Latvia's demographic future

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Economic Growth & Population Decline – What To Do About Latvia? Edward Hugh Riga: March 2012 Edward Hugh Riga: March 2012

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Transcript of Latvia's demographic future

Page 1: Latvia's demographic future

Economic Growth & Population Decline – What To Do About Latvia?

Edward Hugh Riga: March 2012Edward Hugh Riga: March 2012

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Warning

It Is Never Too Late To do Something,

But This Is Not An Excuse For Doing Nothing.

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As We All Know, Latvia’s Population Is In Sharp Decline

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And The numbers Are Worse Than They Seem

The Econonomic Collapse Means That Thousands Of Young People

Have Been Forced To Leave, Looking For Work

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Ageing Is A Global Issue But East Europe’s Problems Are Particularly Severe

Among emerging economies, the East of Europe stands out as by

far the worst case in the short term. In 2025, more than one in five

Bulgarians will be over 65 - up from just 13 percent in 1990.

Ukraine’s population will shrink by a fifth between 2000 and 2025.

And the average Slovene will be 47.4 years old in 2025 – one of the

oldest populations in the world.

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Why Is The Problem So Severe In The East?

a) The countries went through their second demographic transition

before becoming modern developed economies

b) The shock of the ending of the USSR lead to population

movements unprecedented in Europe since WWII. Many countries

had sharp population drops.

c) The continuing wage differentials with Western Europe and the c) The continuing wage differentials with Western Europe and the

impact of the global financial crisis lead many young people to

emigrate, reducing the potential reproductive population even further.

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Second Demographic Transition

This process of rapid ageing is due to the combined impact of two factors

1) Declining fertility

Spain Total Fertility Rate

3,0

0,0

0,5

1,0

1,5

2,0

2,5

3,0

2010

2005

2000

1995

1990

1985

1980

1975

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2) Steadily Rising Life Expectancy

Spain Male Life Expectancy

(years, from birth)

6065707580

4045505560

2010

2005

2000

1995

1990

1985

1980

1975

Source: Eurostat

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1980 1995 2010

The Changing Shape Of Latvia’s Population Pyramid

2020 2035 2050

Data Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs

of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision

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Population Ageing – A Unique Historical Challenge

The economic and social implications of the ageing process are

going to be profound. According to a recent report from credit

rating agency Standard & Poor’s:

• the process is seemingly irreversible.

• No other single force is likely to shape the future of national

economic health, public finances, and policymaking over the

coming decade coming decade

Strangely, the issue receives only a fraction of the attention that has

been devoted to global climate change, even though, arguably, ageing

is a problem our social and political systems are, in principle, much

better equipped to deal with.

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As far as we are able to understand the issue at this point,

population ageing will have major economic impacts and

these can be categorised under four main headings:

i) ageing will affect the size of the working age population, and

with this the level of trend economic growth in one country after

another

ii) ageing will affect patterns of national saving and borrowing,

and with these the directions and magnitudes of global capital

flowsflows

iii) through the saving and borrowing path the process can

influence values of key assets like housing and equities

iv) through changes in the dependency ratio, ageing will influence

pressure on global sovereign debt, producing significant changes

in ranking as between developed and emerging economies.

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Life Cycle Effects

There is a generally accepted wisdom in academic work known

as the “life cycle hypothesis” (Franco Modigliani). This suggests

that the population’s financial behaviour changes depending on

age. In terms of adult life, those in their twenties and early

thirties tend to be net borrowers as they are relatively low

earners at the same time as they look to buy housing, expensive

durables and fund their burgeoning families.

At some point around middle-age this group then tends to move

from being net borrowers to net investors as they move into their

economic prime and accumulate financial assets to hopefully

fund their retirement. As they approach retirement this group

then start to shed the financial assets they’ve been accumulating

to fund their nonworking days.

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One Hypothesis - Could Something As Simple As Shifting Median

Population Age Help Us To Understand Economic Dynamics?.

Ours is an age of rapidly ageing societies.

What is so modern about our

current situation is not the ageing

itself, but its velocity, its global

extension, and the differing rates

of ageing even between countries

in the same income group

(developed economies, emerging

markets, less developed

economies etc).

Back in the 1970s the United States

had a median age closer to that of a

contemporary developing economy

like Philippines or Turkey. Even today

it is far younger than any European

country except Ireland or Iceland.

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.Median Age And The Imbalances

A country’s current account shows a non linear relationship with

median population age and the latter is also reflected in the

degree of export dependency for economic growth. This

hypothesis was first explored by the young Danish economist

Claus Vistesen. In the chart the blue line represents the path of

the current account, while the purple one represents the degree

of export dependence. Japan it will be noted has now begun to

enter the negative current account dynamic.

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.Growth Function That Looks Like An

Inverted “U”

Those countries where population momentum has slowed, even to

the point that their populations may now decline (Italy, Japan,

Germany, for example) do not seem able to achieve their former high

rates of economic growth, and, even worse, they seem to be losing

ground in per capita income terms with those economies whose

populations continue to grow reasonably rapidly.

Leaving aside all the complex and intricate details, I simply wish to Leaving aside all the complex and intricate details, I simply wish to

make one clear and central point, and that is that the relationship

between population growth and per capita income growth does not

seem to be a simple linear one, and arguably it is this property which

has thrown many previous researchers off track since in running

growth correlations to test for population impacts they have normally

tended to treat the relation as if it was.

Rapid population growth in high fertility societies simply makes the

country even poorer, but once fertility nears replacement level the

relation is reversed.

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.Running Out Of Energy?

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Per- capita Income In Higher Population

Growth Economies

.

Per-capita income levels in higher population growth developed

economies have remained relatively constant in relation to their peers

– PPSs are comparative not absolute indicators.

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.Versus Per-capita Income Growth In The Slow

Population Growth Group

While per-capita income has fallen in comparative terms in the low

population growth group. So population dynamics don’t just affect absolute

GDP numbers (more workers more GDP), they also affect living standards.

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.So We Need To Think About the Differences

Between High Median Age

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And Lower Median Age Countries.

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Many Societies – Like The Italian One - Have

Long Had Stationary Populations Ex-immigration

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But The Population Pyramids Have Been Shifting, And Will Continue To Do So

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Before The Crisis Immigration Drove The Italian

Population And The Workforce Upwards

Between 2002 and 2008 Italy

either received or legalised a

large number of migrants.

In 2008 Italian employment

fell back sharply and it has

not subsequently recovered.

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But This Was Not Reflected in Growth

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The Same Thing Happened In Spain

Population Surged With Strong Immigration

But Then The Housing Bust Sent Everything But Then The Housing Bust Sent Everything

Into Reverse Gear

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Latvia Has Similar Problems

Population has been

falling, due to low birth

rates and outward

migration.

But now the economic

crash, and the absence of

strong recovery, is

accelerating the process

as young people leave in

search of work.

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The Pedal Went To The Metal In The Vain Hope Of Stopping The Rot

Stability & Sustainability!

But This Only Created An Unsustainable Boom That Then Went Bust

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Not Just Working Age Population

Most of the literature on the impact of immigration on ageing

focuses on the impact of immigration on the labour market and

the welfare state. A drawback of this focus then is that the

impact of ageing and immigration on capital formation and

economic growth usually are ignored.

Most “overlapping generations” economic models assume that

the younger generation works, borrows to buy a house and the younger generation works, borrows to buy a house and

pays pension contributions, whereas the older generation lives

from previous saving, pension benefits and (later) dissaving.

Modern economic growth is increasingly fuelled by either

exports or domestic credit growth. The latter declines as

population median age rises, and this implies that an ageing

economy experiences a decline in economic growth.

Immigration then might help counter this decline.

Growth Is Also Involved!

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The Counter Argument

“There may be many reasons to favour increased immigration.... But

it would be wrong to advocate increased immigration as necessary to

deal with the fiscal consequences of an ageing population, or as a

means to avoid large future tax increases or benefit reductions”.

US Economist Marty Feldstein

Two Principal Points

i) immigration is not necessary to deal with the fiscal

consequences of ageing populations

ii) it is false that immigration constitutes a way of handling ageing

which enables you to do so without large tax increases or benefit

reductions since increased immigration would do little to reduce

the future fiscal burden. The increased revenue from a large rise in

immigration would finance only a small part of the coming rise in

the cost of pension and health benefits.

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My opinion - Feldstein is both right and wrong

He is right that immigration alone won’t be enough to address

the problems we face. We also need structural reforms in

labour markets to encourage higher participation rates. We

need to move away from Paygo to fully funded pension

systems.

But he surely goes too far. Migrants can help keep our welfare

systems afloat as we transit from one system to the other. They

help fill the gap of the “missing generation” of contributors.

Most migrants are in their 20s and 30s, so they will also form

homes and families, helping push the birth rate up a bit.

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Human Capital Loss Gives The Key To The Italian

Problem

• It is hard to say why Italy has fared so badly in terms of

growth, given the recent strong immigration.

• A number of factors are involved, but one that stands out

clearly in the annual brain drain out of Italy.

• Each year somewhere between 5% and 10% of Italian • Each year somewhere between 5% and 10% of Italian

university graduates leave their country, never to return.

• So some of the migration represents a “bad swop” of

highly qualified people for people with far lower education

levels.

• Reform in Italy’s “insider-outsider” labour market, and

changes making it easier for young people to start their

own businesses would be a big step forward.

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There are a number of reasons why a

“V” shaped recovery might be preferrable

to an “L” shaped one, obviously Keynes

was right that lost output is lost

permanently. But human capital loss,

and potential human capital drain is not

normally considered.

Losses Are Permanent, And Economies Path Dependent, Which Means

Deep Recessions Cast Long Shadows

During the deep depressions to which

many countries on Europe’s periphery

are being subjected, many workers

are kept idle for far too long – with an

inevitable deterioration in

accumulated human capital, but

young people also leave, and less

children are born, casting a long

shadow over the future path of

economic growth.

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Ec

TechnologyTechnology

Economic

System

Population

younger

0lder

Developed

Mature

Median Age

37

45

Reproduction

LabourCapital

A Simple Illustrative Example Of How Economies Might Work

Technology Technology

Output

Underdeveloped

Developed

20

37

Consumption Maintenance/Reproduction

Investment

ReproductionGrowth

Technology Considered To Be An Environment Which Interacts With the Economic System

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Time To Act – What Can Be Done?

Short Term:

- Continuing and Continuous Structural Reform

• More Internal Devaluation to boost exports

• Labour Market Reform

• Pension Reform

• Heath System Reform

• Immigration• Immigration

Long Term:

• Stabilising Population & Stabilising Debt

• Aid For Would-be Mothers

• Shifting Public Resources from Old to Young

• Europe Wide Institutional Changes

• More Realism In Policymaking - Acceptance That

The Modern Growth Era (Like Modernity Itself)

Doesn’t Last Forever.

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We Still Have Time

Thank You For Your Attention