Plato as a Muslim. The question is not whetherFarabi used dissimulation (taqiya) in his writing. The answer is, of course, thathe did. The question is whether it was used as frequently and in the ways thatthe standard interpretation considers to be the case. The best way to tackle thisquestion is by looking at alternative accounts of works subjected to the stan-dard interpretation to see if they are convincing. The evidence that Strauss se-lects in favor of the standard interpretation is not compelling and is perfectlyconducive to an alternative and less forced interpretation as an aspect of a nor-mal philosophical discussion.

But it would no doubt be argued by an adherent of the standard interpretationthat the account of the Summary as an ordinary philosophical work ignores thebeginning of the book. Here Farabi speaks at some length of a story about a cityin which a holy ascetic is sought by the ruler with the intention of killing him.The holy man disguises himself as a drunken musician and safely passesthrough the gates of the city after telling the guards, perfectly truthfully, that heis the holy man for whom they are to keep a lookout. Strauss takes the moral ofthis story to be that Farabi is prepared to tell the truth (i.e., present his opinionsabout the Laws) but only if he is able to disguise it in such a way that he will notsuffer for it. Thefailasuf was eager to avoid the fate of Socrates, who was putto death, according to them, for his failure to disguise his teaching adequately.36But this story does not provide incontestable support for the standard interpre-tation. It may be interpreted in other ways. For example, it may be that Farabiwishes readers to think that he has disguised his views, so that only those whoare capable of understanding and appreciating his teaching will recognize thathe has not disguised his views at all. Such an interpretation is not as fanciful asit sounds. After all, in the story the holy man misleads the guards by telling thetruth and getting them to think that he is not telling the truth at all. PerhapsFarabi uses the story to get people to think that he is not telling the truth, whilehe is expressing his real opinions after all. In that case Strauss would be in theposition of the guards, in that he naively assumes, when he is thus presentedwith the truth, that he is in fact being presented with a disguise. Such an inter-pretation may seem too subtle, but it is surely not more so than the lengths towhich Strauss's use of the standard interpretation leads him. But a more plausi-ble interpretation of the story is that Farabi is arguing that the philosophicalcomplexity of his book is such that it will prevent those who might dislike itscharacteristics from understanding them. It is worth recalling that Farabithought that Aristotle's style of philosophy was a form of dissimulation in thatit excludes those incapable of philosophy from grasping his teaching. Farabi did



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will often be cases where it seems equally possible to interpret a text in accord-ance with the standard interpretation or in accordance with the general normsof medieval philosophy. Of course, it is always tempting to use the standardinterpretation because it is fascinating to inquire into the intentions behind away of writing and to try to unravel the tricks and puzzles that the author alleg-edly sets out for the reader. The standard interpretation provides its users withample opportunity to display their interpretative virtuosity to the full, not tomention the erudition involved in collecting and connecting apparently unre-lated facts to each other. But it has been argued here that the pleasures of suchan interpretative activity should not blind the interpreter to the fact that sometexts do not require such treatment. The idea that thefaldsifa were obsessed bythe conflict between religion and philosophy needs revision; they were

per-fectly capable of writing on either religion or philosophy without worryingabout the relationship that one has to the other. The standard interpretationcannot accept this, however, so that a work that deals with nothing more than aphilosophical issue (such as Ibn Rushd's discussion of the demonstrative/dia-lectical distinction) is seen as necessarily hiding something, as being importantor worth making only because of its possible relevance to theological argu-ments. We are told that the application of Plato's Laws to Islam, as in Farabi'sSummary, can be understood only if it is compared with the Platonic text and ifcomplicated conclusions are drawn from asking at each stage what is omitted,what is added, what is implied, what is repeated, and so on. The standard inter-pretation demands of the original readers of Islamic philosophy the same ca-pacity for interpretative creativity as must be employed by present-day schol-ars. Surely this is highly implausible.

There are, of course, works that do call for the standard interpretation. Anexcellent example is Maimonides's Guide for the Perplexed, which is repletewith contradictions, omissions, repetitions, and the whole gamut of confusingand obscuring techniques that Strauss catalogues in his introduction to thework.40 But he uses this book as a paradigm offalsafa and thinks that the tech-niques its author uses are generally present throughout that philosophical tradi-tion. Sometimes

theyare, but there is an

importantreason to refuse to

acceptthe Guide as a reliable key tofalsafa. Strauss himself points this out when heclaims that the very existence of the Guide implies a conscious transgressionof an unambiguous prohibition, 41 that is, not to explain the secrets of theTorah in a writing. Clearly, to get around such an explicit law it is necessary toemploy all manner of complicated and strong devices to ensure that only thosefit to receive the secrets can sift through the book and attain them. In Islamthere is no such unambiguous prohibition, although ta'wil, or interpretation,should be restricted to those who require it to complete their understanding ofthe Law and satisfy their doubts. The Guide is in many ways a unique work.Strauss's

studyof Maimonides makes him ever alert to dissimulation even

where it is not present, or where it is not present in nearly the strength he ex-pects. The Guide is a work whose whole rationale is the conflict between reli-gion and philosophy, and it is unrealistic to expect it to serve as a reliable modeloffalsafa in general. Once the assumption that the conflict between religion



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and philosophy is a characteristic of allfalsafa is abandoned, the standard in-terpretation no longer deserves the label of standard and merely becomesthe appropriate method with respect to understanding certain (restricted)works. Approaching Islamic philosophy with a more open mind may seemnaive to adherents of the standard interpretation, but it will undoubtedly resultin a superior appreciation of the philosophical content of the works in that tra-dition.

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY

NOTES

I should like to thank Dr. E. I. J. Rosenthal for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of thisarticle.

1 Strauss, Leo, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Glencoe, Ill., 1952), p. 107.2 Keddie, Nikki, Symbol and Sincerity in Islam, Studia Islamica, XIX (1963).3 Strauss, Persecution, p. 36; see also the account that G. F. Hourani gives of Ibn Sina, 'Essay

on the Secret of Destiny, Bulletin of the School of African and Asian Studies (I966), 45.4 Hourani, G., Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy (London, I96I), p. 47.5See the discussion of the distinction between heresy and disbelief in Ghazali, Tahaiut al-fala-

sifa, ed. M. Bouyges (Beirut, 1927).6 See Maimonides's description of the sort of person to whom the Guide fJr the Perplexed is

directed at the start of that work.7 Farabi quotes from a letter from Aristotle to Plato, in which Aristotle is supposed to defend his

practice of committing his teaching to writing in unenigmatic writing in this way: 'If I have writtendown these sciences and the wisdom contained in them, I have arranged them in such an order thatonly those qualified for them can attain them. See his Jam'bayna ra' yay al-hakimain Aflatunal-ilahi wa Aristutalis, ed. A. N. Nader (Beirut, 1960), p. 85.

8 Goodman, L. E. Hayy ibn Yaqzan (New York, 1972), pp. I00-103.9 Ibid., p. Ioo.10Strauss, Leo, 'Literary Character of the Guide for the Perplexed, Persecution, pp. 68-70.

There are good grounds for thinking that Strauss wildly overemphasizes this distinction. See inparticular Hartman, D., Maimonides: Torah and Philosophic Quest (Philadelphia, 1976).

n Rosenthal, E. I. J. Islamic themes, Studia Semitica, II (Cambridge, England, 1971), ix.12 Mahdi, M. ed., Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle (New York, 1962), p. 3.'1 This is particularly obvious in the refutations Ghazali and Ibn Rushd offer of philosophical

positions that oppose theirs.14 Farabi, Against John the Grammarian, quoted in Alfarabi against Philoponous, Journal

of Near Eastern Studies (1967), 257.15 Butterworth, C. E. ed. and trans., Averroess' Three Short Commentaries on Aristotle's

Topics, Rhetoric and Poetics, (SUNY, 1977), p. 25.16Who in any case writes logic in an exciting style?

7 Butterworth, Short Commentaries, p. 26.18 Strauss, Persecution, p. 75.19 Butterworth, Short Commentaries, p. 28.20 Ibid., p. 27.21 Ibid., pp. 66, 72.22 Ghazal, Mizan al-'Amal (Cairo, AH 1328/1938), p. 160. For an account of how the termjadal

was understood in Islamic philosophy, see Van Ess, The logical structure of Islamic theology inLogic in classical Islamic culture, ed. G. E. von Grunebaum (Wiesbaden, I970), pp. 21-50.

23 The jurisprudent takes the opinions and the actions which the founder of the religion enun-ciated as given and makes them fundamental principles from which he deduces those things whichare necessary corollaries, but the theologian defends the things which the jurisprudent employs as



15/15

538 Oliver Leaman

fundamental principles without deriving other things from them, Farabi, Enumeration V, pp. 75-6, in Alfarabi's Book of Religion and Related Texts, ed. M. Mahdi (Beirut, I968).

24 Strauss, Leo, How Farabi Read Plato's Laws, in Melanges Louis Massignon (InstitutFrancais de Damas, I957), p. 322.

25 See n. 7, supra.26 See n. I I, supra.27 Strauss, How Farabi, pp. 330-3I.28 Ibid., p. 333.29 Farabi, Compendium Legum Platonis, ed. and trans. F. Gabrieli London, 1952), pp. 4, 20-21.30 Ibid., 42, 20-21.31 Ibid., II, 5; 21, 5; 27, I8, 32, 3, 22.32 Strauss, How Farabi, p. 326.33 Ibid., p. 338.34 A significant contribution to understanding this genre is to be found in G. E. von Grunebaum,

The Concept of Plagiarism in Arabic Literary Theory, Journal of Near Eastern Studies (I944),234-53.

35 Strauss, How Farabi, p. 325.36 Mahdi, Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, p. 66.37 Mahdi, M., ed., Alfarabi's Book of Letters (Beirut: I970), p. 131.38 Strauss, Leo, Farabi's Plato, in Persecution, passim.39 Farabi, Against John the Grammarian, p. 257.40 Strauss, Literary character ; How to Begin to Study the Guide for the Perplexed, in Mai-

monides, Guide for the Perplexed, trans. Pines (Chicago, 1963).41 Strauss, Literary Character, p. 48. But there are good grounds for thinking, pace Strauss,

that the question of permitting or prohibiting the study of philosophy arose only in the wake of theanti-Maimonides controversy.

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