Sps Dalion v. CA (1990) Petitioners: Spouses Dalion Respondents: CA and Sabesaje, Jr. Ponente: Medialdea, J. Doctrine: A contract of sale is a consensual contract, which means that the sale is perfected by mere consent. No particular form is required for its validity. Short version: (saying his signature was forged) and also says that assuming the signature was valid, sale is still invalid because it was not executed in a public document. SC says Dalions argument is wrong. In a contract of sale, no part based on a private document of absolute sale, allegedly executed by Segundo Dalion. oooevidenced by the "Escritura de Venta Absoluta.with Sabesaje to be allowed to administer the land because Dalion did not have livelihood. Sabesaje, grandfather of Sabesaje, who died in 1956. Issue: Was the contract of sale valid? Is a public document needed for transfer of ownership? Held: Yes. No. Ratio: Re: validity of the contract Re: Public document oorights over immovable property must appear in a public instrument." (NCC 1358 par. 1) oovendee may compel transfer of ownership of the object of the sale, and the vendor may require the vendee to pay the thing sold (NCC 1458corresponding formal deed of conveyance in a public document. thing. othe vendee in control and possession of the land (real) or by embodying the sale in a public instrument (constructive). Decision affirmed.

HELD:The authenticity of the signature of Dallion was proven by the testimony of several witness including the person who made the deed of sale. Dalion never presented any evidence or witness to prove his claim of forgery.

Dallions claim that the sale is invalid because it was not made in a public document is of no merit. This argument is misplaced. The provision of Art. 1358 on the necessity of a public document is only for convenience, not for validity or enforceability. It is not a requirement for the validity of a contract of sale of a parcel of land that this be embodied in a public instrument. Sale is perfected upon meeting of the minds of both parties.

Lee Tek Sheng vs. CAWednesday, June 18, 2014

Facts:

After his mothers death, petitioner Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng filed a complaint against his father (private respondent) for the partition of the conjugal properties of his parents. The private respondent alleged that the 4 parcels of land registered in petitioners name are conjugal properties. The PR contends that the lots were registered under Leoncios name only as a trustee because during the registration, Leoncio was the only Filipino in the family. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the partition case and for the reconveyance of the lots to its rightful owner the conjugal regime. To protect the interest of the conjugal regime during the pendency of the case, PR caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT 8278. Petitioner moved for the cancellation of said annotation but it was denied by RTC on the grounds that: (a) the notice was not for the purpose of molesting or harassing petitioner and (b) also to keep the property within the power of the court pending litigation. CA affirmed the decision. Hence this petition. Petitioners contention: The resolution of an incidental motion for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens was improper to thresh out the issue of ownership of the disputed lots since ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case and that it would amount to a collateral attack of his title obtained more than 28 years ago. Private respondents contention: The evidence of ownership is admissible in a partition case as this is not a probate or land registration proceedings when the courts jurisdiction is limited.

Issue: WON the annotation of a notice of lis pendens is valid.

Held: Yes.

Petitioners claim is not legally tenable. The annotation of a notice of lis pendens does not in any case amount nor can it be considered as equivalent to a collateral attack of the certificate of title for a parcel of land.

What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. Besides, the certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.

Registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used. In this case, contrary to petitioners fears, his certificate of title is not being assailed by private respondent. What the latter disputes is the formers claim of sole ownership. Thus, although petitioners certificate of title may have become incontrovertible one year after issuance, yet contrary to his argument, it does not bar private respondent from questioning his ownership.

A notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two grounds:(1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party(2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded.Neither ground for cancellation of the notice was convincingly shown to concur in this case.

It must be emphasized that the annotation of a notice of lis pendens is only for the purpose of announcing to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.

On the contention that ownership cannot be passed upon in partition case, suffice it to say that until and unless ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect partition of the property. For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens, there is nothing in the rules which requires the party seeking annotation to prove that the land belongs to him. Besides, an action for partition is one case where the annotation of a notice of lis pendens is proper.

REPUBLIC VS CA

Maria Consuelo Felisa Roxas vs Rafael Enriquez

Facts:1) Maria Consuelo applied for a titles of 4 parcels of land in 1906.2) The adjoining owners of the land were informed of such application, but no one went to question it so they were declared in default.3) The same application was published in two newspapers.4) The City of Manila questioned in court the borders of Parcel A. The Court ordered the correction but none was executed. 5) The court approved the application and Consuelo was given the titles. 6) In 1912, the City of Manila appied for the correction of the title because it covered a public road.7) It was also in 1912 the Consuelo went to court to ask for a correction of the title because there were 2 buildings which were not included in the title, although it was in the application.8) She sold the same to Masonic Temple Assoc.9) During the hearing, the heirs of Antonio Enriquez, owners of the adjoining land, appeared in court questioning the title.10) The Court granted the motions of the City of Manila and Consuelo.

ISSUE:Was the court correct in denying the opposition of the heirs of Enriquez?

HELD:1) NO notice was served to the heirs of Enriquez: Records show that the counsel of Enriquez received a notice. Even if it is denied by the party, personal notification is not a requirement of the law. Registration is a proceeding in rem and not in personam. It is the only practical way that allows the Torrens system to fulfill its purpose.

Legarda vs Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590; GR No. 8936, October 2,1915Posted by Pius Morados on November 27, 2011.entry-meta.entry-header(Land Titles and Deeds Purpose of the Torrens System of Registration)Facts: A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda and Saleeby. The said wall and the strip of land where it stands is registered in the Torrens system under the name of Legarda in 1906. Six years after the decree of registration is released in favor of Legarda,Saleeby applied for registration of his lot under the Torrens system in 1912, and the decree issued in favor of the latter included the stone wall and the strip of land where it stands.Issue: Who should be the owner of a land and its improvement which has been registered under the name of two persons?Held: For the issue involved, The Land Registration Act (Act 496) affords no remedy. However, it can be construed that where two certificates purports to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold title and will prevail.The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land.The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has entered into the Torrens system.

TIBURCIO VS PHHC

Traders Royal Bank vs. Court of Appeals, Patria Capay, et al G.R. No. 118862, Sept. 24, 1999 (315 SCRA 190)

"Torrens System""latches"

Facts:A parcel of land owned by the spouses Capay was mortgage to and subsequently extrajudicially foreclosed by Traders Royal Bank (TRB). To prevent property sale in public auction, the Capays filed a petition for preliminary injunction alleging the mortgage was void because they did not receive the proceeds of the loan. A notice of lis pendens (suit pending) was filed before the Register of Deeds with the notice recorded in the Day Book. Meanwhile, a foreclosure sale proceeded with the TRB as the sole and winning bidder. The Capays title was cancelled and a new one was entered in TRBs name without the notice of lis pendens carried over the title. The Capays filed recovery of the property and damages. Court rendered a decision declaring the mortgage was void for want of consideration and thus cancelled TRBs title and issued a new cert. of title for the Capays.

Pending its appeal before the court, TRB sold the land to Santiago who subsequently subdivided and sold to buyers who were issued title to the land. Court ruled that the subsequent buyers cannot be considered purchasers for value and in good faith since they purchase the land after it became a subject in a pending suit before the court. Although the lis pendens notice was not carried over the titles, its recording in the Day Book constitutes registering of the land and notice to all persons with adverse claim over the property. TRB was held to be in bad faith upon selling the property while knowing it is pending for litigation. The Capays were issued the cert. of title of the land in dispute while TRB is to pay damages to Capays.

Issue: Who has the better right over the land in dispute? Whether or not TRB is liable for damages

Ruling:The court ruled that a Torrens title is presumed to be valid which purpose is to avoid conflicts of title to real properties. When the subsequent buyers bought the property there was no lis pendens annotated on the title. Every person dealing with a registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the title and is not obliged to interpret what is beyond the face of the registered title. Hence the court ruled that the subsequent buyers obtained the property from a clean title in good faith and for value. On one hand, the Capays are guilty of latches. After they filed the notice for lis pendens, the same was not annotated in the TRB title. They did not take any action for 15 years to find out the status of the title upon knowing the foreclosure of the property. In consideration to the declaration of the mortgage as null and void for want of consideration, the foreclosure proceeding has no legal effect. However, in as much as the Capays remain to be the real owner of the property it has already been passed to purchasers in good faith and for value. Therefore, the property cannot be taken away to their prejudice. Thus, TRB is duty bound to pay the Capays the fair market value of the property at the time they sold it to Santiago.

Lacbayan vs. SamoyMonday, June 16, 2014

Facts:

Betty Lacbayan (petitioner) and Bayani S. Samoy (respondent) had an illicit relationship. During their relationship, they, together with three more incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services company. The company acquired five parcels of land were registered in petitioner and respondents names, ostensibly as husband and wife. When their relationship turned sour, they decided to divide the said properties and terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement. Initially, respondent agreed to petitioners proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the three other properties will go to respondent. However, when Lacbayan wanted additional demands to be included in the partition agreement, Samoy refused. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition of the said properties. Petitioners contention: She claimed that they started to live together as husband and wife in 1979 without the benefit of marriage and worked together as business partners, acquiring real properties amounting to P15,500,000.00. Respondents contention: He purchased the properties using his own personal funds. RTC and CA ruled in favor or respondent.

Issues:1.WON an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of ownership.2.Would a resolution on the issue of ownership subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral attack?

Held:

1.No.

While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. Until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties. More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful interest over the subject properties.

A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that the document involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of which is a determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely divide among themselves the subject properties.

2.No.

There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that document.

Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. Needless to say, registration does not vest ownership over a property, but may be the best evidence thereof.

Other topic:

Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating co-ownership over the subject realties.

YES. Petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition Agreement after seeing the need to amend the same to include other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist on the contents of an agreement she intentionally refused to sign.

Moreover, to follow petitioners argument would be to allow respondent not only to admit against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over the said properties.