1.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 8391               November 23, 2010[Formerly CBD Case No. 06-1631]

MANUEL C. YUHICO, Complainant, vs.ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Complaint1 dated January 10, 2006 for disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez (Gutierrez) filed by Manuel C. Yuhico (Yuhico) for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Complainant Yuhico alleged that he met Gutierrez at the Office of the City Prosecutor in Pasig City on May 4, 2005. Yuhico was there to testify at the preliminary investigation of a Complaint for Estafa against one Jose S. Chicharro, who was then being represented by Gutierrez. He claimed that they eventually became acquainted as they frequently saw each other during the hearings of the case.

On June 24, 2005, Yuhico averred that Gutierrez phoned him and asked for a cash loan of P30,000.00. Gutierrez then claimed that he needed money to pay for the medical expenses of his mother who was seriously ill. Yuhico immediately handed the money. In turn, Gutierrez promised to pay the loan very soon, since he was expecting to collect his attorney's fees from a Japanese client.

On June 28, 2005, Gutierrez again asked Yuhico for a loan, this time in the amount of P60,000.00, allegedly to pay the medical expenses of his wife who was also hospitalized. Again, Yuhico readily issued to Atty. Gutierrez an Equitable PCI Bank check amounting to P60,000.00.2 Again, Gutierrez promised to pay his two loans totalling toP90,000.00 "within a short time."

On July 12, 2005, Yuhico asked Gutierrez to pay his loans. Atty. Gutierrez failed to pay. In a text message on July 12, 2005 at 2:47 p.m., Atty. Gutierrez stated:

I really don't know how to say this as I don't want to think that I may be taking advantage of our friendship. You see i've long expected as substantial attorney's fees since last week from my client Ogami from japan. It's more or less more than 5m and its release is delayed due to tax and the law on money laundering. From my estimate it wud be collected by me on or b4 august 5. N the meantime I am quite in a financial difficulty as everyone is.

Later, Yuhico alleged that Gutierrez attempted to borrow money from him again. He said Gutierrez claimed that his daughter needed P70,000.00 to pay the fees required to take the licensure examination in the U.S. Medical Board. Gutierrez assured him that he will pay all his debts on or before August 10, 2005. In his text message on July 12, 2005 at 3:05 p.m., Atty. Gutierrez said:

As you are aware of these past few days were really great trials 4 me. My mother died, my wife got sick and now my bro in law died. These events led me to struggling finances. To get me going I tried to sel my car but my buyer backed out. Now my immediate problem is the amt of 70thousand which my daughter needs for her payment sa US medical board. I dnt want her to miss this opportunity. Can u help me again? I will pay all my debts on or b4 Aug.10 pls. Thanks.

However, this time, Yuhico refused to lend Gutierrez any amount of money. Instead, he demanded from Gutierrez the payment of his debts. Gutierrez then sent another text message to Yuhico on July 12, 2005 and requested him to give him another week to pay his debts. Gutierrez failed to make the payment.

Yuhico repeatedly requested the payment of loans from Gutierrez from August to December 2005. Gutierrez, on the other hand, for numerous times promised to pay, but always failed to do so. At one point, Gutierrez even asked Yuhico's account number and promised to deposit his payment there, but he never deposited the payment.

On December 5, 2005, Yuhico's counsel sent a demand letter3 to Gutierrez to pay his debts, but to no avail.

Thus, Yuhico filed the instant complaint against Gutierrez before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).

On January 12, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed Gutierrez to submit his Answer on the complaint against him.4

In his Answer,5 Gutierrez claimed that Yuhico was the one who offered to lend him money in gratitude for the assistance he extended to the latter when he was under threat by his clients. He, however, admitted that he accepted the loan due to compelling circumstances. Gutierrez added that he has no intention of evading his obligation to pay his debts, but he is currently in financial distress, thus, he cannot pay his debts yet. He claimed he will pay his debts when his financial condition improves.

On March 24, 2006, both parties were directed to appear at the mandatory conference before the IBP-CBD. Gutierrez failed to attend on two occasions.

On June 9, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed both parties to submit their respective position papers.

Likewise, during the clarificatory hearing before the IBP-CBD, only the complainant's counsel attended. There was no appearance on the part of Gutierrez.

In his Position Paper, Yuhico manifested that the Supreme Court, in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez,6 had already disbarred Gutierrez from the practice of law for gross misconduct, in view of his failure to pay his debts and his issuance of worthless checks.

Subsequently, in a Resolution dated December 11, 2008, the, IBP-CBD found Gutierrez guilty of non-payment of just debts and ordered him to return the amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00) to Yuhico, with interest until full payment.

In view of the previous disbarment of Gutierrez, the IBP-CBD recommended to the Court that, instead of rendering the instant case moot, Gutierrez should be disbarred anew effective upon the expiration of the sanction pursuant to the March 26, 2004 Supreme Court Decision. The IBP-CBD explained that while we do not have jurisprudence on the issue of double or multiple disbarment, the American jurisprudence, however, recognizes double or multiple disbarments as well as the minimum requirement of five (5) years for readmission to the Bar.

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649, resolved to adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve it with modification as to the payment of the amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00), this time, without interest.

We sustain the findings of the IBP, but with modification as to its recommendations.

We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.7

In the instant case, there is no question as to Gutierrez's guilt. His admission of the loan he contracted and his failure to pay the same leaves no room for interpretation. Neither can he justify his act of non-payment of debt by his dire financial condition. Gutierrez should not have contracted loans which are beyond his financial capacity to pay.1avvphi1

Likewise, we cannot overlook Gutierrez's propensity of employing deceit and misrepresentations for the purpose of obtaining debts without the intention of paying them. Records show Gutierrez's pattern of habitually making promises of paying his debts, yet repeatedly failing to deliver. The series of text messages he sent to Yuhico promising to pay his loans, while simultaneously giving excuses without actually making good of his promises, is clearly reprehensible. Undoubtedly, his acts demonstrate lack of moral character to satisfy the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court.

We also note that in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez,8 the Court had already disbarred Gutierrez from the practice of law for gross misconduct due to non-payment of just debts and issuance of bouncing checks.

In view of the foregoing, while we agree with the findings of the IBP, we cannot, however, adopt its recommendation to disbar Gutierrez for the second time, considering that Gutierrez had already been previously disbarred. Indeed, as the IBP pointed out, we do not have double or multiple disbarment in our laws or jurisprudence. Neither do we have a law mandating a minimum 5-year requirement for readmission, as cited by the IBP. Thus, while Gutierrez's infraction calls for the penalty of disbarment, we cannot disbar him anew.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649 dated December 11, 2008, of the IBP, which found FRED L. GUTIERREZ guilty of GROSS MISCONDUCT, is AFFIRMED. He is ORDERED to

PAY the amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00) to the complainant immediately from receipt of this decision with interest.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished and properly recorded in the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal record of Gutierrez; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator, for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

This Decision shall be immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

2.

              THIRD DIVISION 

 JUDGE RENATO A. FUENTES,        A.M. No. P-10-2791REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,              (formerly A.M. No. 10-3-91-RTC)BRANCH  17, DAVAO CITY,                             Complainant,                 Present:                                                                                                                          

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

                                                                    BRION,                         - versus -                                           BERSAMIN,                                                                    VILLARAMA, JR., and                                                                    SERENO, JJ.                                                                 ATTY. ROGELIO F. FABRO,                Promulgated:BRANCH CLERK OF COURT,SAME COURT,                             Respondent.                                      April 6, 2011x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x   

D E CI S I O N 

BRION, J.:

 

For the Court’s resolution is the letter-

complaint[1] dated July 17, 2009 of Judge Renato A. Fuentes

(Judge Fuentes), Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region,

Branch 17, Davao City, addressed to the Office of the Court

Administrator (OCA). Judge Fuentes charged Branch Clerk of

Court      Atty. Rogelio F. Fabro (Atty. Fabro) and Civil Records In-

Charge Ofelia Salazar (Salazar) with gross negligence of

duty.  This was the second letter of Judge Fuentes to the OCA on

Atty. Fabro and Salazar.

 

 

Background Facts

 

On May 19, 2009, Judge Fuentes wrote the OCA to report

the negligence committed by Atty. Fabro and Salazar in not

elevating to the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City (CA) for

more than six (6) years the records of Civil Case No. 29,537-2003,

entitled Teodoro Polinar, et al. v. Hon. Antonio D. Laolao.  

 

In his second letter to the OCA, Judge Fuentes again

reported the negligence of Atty. Fabro and Salazar for failing to

elevate to the CA the records of Civil Case No. 29,019-2002,

entitled Medardo E. Escarda v. Celso E. Escarda and the Register

of Deeds of Davao City.  Judge Fuentes claimed that he approved

Medardo Escarda’s Notice of Appeal in his April 10, 2007 Order

and directed the Branch Clerk of Court to elevate the entire

records to the CA.   Apparently, the records were not elevated

because Medardo Escarda’s counsel, Atty. Santos E. Torreña, Jr.,

wrote Judge Fuentes on July 14, 2009[2]  to inquire if their appeal

and records have been forwarded to the CA.  Atty. Torreña

enclosed a CA letter[3] stating that “[t]here is no showing that the

case was elevated on appeal to this Court as per verification from

the records and list of cases from 2007 until the present time.” 

 

In his second letter to the OCA, Judge Fuentes related

that: 

What is alarming in this second discovery, however, is the record consisting of the Notice of Appeal and the Order, elevating the case to the Honorable Court of Appeals, along with the other documents, such as Decision of the Court, Motion for Reconsideration and Order of denial, were not attached in the main record, consisting of pleadings

and transcript of stenographic notes but after exerting pressure on the Civil Records In-Charge, to look for the remaining portion of the records, she turned-over the remaining records, after one week, but was observed by the undersigned, purposely separated, so that the compliance of the Order to elevate the entire records to the Appellate Court, can be justified by her and the Branch Clerk of Court.

 

The OCA required Atty. Fabro to comment on Judge

Fuentes’ letter.  Atty. Fabro filed his comment on August 8,

2009[4]. He averred that the records of Civil Case No. 29,537-

2003 have been elevated to the CA and that Salazar admitted that

it was her own fault and that she found that the record, “already

bounded for transmittal to the Court of Appeals, was indeed mixed

up with the files of old cases transferred to the other store room”

at a time when the staff of the RTC Branch 17 was decongesting

the office store room to give way to newly filed cases.  He also

mentioned that his office was a very busy one, that he had his

own duties, and that he could not “at all times” spend his time

supervising  subordinate employees to ensure their performance

of their normal duties without prejudice to his own duties and

responsibilities.

 

On March 2, 2010, the OCA submitted a report and

recommendation[5] that: (1) the case be re-docketed as a regular

administrative matter; and      (2) Atty. Fabro be fined P5,000.00

for the delay in transmitting the records of two cases to the CA,

with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the

future shall be dealt with more severely.

 

The OCA Report stated that although the records of the

cases have already been transmitted to the CA, the OCA cannot

tolerate the long delay in transmission nor give credence to Atty.

Fabro’s reasons for the delay. The OCA stressed that the

administrative functions of the Branch Clerk of Court are vital to

the prompt and proper administration of justice and that the timely

transmittal to the appellate court of the records of appealed cases

ensures the speedy disposition of cases;  any delay in the

transmission of the case records would hamper the proper

administration of justice.  The OCA added that it has been held

that the failure of the clerk of court to transmit the records of the

case constitutes negligence and warrants disciplinary action. 

 

The Court's Ruling

 

We agree with the OCA finding that Atty. Fabro was guilty

of gross negligence of duty for being remiss in his duty to transmit

to the CA the records of Civil Case Nos. 29,537-2003 and 29,019-

2002 within the required period.   The Rules of Court in Section 10

of Rule 41[6] provides that within thirty (30) days after the

perfection of appeal, the clerk of court of the lower court has the

duty to transmit the records to the appellate court. Judge Fuentes

gave due course to the appeals but the records were not

transmitted to the CA within the 30-day period provided in the

Rules. 

 

The records of Civil Case No. 29,019-2002 (Medardo E.

Escarda v. Celso E. Escarda) were mailed on August 15,

2009[7] or two (2) years after the issuance of the Order directing

their transmittal to the CA (April 10, 2007).  The records of Civil

Case No. 29,537-2003 (Teodoro Polinar, et al. vs. Hon. Antonio D.

Laolao) were transmitted only after more than six (6) years as

claimed by Judge Fuentes. Clearly, Atty. Fabro as the clerk of

court of the lower court, was grossly remiss in his duty.  We agree

with the OCA recommendation of imposing a fine with warning on

Atty. Fabro. We hold, however, that the fine should be increased

to Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) considering the number

of incidents of delay and the considerable time involved.

 

WHEREFORE, we find Atty. Rogelio F. Fabro, Branch

Clerk of Court, RTC Branch 17, Davao City, GUILTY of gross

negligence of duty for the delay in transmitting to the Court of

Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City, the records of Civil Case No.

29,019-2002, entitled Medardo E. Escarda v. Celso E. Escarda,

and Civil Case No. 29,537-2003, entitled Teodoro Polinar, et al. v.

Hon. Antonio D. Laolao.  We hereby impose on him a FINE of

Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) with a WARNING that a

repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more

severely. 

 

The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to inform

the Court of the action taken against Civil Records In-Charge

Ofelia Salazar.

 

SO ORDERED.

3.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-09-1737               February 9, 2011

LYDELLE L. CONQUILLA, Complainant, vs.JUDGE LAURO G. BERNARDO, Municipal Trial Court, Bocaue, Bulacan Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is an administrative complaint for usurpation of authority, grave misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law filed by Lydelle L. Conquilla (complainant) against Judge Lauro G. Bernardo (respondent judge), Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bocaue, Bulacan.

The Facts

In a verified complaint dated 30 July 2008, complainant Conquilla charged respondent judge with usurpation of authority, grave misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law.

Complainant alleged that on 4 July 2008, a criminal complaint for direct assault was filed against her before the MTC of Bocaue, Bulacan. The complaint was signed by Police Chief Inspector Rizalino Andaya of the Bocaue Police Station.

On 8 July 2008, respondent judge conducted a preliminary investigation and found probable cause to hold the complainant for trial for the crime of direct assault. Respondent judge then issued a warrant of arrest dated 8 July 2008, with the bail fixed at P12,000.

On 10 July 2008, upon motion of complainant, respondent judge issued an order reducing the bail for complainant’s provisional liberty to P6,000. On the same date, complainant posted cash bail of P6,000 for her provisional liberty.

Complainant then filed an administrative complaint, alleging that under A.M. No. 05-08-[2]6-SC, first level court judges no longer have the authority to conduct preliminary investigations. Thus, complainant avers that respondent judge committed an illegal act constituting gross ignorance of the law and procedure when he conducted the preliminary investigation and issued the warrant of arrest. Complainant claims that the hasty issuance of the warrant of arrest was without legal basis and unjustly prejudiced complainant and deprived her of her liberty. Complainant submits that respondent judge usurped the power of the prosecutor, who was not even given the chance to comment on complainant’s Motion to Reduce Bail. Furthermore, complainant alleges that when she learned about the warrant of arrest, she called respondent judge’s wife, who said "she would help in having the bail reduced to P6,000.00 and would have the case for direct assault against herein complainant dismissed provided herein complainant cancel the wife’s debt of P35,000.00 and provided that herein complainant loan the wife an additional amount of P50,000.00."1

In his Comment, respondent judge states that he issued the warrant of arrest in good faith because he was convinced that there was probable cause and that it was necessary to place the complainant under immediate custody to prevent a frustration of justice. Although respondent judge knew that the Supreme Court already amended Rules 112 and 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure by removing the conduct of the preliminary investigation from judges of first level courts, he argues that the power to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of a warrant of arrest cannot be revoked. Besides, even if such power to determine probable cause was indeed revoked by the amendment, respondent judge submits that technical rules can be relaxed if their implementation will result in injustice.

Respondent judge further states that he did not usurp the power of the prosecutor when he reduced the bail considering that under Section 20 of Rule 114, the court may increase or decrease the bail upon good cause.

Lastly, respondent judge denies any knowledge of the alleged conversation and transaction between complainant and his wife.

The OCA’s Report and Recommendation

In its Report dated 12 February 2009, the OCA found respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law for his patent and unjustified violation of the provisions of the Resolution in A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC. The OCA stated that the Resolution in A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC, which took effect on 3 October 2005, removed the conduct of investigation from the scope of authority of first level courts

judges. Had respondent judge been more prudent in understanding the pertinent provisions of the Resolution in A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC, which are very clear and concise, no administrative complaint would have been filed against him.

The OCA, however, found the charge of usurpation of authority without merit. The OCA agreed with respondent judge that the power to determine the amount of bail is vested in the judge.

The OCA recommended (a) that the administrative complaint against respondent judge be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; and (b) that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P20,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

The Ruling of the Court

In this case, respondent judge makes it appear that he merely conducted a preliminary examination for the purpose of determining whether probable cause exists to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. However, the records of the case clearly show that respondent judge indeed conducted a preliminary investigation on 8 July 2008. After finding probable cause to hold complainant for trial for the crime of direct assault, respondent judge then issued a warrant for her arrest. That respondent judge conducted a preliminary investigation and not just a preliminary examination to determine existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is evident in his Order dated 8 July 2008, which reads:

ORDER

The undersigned, after personal examination of the witnesses in writing and under oath, finds that a probable cause exists and there is sufficient ground to hold the accused LYDELLE L. CONQUILLA for trial for the crime of DIRECT ASSAULT as charged in the complaint. In order not to frustrate the ends of justice, there is a need to place the accused in immediate custody. Let warrant immediately issue for his [sic] arrest hereby fixing bail in the amount of P12,000.00 for his provisional liberty.2

SO ORDERED.

Bocaue, Bulacan, July 8, 2008.

(signed)HON. LAURO G. BERNARDOJudge

Furthermore, after complainant posted bail on 10 July 2008, respondent judge then issued an Order dated 10 July 2008, ordering the complainant’s release and setting the case for her arraignment on 3 September 2008.

The conduct of preliminary investigation by respondent judge was in direct contravention of A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC, which took effect on 3 October 2005, amending Rules 112 and 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure by removing the conduct of preliminary investigation from judges of the first level courts. Thus, under Section 2 of Rule 112, only the following officers are authorized to conduct preliminary investigations: (a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants; (b) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and (c) Other officers as may be authorized by law. Furthermore, Section 5 of Rule 112 provides:

SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. ‒

(a) By the Regional Trial Court. ‒ Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on records clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.

(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. ‒ When required pursuant to the second paragraph of section 1 of this Rule, the preliminary investigation of cases falling under the original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Court SHALL be conducted by the prosecutor. The procedure for the issuance of a warrant of arrest by the judge shall be governed by paragraph (a) of this section. (Emphasis supplied.)

Clearly, MTC judges are no longer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation.

In this case, the crime charged against complainant was direct assault against a public school teacher, who is a person in authority under Article 1523 of the Revised Penal Code.4 Under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, when the assault is

committed against a person in authority while engaged in the performance of his official duties or on the occasion of such performance, the imposable penalty is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. The duration of the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods is 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years. Thus, the offense charged against complainant requires the conduct of preliminary investigation as provided under Section 1 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SECTION 1. Preliminary investigation defined; when required. ‒ Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.

Except as provided in Section 6 of this Rule, a preliminary investigation is required to be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and (1) day without regard to the fine. (Emphasis supplied.)

It was therefore incumbent upon respondent judge to forward the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for preliminary investigation, instead of conducting the preliminary investigation himself.

Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. Indeed, competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.5 Section 3, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct6 requires judges to maintain and enhance their knowledge and skills to properly perform their judicial functions, thus:

SEC. 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge, skills and personal qualities for the proper performance of judicial duties, taking advantage for this purpose of the training and other facilities which should be made available, under judicial control, to judges.

When a law or a rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law. Anything less is gross ignorance of the law.7 Judges should exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules,8and should be diligent in keeping abreast with developments in law and jurisprudence.9

On the alleged promise of respondent judge’s wife that the bail would be reduced provided her P35,000 debt will be cancelled and that complainant grant respondent judge’s wife an additional

loan, we find that complainant did not substantiate her allegation. Nevertheless, the Court notes that although respondent judge denies knowledge of such transaction between his wife and complainant, respondent judge did not categorically deny his wife’s debt to complainant. In his Comment, respondent judge states: "Assuming arguendo that there really was a loan made by his wife, he did not know of such transaction between his wife and the complainant and given this, he did not allow such transaction to take place."10

Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct stresses the importance of propriety and the appearance of propriety to the performance of all the activities of a judge. Respondent judge should bear in mind that judges should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.11 Furthermore, judges and members of their families are prohibited from asking for or accepting any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him in connection with the performance of judicial duties.12

On respondent judge’s issuance of the warrant of arrest and reduction of the amount of bail, we find such acts void for want of jurisdiction. While Rule 114 of the Rules of Court allows a judge to grant bail in bailable offenses and to increase or decrease bail, it assumes that the judge has jurisdiction over the case. In this case, respondent judge conducted the preliminary investigation without authority and issued the warrant of arrest. Thus, these acts are void for want of jurisdiction. The reduction of bail is also void because in the first place, respondent judge had no jurisdiction over the case itself.

The Court notes that this is respondent judge’s third offense. In 2003, the Court found respondent judge administratively liable for undue delay in rendering decisions and fined him P19,000, with a stern warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely.131avvphi1

More importantly, in the 2008 case of Santos v. Bernardo,14 the Court found respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and basic rules of procedure and fined him P20,000, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.15 The Court found no merit in respondent judge’s supposition that grave coercion is an offense not subject to preliminary investigation. The Court, however, emphasized that when the complaint was filed on 3 January 2006, respondent judge no longer had authority to conduct preliminary investigation by virtue of A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC. Thus, the Court held that respondent judge should have referred the complaint to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor instead of issuing the subpoena directing complainants to appear before the Court.

Under Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge, for which the imposable penalty is any of the following:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporation: Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.16

Considering that this is respondent judge’s third offense, the second of which was also for gross ignorance of the law, we hold that the penalty of six (6) months suspension from office without salary and other benefits is in order.17

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Lauro G. Bernardo GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law andSUSPEND him from office for a period of six (6) months without salary and other benefits, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

4.

EN BANC

 JUDGE NAPOLEON E. INOTURAN,    A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362Regional Trial Court, Branch 133,             (formerly A.M. No. 01-2-49-RTC)Makati City,                                                        

Present:           CORON

A, C.J.,                                                                             CARPIO,                                                                            *CARPIO MORALES,                                                                             VELASCO, JR.,                                                                             NACHURA,                        - versus -                                             **LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,                                                                             BRION,                                                                             PERALTA,                                                                             BERSAMIN,                                                                             DEL CASTILLO,                                                                             ABAD,                                                                             VILLARAMA, JR.,                                                                             PEREZ,                                                                             MENDOZA, and                                                                             SERENO, JJ.JUDGE MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR.,Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Valladolid,           Promulgated:San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental,                             Respondent.                                      February 22, 2011x--------------------------------------------------x SANCHO E. GUINANAO,                            A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785                                        Complainant,                      (formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-1945-MTJ)                     -  versus  -  JUDGE MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR.,Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Valladolid,San Enrique-Pulupandan, NegrosOccidental,                                       Respondent.                                     

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D E C I S I O N

 

PER CURIAM:

 

Before us are two (2) consolidated cases filed against

Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr. as the Presiding Judge of the

Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Valladolid, San Enrique-

Pulupandan, Negros Occidental. The first case involves the failure

of Judge Limsiaco to comply with the directives of the Court.  The

second case involves the failure of Judge Limsiaco to decide a

case within the 90-day reglementary period.

 

A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362

 

          On September 25, 1998, a complaint was filed against

Judge Limsiaco for his issuance of a Release Order in favor of an

accused in a criminal case before him.[1]  After considering the

evidence, we then found Judge Limsiaco guilty of ignorance of the

law and procedure and of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct.

In the decretal portion of our May 6, 2005 Decision, we ruled:

             WHEREFORE, Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr. is found GUILTY of ignorance of the law and procedure and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is hereby ordered to pay a FINE in the amount of Forty Thousand pesos (P40,000.00) upon notice, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infractions will be dealt with more severely.             Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to explain, within ten (10) days from notice, why he should not be administratively charged for approving the applications for bail of the accused

and ordering their release in the following Criminal Cases filed with other courts: Criminal Cases Nos. 1331,1342,1362,1366 and 1368 filed with the RTC, Branch 59, San Carlos City; 67322, 69055-69058 filed with the MTCC, Branch 3, Bacolod City; 67192-67193 filed with the MTCC, Branch 4, Bacolod City; 72866 filed with the MTCC, Branch 5, Bacolod City; 70249, 82897 to 82903, 831542, 83260 to 83268 filed with the MTCC, Branch 6, Bacolod City; and 95-17340 filed with the RTC, Branch 50, Bacolod City, as reported by Executive Judge Edgardo G. Garvilles.             SO ORDERED. 

Judge Limsiaco twice moved for an extension of time to file

a motion for reconsideration of the above decision and to comply

with the Court’s directive requiring him to submit an explanation.

Despite the extension of time given however, Judge Limsiaco

failed to file his motion for reconsideration and the required

explanation.

 

          In the Resolution dated January 24, 2006, we issued a

show cause resolution for contempt and required Judge Limsiaco

to explain his failure to comply with the Decision dated May 6,

2005. In the Resolution dated December 12, 2006, after noting the

failure of Judge Limsiaco to comply with the Resolution

dated January 24, 2006, we resolved to impose a fine in the

amount of P1,000.00 against Judge Limsiaco and to reiterate our

earlier directive for him to file an explanation to the show cause

resolution. 

 

          On February 1, 2007, Judge Limsiaco filed a Manifestation

and Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File

Explanation wherein he apologized to the Court and paid

the P1,000.00 fine. He cited poor health as the reason for his

failure to comply with the Resolution dated January 24,

2006.  On February 6, 2007, we resolved to grant the motion for

extension filed by Judge Limsiaco and gave him ten (10) days

from January 15, 2007 within which to file his explanation.  

 

Despite the grant of the extension of time, no explanation

for the show cause resolution was ever filed. Per Resolution

dated December 15, 2009, we again required Judge Limsiaco to

comply with the show cause resolution within ten (10) days from

receipt under pain of imposing a stiffer penalty. Verification made

from the postmaster showed that a copy of the December 15,

2009 Resolution was received by Judge Limsiaco on February 1,

2010.

 

          In addition, a Report (as of August 31, 2010) from the

Documentation Division, Office of the Court Administrator

(OCA) showed that the directives in our Decision dated May 6,

2005 have not been complied with by Judge Limsiaco. 

 

A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785

 

On September 24, 2007, Judge Limsiaco was charged

with Delay in the Disposition of a Case by complainant Sancho E.

Guinanao, a plaintiff in an ejectment case pending before Judge

Limsiaco. Guinanao claimed that Judge Limsiaco failed to

seasonably decide the subject ejectment case which had been

submitted for resolution as early as April 25, 2005. The OCA

referred the matter to us when Judge Limsiaco failed to file his

comment to the administrative complaint. Under the pain of a

show cause order for contempt for failure to heed the OCA

directives to file a comment, Judge Limsiaco informed us that he

had already decided the case on February 4, 2008. Subsequently,

we resolved[2] to declare Judge Limsiaco in contempt and to

impose a fine of P1,000.00 for his continued failure to file the

required comment to the administrative complaint. The records

show that Judge Limsiaco paid the P1,000.00 fine but did not

submit the required comment.

 

          Per Resolution dated November 23, 2010, we ordered the

consolidation of the above cases, together with A.M. No. MTJ-09-

1734, entitled Florenda V. Tobias v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco,

Jr.,  which case was separately decided on January 19, 2011.

 The Court’s Ruling

 

We shall consider in this ruling not merely Judge

Limsiaco’s conduct in connection with the discharge of judicial

functions within his territorial jurisdiction, but also the performance

of his legal duties before this Court as a member of the bench. We

shall then take both matters into account in scrutinizing his

conduct as a judge and in determining whether proper disciplinary

measures should be imposed against him under the

circumstances.

 

A judge’s duties to the Court

 

Case law teaches us that a judge is the visible

representation of the law, and more importantly of justice; he or

she must, therefore, be the first to follow the law and weave an

example for the others to follow.[3] Interestingly, in Julianito M.

Salvador v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., etc.,[4] a case where

Judge Limsiaco was also the respondent, we already had the

occasion to impress upon him the clear import of the directives of

the Court, thus:

 For a judge to exhibit indifference to a resolution requiring him to comment on the accusations in the complaint thoroughly and substantially is gross misconduct, and may even be considered as outright disrespect for the Court. The office of the judge requires him to obey all the lawful orders of his superiors.  After all, a resolution of the Supreme Court is not a mere request and should be complied with promptly and completely. Such failure to comply accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but has likewise been considered as an utter lack of interest to remain with, if not contempt of the judicial system.

  

            We also cited in that case our ruling in Josephine C.

Martinez v. Judge Cesar N. Zoleta[5] and emphasized that

obedience to our lawful orders and directives should not be merely

selective obedience, but must be full:

 [A] resolution of the Supreme Court requiring comment on an administrative complaint against officials and employees of the judiciary should not be construed as a mere request from the Court. Nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively.Respondents in administrative complaints should comment on all accusations or allegations against them in the administrative complaints because it is their duty to preserve the integrity of the judiciary. Moreover, the Court should not and will not tolerate future indifference of respondents to administrative complaints and to resolutions requiring comment on such administrative complaints.

 

          As demonstrated by his present acts, we find it clear that

Judge Limsiaco failed to heed the above pronouncements. We

observe that in A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362, Judge Limsiaco did not

fully obey our directives. Judge Limsiaco failed to file the required

comment to our show cause resolution despite several

opportunities given to him by the Court. His disobedience was

aggravated by his insincere representations in his motions for

extension of time that he would file the required comments. 

 

The records also show Judge Limsiaco’s failure to comply

with our decision and orders. In A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362, Judge

Limsiaco failed to file his comment/answer to the charge of

irregularity pertaining to his approval of applications for bail in

several criminal cases before him. He also failed to pay

the P40,000.00 fine which we imposed by way of administrative

penalty for his gross ignorance of the law and procedure and

violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  Incidentally, in A.M.

No. MTJ-11-1785, Judge Limsiaco failed to file his comment on

the verified complaint despite several orders issued by the Court.

 

We cannot overemphasize that compliance with the rules,

directives and circulars issued by the Court is one of the foremost

duties that a judge accepts upon assumption to office. This duty is

verbalized in Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct:  SECTION 7. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial duties in order to maintain and enhance the institutional and operational independence of the Judiciary. SECTION 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in the Judiciary,

which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence. 

 

The obligation to uphold the dignity of his office and the institution

which he belongs to is also found in Canon 2 of the Code of

Judicial Conduct under Rule 2.01 which mandates a judge to

behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity

and impartiality of the judiciary.

 

Under the circumstances, the conduct exhibited by Judge

Limsiaco constitutes no less than clear acts of defiance against

the Court’s authority.  His conduct also reveals his deliberate

disrespect and indifference to the authority of the Court, shown by

his failure to heed our warnings and directives. Judge Limsiaco’s

actions further disclose his inability to accept our

instructions.  Moreover, his conduct failed to provide a good

example for other court personnel, and the public as well, in

placing significance to the Court’s directives and the importance of

complying with them.  

 

We cannot allow this type of behavior especially on a

judge. Public confidence in the judiciary can only be achieved

when the court personnel conduct themselves in a dignified

manner befitting the public office they are holding. They should

avoid conduct or any demeanor that may tarnish or diminish the

authority of the Supreme Court.  

 

Under existing jurisprudence, we have held judges

administratively liable for failing to comply with our directives and

circulars.

 

In Sinaon, Sr.,[6] we penalized a judge for his deliberate

failure to comply with our directive requiring him to file a comment.

We disciplined another judge in Noe  Cangco Zarate v. Judge

Isauro M. Balderian[7] for his refusal to comply with the Court’s

resolution requiring him to file a comment on the administrative

charge against him. In Request of Judge Eduardo F. Cartagena,

etc.,[8] we dismissed the judge for his repeated violation of a

circular of the Supreme Court. In fact, we have already

reprimanded and warned Judge Limsiaco for his failure to timely

heed the Court’s directives in Salvador.[9] 

 

A judge’s duty to his public office

 

Given the factual circumstances in A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785,

the considerable delay Judge Limsiaco incurred in deciding the

subject ejectment case has been clearly established by the

records and by his own admission. Judge Limsiaco admitted that

he decided the ejectment case only on February 4, 2008. In turn,

the records show that Judge Limsiaco did not deny Guinanao’s

claim that the ejectment case was submitted for resolution as

early as April 25, 2005. Thus, it took Judge Limsiaco more than

two (2) years to decide the subject ejectment case after it was

declared submitted for resolution.

 

The delay in deciding a case within the reglementary

period constitutes a violation of Section 5, Canon 6 of the New

Code of Judicial Conduct[10] which mandates judges to perform

all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions,

efficiently, fairly and with promptness. In line with   jurisprudence,

Judge Limsiaco is also liable for gross inefficiency for his failure to

decide a case within the reglementary period.[11] 

 

The Penalty

 

Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by

A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC dated September 11, 2001, violation of

Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars, and gross

inefficiency are categorized as less serious charges with the

following sanctions: (a) suspension from office without salary and

other benefits for not less than one or more than three months; or

(b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

[12]  

 

In determining the proper imposable penalty, we also

consider Judge Limsiaco’s work history which reflects how he

performed his judicial functions as a judge. We observed that

there are several administrative cases already decided against

Judge Limsiaco that show his inability to properly discharge his

judicial duties.

 

In Salvador,[13] we penalized Judge Limsiaco for having

been found guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision, imposing

on him a P20,000.00 fine, with a warning that a repetition of the

same or similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more

severely.

 

In Helen Gamboa-Mijares v. Judge Manuel Q.

Limsiaco, Jr.,[14] we found Judge Limsiaco guilty of gross

misconduct and imposed on him a P20,000.00 fine, with a warning

that a more severe penalty would be imposed in case of the same

of similar act in the future.

 

 In Atty. Adoniram P. Pamplona v. Judge Manuel Q.

Limsiaco, Jr.,[15] we resolved to impose a P20,000.00 fine on

Judge Limsiaco for gross ignorance of the law and procedure, with

a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense

would be dealt with more severely.  The Court also resolved in the

said case to re-docket, as a regular administrative case, the

charge for oppression and grave abuse of authority relative to

Judge Limsiaco’s handling of two criminal cases.

 

In Re: Withholding of Salary of Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco,

Jr., etc.,[16] we imposed a P5,000.00 fine, with warning, against

Judge Limsiaco for his delay in the submission of the monthly

report of cases and for twice ignoring the OCA’s directive to

explain the delay.

 

           Moreover, in the recent case of Florenda Tobias v. Judge

Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr.,[17] where Judge Limsiaco was charged

with corruption, the Court found him liable for gross

misconduct and imposed a fine in the amount of P25,000.00. 

 

Lastly, we also note the existence of two other

administrative cases filed against Judge Limsiaco that are

presently pending with the Court. The first case is Mario B.

Tapinco v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr.,[18] where Judge

Limsiaco is charged with grave misconduct, obstruction of justice,

and abuse of authority in connection with his invalid issuance of

an order for the provisional release of an accused.  The second

case entitled Unauthorized Hearings Conducted by Judge Manuel

Q. Limsiaco, Jr., MCTC, et al.,[19]  is a complaint charging Judge

Limsiaco of violating  the Court’s Administrative Circular No. 3,

dated July 14, 1978 which prohibits the conduct of hearings in

another station without any authority from the Court. 

 

          We find that his conduct as a repeat offender exhibits his

unworthiness to don the judicial robes and merits a sanction

heavier than what is provided by our rules and jurisprudence.

Under the circumstances, Judge Limsiaco should be dismissed

from the service. We, however, note that on May 17, 2009, Judge

Limsiaco has retired from judicial service. We also note that Judge

Limsiaco has not yet applied for his retirement benefits. Thus, in

lieu of the penalty of dismissal for his unethical conduct and gross

inefficiency in performing his duties as a member of the bench, we

declare all his retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits,

forfeited. Furthermore, he is barred from re-employment in any

branch or service of the government, including government-owned

and controlled corporations.

 

          WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Judge Manuel

Q. Limsiaco, Jr. administratively liable for unethical conduct and

gross inefficiency under the provisions of the New Code of Judicial

Conduct, specifically, Sections 7 and 8 of Canon 1, and Section 5

of Canon 6. For these infractions, we DECLARE all his retirement

benefits, except accrued leave credits if any, FORFEITED. He is

likewise barred from re-employment in any branch or service of

the government, including government-owned and controlled

corporations.

           SO ORDERED.

5.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. P-09-2714               December 6, 2010[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2707-P]

FERNANDO P. CHAN, Complainant, vs.JOVEN T. OLEGARIO, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a criminal complaint dated July 30, 2007 filed by Fernando P. Chan (Chan) against respondent Joven Olegario (Olegario), Process Server of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 6, Iligan City, for Estafa. The complaint was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, however, Olegario being a court employee, the instant complaint was forwarded to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for administrative disciplinary action.

The antecedent facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Complainant Chan is the owner/proprietor of XRG Hardware and Construction Supply located at Tibanga Highway, Iligan City.

On February 3, 2001, Olegario went to Chan's hardware to obtain construction materials which will be utilized for the construction of his house. He introduced himself to Chan as a court process server at the RTC of Iligan, Branch VI, and showed certain documents as proof. Olegario explained then to Chan that he was short of funds for the construction of his house and that he had applied for a loan at GSIS. He then asked Chan for construction materials and promised that he will pay his loan as soon as he received the proceeds of his GSIS loan as well as an interest of 20% per annum.

Banking on the words of Olegario and his being a government employee, Chan agreed to his request and delivered to him construction materials, to wit: (1) 10 bags of cement; (2) 10 pcs. of

Plywood; and (3) 10 pcs. of corrugated G.I. sheet. The total cost of the construction materials amounted to Four Thousand Five Hundred Ten Pesos (P4,510.00).

Three months after, Chan demanded payment from Olegario, but the latter told him that his loan has yet to be released. He promised though that he will pay his obligation with interest. His promise to pay his obligation went on and on.

Chan averred that for seven years, Olegario has not paid him even a single centavo.

On June 15, 2007, Chan sent another demand letter to Olegario to pay his obligation. Again, Olegario merely promised him that he will pay his obligation within 15 days, but he never did.

On October 16, 2007, the Court directed Olegario to submit his comment on the instant complaint against him.

In his Comment dated March 4, 2008, Olegario denied that he had been evading his obligation to pay his debts to Chan. He alleged that his wife died on February 6, 2008 after a month of fighting a massive stroke, thus, he had to attend to the needs of his wife.

Olegario likewise manifested that he attempted to tender partial payment to Chan, but the latter refused it. He asked the Court to give him more time to settle his obligation to Chan.

Subsequently, in its Memorandum dated September 23, 2009, the OCA recommended that the instant complaint be redocketed as a regular administrative complaint. It further found Olegario guilty of willful failure to pay just debt and conduct unbecoming of a court employee, thus, also recommended the imposition of a fine in the amount ofP5,000.00.

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.

The Court cannot overstress the need for circumspect and proper behavior on the part of court employees. While it may be just for an individual to incur indebtedness unrestrained by the fact that he is a public officer or employee, caution should be taken to prevent the occurrence of dubious circumstances that might inevitably impair the image of the public office. Employees of the court should always keep in mind that the court is regarded by the public with respect. Consequently, the conduct of each court personnel should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of onus and must at all times be characterized by, among other things, uprightness, propriety and decorum.1

There is no question as to the existence of the debt and its justness as Olegario himself admitted them. Likewise, Olegario's allegation of financial difficulties is not a sufficient excuse for failing to pay his debt to Chan. He claimed that he had no intention of evading his obligation, but we are unconvinced. The fact that it took more than seven years before he attempted to pay his obligation clearly negated his claim.

Moreover, we also take note that it was Olegario's pronouncement that he is a court employee which induced Chan to trust him and extend a loan to him. Thus, Olegario's non-payment of his debt for more than 7 years not only tainted his name but the court's image as well. This we will not tolerate.

Furthermore, the fact that Chan, on December 12, 2009, manifested that he is no longer interested to pursue the instant administrative case since he and Olegario have already agreed to settle their dispute amicably would not render this case moot. The withdrawal of complaints cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction nor strip it of its power to determine the veracity of the charges made and to discipline, such as the results of its investigation may warrant, an erring respondent. Administrative actions cannot depend on the will or pleasure of the complainant who may, for reasons of his own, condone what may be detestable. Neither can the Court be bound by the unilateral act of the complainant in a matter relating to its disciplinary power. The Court’s interest in the affairs of the judiciary is of paramount concern. For sure, public interest is at stake in the conduct and actuations of officials and employees of the judiciary, inasmuch as the various programs and efforts of this Court in improving the delivery of justice to the people should not be frustrated and put to naught by private arrangements between the parties as in the instant case.2

Likewise, the fact that Olegario settled his obligation with complainant during the pendency of the present complaint does not exculpate him from administrative liability. Willful failure to pay just debt amounts to conduct unbecoming a court employee.3

We cannot overlook the fact that Olegario's unethical conduct has diminished the honor and integrity of his office and stained the image of the judiciary. Certainly, to preserve decency within the judiciary, court personnel must comply with just contractual obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical standards. Like all other court personnel, Olegario is expected to be a paragon of uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in all his official conduct but also in his personal actuations, including business and commercial transactions, so as to avoid becoming his court’s albatross of infamy.4 The penalty imposed by the law is not directed at Olegario’s private life, but at his actuation unbecoming a public official.1avvphi1

WHEREFORE, the Court finds JOVEN T. OLEGARIO, Process Server, Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6, GUILTY of CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF COURT EMPLOYEE for which he is FINED in the amount ofP5,000.00 with STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.