Lazarus Primacy

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    On the Primacy of CognitionRichard S. Lazarus University of California, Berkeley

    Abstract: Zajonc and I differ greatly in our concep-tualization of emotion and its relations with cognition,as well as in our evaluation of the evidence. My replyis in two parts. First, I discuss the boundaries of emo-tion as a phenomenon and whether sensory preferencescan be regarded as emotions; second, I make an anal-ysis of the evidence Zajonc regards as supporting hisclaims for the independence of cognition and emotionand the primacy of emotion. My aims are to sharpenthe philosophical and empirical issues that underlieour disagreement and to emphasize the indetermi-nancy of the issue of cognitive versus emotional pri-macy. This latter issue is less important than the taskof exploring the cognitive contents or meanings thatshape each kind of emotional reaction. Finally, I offera brief programmatic statement about w hat cognitiv-ists can do to advance our understanding of emotionover the life course.

    The latest riposte by Zajonc (1984) has, in my view,no t helped to clarify our understanding of the rela-tionship between cognition and emotion. Za jonc takesmy reasoning (Lazarus, 1982) to task in two majorways. First he complains that my position cannot befalsified because I defined emotion as requiring cog-nitive appraisal, then that I have ignored the evidencethat emotion ca n occur without cognitive activity,which he cites. I believe he is wrong about my episte-mological position and wrong that the evidence sup-ports the primacy of emotion or its independencefrom cognition. The body of this reply consists of adiscussion of the definitional issue and why I thinkthe em pirical case he makes is specious. My objectiveis to sharpen the issue and sustain my position andthat of like-minded cognitivists.The Definitional IssueDefinitions do not arise out of the blue; they are anintegral part of a theory that helps delimit the phe-nomena of interest and organize observations. In myview, emotion reflects a constantly changing person-environment relationship. When central life agendas(e.g., biological surv ival, personal and social valuesand goals) are engaged, this relationship becomes asource of emotion. Therefore, an emotional experi-ence cannot be understood solely in terms of whathappens inside the person or in the brain, but grows

    out of ongoing transactions with the environmentthat are evaluated.Cognitive activity is a necessary precondition ofemotion because to experience an emotion, peoplemust comprehendwhether in the form of a prim-itive evaluative perception or a highly differentiatedsymbolic processthat their well-being is implicatedin a transaction, for better or worse. A creature thatis oblivious to the significance of what is happeningfor its well-being does not react with an emotion.This same point has been stated cogently in variousways by num erous multidisciplinary scholars who re-sponded recently to an article on a general psycho-biological theory of emotions by Panksepp (1982)appearing in The Behavioral and Brain Sciences.The conception that the mean ing or significanceof a transaction is crucial to emotion forces us torestrict its definition to some psychophysiologicalphenomena and to reject others as outside its purview.The searching question is what an emotion is or isnot. Zajonc evades this question. Thus, he takes meto task for doing what any good theorist should dowith definitions, but he does not do himselfnamely,specify the phenomena of interest. Emotion, for ex-ample, is not just physiological arousal, though sucharousal is one of the traditional defining attributes.Arousal can be produced by exercising vigorously o rentering a hot or cold room. Doing this will producean emotion only if we appraise the encounter (e.g.,the physical and social conditions and the bodily stateit produces) as having a bearing on our well-being,as when, for example, it presents some physical dangeror brings blissful relief from discomfort.Startle is a reaction that has long but erroneouslybeen included under the rubric of emotion. Ekman(in press) presents new experimental evidence thatstartle might better be regarded as a reflex, like theknee jerk, because it does not behave as do otherreactions we call emotions. He examined facial andbodily responses under four conditions: when subjectsdid not know at what moment a blank pistol wouldbe fired; when they did know the mom ent; when theytried to inhibit the startle reaction; and when theyattempted to simulate a genuine startle. Ekman con-trasted emotions with startle. He found that the startlewas easy to elicit and was consistently the initial re-sponse to a gunshot; in contrast, there is no singleelicitor that will always call forth the same emotionin adults. Moreover, the startle response could not

    124 February 1984 American PsychologistCopyright 1984 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.

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    be totally inhibited; in contrast, emotions can. Norcould the startle be simulated correctly by any subject.On the basis of these findings, the startle responseseems fixed and rigid in comp arison to emotions, andonce elicited it seems to run its course. Thus, fromthe perspective of a relational and cognitive concep-tualization of emotion, I think we should excludestartle from the rubric of emotion, as I advocated inmy earlier discussion in this jour nal (Lazarus, 1982).Historically, there has been mu ch concern aboutdiverse phenomena for which emotion term s are em-ployed, such as moods, sentiments, emotion traits,and actual emotional reactions (cf. Ortony & Clore,1981). Moods usually refer to sustained general states,such as sadness and contentment, that may or maynot be considered emotions depending on theoreticaland definitional conventions. Sentiments refer tocharacteristic ways a person evaluates an object (per-son, idea, thing); they operate as dispositions to reactemotionally to that object but are not in themselvesemotions. A nother questionable category of emotionconsists of personality traits, such as cheerful, whichcould in some instances describe an actual emotion,as in "I feel cheerful," but could in other instancesdescribe a trait, not an actual emotional response, asin "I am a cheerful person." Some emotion termsare heavily detached, lukewarm , or cold, such as in-terested, whereas others, such as enraged, are hot. AsOrtony and Clore pointed out, it makes a considerabledifference how such terms are used by subjects inemotion research.In the 1940s and 1950s, a period characterizedby the scientific outlook sometimes called logical pos-itivism, the dominant view in psychology was thatemotions could not be defined and studied as suchbut represented intervening variables (cf. Brown &Farber, 1951; Lazarus, 1968; Lazarus, Kanner, &Folkman, 1980). Although similar attitudes still exist,the more restrictive treatme nt of emotions in the pasthas given way to a view that allows much greaterlatitude in their study; this view depends heavily onwhat subjects report, but can be supplemented bysimultaneous assessments of behavioral and physio-logical response variables. Emotions are commonlyconceptualized and studied as an organic mix of actionimpulses and bodily expressions, diverse positive ordysphoric (subjective) cognitive-affective states, andphysiological disturbances. Although there are ar-guments about whether these physiological distur-bances are diffuse or patterned, an emotion is notI acknowledge with appreciation several valued colleagues wh ocarefully read, criticized, and made suggestions on an earlier draftof this article. They include Paul Ekm an, Susan Folkm an, BarbaraMellers, and Philip Tetlock; Carol Carr warrants special mentionfor her skilled editorial assistance. Regrettably, acute limitationsin our resources dictate that reprints will no t be available.

    definable solely by behavior, subjective reports, orphysiological changes; its identification requires allthree components, since each one can be generatedby conditions that do not necessarily elicit emotion,as in the example of arousal by exercise given above.An emotion researcher must worry about which re-sponse states or processes can be called emotions andwhich cannot; meeting one or even two of the threeresponse criteria is not enough.With respect to the debate between Zajonc andme, a critical question is, On what basis should pref-erences (e.g., for taste, smell, or photographs of faces)be regarded as emotions? We must ask a similar ques-tion about aesthetic reactions to a pretty picture, apleasing sunset, a stirring piece of music, or a finepiece of literature. Some years ago, while examiningemotion and feeling in psychology and art, Arnheim(1958) pointed out that emotion in artistic experienceis not merely a passive receipt or apprehension ofinformation, bu t requires active, involved partici-pation. As with sensory preferences, what may passfor an emotional (aesthetic) response may be nothingmore than a pro forma statement that implies emotionbut does not necessarily reflect it, as when one casuallysays, "That's a pretty picture" in a manner moreindicative of labeling than emotion.Although preferences can involve emotions, evenstrong ones, they often seem to fall at the ambiguousborderline between emotion and no nemotion. On theone hand, statements of preference can be "cold cog-nitions" expressing merely a social requirement tomake a choice, or on the other hand, they can beexpressions of genuine emotional involvement. In theresearch Zajonc cites, we do not know whether inexpressing a preference (e.g., "I like him more") sub-jects are experiencing an emotion, as indicated bymultileveled response criteria, or merely expressingan intellectual choice. If the latter, then preferencesmust be excluded from the category of emotions; ifthe former, they fall under the rubric of emotion.Zajonc fails to come to grips with this problem, andhe makes no mention of the alternative states thatcould be indicated when subjects give reports abouttheir sensory preferences.Zajonc defines cognition as requiring some kindof transformation of a present or past sensory input,and in his current article he notes that untransformedsensory input is just pure sensation. Indeed we areconstructed to respond neurally to certain inputs,such as noxious tastes and smells and to pain-inducingassaults on our tissues. And although Steiner (1973)has shown that newborn infants' facial expressionsdiscriminate among salty, sweet, and sour tastes, aprocess he regards as "hard-wired," he did not suggestthat such expressions signify emotional reactions,preferring to use the neutral term gustojacial re-sponses. Tomkins (1982) explicitly excluded pain and

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    pleasure from the category of emotions. We can alsodevelop preferences through re inforcem ent learning,or through canalization, to use Muiphy's (1947) con-cept. What would transform sensory states into emo-tions? Th e transformation necessary to produce anemotion out of sensory states is an appraisal thatthose states are favorable or damaging to one's well-being. When we cognize an event as pleasant or un-pleasant, we are not experiencing an emotion. How-ever, when we further cognize th at we are or may bepersonally benefited or harmed, the cognitive trans-formation has gone beyond the mere registration ofdiscomfort, and the experience becomes an emotion.Rather than the question Zajonc ponders, whichis whether emotion can occur without cognition, Ithink it is more interesting and useful to ask aboutthe kinds of cognition (or meanings; see Kreitler &Kreitler, 1976) capable of arousing emotions of dif-ferent kinds and intensities, such as fear, anger, guilt,disappointment, sadness, joy, relief, happiness, andlove at different stages of life. These are some of theemotions of great significance in human affairs be-cause they arise from our changing functional rela-tionships with the world and reflect our appraisal ofhow we are faring in our personal and social agendas.Zajonc's question, although legitimate, is subordinateto the larger issue of how cognition shapes emotion;it is also only relevant in certain very limited andunusual circumstances. Although we should try tounderstand sensory preferences and aesthetic appre-ciation, I believe that these phenomena often, thoughnot always, fall under a separate rubric and, like star-tle, may require a different conceptualization.Zajonc's Empirical Evidence:A Personal ViewWhat I find remarkable is Zajonc's insistence that Ihave provided no evidence that cognitive activity pre-cedes emotion and his simultaneous insistence thatthere is abundant evidence for the opposite propo-sition. In pressing this point in both of his articles,Zajonc offers long lists of studies pu rpor ting to suggest,if not prove, the primacy of emotion or affect, andits independence from cognition. The studies citeddo not, in my estimation, prove these points at all.I do not have the space to rebut each study. Nor canI effectively take up others' criticisms of Zajonc's ev-idence (e.g., Birnbau m, 1981; Birn baum & Mellers,1979a, 1979b; M ellers, 1981) or Zajonc's (1981) re-joinder. I must restrict myself here to general com-ments about the major themes.The essence of my position is, in fact, that atthis stage of theory, knowledge, and method, Zajonccan no more prove that a cognition is not present inany emotion, much less before it occurs, than I can

    prove it is present. Zajonc (1984) concedes this inhis statement, "Of course the question contested herecannot be fully resolved unless we have a full un-derstanding of consciousness. Such an understandingis at the moment beyond our reach" (p. 118). Thisis, incidentally, why in my earlier statement (Lazarus,1982) about the relations between emotion and cog-nition I ignored the evidence he cited in his 1980article.Zajonc and I are separated by a philosophicaldifference. This difference might allow him to answerthat, although the issue cannot yet be fully resolved,the scales of plausibility might be tipped in favor ofaffective primacy by the evidence. Zajonc could becalled a neo-positivist, whereas I am more of a con-structivist, and we differ on the role that theory playsin shaping our observations and our interpretationsof nature. There are many styles of explanation thatcan be scientifically rigorous, as Haugeland (1978)pointed out in his defense of cognitivism in psy-chology. In contrast with Zajonc, I agree with theindeterminancy stance that Tetlock and Levi (1982)adopted in their review and analysis of the cognition-motivation debate among attribution researchers.They stated,(1) Current cognitive an d motivational explanations arenot distinguishable on the basis of attributional data (i.e.,lack of conceptual disconfirmability), and (2) advocates ofcognitive and motivational explanations should devote moreeffort to clarifying ambiguities in their own theoretical po-sitions than to seeking a crucial experiment that gives adecisive advantage to either a cognitive or motivationalanalysis, (p. 70)Tetlock and Levi added the provocative commentthat "neither side is likely to 'win' the cognition-motivation debate as currently formulated" (p. 83).Although this debate is cast in terms of cognition andmotivation, it applies equally well to the relationshipbetween cognition and emotion.Although I maintain that cognition (of meaning)is a necessary precondition for emotion , this does notimply that emotions, once elicited, do not affect cog-nition. Emotions appear to be powerful influences onhow we think and interpret events. They are the resultof cognition but in turn affect cognition. The causallinkages one perceives among emotion, motivation,and cognition depend, in part, on where in an ongoingbehavior sequence one arbitrarily stops the action(Lazarus, Coyne, & Folkman, 1982).What would it take to prove that emotion isindependent of cognition and even precedes it? Zajoncwould have to show that there was not the slightesttrace of an evaluative perception or thought when anemotion occurred; conversely, I would have to showthat w henever an emotion occurred it was alwayspreceded by a cognitive appraisal process. At presentI believe that neither of these proofs is possible.

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    On the other hand, if the central question were"Does cognitive appraisal affect emotion?" rather than"Does emotion require cognitive appraisal?" therewould be abunda nt supportive evidence. My own lab-oratory in the 1960s produced a series of psycho-physiological studies using motion picture films togenerate stress reactions. These studies made a strongcase that when cognitive appraisal processes are al-tered, stress reactions (and emotions) are altered too.We had physiological as well as behavioral and/orsubjective response criteria of emotion, somethingmissing in the studies Zajonc cites. Soundtracks andorienting passages, designed to increase threat, or toencourage either denial of or psychological distancingfrom the disturbing events portrayed in the films,were used to manipulate cognitive activity. The ev-idence, fully reviewed elsewhere (e.g., Lazarus, 1968;Lazarus, Averill, & Opton, 1970), showed that howevents are appraised determines the intensity andquality of the emotions generated. Since then, nu-merous studies from other laboratories have con-firmed and expanded the case for cognitive factorsin emotion.Zajonc (1984) does not acknowledge this evi-dence when he states, "Nowhere in Lazarus's articleis there any empirical evidence to suggest that cog-nitive appraisal must precede affect" (p. 121). If theword must is deleted from the above quote, then thecase is indeed strong for concluding that when cog-nitions change, emotions change.What sort of evidence does Zajonc provide totip the scales of plausibility in demonstrating thatemotion is independent of cognition and can evenprecede it? The first line of evidence is that "Affectivereactions show phylogenetic and ontogenetic primacy"(p. 119). With respect to ontogenesis, Zajon c cites anarticle by Izard (1984) that reviews what Zajonctakes to be convincing evidence of the primacy ofemotion in infants. Nevertheless, the methodologicalas well as theoretica l state of the art in developmentalresearch make it doubtful that a good case can bemade that infants are no t capable of making cognitiveappraisals that result in emotion. Moreover, a growingnum ber of developmental psychologists (e.g., Cam pos,Cicchetti, Cowan, Hesse, Hoffman, Kagan, Lewis,Sroufe, Weiner) have either explicitly adopted the po-sition that cognitive appraisal shapes emotional pat-terns, or have supported the principle implicitly byemphasizing the early development of a differentiated(cognitive) concept of self tha t has a strong influencein human affairs. Their w ork provides the beginningsof documentation for the role of cognition in emotionfrom a developmental perspective, although to myknowledge they have not explicitly commented onwhether cognitive activity is a necessary preconditionof emotion, nor argued the case for either the sepa-ration of thought and feeling or their interdependence.

    With respect to phylogenetic primacy, the m eth-odological difficulties of evaluating cognitive activityin infrah um an animals should make us wary of ac-cepting statements about w hat animals can or cannotaccomplish cognitively. I am doubtful that any state-ment about the absence of cognitive appraisal pro-cesses in an animal, even a simple evaluative per-ception studied experimentally or in the field, couldbe made without substantial doubt.A second line of evidence in Izard's review, onwhich Zajonc draws heavily, is based on reductionisticthinking. Zajonc's brand of reductionism is to em-phasize the existence of "Separate neuroanatomicalstructures . . . for affect and cognition" (p. 119),specifically, right- and left-hemispheric control ofemotion and speech, and neural pathways that rundirectly from retina to hypothalamus. A look intosplit-brain research strongly suggests, however, thatthis is an area in which confusion still reigns, m aki ngit dangerous to pontificate about what the findingsmean for the relations between emotion and cognition.What is more, I am convinced that Zajonc has gottenhis neurop hysiology wro ng (e.g., see Davidson & Fox,1982). Research on the neurophysiological bases ofemotion, as important as it ultimately will be, doesnot now provide grounds for choosing between Za-jonc's or my views on the role of cognition, despiteZajonc's claim. No less a figure than Roger Sperry,the progenitor of split brain research, ha s recentlyoffered some relevant thoughts on the neural orga-nization of emotion and cognition that belie theirtotal separation. Sperry (1982) wrote,Unlike other aspects of cognitive functioning, emotions havenever really been readily confinable to one hemisphere.Though generated by lateralized in put, the emotional effectstend to spread rap idly to involv e both hemisphe res, ap-parently through crossed fiber systems in the undividedbrain stem. In the tests fo r self-consciousness and socialawareness, it was found that even subtle shades of emotionor semantic c onnotations generated in the right hemispherecould help the left hem isphere guess the stimulus know nonly to the right hemisphere. T he results suggested that thisaffective, connotational, or semantic component could playan important role in cognitive processing, (pp. 1225-1226)

    I remind the reader also that until very recentlyneurophysiologists believed that there could be novolitional control over the activities of visceral organs,the functioning of these organs being un der the controlof the autonomic or "involuntary" nervous system.This "knowledge" of anatomy and neurophysiologywas later to be proven wrong, or at least incomplete(see the historical review by Anchor, Beck, Sieveking,& Adkins, 1982), leading to extensive clinical workon what is today called biofecdback. Biofeedbackcontrol of visceral activity is possible because thereare num erous interconnections in the nervo us systemFebruary 1984 American Psychologist 127

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    between the nerve pathways that regulate skeletal ac-tion and visceral function.Efforts to deal with areas of confusion in psy-chological theory by reduction to anato my and phys-iology usually represent an attempt to clarify ob-scurities at one level of analysis by reference to ob-scurities at another. Rarely if ever does thislegerdemain clarify obscure mechanisms at eitherlevel. Here too one can observe the philosophicalbreach that exists between Zajonc and me. As Hauge-land (1978) stated, "A common misconception is thatreductions supplant the explanations they reducethat is, render them superfluous. This is not so" (p.217). However the connections between the psycho-logical and physiological levels of analysis are con-ceived, explanationsat each level must be both viableand independen t even before any attempt at reductionis made in an effort to achieve the dream of a unifiedscience.A third line of evidence discussed by Zajonc isthat "Appraisal and affect are often uncorrelated anddisjoint" (p. 119). One study cited in this connection(Petty & Cacioppo, 1981) demonstrates, I believe, acasual and selective approach to research findings.Zajonc writes, "If cognitive appraisal is a necessarydeterminant of affect, then chan ging appraisal shouldresult in a change of affect. This is most frequentlynot so, and persuasion is one of the weakest methodsof attitude change" (p. 120). Now really! The entireline of psychophysiological research from my labo-ratory I cited earlier demonstrated via multiple meth-ods of manipulation and observation that soundtracksplayed along with a movie, and even presented priorto its viewing, could drastically alter the film's emo-tional impact. Further, if the failure of persuasion isat all relevant to this argum ent, it tells us only thatit may not always be easy to alter how people thin kabout themselves and the world they live in, whichis precisely why psychotherapy is such a difficult art.Zajonc's positivist philosophical bent is reflected, in-cidentally, in his equation of persuasion with thestimulus designed to produce change.A fourth line of evidence is presented to supportthe claim that "New affective reactions can be estab-lished without an apparent participation of appraisal"(p. 120), and a motley collection of studies is offeredto support it. One of these is an interesting study oftaste aversion to food (the conditioned stimulus) whichwas established even when nausea (the conditionedresponse) had been delayed and then obliterated byanaesthesia; presumably the animal was unconsciouswhen the association between the food and the nauseawas established. Zajonc states that "It is highly un-likely that any sort of appraisal process, even un-conscious, could have been involved when the an-imal rejected the CS food following conditioning"(p. 120). Even if one accepts the questionab le premise

    that nausea is an emotion, unlikelihood is hardlyproof, and even the claim of unlikelihood is ques-tionable, especially when the conclusion is based onthe uncertain effects of drugs. Total unconsciousnessand subclinical nausea before consciousness set in(e.g., during the so-called delay of nausea) cannot beruled out, as Zajonc implies. Drug effects always posegreat problems for interpretation because of the manyunintended neurochemical events that take placealong with the target effects. This and other studiescited by Z ajonc do not at all eliminate the possibilitythat cognitive activity was involved in each case ofan emotional response.ConclusionsThe idea that emotion and cognition are independenthas a long history and is presently maintained byhighly respected theorists such as Tomkins (1981,1982). If one could reasonably argue for their inde-pendence, whether on physiological or behavioralgrounds, then it follows logically that there could alsobe affective primacy. However, that independence canbe argued logically does not make it the best theory.For the way emotion is commonly experienced, I thinkthat approaches emphasizing the neurophysiologicaland psychological separation of emotion and cognitionare less fruitful than the cognitive theory I and manyothers espouse. The evidence is strong that emotionsare highly sensitive to changes in the person-envi-ronment relationship and the way these changes areappraised. The fun dame nta l task of a cognitively ori-ented theory of emotion is to propose how this works.Ironically, the proposition that cognitive appraisal isa necessary condition of emotion is more parsimo-nious than the one Zajonc argues. I see no reason atthis writing to accept the more complex system ofthoughtunspecified as to causal conditionsthatsometimes cognition is causal and sometimes not.The relational and meaning-centered view I es-pouse has many other virtues. For example, it helpsus understand and predict (see Folkman & Lazarus,in press) the tremendous inter- and intraindividualvariation observed in the intensity and quality of ex-perienced emotions, the rapid flux of emotion andits responsiveness to feedback, the powerful socialand cultural influences on emotion, and its ontoge-netic as well as phylogenetic aspects. In the case ofontogenesis, for example, research can delineate thechild's changing grasp of social meanings to identifythe patterns of cognitive appraisal that underlie diverseemotions in a social encounter. Such research wouldnot be generated by a view of emotions as independentof cognition.Polemics aside, the major task of those who adopta relational view of emotion is to develop more precisetheory about the conditions underlying diverse emo-

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    tion qualities and intensities and their flux. Cognitiveformulations should specify how various personalagendas, such as values, goals, and commitments, aswell as beliefs or expectations about oneself and theworld, shape cognitive appraisal over the life spanand, in so doing, affect the propensity to experiencecertain emotions in particular environmental con-texts. Attention might be directed at anticipatoryemotions such as those involved in threat and chal-lenge appraisals (e.g., uneasiness and eagerness), aswell as outcome emotions that follow encounters thathave harmed or benefited the person (e.g., disap-pointment or relief). A growing number of scholarsare now struggling with this kind of theoretical pro-gram. If emerging cognitive theories are promulgatedwith sufficient precision and detail, we will be in agood position eventually to predict emotional reac-tions from the circumstances people face in their dailyencounters of living.REFERENCESAnchor, K. N., Beck, S. E., Sieveking, N., & Adkins, J. (1982). Ahistory of clinical biofeedback. American Journal of ClinicalBiofeedback, 5, 3-16.Arnheim, R. (1958). Emotion and feeling in psychology and art.Confina Psychiatrica, 1, 69-88.Birnbaum, M. H. (1981). Thinking an d feeling: A skeptical review.

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