DOCUMENT RESUME

02155 - A1572545]

If Defense and Civil Agencies Work More Closely Together, MoreEfficient Search/Rescue and Coast Law Enforcement Could Follow.LCD-76-456; B-114851. May 26, 1977. 54 pp. + appendices.

Report to the Congress; by Robert F. Keller, Acting ComptrollerGeneral.

Issue AL'ea: Military Preparedness Plans: Military ForcesPeadiness (805).

Contact: Loqistics and Communications Div.Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense -

Military (except procurement contracts) (051).Organization Concerned: Department of the Navy; Department of

Defense; Department of the Army; Dpartment of the AirForce; Department of the Treasury; Department of Justice.

Congressional Relevance: House Committee on Armed Services;Senate Committee on Armed Services; Congress.

Increased coordination is needed among several Federalservices in providirg assistance to people in distress. Thiscould be accomplished by greater sharing of aircraft and crewsand support equipment and facilities by the Air Force, Navy, andCoast uard unaer the Naticral. Search and Rescue Plan. heNational Search and %.-cue policy was established in 1954 torovide: a asic network of facilities, an overall plan forPffecti , se of all available people and equipment, and formaximum use of State and local facilities.Findings/Conclusions: Despite National Search and Rescue Planguidelines, the Air Force, Navy, and Coast Guard are essentiallycomputing hair own search and rescue requirements independent]to satisfy their individual needs without adequately consideringthe assets of orhers in the plan. They are also stationingaircraft in some of the same areas without adequetelycoordinating their ase. Tis has resulted in more aircraft,crews, and supporting services than are needed to provideadeguate coverage. The coordination of the rescue objectives ofthe National Search and Rescue Plan was not being met inmaritim- regions in fiscal year 1975. Coordination of operationsand joi-. planning to clarify total aircraft requirement.s couldresult n a reduction in the number of aircraft needed.Rec)mmendations: The Secret :ies of Defense and Transportationshould direct the military services and the Coast Guard todetermine jointly the total search and rescue aircraftrequirements for both peacetime and wartime and begin jointeffective use of search and rescue aircraft. The Coast Guardshould reevaluate the number of aircraft it plans to purchase.Congress should enact legislation authorizing Defense to loanpersonnel and equipment to civil law enforcement agencies totransport agency representatives on law enforcement missions.(RRS)

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

IN

BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL, OF THE UNITED STATES

If Defense And Civil Agencies WorkMore Closely Together, MoreEfficient Search/Rescue And CoastalLaw Enforcement Could Follow

This report discusses the potential for in-creased coordination among Department ofDefense components, the Coast Guard, andcivil law enforcement agencies in using theiraircraft and ships. It discusses economies thatcould be realized from greater sharing of as-sets and provides alternatives for more effec-tive use of people end equipment.

LCD-76-456 MAY 26, 1977

COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATESWASHINGTON. D.C. 0

B-114851

To the President of the Senate and theSpeaker of the House of Representatives

This report discusses the need for greater cooperationamong military and Federal civil agencies conducting opera-tions, particularly search and rescue and law enforcementmissions along the coasts or in U.S. coastal waters.

We made our review pursuant to the Budget and Account-ing Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Audit-ing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

We are sending copies of this report to the Director,Office of Mantgement and Budget; the Secretaries of Trans-portation, Defense, and the Treasury; the Attorney General;the Secretaris of the Army, Air Force, and Navy; and theCommandant of the Coast Guard.

ACTINGComptroller Generalof the United States

COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S IF DEFENSE AND CIVIL AGENCIES WORKREPORT TO THE CONGRESS MORE CLOSELY TOGETHER, MORE EFFICIENT

SEARCH/RESCUE AND COASTAL LAWENFORCEMENT COULD FOLLOW

DIGEST

Increased coordination is needed amongseveral Federal services in providing as-sistance to people in distress. This coor-dination is provided for under the NationalSearch and Rescue Plan. If this plan weresufficiently adhered to, which it is not,substantial savings to American taxpayerscould be realized.

This could be done by greater sharing ofaircraft and crews and support facilitiesand equipment, chiefly by the Air Force,the Navy, and the Coa;t Guard in meetingtheir cooperative responsibilities underthe Naticnal Search and Rescue Plan.

In fact, excellent opportunities exist forjoint determination of aircraft and per-sonnel requirements and sharing of resourcesamong agencies which, if realized, wouldresult in less total resource requirementsand more efficient use of Federal aircraft,ships, and personnel.

SEARCH AND RESCUE PO'LICY

The national policy on search and rescuewas established in 1954 to provide

--a basic network of facilities,

-- an overall plan for effective use ofall available people and equipment andprovisions for controlling nd coordi-nating search and rescue missions, and

-- for use of State and local facilities tothe maximum extent possible.

IuSterL. Upon removal, the report i LCD-76-456ccver date should be noted hereon.

The National Search and Rescue Plan, reisedin 1969, implements this policy.

NETWORK FOR SEARCH AND RESCUENOT FUNCTIONING PROPERLY

Despite National Search and Rescue languidelines, the Air Force, Navy, and CoastGuard are essentially computing their ownsearch and rescue requirements independentlyto satisfy their individual needs, withoutadequately considering available assets ofthe others in the plan. Also, they werestationing aircraft in some of the same areaswithout adequately coordinating their use.Result: overabundance of aircraft, people,and equipment.

The objective of the National Search andRescue Plan is to integrate all facilitiesinto a cooperative network to render aid todistressed civilian and military ersonsand property, to coordinate the use of faci-lities. and to promote efficiencies and econ-omies. (See p. 15.)

But Coast Guard and Department of Defenseunits are computing requirements and sta-tioning search ana rescue aircraft to pro-vide for their peak needs without adequatelyconsidering assistance available from otherservices. This practice has resulted inmore aircraft, crews, and supporting serv-ices than are needed to provide adequatecoverage to both the military and civilianareas.

For example, enough H-3 helicopters capableof performing search and rescue missions areavailable at the Naval Air Station, Jackson-ville, Florida, at all times, to reduce Navydedicated search and rescue helicopter needs.Some of Jacksonville's helicopters and crewscould be reassigned to other missions.

An overabundance of search and rescue air-craft in the Pensacola, Florida, and SanFrancisco, California, areas also exists.(See pp. 20 and 21.)

ii

GAO recommends that the Secretaries of De-fense and Transportation direct the militaryservices and the Coast Guard to determinejointly total search and rescue aircraftrequirements for both peacetime and wartime.(See p. 23.)

While the Departments of Defense and Trans-portation agreed that there are opportunitiesfor increased cooperation, they disagreedwith the above recommendation. (See p. 24.)

Defense said its search and rescue assets aremaintained and justified to support militaryforces, and cooperation in civil search andrescue missions will be done, but on a basisof noninterference with military operations.The Coast Guard disagreed on the basis thatthey have statutory responsibility for civilmaritime search and rescue.

GAO believes that since Defense assets areFederal assets they should be used for civilas well as military search and rescue purpos.;if physically available and not otherwiseactively engaged in critical military opera-tions.

Also, the Coast Guard's statutory responsi-bility fr civil maritime search and rescuedoes not pclude use of other availableFederal assets.

BETTER USE OF SEARCH AND RESCUE ASSETS

The coordination of resource objectives ofthe National Search and Rescue Plan were notbeing met in the maritime regions in fiscalyear 1975. The Coast Guard did nct adequatelyuse other available resources, choosing in-stead to fly all but 3 percent of the mari-time search and rescue missions that fiscalyear. Dense units culd have performedmany of these missions. (See p. 26.)

GAO could not determine the precise amounLof search and rescue assistance Defense unitscould annually provide the Coast Guard butbelieves the amount is substantial.

Tear Sheet iii

The Air Force, Navy, and Coast Guard flewover 27,800 hours on search and rescuetraining flights in fiscal year 1975, atan estimated cost of over $12.4 million.Many of these hours could have been usedfor such missions. Had this been done,two purposes (search and rescue and train-ing) would have been met and a number offlight-hours could have been eliminated.(See p. 29.)

Substantial economies of operation wouldresult from greater shared use of searchand rescue assets by Defense units and theCoast Guard.

GAO recommends that the Secretaries ofDefense and Transportation direct Defensebranches and the Coast Guard, respectively,to begin joint effective use of search andrescue aircraft, including stationing,personnel staffing, training, and futuredeployments. Such use should consider thealternatives GAO suggests. (See p. 44.)

But the Coast Guard, the wNv¥. and theAir Force said that Defense facilities areavailable to meet civil search and rescueneeds on a basis that they do not interferewith military missions. Their commentsare discussed in detail on pages 35 and 36,and 40 and 41.

GAO ooes ot believe th.? intent of the Na-ti:nal Search and Rescue Policy or Plan wasto place higher priorities on military mis-sions than on civil search and rescue mis-sions. GAO believes more effective use ofFederal search and rescue aircraft is needed.

POSSIBLE REDUCTION OF COAST GUARDAIRCRAFT PURCHASES

The Coast Guard, the Navy, and the Air Forceshould improve their coordination of opera-tions and joint planning to clarify totalrequirements for aircraft. This would re-sult in more efficient and effective opera-tions and could reduce the total quantityof aircraft needed.

iv

Currently the Coast Guard is planning topurchase 56 aircraft at a cost of $287million. In making its requirements com-putations, the Coast Guard did not con-sider the aircraft available from the AirForce and Navy which could satisfy, inpart, the Coast Guard's requirements.(See pp. 37 to 39.)

The Coast Guard replied that GAO assumesAir Force and Navy aircraft are availablefor Coast Guard missions on a continuingbasis, and because such is not the case.sufficient aircraft must be pfocured to"satisfactorily meet statutory re bilities."

GAO does not subscribe to the logic thatbecause Air Force and Navy aircraft arenot available for civil search and rescuemissions on a continuing basis the CoastGuard must procure sufficient aircraft andequipment to satisfy all civil maritimesearch and rescue requirements.

GAO recommends that in light of the assis-tance available from Defense, the Secretaryof Transportation require the Coast Guard toreevaluate the number of aircraft it plansto purchase.

LAW ENFORCEMENT ALONG U.S. COASTS

Several branches of the Federal Governmenthave law enforcement functions along thecoasts and in U.S. coastal waters.

The opinion is widely held that Defense can-

not assist in civil law enforcement becauseof the Posse Comitatus Act. (See p. 47.)

GAO believes Defense can provide more assis-tance to civil law enforcement agenc.es with-out violating the Posse Comitatus Act.

Defense believes its current relationship with

civil law enforcement agencies to be realisticand that clarifying legislation is not needed.However, both the Departments of the Treasuryand Justice said that clarification of the

Tear Sheet

Posse Comitatus Act is needed. Therefore,GAO recommends that the Congress enact legis-lation authorizing Defense to loan personneland equipment to civil law enforcement agen-cies to transport agency representatives onlaw enforcement missions.

vi

Pace

DIGEST i

CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION 1

2 SEARCH AND RESCUE POLICY 2SAR responsibilities under the National

Plan 2Coast Guard organization for

SAR 5Air For'e organization for SAR 5Navy S, 1, assets 9Coordin.ting the use of aircraft 9

3 THE NATIONAL INTEGRATED NETWORK FORSEARCH AND RESCUE IS NOT FUNCTIONINGPROPERLY 15Computing requirements to support indi-

vidual services' needs 15

Concentrations of SAR aircraft 16Are the Nation'. SkR assets being effec-

tively used? 17Examples of redundant SAR capabilities 19

Naval Air Statinr, Jacksonville.Florida 19

SAR aircraft in and around Pensa-cola. Florida '20

San Francisco, California 20Wartime availability of SAR assets

in the United States 21Conclusions 23Recommendation 23Agency comments and our evaluation 24

4 OPPORTUNITIES FOR BETTER USE OF SEARCH ANDRESCUE ASSETS 26

Executing maritime SAR missions 26The Coast Guard flew many maritime mis-

sions near DOD activities having SARfacilities 27

Availability of DOD assets for SAR 28Other available assets 30The Coast Guard could make greater use of

DOD SAR assets 31DOD SAR aircrew capability 33DOD ani Coast Guard SAR aircraft have

similar equipment 33

ChiAPTER Page

Response time objectives 33Conclusions 34Recommendations 35Agency comments and our evaluation 35'

5 USE OF AVAILABLE ASSETS COULD REDUCE COASTGUARD AIRCRAFT PURCHASES 37

Coast Guard purchase of aircraft 37Potential reductions in Coast Guard

aircraft purchases 39Conclusions 39Recommendation 39Agency comments and our evaluation 40

6 ALTERNATIVES FOR IMPROVED SEARCH ANDRESCUE OPERATIONS 42Alternatives for more efficient use

of available assets for SAR 42The Coast Guard as single manager

for SAR worldwide 42DOD SAR units could perform

SAR missions in designated sectors 43DOD SAR units and the Coast Guard

could alternate SAR alert periods 43DOD SAR units could provide

long-range SAR capability for theCoast Guard 44

Conclusion 44Recommendation 44Agency comments and our evaluation 44

7 OTHER OPPORj'JNITIES FOR AIEVING GREATEREFFICIENCY AND ECONOMIES THROUGH INCREASEDCOORDINATION 46

Control of illegal entry of persons andgoods 46

Military assistance to civil law enforce-ment agencies 47

Marine environmental protection surveil-lance 48

Conclusions 50Recommendations 50Agency comments and our evaluation 50Recommendation to the Congress 52

8 SCOPE 53

APPENDIX PaS

I Letter dated December 14, 1976, from theAssistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 55

II Letter dated December 22, 1976, from theAssistant Secretary for Administration,Department of Transportation 57

III Letter dated November 11, 1976, from theDeputy Assistant Secretary of the TreasL.y(Operations) 67

IV Letter dated January 5, 1977, from the Assis-tant Attorney General for Administration,Department of Justice 70

V Number of search and rescue aircraft in thecontinental United States as of June 30,1975, by type and owning service, and theirrelated capital cost and estimated annualoperating costs 74

VI Other GAO reports relating to the matters dis-cussed in this report 75

VII Principal officials responsible for administer-ing activities discussed in this report 76

ABBREVIATIONS

ARRS Aerospace Rescue Recovery ServiceCAP Civil Air PatrolCONUS continental United StatesDEA Drug Enforcement AdministrationDOD Department of DefenseGAO General Accounting OfficeINS immigration and Naturalization ServiceMRS medium-range searchNAS Naval Air StationNOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric AdministrationRCC Rescue Coordination CenterSAR search and rescue

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Coast Guard is the principal U.S. Governmentmaritime law enforcement agency, providing assistance tothose in distress in U.S. maritime regions. Other CoastGuard missions include marine environmental protection andmarine science activities, and upon declaration of war orwhen the President otherwise directs, it becomes part orthe U.S. Navy. To accomplish its missions the Coast Guardhas a fleet of 240 ships and 141 aircraft and is authorizedover 39,000 personnel in the continental United States(CCNUS).

The Department of Defense (DOD) service branches havemissions throughout U.S. coastal waters. Some, such assearch and rescue (SAR) of persons and property, closelyparallel Coast Guard missions and require similar equipment.

Many civil agencies also have activities along the U.S.coasts or in coastal waters. These include law enforcementagencies such as the Drug Enforcement AdministLation (DEA)and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), bothorganizations of the Department of Justice; the U.S. CustomsService, an element of the Department of the Treasury; andparts of the Department of Commerce, which conduct operationssuch as marine research, weather observation and prediction,and ocean monitoring. All these activities require equipmentsuch as aircraft or ships, although needs and assets varyamong agencies.

we examined the operations of several Federal agencieswith similar functions in U.S. maritime areas to determine(1) common functions, (2) intercoordination, and (3) theirpotential for increased coordination and more effective useof resources.

We concentrated on SAR, enforcement of laws and trea-ties, and marine environmental protection.

This report discusses the need for increased coordina-tion among DOD branches, the Coast Guard, and civil law en-forcement agencies; savings that could .e realized fromgreater sharing of assets; ard alternatives for more effec-tive use of personnel and equipment.

1

CHAPTER 2

SEARCH AND RESCUE POLICY

The national policy on SAR was established in 1954 to(1) provide a basic network of SAR facilities to serve bothcivil and military aviation, (2) provide an overall SAR planfor effective use of all available facilities to include pro-visions for the control and coordination of SAR missions, and(3) use State and local SAR facilities to the maximum extentpossible and encourage their continued development. An SARfacility is any unit, command, device, or system used for SARoperations.

The National SAR Plan implements this policy. The 1969revision was signed by the Secretaries of Transportation andDefense, the Administrator of the National eronautics andSpace Administration, and the Commissioner of the FederalCommunications Commission.

SAR RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THENATIONAL PLAN

The National SAR Plan divides responsibility for coordi-r.ating SAR efforts geographically among the Coast Guard, thecoordinator within the maritime regions; the Air Force, thecoordinator for the inland region; and military commands, coor-dinators for overseas regions. Maritime regions include watersunder the jurisdiction of the United States and certain ad-jacent waters, the coastal areas of Alaska, the State o Ha-waii, and U.S. territories and possessions (except the PanamaCanal Zone). Land masses within the continental United Statesmake up the inland region. All other areas, including theinland areas of Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone, comprise theoverseas regions. Figure 1 shows the maritime, inland, andoverseas SAR regions.

SAR coordinators are responsible for promptly beginningand ending operations with maximum efficient use of availableresources. The Coast Guard and the Air Force have delegatedthis responsibility to major subcommands: the Coast Guard tothe Commaners of the Atlantic and Pacific areas in New YorkCity, New York, and San Francisco, California, respectively;and the Air Force to the Commander, Aerospace Rescue and Re-covery Service, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. Each serviceuses Rescue Coordination Centers (RCCs) for the overall con-trol and coordination of SAR operations.

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COAST GUARD ORGANIZATION FOR SAR

For maritime SAR, the Coast Guard's Atlantic and PacificArea Commands are divided into subregions, generally by CoastGuard district with each district commander acting as the SARcoordinator for the area. Each subregion operates an RCC.The Atlantic area has eight subregions, the Pacific three.One Atlan:ic area subregion and the three Pacific area subre-gions also ommand one or more subordinate sectors, eacn hav-ing its owr. RCC. In most subregions and sectors, the CoastGuard has aircraft which are on call to the SAR coordinator.

The Coast Guard had a total of 141 short-, medium-, andlong-range helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft in its inven-tory available in CONUS for SAR missions as of June 30, 1975.

The acquisition cost of these aircraft wa, $110.4 million. 1/Coast Guard aircraft flew a total of 18,040 hours in performingmaritime SAR missions in fiscal year 1975.

Projected Coast Guard SAR flight-hour requirements arebased on historical SAR flight-data, with a 6.4-percent factoradded for anticipated increases in future SAR incidents.

The Coast Guard aircraft inventory includes the short-range HH-52 helicopter; the medium-range HH-3 helicopter;the medium-range HU-16E aircraft, a twin-engine fixed-wingaircraft first purchased b~ the Coast Guard in 1951; and thelong-range C-130B Hercules aircraft. The Coast Guard ispurchasing a new twin-engine jet, medium-range search (MRS)aircraft to replace HU-16E aircraft, which are being retiredas they reach flight-hour limits. The Coast Guard has projectedannual SAR mission flying requirements of 14,000 hours for thenew MRS aircraft by 1986. Each aircraft is expected to fly

about 1,000 hours each year; therefore, an equivalent of atleast 14 MRS aircraft (not including training and overheadflight-hours) will be required to perform SAR missions by 1986.

AIR FORCE ORGANIZATION FOR SAR

Inland SAR is centralized in a single Air Force sub-command. The Aerospace Rescue Recovery Service (ARRS) is the

inland SAR coordinator, operating a single national RCC atScott Air Force Base.

ARRS has 108 SAR aircraft, both helicopters and long-range C-130s, at 18 locations throughout CONUS, including 4

l/See app. V for a breakdown of Coast Guard aircraft by typeand cost.

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Air Force Reser,e and 2 Air Naticnal Guard units. ARRS canalso refuel some of its SAR helicopters from C-130s givingthe helicopters greater operational flexibility.

Air Force SAR aircraft requirements are based on combatrescue requirements. Civil SAR missions are not consideredin the computation of SAR flight-hours.

Most flying hours for inland SAR missions coordinatedby the Scott Air Force Base RCC in fiscal year 1975 were flownby the Civil Air Patrol (CAP), an official auxiliary of theU.S. Air Force. ARRS and Air Force Reserve units also wereused for inland SAR missions.

NAVY SAR ASSETS

The Navy's SAR helicopters support naval fleets, trainingoperations, and local base operations; but if requested canrespond to other SAR incidents. As of June 30, 1975, theNavy had 66 shore-based SAR helicopters at 17 bases withinCONUS.

Navy shore-based SAR assets requirements within theUnited States are based on need, as determined by the localcommander, with approval from higher command levels. SAR as-sets are allocated in response to these requests.

COORDINATING THE USE OF AIRCRAFT

Procedures for coordinating the use of aircraft to re-spond to SAR incidents vary depending on the owning service.Regardless of ownership, the responsible SAR mission coordi-nator has operational control over aircraft in a SAR mission.

For Coast Guard aircraft, except the C-130, each dis-trict commander or his representative in the Atlantic andPacific areas may authorize the use of Coast Guard aircraftfor SAR. The use of C-130 aircraft, however, must be au-thorized by the respective area commander.

ARRS commander authorizes the use of its aircraft forboth inland and maritime SAR. However, to obtain Air Forceaircraft for maritime SAR, the Coast Guard subregion SARcoordinator must contact the Coast Guard area command, whichrequests aircraft from the owning Air Force command. In anextreme emergency, the SAR coordinator may bypass this systemand contact the Air Force unit directly.

CAP participation in inland SAR missions is obtained atRCC at Scott Air Force Base. For SAR assistance, RCC contacts

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the Wing in the State in which the need exists and requestsCAP aircraft. For maritime SAR, the coordinator may requestCAP assistance trough Scott Air Force Base or a State CAPdirectly.

Requests for Navy and Marine Corps aircraft for SARmay be made by the SAR coordinator directly to the owningcommand. In at least one maritime SAR subregion, however,local Navy and Marine Corps air units agree to provideaircraft for SAR when needed and the military units alsomaintain aircraft on standby.

Authorization to use Army aircraft in SAR must be ob-tained from Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Commend, FortMcPherson, Georgia. In an extreme emergency, a request maybe made directly to the local Army unit.

14

CHAPTER 3

THE NATIONAL INTFGRATED NETWORK FOR

SEARCH AND RESCUE IS NOT FUNCTIONING PROPERLY

Despite National SAR Plan guidelines, the Air Force,

Navy, and Coast Guard are essentially computing their own

SAR requirements independently to satisfy their individual

program needs, without adequately considering other avail-

able assets. Also, they were stationing aircraft in some of

the same areas without adequately coordinating their use,

resulting in an overabundance of SAR assets.

The objective of the National SAR Plan is to integrate

all SAR facilities into a cooperative network to help dis-

tressed civilian and military persons and property, to co-

ordinate the use of facilities, and to promote efficiencies

and economies. The National SAR Plan recognizes that Depart-

ment of Defense components have requirements for SAR to sup-

port military operations. In filling such requirements, how-

ever, each component should give maximum consideration to

(1) SAR capabilities within its own forces, (2) special

forces with a primary SAR mission, (3) availability of SAR

facilities in other DOD components, and (4) the Coast Guard.

The National SAR Plan distinguishes between military

and civil SAR requirements when it states that all DOD SAR

facilities are available for civil SAR needs when such use

will not interfere with primary military missions. We be-

lieve that a fully integrated network of all SAR facilities

cannot be achieved without the joint determination of all

SAR requirements, both peacetime and wartime, and the common

use of assets by DOD components and the Coast Guard. Further,

since the U.S. Coast Guard is a uniformed armed force, ready

to operate as a service of the Navy upon declaration of war,

or when the President otherwise directs, it is logical to

include the Coast Guard in an integrated network capable of

responding to peacetime or wartime SAR requirements. We be-

lieve such a network could satisfy total SAR needs with fewer

total assets than are needed under present SAR requirements

computation methods.

COMPUTING REQUIREMENTS TO

SUPPORT INDIVIDUAL SERVICES' NEEDS

We found that DOD branches and the Coast Guard computed

SAR requirements on the basis of their individual program

needs.

15

The objective of the Coast Guard SAR program is to helpdistressed persons and property in U.S. maritime regions.The progr - is geared to. civil SAR. needs, although it doesnot excl military incidents. Coast Guard officials toldus they cam_ upon DOD SAR assets for civil SAR missions. TheCoast Guard's SAR aircraft requirements, however, are basedon Coast Guard historical flight data, and the computationsdo not consider DOD assets.

Commenting on our draft report the Coast Guard saidtheir SAR flight-hour requirements inherently include DODcontributions. This statement is true to the extent thatSAR hours flown by DOD are not flowr by the Coast Guard.The Coast Guard's SAR flight-hour requirements, however,were based on the number of Coast Guard SAR hours flown inprevious years. And, DOD SAR capability over and above thatactually used for SAR missions has not been applied by theCoast Guard to reduce its SAR requirements figure.

The Coast Guard keeps aircraft on alert 24 hours a dayto respond to SAR requests. Coast Guard officials believeit is their statutory responsibility and duty to respond tocivil SAR incidents, and believe they can perform this dutymore efficiently than others. Coast Guard officials in-formed us that even if DOD aircraft were used for a civilSAR mission they would feel obligated to send aircraft tothe scene.

Air Force officials said that their SAR assets require-ments are based on combat mission needs, and do not considercivil SAR incidents or other SAx capabilities in their com-putations.

Navy shore-based SAR assets are computed on the basis local area needs, as determined by local commanders. Navyofficials said other SAR assets are taken into considerationin computing requirements for the area. Hever, they alsotold us that SAR capability is needed for the Navy bases andthe immediate surrounding areas, and that naval aviators liketo know that a SAR capability is on the base. We found in-stances of the Navy's placing local base SAR assets on sta-tions where similar assets were stationed or located nearby.We believe such placement results from the Navy's not ade-quately considering nearby SAR assets.

CONCENTRATIONS OF SAR AIRCRAFT

In stationing its aircraft for civil SAR missions, theCoast Guard does not usually station less than three aircraft

16

of a particular type at any one location. The Air Forcestations its aircraft in support of military operations butauthorizes their use for civil SAR. Navy SAR aircraft arepositioned for local base SAR or in support of the navalfleets, either from port or aboard aircraft carriers.

The map on page 18 shows the locations of DOD andCoast Guard SAR aircraft in the continental United States.The map shows that the aircraft are stationed very neareach other in some areas, making their spans of operationessentially the same.

ARE THE NATION'S SAR ASSETSBEING EFFECTIVELY USED?

During fiscal year 1975. the Coast Guard coordinated8,734 maritime SAR missions involving 21,655 flying hours.Although the national SAR policy stresses coordinating allavailable SAR facilities to insure effective use of assetsand efficient execution of SAR missions, the following tableshows that in fiscal year i975 the Coast Guard flew 8,501 ofthe 8,734 missions in the areas where it had SAR coordinatorresponsibility. These figures indicate a lack of coordina-tion and inefficient use of assets among the organizationsresponsible for SAR.

Maritime SARNumber of

Activity missions Flying hours

Coast Guard 8,501 18,040Air Force (note a):

Air Rescue Service 35 325Reserves 9 67Civil Air Patrol (note b) 26 2,708Other -

Navy (note a) c/'63 c/515Army - -

Total 8,734 21.655

a/Includes medical evacuation missions and flying hours.

b/The Civil Air Patrol is an official auxiliary of theU.S. Air Force.

c/Our estimate based on the relation of total Navy SAR air-craft flying hours to the number of missions and flyinghours for SAR aircraft located at Key West, Jacksonville,and Pensacola Naval Air Stations in Florida, and the CorpusChristi Naval Air Station in Texas.

17

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EXAMPLES OF REDUNDANT SAR CAPABILITIES

During this survey we examined SAR assets available inseveral areas of the United States. The following analysisshows the redundancies in SAR capabilities in these areas.

Naval Air Station (NAS)Jacksonville, Florida

During 1975 H-3 helicopters replaced H-1 helicopters asNAS Jacksonville local base SAR support aircraft. At the endof 1975 there were three H-3s assigned at NAS Jacksonville.These aircraft, as well as those they replaced, were usedmainly for training and administrative flying. Of the1,100 hours flown, only 85 hours were for actual SAR mis-sions. We estimated the cost of flying local SAR supportaircraft at Jacksonville during 1975, exclusive of personnelcosts, at over $490,000. Also, approximately 30 personnelwere required to fly and maintain the aircraft. The Navyplanned to replace the H-3s with three H-46 helicoptersduring 1976.

A helicopter utility/support squadron, with 13 H-3helicopters, is a tenant at NAS Jacksonville. Its primarymission is SAR support for aircraft carriers in the AtlanticFleet which do not have antisubmarine helicopters aboard.The squadron has a secondary mission of fleet logistical sup-port. During an 18-month period ended December 1975, thetenant's H-3 helicopters were flown 877 hours, of which only132 were for SAR. Normally, the squadron has helicopters atJacksonville which, we believe, could be made available toassist Jacksonville in its SAR requirements.

A helicopter training squadron with 15 H-3 helicoptersis also a tenant at NAS Jacksonville. Its primary missionis to provide antisubmarine warfare training to the AtlanticFleet replacement pilots. This unit does not have a deploy-able mission; therefore, its helicopters also could supportNAS Jacksonville SAR efforts.

In addition to the above aircraft, 48 H-3 antisubmarinehelicopters (6 squadrons of 8 aircraft each) are based at NASJacksonville and have SAR support as their secondary missionswhen deployed aboard aircraft carriers. Normally, not allthese helicopters deploy at the same time.

19

SAR aircraft in and aroundPensacola, Florida

', Navy has a squadron of 14 H-46 helicopters locatedat P,. cola, with a primary mission of SAR to support the(1) needs of shore facilities in the area, (2) U.S.S. Lexing-ton's training operations, and (3) maritime SAR needs underthe National SAR Plan.

During 1975 Navy SAR helicopters were primarily usedfor squadron training and Navy pilot and aircrew transitiontraining for H-46 SAit helicopters. Out of 4,484 hours flown,291 hours were for SAR and medical evacuation purposes, 878were in support of the U.S.S. Lexington, 1,630 were for squad-ron training, 779 were for transition to H-46 SAR helicopters,and 906 were for miscellaneous purposes.

About 50 miles east of NAS Pensacola, the Air Force hasfive C-130 cargo/tanker fixed-wing aircraft and five H-53 airrefuelable helicopters assigned as combat SAR aircraft. Mostof the 3,971 hours these aircraft flew during fiscal year 1975were for training and administrative missions, only 310 hourswere for SAR missions.

Approximately 60 miles west of Pensacola, at Mobile,Alabama, the Coast Guard had, as of October 1975, 2 H-3 and14 H-52 helicopters, and 3 HU-16 fixed-wing aircraft whichhad SAR capabili ~, and could have been used to support NASPensacola S The aircraft at Mobile are mainly usedfor trainin,. oj, 'nbile is the Coast Guard aviation train-ing facility.

San Francisco, California

In San Francisco, the Coast Guard, Air Force, and Navyhave or will have 10 SAR helicopters and 10 SAR fixed-wingaircraft, as follows:

Fixed-wingHelicopters aircraft

Owning service Location Number Type Number Type

Coast Guard International 4 H-52 3 C-130Airport 3 HU-16

Air National Hayward Munici-Guard (note a) pal Airport 4 H-3 4 C-130

Navy NAS Alameda 2 H-46 - -

Total 10 10

a/This unit was to become operational for SAR in 1976.

20

In addition to the SAR aircraft in the immediate SanFrancisco area, the Air Force has an Aerospace Rescue andRecovery Service unit with four C-130 aircraft anc two H-3helicopters located about 90 miles east in the Sacramentoarea. The H-3s are being replaced by six H-53 helicopters,which will have an added capability for night rescue. Also,the Air Force helicopters are refuelable in flight usingthe C-130s as tankers.

The Air Force and Navy SAR aircraft are flown mostlyfor training and support purposes. Out of 3,080 hours flownby both active units during fiscal year 1975, only 683 hourswere flown for SAR. During the same period, the Coast Guardunit flew 2,336 hours for SAR out of a total 5,987.

In addition to SAR aircraft that the Coast Guard, AirForce, and Navy have in the area, the Army has both activeand reserve aviation units about 30 miles north of SanFrancisco. Although neither unit has a SAR mission, bothhave done SAR work. As of the end of fiscal year 1975, the2 units together had 15 aircraft, both helicopters and fixed-wing.

We did not evaluate the need for SAR aircraft for otherthan SAR missions. However, the SAR hours flown in fiscalyear 1975 were nly a small part of the total capability ofthese aircraft, although SAR was their primary mission. Thisdemonstrates the potential for reductions in SAR aircraftthrough coordinated SAR requirements planning.

WARTIME AVAILABILITY OF SAR ASSETSIN THE UNITED STATES

This report demonstrates the peacetime availability ofDOD SAR assets for civil SAR missions. But, would the assetsbe available in wartime? Several members of DOD componentsexpressed concern that DOD's SAR assets would not be avail-able for civil SAR in wartime. The Coast Guard in respondingto our draft report stated "* * * DOD resources are predicatedon combat SAR postures only, and their availability can notbe assured."

We believe that although the military services' partici-pation in SAR would change upon mobilization, many of themilitary SAR assets would remain available. Undoubtedly awartime SAR mission to support military operations along U.S.coasts and in its coastal waters would remain.

21

Air Force SAR assets are responsible for SAR support ofAir Force combat missions, and therefore, could be calledupon to deploy to support the missions. The possibility ofdeployment of military SAR aircraft might not be a seriousobstacle, however. The services plan to use their CONUS SARunits as rotation bases for their overseas units, and thiswill provide continuity for local CONUS SAR operations. Forexample, even though SAR units in Vietnam were reinforcedduring the conflict to provide SAR coverage, only one CONUS-based Air Force SAR unit was deployed there. And, massiveamounts of air power were committed to the long, arduousconflict.

Navy SAR assets are shore-based SAR helicopters stationedto support the Navy's inland aviation and port operations;fleet SAR operations and the associated assets were not in-cluded. A Navy official said that there would be a continuedrequirement for these shore-based SAR assets in wartime, andthe Navy has no plans to relocate them in the event ofmobilization.

Our discussions of SAR capability center on organiza-tions and assets having SAR as their primary responsibility.There is a large additional SAR capability represented by thenumerous aircraft that have SAR as a secondary or backup mis-sion. Within the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard,units have SAR mission assignments and can be expected toprovide a surge capability upon mobilization. Many DOD admin-istrative and support aircraft can be used for SAR. (Seepp. 31 and 32.) Alsor many aircraft, now in storage, can beactivated in the event of mobilization.

Although this report discusses the peacetime SAR missionsof the Coast Guard, it has additional potential SAR capabil-ity, represented by the lower priority flying missions thatwould be discontinued or curtailed during wartime. Functionssuch as pollution control and enforcement of fishing and cus-toms laws could be supplanted by SAR-type missions. As anexample of magnitude, the Coast Guard's projected total com-posite aviation requirements for fiscal year 1979 are over89,000 flying hours. Over 39,000 hours of this total are forenforcement of laws and treaties and marine environmental pro-tection flights, with a projected requirement of 32,600 hoursfor SAR. Additionally, the Coast Guard would be able to in-crease its total flying program and thereby provide additionalflying for SAR.

We believe joint planning and determination of require-ments could provide improved peacetime SAR capability while

22

also enhancing wartime SAR capability. Such procedures wouldimprove utilization of all Federal SAP assets.

By increasing military services' participation in actualSAR operations during peacetime, the services would receivevaluable training, and their proficiency for SAR operationsduring wartime would benefit. And, more integrated use ofCoast Guard SAR assets with DOD in peacetime would assuregreater effectiveness in wartime.

CONCLUSIONS

The Coast Guard and DOD components are computing require-ments and stationing SAR aircraft to provide for their peakneeds without considering adequately assistance availablefrom SAR assets of the other services. This practice hasresulted in more SAR aircraft, crews, and supporting servicesthan are needed to provide adequate coverage to both the mili-tary and civilian sectors. It also fails to recognize thepotential for effective use of these assets along the coastsand in coastal waters during wartime.

DOD and the Coast Guard are not adequately consideringother SAR capabilities in the vicinity before placing SARassets there. The number of DOD and Coast Guard SAR assetsstationed in the Jacksonville, Florida, and San Francisco,California, areas illustrate, we believe, a duplication ofSAR cpabilities.

This redundancy points up the need for DOD componentsand the Coast Guard to jointly determine SAR requirementsand to station SAR assets accordingly. We believe suchjoint determination of SAR aircraft needs and more coopera-tion in using the assets would reduce the total number ofneeded SAR aircraft and crews without reducing the qualityof coverage.

We also believe the rethinking of the use of SAR assetsamong the DOD components and the Coast Guard would enhancethe wartime use of these assets. Better preparation of pilotsfor wartime roles and reliance on the Coast Guard for wartimemissions along U.S. coasts are examples.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Trans-portation direct DOD branches and the Coast Guard to jointlydetermine total SAR aircraft requirements during both peace-time and wartime.

23

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

The Departments of Defense and Transportation agreedthat there are opportunities for increased cooperation amongthe various Federal agencies conducting SAR operations. (See

app. I and II.)

However, DOD and the Coast Guard disagreed with our

recommendation that they jointly determine SAR aircraft

requirements and aircraft ind crew stationing, utilization,and potential deployment plais.

DOD stated that joint determination of Federal SAR assetrequirements is not needed because humanitarian and military

SAR are mutually exclusive. They also indicated that the es-tablishment of combat SAR requirements are the responsibility

of the Secretary of Defense.

The Coast Guard disagreed on the basis that they havestatutory responsibility for civil maritime SAR. Also, DOD

resources are predicated on combat SAR postures only, andbecause they experience emergency deployment and base clo-

sures, their continuing availability cannot be assured. TheCoast Guard also said their wartime taskings are alreadysatisfactorily defined.

,,OD and Coast Guard comments indicate, in our opinion,attitudes of acquiring and maintaining resources to performtheir own missions, without regard for efficiencies and econ-omies that could accrue from joint requirements and utiliza-

tion determinations in both peace and wartime.

The Secretary of Defense in his annual report for fiscalyear 1975 stated that:

"The notion that each of the services should beindependent of the others so that it doesn'thave to rely, as it were, on external sourcesfor support is outdated. We can no longer affordit. We have to now think in terms of Total Forcestructure as opposed to separate interests."

Also, in his fiscal year 1976 report, the Secretarypointed out that applying the principle of mutual support andforce interdependence is completely feasible and indeed desir-able. Though, in making the point the Secretary was address-ing air defense forces, the principle of interdependence isapplicable to many requirements and capabilities.

24

DOD Directive 4000.19, entitled "Basic Policies and

Principles for Interservice, Interdepartmental and Interaqency

Support" provides guidance for the services to achieve effec-

tiveness and economies through interservice and interagency

support arrangements.

We believe DOD's comments on this report are inconsistent

with the policies of the Secretary of Defense on interagency

coordination, as shown above.

We believe humanitarian and military SAR requirements

are not mutually exclusive. Military SAR assets are also

Federal assets and, as such, their application should be

dependent on whether they are capable of responding--not

whether the mission is civil or military.

No doubt, applying DOD SAR assets would differ in war-

time and peacetime. But, we believe this should not negate

attempts to improve utilization of these assets in both

peacetime and wartime. Also, the types of fluctuations in

combat resources the Coast Guard refers to in its comments

are unusual during peacetime.

We recognize the Coast Guard's statutory responsibility

for civil maritime SAR. Nevertheless, this statutory respon-

sibility can be carried out by the Coast Guard with other

than Coast Guard resources. As discussed earlier the Coast

Guard, as SAR coordinator within maritime regions, has respon-sibility for insuring that an operation can be promptly ini-tiatad and thoroughly prosecuted with maximum efficient useof all available SAR resources.

We agree that the responsibility for establishing na-tional defense requirements rests with the Secretary of De-fense. However, recognizing that the U.S. Coast Guard is auniformed Armed Force operating as a service in the Navy inwartime or when otherwise directed by the President, it seemslogical and prudent to include the Coast Guard in wartimeSAR requirement determinations.

25

CHAPTER 4

OPPORTUNITIES FOR BETTER USE

OF SEARCH AND RESCUE ASSETS

The National SAR Plan makes it clear that the various ARcoordinators, the Air Force, the Coast Guard, and overseascommanders, shouti make maximum use of all available SAR as-sets to provide effective and economical SAR coverage.

However, despit.e the potential help available fromapproximately 175 Department of Defense SAR helicopters andfixed-wing aircraft, more than 2,000 support aircraft suit-able for SAR work, and a large number of Army helicopters,the Coast Guard flew almost all maritime SAR missions infiscal year 1975. The Coast Guard, by not using DOD assetsto a greater extent, failed to use fully all available SARassets.

EXECUTING MARITIME SAR MISSIONS

Consistent with tle National SAR Plan the Coast Guardhas a responsibility to conduct mariime SAR missions, butalso has management responsibility for maritime SAR. UnderNational SAR policy and the national plan any suitable Fed-eral assets can be called upon to perform SAR missions. But,despite the availability of DOD assets the Coast Guard flew97 percent of more than 8,700 maritime SAR missions made infiscal year 1975.

The Coast Guard disagreed that any suitable Federal assetcould be employed for maritime SAR on the basis that legalsuits involving SAR activities might increase. They statedthat the proportion of maritime SAR missions they perform maywell increase, to insure a proper and effective response.

We believe that responding to SAR incidents with theclosest asset capable of performing the mission insures properand effective response. Despite the Coast Guard's position,DOD assets capable of performing civil maritime SAR missionsare available for use. Improved management would not only in-crease the utilization of these assets, but would also in-crease the efficiency and economy of SAR operations.

The Coast Guard apparently believes they should respondto all SAR incidents, to avoid legal suits as well as toinsure proper and effective response. We believe thatconsidering all available SAR assets may enable he Coast

26

Guard to provide more effective response to SAR incidents.Further, legal suits are filed against the Federal Government,not individual agencies, and each case is decided on its cir-cumstances, regardless of whether the SAR operation was madeby the Coast Guard or other agencies.

THE COAST GUARD FLEW MANY MARITIME MISSIONSNEAR DOD ACTIVITIES HAVING SAR FACILITIES

We analyzed about 80 percent of the Coast Guard's ari-time SAR missions flown in nine selected geographic areasduring fiscal year 1975. We found that the Ccast Guard flewalmost 700 SAR missions in the immediate vicinity of DOD ac-tivities which had SAR capabilities. In some cases both theCoast Guard and DOD units were located in the s generalvicinity, but in many cases the DOD activity war considerablycloser.

The following chart shows the number of SAR missions theCoast Guard flew in the vicinity of DOD activities in fiscalyear 1975, and the distance of the nearest Coast Guard stationto the vicinity of the incidents. The chart also illustratesthe opportunities for more coordination between the CoastGuard and DOD.

Miles from the

Number of Coast Guard Nearest Coast nearest Coastmissions by type of Guard Air Guard Air DOD activities

aircraft used Station to Station to in the

Fixed- }{eli- vicinity of vicinity of vicinity ofwing copter Total the incidents the incidents the incidents

56 71 127 Miami, Fla. 127 NAS Key West, Fla.2 41 43 St. Petersburg, 105 NAS Jacksonville,

Fla. Fla.10 8 18 Mobile, Ala. 95 Eglin AFB, Fla.0 67 67 Brooklyn, N.Y. 65 Suffolk County AFB,

N.Y.8 8 16 Mobile, Ala. 50 NAS Pensacola,

Fla.4 72 76 Elizabeth City, 37 NAS Patuxent River

N.C. Md., and Oceana, a.13 17 30 Miami, Fla. 14 Homestead AFB, Fla.

13 259 272 San Francisco, 4 NAS Alameda, Calif.Calif.

0 44 44 Port Angeles, 0 NAS Whidbey Island,Wa. Wa.

Total 106 587 693

Note: This information was developed by examining SAF incidents within geographicalquadrants near or around DOD activities. Distances to the vicinity of the

incidents are the distances from the nearest Coast Guard Air Stations to theclosest boundaries of the quadrants.

27

The following examples illustrate the potential forgreater coordination.

-- In the Chesapeake ay area near Norfolk the CoastGuard flew 72 missions using helicopters. The near-est Coast Guard Air Station is located at ElizabethCity, about 37 miles from the south end of the bay.The Naval Air Station, Patuxent River, near thenorthern end of the bay, had two H-46 helicoptersdesignated for SAR duty. At the southern end of thebay, Oceana Naval Air Station also had two H-46 SARhelicopters. We believe these Navy helicopters couldhave been used to perform many of the 72 Coast Guardmissions.

-- In the Miami area both the Coast Guard and the AirForce have SAR aircraft. The Coast Guard aircraftare located in Miami; the Air Force aircraft about15 miles south, at Homestead Air Force Base. TheCoast Guard flew helicopters on 17 SAR missions inthe vicinity of Homestead, the location of 7 activeAir Force SAP helicopters and an Air Force reserveunit with 11 SAR helicopters. Potentially, these AirForce assets could have been used to perform the CoastGuard SAR missions.

AVAILABILITY OF DOD ASSETS FOR SAR

The actual SAR hours flown by the Coast Guard and themilitary services in fiscal year 1975 are shown below. Theseare representative of actual SAR needs in that fiscal year,since neither the Coast Guard nor DOD services could providea measure of unfilled need. The difference between actualSAR hours and total hours flown indicates the availability ofSAR aircraft flying time for actual SAR missions. Availableflight-hours for SAR missions, however, are limited only byaircraft maintenance requirements, fuel, and aircrew endur-ance, and therefore could be more.

28

Helicopters___ _ Fixed-win aircraft

huurs hoursflown Total flown Total Total

by SAR SAR Non-SAR by SAR SAR Non-SAR non-SAR

Number aircraft hours flying Number aircraft hours flying flying

Owner assined (note a) needed hours assigned (note a) needed hours hours

Coast Guard (note b) 101 12,147 12,147 (c) 40 6,137 6,137 (c) (c)Air Force and its

reserves 79 6,928 1,221 5,707 29 2,062 756 1,306 ,,013Navy/Marine Corps 66 615 1,022 6593 - 6,593

Total 246 26,690 14,390 12, 00 69 8,199 6093 1,306 3L606

a/Excludes SAR training.

b/Tnese figures do not include aircraft located outside the continental United States and aircraft

in contingency reserve status.

c/Coast Guard aircraft are considered multimission aircraft and fly other than SAR missionsroutinely. Therefore, non-SAR flying hours were not shown.

Although the Air Force and Navy SAR aircraft flew atotal of 16,605 flight-hours, excluding SAR training flights,during fiscal year 1975, only 2,999 hours were for actual SARmissions. The remaining 13,606 hours, used mostly for admin-istrative and support flights, represent an indication of themagnitude of hours that could be made available to assist theCoast Guard in SAR missions.

In addition to the capability mentioned above, we be-lieve a considerable number of the required SAR trainingflight-hours in the Air Force, Navy, and Coast Guard couldbe obtained while performing actual SAR missions. Many ofthese SAR training flights are made so that qualified crewscan maintain their proficiency.

During fiscal year 1975, Air Force, Navy, and CoastGuard SAR units flew training hours at an estimated cost ofover $12.4 million, as shown below:

Training EstimatedService hours cost

Air Force 10,508 $ 4,768,000Navy 9,546 2,117,000Coast Guard

(note a) 7,810 5,574,000

Total 27,864 $12,459,000

a/Our estimate based on total Coast Guard training flights.

An example of the hours flown by a typical Air Force SARunit are those flown by the squadron located at Eglin AirForce Base. During 1975 this unit flew 310 hours for actual

29

SAR missions, 2,214 hours for training, 84 hours for opera-tiona' missions, 815 hours for command support, and 548 hoursfor administrative activities.

We could not quantify the number of SAR tra ning flight-hours that could be made available for actual SAl missions.However, we believe. and Air Force and Navy officials agree,that a considerable amount of SAR training could be obtainedin typical SAR missions.

Each training hour flown strictly for training purposesthat could be changed to an actual SAR mission is an unneces-sary duplication. Such duplication is costly, not only interms of strict flight-hour costs, but also in terms ofattendant costs, such as the consumption of fuel and groundsupport.

OTHER AVAILABLE ASSETS

Aside from aircraft assigned principally to SAR, thereare over 2,000 administrative and support aircraft and sev-eral hundred helicopters in DOD which could fly SAR missions.Many of these aircraft, although equipped differently, arethe same basic type as those used for SAR work and could ecalled upon to augment Coast Guard air SAR capability.

DOD administrative and support aircraft include a varietyof single-, twin-, and four-engine fixed-wing aircraft. Heli-copters include both single- and twin-engine types. Thefollowing table lists some of these aircraft and their uses.

30

Types of DOD Aircraft Not Assigned to SAR Units

That Could be Called Upon For SARMissions (note a)

Aircraft Owning service Use

Helicopters:H-1 Air Force, SAR, personnel evacuation,

Army support

H-3 Air Force, SAR, antisubmarine warfare,Navy logistical support, personnel

evacuation

H-46 Navy SAR, transportation of cargoand troops

H-53 Air Force, SAR, transportation of cargoNavy and troops

Fixed-Wing:C-130 Air Force, Long-range search, transport

Navy of troops and materiel, heli-copter in-flight refueling

P-3 Navy SAR, antisubmarine warfare

T-39 Air Force Operational support of AirForce and other Governmentagencies, executive transport

U-8F Army Transport of priority personneland light cargo

T-42A Army Instrument flight trainer, in-stallation support

a/Many of these aircraft are stationed near U.S. coastalwaters. (See p. 32.)

The chart on the following page snows the stationing of

these aircraft within CONUS.

THE COAST GUARD COULD MAKEGREATER USE OF DOD SAR ASSETS

Coast Guard officials said that DOD aircraft are not

used more for SAR missions because Coast Guard aircrews are

better trained and equipped for maritime SAR and can respond

to SAR incidents more quickly than can DOD. Another Coast

Guard objection is that it cannot rely on using DOD aircraft

for SAR because these units have military mission and mobility

requirements.

In reviewing DOD SAR units' training, equipment, and

response times we found little difference between Coast Guard,

Air Force, and Navy SAR training requirements and equipment,

but we noted differences in response times. Longer DOD

31

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response times are the only significant obstacle to increaseduse of DOD assets by the Coast Guard. Several ways exist toalleviate this obstacle.

DOD SAR aircrew capability

DOD SAR aircrews receive training similar to that ofthe Coast Guard except for night helicopter operations overwater. The Coast Guard and Navy units receive such training;the Air Force units do not.

Officials of Air Force and Navy units said they could domore SAR work. Air Force officials also said that participa-tion in actual SAR work provided good training for militaryrequirements. An Air Force officer with a previous SAR combattour in Vietnam said he would have been much better qualifiedfor combat SAR duties had he participated in Coast Guard SARassignments before his combat tour. Another Air Force offi-cial said that SAR missions flown by the Coast Guard lendthemselves to fulfilling Air Force SAR training requirementsand participation in such missions adds realism to thetraining.

DOD and Coast Guard SAR aircrafthave similar equipmen t

We found no major differences between SAR equipmentaboard Coast Guard, Air Force, and Navy aircraft which wouldprevent their use in civil SAR. Also, the Navy plans toeliminate most of the differences that exist in its aircraft.

The principal differences in equipment were (1) lack ofradio equipment in Air Force and Navy aircraft to communicatewith surface vessels, (2) lack of rescue baskets in Navyhelicopters, and (3) lack of automatic hover devices on AirForce and Navy helicopters. Navy officials told us theyexpect to install rescue baskets aboard H-46 helicopters assoon as booms can be installed and automatic hover devices.They have no plans to install radio equipment to communicatewith surface vessels, although they recognize the need forsuch equipment.

Response time objectives

The Coast Guard's response time objective to SAR callsis to send aircraft within 30 minutes after receiving a mis-sion request. To accomplish this, it keeps aircrews and air-craft on SAR alert status 24 hours a day. During normal work-ing hours, the Air Force and Navy SAR units response timeobjectives are essentially the same as the Coast Guard's.

33

The most important differences between Coast Guard andDOD response time objectives are for hours outside normalduty hours.

The objectives for DOD SAR units are established locallyand are categorized by the normal workday and other periods.At DOD units visited, personnel were kept on SAR standby atall times. Response time objectives ranged from 10 to30 minutes for requests received during normal working hoursor periods of high Navy flight activity, and 50 minutes toan hour for other periods. Active Air Force units had re-sponse time objectives during the normal workday ranging from30 minutes to 1-1/2 hours. During other periods the responseobjectives ranged from 45 minutes to 3 hours. Officials ofan Air Force reserve unit felt they could respond to a SARmission request within about 1 hour during its workweek andwithin about 2 hours in other periods, provided their aircraftwere fueled and ready.

CONCLUSIONS

The objectives of the National SAR Plan were not beingmet in the maritime regions. The Coast Guard did not ade-quately utilize other resources available to it, choosinginstead to fly all but 3 percent of the maritime SAR mis-sions conducted in fiscal year 1975. DOD units could haveperformed many of these missions.

We could not determine the precise amount of SAR assist-ance DOD units could annually provide the Coast Guard; how-ever, we believe the amount is substantial. For example,DOD SAR aircraft flew 16,605 hours during fiscal year 1975,only 2,999 of which were for actual SAR missions. Many ofthe remaining 13,606 hours, which were flown for administra-tive and support purposes, could have been used for AR.

The Air Force, Navy, and Coast Guard flew over27,800 hours on SAR training flights in fiscal year 1975,at an estimated cost of over $12.4 million. Many of thesehours could have been used for SAR missions. Had this beendone, two purposes (SAR and training) would have been metand many flight-hours could have been eliminated.

Several benefits would result from increased use of DODassets by the Coast Guard.

-- Less total assets would be required for SAR missions,without impairing SAR coverage.

34

-- Savings, in terms of numbers of aircraft required for

SAR and the attendant costs associated with theiroperation, such as fuel, maintenance, and ground

support personnel, would result.

-- Valuable experience could be gained by DOD aircrews

which would increase their overall proficiency.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Trans-

portation direct DOD branches and the Coast Guard, respec-

tively, to begin joint effective use of SAR aircraft, in-

cluding stationing, personnel staffing, training, and future

deployments.

We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct

DOD units to make aircraft not actual'y performing SAR mis-

sions or military exercises available to perform or assist

in civil SAR missions.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

In comments relating to the above recommendations the

Coast Guard, the Navy, and the Air Force stated that DOD

facilities are available to meet civil SAR needs on a basis

of noninterference with DOD components' military missions.

Their comments point out that this language is consistent

with the language of the National SAR Plan. DOD and the

Coast Guard commented that DOD SAR assets have responded to

civil SAR incidents when called upon and when assets were

available.

The stated purpose of the National SAR Policy, which is

implemented by the National SAR Plan, is to provide for the

effective use of all available facilities in all types of

SAR missions. (See p. 2.) While we agree that the National

SAR Plan states DOD facilities be used to meet civil needson a basis of noninterference with military missions,

we do

not believe the intent of National SAR Policy or Plan was to

place higher priorities on military SAR or other missions

than on civil SAR missions. On the contrary, we believe the

intent is to make all assets, military or civil, not actually

involved in a military SAR mission or other necessary activity

available for SAR missions, be they military or civil.

We realize that there may be instances when DOD cannot

release specific SAR assets for civil SAR missions. Although

such instances need to be allowed for, they are not day-to-

day operations and should not normally interfere with the

35

performance of civil SAR missions. Examples of such excep-tional instances might include providing SAR coverage forlarge-scale military exercises or coverage for transportationof sensitive cargo.

Regarding use of Air Force, Navy, and Coast Guard SARtraining flights for actual SAR missions, the Coast Guard saidthe use of actual SAR cases to conduct training is probablynot the best policy for the public or the Coast Guard. Ourreview, however, showed that the flyers in operational unitshave already graduated from service flight schools, and muchof their training time is to maintain proficiency. We there-fore believe the use of these crews for actual SAR missionswould be one way of increasing the utilization of existingassets, and if properly administered would not expose SARincident victims to unqualified and/or inexperienced crews,as the Coast Guard comments imply.

We recognize that DO n components have contributed tocivil SAR efforts. This -rt demonstrates, however, thatmore SAR capability exists . DOD than is being effectivelyused, and that greater participation in civil SAR by DOD com-ponents would contribute to greater efficiency and economywithin the Federal Government.

In its comments on our draft report, DOD acknowledged theavailability of assets in peacetime to assist in civil SARactivities, but indicated a lack of enthusiasm for pursuingmeasures to more effectively utilize these assets. Theirposition is one of maintaining the status quo. We disagreewith this philosophy and believe aggressive and positive man-agement approaches for employing these assets will prove ef-ficient and cost effective. We believe our recommendationsreflect sound management principles and are consistent withthe intent of the National SAR Policy and the implementingplan.

36

CHAPTER 5

USE OF AVAILABLE ASSETS COULD

REDUCE COAST GUARD AIRCRAFT PURCHASES

By considering all services' search and rescue aircraftrequirements and the number of aircraft available to performSAR missions, a considerable number of flight-hours couldbe made available to the Coast Guard. Use of this flighttime would reduce Coast Guard aviation requirements and thusthe number of aircraft ,needed. Consequently, we believe theopportunity exists to reduce the number of aircraft theCoast Guard intends to purchase.

COAST GUARD PURCHASE OF AIRCRAFT

The Coast Guard awarded a contract for 41 medium-rangesearch fixed-wing twin-engine jet aircraft in January 1977.The new aircraft are intended to replace the Coast Guard'spresent MRS aircraft, the HU-16E, which was first acquiredin 1951. The estimated cost for the 41 aircraft was about$205 million, or about $5 million per aircraft; deliveriesare to begin in 1978 and continue into the 1980s.

The Coast Guard intends to use 34 of the 41 aircraftfor active operational purposes, including SAR, marine en-vironmental protection, enforcement f laws and treaties,marine science activities, and several other missions requir-ing fewer flying hours. Of the remaining seven aircraft,four are intended for maintenance support purposes (to re-place aircraft that are out of operation for extended main-tenance or overhaul). The remaining three aircraft are tobe purchased for contingency fleet support purposes to

-- replace crashed aircraft while the aircraft are beingrebuilt,

-- replace aircraft that crash and are eliminated fromthe inventory,

-- provide for longer than anticipated overhaul periods,or

--be used as prototype aircraft for development ofmodifications and new systems for MRS aircraft.

The Coast Guard has projected annual SAR flying require-ments for MRS aircraft at 14,000 hours by 1986. Since each

37

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aircraft is expected to fly about 1,000 operational hoursannually, an equivalent of 14 MRS aircraft will be requiredto perform SAR missions.

To patrol the expanded area resulting from the exten-sion of the U.S. economic boundary to 200 miles offshore,the Coast Guard aso expects to purchase five short-rangereconnaissance helicopters at a projected cost of $8.5 mil-lion, four additional MRS aircraft at a projected cost of$22 million, and six additional C-130 aircraft at a costof $51.6 million.

POTENTIAL REDUCTIONS IN COAST GUARDAIRCRAFT PURCHASES

The Coast Guard uses its helicopters, MRS aircraft, andC-130 aircraft for SAR missions. Additionally, all CoastGuard aircraft are capable of performing other missions,including enforcement of laws and treaties.

We believe sufficient unused capability exists in theother military services, as shown by the number of Air Forceand Navy SAR and other aircraft flight-hours potentiallyavailable, to reduce Coast Guard SAR aircraft requirements.We could not quantify the number of flight-hours the Depart-ment of Defense could provide for SAR and the resulting reduc-tion in Coast Guard SAR requirements. Since all Coast Guardaircraft have a multimission capability, reduction in SARaircraft requirements would have an impact on aircraft avail-ability for other purposis.

CONCLUSIONS

We believe the Coast Guard, the Navy, and the Air Forceshould improve their coordination of operations and jointplanning to clarify total requirements for aircraft. Suchplanning would result in more efficient and effective opera-tions and could reduce the total quantity of aircraft needed.The Coast Guard is planning to purchase 56 aircraft at a costof $287 million. In making its requirements computations,the Coast Guard did not consider the aircraft available fromthe Air Force and Navy. Through better coordination and jointplanning, DOD aircraft could satisfy, in part, the CoastGuard's requirements for new aircraft.

RECOMMENDATION

Due to the considerable flying capability available fromthe Navy and Air Force, and in col-ection with our earlier

39

recommendation that the Coast Guard, Air Force, and Navyjointly determine total aircraft requirements to supporttheir peacetime and wartime missions, we recommend that theSecretary of Transportation require the Coast Guard to re-evaluate the number of aircraft it plans to purchase.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

In commenting on our recommendation the Coast Guard re-marked that a reevaluation of aircraft requirements based onour audit is not warranted. The Coast Guard stated that weassume Air Force and Navy aircraft are available for CoastGuard missions on a continuing basis, and because such is notthe case sufficient resources must be procured to "satisfac-torily meet statutory responsibilities."

We do not recognize the accomplishment of civil SAR mis-sions as the exclusive domain of the Coast Guard. Nor do wesubscribe to the Coast Guard's logic that because Air Forceand Navy aircraft are not available for civil SAR missionson a continuing basis the Coast Guard must procure sufficientresources to satisfy all civil maritime SAR requirements.

Rather, the Coast Guard has been assigned the responsi-bility for insuring that maritime SAR missions can be accom-plished with the maximum efficient use of all available re-sources. And, we believe, DOD assets are available or couldbe made available for SAR on a much more continuing basis thanthe Coast Guard represents.

As the Navy indicates in its comments, DOD SAR assetsdevote only a small percentage of actual flight time to rescuemissions. At most other times DOD assets should be availablefor and should undertake SAR missions if it is physicallyfeasible. SAR missions, both civil and military, should takepriority over non-SAR missions, in our opinion. (See p. 35.)

We also believe that sufficient dispersion of DOD air-craft exists that if one aircrdft is on a SAR mission, eithera backup aircraft from that location or an aircraft from an-othec location could respond to a SAR mission request. Wewould consider it unlikely, for example, if the military couldnot make any military SAR aircraft available at a given timein the San Francisco area.

Finally, the Coast Guard contends that because DOD SARaircraft experience emergency deployments and base closuresoccur, such facilities cannot be relied upon for continuousassistance in any one given area. These statements are mis-leading s nce emergency deployments are extremely infrequent

40

and base closures, in addition to occurring rather infre-

quently, are known with sufficient leadtime to provide ample

opportunity to plan for replacement of assets affected by

the closure.

We believe there are sufficient DOD SAR assets available

on a contiuous basis to affect the Coast Guard's asset re-

quirements determination. The amount of assistance the Coast

Guard receives from DOD is, w believe, largely dependent on

the degree of coordination ctween the agencies.

With DOD assets available, we do not believe it is neces-

sary for the Coast Guard to procure assets to totally satisfy

civil SAR needs.

The Department of Justice said that they find the report

incongruent in that it recommends increased support of law

enforcement by the Coast Guard on the one hand, while recom-

mending that the Coast Guard reconsider its request for ddi-

tional aircraft in favor of more coordinated use of military

aircraft, on the other.

These recommendations are not inconsistent in our opin-

ion. We believe that each Federal agency should purchase only

enough assets, after considering other available assistance,

to perform its duties. This belief is based on the concept

that agency assets, such as SAR aircraft, are Federal assets

which should be used as efficiently and effectively as

possible.

41

CHAPTER 6

ALTERNATIVES FOR IMPROVED SEARCH

AND RESCUE OPERATIONS

Every effort must be made to insure that the tremendousamounts of assets owned by the Federal Government are usedefficiently and economically. No assets procured by individ-ual Federal agencies are theirs exclusively. If agen:ies cansatisfy the valLd requirements of other agencies without ma-terially reducing their capabilities, they should do so.

The preceding data indicates that many aircraft areavailable among Department of Defense branches and the CoastGuard that could be more effectively used for SAR. Substan-tial savings, as well as increased efficiencies, are possibleif these organizations fully coordinate their procurement,stationing, and use of these assets.

ALTERNATIVES FOR MORE EFFICIENTUSE OF AVAILABLE ASSETS FOR SAR

There are several ways in which Coast Guard and DODofficials can achieve more efficient and economical SARcoverage.

The Coast Guard as single managerfor SAR worldwide

The Coast Guard computes SAR requirements on the basisof civil SAR missions during peacetime, but has aircraft andqualified SAR crews which, given appropriate training, arecapable of performing any type of SAR mission including war-time missions. In addition, the Coast Guard is a uniformedarmed force ready to operate as a service of the Navy upondeclaration of war, or when the President otherwise directs.

Also, DOD branches' SAR asset levels are primarily basedon wartime needs, but are suitable for some civil maritimeSAR during peacetime.

The National SAR Plan divides SAR coordinator responsi-bilities among the Air Force, inland; the Coast Guard, mari-time regions; and the overseas commanders, overseas. If ap-pointed the single manager for all SAR in both peacetime andwartime, the Coast Guard could determine asset needs world-wide and effectively coordinate their use. The result wouldbe less duplication of SAR assets, elimination of interservice

42

SAR coordination problems, better aircraft stationing patterns,and more efficient and economical response to SAR incidents.

DOD SAR units could performSAR missions in dsignated sectors

The Air Force and Navy have SAR aircraft and trainedpersonnel available to perform civil SAR missions. Sincethese asset levels are based primarily on combat require-ments, more assets are available during peacetime than thereare SAR mission requirements.

At the same time, Coast Guard officials informed us thatthey perform SAR missions at the expense of other missionsbecause they do not have enough aircraft to satisfy all theirmission requirements. Despite their lack of aircraft, theCoast Guard flew several hundred SAR missions from Coast GuardAir Stations to the immediate vicinity of military installa-tions which had SAR capabilities.

We believe military SAR units could assume the responsi-bility for civil as well as military SAR missions in desig-nated sectors, with the Coast Guard maintaining SAR coordina-tor responsibility. Such arrangements would increase use

of available DOD assets, reduce demands for Coast Guard as-sets, and provide more economical SAR coverage.

DOD SAR units and the Coast Guard couldternate SAR alert periods

Many military SAR units and Coast Guard Air Stationsare located in the same geographic areas. For example, theAir Force SAR units at Homestead Air Force Base are locatedabout 17 miles from the Coast Guard Air Station in Miami.Both are capable of performing civil and military SAR mis-sions. Coast Guard units stand 24-hour alerts to respond toSAR incidents and military units have similar response ca-pabilities during duty hours.

We believe DOD and Coast Guard SAR units could alter-nate SAR alert watches periodically, either on a duty hour--nonduty hour, 24 hour, or other such basis. Such a systemwould result in greater use of DOD SAR assets, eliminationof duplicate SAR alert watches by DOD and Coast Guard units,and more economical operation of both DOD and Coast Guardunits. Also, we believe such a system would require fewertotal aircraft than are presently used since fewer alert andbackup aircraft would be required.

43

DOD SAR units could Provide long-rangeSAR cality for the Coast Guard

To perform SAR missions in the maritime areas the CoastGuard has short-range helicopters, medium-range twin-enginefixed-wing aircraft, and long-range C-130 aircraft. TheDOD SAR units have similar helicopters available for short-range missions, air refuelable helicopters for medium ranges,and C-130 aircraft for long ranges. In addition, DOD hashundreds of other aircraft which, although not designated asSAR aircraft, are suitable for all ranges of SAR work.

The Coast Guard mostly needs aircraft in the medium- andlong-range categories. At the time of our review the CoastGard was in the process of purchasing 41 medium-ranqe searcha rcraft, at a projected cost of over $200 million. Also,the Coast Guard plans to purchase six C-130 aircraft at aprojected cost of $51.6 million.

The Coast Guard could use DOD assets to a greater extentfor medium- and long-range SAR missions, and by so doing reducerequirements for these types of aircraft.

CONCLUSION

Substantial economies of operation would accumulate fromjoint determination of SAR requirements and increased use ofSAR assets by DOD branches and the Coast Guard.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Trans-portation direct that the DOD components and the Coast Guardconsider the alternatives discussed in this report, and otherways to improve overall use of aircraft in both civil andmilitary SAR missions.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

In general comments on the statements made in this chap-ter, the Air Force stated that Coast Guard aircraft are notconfigured to accomplish Air Force combat rescue missions,and the Coast Guard remarked that we erroneousiv assumed thatCoaFt Guard and DOD forces could be used interchangeably forc;-i. and military, peacetime and wartime, SAR. The CoastGuard also stated that its helicopter pilots who served dur-ing the Vietnam conflict with the Air Force received 8 weeksof combat SAR training and approximately 3 weeks of survivalschool training before being sent overseas.

44

In comparing the two services' aircraft, their con-figurations, and the training schedules of heir pilots, wefound no major differerces that would preclude the aircraftand crews of one servic? from assuming the missions of the

other. (See p. 33.)

Regarding SAR crew training, Air Force, Navy, and CoastGuard SAR crews are already trained for at least some SAR,

and because they could be called upon at any time to performSAR work other than that to which they are accustomed, it

seems prudent and advisable that the SAR crews of all threeorganizations be trained to undertake a variety of SARmissions.

We agree with the Coast Guard that its pilots mightneed special training to assume wartime SAR missions, but

we don't regard this as a prohibiting factor. On the con-trary, since in time of war the Coast Guard would revert toNavy control, peacetime training of Coast Guard personne'for their possible wartime roles would seem to enhance t rvalue to the Nation.

The above Coast Guard and Air Force comments are appar-ently meant as explanations of why there is not better coordi-nation and use of SAR assets. We don't regard these as com-pelling arguements. In our opinion, excellent opportunitiesexist for improved SAR operations despite these obstacles,which can be overcome.

45

CHAPTER 7

OTHER OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACHIEVING GREATER

EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMIES THROUGH INCREASED

COORDINATION

The Department of Defense has numerous aircraft andships crossing U.S. coastal waters, the Coast Guard hasaircraft and ships operating routinely in these waters, andseveral other Federal agencies conduct operations in theseareas. If civil agencies could better coordinate theiroperations with each other, and if DOD could provide greaterassistance to civil agencies, especially in the areas of lawenforcement and environmental protection, more efficientoperations and use of assets would result.

CONTROL OF ILLEGAL ENTRYOF PERSONS AND GOODS

The Immigration and Naturalization Service, the DrugEnforcement Administration, and the U.S. Customs Service havelaw enforcement responsibilities involving detection and pre-vention of illegal entry of goods and persons into the UnitedStates. INS is responsible for the entry of persons; DEA isresponsible for narcotics and drugs; the Customs Service isresponsible for interdicting contraband coming into the UnitedStates, including narcotics and drugs.

To some degree these agencies coordinate their effortsand receive support from the Coast Guard and State and localagencies. The Coast Guard, for example, has provided person-nel and equipment for several special la4 enforcement opera-ticas conducted by the Customs Service in the Florida area.Customs and the Coast Guard have several other agreements,both formal and informal, which include the stationing ofCustoms' personnel aboard Coast Guard ships for patrol mis-sions and berthing of Customs' boats at Coast Guard facil-ities.

We believe that more of this type of interagency coordi-nation could increase the agencies' effectiveness and at thesame time require less resources. More routine stationingof INS and Customs' officers aboard Coast Guard patrol vesselsmight increase the agencies' operational capabilities withoutthe need for more patrol vessels.

46

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVILLAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

The Posse Comitatus Act is represented to be a limitingfactor in the use of military personnel and equipment by Fed-eral law enforcement agencies. Considerable uncertaintyexists concerning the amount of assistance the military canprovide civil law enforcement agencies without violating theact.

The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 United States Code 1385,states:

"Whoever, except in cases and under circum-stances expressly authorized by the Constitu-tion or Act of Congress, willfully uses anypart of the Army or the Air Force as a possecomitatus or otherwise to execute the lawsshall be fined not more than $10,000 or im-prisoned not more than two years, or both."

The act has been interpreted as precluding the military

services from actively enforcing civil laws. / Investiga-tion, pursuit, search, and arrest by military forces areexamples of active, or direct, enforcement of civil laws.

A 1976 opinion from the Department of Justice stated

that recent court cases, when -ead together, made clearthat the Posse Comitatus Act is only violated if militarypersonnel take a direct active role in executing the lawthrough such activities as investigation, search, arrest,

or pursuit. The test is whether military personnel sub-ject citizens to the exercise of military power, which isregulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature. The

1/ Although not expressly applicable to the Navy and MarineCorps, the Posse Comitatus Act is regarded as a statementof Federal policy which is closely followed by the Navy.

Members of the naval services shall not, in their offi-

cial capacity, enforce or execute local, State, or Federalcivil laws except when expressly authorized by the Constitu-tion or Act of Congress, or when specific approval of theSecretary of the Navy is granted.

47

opinion further stated that indirect roles by military person-nel, such as the loan and maintenance of equipment, aerialphotographic flights, training, and other expert advice aretoo passive to be viewed as violations of the act and aretherefore lawful and proper. 1/

Since there is not a consistent line of court cases inopposition, the opinion of the Justice Department is con-sidered persuasive commentary. The Department has the re-sponsibility to advise the Executive Branch on legal matters.

From the above statements, it is clear that direct en-forcement of civil laws by the military would violate theact. It is also clear that indirect assistance to civil au-thorities is allowed. The specific form of authorized in-direct assistance is uncertain. For example, it has not beenestablished under what circumstances military personnel canoperate loaned military equipment for civilian law enforce-ment authorities. For instance, it is not clear whether anAir Force pilot transporting a Customs' agent in an Air Forceplane on a contraband patrol or interdiction mission wouldbe in violation of the act.

MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SURVEILLANCE

It is against U.S. law to discharge oil and other pollu-tants into the inland waterways within 50 miles of U.S. coasts.

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act as amended by theWater Quality Improvement Act of 1970 (33 U.S.C. 1151 et seq.(1970)) gave the Coast Guard responsibility and enforcement au-thority for protecting the marine environment from dischargesof oil and other hazardous substances. Recognizing this re-sponsibility, the Coast Guard's Marine Environmental Protec-tion Program was established in 1971.

The objectives of the program are to (1) minimize damageto the marine environment and its living resources caused byintentional or unintentional acts of man, (2) increase man'sawareness of the envirorntental impact of his acticns, and(3) improve the quality of the marine environment.

1/The Justice Department's position regarding the proprietyof indirect assistance to civil law enforcement authoritiesby military personnel is supported by the opinion of JudgeAndrew Bogue in United States V. Red Feather, 392F. Supp.916 (D.S.D., 1975).

48

The fur main elements of the program are (1) surveying

to detect oil spills and other pollutants, (2) containingand cleaning up the ollutant, (3) gathering evidence forenforcement of laws concerning the discharge of oil and other

harmful pollutants into inland and coastal waterways, and(4) deterring potential violators of pollution laws.

The Coast Guard uses both aircraft and ships in the

Marine Environmental Protection Program. Aircraft are usedprimarily for aerial pollution surveillance patrols; the~ arealso used for aerial transport of personnel and major items ofequipment needed to respond to oil spill incidents. Ships areused for containing spills and gathering samples for evidence.

The Coast Guard recorded over 11,400 oil slick sightingsin 1974. Because of shortages of ships and crews, or diver-sions of ships from oil spill missions to search and rescuemissions, they only responded to about 7,000 spills.

In fiscal year 1975 the Coast Guard projected a total of16,651 flight-hours for the Marine Environmental ProtectionProgram. Only 6,966 hours were flown. Reasons for the short-fall were

-- shortages of equipment,

-- reduction of flights because of fuel consumption cut-backs, and

-- diversion of environmental protection flights to SARflights.

The Coast Guard has projected fiscal year 1977 environ-mental protection flight-hour requirements at 18,500 hours.

The oil spills, shortfall of hours flown in fiscal year

1975, and increased flight-hour projections for fiscal year1977 indicate the Coast Guard's need for any assistance itcan obtain from other Federal agencies in fulfilling programrequirements.

Numerous Federal agencies, in addition to the militaryservices, routinely operate craft on and over inland andcoastal waterways and could perform a pollution surveillancefunction. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-tion (NOAA) of the Department of Commerce i one such orga-nization. NOAA's basic mission is to organ.ze a unifiedapproach to the problems of the ocean and atmosphere andto create a focal point within the civilian sector of the

49

Federal Government for this purpose. NOAA administers over40 programs, including coastal mapping services, marinemining research, the National Environmental Satellite Serv-ice, and the State/Federal fisheries management.

In the past the military services have reported oilslicks sighted during their operations. However, Coast Guardofficials informed us that these reports have often been trans-mitted late and have therefore been of little value.

CONCLUSIONS

We believe opportunities for increased cooperation amongvarious civil agencies of the Federal Government exists.Also, the military services have assets that we believe couldbe made available to civil agencies on a loan basis. Suchcooperation and loan of assets could increase the effective-ness of the law enforcement activities of these agencieswithout increasing the amount of resources the agencies re-quire to accomplish their missions.

We believe surveillance and prompt reporting of visiblepollutant spills by the military services and Federal andState agencies would provide more effective pollution sur-veillance. Such expanded coverage and reporting might alsoreduce the number of surveillance patrols the Coast Guardrequires.

RECOMMENDA' 'ONS

We recommend that ne Commandant of the Coast Guardplace greater emphasi· on sharing assets with Federal lawenforcement agencies o reduce duplication or overlap ofpatrols and assets anc allow more efficient performance oflaw enforcement operations.

We also recommend that the Coast Guard sponsor an Execu-tive order requiring DOD branches and other Federal and Stateagencies to promptly report sightings of pollutants.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

In addition to comments by the Secretaries of Defenseand Transportation, the Secretary of the Treasury and theAttorney General commented on this chapter. (See apps. IIIand IV.)

50

All the agencies pointed out examples of interagencycooperation and sharing of assets that facilitate more effi-cient operations. DOD and the Coast Guard stated that theyrecognize the opportunities for increased interagency co-operation and will continue efforts in this area.

Regarding military assistance to civil law enforcementagencies, we believe there is potential for increasing theamount of assistance the military can provide Federal ci, illaw enforcement agencies. This potential, if realized, canincrease the agencies' capabilities without proportionateincreases in equipment purchases. Much of the uncertaintysurrounding increased use of military resources for civil lawenforcement rests with interpretation of levels of assistanceauthorized under the Posse Comitatus Act. (See p. 47.)

We therefore proposed that DOD sponsor legislation tothe Congress defining the level of assistance DOD could jo-vide Federal civil law enforcement agencies without vio4 ingthe act.

The Departments of Justice and the Treasury fully c.'-curred in and supported our proposal. The Coast Guarl wtsmore cautious, stating that because of the unequivocal lan-guage of the statute and the lack of unanimity by the juCi-ciary on our distinction between DOD's active and passiveparticipation in civil law enforcement, it would act withcaution in this area.

DOD declined to propose clarifying legislation. Wesuggested legislation authorizing DOD to loan personnel ancequipment to civil law enforcement agencies for the purposeof transporting them on law enforcement missions. DOD be-lieves their current relationship with civilian law enforce-ment agencies, which includes determining support for assist-ance requests on a case-by-case basis, is realistic.

Notwithstanding DOD's comments we believe clarifyinglegislation is needed. In our opinion, DOD's present rela-tionship with civil agencies in this area is cumbersome andunclear.

We recommend that the Congress enact legislation clarify-ing what assistance DOD can provide Federal civil law enforce-ment agencies without violating the Posse Comitatus Act. Suchlegislation should, in our opinion, expressl:' authorize DODto loan personnel and equipment to Federal civil law enforce-ment agencies for the purpose of transporting them on lawenforcement missions. This recommendation is intended toclarify but not to change the basic policy of the PosseComitatus Act.

51

In our draft report, we proposed that the Coast Guardinitiate action to develop formal agreements, or proposelegislation to the Congress, requiring DOD components andFederal and State agencies to promptly report sightings ofpollutants. In response to this proposal, the Coast Guardsuggested that an Executive order might be a more appropriatemechanism for achieving the desired results. We agree withthe Coast Guard's suggestion and have changed our recommenda-tion accordingly. The Departments of Justice, the Treasury,and Defense generally concurred with this recommendation.

RECOMMENDATION TO THE CONGRESS

We recommend that the Congress enact legislation ex-pressly authorizing the Secretary of Defense to loan avail-able personnel and equipment to Federal civil law enforce-ment agencies for the purpose of transporting them on lawenforcement missions.

52

CHAPTER 8

SCOPE

This review was primarily concerned with the extent theCoast Guard and the Department of Defense coordinated require-ments for and the use of aircraft to perform search and rescuemissions. We also assessed the potential for the Coast Guardand other civil agencies to coordinate with each other, andDOD to use aircraft and other resources to detect and controlthe illegal entry of goods and people into the United Statesand some of the constraints delaying such coordination.

Our work was conducted principally at Headquarters, U.S.Coast Guard, Air Force, Navy, and Army and at selected fieldactivities of the services in California, Florida, Illinois,Virginia, and North Carolina. We also contacted or did lim-ited work at the Headquarters, U.S. Customs Service, Immigra-tion and Naturalization Service, National Oceanic and Atmos-pheric Administration, Environmental Protection Agency, andselected field offices in California.

We interviewed officials at these organizations regard-ing the extent to which coordination of aircraft requirementsand use is now taking place and reviewed applicable legisla-tion, policies, procedures, reports, agreements, correspond-ence, and records. Also, we analyzed the fiscal vear 1975aircraft SAR statistics of the various services id comrredthe services' aircraft a aircrew capabilities.

Primary iield Activities Visited

Coast Guard

Fifth Coast Guard District--Portsmouth, VirginiaSeventh Coast Guard District--Miami, FloridaTwelfth Coast Guard District--San Francisco, California

Air Force

Air National Guard--Hayward, CaliforniaMcClellan Air Force Base--CaliforniaEglin Air Force Base--FloridaHomestead Air Force Base--FloridaScott Air Force Base--Illinois

53

Navy

Commander In Chief, Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk, VirginiaNaval Air Station, Lemoore, CaliforniaNaval Air Station, Alameda, CaliforniaNaval Air Station, Jacksonville, FloridaNaval Air Station, Pensacola, FloridaMarine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North CarolinaNaval Air Station, Norfolk, VirginiaNaval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia

Army

Hamilton Air Force Base, California

54

APPENDIX I APPENDIX I

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSEWAIHINGTON, D.C. 20201

coawn~~~nr~~~~~ouft n1 4 !EC, 1976

Mr. Fled J. ShaferDirector, Logistics and Communications DivisionUnited States General Accounting OfficeWashington, D. C. 20548

Dear Mr. Shafer:

This is in reply to your letter of October 1, 1976 to SecretaryRumsfeld regarding comments on your draft report entitled "Opportunityfor Increased Coordination between DoD and Civil Agencies in CoastalSurveillance and Security" (GAO Code 94718). We have reviewed thereport and our detailed comments, which are summarized belo,r, areattached.

The DoD supports any viable opportunity to cooperate with otheragencies to increase operational efficiency while not significantlydegrading the DoD capability to carry out its assigned military missions.In the search and rescue area, the DoD recognizes that there areopportunities for coperation and will continue to work with the CoastGuard to exploit these opportunities where they exist. We will workwith the Coast Guard to improve the present system of coordinationwithin the guidelines of the National Search nd Rescue Plan.

The DoD search and rescue assets, however, are maintained andjustified to support our national military forces. Although there mayappear to be a lack of actual SAR activities for military aircraftduring peacetime, these assets would be fully utilized to support ourcombat forces during periods of national crisis during which the CoastGuard would be required to support humanitarian search and rescueactivities. To prepare the military personnel to meet their wartimeresponsibilities, peacetime training must be provided. Obviously, ourmilitary units would prefer to receive training performing actual searchand rescue missions; but in most instances this is not possible, sinceto effectively utilize available military assets, training must beconducted on a scheduled basis. In addition search and rescue supportmust be provided to our combat forces during peacetime. Thus, whilewe will continue to cooperate with the Coast Guard, we do not exnectany reduction in total federal search and rescue asset requirement orfederal expenditures for SAR activities. Also, because the requirementsfor humanitarian and military SAR are mutually exclusive, we de notbelieve that joint determination of the federal SAR requirement isneeded; but we would be available to consult with the Coast Guard indetermining their SAR aircraft requirement.

55

APPENDIX I APPENDIX I

In regard to your recommendation that the DoD consider proposinglegislation to Congress authorizing DoD to cooperate with civil lawenforcement agencies, I believe the current relationship with thecivilian law enforcement agencies -- considering the Posse CommitatusAct and training requirement for law enforcement -- is realistic. Wewill continue to support requests from the civilia.i law agencies on acase-by-case basis.

We accept your recommendation that Federal and State agenciespromptly report sighting of pollutants to the Coast Guard. I believeagreements between the Coast Guard and DoP rather than Congressionallegislation would be adequate to implement this concept.

I appreciate your giving us the opportunity to comment on the draftreport. We are available to discuss these comments if required.

56

APPENDIX II APPENDIX II

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590

ASSISTANT SICRETARYFOR ADMNISIRATION

December 22, 1976

Mr. Henry EschwegeDirectorCommunity and Economic Development DivisionU. S. General Accounting OfficeWashington, D. C. 20548

Dear Mr. Esch:.ege:

This is in response to your letter of October 1, 1976, requestingcomments from the Department of Transportation on the GeneralAccounting Office draft report entitled, "Opportunities for IncreasedCoordination Between DOD and Civil Agencies in Coastal Surveillanceand Security." We have reviewed the report in detail and prepared aDepartment of Transportation reply.

Two copies of the reply are enclosed.

Sincerely,

William S. Heffelfinger

57

APPENDIX II APPENDIX II

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION REPLY

to

GAO DRAFT REPORT OF 1 OCTOBER 1976 (CODE 947184)

on

OPPORTUNITIES FOR INCREASED COORDINA 'ION BETWEEN DOD AND

CIVIL AGENCIES IN COASTAL SURVEILLANCE AND SECURITY

SUMMARY OF GAO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In reviewing FY 1975 data and the National Search and Rescue Plan, GAOhas formulated the following findings/conclusions and recommendations.

Findings

1. Excellent opportunities exist for joint determination of aircraft andpersonnel requirements and sharing of resources among agencies which,if realized, would result in less total resource requirements and moreefficient use of Federal aircraft, ships and personnel.

Recommendations

1. DOD and Coast Guard officials jointly deternmine total peacetime andwartime search and rescue aircraft requirements and revise aircraftstationing patterns accordingly.

2. In conjunction with the above, the Coast Guard reevaluate the numberof aircraft it plans to procure.

3. The Coast Guard place greater emphasis on sharing assets on aroutine basis with civil law enforcement agencies to more effectivelyperform their rrissions and reduce duplication.

4. The Coast Guard initiate action to develop formal agreements, orpropose legislati to the Congress requiring the military services andFederal and State agencies to promptly report sightings of pollutants.

58

APPENDIX II APPENDIX II

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION POSITION

1. 'Ihe Coast Guard concurs that there are opportunities for increased

cooperation among the various agencies of the Federal Government with

respect to search and rescue (SAR), civil law enforcement, and marine

environmental protection surveillance, and that more efficient use of

Federal aircraft, ships and personnel can be achieved. The more effic-

ient use of assets will result in better service to the public, but will not

necessarily reduce resource requirements.

2. The Coast Guard does not concur that DOD and Coast Guard officials

jointly determine peacetime and wartime SAR aircraft requirements and

revise aircraft stationing patterns accordingly. The Coast Guard, which

has statutory responsibility for civil maritime SAR, recognizes the fact

that DOD facilities are available to meet civil needs on a basis of non-interference with military missions. Categorically, DOD resources are

predicated on combat SAR postures only, and their availability can not

be assured. Because DOD forces do experience emergency deployment

and because base closures do occur, the Coast Guard cannot rely on

DOD forces for continuous assistance in any one given area. The Coast

Guard believes that wartime tasking for Coast Guard units is satis-

factorily delineated in various publications.

3. This audit assumes that Air Force and Navy aircraft are available

for Coast Guard missions on a continuing basis. Because this is not

the case, the Coast Guard must primarily rely on and plan for pro-curement of sufficient resources to satisfactorily meet statutory

responsibilities. A reevaluation of aircraft procurement plans basedon this audit is not warranted.

4. The Coast Guard will continue to effect greater cooperation with

civil law enforcement agencies enabling them to more eifectively

perform their missions and reduce duplication. The policy has been

and will continue to be to cooperate fully with other federal, state,

and local agencies in providing personnel and facilitities, including air-

craft and vessels, necessary for effective at-sea surveillance and en-

forcement. Memoranda of understanding are being executed with

DEA and Customs to formalize this policy, which has been practiced for

sometime. Coast Guard assets, however, have been and will continue to

be multimission resources, i. e. capable and equipped tc perform many

and varied missions. Priority usage of these assets is (1) satisfy

Coast Guard statutory responsibilities, (2) assist other agencies in

Coast Guard related mission areas, and (3) assist other agencieswhen possible.

5. While it is possible that more aggressive pollution reporting by

the DOD and other Federal/State facilities might result in an increased

number of violations detected and reported, to which the Coast Guard

must respond and investigate, it is important to recognize that the

59

APPENDIX II APPENDIX II

Coast Guard's pollution surveillance requirements cannot be satisfiedby simply reporting violations. The essence of the program is toprevent pollution. Coast Guard surveillance requirements includeCoast Guard presence to deter potential violators, as well as thedetection of violations. Reports . .i;olations submitted by anotheragency's facilities do not satisfy the requirement for a credibledeterrence of potential violations which the Coast Guard' s pollutionsurveillance patrols provide. Therefore, while the Coast Guard doesnot believe that the number of Coast Guard surveillance patrols re-quired can be reduced by this means, we do agree that any additionalefforts to detect violations would be beneficial to the environmentalprotection effort. The Coast Guard does not concur that formalagreemento or Congressional legislation that require militaryservices and Federal and State agencies to promptly report sightingsof pollutants is necessary. (An Excutive Order would be a moreappropriate means of addressing a requirement that all Federalfacilities report sightings of pollution incidents) The prospectiveadministrative effort which would be required to develop formalagreements with each individual Federal and State agency and withthe various military services is staggering. In addition, the conceptof legislating requirement that state agencies report sightings isof doubtful legality and would create yet another cumbersome enforce-ment problem. In light of the criminal penalties which may be imposedagainst polluters who fail to report known discharges and an environ-mentally aware public, it is felt that the recommendation to seekformal agreements or Congressional legislation regarding state agency'reporting is unnecessary.

6. In summar, the GAO report appears to have drawn conclusions andmade recommendation from a review that was not made in suffic:entdepth. Areas of responsibility, assiened missions and basic objectivesof each organization have been crossed, mixed and juggled in completedisregard of the purpose for which each organization was established.A comprehensive study would be necessary prior to any assignment ofresponsibilities which cross the normal lines of organizational functions.

7. Specific comments and recommendations regarding the content-of the report are listed in enclosure (1). Individual comments mayapply in numerous areas, but are listed only once.

l. B. SCatR0ar Afliral, U S. Coast GUST

Chief o Staff

60

APPENDIX II APPENDIX II

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING

THE CONTENT OF THE REPORT

[See GAO notes 1 and 2, p. 66.]

Pg. 20

The CoastGuard believes an integrated network doesexist under the National Search and RescueManual for the operational control andcoordination of SAR assets in prosecutingSAR missions. Operational control andcoordination of all available SAR assetsis the essence of the National SAR Plan.

Pg. 20 Para. 1 Line 3 With respect to the computation of SARassets, Coast Guard SAR flight hour pro-jections are based on an average historicaldata base. In the case ofi the Aviation Planreferenced by this audit, FYs 1967 through1973 were utilized. If the Coast Guardplanned to meet peak SAR needs, flighthour projections would be based on peaksummertime workload. As an example,FY 1975 average quarterly SAR hours were5438 hours, which, compared to 1st Quarter

61

V.

APPENDIX II APPENDIX II

hours of 6286, represents a 16% difference.Also, planning forr peak needs would includethose resouvces necessary to satisfy the DODcontribution to the miaritime SAR effort. Inthe case of this report 233 missions and3615 hours of maritime SAP, were performedby DOD components in FY 1975.

Pg. 21, Para. 3, Lines The Coast Guard believes that Coast Guard4 and 5 forces responding to DOD SAR incidents is

an excellent eample of an integratedSAR network. (DOD's contribution to mari-time SAR mentioned in this report is alsoevidence of an integrated network. )

Pg. 21, Para. 3, Line 7 Coast Guard omputations of SAR flight hours,previously described, inherently include DODcontributions.

Pg. 21, Para. 4, Line 2 Delete "Coast Guard officials believe it istheir" and substitute "It is the Coast Guard's. "Title 14 USC 2 and 88 are fairly explicit withrespect to the Coast Guard statutory responsi-bilities in the search and rescue area.

Pg. 21, Para 4, Line 4 Because the Coast Guard has statutoryresponsibility to respond to civil SAR, and thepersonnel and resources, trained and equippedfor these SAR missions, the Coast Guard be-lieves it is logical that they would or shouldperform this duty more efficiently.

Pg. 21, Para 4, Lines 5 The fact that Coast Guard resources some-and 6 times respond to civil SAR even though DOD

aircraft are already involved reflects theCoast Guards deep humanitarian concerns.After the fact analysis of these instancesrarely reveals the uncertainty that existed whenthe SAR mission was in progress. When alife is at stake the Coast Guard believes itis better to have an overabundance of re-sources responding rather than providing anan inadequate response.

62

APPENDIX II APPENDIX II

Pg. 26, Para. 1 The Coast Guard believes the GAO hasimproperly interpreted the National SARPlan and formulated conclusions based onquestionable assumptions after reviewing oneyear's worth of data. As previously indicated,the Coast Guard does have statutory responsi-bility for maritime SAR, and DOD facilitiesare used to meet civil SAR needs on a basisof noninterference with military missions.The National SAR Plan clearly states: "No pro-

visions of this plan or any supporting plan are tobe construed in such a way as to contravene theresponsibilities of authorities of any participatingagency as defined by statutes, executive ordersor international agreements. " In this context itis difficult to visualize how DOD forces could haveas their primary mission, civil SAR Many ques-tions are raised. How would this effect our defenseposture? What SAR assets would be available when

DOD forces deploy in times of emergency or war?Further, what SAR assets would be available when

DOD closes a base and completely eliminates ortransfers personnel and equipment?

Pg. 33, Para 3, Lines The Coast Guard has "statutory'' responsibility1-3 in addition to "management. " The Coast

Guard believes that GAO's interpretation of"suitable Federal asset" is different than thelegal interpretation. The number of suitsinvolving SAR activity has grown from twelvein 1970 to twenty in 1976 with eleven additionalcases currently in the claims stage. The1976 cases involve $36.4 millions dollars.A count of our currently pending cases showseight involve allegations of negligent activitywith aircraft. This increase can be expectedto continue. In summary, to ensure a properand effective response, Coast Guard per-centages of maritime SAR involvement maywell increase.

63

APPENDIX II APPENDIX II

Pg. 33, Para 3, Line 7 The sentence and conclusions drawn areand 8 and Pg. 34 misleading. Unknowns not addressed

are availability of DOD resources, rapidityof reaching SAR incident in minimum time,properly trained personnel, and adequatelyequipped aircraft.

Pgs. 37 and 38 The Coast Guard does not send out crewsunder training to perform actual SAR missions.Fully qualified crews are required consideringthe operational environment, i. e., adverseweather conditions and periods of darkness.The increase in claims against the CoastGuard in the SAR area must also be con-sidered. In some recent decisions, courtshave expressed concern over qualificationsand training levels. The use of actual SARcases as a means of conducting trainingis probably not the best policy for the publicor the Coast Guard. The potential for adversejudgment-, against the United States as aresult of the implementation of the GAO pro-posals is a factor which weighs heavilyagainst their adoption. The problem may wellbe illustrated in one case about to go to trial,where an Army helicopter, participatingwith a Coast Guard helicopter in a rescueeffort, dropped an individual while attemptingto lift him from the sea, resulting in hiseventual death.

Pg. 44, Para. 6 "Amount of SAR assistance available fromDOD is substantial. " The Coast Guardbelieves there are opportunities for in-creased cooperation within the existingframework of the National SAR Plan andManual but, for various reasons alreadygiven, does not believe "substantial DODassistance is available. "

[See GAO note 1, p. 66.1

Pg. 46, Para. 1, Lines That a "significant numuer of flight hours3-4 can be made available to the Coast Guard, as

previously discussed, is a questionableassumption. The Coast Guard believes the

64

APPENDIX II APPENDIX II

question of continuous availability of DODassets should be addressed in its planningprocess. DOD resources have a primarymission what does not pertain to civilmaritime SAR, enforcement of laws and treatiesand protection of the marine envioronment.Additionally, DOD resources deploy during

periods of emergency or war. And finally, DODbases occasionally close and/or relocate withassociated resources being removed from the

area. Unless other agencies' operating assets

can be dedicated to Coast Guard programs, andplaced under Coast Guard command and control, theCoast Guard believes it would be a mistake to rely

on them for anything other than incidental assistance.

Because of these factors, the Coast Guard believesits procurement plans are not in excess.

Pg. 51 Para. 4 Line 3 Assumption that Coast Guard crews trained for

civil maritime SAR are capable of performingany type of SAR mission including wartimemissions is erroneous. Coast Guard helicopterpilots who served during the Vietman conflictwith the Air Force received eight (8) weeks of

combat SAR training and approximately three(3) weeks of survival school training beforebeing sent overseas. Familiarization and area

check out flights were also required afterarriving at the overseas station.

[See GAO note 1, p. 66.]

Pg. 5Z and 53 Based on erroneous assumptions GAO has deter-

mined that Coast Guard and DOD forces canbe used interchangeably for civil and military SAR.

[See GAO note 1, p. 66.]

65

APPENDIX II APPENDIX II

If this is not the case, the Coast Guard mustadd aircraft just to respond to the reports ofviolations spotted by aircraft which are notcompetent to t.ke law enforcement action.

Pg 56 and 57 Interpretation of Posse Comitatus statute islegally insufficient. The statute is wordedin absolute terms and the GAO distinction be-tween "active" and "passive" participation inexecuting the laws has not been unanimouslyaccepted by the judiciary.

[See GAO note below.]

It is by nomeans clear that "indirect" assistance to civilauthorities is allowed. Because of the unequivocallanguage of the statute the Coast Guard must actwith caution in this regard.

[See GAO note below.J

GAO note 1: Deleted material relates to data in our draftreport which has been considered and/or revisedin this final report to reflect the agency'scomments.

GAO note 2: The page references in our draft report maynot correspond to those in this final report.

66

APPENDIX III APPENDIX III

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURYWASHINGTON. D.C. 20220

DEPnr ASSISTANT SECRETARY Nov. 11, 1976

Dear Mr. Lowe:

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the GAO draft report"Opportunities for Increased Coordination between DOD and Civil Agenciesin Coastal Surveillance and Security." (GAO Code 947184)

We have no comments on the first six chapters of the report which

deal with Search and Rescue, since the Treasury Department is not in-volved in such missions. Our comments are directed specifically to

Chapter 7, on other opportunities for increased coordination among DOD,Coast Guard and Civil Agencies.

We fully Euipport your conclusion that further opportunities existfor increased coo -,ration between Treasury's Customs Service and boththe Coast Guard and the Defense Department, and that the military ser-vices possess much equipment and knowledge that could be used in the

Customs Service law enforcement efforts.

Treasury has always had an excellent relationship with the Coast

Guard. This rapport started when the Coast Guard and Customs weresister agencies in the Treasury Department, and has continued sincethe Coast Giird's transfer to the Department of Transportation in 1967.Customs Prtrol officers are routinely stationed aboard Coast Guard ves-sels for patrol missions as you correctly point out, and the Coast Guardhas supported many special drug enforcement operations that Customs hasdirected over the past years. In addition, there have been numerousinstances where the Coast Guard has provided Customs vessels maintenanceassistance at cost. We anticipate a continued good relationship in theyears to come.

In 1971, the Secretary of Treasury and the Secretary of Defenseentered into an agreement, "Project Grass Catcher," whereby DOD wouldprovide technical assistance and equipment to Customs in the anti-narcotic smuggling effort. That project was renamed and remains"Project Linebacker," and we continue to receive excellent technicaland logistical support from DOD. The Customs Air Support Branch pres-ently has fourteen interagency support agreements with facilitiesthroughout the United States. These agreements, plus civil procure-ments, provide adequate logistic support to the Air Interdictionplogram.

67

APPENDIX III APPENDIX III

In the area of training, DOD also provides pilot training on a costreimbursable basis for both fixed and rotor wing Customs pilots.

At the inception of Project Linebacker, DOD loaned Customs four OV-JC Mohawks and four S-2D's. Both aircraft are now obsolete and we havebeen unable to acquire any additional modern aircraft from DOD.

A very important support to the Customs effort is supplied by theAir orce Air Defense Command (NORAD). Support agreements with the 20thand 26th Division allow Customs to utilize their border surveillanceradar capability. Radar coverage, asc upplied by those two Divisions,extends from Washington, D. C., around the southern peri.v.er of theUnited States to San Diego, California.

Looking to he future, efforts are now underway and formal liaisonhas been established which will permi.t Customs to participate fully,within the limitations f the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 USC 1385, ., themodern Air Force AWACS program.

In short, our relationship with DOD on technical assistance andongoing DOD program participation has been very good, but we foresee aproblem if more cooperation is not obtained in the near future.

The Customs Service recognizes the primary mission of -'%e Depart-ment of Defense, however, and does not wish to take advantage of themilitary. As in the past, we wisi .never possible, to reimbursethe military serviceJ for the a.!;uace they provide, or to purchasethe equipment that we require rather than deplete limited militaryinventories. But the fact of the matter is that the Customs Servicemust operate within tight budgetary constraints, and it simply cannotafford to purchase needed equipment that either has an extremely highunit cost, such as an interdiction aircraft, or that is very expensivein the quantities required, such as ground censors. In addition, wecannot afford the delay that wou.d be encountered in having new itemsproduced rather than using existing items. To adequately perform itsenforcement mission, Customs must obtain equipment support in the formof loans and provision of excess property, and through access to themore economical large-quantity procurements available to the military.Logistics support and other services from military activities and in-stallations also are essential.

Much of he equipment provided to Customs by th- military has beenoffered on a loan basis. Often the period of the loa,' is for only oneyear, and equipen-t must be restored to its original cor it½r beforebeing returned. It would be extremely desirable to Customs ±£ equip-me,t ould be provided for loan period of mo'e than ne year, andwithout the obligation to re3tore the equipment to its original condition.Such terms often make the arrangement so expensive that Customs stillcannot take advantage of the loan opportunity.

68

APPENDIX III APPENDIX III

Examples of equipment needed by Customs to conduct their missionof drug interdiction are high performance interdiction aircraft, longrange reconnaissance aircraft, forward looking infrared systems, avionicsequipment, airborne and mobile ground-based radar, ground sensor systemsand night vision equipment. The military has developed and possessesall of these items. These few examples are indicative of the widerange of needs in which DOD could support Customs.

The recent opinion from the Justice Department on the Posse Comi-tatus Act should do much to clear up the ambiguity that has surroundedthis statute for a century. We would recommend a Etep further, thatthe Justice Department give an opinion on what indirect military assis-tance is allowed under the Act. This is necessary for Customs incethe questions of direct military enforcement of Customs laws is rarelyin question.

Treasury fully supports your recommendation that DOD consider pro-posing legislation to the Congress for authorization to loan personneland equipment to Civil agencies for transporting them on law enforce-ment missions.

An additional sharing of Federal resources is reflected in aCustoms/FAA interagency support agreement. This agreement allowsCustoms, on a cost reimbursable basis, to utilize various FAA radarcapabilities throughout the United States as the need arises.

In 'onclusion, Treasury also agrees with your recommendation thatmilitar services and Federal and State agencies rort sightings ofpollutants to the Coast Guard. Customs has already issued instructionsto this effect.

S cerelyyours,

J hn H. Harperputy Assistant SecretaryOperations)

Mr. Viotol L. Lowe /Director, General GoveiF v ionU. S. General Accountig DfficeWashington, D. C. 20548

69

APPENDIX IV APPENDIX IV

' .. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON. D.C. 2053

4Add.. HePy ,o lb, JAN 5 77Diviio Indictd

nd R to Iniilb nd Numba

Mr. Victor L. LoweDirectorGeneral Government DivisionUnited States General Accounting OfficeWashington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Lowe:

This is in response to your request for comments onthe draft report titled "Opportunities for IncreasedCoordination Between DOD and Civil Agencies in CoastalSurveillance and Security."

We are generally in accord with the recommendationsof the report that increased coordination and assistanceto civil law enforcement agencies by the Coast Guard andthe Department of Defense would do much to assist theGovernment in executing its overall enforcement mission.Actually, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) hasexperienced considerable assistance and cooperation fromthe Coast Guard in law enforcement matters, primarily theproviding of surveillance by Coast Guard vessels andaircraft of suspect vessels and aircraft, interdictionof suspect essels by Coast Guard vessels, and at times,the transi tation by aircraft or vessel of DEA personnelon enforcement mkissions.

In those instances where the Coast Guard has beenunable to comply with a request for assistance, the causehas ordinarily been () a priority mission which theCoast Guard considered to have greater urgency, such asa search and rescue mission; or (2) unavailability ofresources.

A recent major step in increasing law enforcementcoordination between the Department of Justice and theCoast Guard has been undertaken in El Paso. Texas. Atthe Department's initiation, the El Paso IntelligenceCenter (EPIC) was established to focus on the production

70

APPENDIX IV APPENDIX IV

of operational and tactical intelligence on suspected

drug, alien, and contraband smugglers. The Coast Guard

has become a vital participant in EPIC and an important

factor in EPIC's daily maritime intelligence and operational

intercept mission. Each dy, EPIC's Watch Center tracks

vessels suspected of smuggling activities. The Coast Guard

representative directly participates in these watch

activities and coordinates the interception of violators

entering United States territorial waters.

Our experience with military assistance is extremely

limited due to the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act,

although there have been pressing situations where the

military has provided aircraft transportation for DEA

personnel and DEA fugitives. Not germane to this report,

but worthy of note, is the fact that the Air Force has

provided many aircraf+ on long-term loan for use by the

DEA Air Wing.

G&O note: Deleted material relates to data in our draft

report whicl has been considered and/or revised

in this final report to reflect the agency's

comments.

In relation .o the matter of resource management,

we find the report incongruent in that it is recommending

increased support of law enforcement by the Coast Guara,

71

APPENDIX IV APPENDIX IV

a civil law enforcement agency, at the same time that itis recommending the Coast Guard reconsider its requestfor additional aircraft in favor of more coordinated useof military aircraft, which aircraft cannot be used forlaw enforcement interdiction and whose use in law enforce-ment surveillance appears to be prohibited.

A suggested procedure to correct the discrepancybetween the draft report's recommendations and its intentwould be the assignment of a number of Coast Guard pilotsin each search and rescue area--flying either Coast Guardor military planes, as appropriate--to law enforcementmissions, with military pilots flying search ad rescuemissions to the degree necessary to fill the gap thuscreated. We believe this suggestion is responsive to GAO'sobservation on page 54 that there may be other alternativesthan those mentioned in the report for improving overallutilization of resources.

We fully concur with the report recommendation thatDOD ppose legislation to the Congress expressly authorizingDOD to loan personnel and equipme'n to civil law enforcementagencies to transport personnel f those agencies on lawenforcement missions. Such legislation would therebyassure availability of that valuable service, the proprietyof which the Posse Comitatus Act now makes doubtful. Wealso suggest the legislation provide fcr similar loans tothe Coast Guard, also a civil law enforcement agency, forits law enforcement use and for its acts of assistance toother civil law enforcement agencies.

We further believe that the legislation should includethe authority to transport people and property in supportof enforcement missions. It should, for example, specifyfugitives, prisoners, and sensitive witnesses--whoseexpeditious movement by noncommercial ,:ircraft is sometimeshighly desirable--and items of equipment which must be moved,and oftentimes quickly, to or from locations where commercialservice is unavailable or inadequate. Also, to adequatelymeet DEA's requirements, which are international in acope,the legislation should provide for international movtments,such as those associated with our program in support ofthe Mexic Government's crop eradication program.

72

APPENDIX IV APPENDIX IV

We appreciate the opportunity given us to comment onthe draft report. Should you have any further questions,please feel free to contact us.

Sincer

Glen E. P

for Administratrl

73

APPENDIX V APPENDIX V

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APPENDIX VI APPENDIX VI

OTHER GA REPORTS

RELATING TO MATTERS DISCUSSED

IN THIS REPORT

A Single Agency Needed to Manage Port-of-Entry Inspections--Particularly at U.S. Ports (B-114898, May 30, 1973)

Mc e Needs To Be Done to Reduce the Number and Adverse Impactof Illegal Aliens In the United States (B-125051, July 31,1973)

Federal Agencies Administering Programs Related to MarineScience Activities and Oceanic Affairs (GGD-75-61, Feb. 25,1975)

The Need for A National Ocean Program and Plan (GGD-75-97,Oct. 10, 1975)

75

APPENDIX VII APPENDIX VII

PRINCIPAL OFFICIAL RESPONSIBLE

FOR ADMINISTERING ACTIVITIES

DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

Tenure of officeFrom To

DEPARTMENT OF DEFELSE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:Dr. Harold Brown Jan. 1977 PresentDonald H. Rumsfeld Nov. 1975 Jan. 1977James R. Schlesinger July 1373 Nov. 1975William P, Clements, Jr.

(actirn Apr. 1973 July 1973

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:Charles W. Du rcan, Jr. Jan. 1977 PresentWilliam P. Clements, Jr. Jan. 1973 Jan. 1977

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:Clifford Alexander Feb. 1977 PresentMartin R. Hoffman Aug. 1975 Jan. 1977Howard H. Callaway July 1973 July 1975

UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:Vacant Jan. 1977 PresenthNorman R. Augustine May 1975 Jar.. 1977Vacant Apr. 1975 May 1975Herman R. Staudt Oct. 1973 Apr. 1975

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:W. Graham Clagtor, Jr. Feb. 1977 PresentGary D. Penisten (acting) Feb. 1977 Feb. 1977Joseph T. McCullum Feb. 177 Feb. 1977David P. MacDonald Jan. 1977 Feb. 1977J. William Middendorf June 1974 Jan. 1977J. William Middendorf

(acting) Apr. 1974 June .974John W. Warner (acting) May 1972 Apr. 1974

76

APPENDIX VII APPENDIX VII

Tenure of officeFrom To

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (continued)

UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:R. James Woolsey Mar. 1977 PresentDavid R. MacDonald Sept. 1976 Feb. 1977John Bowers (acting) July 1976 Aug. 1976Vacant Mar. 1976 June 1976David S. Potter Aug. 1974 Mar. 1976Vacant June 1974 Aug. 1974J. William Middendorf June 1973 June 1974

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:John C. Stetson Apr. 1977 PresentJohn C. Stetson (acting) Jan. 1977 Apr. 1977Thomas C. Reed Jan. 1976 Jan. 1977James W. Plummer (acting) Nov. 1975 Jan. 1976John L. McLucas July 1973 Nov. 1975Vacant June 1973 July 1973Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Feb. 1969 May 1973

UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:James W. Plummer Dec. 1973 PresentVacant July 1973 Dec. 1973John L. McLucas Mar. 1969 July 1973

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION:Brock Adams Jan. 1977 PresentWilliam T. Coleman Mar. 1975 Jan. 1977John W. Barnum (acting) Feb. 1975 Mar. 1975Claude S. Brinegar Feb. 1973 Feb. 1975John A. Volpe Jan. 1969 Feb. 1973

COMMANDANT OF THE COAST GUARD:Admiral Owen W. Siler May 1974 PresentAdmiral Chester R. Bender June 1970 May 1974

77

APPENDIX VII APPENDIX VII

Tenure of officeFrom To

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THEUNITED STATES:Griffin Bell Jan. 1977 PresentEdward H. Levi Feb. 1975 Jan. 1977William B. Saxbe Jan. 1974 Feb. 1975Robert H. Bork, Jr. (acting) Oct. 1973 Jan. 1974Elliot L. Richardson May 1973 Oct. 1973Richard G. Kleindienst June 1972 Apr. 1973

ADMINISTRATOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENTADMINISTRATION:

Peter B. Bensinger Feb. 1976 PresentPeter B. Bensinger

(acting) Jan. 1976 Feb. 1976Henry S. Dogin (acting) May 1975 Jan. 1976John R. Bartels, Jr. Oct. 1973 May 1975John R. Bartels, Jr.

(acting) July 1973 Oct. 1973

COMMISSIONER, IMMIGRATION ANDNATURALIZATION SERVICE:Leonard F. Chapman, Jr. Nov. 1973 PresentJames F. Green (acting) Apr. 1973 Nov. 1973Raymond F. Farrell Jan. 1962 Apr. 1973

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY:W. Michael Blumenthal Jan. 1977 PresentWilliam E. Simon May 1974 Jan. 1977George P. Shultz June 1972 May 1974

COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMSSERVICE:Vernon D. Acree May 1972 Present

78