League 2011

8/7/2015 G.R.No.176951,G.R.No.177499andG.R.No.178056

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/jun2011/gr_176951_2011.html 1/15

TodayisFriday,August07,2015

RepublicofthePhilippinesSUPREMECOURT

Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.176951June28,2011

LeagueofCitiesofthePhilippines(LCP),representedbyLCPNationalPresidentJerryP.TreasCityofCalbayog,representedbyMayorMelSenenS.SarmientoandJerryP.Treas,inhispersonalcapacityasTaxpayer,Petitioners,vs.CommissiononElectionsMunicipalityofBaybay,ProvinceofLeyteMunicipalityofBogo,ProvinceofCebu Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Western Samar Municipality of Tandag, Province ofSurigao del Sur Municipality of Borongan, Province of Eastern Samar and Municipality of Tayabas,ProvinceofQuezon,Respondents.

xx

G.R.No.177499

LeagueofCitiesofthePhilippines(LCP),representedbyLCPNationalPresidentJerryP.TreasCityofCalbayog,representedbyMayorMelSenenS.SarmientoandJerryP.Treas,inhispersonalcapacityasTaxpayer,Petitioners,vs.CommissiononElectionsMunicipalityofLamitan,ProvinceofBasilanMunicipalityofTabuk,Provinceof Kalinga Municipality of Bayugan, Province of Agusan del Sur Municipality of Batac, Province ofIlocosNorteMunicipalityofMati,ProvinceofDavaoOrientalandMunicipalityofGuihulngan,ProvinceofNegrosOriental,Respondents.

xx

G.R.No.178056

LeagueofCitiesofthePhilippines(LCP),representedbyLCPNationalPresidentJerryP.TreasCityofCalbayog,representedbyMayorMelSenenS.SarmientoandJerryP.Treas,inhispersonalcapacityasTaxpayer,Petitioners,vs.Commission on ElectionsMunicipality of Cabadbaran, Province of Agusan del NorteMunicipality ofCarcar,ProvinceofCebuMunicipalityofElSalvador,ProvinceofMisamisOrientalMunicipalityofNaga,CebuandDepartmentofBudgetandManagement,Respondents.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN,J.:

Weherebyconsiderandresolve:(a)thepetitionersMotionforLeavetoFileMotionforReconsiderationoftheResolutionof12April2011,attached towhich isaMotion forReconsiderationof theResolutiondated12April2011 dated April 29, 2011 (Motion For Reconsideration), praying that the resolution of April 12, 2011 bereconsideredandsetasideand(b)therespondentsMotionforEntryofJudgmentdatedMay9,2011.

After thoroughconsiderationof the incidents,wedeny theMotion forReconsiderationandgrant theMotion forEntryofJudgment.

Asitsprayerforreliefshows,theMotionforReconsiderationseeksthereconsideration,reversal,orsettingasideoftheresolutionofApril12,2011.1 Inturn, theresolutionofApril12,2011deniedthepetitionersAdCautelamMotionforReconsideration(oftheDecisiondated15February2011).2Clearly,theMotionforReconsideration isreallyasecondmotionforreconsiderationinrelationtotheresolutiondatedFebruary15,2011.3



AnotherindiciumofitsbeingasecondmotionforreconsiderationisthefactthattheMotionforReconsiderationraises issues entirely identical to those the petitioners already raised in their Ad Cautelam Motion forReconsideration(oftheDecisiondated15February2011).Thefollowingtabulationdemonstratesthesamenessofissuesbetweenthemotions,towit:

MotionforReconsiderationofApril29,2011

AdCautelamMotionforReconsideration(oftheDecisiondated15February2011)dated

March8,2011

I. With due respect, neither theRules of Court nor jurisprudenceallows the Honorable Court to takecognizance of RespondentMunicipalities multiple motions. Bydoing so, the Honorable CourtthereforeactedcontrarytotheRulesofCourtanditsinternalprocedures.

II. TheResolutionContravenesThe1997RulesOfCivilProcedureAndRelevant Supreme CourtIssuances.

II. Contrary to the ruling of theHonorable Court in the AssailedResolution,thecontroversyinvolvingtheSixteen (16)Cityhood lawshadlong been resolved with finalitythus, the principles of immutabilityof judgment and res judicata areapplicable and operate to deprivetheHonorableCourtofjurisdiction.

I. The Honorable Court Has NoJurisdiction To Promulgate TheResolution Of 15 February 2011,Because There is No Longer AnyActual Case Or Controversy ToSettle.

III. The Resolution Undermines TheJudicial System In Its Disregard OfThePrinciplesOfResJudicataAndThe Doctrine of Immutability ofFinalJudgments.

III. Contrary to the AssailedResolution of the Honorable Court,the sixteen (16) Cityhood lawsneither repealed nor amended theLocal Government Code. TheHonorableCourtcommittedanerrorwhen it failed to rule in theAssailedResolution that the Sixteen (16)CityhoodLawsviolatedArticleX,Sections 6 and 10 of theConstitution.

IV.TheResolutionErroneouslyRuledThat The Sixteen (16) Cityhood BillsDoNotViolateArticleX,Sections6and10OfThe1987Constitution.

V. The Sixteen (16) Cityhood LawsViolate The Equal Protection ClauseOfTheConstitutionAndTheRightOfLocal Government Units To A JustShareInTheNationalTaxes.

IV. With due respect, theconstitutionality of R.A. 9009 is notanissueinthiscase.Itwaserroronthe part of the Honorable Court toconsiderthelawarbitrary.

ThatIssueNo.IV(i.e.,theconstitutionalityofRepublicActNo.9009)appearsintheMotionforReconsiderationbutisnotfoundintheAdCautelamMotionforReconsideration(oftheDecisiondated15February2011)isofnoconsequence,fortheconstitutionalityofR.A.No.9009isneitherrelevantnordecisiveinthiscase,thereferencetosaidlegislativeenactmentbeingonlyforpurposesofdiscussion.

TheMotion forReconsideration, beinga secondmotion for reconsideration, cannot beentertained.As to that,Section24 ofRule51of theRulesofCourt is unqualified.TheCourt has firmlyheld that a secondmotion forreconsideration is a prohibited pleading,5 and only for extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only after anexpress leavehasbeenfirstobtainedmayasecondmotionforreconsiderationbeentertained.6The restrictivepolicyagainstasecondmotionforreconsiderationhasbeenreemphasizedintherecentlypromulgatedInternalRulesoftheSupremeCourt,whoseSection3,Rule15states:



Section 3. Second motion for reconsideration. The Court shall not entertain a second motion forreconsideration,andanyexceptiontothisrulecanonlybegrantedinthehigher interestof justicebytheCourtenbancuponavoteofatleasttwothirdsofitsactualmembership.Thereisreconsideration"inthe higher interest of justice"when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patentlyunjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. AsecondmotionforreconsiderationcanonlybeentertainedbeforetherulingsoughttobereconsideredbecomesfinalbyoperationoflaworbytheCourtsdeclaration.

IntheDivision,avoteofthreeMembersshallberequiredtoelevateasecondmotionforreconsiderationtotheCourtEnBanc.

Weobserve, too, that theprescriptionthatasecondmotionforreconsideration"canonlybeentertainedbeforethe ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Courts declaration" evenrenders thedenialof thepetitionersMotion forReconsiderationmorecompelling.As theresolutionofApril12,2011 bears out,7 the ruling sought to be reconsidered became final by the Courts express declaration.Consequently,thedenialoftheMotionforReconsiderationisimmediatelywarranted.

Still, the petitioners seem to contend that theCourt hadearlier entertainedandgranted the respondents ownsecondmotionforreconsideration.Thereisnosimilaritybetweenthenandnow,however,fortheCourtenbancitself unanimously declared in the resolution of June 2, 2009 that the respondents second motion forreconsiderationwas "no longeraprohibitedpleading."8Nosimilardeclaration favors thepetitionersMotion forReconsideration.

Finally, considering that the petitionersMotion forReconsideration merely rehashes the issues previously putforward,particularlyintheAdCautelamMotionforReconsideration(oftheDecisiondated15February2011),theCourt,havingalreadypasseduponsuch issueswith finality, findsnoneed todiscuss the issuesagain toavoidrepetitionandredundancy.

Accordingly,thefinalityoftheresolutionsupholdingtheconstitutionalityofthe16CityhoodLawsnowabsolutelywarrantsthegrantingofrespondentsMotionforEntryofJudgment.

WHEREFORE, the Court denies the petitioners Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration of theResolutionof12April2011andtheattachedMotionforReconsiderationoftheResolutionof12April2011grantsthe respondentsMotion for Entry of Judgment datedMay 9, 2011 and directs theClerk ofCourt to forthwithissuetheEntryofJudgmentinthiscase.

Nofurtherpleadingsorsubmissionsbyanypartyshallbeentertained.

SOORDERED.

LUCASP.BERSAMINAssociateJustice

WECONCUR:

RENATOC.CORONAChiefJustice

ANTONIOT.CARPIOAssociateJustice

PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.AssociateJustice

TERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTROAssociateJustice

ARTUROD.BRIONAssociateJustice

DIOSDADOM.PERALTAAssociateJustice

MARIANOC.DELCASTILLOAssociateJustice

ROBERTOA.ABADAssociateJustice

MARTINS.VILLARAMA,JR.AssociateJustice

JOSEPORTUGALPEREZAssociateJustice

JOSECATRALMENDOZAAssociateJustice



MARIALOURDESP.A.SERENOAssociateJustice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant toSection 13,ArticleVIII of theConstitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision hadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt.

RENATOC.CORONAChiefJustice

Footnotes

1TheprayerforreliefoftheMotionforReconsiderationstates:

WHEREFORE,PetitionersmostrespectfullypraythattheResolutiondated12April2011beforthwithRECONSIDERED,REVERSEDorSETASIDE.

2ThedispositiveportionoftheresolutionofApril12,2011reads:

WHEREFORE, the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February2011)isdeniedwithfinality.

SOORDERED.

3ThedispositiveportionoftheresolutionofFebruary15,2011says:

WHEREFORE,theMotionforReconsiderationofthe"Resolution"datedAugust24,2010,datedandfiled on September 14, 2010 by respondents Municipality of Baybay, et al. is GRANTED. TheResolution dated August 24, 2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Cityhood LawsRepublicActsNos.9389,9390,9391,9392,9393,9394,9398,9404,9405,9407,9408,9409,9434,9435,9436,and9491aredeclaredCONSTITUTIONAL.

SOORDERED.

4Section2.Secondmotionforreconsideration.Nosecondmotionforreconsiderationofa judgmentorfinalresolutionbythesamepartyshallbeentertained.

5Securities and Exchange Commission v. PICOP Resources, Inc., 566 SCRA 451 (2008) APO Fruitscorporationv.LandBankofthePhilippines,G.R.No.164195,April5,2011OrtigasandCompanyLimitedPartnershipv.Velasco,254SCRA234.

6OrtigasandCompanyLimitedPartnershipv.Velasco,supra.

7Supra,note2.

8TheresolutionofJune2,2009pertinentlydeclared:

xxx

In thepresentcase, theCourtvotedon thesecondmotion for reconsideration filedby therespondent cities. In effect, the Court allowed the filing of the second motion forreconsideration. Thus, the secondmotion for reconsideration was no longer a prohibitedpleading. However, for lack of the required number of votes to overturn the 18 November 2009Decisionand31March2009Resolution,theCourtdeniedthesecondmotionforreconsiderationinits28April2009Resolution.

xxx

TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

DISSENTINGOPINION

CARPIO,J.:



The majority decision upheld the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws because (1) of the pendency of theconversionbillsduring the11thCongressand (2) compliancewith the requirementsof theLocalGovernmentCodepriortoitsamendmentbyRepublicActNo.9009.

Ireiteratemydissent.

I.TheCityhoodLawsviolateSection10,ArticleXoftheConstitution.

Section10,ArticleXofthe1987Constitutionprovides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundarysubstantiallyaltered,exceptinaccordancewiththecriteriaestablishedinthelocalgovernmentcodeandsubjecttoapprovalbyamajorityofthevotescastinaplebisciteinthepoliticalunitsdirectlyaffected.(Emphasissupplied)

The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in theLocalGovernmentCodeitselfandnotinanyotherlaw.ThereisonlyoneLocalGovernmentCode.1Toavoiddiscriminationandensureuniformityandequality,theConstitutionexpresslyrequiresCongresstostipulateintheLocalGovernmentCode itself all the criterianecessary for the creationof a city, including the conversionof amunicipalityintoacity.Congresscannotwritesuchcriteriainanyotherlaw,liketheCityhoodLaws.

Notably,eachCityhoodLawprovidesinitsSeparabilityClausethatifanyofitsprovisionsis"inconsistentwiththeLocalGovernmentCode,"theotherconsistentprovisions"shallcontinuetobeinfullforceandeffect."TheclearandinescapableimplicationisthatanyprovisionineachCityhoodLawthatis"inconsistentwiththeLocalGovernmentCode"hasnoforceandeffectinshort,voidandineffective.EachCityhoodLawexpresslyandunequivocallyacknowledgesthesuperiorityoftheLocalGovernmentCode,andthatincaseofconflict,theLocalGovernmentCodeshallprevailovertheCityhoodLaw.TheclearintentandexpresslanguageoftheCityhoodLawsisfortheselawstoconformtotheLocalGovernmentCodeandnottheotherwayaround.

Moreover,Congress, inproviding in theSeparabilityClause that theLocalGovernmentCodeshallprevailovertheCityhoodLaws,treatstheCityhoodLawsasseparateanddistinctfromtheLocalGovernmentCode.Inotherwords,theCityhoodLawsdonotformintegralpartsoftheLocalGovernmentCodebutareseparateanddistinctlaws.ThereisthereforenoquestionthattheCityhoodLawsarelawsotherthantheLocalGovernmentCode.Assuch,theCityhoodLawscannotstipulateanexceptionfromtherequirementsforthecreationofcities,prescribedintheLocalGovernmentCode,withoutrunningafouloftheexplicitmandateofSection10,ArticleXofthe1987Constitution.

Contrarytothefaultyconclusionofthemajority,theCityhoodLawsdonotamendtheLocalGovernmentCode.TheLegislatureneverintendedtheCityhoodLawstoamendtheLocalGovernmentCode.NowhereintheplainlanguageoftheCityhoodLawscanthisinterpretationbediscerned.NeitherthetitlenorthebodyoftheCityhoodLaws sustains such conclusion. Simply put, there is absolutely nothing in the Cityhood Laws to support themajoritydecisionthattheCityhoodLawsamendedtheLocalGovernmentCode.

II.TheCityhoodLawsviolatetheequalprotectionclause.

There is no substantial distinction betweenmunicipalitieswith pending cityhood bills in the 11thCongress andmunicipalitiesthatdidnothavependingbills.Themerependencyofacityhoodbillinthe11thCongressisnotamaterialdifferencetodistinguishonemunicipality fromanotherfor thepurposeof the incomerequirement.Thependencyofacityhoodbillinthe11thCongressdoesnotaffectordeterminethelevelofincomeofamunicipality.Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income thanmunicipalitiesthatdidnothavependingcityhoodbills. Inshort, theclassificationcriterionmerependencyofacityhoodbill inthe11thCongressisnotrationallyrelatedtothepurposeofthelawwhichistopreventfiscallynonviablemunicipalitiesfromconvertingintocities.

Thefactofpendencyofacityhoodbillinthe11thCongresslimitstheexemptiontoaspecificconditionexistingatthe timeofpassageofRA9009.Thatspecificconditionwillneverhappenagain.Thisviolates the requirementthatavalidclassificationmustnotbelimitedtoexistingconditionsonly.

Inthesamevein, theexemptionprovision intheCityhoodLawsgivesthe16municipalitiesauniqueadvantagebasedonanarbitrarydatethefilingoftheircityhoodbillsbeforetheendofthe11thCongressasagainstallothermunicipalitiesthatwanttoconvertintocitiesaftertheeffectivityofRA9009.

Further, limiting theexemptiononly to the16municipalitiesviolates therequirement that theclassificationmustapply to all similarly situated.Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondentmunicipalities cannot



convertintocities,whilethe16respondentmunicipalitiescan.Clearly,aswordedtheexemptionprovisionfoundintheCityhoodLaws,evenifitwerewritteninSection450oftheLocalGovernmentCode,isunconstitutionalforviolationoftheequalprotectionclause.

III.Respondentmunicipalitiesmustcomplywiththe

P100millionincomerequirementundertheprevailingLGC.

RANo.9009amendedtheLocalGovernmentCodepreciselybecausethecriteria in theoldLocalGovernmentCodewere no longer sufficient. In short, RANo. 9009 repealed the old income requirement of P20 million, arequirementthatnolongerexistsinourstatutebooks.Compliancewiththeoldincomerequirementiscompliancewitharepealed,dead,andnonexistentlawatotallyuseless,futile,andemptyact.Worse,compliancewiththeoldrequirementisanoutrightviolationoftheConstitutionwhichexpresslycommandsthat"noxxxcityxxxshallbecreatedxxxexceptinaccordancewiththecriteriaestablishedinthelocalgovernmentcode."Therefore, respondent municipalities in order to validly convert into cities must comply with the P100 millionincomerequirementundertheprevailingLocalGovernmentCode,asamendedbyRA9009,andnotwiththeoldP20millionincomerequirement.Otherwise,suchcompliancewiththeoldP20millionincomerequirementisvoidforbeingunconstitutional.

Theremust be strict compliance with the express command of the Constitution that "no city x x x shall becreatedxxxexceptinaccordancewiththecriteriaestablishedinthelocalgovernmentcode."Substantialcompliance is insufficientbecause itwilldiscriminateagainstallothercities thatwerecreatedbeforeandafterthe enactment of the Cityhood Laws in strict compliance with the criteria in the Local Government Code, asamended byRANo. 9009. The conversion ofmunicipalities into new citiesmeans an increase in the InternalRevenue Allotment of the former municipalities and a corresponding decrease in the Internal RevenueAllotmentofallotherexistingcities.Theremustbestrict,notonlysubstantial,compliancewiththeconstitutionalrequirementbecausetheeconomiclifelineofexistingcitiesmaybeseriouslyaffected.

IV.TheincreasedincomerequirementofP100million

isneitherarbitrarynordifficulttocomply.

Accordingtothemajority,"theimpositionoftheincomerequirementofP100millionfromlocalsourcesunderR.A.No.9009wasarbitrary.xxxnoresearchorempiricaldatabuttressed the figure.Norwas thereproof that theproposaltookintoaccounttheaftereffectsthatwerelikelytoarise."

Thisisglaringerror.

TheLegislature,inenactingRANo.9009,isnotrequiredbytheConstitutiontoshowthecourtsdatalikeinflationfigures to support the increased income requirement. As long as the increased income requirement is notimpossibletocomply,suchincreaseisapolicydetermination involvingthewisdomof the law,whichexclusivelylieswithintheprovinceoftheLegislature.WhentheLegislatureenactslawsincreasingtaxes,taxrates,orcapitalrequirementsforbusinesses,theCourtcannotrefusetoapplysuchlawsonthegroundthatthereisnoeconomicjustification for such increases. Economic, political or social justifications for the enactment of laws go into thewisdomofthelaw,outsidethepurviewofjudicialreview.ThisCourtcannotrefusetoapplythelawunlessthelawviolatesaspecificprovisionoftheConstitution.Thereisplainlynothingunconstitutionalinincreasingtheincomerequirement fromP20million to P100 million because such increase does not violate any express or impliedprovisionoftheConstitution.

V.Failureof59existingcitiestopostP100millionannualincome

doesnotrendertheP100millionincomerequirementdifficulttocomply.

SufficeittostatethatthereisnoConstitutionalorstatutoryrequirementforthe59existingcitiestocomplywiththeP100millionincomerequirement.Obviously,thesecitieswerealreadycitiespriortotheamendmentofthe Local Government Code providing for the increased income requirement of P100million. In otherwords, at the timeof their creation, thesecitieshavecompliedwith the criteriaprescribedunder theoldLocalGovernmentCode for the creationof cities, and thusarenot required to complywith theP100million incomerequirementof theprevailingLocalGovernmentCode. It isutterlymisplacedandgrosslyerroneous tocite the"noncompliance"bythe59existingcitieswiththeincreasedincomerequirementofP100milliontoconcludethattheP100millionincomerequirementisarbitraryanddifficulttocomply.

Moreover,asstated, the increased incomerequirementofP100million isneitherunconstitutionalnorunlawful.UnlesstheP100millionincomerequirementviolatesaprovisionoftheConstitutionoralaw,suchrequirementforthe creation of a citymust be strictly compliedwith. Any local government unit applying for cityhood, whetherlocatedinoroutsidethemetropolisandwhetherwithintheNationalCapitalRegionornot,mustmeettheP100



million income requirement prescribed by the prevailing Local Government Code. There is absolutely nothingunconstitutionalorunlawful if theP100million income requirement iseasily compliedwithby localgovernmentunitswithinorneartheNationalCapitalRegion.Themajoritysgroundlessandunfairdiscriminationagainstthesemetropolislocatedlocalgovernmentunitsmustnecessarilyfail.

VI.TheCityhoodLawsviolateSection6,ArticleXoftheConstitution.

UniformandnondiscriminatorycriteriaasprescribedintheLocalGovernmentCodeareessentialtoimplementafairandequitabledistributionofnationaltaxestoalllocalgovernmentunits.Section6,ArticleXoftheConstitutionprovides:

Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall beautomaticallyreleasedtothem.(Emphasissupplied)

Ifthecriteriaincreatinglocalgovernmentunitsarenotuniformanddiscriminatory,therecanbenofairandjustdistributionofthenationaltaxestolocalgovernmentunits.

AcitywithanannualincomeofonlyP20million,allothercriteriabeingequal,shouldnotreceivethesameshareinnationaltaxesasacitywithanannualincomeofP100millionormore.Thecriteriaoflandarea,populationandincome, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code,must be strictly followed because suchcriteria,prescribedbylaw,arematerialindeterminingthe"justshare"oflocalgovernmentunitsinnationaltaxes.SincetheCityhoodLawsdonot followthe incomecriterion inSection450of theLocalGovernmentCode, theyprevent the fairand justdistributionof the InternalRevenueAllotment inviolationofSection6,ArticleXof theConstitution.

Aspointedoutbypetitioners,"respondentmunicipalitieshaveatotalpopulationequivalenttothatofDavaoCityonly,oraround1.3millionpeople.Yet, the IRA thatpertains to the16municipalities (P4,019,776,072) ismorethandoublethatforDavaoCity(P1,874,175,271).xxxAsaresult, thepercapitaIRAallotedfor the individualdenizen of Davao is even less than half of the average per capita IRA of the inhabitants of the sixteen (16)municipalities(P1,374.70dividedbyP3,117.24)."

This indisputablefactvividlyreveals theeconomic inequity thatwill inevitablyresult fromtheunjustallocationoftheIRAasaconsequenceoftheconversionofrespondentmunicipalitiesintocities.Clearly,iftheexistingcitiesshareintheInternalRevenueAllotmentisunreasonablyreduced,it ispossible,evenexpected,thatthesecitiesmayhavetolayoffworkersandabandonprojects,greatlyhampering,orworseparalyzing,thedeliveryofmuchneededpublicservicesintheirrespectiveterritorialjurisdictions.

VII.

Conclusion

The Constitution expressly requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code itself all the criterianecessaryforthecreationofacity,includingtheconversionofamunicipalityintoacity.Toavoiddiscriminationand ensure uniformity and equality, such criteria cannot be embodied in any other law except the LocalGovernment Code. In this case, the Cityhood Laws, which are unmistakably laws other than the LocalGovernmentCode,provideanexemptionfromtheincreasedincomerequirementforthecreationofcitiesunderSection450oftheLocalGovernmentCode,asamendedbyRANo.9009.Clearly,theCityhoodLawscontravenethe letterand intentofSection10,ArticleXof theConstitution. Inaddition, theCityhoodLawsviolate theequalprotectionclauseandSection6,ArticleXoftheConstitutiononthefairandequitabledistributionofnationaltaxesto all local government units. Without any doubt, the Cityhood Laws must be striken down for beingunconstitutional.

Accordingly,IvotetoGRANTthemotionforreconsiderationoftheLeagueofCitiesofthePhilippines.

ANTONIOT.CARPIOAssociateJustice

Footnote

1RepublicActNo.7160,asamended.




DISSENTINGOPINION

SERENO,J.:

"Ifchangingjudgeschangeslaws,itisnotevenclearwhatlawis."

RichardA.Posner1

I maintain my dissent that the sixteen Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional. In questioning the Courts latestResolution,2petitionershaveraisedconcernsoverthe"highly irregularandunprecedented"actsofentertainingseveralmotionsforreconsideration.3Inresponsetotheseconcerns,Iwishtoexpoundontheeffectsofthe"flipflopping"decisionsontheCourtsroleinourdemocraticsystemanditsdecisionmakingprocess,inorderthatitmay"servetobulwarkthefortificationsofanorderlygovernmentoflaws."4

Oursystemofdemocracyiscommittedirrevocablytoagovernmentoflaws,5andnotofmen.6Lawsgivewitnesstosocietysmoralvalues7andarethedepositoriesofwhatthesovereignasawholehasagreedtoupholdastheminimum standards of conduct that will govern relationships and transactions within that society. In arepresentativedemocracy,theFilipinopeople,throughtheirelectedrepresentatives,deliberate,distillandmakemoral judgments, which are crystallized into written laws that aremade public, accessible and binding to all.8Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is more fundamental than its erection andenforcementofasystemofrulesdefiningthevariousrightsanddutiesofitsmembers,enablingthemtogoverntheiraffairsanddefinitivelysettletheirdifferencesinanorderly,predictablemanner.9

Obedience to the ruleof law forms thebedrockof our systemof justice.10Once the sovereign peoples "soft"moralchoicesarehardenedthroughtheconstitutionallymandated legislativeprocess,11 statutory lawsperformanequalizingfunctionof imposingaknowablestandardofconductorbehavior towhichallmembersofsocietymustconform toasocial contractwhicheveryone regardlessof class,sexor religion isbound.12 Legislativeenactments are ordinarily prospective and general in character insofar as they prescribe limitations on anindividualsfutureconduct.Undertheruleoflaw,13ordinarypeoplecanreasonablyassumethatanotherpersonsfutureconductwillbeinobservanceofthelawsandcanconceivablyexpectthatanydeviationtherefromwillbepunished accordingly by responsible authorities. Thus, written constitutions and statutory laws allow citizens aminimumconfidenceinaworldofuncertainty:

Through constitutionalism we placed limits on both our political institutions and ourselves, hoping thatdemocracies,historicallyalwaysturbulent,chaotic,andevendespotic,mightnowbecomerestrained,principled,thoughtful and just.Soweboundourselvesover to a law thatwemadeandpromised to keep.And thoughagovernmentoflawsdidnotdisplacegovernancebymen,itdidmeanthatnowmen,democraticmen,wouldtrytolivebytheirword.14

Asmanmadecreations,however,lawsarenotalwaysentirelyencompassing,asfutureconditionsmaychangeconditions that could not have been perceived or accounted for by the legislators. Actual situationsmay arisebetween two conflicting claimsby specific partieswith differing interpretations of the law. In those instances inwhichagrayareaoranunintendedgapexistsintheimplementationorexecutionoflaws,thejudicialdepartmentischargedwiththedutyofdeterminingthelimitationsthatthelawplacesuponallactionsofindividuals.15Hence,the courts primary adjudicatory function is to mark the metes and bounds of the law in specific areas ofapplication,aswellastopassjudgmentonthecompetingpositionsinacaseproperlybroughtbeforeit.

TheCourtnotonly functions toadjudicate rightsamong theparties,butalsoserves thepurposeofasupremetribunal of last resort that establishes uniform rules of civil justice.16 Jurisprudence "narrows the field ofuncertainty"17 in the application of an unclear area of the law. The certainty of judicial pronouncement lendsrespectforandadherencetotheruleoflaw"theideathatallcitizensandallorgansofgovernmentareboundbyrulesfixedinadvance,whichmakeitpossibletoforeseehowthecoercivepowersofgovernmentwillbeused,whether in its own interests or in aid of citizenswho call on them, in particular circumstances."18 The Courtshistoricroleofpronouncingwhatthelawisbetweentheparties19isthecornerstoneofagovernmentoflaws,andnot of men.20 Justice Antonin Scalia of the United States Supreme Court expounded on the objectives ofuniformityandpredictabilityofjudicialdecisions,towit:

Thislastpointsuggestsanotherobviousadvantageofestablishingassoonaspossibleaclear,generalprincipleofdecision:predictability.EveninsimplertimesuncertaintyhasbeenregardedasincompatiblewiththeRuleofLaw. Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the law must have the means of knowing what itprescribes.ItissaidthatoneofemperorNero'snastypracticeswastoposthisedictshighonthecolumnssothattheywouldbeharder to readandeasier to transgress.As lawshavebecomemorenumerous,andaspeoplehavebecomeincreasinglyreadytopunishtheiradversariesinthecourts,wecanlessandlessaffordprotracted



uncertainty regardingwhat the lawmaymean.Predictability, orasLlewellynput it, "reckonability," isaneedfulcharacteristicofanylawworthyofthename.Therearetimeswhenevenabadruleisbetterthannoruleatall.21(Emphasissupplied)

Certaintyand"reckonability" inthelawarethemajorobjectivesofthelegalsystem,andjudicialdecisionsservethe important purpose of providing stability to the law and to the society governed by that law.22 If we are tosubscribetoJusticeOliverWendellHolmestheoryofabadman,23thenlawprovidesreasonablepredictabilityinthe consequences of ones actions relative to the law, if performed in a just and orderly society. As judicialdecisionsformpartofthelawoftheland,24thereisastrongpublicinterestinstabilityandintheorderlyconductofouraffairs,anendservedbyaconsistentcourseofadjudication.25Thus,onceacourthasdecideduponaruleoflaw,"thatdecisionshouldcontinuetogovernthesameissuesinsubsequentstages"ofthesamecase26andthusoffers to thepeoplesomemeasureofconvictionabout the legaleffectsof theiractions. In theabsenceofextraordinarycircumstances,courtsshouldbeloathetorevisitpriordecisions.27

In the instant case, the public confusion, sown by the pendulum swing of the Courts decisions, has yieldedunpredictabilityinthejudicialdecisionmakingprocessandhasspawneduntoldconsequencesuponthepublicsconfidenceintheenduringstabilityoftheruleoflawinourjurisdiction.

TheCourthasbeenentrustedbythesovereignwiththedutyofvoicingoutandsharpeningwithfinalitysocietyscollective ideals in itswrittendecisions.Yet, ifcasesare litigated inperpetuity,and judgmentsarecloudedwithcontinuous uncertainty, the publics confidence in the stability of judicial precedents promulgated by theCourtwould be greatly diminished. In this case, the Court has reviewed and reconsidered, no less than five timesalready,28 the constitutionality of the sixteenCityhood Laws.29 During this time, the public has beenmade toendureaninordinatedegreeofindecisionthathasdisturbedtheconductoflocalgovernmentaffairswithrespectnot only to the municipalities asking to become cities, but also with respect to cities genuinely fearful of thedestruction of the standards for the creation of cities and the correlative diminution of the internal revenueallotmentsofexistingcities.TheCourtscommitment toprovideconstantandsteadfast ruleson thecreationofcitieshasbeeninevitablyweakenedbythe"flipflopping"inthecasethathasopenedthedoorstorabidcriticismsof the Courts failure to abide by its own internal rules and, thus, diminishing reliance on the certainty of itsdecisions.

Tobesure,theCourtisnotprecludedfromrectifyingerrorsofjudgmentifblindandstubbornadherencetothedoctrine of immutability30 would involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality.31 The Court has previouslyprovided for exceptions to the rule on immutability of final judgments, as follows: (1) the correction of clericalerrors32 (2) nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party33 (3) void judgments34 and (4)superveningevents.35Asexceptionstothegeneralrule,theirapplicationtoinstanceswhereinareviewofafinaland executory decision is called are to be strictly construed.36 No convincing argument or extraordinarycircumstance has been raised to justify and support the application of any of these exceptions to warrant areversal of the Courts First Decision. Reversing previous, final, and executory decisions are to be done onlyunder severely limited circumstances. Although new and unforeseen circumstancesmay arise in the future tojustifyareviewofanestablishedlegalprincipleinaseparateanddistinctcase,theextensionofaprinciplemustbedealtwithexceptionallyandcautiously.

Undeniably, the Court in the past has overturned prior decisions even on a second or third motion forreconsiderationandrecalledentriesof judgmentonthegroundofsubstantial interestof justiceandspecialandcompelling reasons.37 The Court bows to "the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning,recognizingthattheprocessoftrialanderror,sofruitfulinthephysicalsciences,isappropriatealsointhejudicialfunction."38Notable reversals in recentmemory include thecases involving the request forextraditionofMarkJimenez,39theconstitutionalityofthePhilippineMiningActof1995,40thelandtitlecoveringthePiedadEstateinQuezonCity,41thejustcompensationduetoApoFruitsCorporation,42andthe"deemedresigned"provisionforpublicappointiveofficialsintherecentMay2010election.43AlthoughnoprohibitionexiststhatwouldpreventthisCourt from changing its mind in the light of compelling reasons and in the interest of substantial justice asabovedemonstrated,extremeretrospectandcautionmustaccompanysuchreview.

Intheinstantcase,thereisnosubstantialinterestofjusticeorcompellingreasonthatwouldwarrantthereversalof the First Decision declaring the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional. There is no injustice in preventing theconversionofthesixteenmunicipalitiesintocitiesatthispointintime.Infact,justiceismoreequitablydispensedby the stringent application of the current legislative criteria under the Local Government Code (LGC),44 asamended by Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), for creating cities without distinction or exception. It must berememberedthat thedeclarationofunconstitutionality isnotanabsolutebanonthesemunicipalitiesprohibitingthemfrompursuingcityhoodinthefutureoncetheyareabletoachievethePhP100,000,000incomerequirementunderRA9009.45Alternatively,theircongressionalrepresentativescanalsopressforanotheramendatorylawofthe LGC that would include an explicit exception to the income requirement for municipalities with pending



cityhoodbillspriortotheenactmentofRA9009.TheroutepurportedlychosenbyCongresstoindirectlyamendtheLGC through theexemptionofannual income requirements in theCityhoodLaws is improper. IfCongressbelievesthattheminoritysconstructionofitsintentioninincreasingtheannualincomerequirementiserroneous,then the legislature can show its disapproval by directly enacting amendatory legislation of the LGC. In bothcases, the remedyavailable to thesixteenmunicipalities isnotwith theCourt,butwith the legislature,which isconstitutionallyempoweredtodeterminethestandardsforthecreationofalocalgovernmentunit.ThereasoningandsubstantialjusticeargumentsexpoundedtoreversetheinitialfindingoftheCourtthattheCityhoodLawsareunconstitutionalarepoorlyfounded.

The LGC is a distinctly normative law that regulates the legislative power to create cities and establishes thestandards bywhich the power is exercised.Unlike other statutes that prohibit undesirable conduct of ordinarycitizens and are ends by themselves, the LGC prescribes the means by which congressional power is to beexercisedand localgovernmentunitsarebrought into legalexistence. Itspurpose is toavoid thearbitraryandrandom creation of provinces, cities andmunicipalities. By encapsulating the criteria for cityhood in the LGC,Congressprovidedobjective,equallyapplicableandfairlyascertainablestandardsandreducedtheemphasisoncurrying political favor from its members to approvingly act on the proposed cityhood law. Otherwise, citiescharteredunderapreviousCongresscanbeunmade,atawhim,byasubsequentCongress, regardlessof itscompliancewiththeLGCsrequirements.FairnessandequitydemandthatthecriteriaestablishedbytheLGCbefaithfully and strictly enforced, most especially by Congress whose power is the actual subject of legislativedelimitation.

Ingranting it thepower to fix thecriteria for thecreationofacity, theConstitution,ofcourse,didnotprecludeCongressfromrevisingthestandards imposedundertheLGC.Congressshallenjoythefreedomtoreconsidertheminimumstandardsunder theLGC, if futurecircumstancescall for it.However, themethodof revising thecriteriamustbedirectlydone throughanamendatory lawof theLGC (suchasRA9009),andnot through theindirectrouteofcreatingcitiesandexemptingtheircompliancewiththeestablishedandprevailingstandards.Byindiscriminately carving out exemptions in the charter laws themselves, Congress enfeebled the normativefunction of the LGC on the legislative power to create cities. Taking the argument to the extreme, a singlebarangay now has the chance of being chartered as a component city without compliance with the income,territorialorpopulationrequirementsundertheLGC,foraslongasenoughCongressionalsupportismusteredtopush for its exemptionnot inageneral amendatory law,but through its ownspecific legislative charter.TheselectivedisregardofthenormsundertheLGCinfavorofsomemunicipalitiescannotbesanctionedinasystemwhere the ruleof law remainsdominant.Unlesspreventedby theCourt,Congresswill nowbeemboldened tocharter new cities wholesale and arbitrarily relax the stringent standards under the LGC,which it imposed onitself.

It must be emphasized that no inconsistency arises from the present minoritys continued participation in thedispositionof thesecondorsubsequentmotions for reconsiderationof thepartieswith theavowedpurposeofpredictability of judicial pronouncements. The reiteration of the minoritys position that the Cityhood Laws areunconstitutionalisanexpressionthatnoneofthe"new"orrehashedargumentsinthesubsequentmotionshavemerited a change in their stand and appreciation of the facts and the law. For theminority to abandon theirinvolvementfromtheproceedingsinamechanicaladherencetotherulethatthesecondandsubsequentmotionsforreconsiderationareprohibitedpleadingsthatdonotwarranttheCourtsattentionistocapitulatetothesixteenmunicipalities abhorrent strategy of insistent prayer for review of rehashed arguments, already passed on,repeatedly.

IfstabilityintheCourtsdecisions46istobemaintained,thenpartiesshouldnotbeencouragedtotirelesslyseekreexamination of determined principles and speculate on the fluctuation of the law with every change of itsexpounders.47InClavanov.HousingandLandUseRegulatoryBoard,theCourtexplainedthat:

"The tendency of the law," observes Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, "must always be to narrow the field ofuncertainty."Andsowasthejudicialprocessconceivedtobringaboutthejustterminationoflegaldisputes.Themechanismsfor thisobjectivearemanifoldbut theessentialpreceptunderlying themis the immutabilityof finalandexecutoryjudgments.

Thisfundamentalprincipleinpartaffirmsourrecognitionofinstanceswhendisputesareinadequatelypresentedbeforethecourtsandaddressessituationswhenpartiesfailtounravelwhattheytrulydesireandthusfailtosetforth all the claims which they want the courts to resolve. It is only when judgments have become final andexecutory, orevenwhenalreadydeemedsatisfied, thatournegligent litigantsbelatedly come forth topray formorerelief.Thedistilledwisdomandgeniusoftheageswouldtellustorejecttheirpleas,forthelosstolitigantsinparticularand tosociety ingeneralwould in the long runbegreater than thegain ifcourtsand judgeswereclothedwithpowertorevisetheirfinaldecisionsatwill.48(Emphasissupplied)

Unlikethatoftheothertwopoliticalbrancheswhosemandatesareregularlyrenewedthroughdirectelection,theCourts legitimacy must be painstakingly earned with every decision that puts voice to the cherished valuejudgmentsofthesovereign.Thejudicialfunctioninanorganizedandcohesivesocietygovernedbytheruleoflaw



isplacedinseriousperilifthepeoplecannotrelyonthefinalityofcourtdecisionstoregulatetheiraffairs.Thereisno reason for theCourt tobendoverbackwards toaccommodate theparties requests for reconsideration,yetagain,oftheunconstitutionalityofthesixteenCityhoodLawsasbornebytheFirstDecision,especiallyiftheresultwouldleadtothefracturingofcentraltenetsofthejusticesystem.Thepeoplessenseofanorderlygovernmentwill find it unacceptable if the Supreme Court, which is tasked to express enduring values through its judicialpronouncements,isfoundedonsand,easilyshiftingwiththechangingtides.

The legal process of creating cities as enacted and later amended by the legislature, implemented by theexecutive, and interpreted by the judiciary serves as the peoplesNorthStar: certain, stable and predictable.Absentthethreebranchesadherencetotheruleof law,oursocietywoulddenigrate intouncertainty, instabilityandevenanarchy.Indeed,thelawistheonlysupremepowerinoursystemofgovernment,andeverymanwhobyacceptingofficeparticipatesinitsfunctionsisonlythemorestronglyboundtosubmittothatsupremacyandtoobserve the limitations it imposesupon theexerciseof theauthority that it gives.49Nopublic officer is held tothesehighestofnormativestandardsthanthosewhosedutiesare toadjudicate therightsof thepeopleandtoarticulateonenduringprinciplesoflawapplicabletoall.

As JusticeRobert Jackson eloquently expressed,50 the SupremeCourt is not final because it is infallible it isinfallible because it is final. And because its decisions are final, even if faulty, there must be every energyexpendedtoensurethatthefaultydecisionsarefewandfarbetween.Theintegrityofthejudiciaryrestsnotonlyuponthefactthat it isabletoadministerjustice,butalsoupontheperceptionandconfidenceofthecommunitythatthepeoplewhorunthesystemhavedonejustice.51

Thedeterminationofthecorrectnessofajudicialdecisionturnsonfarmorethanitsoutcome.52Rather,itturnsonwhether its outcome evolved from principles of judicialmethodology, since the judiciarys function is not tobringaboutsomedesiredstateofaffairs,buttofindobjectivelytherightdecisionbyadheringtotheestablishedgeneralsystemofrules.53

WhatwearedealingwithinthiscaseisnolongerlimitedtothequestionofconstitutionalityofCityhoodLawsweare also confronted with the question of certainty and predictability in the decisions of the Court under ademocraticsystemgovernedbylawandrulesanditsabilitytoupholdtheConstitutionandnormativelegislationsuchastheLGC.

Thepublichasundulysuffered fromtherepeated"flipflopping" in thiscase,especiallysince itcomes fromthebranchofgovernmenttaskedtoembodyinaclearformenduringrulesofciviljusticethataretogovernthem.Inexpressingthesetruths,Iechothesentimentofajudicialcolleaguefromaforeignjurisdictionwhooncesaid,"Iwrite thesewords,notasa jeremiad,54but in thebelief thatunless thecourtsadhere to theguidanceof fixedprinciples,wewillsoonbringobjectivelawtoitssepulcher."55

MARIALOURDESP.A.SERENOAssociateJustice

Footnotes

1Posner,RichardA.,HowJudgesThink(2008),at1.

2Resolutiondated12April2011.

3PetitionersMotionforReconsiderationdated29April2011,para.1.6,at7.

4"Inconcludingthistediousanddisagreeabletask,maywenotbepermittedtoexpressthehopethatthisdecisionmayservetobulwarkthefortificationsofanorderlygovernmentof lawsandtoprotect individuallibertyfromillegalencroachment."(Villavicenciov.Lukban,G.R.No.14639,25March1919,39Phil.778emphasissupplied)

5DissentingOpinion,JusticeParas,Austriav.Amante,G.R.No.L959,09January1948,79Phil.780.

6"TheGovernmentofthePhilippineIslandsisessentiallyaGovernmentof lawsandnotofmen."(InRe:MullochDick,G.R.No.13862,16April1918,38Phil.41)

7 "The laws enacted become expressions of public morality. As Justice Holmes put it, (t)he law is thewitnessanddepositofourmorallife.Inaliberaldemocracy,thelawreflectssocialmoralityoveraperiodoftime.Occasionallythough,adisproportionatepoliticalinfluencemightcausealawtobeenactedatoddswithpublicmoralityorlegislaturemightfailtorepeallawsembodyingoutdatedtraditionalmoralviews.Law



hasalsobeendefinedassomethingmencreateintheirbestmomentstoprotectthemselvesintheirworstmoments.Lawdealswiththeminimumstandardsofhumanconductwhilemoralityisconcernedwiththemaximum.Lawalsoservesasahelpfulstartingpointforthinkingaboutaproperoridealpublicmoralityforasocietyinpursuitofmoralprogress."(Estradav.Escritor,A.M.No.P021651,04August2003,408SCRA1)

8 "Inademocracy, this commonagreementonpolitical andmoral ideas isdistilled in thepublic square.Wherecitizensarefree,everyopinion,everyprejudice,everyaspiration,andeverymoraldiscernmenthasaccesstothepublicsquarewherepeopledeliberatetheorderoftheirlifetogether.Citizensarethebearersofopinion,includingopinionshapedby,orespousingreligiousbelief,andthesecitizenshaveequalaccessto the public square. In this representative democracy, the state is prohibited from determining whichconvictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public deliberation. Through a constitutionallydesigned process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle in thisdemocraticgovernance.Thus,whenpublicdeliberationonmoral judgments is finallycrystallized into law,the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or mediangroups."(Estradav.Escritor,id.)

9Boddiev.Connecticut,401U.S.371,91S.Ct.780,28L.Ed.2d113(1971).

10Peoplev.Veneracion,G.R.No.11998788,12October1995,319Phil.364.

11Constitution,Art.VI,Sec.26and27.

12"Forwhenanynumberofmenhave,bytheconsentofeveryindividual,madeacommunity,theyhavetherebymade that community onebody,with a power to act as onebody,which is only by thewill anddeterminationofthemajority:forthatwhichactsanycommunity,beingonlytheconsentoftheindividualsof it,and itbeingnecessary to thatwhich isonebody tomoveoneway it isnecessary thebodyshouldmove that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority: or else it isimpossible itshouldactorcontinueonebody,onecommunity,which theconsentofevery individual thatunited into it, agreed that it should and so every one is bound by that consent to be concluded by themajority.Andthereforewesee,thatinassemblies,empoweredtoactbypositivelaws,wherenonumberissetbythatpositivelawwhichempowersthem,theactofthemajoritypassesfortheactofthewhole,andofcourse determines, as having, by the lawof nature and reason, the power of thewhole." (Locke, John.SecondTreatiseonCivilGovernment,citedinfootnoteno.47ofChiefJusticeReynatoPunosConcurringOpinioninProvinceofNorthCotabatov.GRPPeacePanelonAncestralDomain,568SCRA402)

13 The rule of law has likewise been described as "a defeasible entitlement of persons to have theirbehaviorgovernedbylawsthatarepubliclyfixedinadvance."(StephenR.Munzer,ATheoryofRetroactiveLegislation,61Tex.L.Rev.425[1982]at438)

14SeparateOpinion,JusticeSantiagoKapunan,Estradav.Desierto,G.R.No.14671015&146738,02March2001,356SCRA108.

15 SeparateOpinion, JusticeReynato Puno in IBP v. Zamora,G.R.No. 141284, 15 August 2000, 338SCRA81.

16 "Lawsareadead letterwithoutcourts toexpoundanddefine their truemeaningandoperation.Their true import, as far as respects individuals, must, like all other laws, be ascertained by judicialdeterminations. To produce uniformity in these determinations, they ought to be submitted, in the lastresort,toonesupremetribunal.Thereareendlessdiversitiesintheopinionsofmen.Weoftenseenotonly different courts but the judges of the same court differing fromeach other. To avoid the confusionwhichwouldunavoidablyresultfromthecontradictorydecisionsofanumberofindependentjudicatories,allnations have found it necessary to establish one court paramount to the rest, possessing a generalsuperintendence, and authorized to settle and declare in the last resort a uniform rule of civil justice."(AlexanderHamilton,FederalistPaperNo.22emphasissupplied)

17"Still,thetendencyofthelawmustalwaysbetonarrowthefieldofuncertainty."(JusticeOliverWendellHolmes,TheCommonLawat53)

18J.D.Heydon,LimitstothePowersofUltimateAppellateCourts,L.Q.R.2006,122(JUL),399425,404,citingPlannedParenthoodofSouthEasternPennsylvaniavCasey,505U.S.833,854(1992).

19Abuevav.Wood,G.R.No.21327,14January1924,45Phil.612.

20SeparateOpinion,JusticeReynatoPunoinIBPv.Zamora,supra.Note12.



21JusticeAntoninScalia,TheRuleofLawasaLawofRules,56U.Chi.L.Rev.1175(1989)at1179.

22 Dissenting Opinion, Justice Conchita CarpioMorales, La Bugal Blaan Tribal Association, et al., v.Ramos,G.R.No.127882,01February2005.

23"Ifyouwanttoknowthelawandnothingelse,youmustlookatitasabadman,whocaresonlyforthematerial consequenceswhich such knowledgeenables him to predict, not as a goodone,who finds hisreasonsforconduct,whetherinsidethelaworoutsideofit,inthevaguersanctionsofconscience."(JusticeOliverWendellHolmes,Jr.,ThePathoftheLaw,10Harv.L.R.457[1897])

24 Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legalsystemofthePhilippines.(CivilCode,Art.8Florescav.PhilexMiningCorporation,G.R.No.L30642,30April1985,136SCRA141)

25 Concurring Opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens, Thornburgh v. American College ofObstetriciansandGynecologists,476U.S.747,780781,106S.Ct.2169(1986)

26JanoJusticeSystems,Inc.,v.Burton,F.Supp.2d,2010WL2012941(C.D.Ill.)(2010),citingChristiansonv.ColtIndus.OperatingCorp.,486U.S.800,816,108S.Ct.2166,100L.Ed.2d811(1988).

27JanoJusticeSystems,Inc.,v.Burton,id.

28 Ina littleover threeyears, theCourtsdecisions in the instantcasehaveswung likeapendulumfromunconstitutionalitytovalidity.BeginningwiththeFirstDecisiondated18November2008,theCourtinitiallyfound the subject sixteen Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional, but reversed itself in the Second Decisiondated21December2009,wherethelawsweredeclaredvalid.However,theCourthadachangeofheartandreinstateditsearlierfindingofunconstitutionalityintheThirdDecision(SCResolutiondated24August2010,pennedbyJusticeAntonioCarpio),but lessthanayear later, itoverturnedthe lastrulingbyagaindeclaringtheCityhoodLawsconstitutionalintheFourthDecision(SCResolutiondated15February2011,penned by Justice Lucas Bersamin). The Fifth Decision and latest Resolution of the Court denied withfinality the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration and reiterated that the Cityhood Laws wereconstitutional(SCResolutiondated12April2011pennedagainbyJusticeBersamin)

29ThesixteenCityhoodLawsconsistofRepublicActsNos.938994,9398,940405,940709,943436and9491.

30 "A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer bemodified inany respect,even if themodification ismeant tocorrecterroneousconclusionsof factor lawandwhether itwill bemadeby the court that rendered it or by thehighest court of the land." (Labaov.Flores, G. R. No. 187984, 15 November 2010, 634 SCRA 723, citing Pea v. Government ServiceInsuranceSystem,G.R.No.159520,19September2006,502SCRA383,404)

31Republicv.Ballocanag,G.R.No.163794,28November2008,572SCRA436,citingHeirsofMauraSov.Obliosca,G.R.No.147082,28January2008,542SCRA406,421422.

32FGUInsuranceCorporationv.RTCofMakati,G.R.No.161282,23February2011,citingVillav.GSIS,G.R.No.174642,31October2009.

33"Theobjectofajudgmentnuncprotuncisnottherenderingofanewjudgmentandtheascertainmentanddeterminationofnew rights,but isoneplacing inproper formon the record, the judgment thathadbeenpreviouslyrendered,tomakeitspeakthetruth,soastomakeitshowwhatthejudicialactionreallywas,nottocorrectjudicialerrors,suchastorenderajudgmentwhichthecourtoughttohaverendered,inplaceof theone it diderroneously render,nor to supplynonactionby thecourt, howevererroneous thejudgmentmayhavebeen." (Mocorrov.Ramirez,G.R.No.178366,28July2008,560SCRA362,citingBrionesVasquezv.CourtofAppeals,450SCRA482,492[2005])

34"Voidjudgmentsmaybeclassifiedintotwogroups:thoserenderedbyacourtwithoutjurisdictiontodosoand thoseobtainedby fraudorcollusion." (Legardav.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.94457,16October1997,280SCRA642)

35"Oneoftheexceptionstotheprincipleofimmutabilityoffinaljudgmentsistheexistenceofsuperveningevents.Superveningeventsrefertofactswhichtranspireafterjudgmenthasbecomefinalandexecutoryortonewcircumstanceswhichdevelopedafterthejudgmenthasacquiredfinality,includingmatterswhichthepartieswerenotawareofpriortoorduringthetrialastheywerenotyetinexistenceatthattime."(NataliaRealty,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.126462,12November2002,391SCRA370)



36"Undertherulesofstatutoryconstruction,exceptions,asageneralrule,shouldbestrictlybutreasonablyconstrued." (Commissionerof InternalRevenuev.CA,G.R.No.107135,23February1999,303SCRA508)

37 " In the past, however, we have recognized exceptions to this rule by reversing judgments andrecallingtheirentriesintheinterestofsubstantialjusticeandwherespecialandcompellingreasonscalledforsuchactions."

"Notably, in San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, Galman v.Sandiganbayan, Philippine Consumers Foundation v. National Telecommunications Commission,andRepublicv.delosAngeles,wereversedourjudgmentonthesecondmotionforreconsideration,whileinVirJenShippingandMarineServicesv.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,wedidsoonathirdmotionforreconsideration.InCathayPacificv.RomilloandCosiov.deRama,wemodifiedoramendedourrulingonthesecondmotionforreconsideration.Morerecently,inthecasesofMuozv.CourtofAppeals,TanTiacChiongv.Hon.Cosico,ManotokIVv.Barque,andBarnesv.Padilla,werecalledentriesof judgmentafterfindingthatdoingsowasintheinterestofsubstantial justice."(Apo FruitsCorporation v. Landbank of thePhilippines,G.R.No. 164195, 12October 2010, 632SCRA727)

38DissentingOpinion,JusticeLouisBrandeis,Burnetv.CoronadoOil&Gas,Co.,285U.S.393,407408(1932).

39InSecretaryofJusticev.Lantion,G.R.No.139645,theCourtfirstorderedtheSecretaryofJusticetofurnishprivaterespondentMarkJimenez,copiesoftheextraditionrequestanditssupportingpapers,andtogivehimareasonableperiodwithinwhichtofilehiscommentwithsupportingevidence.(Decisiondated18January2000)TheCourtsubsequentlyreverseditselfanddeclaredthatprivaterespondentisbereftoftherighttonoticeandhearingduringtheevaluationstageoftheextraditionprocess.(Decision17October2000)

40InLaBugalBlaanTribalAssociationv.Ramos,G.R.No.127882,theCourtfirstdeclaredsomeoftheprovisions of Republic Act No. 7942 (PhilippineMining Act of 1995) unconstitutional and void (Decisiondated27January2004)butonamotionforreconsiderationtherulingwaslaterreversedandthemininglawwasdeclaredconstitutional(Resolutiondated01December2004).

41InHeirsofManotokv.Barque,G.R.No.162335&162605,theCourtsFirstDivisioninitiallyaffirmedthecancellationoftheManotoktitleoverthefriarlandandorderedthatthetitlebereconstitutedinfavoroftheHomerL.Barque,Sr. (Decisiondated12December2005)After theDecisionwas recalledand thecaseremanded to theCourt ofAppeals for reception of evidence (Resolution dated 18December 2008), theCourtenbancnullifiedthetitlesofManotokandBarqueanddeclaredthelandaslegallybelongingtothenationalgovernment.(Decisiondated24August2010)

42 InApoFruitsCorporationv.Landbankof thePhilippines,G.R.No.164105, theCourtsThirdDivisionorderedLandbanktopayApoFruitsCorporationandHijoPlantationtopayP1,383,179,000with12%legalinterest as just compensation for the two companies expropriated lands. (Decision dated 06 February2007) Landbanks motion for reconsideration was partially granted and the award of legal interest wasdeleted(Decisiondated19December2007and30April2008),whichwasaffirmedbytheCourtenbanc.(Decisiondated04December2009)However,theawardoflegalinterestwasreinstatedlateron.(Decisiondated12October2010)

43InQuintov.COMELEC,G.R.No.189698,theCourtfirstdeclaredunconstitutionaltheprovisionintheOmnibusElectionCode,asamendedbyRepublicActNo.9369,consideringpublicappointiveofficialsasipsofactoresignedfromthefilingoftheircertificateofcandidacy.(Decision01December2009)TheCourtagain reversed itself and declared the same provision as "not unconstitutional." (Resolution dated 22February2010)

44RepublicActNo.7160,Sec.450.

45 "Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into acomponent city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department ofFinance,ofat leastOnehundredmillionpesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutiveyearsbasedon2000constantprices,andifithaseitherofthefollowingrequisites:

(i) a contiguous territoryofat leastonehundred (100) squarekilometers,ascertifiedby theLandManagementBureauor



(ii)apopulationofnotlessthanonehundredfiftythousand(150,000)inhabitants,ascertifiedbytheNationalStatisticsOffice.

xxxxxxxxx

(c)Theaverageannual incomeshall include the incomeaccruing to thegeneral fund,exclusiveofspecial funds, transfers, and nonrecurring income." (RA 9009, Sec. 1, amendingSec. 450 of theLGCemphasissupplied)

46ConcurringOpinion,JusticeRomeoCallejo,Sr.,Lambinov.COMELEC,G.R.No.174153,25October2006,505SCRA160,citingLondonStreetTramwaysCo.,Ltd.v.LondonCountyCouncil,[1898]A.C.375,inCOOLEY,ATREATISEONTHECONSTITUTIONALLIMITATIONS117118.

47ConcurringOpinion,JusticeRomeoCallejo,Sr.,Lambinov.COMELEC,supra.

48G.R.No.143781,27February2002,378SCRA172.

49U.S.v.Lee,106US196,261(1882)

50 "Rightly or wrongly, the belief is widely held by the practicing profession that this Court no longerrespectsimpersonalrulesoflawbutisguidedinthesemattersbypersonalimpressionswhichfromtimetotimemaybesharedbyamajorityofJustices.Whateverhasbeenintended,thisCourtalsohasgeneratedanimpressioninmuchofthejudiciarythatregardforprecedentsandauthoritiesisobsolete,thatwordsnolongermeanwhattheyhavealwaysmeanttotheprofession,thatthelawknowsnofixedprinciples."

"Wheneverdecisionsofonecourtarereviewedbyanother,apercentageof themarereversed.That reflectsadifference inoutlooknormally foundbetweenpersonnelcomprisingdifferentcourts.However,reversalbyahighercourtisnotproofthatjusticeistherebybetterdone.Thereisnodoubtthat if therewereasuperSupremeCourt,asubstantialproportionofour reversalsof statecourtswouldalsobereversed.Wearenotfinalbecauseweareinfallible,butweareinfallibleonlybecauseweare final." (ConcurringOpinionofJusticeRobertJackson,Brownv.Allen,344U.S.443 [1953]emphasissupplied).

51SpousesSadikv.Casar,A.M.No.MTJ951053,02January1997,266SCRA1,citingTalensDabonv.Arceo,AdministrativeMatterNo.RTJ961336,25July1996.

52 Dissenting Opinion, Justice Conchita CarpioMorales, La Bugal Blaan Tribal Association, et al., v.Ramos,G.R.No.127882,01February2005.

53 Dissenting Opinion, Justice Conchita CarpioMorales, La Bugal Blaan Tribal Association, et al., v.Ramos,id.

54 A lamenting and denunciatory complaint a doleful story or a dolorous tirade. (Websters Third NewInternationalDictionary[MerriamWebster1993]at1213)

55DissentingOpinion,CircuitJudgeTam,InRe:EstateofBurrogh,475F.2d370,154U.S.App.D.C.259(1973).


League 2011

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Transcript of League 2011