DOCUMENT RESUME

02793 - [A2033111]

Department of Defense Air Pollution Control: Progress andDelays. LCD-77-305; B-166506. Jujy 18, 1977. 25 pp. + 3appendices (6 pp.).

Report to the Congress; by Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General.

Issue Area: Facilities and Material Management: Operation andMaintenance of Facilities (708); Environmental ProtectionPrograms: Environmental Protection Standards (2201).

Contact: Logistics and Communications Div.Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense -

Mil.tary (except procurement S contracts) (051).crganization Concerned: Department of Defense; Environmental

Protection Agency.Congressional Relevance: house Committee on Armed Services;

Senate Committee on Armed Services; Congress.Authority: Clean Air Act of 1963 (77 Stat. 392). Air Quality Act

of 1967 (81 Stat. 485). Clean Ai.r Act Amendments of 1970 (84Stat. 1676). Resource ConseLvation and Recovery Act of 1976(90 Stat. 2799). Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167. H. Rept.95-294. Executive Order 1 282. Executive Order 11507.Executive Ordc 11752.

Pollution from stationary sources at some Department ofDefense (DOD) installations will continue to pollute theNation's air for several years. Federal agencies had until July1, 1973, in most areas of the country, to comply with Federalair pollution sta.~dards. Findings/Conclusions: While some stepshave been taken to control air pollution, DOD needs to do muchmore to comply with emission control standards. DOD and itsmilitary services did not know, as of July 1, 1975, if theirinstallations were complying with air pollution standards. MoreDOD installations could have been in compliance by the deadlineif the services had evaluated the status of their installationssooner. The controllable causes of delayed compliance by themilitary services were long delays in deciding how to controlemissions and lengthy project design phases. The uncontrollablecauses were the erergy crisis, the lack of technology, and theunforeseen construction delays. Several State and localofficials were uncertain whether they should be involved inconsent agreements and whether they could enforce coapli'.ecommitments under such agreements. The Army and the Air Force donot have a procedure to guarantee that environmental protectionrecommendations are carried out. Recommendations: The Secretaryof Defense should require the Army, Navy, and Air Force to:evaluate current air pollution emission surveys to isolateviolations of stationary source standards; develop the fundingprogram needed to attain full comFliance by the new deadline;and make a thorough inspection to identify sources not incompliance with new standards and take the necessary correctiveactions; and establish procedures to isolate and monitor

controllable causes which delayed control projects. The Army anithe Air Force should be required to adopt a system of scheduledsurveys and establish procedures for monitoring installations'actions on survcy team recommenlations. (Author/QM)

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERALOF'" 0THE UNITED STATES

Department Of DefenseAir Pollution Control:Progress And DelaysAi- pollution control standards were sup-posed to be met by July 1, 1975. TheDepartment of Defense nas made progressbut about 30 percent of the major pollu-ting installations were still not complyingwith the standards in January 1977. Someof these may not comp'v for several moreyears.

GAO recommends steps to avoid delays incorrecting violations. it also discloses thequestionable status of jet engine test cellsunder existing clean air legislation, which theCongress should clarify.

L(CD-77-306 JULY 18, 1977

COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATEIWASWHINTON, D.C. te6s

B-166506

To the President of the Senate an< theSpeaker of the House of Representatives

This report discussed the status of major Defenseinstallations in relation to air quality standards and aircontrol authorities. The information should be useful ingaging how clean air legislation is working in Federalfacilities.

A previous report to the Congress on August 23, 1973(B-166506), discussed the Federal and State reluctance toenforce air pollution control laws and regulations,

We made the review pursuant to the Budget and AccoutltingAct, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), ard the Accounting and Auditing Actof 1950 (31 U.s.C. 67).

We are sending copies of this report to the Director,Office of Management and Budget; the Secretary of Defense;and the Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency.

omptroller Generalof the United States

COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSEREPORT TO THE CONGRESS AIR POLLUTION CONTROL:PROGRESS AND DELAYS

DIGEST

Pollution from stationary sources (all sourcesexcept vehicles) at some Department of Defenseinstallations will continu tro pollute theNation's air for several years. While somesteps have been taken to control harmful airemissions, Defense needs to do much more tocomply with emission control requirements.(See ch. 2.)

The Clean Air Amendments of 1970 requireFederal facilities to comply with Federal,State, and local air pollution standards. OnApril 30, 1971, the Environmental ProtectionAgency published air quality standards forsulfur oxide, nitrogen oxide, carbon monoxide,particulate matter, hydrocarbons, and photo-chemical oxidants. Federal agencies had untilJuly 1, 1975, in most areas of the country tocomply with Federal standards. The Congressis considering extending the deadline. (:'eepp. 1 and 2.)

California has filed suit to stop the Navyfrom violating air pollution standards.The dispute is whether the Clean Air Act,as amendeC, makes jet engines tested intest cells subject to stationary-sourceair pollution requirements. (See ch. 4.)The Congress should amend the law toclarify the situation.

COMPLIANCE WITH STANDARDS--WHAT CAN BE DONE

Defense and its military services did notknow as of July 1, 1975, if their installa-tions were complying with air pollutionstandards.

The Environmental Protection Agency in July1975 c-assified 269 Defense installationsas major air pollution emitters. Major

Tur Sheet. Upon removal, the reportcover date should be noted hereon. i LCD-77-305

emitte[s can discharge at least 100 tons ofa single air pollutant each year. About70 percent of Defense's major emitters werein compliance in January 1977. More in-stallations could have been in compliance bythe deadline if the services had evaluatedthe status of their installations sooner.(See pp. 3 to 6.)

In recognition of pending legislation to ex-tend the d&adline, the Secretary of Defenseshould require the Army, Navy, and Air Forceto

--evaluate current air pollution emnissioninventories to isolate violatioi, of sta-tionary source standards,

--develop the funding program needed toattain full compliance by the new deadline,and

-- make a thorough inventory,if and when addi-tional standards are issued, to identifysources not in compliance and take the ac-tions necessary to meet new standards in atimely manner.

Defense agrees with the recommendations andfeels it has always acted quickly to attainfull compliance but that the Government bud-get system takes 3 years tc move an abate-ment project from inception to approval.(See p. 6.)

CAUSES DELAYING COMPLIANCE

At five installations visited, the militaryservices could not control about half of thecauses which delayed them from complying withthe standards. The most time-consuming causesof delays could have bee, controlled.

The controllable causes were long delays indeciding how to control emissions and lengthyproject design phases. The uncontrollablecauses were (1) the energy crisis, (2) thelack of technology, and (3) the unforeseenconstruction delays. (See p. 10.)

ii

The Secretary of DefensF should require theArmy, Navy, and Air Force to establish pro-cedures to isolate and monitor controllablecauses which delayed control projects.Defense agrees with this recommendation.(See p. 14.)

Consent agreements between Federal agenciesand the Environmental Protection Agency makethe agencies comply with air pollution con-trol standards by an established date.States are encouraged to take part in thecompliance process. Several State and localofficials were uncertain whether they shouldbe involved in consent agreements and whetherthey could enforce compliance commitmentsunder such agreements.

The Congress is considering amending the CleanAir Act to clarify

--whether and when Federal agencies are boundby Federal, State, interstate, and localprocedural requirements and

-- who is authorized to enforce compliance withair quality standards. (See p. 17.)

INTERNAL REVIEWS

Navy makes regular technical environmentalsurveys of its installations and requiresfeedback on recommended actions. The Artayand the Air Force survey installation prob-lems on request and do not have a procedureto guarantee thdt recommendations are carriedout. (See ch. 5.)

Defense said that inspections will be madewhere warranted and it did not comment on theneed for monitoring the bases' actions onrecommendations by Army and Air Force environ-mental teams.

The Secretary of Defense should require theArmy and Air Force to adopt a system of sched-uled surveys and establish procedures formonitoring installations' actions on surveyteam recommendations. (See p. 24.)

ITer Shot iii

Co n ten t sPage

DIGEST

CHAPTER

AIR POLLUTION LAWS 1

2 PROGRESS OF MAJOR EMITTERS TOWARD COMPLIANCE 3Compliance with stationary source emis-sion standards 3Cost estmnates for full compliance 4

Conc.usions, recommendations, and agencycomments 6

3 COMPLIANCE STATUS OF SELECTED MAJOR EM::TTERS 7Reasons for missing July 1, 1975, com-pliance deadline: controllable anduncontrollable 'OConclusions, recommen6ation, and agencycomments 14Reasons for lack of operating agreements 15

4 JET ENGINE TEST CELL STATUS UNDECIDED 18Emission control problems 18Litigation in process 19Recommendation to the Congress 215 INTERNAL REVIEWS 22

Environmental surveys 22Internal audits 23Conclusions, agency comments, andrecommendation 24

6 SCOPE OF REVIEW 25APPENDIX

I Letter dated March 23, 1977, from ActingAssistant Secretary of Defense (Installa-tions and Logistics) 26

II Letter dated March 17, 1977, from ActingAssistant Administrator for Planning andManagement, Environmental ProtectionAgency 28

III Principal officials responsible for activi-ties discussed in this report 31

ABBREVIATIONS

DOD Department of Defense

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

GAO General Accounting Office

a

CHAPTER 1

AIR POLLUTION LAWS

Miilions of tons of harmful pollutants are graduallysaturating the atmosphere each year. The Council onEnvironmental Quality estimated the 1975 nationwide costfor controlling air pollution to be $11.6 billion.

In 1955 the Congress passed the first ail pollutioncontrol act authorizing the Surgeon General to examine thenature and extent of the Nation's air pollution problems.The Clean Air Act of 1963 (77 Stat. 392) authorized grantsto State and local agencies for developing control programsand provided the Federal Government authority to act againstpolluters.

The Air Quality Act of 1967 (81 Stat. 485) required(1) identifying geographical regions where air pollutionwas a problem, (2) publishing air quality criteria for thosepollutants that may le harmful to a person's health or wel-fare, and (3) publishing information on the techniques whichcould be used to control the sources of those pollutants.The States were required to develop standards for the pollut-ants and plans for implementing the standards subject to Fed-eral review and approval.

The Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (84 Stat. 1676) expandedthe Federal Goverrndent's role by requiring the Administrator,Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to establish nationalambient air quality standards. Ambient air is that portionof the atmosphere external to buildings and accessible to thegeneral public. Such standards apply to the total allowableconcentration of pollutants in the atmosphere from all emis-sion potints.

On April 30, 1971, EPA published standards for six airpollutants--sulfur oxide, nitrogen oxide, carbon monoxide,particulates, hydrocarbons, and photochemical oxidants.EPA's Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards said thatadditional research is being done on other po.llutants, sucras lead, sulfates, and nitrates, and that standards for thesepollutants may be established by the late :.970s or early1980s.

The 1970 amendments also require States to adopt plansfor implementing, maintaining, and enforcing national ambientair quality standards. The plans are to include emissionlimitations for pollution sources (e.g., power plants,

1

incinerators) and timetables for complying with the nationalstandards. Pollutant emission standards to protect publichealth were to be attained, in most cases, within 3 yearsafter EPA approved the State plans. EPA's 1976 enforcementprogress report states that ambient air quality standardswere to be met by May 31, 1975, except for portions of15 States where an extension up to 2 years has been grantedfor one or more polil'tants. EPA guidelines for Federalagencies specified Ju.v 1, 1975, as the deadline for mostareas of the country to comply with the standards but didnot discuss enforcement (see pp. 15-17). The 95th Congressis considering amendments that would extend the deadline upto 5 years. A prior bill to revise the 1970 amendments diedon the final day of the 94th Congress.

The 1970 amendments specifically require Federal Acili-ties to comply with air pollution control requirements tothe same extent any person is subject to such requirements.Executive Orders 11282, 11507, and 11752, dated May 26, 1966,February 4, 1970, and December 17, 1973, respectively, re-affirmed Federal agencies' responsibilities to comply withapplicable standards and required them to provide leadershipin attaining such standards.

The last order required the heads of Federal agencies(1) to make certain that facilities under their jurisdictionare designed, constructed, managed, operated, and maintainedto conform to Federal, State, interstate, and local standards,(2) to cooperate with EPA, State, interstate, and local agen-cies in the prevention, control, and abatement of environ-mental pollution, and (3; to provide information, in accord-ance with EPA guidelines, necessary to determine installationcompliance.

2

CHAPTER 2

PROGRESS OF MAJOR EMITTERS

TOWARD COMPLIANCE

The Environmental Protection Agency defines major airpollution emitters as facilities capable of emitting atleast 100 tons of a single air pollutant a year. The majoremitters account for about 80 percent of all stationarysource air pollutants in the United States.

The Department of Defense (DOD) and its military serv-ices have made progress in abating air pollution from sta-tionary sources (all sources other than vehicles). However,as of the July 1, 1975, deadline, they did not know if theirinstallations were complying with air pollution standards.Requirements were established as early as August 1966 toidentify pollution sources and to periodically report onprogress in abating the pollution. Yet, in July 1976 or1 year after the deadline, the services said that theirreporting requirements and other management controls did notprovide assurance that all air pollution problems requiringcorrective action had been identified.

COMPLIANCE WITH STATIONARYSOURCE EMISSION STAlNDARDS

On May 6, 1975, EPA published guidelines for Federalagencies' use in (1) determining the compliance status ofall Federal stationary sources subject to Federal, State,and local emission limitations and (2) establishing com-mitments to correct deficiencies. Air pollution sourcesand related emissions data necessary to determine compliancehad to be reported to EPA and the State control agencies onthe air pollutant emissions report. The guidelines providefor a three-phase (major emitters, minor emitters in highlypolluted areas, and all other) program for determining com-pliance. The guidelines do not stipulate target dates forsubmitting the air emission inventory.

Service officials said the inventory's results willhelp them to (1) manage their air pollution control programsby providing, for the first time, a baseline of all air pollu-tion sources under their control and (2) identify any non-complying sources for which no corrective action is planned.

We asked EPA for information on the status of complianceby military installation3 at July 1, '975. Through its 10 re-gional offices, EPA identified 269 DOD installations as major

3

air pollution emitters. EPA's regional officials pointed outthat they were not sure of the accuracy of the statistics and

that the compliance status of many installations was unknownbecause there were not enough (1) source tests, (2) State and

EPA inspections, and (3) established procedures for obtainingnecessary data from Federal facilities. The table below sum-

marizes EPA's estimate of DOD's overall progress in comply-ing with air pollution standards by the deadline.

July-l-195, compliance status-

Military Major Per - Per- Per-

service emitters In cent Out cent Unknown cent

Army 84 34 40 31 37 19 23

Navy 79 31 39 36 46 12 15

Air Force 104 51 49 28 27 25 24

DefenseSupplyAgency 2 - - -1 50 1 50

Total 269 116 43 96 36 57 21

DOD and EPA said (see apps. I and II) that about70 percent of the major emitters were in compliance by Janu-ary 1977. EPA said that it has classified 263 DOD installa-tions as major emitters, and 21 more installations are on the

borderline between major and minor emitters. Tc clarify the

relative impact of DOD installations on attainment of cleaner

air, EPA noted that the 284 installations represented 1.3 per-cent of the 22,140 major emitters which EPA has identifiedat January 1, 1977.

COST-ESTIMATES FOR-FULL COMPLIANCE

To comply with air quality standards during fiscal years1971-77, the services requested $256 million and received$234 million for controlling air pollution and estimated that

an additional $101 million would be needed to correct airpollution problems beyond fiscal year 1977.

The Clean Air Amendments of 1970 authorize the Presidentto exempt any executive bzanch emission source from compli-

ance if he determines it to be in the paramount interest of

the United States. No exemption, however, can be granted due

to lack of appropriation unless the President has specificallyrequested such appropriation and the Congress has denied it-.

The following table shows that the Congress generallyhas supported the military construction budget requestsfor air pollution control projects.

4

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CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND-AGENCY-COMMENTS

We believe that many of the installations out ofcompliance or in an unknown status could have complied bythe deadline had the services taken earlier actions todetermine the status of the installations.

The lack of emissions data from which compliance deter-minations can be made appears t b'e resolved. The EPA airpollutant emissions reports, when completed for all emitters,should provide the data necessary for the services to deter-mine the compliance status of their installations and tomonitor actions necessary to correct deficiencies.

In recognition of pending legislation to extend thedeadline (see p. 2), we recommend that the Secretary of De-fenae require the Army, Navy, and Air Force to

--evaluate the current air pollution emission inven-tories to isolate violations of stationary sourceemission standards,

--develop the funding program needed to attain fullcompliance by the new deadline, and

-- make a thorough inventory, if and when additionalstandards are issued, to identify sources not incompliance and take the actions necessary to meetnew standards in a timely manner.

DOD said (see app. I) it is in the process of identify-ing those stationary sources which do not meet emissionstandards and is continuously monitoring this effort throughsemiannual and annual reports. DOD believes it has alwaystaken timely action to attain full compliance but that oneproblem is that the Federal Government's budget system takes3 years to move an abatement project from inception toapproval.

DOD also said that it is closely monitoring the pub-lication of revised standards and the issuance of newstandards to effect timely implementation. As a followup,it is insuring that appropriate projects are added to thedeficiency list which is updated on a semiannual basisand that the projects are properly programed.

6

CHAPTER 3

COMPLIANCE STATUS OF SeJECTED MAJOR-EMITTERS

The Environmental Protection Agency considered six ofthe eight industrial installations we visited to be out ofcompliance on July 1, 1975. The status of one installationwas in dispute (see ch. 4), and State authorities were re-viewing the emission sources at McClellan Air Force Base,California.

The table on the following page shows that these in-stallations (excluding McClellan AFB) had identified44 sources which needed corrective measures. Of this num-ber, 22 were complying with applicable requirements and 22were not. Of the 22 sources not in compliance on July 1,1975, 14 had control projects in process, and three werealready in compliance at the time of our visit. All butfour of the sources are expected to be in compliance be ire1978.

7

Status of StationarY Sources of Air Pollutantsat selected nustra- n atary nsatone

Comp'.iance Actual (A)/ facilitystateus expected (3) operating

Sources emitting 07/01/75 compliance under agreementsInstallation air pollutants dat-e with State

Radford Army Powerhouse *1 1 (B) 06/77 YesAmmunitionPlant, Powerhouse #2 1 (E) 04/77 astRadford,Va. Open burning of

explosive con- Nottaminated waste 1 (A) 05/76 applicable

(N/A)

Open burning ofwaste propellants 1 (A) 03/77 N/A

Nitric acid/sulfuricacid concentrators 1 (E) 06/77 No

Nitrocelluloseplants 1 (E' 07/77 No

a/Acid tanks 1 (E) 07/77 No

Oleum plant 1 (A) 01/73 N/A

Ammonia oxidationplant 1 (A) 01/73 N/A

2 7 2

Holston Army Ammonia oxidationAmmunition process 1 (E) 01/79 YesPlant,Kingsport,Tenn.

Nitric acid con-centrator: 1 (E) 01/79 Yes

Boilers-Areas A&B 2 (E) 11/77 Yes

Gas-producing plant 1 (E) 06/80 No

Open burning of ex-plosive and explo-sive contaminatedwaste 1 (b) No

Open burning ofsolid waste 1 (A) 11/74 N/A

1 6 4

Letterkenny Bo:ilers 1 (A) 1973 N/AArmy Depot,Chambersburg, Open burning ofPa. waste 1 (A) 08/75 N/A

1 1 0

Compliance Actual (Aj/ Facilitystatus expected (E) operatingSources emitting 07/01/75 compliance under agreementInstallation air pollutants n Out date with State

Alameda Naval Heati;g and steamAir Station, plants (2 buildings) 2 (A) 1974 N/AAlameda,Calif. Liquid storage

tanks 2 (A) 1967 N/A(3 buildings) 1 (A) 1973 N/A

Firefighting school 1 (A) 1967 N/A

Industrial sources 6 (A) 1973 N/A(7 buildings) 1 (A) 1974 N/A

13 0 0

Philadelphia Foundry 1 (A) 08/76 N/ANaval Base,Philadelphia, Abrasive blast 1 (c) NoPa. facility

Test boilers 1 (A) 07/76 N/AFirefighting school 1 (A) 04/75 N/ATraining boilers 1 (A) 11/75 N/A

1 4 0

Charleston Main power plant 1 (E) 18/79 NoNaval Base,Charleston, Classified waste 1 (A) 10/75 N/AS.C. incinerators (2) 1 (d) N/A

Boilers (4 buildings) 4 (A) 10/70 N/A

4 3 0

Tinker Air Paint hanger 1 (E) 09/77 NoForce Base,Oklahoma (e)City,Okla.

0 1 0Total 22 22 6

a/This project has Deen completed; however, compliance will not be attaineduntil the pollutant controls are connected to the new nit-ic acid/sulfuricacid concentrators and nitrocelluIose plants under construction.

b/Control technology is not available.

c/City of Philadelphia officials consider this a minor source and will nottake action against the base unless a complaint is received.

d/One incinerator was deactivated in March 1975.

e/Tinker had not identified all of its air pollutant sources; therefore, thenumber of sources emitting air pollutants and their compliance status wereunknown.

9

REASONSFOR MISSING JULY 1 1975COMPLIANCE DEADLINE:- eANTAOLABLEAND UNCONTROLLABLE

About half the reasons delaying compliance at fiveinstallations visited were controllable and about half wereuncontrollable by the lailitary services. We categorized thecontrollable reasons as (1) lengthy decisionmaking processeson controlling emissions and (2) prolonged project designphases. The uncontrollable reasons included (1) the energycrisis, (2) the lack of technology, and (3) the unforeseenconstruction delays.

The status and problems of the five installations maynot be indicative of the causes for noncompliance and delaysin attaining compliance at other facilities since we selectedthe five because of their industrial activities. DOD saidthat many of its 67 noncomplying .Iajor emitters are out ofcompliance because of uncontrollable reasons, and correctionshave been programed for the few emitters which are out of com-pliance because of controllable reasons.

The following table summarizes the reasons delaying com-pliance for 16 sources at 5 installations.

10

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In March 1973, local pollution authorities formallyrequested Tinker Air Force Base to provide a comprehensiveemissions inventory to determine the inptallation's compli-ance status. As of March 1976, Tinker had not identifiedand quantified all of its air pollut!on sources and had notprovided Federal, State, or local authorities with the in-formation necessary to determine its air pollution status.EPA, State, and local officials said that the installationhad not emphasized the importance of air pollution control.DOD said that Tinker reported its emissions inventory to EPAin June 1976 and, as of January 1977, had not received theresults of EPA and local officials' review.

Lengthy decisionmaking-process

Bringing 10 sources at four installations into compliancewas delayed while officials at various levels spent consider-able time in reviewing and approving control plans. Thedecisionmaking processes sometimes require6 3 years or more.The following examples illustrate the delays.

Powerhouse No. 1 is Radford Army Ammunition Plant'slargest source of pollution and is capable of emitting about41 tons of particulate matter daily. The primary reason forthe powerplant not being in compliance by the deadline wasthe prolonged delay (39 months) in deciding how to controlthe pollution. The energy crisis accounted for 10 monthsof the delay. After the decision was made, it took another21 months to design the control project.

In December 1969, the powerhouse was identified as anair pollution source needing correction. In March 1970,a fuel study recommended that the powerhouse continue usingcoal with appropriate air pollution control devices. TheArmy requested and the Congress appropriated fiscal year 1971funds to install an electrostatic precipitator (a controldevice which separates suspended particulates from a gasstream via electrical charges) and a 300-foot stack. However,a fuel study in September 1971 indicated that savings couldbe achieved by converting the powerhouse to burn oil and gas,G-d a fuel conversion project was submitted in place of theprecipitator and stack. DOD i'sapproved the fuel conversionproject in April 1972 because of a natural gas shortage. Thearmy returned to its original plans and completed the prelimi-nary design in November 1972. Because the drawings indicatedcost overruns, officials delayed additional design work andsubmitted a revised fuel study for approval. DOD again dis-approved fuel conversion and, in February 1973, the Army

12

resumed designing the precipitator. The project is expectedto be completed in June 1977--2 years after the deadline.

The Charleston Naval Base main powerplant was identifiedas a pollution source in March 1967. Although tests did notreveal whether violations existed, the base began installing

air pollution control devices in June 1970 but canceled theproject. In March 1971, the base initiated a project to con-

vert the powerplant from coal to oil and natural gas. InAugust 1973, DOD required that all fuel conversion projects(from coal to gas or oil) be canceled because of the energycrisis. The base restudied the matter and submitted a request

for particulate controls in June 1975. The controls wereexpected to be funded in fiscal year 1978 and completed in

July 1979--4 years after the deadline. DOD now expects proj-

ect funding to be deferred to fiscal year 1979.

Charleston Naval Base officials said that a major problem

was the low priority assigned to environmental matters. Offi-

cials of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, SouthernDivision, and State of South Carolina agreed that the instal-

lation did not emphasize environmental matters enough.

Prolonged design phases

Extensive time to design control projects delayed sevensources at three installations from complying with air pollu-

tion regulations. Some projects took 4 years to design.Reasons for the prolonged design periods were project scopechanges, design changes, and prolonged review and approval

of designs by various military levels. A project at HolstonArmy Ammunition Plant illustrates the design delays.

According to State officials, Tennessee issued its Pollu-

tion Control Regulations for particulate matter in August1969. A surrey conducted at l'olston Army Ammunition Plant

during May and June 1970 indicated that particulate emissions

from its stoker boilers s'hould .te reduced. The Army requested

air pollution control funds to install electrostatic precipi-

tators, and the Congress appropriated these funds for fiscalyear 1973. The design contract was awarded in May 1972, andconcept design was completed in December 1972. However, the

Corps of Engineers required the architect/engineer firm to

completely rework the design because it had the precipita-tors inside the building rather than outside. The revised

concept design was completed in September 1973. Thearchitect/engineer finished the final design in April 1974.

The review and approval process was finished in February 1975,

33 months after awarding the design contract. Constructionis expected to be completed in November 1977--28 months afterthe deadline.

13

Energy crisis

Three installations planned to correct their air pollu-tiH problems by converting to cleaner burning fuels. How-ever, fear of oil and gas shortages from the energy crisiscaused these plans to be canceled. The installations had toreduce emissions by installing control devices such as elec-trostatic precipitators which delayed compliance at CharlestonNaval Base, Philadelphia Naval Base, and Radford Arm'/ Ammuni-tion Plant.

Lack of technology

Lack of technology to control emissions primarily af-fected explosive waste disposal at Army ammunition plants.Because open burning of waste propellants at. the Radford ArmyAmmunition Plant violated State regulations, the Army re-quested funds for a waste propellant incinerator, and theCongress appropriated the funds for fiscal year 1972. Duemainly to lack of technology, the Army spent about 4 yearsdeciding how to control the emissions and design the project.Radford had a prototype incinerator operating in May 1972 andmonitored its operation over a 14-month period. The resultsprovided the criteria to design the waste propellant incinera-tor which was completed in March 1977--20 months ;after thedeadline.

Construction delays

Four sources at two installations failed to meet the com-pliance deadline because of unforeseen construction delays.These included a labor strike, bid protests, disputes with thecontractor over loss of equipment and material, and the timeneeded to complete a high priority operational requirement.

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATION, AND AGENCY COMMENTS

We believe that the most time-consuming causes for notmeeting the compliance deadline were controllable. Quickerdecisions on controlling emissions and more timely projectdesigns would have allowed several DOD sources to attaincompliance by the deadline.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense require theArmy, Navy, and Air Force to establish procedures to isolateand monitor controllable factors delaying control projectsso that pollution sources can be brought into compliance andnecessary actions taken to meet any authorized extension ofthe compliance deadline.

14

DOD agreed (see app. I) and said that it is givinggreater attention to this area during semiannual review ofthe overall program, during the budget review procesas, andduring staff visits to selected commands and installations.

.ASONS FOR LACK OF OPERATING* REEMENTS

EPA guidelines for Federal agencies require consent (oroperating) agreements to be signed by representatives ofeach Federal facility, EPA, and if possible, concurred withby the State air pollution control agency. Consent agree-ments state the conditions under which the facility willoperate and the schedule under which the facility will bebrought into compliance. Each agreement will identify thesource, the applicable standard, proposed control method, anda timetable for attaining compliance.

The timetable represents the Federal facility's commit-ment to achieve compliance and gives the progress dates for(1) completing the design, (2) initiating and completing con-struction of control devices or process modifications, and(3) achieving final compliance. EPA and State inspections,as resources permit, verify the facility's progress. Informa-tion on source compliance status and progress will be pub-lished in the State Implementation Plan Progress Report. Theguidelines do not discuss enforcement methods or procedures.

EPA said that of the 68 major emitters which DOD cur-rently reports as out of compliance

-- 24 are on compliance schedules set forth in consentagreements between EPA and the installations,

-- 22 are the subject of current negotiations whichshould produce consent agreements, and

-- 22 are so close to complying or making such satis-factory progress toward compliance that EPA does notbelieve that consent agreements are needed.

Five of the installations visited did not have operatingagreements with State pollution control authorities for10 noncomplying sources. State and local authorities pro-vided various reasons for not having operating agreementswith the installations.

15

Radford Army Ammur.ition Plant does not have an operatingagreement with Virginia for three of its noncomplying sourcesbecause the sources emit nitrogen oxides which, a State offi-cial said, are not a problem in the Radford area.

Holston Army Ammunition Plant had operating agreementswith Tennessee for its ammonia oxidation process and nitricacid concentrators until February 1976. Through an oversight,these agreements expired withouc the State's knowledge andHolston did not request extensions. In reply to our draft,DOD said that Holston was granted extensions in January 1977.The plant had also been granted a permit for its open burningof explosive wastes. However, this permit had also expiredwithout the State's knowledge or without Holston requesting arenewal. Holston's gas-producing plant wis not on an operat-ing agreement because State officials had little knowledgeof this source and did not know what pollutants weie beingemitted.

City of Philadelphia officials prefer to deal with Fed-eral facilities informally because they are not certain thatoperating agreements with Federal facilities are legally en-forceable. Conseauently, operating agreements have not beennegotiated with tha Philadlphia Naval Base.

DOD said that EPA and the Navy entered into an operatingagreement durino May 1976 outlining steps for the main power-plant at Charleston Naval Base to achieve final compliancein July 1979. South Carolina refused to grant an agreementto the base because it believed that such an agreement withFederal facilities only represented a publicly stated goaland was not legally binding. South Carolira also feared thatan agreement would jeopardize its position against the baseif the State is given authority to enforce its regulationsagainst Federal facilities. State officials also believedthat an operating agreement with Charleston Naval Base wouldset a bad example for other polluters in the State.

Tinker Air Force Base has not requested an operatingagreement for its paint hanger. The Oklahoma City-CountyHealth Department said that it is not their responsibilityto convince Tinker to request an agreement and that such a

,request depends upon the base's initiative. Furthermore,local officials believe that thel could not legally enforcethe agreement.

The State of Kentucky appealed a judgment of the SixthCircuit Court of Appfals to the Supreme Court regarding theState's authority to require Federal installations to secure

16

operating permits. The Supreme Court in a 7 to 2 decisionon June 7, 1976, ruled that the Clean Air Act obligates Fed-eral installations discharging air pollutants to joi;i withhon-fder-ali tailtiei in compI i-n with- State conrol andabitement requirements, but obtaining a perit-ifom- a stateis not among such requirements. The Court said that any clearand unambiguous declaration by the Congress that Federal in-stallations may not operate without a State permit cannot bef£,und in the act nor derived from the legislative history oft['e Clean Air Amendments of 1970. The Court said that shouldit be the decision of the Congress to subject Federal instal-lations to State permit requirements, the Congress need onlyamend the act to make its intention evident (Hancock vs.Train, 426 U.S. 167).

The Congress in its October 1976 revision of solid wastelegislation provided in the Resource Conservation and RecoveryAct of 1976 (90 Stat. 2795) that Federal installations aresubject to all Federal, State, interstate, and local require-ments, both substantive and procedural including any require-ments for permits.

The Congress is considering amending the Clean Air Actto clarify t:[e status of Federal agencies regarding Federal,State, interstate, and local requirements both substantiveand procedural and the authority to enforce compliance byFederal agencies with the ambient air quality standards.

The House Report accompanying the proposed Clean Air ActAmendments of 1977 states that the new section on Federal fa-cilities is intended to overturn the Hancock case; to end anyfurt.er delays, excuses, or evasions by Federal agencies; andto mandate complete compliance, except as express Presidentialexemption may otherwise permit in the interests of nationalsecurity. (House 3eport No. 95-294, May 12, 1977).

17

CHAPTER 4

JET-ENGINE TEST CELL STATUS'UNDECIDED

The Navy and the State of California have differentopinions concerning whether the Clean Air Act, as amended,makes emissions from jet engines tested in test cells sub-ject to the State's stationary source air pollution standards.Consequently, California has filed suit against the Depart-ment of the Navy for violating visible emission stationarysource standards by jet engine test cells at four naval airstations. The outcome of this controversy could cost millionsof dollars. The Navy's defense is that the Federal Governmenthas preempted the field of aircraft and aircraft engine emis-sions and has not issued regulations for testing military air-craft and aircraft engines. Under section 233 of the CleanAir Act, State and local authorities cannot act until theAdministrator of EPA has promulgated such regulations.

EMISSION CONTROL PROBLEMS

The Bay Area Air Pollution Control District notified theNaval Air Station, Alameda, that one of its jet engine testcell facilities was violating local visible emission air pol-lution regulations in July 1970. Test cells are buildingswhich house jet engines during testing operations. The Navyhas been trying to develop technology to control the particu-late emissions from test cells. However, the Navy does notbelieve current technology provides a method, at a reasonablecost, to assure that jet engine test cells comply with sta-tionary source air pollution regulations.

Three control methods are being examined--test cellmodification, engine modification or replacement, and jetengine fuel modification. The Navy believes wet-packedcross flow scrubber systems (a device which uses water toremove particulate matter) will reduce engine test emissionsto within existing stationary source particulate standards.Four new test cells at two naval air stations are being con-structed with the scrubber systems. However, the modificationof an existing cell requires structural redesign. The Navyestimates that a scrubber system can be installed on an exist-ing test cell for about $1.9 million. Increased utility costsare about $88,000 a year, based on two tests per day, 250 daysper year.

We were told that, in some cases, adequate supplies ofelectrical power for the scrubbers may not be readily obtain-able and that an obligation exists to analyze the relative

18

value and impact against the conservation of limited suppliesof energy and water, especially in areas affected by drought.Consequently, the Naval Facilities Engineering Commasnd,Western Division, does not consider the installation ofscrubbers at Alameda to be a reasonable solution. Othermethods of test cell modifications, such as installing ther-mal converters (afterburners which reburn emissions beforeentering the atmosphere) or electrostatic precipitators,have also been rejected or are still being examined.

Engine modifications and new engine procurements arepartial solutions in controlling test cell emissions. Allnew model jet aircraft engines being purchased are smokeless.The Navy also has a $38 million program underway to modifycertain existing jet engines. Although these convertedengines will essentially be smokeless, that change may in-crease certain other emissions. Two of the four engine modelsat Alameda which have been cited as violating local visibleemission standards are being converted.

The third method being considered is modifying fuel withadditives. Alameda uses a ferrocene additive which, to somedegree, effectively controls visible emissions from some ofits jet engines during testing. For the one engine modelconsistently cited for violations, however, the additive isused for only 45 minutes of the normal 4- or 8-hour tests.Alameda officials stated that the long testing time is dueto the highly technical and complicated nature of militaryengines, especially turbofan engines, and the degree of pre-cision required for combat engines. Officials also said thatthe fuel additive could not be used beyond 45 minutes becauseiron deposits begin collecting on the engines' internal partsand degrade performance. Personnel of a major airline agreedthat there are many complications with highly technical en-gines and that the Navy may be justified in testing its en-gines for longer periods and restricting fuel additive use.

LITIGATION IN-PROCESS

In January 1976, the California Air Resources Board andBay Area Air Pollution Control District filed suit in U.S.District Court against the Department of the Navy and Com-manding Officers at the Naval Air Station, Alameda, and threeother Department of the Nevy installations in California foroperating jet engine test cells that exceed State and localair pollution standards for stationary sources. The Board'ssuit contends:

19

-- Section 118 of the Clean Air Act provides that Federalfacilities must comply with duly promulgated Federal,State, and local requirements respecting control andabatement of air pollution.

-- The cells where the jet engine testing takes place"constitute stationary sources within the meaning ofthe Clean Air Act, the California Implementation Planand applicable local rules and regulations."

--UWder the California Implementation Plan and localregulations, persons who operate stationary sourcesmust comply with specific visible emission standards.

--Emissions from test cell stacks at Alameda and theother three installations exceed local visible emis-sion standards.

-- State oi local agencies have not granted the installa-tions a variance for test cell operations which wouldallow them to exceed the visible emission regulations.

The Navy disagrees with the pollution/State authorities'opinion that the test cells are out of compliance. It pro-vides the following arguments:

-- The test cells do not, of themselves, produce airpollutants. Rather, the aircraft engines constitutethe sole source of the air pollutants emitted from thetest cells.

-- The effect of engines in test cell emissions on airquality has been determined by use of EPA computermodels to be insignificant.

--Only the Administrator of EPA, not State or local gov-ernments, is empowered, under the Clean Air Act, asamended, to prescribe and enforce emission standardsand limitations with respect to the enissions frommilitary aircraft and aircraft engines, regardless ofwhere such engines are located.

--"* * * Consequently, aircraft engine test cells areconsidered not to be 'stationary sources' of airpollutants within the meaning of the Clean Air Act,as amended."

20

Because of this belief, the military has voluntarily adoptedaircraft engine emission design goals for new engines beingprocured. These goals are essentially equivalent to existingEPA standards for commercial aircraft engines.

Because of the current suit, EPA does not want to givean opinion on whether test cells are exempt from stationarysource emission regulations. Until the court decides, EPAprefers "to acquiesce in DOD's treatment of test facilitiesas non-regulated sources" and considers jet engine test cellfacilities operated by DOD "not deficient."

RECOMMENDATION TO THE CONGRESS

It is currently disputed whether the Clean Air Act, asamended, subjects jet engine test cells to stationary sourceair pollution requirements. The suit brought by Californiaauthorities seeks a court order to force the Navy to stopviolating air pollution laws and asks that $500 be paid to theState for each day violations occur. According to DOD's liai-son officer at EPA, the Army, Navy, and Air Force have 191 jetengine test cells at installations located in 32 States. Theliaison officer estimated that it would cost $356 million forthese cells to meet stationary source emiscior. requirements.

We recommend that the Congress amend the law to clarifythe issue.

21

CHAPTER 5

INTERNAL REVIEWS

ENVIRON!!ENTAL SURVEYS

The Army Environmental Hygiene Agency and the Air ForceEnvironmental Health Laboratory make surveys at the requestof base commanders to help solve specific problems. Theyhave also made a limited number of comprehensive surveys ofall air pollution sources at some bases to determine if theycomply with applicable regulations. Although there is noprocedure to guarantee that bases carry out the survey team'srecommendations, Army and Air Force officials said that it isto the bases' advantage to do so because the commanders askedfor their help.

The Navy has recognized the need for scheduled environ-mental surveys to monitor the compliance status of its instal-lations and has initiated actions to make certain that recom-mended corrective actions are taken. The Army and Air Forcehave not established such a prepram.

Regional environmental teams from the Navy's EngineeringField Divisions regularly survey installations to identifyall pollution problems and recommend corrective action. Toassure that base commanders implement the survey recommenda-tions, the Chief of Naval Operations requires all activitiesto report to the major commands and to his of ice on actionstaken.

Survey results

We selected and reviewed environmental surveys issuedin a 2-year period which ended July 1976 and summarized thesurvey results in the following table.

Total Army Navy Air Force

Surveys reviewed 79 32 35 12Bases in compliance 26 10 14 2Bases with minor sources

out of compliance 26 10 14 2Bases with major sources

out of compliance 27 12 7 8

This summary showing that over half of the surveyed baseswere out of compliance may not be considered representativebecause all bases were not surveyed, and the Army and AirForce bases were usually surveyed when the base commanderssuspected specific pollution problems.

22

INTERNAL AL TS

The Arm} %udit Agency reported in May 1973 that theinstallations ad not identified all pollution sources inreports to higi. command levels and regulatory bodies. Theagency recommenc I that the major commands begin high prior-ity programs to i 'ntify and solve all pollution problemsand report them to eadquarters. The Deputy Chief of Stafffor Logistics agree wsith the audit recommendations.

In December 1975 the Air Force Audit Agency recommendedthat Air Force headqua -ers formalize funding procedures toguarantee prompt accomp '.shment of pollution projects requir-ing operation and mainte ince funds. Air Force officialsagreed with the audit aget y's recommendations.

On May 28, 1976, the oefense Audit Service issued a re-port on the financial management of environmental projects.The DOD auditors found that only 45 percent of the projectswould be completed on time and concluded that DOD could besubject to lawsuits, unless exemptions arc obtained. Theyrecommended several actions to the Assistant Secretary of De-fense for Installations and Logistics such as issuing specificguidance on the Executive Order 11752 budgetary requirements.

On June 3, 1977, the Defense Audit Service, with theassistance of the military services' internal audit agencies,issued a report assessing DOD's progress towards reducing airand water pollution and actions taken by management on itsMay 28, 1976, report. The report stated that the managementof DOD's pollution abatement program was generally effective.It said that some problems noted in each military department'sidentification, evaluation, and funding of pollution projectsshould be corrected by implementing the services' audit agen-cies recommendations.

The auditors reported that about 52 percent of the pollu-tion projects they reviewed were expected to be completed bythe required compliance dates, noting this as a slight im-provement over she status shown in their May 1976 report.They said that funding constraints and base restructuringstudies have delayed DOD from complying with environmentallaws. They said that the decision to reduce the fiscal year1978 budget for pollution abatement (to about $30 million)presents some risk-s to DOD since failure to comply withrequirements could result in lawsuits or curtailment ofoperations.

23

CONCLUSIONS, AGENCY COMMENTS,-AND RECOMMENDATION

We proposed to the Secretary of Defense that the Armyand Air Force adopt the Navy's system of scheduled surveysof bases by environmental teams together with procedures forenforcing the team's recommendations to improve pollutioncontrol management. DOD said (see app. I) that it cannotfully concur with this proposal because it limits managementflexibility. DOD said that decentralization is the most prac-tical, efficient, and economical means to manage the functionbecause of the different compliance strategies which aretailored to specific problems in various parts of the country.DOD said that the installation commander is responsible forenvironmental monitoring and compliance, and has sufficientresources for those purposes. DOD said, however, that insome instances periodic inspections by independent teams arewarranted and inspections will be made in such cases.

Although DOD said that inspections will be made whenwarranted, it indicated that the purpose of such inspectionswould be to assist installation commanders which is not verydifferent from what the Army and Air Force have been doing inthe past. Further, DOD did not comment on the need for proce-dures to see that the bases carry out Army and Air Force en-vironmental teams' recommendations.

Accordingly, we recommend that the Secretary of Defenserequire the Army and the Air Force to adopt a system of sched-uled environmental surveys or inspections designed to monitorinstallations' compliance with pollution abatement require-ments and to establish procedures for monitoring installa-tions' actions on survey team recommendations.

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CHAPTER 6

SCOPE O uREVIEW

We reviewed the Department of Defense's implementationof the 1970 Clean Air Amendments and the progress and prob-lems selected industrial-type installations have encounteredin meeting standards for stationary air pollution sources.

The review was made at the Office of the Secretary ofDefense; the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force;various district and field offices of the Army Corps of En-gineers and Naval Facilities Engineering Command; and eightindustrial-type installations identified in chapter 3. Wevisited EPA headquarters, Washington, D.C.; its 10 regionaloffices; its Health Effects Research Laboratory, ResearchTriangle Park, North Carolina; and its Office of Air QualityPlanning and Standards, Durham, North Carolina. We alsovisited air pollution control agencies in California, Penn-sylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia, and con-tacted air pollution officials in 34 other States.

We reviewed reports and records and interviewed variousofficials concerning the status and problems of DOD installa-tions in meeting applicable air pollution standards.

25

APPENDIX I APPENDIX I

ASIIYAITAT S aUIAMY OF DUWWAUINSYO, B. lSI

I a /A W'

*WmlAlWNW ANM

Mr. Fred J. ShaferDirector, Logistics .ndCommunications DivisionU. S. General Accounting OfficeWashington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Shafer:

This is in reply to your letter dated January 10, 1977, to the Secre-

tary of Defense regarding your draft report on "Progress and Delays

in Air Pollution Control by the Department of Defense, " OSD

Case #4155-B, GAO code number 945262.

The report recommends steps to avoid delays in correcting air pol-

lution violations and discloses the questionable status of jet engine

test cells pursuant to regulations under the Clean Air Act.

The Department of Defense has done much to comply with the Clean

Air Act requirements and has implemented a continuing, vigorous

compliance program. Generally, your recommendations reflect

actions that we already have on-going. As such, they will serve to

support and supplement our efforts to attain full compliance.

We fully concu. with three of the five recommendations: namely, (1)

to seek full compliance, (2) to implement new standards in a timely

manner, and (3) to improve our monitoring programs. Since your

survey began over two years ago, much has already been done to imple-

ment those recommendations. To this end, we are closely monitoring

the issuance of new and revised standards to effect timely compliance.

We have completed the compliance inventory and have corrected many

deficiencies or have programed for their early correction. In addi-

tion, we have taken steps to reduce the lead time to effect compliance.

The fruits from this on-going effort are beginning to mature based on

a review of our current compliance data.

26

APPENDIX I APPENDIX I

2

Concerning your recommendation to comply with health-relatedstandards, we/believe that it would be more accurate to state thatcompliance is to be effected with air emission limitations since theyare the standards which appl, to all sources, civilian and military.

We cannot fully concur in your recommendation to require periodicinspections by independent teams. Currently, the installation com-mander is held responsible for environmental monitoring and com-pliance. He is provided sufficient full-time and part-time resourcesto accomplish this task. We do believehowever, that there areinstances where the recommended inspections are warranted, and wewill use them in such cases. The recommendation as written limitsour management flexibility, and we have suggested a revision in theenclosure.

Our specific comments are contained in the enclosure. In addition,we have provided a completely rewritten Chapter 4 which pertains tothe jet engine test cell issue. TLis issue is under litigation, and wewish to insure that your report is accurate so as to not prejudice thecase.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment, on this draft report andtrust that our comments will be helpful to you. Should you have ques-tions on our comments, please call Mr. George Marienthal orCdr. Tom Thoureen on 695-0222.

Since rely,

Actin Act:. . .:; o nDefens

QAO note: We have omitted the *nclosure because we inocr-porated the specific co nts and conformed thecbhapter on jet engine test cells with 000'proposed modtfications to the extent we deemedeppwopriate.

27

APPENDIX II APPENDIX II

t UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCYN4k ~G WASHINGTON. D.C. 20460

17 Mar 1977

OFFICE OF THEADMINISTRATOR

Mr. Henry EschwegeDirectorCommunity and Economic Development DivisionUnited States General Accounting OfficeWashington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Eschwege:

As requested in your transmittal letter of January 15, 1977,we have reviewed the draft report to the Congress entitled,"Progress and Delays in Air Pollution Control by the Departmentof Defense," and offer -he following comments. In summary,our comments cast a mo' · favorable light on the status ofcompliance at Defense installations.

° The main weakness of the report in our view is itsreliance on 1975 estimates of compliance providedby our regional offices as the basis for theconclusions and recommendations. The accuracy ofthose statistics is highly questionable as notedon pages 4 and 5. More recent and reliable dataare available now, and we suggest that in fairnessthey be substituted in the report for the earlierestimates, because they indicate that more Defenseinstallations are in compliance than we had originallyestimated.

Accordingly, we suggest that the table on page 6be revised to show the following January 1977Department of Defense figures:

Compliance StatusMilitary Service No. of Major Emitters In % Out %

Army 120 79 (66) 41 (34)

Navy 65 51 (78) 14 (22)

Air Force 43 33 (77) 10 (23)

Defense Logistics 12 9 (75) 3 (25)Totals 240 172 (72) 68 (28)

28

APPENDIX II APPENDIX II

-2-

This table contains data reported by DOD. EPA'scompliance data differ slightly but agree substantially.EPA has classified 263 Defense installations as majoremitters,* and EPA has identified 21 additionalDefense install'tiors which might be major emitters.The difference li. che number of major emitters listedby the two ac -ci, * ie due to differing classificationsof certain inL .ations which are on the borderlinebetween major or minor emitters (100 tons per year).

o As now written, the report is somewhat misleading asto the relative impact of Defense installationson the attainment of cleaner air and the DefenseDepartment's overall compliance with the Clean AirAct. The opening paragraph of Chapter 2 cites thisAgency's definition of major emitters as being thoseinstallati.ons capable of emitting 100 tons a year ofa single air pollutant and states that major emittersaccount fox 85 percent of all stationary source airpollutants in the United States. Within that context,it should be noted that as of January 1, 1977, theEnvironmental Protection Agency has identified 22,140major emitters of which 284 or 1.3% are Defense installa-tions.

An installation is classified as a major or minoremitter on the basis of the total emissions from allsources of air pollutants 'ozated within that installa-tion. A significant number of the 284 Defenseinstallations reported by this Agency are classifiedas major emitters because they consist of severalminor sources of air pollutants which, in aggregate,emit more than 100 tons of the pollutant per year.Those installations are similar to small communities,but equivalent private communities are not classifiedas major emitters on the same basis.

The Department of Defense reports that at the 240Defense installations which they have designated asmajor emitters there are 1,243 major sources of airpollutants and 229 or 18% of those individual sourcesare out of compliance. This indicates a higher level ofcompliance than the data in the table discussed earlier.Of the 127,877 total individual sources (major andminor) at Defense installations, only 354 or 0.3%have been identified by the Department of Defense asnot in compliance. We can verify the status of themajor sources but not the minor sources at this time.

* 186 (71%) are in compliance and 77 (29%) are out of compliance.

29

APPENDIX II APPENDIX II

3

° Chapter 3 deals with the significant problems ofeight selected major emitters which are out ofcompliance and gives the impression that thoseproblems are indicative of the causes of non-complianceand of the delays in attaining compliance at theother Defense installations. The records of theDefense Department as well as those of our regionaloffices reveal that overall, the Defense installationsare making better progress in correcting airpollution problems than the report indicates.Currently, the Defense Department is reporting 68(28%) of i.ts major emitters out of compliance of which22 (9%) are out because of non-complying minor sourcesof air pollutants which are now being corrected.1,e remaining 46 (19%) involve non-complying majorsources 'Jf air pollutants (including several uniqueproblems such as open burning of munitions) whichthe Defense Department is attempting to correct.

We are also pleased to inform you that of the sixty-eight major Defense installations still out of compliance:

- Twen,:y-four are on compliance 3chedules set forthin Consent Agreements between EPA and the installations;

- Twenty-two are the subject of carrent negotiationswhich should soon produce Consent Agreements; and

- Twenty-two are so close to compliance or makingsuch satisfactory progress toward comp'iance thatw? do not believe that Consent Agreemei.ts are needed.

Thank you for giving us this opportunity to review the drafcreport and we hope that our comments will be useful.

Sincerely yours,

Richard Red niuActing Assistant Administrator

for Planning and Management

GAO note: Page references in the af.endix may not correspondto page numbers in the final report.

30

APPENDIX III APPENDIX III

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE

FOR ADMINISTERING ACTIVITIES

DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

Tenure of officeFrom To

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:Harold Brown Jan. 1977 PresentDonald H. RumBfeld Nov. 1975 Jan. 1977James R. Schlesinger July 1973 Nov. 1975

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:Clifford L. Alexander Feb. 1977 PresentMartin R. Hoffmann Aug. 1975 Feb. 1977Norman R. Augustine (acting) July 1975 Aug. 1975Howard H. Callaway May 1973 July 1975

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:W. Graham Claytor, Jr. Jan. 1977 PresentJ. William Middendorf 11 Apr. 1974 Jan. 1977John W. Warner May 1972 Apr. 1974

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:John C. Stetson Mar. 1977 PresentThomas C. Reed Dec. 1975 Mar. 1977John L. McLucas May 1973 Dec. 1975

31