Law and Data: Voting Technology and the LawHenry E. Brady Class of 1941 Monroe Deutsch Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley

Goals of the Voting Process:Protection of legal voting; prevention of illegal voting, Accuracy in recording peoples voting intentions,Security in counting peoples votes

Legal ConcernsFourteenth Amendment equal protection for all voters (Bush v. Gore)

Voting Rights Act of 1973 and non-discrimination against minorities

Points of Vulnerability Marking the BallotMistakes: Errors by people, Voting equipment failures or poor programming Fraud: Malicious programmingCounting the BallotsMistakes: Poor counting; ballots read twice, poor programmingFraud: False counts, ballots read twice, malicious programming

Is Paper Trail the Answer? Is Paper Trail Necessarily Verified?Does it improve accuracy: making sure that voter intent is captured?

Does it improve security: making sure that votes cannot be miscounted?

Getting Intent Wrong: Miscounted & Lost Votes From:Imperfect marks on ballots due to hanging chads, stray marks, etc.Ballot format mistakes (butterfly ballot)Voting systems Problems: Failing to record or to sense intended mark for a race (unintentional undervotes) Causing or sensing unintended multiple marks for a race (unintentional overvotes)

Persistent Question: Are Lost or Miscounted Votes

The Voters Fault or Intention?

The Voting Systems Fault or Intention?

Voter Errors

System Errors: The Butterfly Ballot

Enron Energy Traders on Voting Errors:KEVIN: So the rumors true? Theyre [expletive] takin all the money back you guys stole from those poor grandmothers in California?BOB: Yeah, Grandma Millie, man. But shes the one who couldnt figure out how to [expletive] vote on the butterfly ballot.

Types of Residual VotesResidual votes are sum of undervotes and overvotes:

Undervotesno mark on a ballot for a race

Overvotesmarks for more than one race

Presidential Residual Vote Rates for Major Voting Systems in 2000Punchcards (435 counties) 2.6%

Lever (323 counties) 1.7%Electronic (266 counties) 1.7% Optical (1018 counties) 1.4%

Are Residual Votes due to the Voter or to the Voting System?The Voter:Voters intentionally overvote or undervoteVoters make mistakes that cannot be avoided The Voting System: Voting systems fail to provide adequate feedback to check the intent of votersVoting systems are badly designed and avoidable mistakes occur

Reducing Residual Vote Rate By Changing SystemsAn ExampleCompare two adjacent counties in IllinoisOne (St. Clair) stayed with Votomatic style punch-cards from 1996 to 2000The other (Madison) changed from Votomatic style punch-cards in 1996 to Optical Scan with precinct count and with notice of overvotes in 2000

Madison CountySt. Clair County Adjacent Illinois Counties1996-2000Stayed with Votomatic Punch 1996-2000Votomatic Punch in 1996Optical Scan 2000

Madison County St. Clair County Adjacent Black Precincts in the Two Counties

Residual Vote Rate in Black Precincts Worse with Votomatic Style Punch But Same with Optical Scan

Residual Votes in Fresno County with Votomatic Punch in 1996

Residual Votes in Fresno County with Optical Scan Precinct in 2000

1996 and 2000 Side by Side

Why do Votomatic Style Punch-Cards Fail to Record Voter Intentions Accurately?

No easy feedbackHard to align punchcardHard to calibrate to work rightNo check of voter intentionNote: Other systems have some of these problems as well.

Whose Votes are Lost?Anyone using error prone voting systems

Anyone using voting systems that fail to provide feedback to check voter intent

Anyone whose personal characteristics makes it especially hard to use error prone systems that fail to provide feedback (the disabled, the elderly, those with low levels of education, etc.)

Does a Paper Trail Solve the Accuracy and Security Problems? Not with Votomatic style punchcards

Is optical scan a voter verified ballot? Is a paper trail for a DRE a voter verified ballot?